THEODICY:

SCIENCE, BIBLE, & LAW

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What are sin and evil? Where do they come from? Why does God allow them to exist?

Second Edition

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PREFACE

In the concluding chapter of his book, **The Consequences of Ideas**, Dr. R.C. Sproul presented what he called "Gilson's Choice".

According to [Etienne] Gilson our choice today is ... between Kant and Thomas Aquinas. Gilson insists that all other positions are mere halfway houses on the road to either absolute religious agnosticism or the natural theology of Christian metaphysics.

... I am convinced that Gilson is fundamentally right. We need to reconstruct the classical synthesis by which natural theology bridges the special revelation of Scripture and the general revelation of nature. Such a reconstruction could end the war between science and theology.¹

Whether this goal of reconstructing the "classical synthesis" is laudable or not depends upon what Sproul means by this term. As he indicates here, he means for the classical synthesis to be the vehicle through which "natural theology bridges ... special revelation ... and ... general revelation". From this it's safe to surmise that Sproul means classical synthesis to be the reconciliation of these two fields of revelation. Taken by itself, and understood to exist strictly within the confines of the Christian community, this synthesis certainly appears to be laudable. If this kind of synthesis were to produce genuine peace between science and theology, meaning peace which doesn't require truth to be sacrificed, then such a synthesis could be a genuinely good thing, even if it's confined strictly to the Christian community. But if this kind of synthesis were genuine, then it would probably be something that would become extremely interesting to non-Christians as well.

Within the context of this quote, the fact that this synthesis is "classical" infers that this synthesis originally arose out of Aquinas' theology. Earlier in **The Consequences**, Sproul defined the "classical synthesis" within the context of what was one of Aquinas' most essential goals in writing theology. Aquinas' goal was to counteract the influence of the "double truth" theory of Muslim "integral Aristotelianism". The double-truth theory argued "that what is true in faith may be false in reason, what is true in philosophy may be false in theology, and what is true in religion may be false in science, and vice versa."² The Islamic scholars who were promoting integral Aristotelianism probably concocted the double-truth theory to

¹ Sproul, R.C., **The Consequences of Ideas: Understanding the Concepts that Shaped Our World**, 2000, Crossway Books, Wheaton, Illinois, p. 203.

² Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, p. 68.

accommodate Muslim political pressure.¹ Sproul characterized the double-truth theory as "intellectual schizophrenia". Given that this theory takes this whimsical approach to the truth, Sproul's characterization of it is hard to deny. It makes sense that Aquinas would dedicate his life to fighting the influences of this kind of insanity. Integral Aristotelianism's double-truth theory is essentially the opposite of Aristotelian logic's law of noncontradiction. Sproul indicated that "Thomas strove ... mightily" to fight the double-truth theory as a "threat to Christianity". Not only does the double-truth theory violate the law of noncontradiction, but this "intellectual schizophrenia [also] separates nature and grace with a vengeance". In other words, if the double-truth theory were to apply in Christendom, then this kind of "intellectual schizophrenia" would separate general revelation ("nature") from special revelation ("grace") radically, similar to the way a sword might separate the soul from the body. So while the double-truth theory can be understood to be excessive compartmentalization, murder can also be understood to be the product of excessive compartmentalization. This kind of excessive compartmentalization that systematically denies the universality of truth is obviously rampant in 21st-century society, and even in the visible Church.

It's certainly valid to distinguish general and special revelation, just as it's valid to distinguish faith from reason, philosophy from theology, and religion from science. But an arbitrary transformation of a distinction into a separation is likely to be an arbitrary distortion of the facts. If there's no good reason for a distinction to turn into a separation, and if the issue at hand is fundamental, as the relations between the special-revelation and general-revelation knowledge bases are, then the transformation from distinction to separation is an invitation to schizophrenia and perhaps even murder. While the double-truth theory says that what's true on Monday might be false on Tuesday, and what's true for one person might be false for another, intellectual sanity demands that truth is truth, no matter where or when a given issue may arise. In many respects this double-truth theory is merely a medieval version of "moral relativism".² The double-truth theory is therefore a kind of peace through compartmentalization, a sacrifice of truth for the sake of getting along. This is not true peace because it's not based on preservation of the

¹ Sproul, R.C., **Defending Your Faith: An Introduction to Apologetics**, 2003, Crossway Books, Wheaton, Illinois, pp. 79-80.

² In this preface, "moral relativism" refers to the belief that there is a complete absence of any objective moral standard, which means that ideas like "good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" are not subject to a universal standard of truth. According to moral relativism, as the term is used here, such ideas are conditioned by, and are functions of, culture and religious training, not of truth and reason. So moral relativism is inherently anti-rational.

truth, but on the suppression of it. So medieval moral relativism in the form of the double-truth theory, modern moral relativism, and the form of moral relativism that manifests as "political correctness", all appear to have this suppression of the truth in common. This excessive compartmentalization that inherently suppresses the truth is also one of the reasons Kant should be discarded. As the scientific research cited below indicates, one of the reasons Kant must be abandoned is because his radical separation of "noumenal" and "phenomenal" is not sustainable in the face of such research. Continued attachment to this arbitrary separation is a prime example of the kind of fixed false beliefs that mark this "intellectual schizophrenia". The distinction between noumenal and phenomenal may be edifying in some respects, but the separation of them is simply more excessive compartmentalization that deserves to be discarded. All this excessive compartmentalization tends to lead to "absolute religious agnosticism". Gilson and Sproul are right to claim that it deserves to be replaced with "the natural theology of Christian metaphysics", assuming that this transition to such "natural theology" doesn't entail sacrifice of the truth, doesn't entail undue harm to anyone, and doesn't entail forcing anyone to accept these ideas. So even though this transition to natural theology could be an extremely good thing, this transition is necessarily hinged upon the existence of what should be some very rigorous conditions.

The ability to cross check knowledge bases is a valuable safeguard against error and insanity. So it's necessary to conclude that such a reconstruction of the classical synthesis could be beneficial to everyone, regardless of whether one is Christian or not.¹ Just as the free sharing of information by two people can be constructive, cross checking between faith and reason knowledge bases, between philosophy and theology knowledge bases, and between religion and science knowledge bases, could all be very constructive. But whether such sharing is constructive or not depends largely upon whether it's voluntary or not. This issue of whether it's voluntary or not is the concern that explains why the thought of a reconstructed classical synthesis is scary to many people, both Christian and otherwise. In the process of reconstructing

¹ "Every discipline ... meets points of impasse in its development ... The impasse between Plato and Aristotle gave rise to a shift from metaphysical concern to the more pragmatic quest for philosophical ataraxia ... So it moved down to the great impasse, with which we are still struggling, between rationalism and empiricism which carried the casket of metaphysics to the graveyard of David Hume. Kant's synthesis, Hegel's massive philosophy of history, and the advent of process thought have been attempts to resurrect metaphysics. But metaphysics and its theological counterpart, natural theology, remain in the tomb." --- Sproul, R.C., Gerstner, John, and Lindsley, Arthur; **Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics**, 1984, Zondervan, Grand Rapids, Michigan, p. 65.

this synthesis, it's crucial to assuage that fear as part of the process. Regardless of whether people are being forced into a compartmentalization regime or into a social integration regime, such force defeats whatever beneficial purpose the regimen may have. This is not to say that Sproul and Gilson don't know this. It's to say that human governments can never be told this too much.

An inevitable aspect of developing this "natural theology" that synthesizes special revelation (the Bible) and general revelation (science and secular knowledge in general), and that bridges the apparent chasm between these two, is the introduction of some kind of natural-law theory. Aquinas' theology certainly contained such a natural-law theory. The inclusion of a natural-law theory as part of this "natural theology" is an inevitable part of this reconstruction process. That's because natural law is practically inseparable from natural theology. Is it reasonable to surmise that Gilson and Sproul are recommending a return to Aquinas' natural-law theory as part of this reconstruction of the classical synthesis? --- One big problem with returning to Aquinas' natural-law theory is the same big problem confronting the American people, and humanity in general. The problem is in discerning and protecting natural rights. Aquinas' natural-law theory was followed over the centuries by natural-law theories devised by numerous other philosophers and theologians. None, not even Aquinas', has adequately presented an argument for natural rights as a function of natural law. Any natural-law theory worthy of implementation in the 21st century must necessarily be a natural-law theory that encompasses, defines, and protects natural rights. The fact that natural-law theories have all historically failed to do that is one major explanation for why natural-law theories have fallen into such disfavor in practically every legal system in the world. Although Aquinas' theology should be heeded in many respects and on many fronts, just as Gilson and Sproul recommend, his treatment of natural rights is lacking. Nevertheless, he laid a foundation for natural theology that is still useful, and there are plenty of good reasons to build this natural-rights-honoring natural-law theory on his foundation. His foundation is the Bible read unashamedly by people who don't apologize for reasoning inductively and deductively.

Regarding this proposed synthesis of special revelation and general revelation, the absence of a rational and comprehensive treatment of natural rights should be a reasonable source of fear for practically anyone. This trepidation is especially reasonable given people who are conscious of the massive abuse of natural rights that happened almost systematically throughout the 20th century. That fear should be compounded and should be even more reasonable when one additionally considers all the blood shed over the centuries to convince human governments to recognize natural rights. The token amount of personal dignity human governments now

grant to ordinary people should not be allowed to deteriorate even further into even more democide,¹ especially in the name of "natural theology". So in spite of Gilson and Sproul's enthusiasm for the classical synthesis, there are good reasons to approach this reconstruction with some trepidation.

This caution, about this lack of a sound treatment of natural rights in the classical synthesis, should not diminish overall enthusiam for pursuit of a natural theology that bridges special revelation and general revelation. That natural-theology bridge is crucial to the health of Christ's visible Church on planet earth. The caution about natural rights is necessary because without the inclusion of a sound treatment of natural rights as an integral part of this synthesis, the synthesis should be recognized by all as incomplete, and therefore dangerous. Even so, it's important to affirm practically all of what Dr. Sproul and his theological comrades have claimed regarding the classical synthesis, the double-truth theory, classical apologetics, and many related doctrines.

Aquinas repudiated the double-truth theory, and the classical synthesis that embodied that repudiation reigned in western Christendom for about 500 years. It might be constructive to ask how that repudiation was enforced, and how it has worked out. Regardless of whether the double-truth theory was adopted or repudiated, the decision to adopt or repudiate necessarily required some kind of enforcement mechanism. The fact that practically all of western Christendom adopted Aquinas' theology meant that to whatever extent his theology had implications for human law, to that extent his theology was enforced by human government. The fact that his theology repudiated the double-truth theory necessarily implies that to whatever extent that repudiation had implications for human law, that repudiation was probably enforced through human government, *i.e.*, through the governmental monopolization of the use of force. This classical synthesis, that repudiated the double-truth theory, facilitated progress in western Christendom that did not happen in the Islamic realm. That progress was not easy. It eventually ended in the Kantian overthrow of the classical synthesis, and in societies aimed suicidally at "absolute religious agnosticism". It's reasonable to claim that this demise of the classical synthesis should be attributed to its lack of treatment of natural rights, although it's outside the scope of this preface to offer proof of this claim. Theories pertinent to natural rights have developed in more-or-less separate secular philosophies, and

¹ "Democide is a term revived and redefined by the political scientist R.J. Rummel as 'the murder of any people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder." --- URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Democide&oldid=583445 600. --- Regarding democide: R.J. Rummel, **Death by Government**, 1997, Transaction Publishers. --- URL: http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE1.HTM.

in secular jurisprudence. But this fact doesn't preclude the possibility that a new synthesis that's based on the classical synthesis could arise, wherein natural rights even arise immediately out of sound biblical exegesis.

Under the original American Constitution and Bill of Rights, there are 1st-Amendment guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances. These guarantees enable people within the scientific community to say whatever they want about their particular subject matter, and the religious community to do the same. As long as the two communities don't descend into slander, threats, fraud, or coercion, the force of law is not brought to bear against the disagreeing parties. The same *laissez faire* attitude exists, under the 1st Amendment, for disagreements between philosophers-scientists and theologians, between so-called faith-based communities and reason-based communities, and between individuals in general. So in effect, the double-truth theory exists in a *de* facto sense under the original Constitution and Bill of Rights. Because this laissez faire attitude is promoted by the organic documents of the united States, many people blame those documents for the moral relativism that is rampant in American society. Even though everything that Dr. Sproul says about the classical synthesis is absolutely true, force of law generally cannot be brought to bear to enforce the truth of the classical synthesis under these organic documents. So under the 1st Amendment, the recognition of "natural rights" trumps the classical synthesis. Contrary to the beliefs of people who blame the organic documents for this country's moral relativism, there is an extremely important distinction between excessive compartmentalization that is clearly insane, and respect for lawful jurisdictions that is crucial to respect for natural rights. The organic documents tend to favor the latter, not the former. Moral relativism is rampant in American society for reasons other than the contents of the organic documents. In fact, opinions about the law like those that appear in Judge Andrew Napolitano's **Constitution in Exile** indicate that it's reasonable to have serious doubts in the 21st century about whether the original Constitution and Bill of Rights are still in effect.¹ If they're not in effect, then there's no way it can be right to blame the organic documents for this country's moral relativism. So it appears that the suicidal pursuit of "absolute religious agnosticism" that is the true source for all this moral relativism, has led to societal rejection of both natural rights and the classical synthesis. These days, that social decay is so pervasive that one must either be genuinely isolated, or obstreperously committed to one's tiny compartment, not to see it.

¹ Napolitano, Andrew, **Constitution in Exile: How the Federal Government Has Seized Power by Rewriting the Supreme Law of the Land**, 2006, Nelson Current, Nashville, Tennessee.

By way of the fact that medieval Christendom did not have some equivalent to the 1st Amendment, it was possible for Aquinas's repudiation of the doubletruth theory to be enforced through the collaboration of church and state. So the repudiation of the double-truth theory was, in fact, enforced not only through the power of Aquinas's argumentation, but also through governmental force of arms. This way, medieval Christendom was able, at least nominally, to avoid the "intellectual schizophrenia" that was built into the double-truth theory. This commitment to the truth, expressed in Aquinas's Summa, certainly had a positive influence on truth seeking, and on the scientific enterprise. But the fact that this church-state alliance had a monopoly on the use of force also had repercussions, such as the burning of Bruno and Servetus at the stake,¹ and the house arrest of Galileo for his "heretical" writings,² to merely scratch the surface of such governmental abuse of power. Clearly, avoiding this "intellectual schizophrenia" in fact, *i.e.*, in a way that allows people freedom to question existing doctrines without violating the sanctity of the visible Church, requires that clear guidelines be built into human law that guard both such freedom and such sanctity. Such guidelines can exist through recognition of lawful jurisdictions, which should not be confused with the ignorance and compartmentalization that are necessary to moral relativism. --- When both the sanctity of human conscience and the sanctity of the visible Church are affirmed, it becomes obvious that an earnest pursuit of the reconstruction of "the classical synthesis by which natural theology bridges ... special revelation ... and ... general revelation" demands a natural theology that both affirms the classical synthesis, and protects natural rights. To some, achievement of these goals may appear to be a mission impossible, because this agenda involves delineating the boundary between

¹ Still controversial, many have accused Calvin of Servetus' "murder". But the historical facts appear to acquit Calvin. As historian Paul Henry writes, "Every age must be judged according to its prevailing laws'". --- See Wileman, William, "Calvin and Servetus", Banner of Truth, URL: http://www.banneroftruth.org/pages/articles/article_detail. php?457. --- The point is that "free speech" was more hazardous then than it has been under the 1st Amendment.

² The 1st Amendment may still be the nominal law, but as Judge Napolitano says, it is "in exile". In fact, the American ship of state is so far from safe harbor that the way could turn extremely nasty on short notice. So modern-day inquisitions, like those under Stalin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot, should be too fresh in the memory for anyone to be cavalier about democide. So it's reasonable for Christian apologists to have some fear of coercion, and to go out of their way to use language that gives no hint that they are "advocating physical force to compel agreement". Even so, it's also important to recognize that logic is inherently compelling, though never coercive in itself. --- Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; pp. 126-127.

church and state so that the classical synthesis and natural rights both receive their due. This is something that's never been done properly. But by pursuing the agenda of the classical synthesis, and giving due diligence to both special and general revelation, this mission is not impossible. Including natural rights within the ambit of the classical synthesis is absolutely crucial to the reconstruction process, and to the pursuit of Christ's kingdom on earth.

Ideally, what people need to be seeking is both the "reconstruction" of "natural theology", on one hand, and the guarantee of natural rights, on the other. Given that the target audience of the present work is the same as Sproul's **Consequences**, meaning philosophical laypeople, in these early decades of the 21st century, all the people in this audience are looking every day at "intellectual schizophrenia ... with a vengeance", along with pervasive abuse of natural rights perpetrated by secular governments gone rogue. One of the contentions of the present work is that recognition of natural rights is a natural outgrowth of the synthesis of general and special revelation.

Where to Start

Kant created "a new synthesis of rationalism and empiricism", thereby "destroying the classical synthesis Thomas Aquinas had achieved ... Many assume that Kant destroyed the traditional arguments for God's existence".¹ But as Sproul makes clear, Kant's presumed refutations of the traditional arguments for the existence of God don't really stand up to intense scrutiny, and neither does Kant's related destruction of the classical synthesis. In fact, the errors in Kant's "new synthesis" have had a profoundly negative impact on the visible Church, on civilization, and on humanity in general. Allowing Kant's errors to continue dominating society and social interactions is becoming increasingly ruinous. This is the reason it's necessary to make Gilson's choice between Aquinas and Kant. All people who value the fruits of civilization, regardless of whether they are Christian or not, American or not, or anything else or not, now face the ultimate rewards due to Kant's errors, life in a society that disregards both natural rights and truth. The ultimate destruction of civilization is not a foregone conclusion, but whether it happens or not probably depends upon decisions made by individual human beings, as secondary causes in the unfolding of God's plan for humanity.

In Dr. Sproul's re-presentation of classical apologetics, which incorporates the classical synthesis, he makes it clear that the system he's proposing starts with rational

¹ Sproul, Consequences of Ideas, p. 117.

proof of the existence of God,¹ not with dogmatic claims that God exists, and not with presuppositions about the superiority of the Bible, the superiority of the visible Church, the superiority of some sect or denomination, or the superiority of the state. Although his apologetic starts with proving the existence of God, the proofs are prefaced by establishment of epistemological standards. He states that, "We must affirm a valid epistemological starting point before we undertake an intellectual defense of the Christian faith."² So in Dr. Sproul's apologetics, it's necessary to "affirm a valid epistemological starting point" as a prelude to offering rational proofs of God's existence. Dr. Sproul offers four "epistemological premises":

- 1) the law of noncontradiction;
- 2) the law of causality;
- the basic (although not perfect) reliability of sense perception; and
- 4) the analogical use of language.

The Bible presupposes each of these premises. The first two premises are crucial features of Aristotelian logic. Aristotle did not create the laws of logic any more than Columbus created America. He discovered them, and articulated them. Such logic "is a necessary condition for science to even be possible. This is because logic is essential to intelligible discourse."³ Out of these four epistemological premises, the latter two have become necessary in more recent decades to refute sophistry that impugns Aristotelian logic, and that thereby impugns the Bible's validity. The latter two premises are as presupposed by the Bible as the first two. The present work accepts Sproul's proofs of God's existence as valid, and it also adopts these premises as its epistemological foundation. So this work will now briefly review these four epistemological premises.

(i)"The law of noncontradiction declares that something cannot be what it is and not be what it is at the same time and in the same sense."⁴ Concisely, "A cannot be A and non-A at the same time and in the same sense or relationship." Regardless of how much sophisticated people may expound their sophistry, thereby misleading the naive and plundering the ranks of the aware, they can never refute the law of noncontradiction. This is because every attempt at refuting the law of noncontradiction uses the law of noncontradiction in its argument.⁵ It's fair to say that the law of noncontradiction is crucial to Aristotelian logic, and to the human

¹ Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, pp. 18-19.

² Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, p. 29.

³ Sproul, Consequences of Ideas, p. 41.

⁴ Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, p. 22.

⁵ Sproul, Consequences of Ideas, p. 58.

ability to communicate. The law of noncontradiction is also foundational to the law of causality.

(ii)The law of causality states that every effect must have an antecedent cause. As an extension of the law of noncontradiction, the law of causality can be stated, "an event (A) cannot be an effect (B) and fail to be an effect (non-B) at the same time and in the same relationship."¹ Starting largely with David Hume, the law of causality has been subjected to almost constant skepticism, and it continues so. It continues so mostly because so many people refuse to accept that logic demands an unmoved mover, and an uncaused cause, as first cause of the universe. In fact, "Many believe that Hume destroyed once and for all the law of causality", but such belief is usually simply a convenient way to avoid admitting that God exists.² In fact,

Hume's main point is that neither cause nor effect can be objective qualities, since anything can be considered either a cause or an effect, depending on the point of view. Since the idea of causality arises through the process of *relation*, we have no original sensation or impression of causality itself. Since we cannot directly perceive the cause of anything, we can never know with certainty what is causing it.³

Hume's skepticism revolves around the question, "how do we *know* that A causes B?" Hume offers three reasons humans presume such knowledge. First, A and B are spatially contiguous. For example, rain (A) and wet grass (B) may be spatially contiguous, but does that mean that there's a causal relationship between the two? --- Second, A precedes B temporally. For example, the rain (A) comes, then the grass gets wet (B). But does this sequence of events prove that A causes B? --- Third, A is always followed by B. At location X, every time it rains (A), the grass gets wet (B).

People tend to perceive these three reasons as prompts for assuming that A causes B. So people tend to assume that there is some kind of "*necessary connection* between A and B", between the rain and the wet grass. But as has been pointed out on numerous occasions, the fact that B has been closely related to A in numerous past observations doesn't guarantee that the relation will exist in future observations. --- Although Hume may have never called such an assumption an "inductive inference", in the 20th century, such assumptions based on a finite number of observations have generally been called inferences that are "inductive", as distinguished from inferences that are "deductive". Hume's radical skepticism about the law of causality

¹ Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, pp. 31, 49, 51-52.

² Sproul, Consequences of Ideas, p. 106.

³ Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, p. 112.

is essentially a subset of what is now commonly called the "problem of induction". The problem revolves around the fact that a mere assumption, based on a customary relation, cannot pass as a guarantee that the relation will continue to exist. Therefore a causal relationship cannot be guaranteed to exist between A and B no matter how many times a customary relationship has been observed. The fact that the grass has always gotten wet when it rains cannot guarantee that the same will be so in the future. Even though all this is true, Dr. Sproul rightly points out that,

Hume did not demolish the law of causality. ... [T]his is the heart of the matter for Hume: since we cannot truly know causality by way of reason or our senses, and since there is no other way than reason or our senses to know anything at all, causality can never be known with precision.¹

People who claim to believe that Hume destroyed the law of causality are claiming that the rain can never be blamed for causing the grass to get wet. Under this regime of misbegotten logic, no criminal can ever be blamed for his/her crime. So under this regime, anything goes. But this is not the regime Hume posited. Instead, he posited a regime in which "causality can never be known with precision".

Since Hume, philosophers and scientists have often accommodated Hume's description of the problem of induction by accompanying inductive inferences with probabilities that indicate the likelihood that the inference is true. For example, if so-and-so has observed a close association between rain and wet grass two times, then the odds of observing that association in the future might be P. But if the association between rain and wet grass is observed 100 times, then the odds of observing that association in the future might be fifty times greater. So the more an association is observed, the more it's recognized as probable that the association will be observed in the future. This shows that in modern science and philosophy, there is generally an extremely close relationship between causal claims and probability, *i.e.*, between causal inferences and chance.

[I]t is one thing to say, as Hume did, "I do not know (nor can I know) what caused an event," and it is quite another thing to say, ... "*Nothing* has caused this event." ... Those who deny causality usually replace it with some notion of "chance." Hume himself defined chance as a synonym for ignorance ... What we can learn from Hume's critique is that sense perception is indeed limited ... [W[e cannot prove causal relationships with some sort of supernatural infallibility. This by no means requires us ... to jettison the law of causality.²

¹ Sproul, Defending Your Faith, pp. 55-56.

² Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, p. 58.

No causal relationship can be proven to exist absolutely. But that doesn't mean that none exists. Because of this discrepancy, scientists generally now assign probabilities to presumed causal relationships. This practice has become so common that society now suffers from another delusion, the delusion that chance exists in the objective, physical domain. But even Hume recognized that the concept of chance is a mere intellectual accommodation to human ignorance, not something that exists objectively.

For whatever reason, Hume tried to introduce skepticism into the general human use of the physical senses. He in effect attempted to convince humans that they cannot rely on their senses in seeking truth. While not properly rebutted, Hume's skepticism threatened scientific progress. As a scientist, to refute Hume's skepticism, Kant attempted to build a system that allowed science to continue. But he did so without properly addressing Hume's arguments. Kant's system rebutted Hume's skepticism sufficiently to allow science to continue, but not sufficiently enough to avoid introducing serious errors with long-term consequences. The primary error was his radical separation of the metaphysical and the physical, the "noumenal" and the "phenomenal". As a step towards remedying both Kant's error and Hume's skepticism, it's now necessary to include the next epistemological premise. But before going on to the next premise, it's critical to understand the following:

> The simple definition "every effect must have a cause" is a "formal" or "analytical" truth. ... [I]t is true by definition ... [B]y its very definition, it has to be true. ... An effect is "that which has been caused." ... A cause cannot be a cause unless it produces an effect.¹

Although the law of causality is analytically true, and is a crucial assumption in pursuit of scientific knowledge, *i.e.*, in pursuit of knowledge about the phenomenal realm, Kant's radical separation of the noumenal and the phenomenal demands an ambiguity, at best, regarding whether or not the law of causality applies in the noumenal realm.² For reasons that become obvious throughout the present work, this ambiguity should be eliminated along with Kant's radical separation. As long as elimination of this ambiguity doesn't lead to proposals for the violation of natural

¹ Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, pp. 51-52.

² Regarding this limitation imposed by Kant: "Kant ... is unwilling to dispense with either reason or causality altogether. Instead he limits the application of the law of causality. He argues that the law of causality has no meaning or application except in the sensible world ... This law applies to the phenomenal realm, not to the noumenal realm. It applies to the realm of physics, not metaphysics." (Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, p. 127.) --- Also: "[T]he logic which applies to the material phenomenal world does not apply to the noumenal or metaphysical realm of God." (Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; p. 75.)

rights, reason demands that this ambiguity, this refusal to apply the law of causality to the metaphysical realm, along with this radical separation of the metaphysical and the physical, should be discarded.¹

(iii) The third epistemological premise is the "basic (although not perfect) reliability of sense perception". No reasonable or rational person claims that he/she has infallible sense perception. The physical senses are subject to error. But that doesn't mean that they are totally unreliable.

[I]f the senses were basically unreliable, then we could draw no conclusions from what we see, hear, touch, or taste. This would spell the end of the physical and natural sciences.²

It would also spell the end of any kind of reliable judicial procedures, and to any kind of society worth living in.

(iv)The fourth epistemological premise is the "analogical use of language". It affirms that ordinary human language generally uses analogies between similar objects to communicate. This premise is necessary to refute the residual effects of logical positivism and the theologies that were created to counteract it. There are radical fallacies in these philosophies and theologies. Sproul indicates that refuting them can be done by using Aquinas's distinctions between univocal, equivocal, and analogical uses of language.³

These four epistemological premises are foundational to the present work. These four principles are assumed in both the Bible and science. In other words, they are all assumed in both special revelation and general revelation. They thereby allow cross checking of these knowledge bases against each other, which is precisely the way this work proceeds, starting with general and cross checking against special. These epistemological premises are the principles, assumptions, and presuppositions that make knowledge, and "intelligible discourse", possible, and they are accepted as established and obvious truths throughout the present work.

While other approaches to apologetics start with the presupposition of the authority of the Bible, with the presupposition of the authority of the visible Church, or with presupposition of any number of other things that all demand credulity, the classical approach to apologetics starts with the individual human being's consciousness. As Sproul says,

¹ For a sampling of ways philosophers and scientists continue to undermine the law of causality: Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; pp. 109-121.

² Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, p. 32.

³ Sproul, Defending Your Faith, p. 67.

[W]e have *not* assumed our four principles [that are the starting point for our epistemological study] in a blind leap of faith; rather, our whole point in discussing them was to show that they can be rationally accepted by all people on the basis of observation.¹

Because all people do not accept the authority of the Bible, the authority of the visible Church, the existence of God, and numerous other possible starting places for Christian apologetics, it's important to start with what "can be rationally accepted by all people on the basis of observation". But some people might not even believe in reason. Because rationality is such a fundamental feature of human nature and nature in general, a total and genuine rejection of reason is equivalent to a commitment to insanity. So rationality and reason are *de facto* substrates of human nature. Nevertheless, some people might refuse to believe in formal logic. For such people, classical apologetics is still the best place to start, because it can help people to learn that formal logic is merely an extension of what they already believe. This means that the proper starting place for Christian apologetics is with the human self, individual consciousness.² Even though the present work attempts to be an appendage and outgrowth of classical apologetics, it starts with something even more basic than human consciousness. It starts with life. But to show how it starts with life, it starts with something even more rudimentary, with basic characteristics of classical physics. But because scientists, since Kant, have surreptitiously slipped into violating these four principles in a number of different and subtle ways, it's important to do a short review of the primary vehicle through which philosophers have violated these four principles before examining the physics.³

The Four Explanations for the Existence of Anything

By understanding how philosophers and theologians have violated these four principles, it should be easier to understand how scientists are making similar mistakes. Dr. Sproul asserts that these mistakes must necessarily fall into one or more of four possible categories. This is because any explanation for the existence of

¹ Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, p. 93.

² For commentary on this starting point, see Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; pp. 214, 217, 223-224, 231, 239.

³ As a theodicy, this work is not a scientific theory. It nevertheless contains philosophical and theological commentary on science, and extrapolation from it. To be a genuine scientific theory, it would need to propose empirical tests of its propositions. At some point in the future, God willing, the author will propose such empirical tests, thereby translating this theodicy from a philosophical-theological theory into a scientific theory.

anything will always fall within these four categories. The four explanations for the existence of anything, regardless of whether the thing being explained is "the self, the world, ... anything in it", or anything in the universe, are these:

- 1. The thing is an illusion.
- 2. The thing is self-created.
- 3. The thing is self-existent.
- 4. The thing is ultimately caused or created by something that is self-existent.¹

The first of these four options was refuted well by Descartes. Reality cannot be illusory, nor can anything that truly exists within it. So the illusion option can be skipped rather quickly. A real thing cannot be simultaneously an illusion, because such a claim would violate the law of noncontradiction. --- For something to be self-created, it must exist before it is created. This violates the law of noncontradiction because something cannot exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense or relationship. It seems that this is practically as common-sensical as the refutation of illusion. But astrophysicists, cosmologists, and numerous other highly trained and ingenious people are functioning on a day-to-day basis under the notion that things they study are self-created. Maybe they don't call it self-creation, but analysis of their claims clearly demonstrates that self-creation is precisely what they are advocating. Self-creation "is formally and logically impossible, for the notion of self-creation is analytically false."²

As indicated, scientists generally sidestep the problem of induction by associating their inductive inferences with probabilities. Another word for "probability" is "chance". So they are crediting chance with the existence of their inference. But they are prone to forget that chance is not a thing, any more than a mathematical line or point is a thing. In Sproul's terms, chance has no ontological existence. It may exist as a purely mental thing, but it has no physical existence. Chance and all the complex mathematics found in probability theory do not have the same ontological status as the central objects of scientific investigation. But especially since the creation of quantum mechanics and the "Heisenberg uncertainty principle",³ there is generally little effort made to maintain chance's status as an ontological non-entity. So chance is embedded in descriptions of reality, thereby acting as *de facto* claims to self-creation. But as Sproul indicates,

¹ Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, p. 126.

² Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, p. 126.

³ Hilgevoord, Jan and Uffink, Jos; "The Uncertainty Principle", The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertainty/.

[T]hings cannot be directed to their ends by chance. Chance can direct nothing, because chance can do nothing. Chance can do nothing because chance is nothing. *Chance* is a perfectly meaningful term to describe mathematical possibilities, but the word becomes a sneaking bogeyman when used to describe something that has the power to influence anything. Chance has no being, and that which has no power to do anything.¹

These claims about chance are absolutely crucial to 21st-century circumstances because science and technology have gone so thoroughly into treating chance as a worthy substitute for God. In fact, chance has an ontological status more like mathematical lines and points than any entity that has existence and power in the physical field of perception and action. These scientists are essentially claiming that self-creation is reasonable if it is claimed under an alias. But, "A rose by any other name ...".

As the present work proceeds, it will address the chance breed of self-creation more specifically. Before proceeding to address why this work takes the form of a theodicy, this work should mention in passing that it accepts Dr. Sproul's reasoning in regard to why physical entities do not have the status of self-existence. His arguments on this front are rational and convincing. This work also accepts his arguments for the necessity of the self-existent God as being equally rational and convincing.²

Why Theodicy?

By now, it should be obvious to the reader that the present work is being established on the classical synthesis, as it's being reconstructed by Sproul, Gerstner, Lindsley, and others. The present work attempts to build on their platform while focusing on different issues. For example, Sproul's **Defending Your Faith** restricts its concern "to the two most crucial issues of apologetics: the existence of God and the authority of the Bible".³ In that book, Sproul uses an epistemological core of Sproul's apologetics. This present work is based on the same epistemological core principles, and is thereby based on the classical synthesis of general and special revelation. But it is not focused on the existence of God and the authority of the Bible, because it takes these as largely given, via the platform built by Sproul and

¹ Sproul, **Consequences of Ideas**, pp. 74-75.

² Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; pp. 114-123.

³ Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**, p. 8.

company. This work restricts its concern to theodicy in a broad sense of that term. Theodicy supplies the unifying theme for the diversity of knowledge bases cited in this work. So it's fitting that this work would present a reasonable explanation for what a theodicy is before entering into the theodicy, *per se*.

The word "theodicy" comes from the combination of the Greek words, *theos*, meaning God, and *dikaiosis*, meaning justification. So a theodicy is an attempt at justifying the existence of God. Credit is usually given to G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716) for coining this word for use in this way.¹ Because a theodicy is a justification or defense of the existence of God, it might appear on its face to be the same thing as an apologetic, a defense of the Christian faith. But a theodicy is usually understood to be a philosophical answer to the "problem of evil". The problem of evil is generally recognized as pre-dating Christianity, being attributed to the work of Epicurus (341 BC - 270 BC). So in order to get a clear understanding of what a theodicy is, it's necessary to understand what the problem of evil is.

The God spoken of by Epicurus was the God of the ancient Greek philosophers: the "prime mover, or a first cause, or a necessary being that has its necessity of itself, or the ground of being, or a being whose essence is identical with its existence".² The problem of evil as posed by Epicurus looks like this:

Is God willing to prevent evil but unable to do so? Then he is not omnipotent. Is God able to prevent evil but unwilling to do so? Then he is malevolent (or at least less than perfectly good). If God is both willing and able to prevent evil, then why is there evil in the world?³

The God that Epicurus is talking about is certainly not the God of the Christian Bible. But the attributes generally attributed to this God of the Greek philosophers are nevertheless attributes that the God of the Bible also has. Aristotle's philosophy made it clear that God must exist, and must have certain attributes. The God of the Bible certainly has these attributes. The difference between Aristotle's God and the God of the Bible is that not only does the God of the Bible have these attributes, but the God of the Bible also has many more. But the God of the Bible certainly

¹ Leibniz, G.W., **Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man,** and the Origin of Evil, 1710.

² Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil", **The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy** (**Spring 2010 Edition**), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2010/entries/evil/.

³ Russell, Paul, "Hume on Religion", **The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy** (**Spring 2012 Edition**), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2012/entries/hume-religion/.

has all these attributes. Because both the God of the Greek philosophers and the God of the Bible share these attributes, if reason negates these attributes, then reason negates the God of the Bible. So for the sake of defending the God of the Bible in pluralistic communications, it's important to defend Him against this problem of evil. That, in a nutshell, is the integrating purpose of this theodicy. The purpose of what remains of this preface is to delineate and define the problem of evil more specifically before entering into any attempt at solving it. In passing, what remains of this preface will also generally describe a few failed theodicies, so that the reader knows that this is not one of them. After the reader has perused the entire theodicy, he/she can decide for his/her self whether it genuinely solves the problem.

Because this problem originated in ancient Greek philosophy, and has been addressed by Christian scholars with only modest success in the history of the visible Church, some people might assume that attempting to solve it is an exercise in metaphysical futility, like counting angels on the head of a pin. But anyone who recognizes that evil exists must necessarily also recognize that evil must be counteracted by good. So exploring this problem, starting at the abstract level demanded by the problem, is capable of generating strategies for combating evil that might not be considered without this abstract starting point. Therein lies the usefulness of trying to solve this problem.

Because people who have read theodicies in the past are predisposed to assume that new theodicies are simplistic repetitions of old theodicies that have already been marked as failures, it's important to include a quick survey of what has already been done, so that it's clear that this theodicy is not the reinvention of a broken wheel. The theodicy that follows this preface is not, (i)an appeal to human free will, (ii) an appeal to demonic coercion, (iii)an appeal to ignorance, or (iv)an appeal to the fact that humans are finite. Although there is truth in each of these approaches, none gets to the root of the matter. For people who have not read theodicies, it's important to describe each of these four kinds of failed arguments so that they know what this theodicy is not. It's also important to recognize two mistakes that are often made along the way, specifically, implying that God is the author of sin, and implying that humans are not responsible for their sinfulness. The author of this theodicy is convinced that this work does not fail on any of these accounts. In fact, the author is convinced that this theodicy is a successful solution to the problem of evil.

In order to solve the problem of evil, it's necessary to define the terms. It's impossible to define God comprehensively, because it's impossible for finite minds to comprehend the infinite. But for the sake of solving this problem, there are three attributes that God must necessarily have, and defining these, and attributing these

to Him, should suffice as an alternative to a comprehensive definition. God must be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, as premises that are deductively valid, and that are inductively highly probable. It's also necessary to define evil. The definition of evil will be uncovered as the theodicy progresses. Otherwise, for the present, it's important to get a reasonably clear statement of the problem. Because of ambiguities in the way Epicurus presented the problem, later philosophers have posed it differently. Here's one of the ways it's presented in the **Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy**:

- 1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
- 2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
- 3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
- 4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate evil.
- 5. Evil exists.
- 6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil.
- 7. Therefore, God doesn't exist.¹

The weakness in this argument is in premise 4. It may be absolutely true that because God is omnibenevolent, meaning "morally perfect", God must have "the desire to eliminate evil". But it doesn't necessarily follow that he will eliminate evil immediately. In fact, it's reasonable to assume that God's timing in eliminating evil relates directly to his reason for allowing its existence in the first place. So a theist's attempt at defending God against this argument for atheism quickly turns into an inquiry into why God allowed evil to exist in the first place. The most common argument in defense of God against the problem of evil says that God wanted humans to have "free will".

Like practically all Christian defenses of theism against the atheist's argument from evil, the "free will" argument usually resorts to the first three chapters of Genesis. There's certainly nothing wrong with starting there, as long as the apologist presents a rational explanation for why God allowed the initial existence of evil. Apologists have never been able to do this in a way that satisfies the facts of general revelation,

¹ Tooley, Michael, "The Problem of Evil", **The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy** (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ spr2010/entries/evil/.

the facts of special revelation, and all logic aimed at rationally reconciling the two. This has never been done properly, regardless of whether the apologist starts in early Genesis or elsewhere, and regardless of whether the apologist is arguing for "free will" or for something else.

The author of this theodicy contends that it's not possible to give a satisfactory explanation for the existence of evil unless one not only starts in the garden of Eden, but also ends in the "New Jerusalem" (Revelation 3:12; 21:2), and explains, at least abstractly, all the evils that happen between the two extremities. This means that it's necessary for the apologist to enter into narrating a protracted story. It's necessary to enter into this protracted story because reference to origin and destination is critical to explaining God's motives in creating humanity, which is critical to explaining God's motives in allowing evil.¹ Most theodicies fail because they do not present this story, or they do not present it in a way that's rationally consistent with both the general and special knowledge bases. But most theodicies also fail for even more fundamental reasons.

In order to present a theodicy that narrates the story from beginning to end, at least at an abstract level, it's necessary to establish an ideological foundation at the front end, a foundation that will ensure that as the story unfolds, it will remain rationally consistent with both the general and special knowledge bases. This foundational, ideological stage is where most theologies fail. They fail even before the story can get started in earnest. This is as true of the best "free will" arguments as it is of appeals to demonic coercion, human ignorance, and human finitude.

Even though the God of the Bible always desires "to eliminate evil", he does not always do so immediately because he has a bigger plan, an ulterior motive, that makes it valuable for Him to allow the evil for the sake of achieving the goals entailed in that plan. So the so-called "greater good" argument is necessarily true from a biblical perspective. But if that greater good is not properly defined, then the theodicy still remains a failure. (i)So when the apologist is confronted by a mother whose child is dying an agonizing death from cancer, and the apologist tells the mother that this evil exists for a greater good, the mother is likely to ask what good could be so great that it justifies her child's daily deterioration and suffering. If the apologist fails to give her a good definition of the greater good and stick it somewhere. (ii)When the apologist is confronted by a father whose young daughter has been brutally beaten, raped, and murdered, and the apologist responds by telling the father that this evil exists for

¹ It's no coincidence that evil follows a timeline that's very close to humanity's timeline between these two extremities.

the greater good, where his/her description of this greater good is flat, the apologist should be prepared to receive wrath that is justly due the rapist and murderer. (iii)If the apologist is confronted by a world that has witnessed holocausts, genocides, mass murders by governments gone rogue, world wars that destroy civilian populations, mass infanticide, and other evils too numerous and grotesque to list, and if the apologist is nevertheless convinced that all these evils exist for the greater good, then the apologist should either be well equipped to explain this greater good to this world, or he/she should be prepared to crawl off somewhere and keep his/her mouth shut. All of the world's horrors, and all of humanity's pain, suffering, disease, and death, must be explained as being subject to the greater good, in a way that makes that greater good look like it's genuinely worth the trouble. So any genuine solution to the problem of evil must be not only rational, but also sympathetic, describing the greater good so realistically and beautifully that even the most dejected are willing to overlook the suffering and evil for the sake of reaching that "beatific vision".

(i)<u>The "free will" argument:</u> Some people who make the "free will" argument assume that Augustine's approach to the problem of evil is the right approach. Both Augustine and Aquinas approached the problem of evil starting in Genesis 1, whose last verse contains the statement, "And God saw all that He had made, and behold, it was very good" (v. 31a). The implication from this is that even the serpent and the people were created "very good", which means that they must have gone bad some time after the creation. This sequence of events is verified in Genesis 3, which gives some evidence of how both the people and the serpent turned from being "very good" to being evil, or at least, to being something much different from "very good". Augustine, Aquinas, and their followers, including the author of this theodicy, see evil as a deprivation or negation of good.1 Like mathematical lines, points, and chance, evil from this perspective has no ontological being. Instead, it is a negation or deprivation of something that has ontological being. Somehow, it is a negation or deprivation of the system of law that God built into creation, and that he supports from moment to moment through Divine Providence. Even though this is a perfectly reasonable explanation for what evil is, it doesn't say much about how evil entered into creation.

The question to the apologist is: "OK. If God created the universe, including all angels and humanity, as 'very good', and somehow this evil, this negation or privation of good entered into creation, then how did that happen?" The "free will" apologist answers that God created humans with "free will". Such apologists claim

¹ According to the Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question 14, "Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God." It is therefore deprivation according to the Westminster Confession of Faith, in agreement with Augustine and Aquinas.

that for his own good pleasure, God created humans in a way that makes them capable of choosing evil, because the capacity to choose evil is a necessary feature of "free will". --- This argument runs into the well-known problem of reconciling God's sovereignty with human "free will". If God is sovereign, then he is by definition omnipotent and omniscient. If there is no limit to the human's will, as so-called "metaphysical libertarians" claim, then God cannot be sovereign because these unlimited humans are always subverting his sovereignty with their "free will".

If the human will is nothing more than the ability to choose, as people like Jonathan Edwards claim, then the freedom of this capacity to choose demands questions like: Free from what? Free to do what? Is there no limit to the human's range of choices? --- Because humans are finite, meaning localized in space and time, it necessarily follows that the human's range of choices at any given point in time must also be finite. So common sense says metaphysical libertarianism is inherently silly. At any given point in time, any given human's range of choices is necessarily limited to what the human can conceive. But it's even more limited than that, if one understands a choice to entail some kind of action. If one presumably chooses something that doesn't really exist and cannot exist, then there is an inherent problem in connecting the presumptive choice with a real action. So the human's range of choices is inherently limited to what can actually be chosen, rather than to what can be merely conceived.¹ This line of reasoning shows that there must necessarily be limits to human "free will" that are more a function of human finitude than of duress or coercion, or of anything of that nature.² The human will is free within the human's finite range of choices.

When people say that human "free will" is the greater good that explains why God allows evil, it still doesn't explain how evil came into existence. Not only the people in the garden, but the serpent in the garden, made choices that were evil. Somehow in this process the angel, Lucifer, was converted into the fallen archangel, manifest as the serpent. Does this mean that the serpent also had "free will"? Is the devil's "free will" also part of the greater good? If not, then what's the difference between the devil's "free will" and human "free will"?

¹ Unless one is committed to being insane for the sake of "metaphysical libertarianism".

² Even though some people may be able to acknowledge this finitude, many of the same people have historically insisted that "free will" is some kind of idol that everyone must bow down to. This latter impulse is often conflated with a reasonable fear of duress by human against human, which should be distinguished, not conflated, with regard to pressures that come from some non-human source. So in dealing with these issues holistically, it's critical to expose the relationship of human law and God's law in the process.

In Jonathan Edwards' book, **Freedom of the Will**, Edwards makes a convincing argument that in order for anyone to choose anything, there must be some kind of inclination within the given human that acts as the motive force behind the choice. Given the weight of Edwards' argument, it's necessary to conclude that such inclinations exist within the human subconscious and influence the will in the choice-making process. So if humans choose something evil, then it's necessary to conclude that they have done so because they had a pre-existing inclination to choose that evil thing. This leads to the conclusion that God must have created them with this inclination. Where else could such an inclination come from? Unless some alternative line of reasoning is supplied, this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that God is the author of the inclination, and therefore the author of sin.¹

Some people have concocted the concept of "concupiscence", which can supposedly be used to relieve God from being the author of sin. Concupiscence is defined as being *of sin*, and to *include sin*, without actually being *sin*. --- Other people deny that choices have prior inclinations, and thereby relieve God from being the author of sin in that way. But if no prior inclination precedes the act of choosing, then the act of choosing must be some kind of automatic thing, a pure function of determinism without any freedom involved in the choice-making process. But this conception of the circumstances not only eliminates prior inclination. It also eliminates "moral agency". In other words, the people cease being responsible for their choices and actions. --- Concupiscence is obviously a more viable description of the circumstances than a deterministic elimination of moral agency.

Claiming that the people in the garden were created in a condition of concupiscence is not an acceptable solution to the problem for some people, because they think that anything that is *of sin*, and *includes sin*, is inherently sinful. Their argument is that because God created the people "very good", he could not have created them in a state that was *of sin* and that *includes sin*, because contrary to the definition of concupiscence, such a state is inherently sinful, which would mean that God created humans in a state of sinfulness, which would make God the author of sin, and which would contradict the Bible's claim that God created humanity and the universe "very good".

<u>Preview:</u> God did in fact create Lucifer, his minions, and Adam and Eve "very good". He did not create them in a state of sinfulness. He did, however, create them with a capacity to be tempted with a certain kind of temptation. The temptation to which they were vulnerable relates directly to the greater good for which he created humanity. The greater good relates directly to the differences between the garden

¹ This is not to say that Edwards ever indicated that God is the author of sin.

of Eden and the New Jerusalem. The differences between origin and destination relate directly to the ability and inclination to access the "tree of life" and the "tree of knowledge of good and evil". --- If anyone claims that living with a capacity for being tempted is, like concupiscence, necessarily a state that is inherently sinful, then whoever makes the claim has a burden to reconcile their claim with the fact that Christ was tempted, but never sinned. --- The position of this theodicy is that humans are in fact created with enough "free will" to guarantee that they have "moral agency", and are responsible for their choices. But this particular kind of "free will" does not interfere with God's sovereignty in any way. In other words, human "free will" is compatible with God's omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. --- The conclusion has to be that even though evil is never good, and even though God is never the author of sin, God has ordained that evil come into existence for the sake of a greater good.

(ii) The "demonic coercion" argument: To explain the existence of evil as a precursor to solving the problem of evil, some people claim that Adam and Eve were coerced into sinning by the serpent. This explanation fails from the start because it doesn't explain how the serpent was converted from being "very good" into being evil. --- Both the man and the woman tried to dodge responsibility for their choices. The man blamed the woman for his choice. The woman blamed the serpent for hers. The demonic coercion argument essentially takes the woman's argument at face value, and says that evil came into the world through an evil act by the serpent against the woman. The serpent certainly lied to the woman. But the "demonic coercion" argument says that the serpent not only lied, but overwhelmed the woman with his spiritual power. If such spiritual power can be rightly described as "coercion", then the woman had a genuine excuse, and it would be wrong for God to pile misery on top of her pre-existing vulnerability. But both the man and the woman lived in the garden in a beatific state, having extraordinary powers, and clarity of mind far in excess of any fallen human's genius. So she knew the serpent was lying, and had extraordinary powers to defend herself against the serpent's spiritual power. She chose to believe the lie anyway, because she had a deep-seated inclination to do so. This is why the biblical story indicates so clearly that God did not excuse her. The fact that God held the man and woman morally accountable means that the "demonic coercion" argument can never really even get started.

(iii)<u>The "ignorance" argument:</u> Another explanation for evil's entry into the world claims that the people were ignorant. Like the "demonic coercion" argument, the ignorance argument doesn't explain how evil entered into the serpent. So it doesn't really even get started. Even so, it essentially says that the garden people were victims of demonic fraud, rather than demonic coercion. The serpent certainly

lied to Eve. But the argument claims that the serpent was so wily, subtle, crafty, and clever that the people were beguiled. They were vulnerable to being beguiled because they were ignorant.

The ignorance argument also underestimates Adam and Eve. The circumstances demand that they had extraordinary powers and intellects, and that they existed in beatific visions of God. Under such circumstances, they should have been invincible to the serpent's guileful arguments. Eve should not have been fooled by the serpent, and Adam should not have been fooled by Eve. The fact that they had extraordinary powers indicates that they must have had a pre-existing inclination to give in to the serpent's enticements. But this was an inclination that could never be rightly blamed on God, for reasons that are made obvious below. Ignorance does not suffice as an excuse because they knowingly and willfully chose to indulge the serpent's guile and lies. That's why God's punishment was fitting. God had told them clearly what was prohibited. So they could not have been ignorant of it. They deliberately chose to violate the prohibition. Their penalties were fitting, even if their motives were unclear.

(iv)<u>The finitude argument:</u> In the early part of the 18th century, Leibniz published a theodicy which claimed that there were three kinds of evil: physical evil, metaphysical evil, and moral evil. In his description of metaphysical evil, he equated metaphysical evil with metaphysical imperfection. He also claimed that the only metaphysically perfect being is God, and that all creatures fall short of being God, and are therefore metaphysically imperfect, and therefore metaphysically evil. So all finite creatures are inherently evil. In his system, metaphysical evil gives rise to physical evil, and physical and metaphysical evil together yield moral evil. Because anything finite is inherently evil, and because humans are finite, humans are inherently evil. This means that God created them evil, which makes God the author of sin, which makes Leibniz's theodicy one among many that fail. Leibniz's claim makes humans evil before the fall, which contradicts the claim that they were created "very good".

Life

Even if the theodicy that follows is not perfect, it does not suffer the weaknesses described above. It does contain a protracted story that starts in the garden of Eden and ends in the New Jerusalem. It thereby shows God's reason for allowing evil as a function of the greater good. But before entering into that protracted story, the theodicy spends time developing an ideological foundation. The ideological

foundation is a prerequisite for telling the story in a way that shows rational consistency between the special and general knowledge bases, throughout the story.

As already indicated, the adoption of the epistemological premises of classical apologetics is foundational. Before developing the ideological foundation, the epistemological foundations are understood to be given. The theodicy also takes the existence of God and the authority of the Bible as given, having been established through classical apologetics. Because the present work attempts to be an appendage and outgrowth of classical apologetics, with a presumption of the validity of the classical synthesis, one might assume that this theodicy starts the construction of its ideological foundation at the same place that classical apologetics starts: with human consciousness. Like classical apologetics, it does start with general revelation, and it does start with the assumption that the reader is a thinker. But because science has advanced to such an extent, and in order to pay proper regard to general revelation, it's necessary to start with something more basic than human consciousness, with life in general, and it's necessary to start with the fundamentals of modern physics. Because all of life is now recognized to exist in the electromagnetic field, it's necessary to start with the physical foundations of life, meaning electromagnetism. Because the quantum-mechanical descriptions of the electromagnetic field depict electromagnetism as having a dual nature, consisting of both particle and wave attributes, and because the linkage between electromagnetic waves, life, consciousness, and theodicy has not been sufficiently explored in the past, the construction of this theodicy's ideological foundation will begin with wave mechanics in classical physics.

Given that it's true that God exists, that God is rational, that God is sovereign, and that God created both general and special revelation, it must also be true that general revelation and special revelation cannot be inherently at odds, and radical separation of the two is not a viable option. There must be rational integrity between the two, even if it's sometimes difficult for humans to see it.

> Historically, the great theologians and apologists of church history have agreed that all truth is one, and that all truth meets at the top. What God reveals in Scripture will not contradict what he reveals to us outside of Scripture in the realm of nature. Conversely, if God reveals some truth in nature, that truth will not contradict what is found in the Bible.¹

Science is about discovering what is true everywhere. But just because something is true, that doesn't mean that everyone agrees that it's true, knows that it's true, cares that it's true. So scientific truth, by itself, doesn't translate well into laws that

¹ Sproul, Defending Your Faith, p. 196.

humans apply to one another. The latter kinds of truths exist within the arena of jurisprudence, rather than the arena of science. Nevertheless, because jurisprudence exists in a kind of gray area between science and special revelation, it's necessary to include it if the classical synthesis is to be genuinely meaningful.

* * *

(Bible quotations are from the New American Standard Bible (NASB, 1995, The Lockman Foundation, La Habra, California) unless specifically indicated otherwise.)

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PART I:

SCIENCE & BIBLE

PART I

SCIENCE & BIBLE

Existing scientific evidence holds that wave interactions in the electromagnetic field are crucial to the aggregation of matter into specific physical entities.¹ Although it may be rare for physicists to speak in such terms, the evidence often drives them to say things that imply the same thing. For example, High Energy Physicist, Giuliano Preparata essentially admits that this is true in the Foreword to his book, QED Coherence in Matter.² The admission may exist behind a veil of semi-technical jargon, but the admission is nevertheless there. It's there because he's looking at undeniable evidence. Because most scientists don't have such undeniable evidence, and because scientists in general have been following the long-established materialist bias that Kant built into his radical separation of noumenal and phenomenal, most scientists remain mum about such things. But to any lay observer who understands that quantum physics long ago discovered that subatomic particles have a dual nature, having both particle and wave attributes, it's obvious that wave interactions in the electromagnetic field are crucial to the aggregation of matter into specific physical entities. To knowledgeable lay observers, the silence among the scientific elite in this regard may appear to be obstreperously obtuse. But it's probably more a function of the Kantian scientific regime, along with the incentive system that's built into scientific research's funding superstructure. The aggregation of matter through wave interaction is a vital topic because it has huge implications for humanity as a whole, and not merely for scientists.

Given that electromagnetic wave interaction is crucial to the aggregation of matter, electromagnetic wave interaction is a physical phenomenon that is crucial to the cohesiveness of any organism's physical body, including every human being's physical body. Because these facts have absolutely profound implications for the understanding of life in general, they have profound implications for the understanding of human

¹ Quantum physicists currently recognize four fundamental forces or interactions: (i) strong nuclear force, (ii)weak nuclear force, (iii)electromagnetic force, and (iv)gravitation. The current so-called "Standard Model" combines the weak and electromagnetic into so-called electroweak interactions, thereby leaving only three fundamental forces or interactions. Out of these three / four, this theodicy is concerned primarily with electromagnetic interactions. But it's assumed that the dual wave-particle nature of the electromagnetic field applies to all of these forces / interactions.

² Preparata, Giuliano, **QED Coherence in Matter**, 1995, World Scientific, River Edge, New Jersey. --- URL: http://www.worldscientific.com. --- "QED" stands for "Quantum Electrodynamic". Quantum electrodynamics is a subset of quantum mechanics that focuses on electrons, positrons, and the electromagnetic field. "Coherence" in this title has the same meaning as in laser physics, which is the meaning used throughout this theodicy.

PART I, SCIENCE & BIBLE

life, and they have absolutely profound implications for the understanding of the Bible and theology. When properly understood, electromagnetic wave interaction also displays harmony between the physical sciences and special revelation.

A genuine and thorough explanation of how humans, as physical life forms, are the products of electromagnetic wave interaction, would take libraries too arduous to compile. But there is a difference between explaining how something happens and proving that it happens. It's already well established in physics that the building blocks of matter, meaning subatomic particles, atoms, and molecules, have both particle and wave attributes. If one accepts this as true, then it's a necessary and inevitable conclusion that if systemic wave interference exists, the human body is a standing wave.¹ The skeptic may claim that this is a huge "If". But the evidence itself shows that such systemic interference is practically a foregone conclusion. To reach the conclusion that the human body is a standing wave, it's not necessary to resort to string theory, a grand unified theory, a theory of everything, or to any other exotic theory aimed a positing a long-sought explanation for how the most basic physical forces of nature interact. In order to understand that the human body is a standing wave, it's not necessary to get any more exotic than classical physics and common sense.

^{1 &}quot;Wave interference" and "electromagnetic interference" should not be confused. They are not the same. This theodicy focuses on waves, whereas electromagnetic interference is generally understood to be nuisance electromagnetism.

Chapter A: Wave Physics in General

As Halliday and Resnick say in their undergraduate physics textbook,

Wave motion appears in almost every branch of physics. We are all familiar with water waves. There are also sound waves, as well as light waves, radio waves, and other electromagnetic waves. One formulation of the mechanics of atoms and subatomic particles is called wave mechanics. Clearly the properties and behavior of waves are very important in physics.¹

Given that an important subset of the field of biophysics is concerned with wave mechanics within biological systems, it's clear that wave physics is important to the understanding of life in general. By reading this theodicy in its entirety, the reader should also recognize that understanding wave physics facilitates the understanding of the human condition, God, theology, the problem of evil, and the problem of hell.² Unless one already understands wave physics, the place to start is with the following brief, non-technical, freshman-level introduction to wave physics.

Sub-Chapter 1: How Traveling Waves Interact - Macroscopic Domain

If one stands on a shore watching waves come in, one is watching what physicists call "traveling waves". Such waves can be depicted mathematically as traveling in space and time. If one sees a cork floating on the surface, where the cork is at a maximum when at the top of a wave, and at a minimum when at the bottom of a trough, then this action of the cork can be depicted mathematically as the displacement of a particle in periodic motion.

> [T]he displacement of a particle in periodic motion can always be expressed in terms of sines and cosines. Because the term harmonic is applied to expressions containing these functions, periodic motion is often called harmonic motion.

¹ Resnick, Robert, and Halliday, David; **Physics, Part One**, 3rd edition, 1977, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 404.

² Anyone interested in other treatments of the problem of evil might be interested in Jonathan Edwards' thoughts on the problem. See Edwards, Jonathan, **An Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that FREEDOM OF THE WILL which is supposed to be essential to moral agency, virtue and vice, reward and punishment, praise and blame**, 1754. Reprinted by Soli Deo Gloria, 2011, Grand Rapids, Michigan. PART IV, SECT. IX-X (pp. 285-305 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

If a particle in periodic motion moves back and forth over the same path, we call the motion *oscillatory* or *vibratory*. ...

Not only mechanical systems can oscillate. Radio waves, microwaves, and visible light are oscillating magnetic and electric field vectors.¹

So seeing waves come in to shore is a macroscopic experience of what is happening constantly in the electromagnetic spectrum that we all live in. One extremely important difference between macroscopic waves traveling through the ocean, on a lake, or in a bathtub, and electromagnetic traveling waves like radio waves, microwaves, and visible light, is that macroscopic waves are clearly impeded, whereas it's not so clear that these other kinds of waves are impeded. The waves in the ocean are impeded by the shore. They are impeded by the rocks or shore they run up against, as well as by the friction that exists in virtually all macroscopic matter. Such impedance terminates their existence as waves. Physicists often call such impedance of wave motion "damping".

If one stands near a seawall watching waves come in, one is likely to notice a phenomenon that instantiates what physicists call the *superposition principle*. When a wave hits the seawall, it bounces off, reversing its direction. Then it meets incoming waves, one at a time, and when incoming wave meets outgoing wave, the amplitudes of the two waves are momentarily added to make a new wave that has a greater amplitude than either of the two waves alone. The general principle that describes this amplitude addition is called the "superposition principle".

It is an experimental fact that for many kinds of waves *two or more waves can traverse the same space independently of one another*. The fact that waves act independently of one another means that the distance of any particle at a given time is simply the sum of the displacements that the individual waves alone would give it. This process of vector addition of the displacements of a particle is called *superposition*. ...

For waves in deformable media the superposition principle holds whenever the mathematical relation between the deformation and the restoring force is one of simple proportionality. Such a relation is expressed mathematically by a linear equation. For electromagnetic waves the superposition principle holds because the mathematical relations between the electric and magnetic fields are linear.²

¹ Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 15, "Oscillations", p. 299.

² Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 410.

At the seawall, when an outgoing wave and an incoming wave are traversing the same space independently of one another, and the two waves meet, a cork that happens to be floating at the intersection is lifted higher than it would be by either one of the waves by itself. This shows that the superposition principle holds for these two waves. After the momentary intersection of these two waves, the waves continue traversing the same space independently. But when they intersected, the superposition principle held momentarily, and their two amplitudes added to make a momentary wave that was bigger than either wave by itself.

> The superposition principle seems so obvious that it is worthwhile to point out that it does not always hold. Superposition fails when the equations governing wave motion are not linear. Physically this happens when the wave disturbance is relatively large and the ordinary linear laws of mechanical action no longer hold. ...

> ... [V]iolent explosions create shock waves. Although shock waves are longitudinal classic waves in air, they behave differently from ordinary sound waves. The equation governing their propagation is quadratic, and superposition does not hold. With two very loud notes the ear hears something more than just the two individual notes. Those familiar with the highfidelity apparatus will know that "intermodulation distortion" between two tones arises when the system fails to combine the tones linearly, and that this distortion is more apparent when the amplitude of the tones is high. A more obvious physical example is water waves. Ripples cannot travel independently across breakers as they can across gentle swells.¹

The important point here is that even though two or more waves may appear to intersect, that doesn't mean that the superposition principle holds. Nevertheless, superposition is common. --- In this use of wave physics as a vehicle for theodicy, the existence of waves, the existence of superposition, and the elimination of damping are three factors that are crucial to the story.

When the superposition principle holds between two or more waves, the waves are said to "interfere" with one another. At the seawall, when the crest of the incoming wave met the crest of the outgoing wave, and the two amplitudes added, there was "constructive interference", meaning that the amplitudes of the two waves added to momentarily make a single wave with an amplitude bigger than the amplitude of either of the two waves. When the crest of the incoming wave met the trough of the outgoing wave, there was "negative interference", meaning that the resulting amplitude was smaller than that of the incoming wave.

¹ Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", pp. 410-411.

PART I, CHAPTER A, WAVE PHYSICS IN GENERAL

Interference refers to the physical effects of superimposing two or more wavetrains. Let us consider two waves of equal frequency and amplitude traveling with the same speed in the same direction ... but with a phase difference ... between them.

Now let us find the resultant wave ... on the assumption that superposition occurs ...

This resultant wave corresponds to a new wave having the same frequency ... When [the phase difference] is zero, the two waves have the same phase everywhere. The crest of one corresponds to the crest of the other and likewise for the troughs. The waves are then said to interfere constructively. The resultant amplitude is just twice that of either wave alone. If [the phase difference] is near 180° ... the resultant amplitude will be nearly zero. When [the phase difference] is *exactly* 180°, the crest of one wave corresponds exactly to the trough of the other. The waves are then said to interfere destructively. The resultant amplitude is zero.

In Fig. 19-9*a* we show the superposition of two wavetrains almost in phase ... and in Fig. 19-9*b* the superposition of two wavetrains almost 180° out of phase Notice that in these figures the algebraic sum of the ordinates of the thin (component) curves at any value of *x* equals the ordinate of the thick (resultant) curve. The sum of two waves can, therefore, have different values, depending on their phase relations.¹

¹ Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", pp. 417-418.




figure 19-9 caption:1

(a) The superposition of two waves of equal frequency and amplitude that are almost in phase results in a wave of almost twice the amplitude of either component. (b) The superposition of two waves of equal frequency and amplitude and almost 180° out of phase results in a wave whose amplitude is nearly zero. Note that in both the resultant frequency is unchanged. (The drawings correspond to the instant t=0.)

The spatial period of a wave is generally called the "wavelength". The wavelength is the distance over which the wave's shape repeats. In watching waves come into shore, the wavelength could be measured from the crest of one wave to the crest of the following wave. So the wavelength includes both the crest and the trough. If the sea was utterly flat, then any given wave's amplitude would be zero. If the sea were not utterly flat, then the amplitude would be measured as the height above zero. Likewise, the negative amplitude of the trough would be measured as the depth

¹ This figure is taken from **Figure 19-9**, Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 418.

PART I, CHAPTER A, WAVE PHYSICS IN GENERAL

below zero. Frequency is the number of cycles of a periodic process that occurs per unit of time. If one wants to know the frequency of waves coming into shore, then one could count the wave crests per minute, which would be the frequency.

In both of the two figures in Resnick and Halliday's figure 19-9, the waves in both instances are out of phase. If the wavelengths in each instance were equal, and if the waves in each instance were perfectly in phase, then in each case, the result would be constructive interference, with no destructive interference. Under such circumstances, the waves are said to be what physicists call "coherent", which means that there is perfect constructive interference. Another way of saying this is to say that the waves have a constant relative phase. Even if the wavelengths are equal, it's possible for a degree of phase shift to exist. In example (a), the waves are slightly out of phase. In example (b), the two waves are close to 180° out of phase. --- Situations like these two sets of overlapping waves might occur if one threw a pebble in a pool of water, followed shortly thereafter by a second pebble.

The next figure shows two intersecting waves that have the same wavelength and that are in phase, but they have different amplitudes.




figure 19-10 caption:1

The addition of two waves of the same frequency and phase but differing amplitudes (light lines) yields a third wave of the same frequency and phase (heavy line)

If one stands at a seawall watching waves bounce off the wall, one can notice not only that the peaks add, but so do the troughs. When two peaks meet they *interfere constructively*, meaning that the two amplitudes add, thereby creating a third wave that is bigger than either of the other two waves by itself. But when the phases of two waves are such that a trough meets a peak, the two waves *interfere destructively*, so that trough is added to peak, and the peak is lower and the trough is shallower, thereby creating a momentary wave whose amplitude is minimized.² --- Resnick and

¹ This figure is taken from **Figure 19-10**, Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 418.

² For more on constructive and destructive interference, see Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 419.

Halliday's figure 19-10 shows another, fourth factor that is crucial to this theodicy's story, in addition to (i)the existence of waves, (ii)the existence of superposition, and (iii)the elimination of damping. This fourth factor is coherence, where coherence has a technical meaning in wave physics, as already indicated. Coherence refers to an ideal state in which two waves that are subject to the superposition principle are in phase, and have the same wavelength. Coherence is the wave phenomenon that allows lasers to have extraordinary power.

Sub-Chapter 2: How Traveling Waves Interact - Electromagnetic Spectrum

In moving from the macroscopic realm into the microscopic realm, the basic characteristics of waves do not change. In the microscopic realm, waves can still interfere with one another so that the interaction between waves is constructive and/ or destructive, so that the wave's existence, power, amplitude, *etc.*, can be damped, and so that waves can sometimes be coherent.

As already indicated the objects of study in the microscopic realm of quantum physics research have a dual character, being either particle-like or wave-like, depending upon the test.

> An astute observer of nature ... will find something fishy about this ... discussion of interference: it does not seem to manifest itself in everyday experiences with light. Sunlight streaming through a window, for instance, doesn't interfere with the light emanating from a lamp inside the room. Something is missing from our basic discussion of interference which explains why some light fields, such as those produced from a single laser source, produce interference patterns and others, such as sunlight, seemingly produce no interference. The missing ingredient is what is known as *optical coherence*

> Optical coherence refers to the ability of a light wave to produce interference patterns If two light waves are brought together and they produce no interference pattern (no regions of increased and decreased brightness), they are said to be *incoherent*; if they produce a 'perfect' interference pattern ('perfect' in the sense that regions of complete destructive interference exist), they are said to be *fully coherent*. If the two light waves produce a 'less

than-perfect' interference pattern, they are said to be *partially coherent*.¹

In the case of sunlight streaming through a window and mixing randomly with light emanating from a lamp, the multitude of light waves probably interact with one another so that there is no sign of any degree of coherence, and therefore no distinguishable interference of any kind. Even if these light waves interact with one another linearly, their mutual interference is so inchoate that "they are said to be *incoherent*". The word "*incoherent*" is used here to distinguish light waves that show no sign of being in phase from light waves that are much closer to being genuinely coherent, such as in a laser.

The lack of coherence of the light from ordinary sources such as glowing wires is due to the fact that the emitting atoms do not act cooperatively (i.e., *coherently*). Since 1960 it has proved possible to construct sources of visible light in which the atoms *do* act cooperatively and in which the emitted light is highly coherent. Such devices are called *optical masers* or *lasers*; their light output is extremely monochromatic, intense, and highly collimated.²

One of the obstacles to the recognition that the superposition principle must hold between subatomic particles and atoms, between atoms and molecules, and between molecules and living entities, so that such superposition is recognized as crucial to the existence of both ordinary matter and biological life, has been the concern that these relations might be nonlinear, and that superposition between these entities might therefore not hold. In a related statement, Dr. Preparata says, "the great successes of Laser Physics (LP), where the subtle order brought about by the coherent intersection between the electromagnetic field and the atomic systems shines in full glory, paradoxically and ironically, have grown into a sort of psychological barrier to recognizing its presence in the quantum mechanical ground states of condensed matter."3 In other words, the display of wave coherence between electromagnetic radiation and atoms, as such coherence is brought about by lasers, has been so profound, that such success acts as a psychological barrier to seeing wave coherence in ordinary solids and liquids. --- It may be true that Dr. Preparata is focusing on wave coherence, where coherence is a special kind of interference. But because coherence is a special kind of interference, if there is no interference, there can

¹ Gbur, Gregory J., associate professor of physics at University of North Carolina at Charlotte. --- URL: http://skullsinthestars.com/2008/09/03/optics-basics-coherence/.

² Halliday, David, and Resnick, Robert; **Physics, Part II**, 1962, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, Chapter 47, "Interference", p. 1077.

³ Preparata, pp. vii-viii.

be no coherence. The psychological barrier that Preparata refers to is not only a barrier to recognizing that coherence can exist in liquid and solid matter. It's also a psychological barrier to acknowledging that the superposition principle holds in such matter, and therefore in living beings. --- Even to knowledgeable lay observers, it should be obvious that macroscopic physical objects, including living bodies, could not coalesce from subatomic particles and atoms into such macroscopic physical entities, unless superposition holds. After examining traveling waves, maybe this is not so obvious. But after examining standing waves, it should be obvious.

Sub-Chapter 3: How Standing Waves Interact - Macroscopic Domain

Now that the properties and behavior of traveling waves are sufficiently exposed, both in the macroscopic and quantum realms, it's possible to examine the properties and behavior of standing waves, also known as "stationary waves". Standing waves are crucial to the understanding of living organisms based on concepts developed in wave physics. At the macroscopic, mechanical level of perception, standing waves can be generally understood in terms of oscillation and resonance.

> [A] bridge vibrates under the influence of marching soldiers, the housing of a motor vibrates owing to periodic impulses from an irregularity in the shaft, and a tuning fork vibrates when exposed to the periodic force of a sound wave. The oscillations that result are called *forced* oscillations. These forced oscillations have the frequency of the *external* force and not the natural frequency of the body. However, the response of the body depends on the relation between the forced and the natural frequency. A succession of small impulses applied at the proper frequency can produce an oscillation of large amplitude. A child using a swing learns that by pumping at proper time intervals he can make the swing move with a large amplitude. The problem of forced oscillations is a very general one. Its solution is useful in acoustic systems, alternating current circuits, and atomic physics as well as in mechanics.¹

In the mechanical realm, when "*forced* oscillations" reach a large amplitude that is near "the natural frequency of the body", the physical body that is subject to the forced oscillations is subject to resonance.

[W]henever a system capable of oscillating is acted on by a periodic series of impulses having a frequency equal or nearly

¹ Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 15, "Oscillations", p. 323.

equal to one of the natural frequencies of oscillation of the system, the system is set into oscillation with a relatively large amplitude. This phenomenon is called *resonance* ... and the system is said to resonate with the applied impulses.

We \dots encounter resonance conditions \dots in sound, in electromagnetism, in optics, and in atomic and nuclear physics.¹

At the macroscopic level, resonance is usually understood to exist as a function of forced oscillations. But it is understood to be a function of the natural vibrational frequency of whatever object is the target of such forced oscillation. For example, if soldiers march in formation over a bridge, they might set the bridge into vibrating at the bridge's harmonic frequency, so that the entire bridge might be prone to collapse. This would certainly be a macroscopic resonance effect. Resonance is where the frequency of forced oscillation approaches the natural frequency of the target system. So it's reasonable to envision macroscopic resonance as the superposition principle as it exists between a traveling wavetrain and a standing wave.

In order to relate this kind of oscillatory behavior to traveling waves, it's necessary to understand oscillatory behavior and resonance in terms of standing waves.

In a one-dimensional body of finite size, such as a taut string held by two clamps a distance l apart, traveling waves in the string are reflected from the boundaries of the body, that is, from the clamps. Each such reflection gives rise to a wave traveling in the string in the opposite direction. The reflected waves add to the incident waves according to the principle of superposition.

Consider two wavetrains of the same frequency, speed, and amplitude which are traveling in *opposite directions* along a string. ... *Characteristic of a standing wave* ... *is the fact that the amplitude is not the same for different particles but varies with the location x of the particle*. ... [Where] the amplitude ... has a *maximum* value ... points are called *antinodes* and are spaced one-half wavelength apart. [Where the] amplitude has a *minimum* value of zero ... [the] points are called *nodes* and are spaced one-half wavelength apart. The separation between a node and an adjacent antinode is one quarter wavelength.²

Wavelength can be defined as the length along the horizontal axis from a point at which amplitude is zero and rising at the origin of the x and y axes, to the point immediately to the right at which the amplitude is again zero and rising.

¹ Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 424.

² Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", pp. 420-421.

Oscillating strings often vibrate so rapidly that the eye perceives only a blur whose shape is that of the envelope of the motion. See Fig. 19-17.

The superposition of an incident wave and a reflected wave, being the sum of two waves traveling in opposite directions, will give rise to a standing wave.¹




figure 19-17 caption:²

The envelope of a standing wave, corresponding to a time exposure of the motion and showing the patterns of nodes and antinodes.

The superposition principle in regard to macroscopic standing waves works largely the same way the superposition principle works for traveling waves. In Resnick and Halliday's figure 19-15, each of the standing waves, (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*) that appears in row 3, is a result of the interference of the traveling waves in rows 1 and 2. Although these standing waves might be understood to exist on a violin or guitar, the same principle applies in the electromagnetic field.³

¹ Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", pp. 422-423.

² This figure is taken from **Figure 19-17**, Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 423.

^{3 &}quot;[T]he nodes of *any* vibrating elastic body are fixed by certain functions of position which are called the eigenfunctions of the problem. In general, these functions are *not* sinusoidal functions but are functions that become zero for certain values of the coordinates. The determination of these functions and the corresponding values of the eigenfrequencies is an important problem in atomic, nuclear, and solid-state physics. They characterize the behavior of such systems. It is in quantum mechanics that the procedure has been successfully worked out for microscopic systems. The results however bear striking analogy to the results of classical vibration and wave theory, as applied to macroscopic systems." --- Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 20, "Sound Waves", p. 443.




figure 19-15 caption:¹

Standing waves as the superposition of left- and right-going waves; 1 and 2 are components, 3 the resultant.

One extremely important fact about any oscillating system pertains to *damping*. If a spring is set oscillating, or a pendulum is set swinging, there are forces in nature that generally impede the oscillation. For example, gravity works to impede the swinging of a pendulum, and friction usually works to impede the oscillation of a spring.

In order to finish this brief, non-technical, freshman-level introduction to wave physics, as an essential prerequisite for establishing the ideological foundations for this theodicy's protracted story, there is one final subject: standing waves as they exist in the electromagnetic, microscopic, quantum realm.

> Sub-Chapter 4: How Standing Waves Interact - Electromagnetic Spectrum (Electromagnetic Wave Interference in Matter)

What's true about standing waves in the macroscopic realm is generally also true about standing waves in the microscopic, electromagnetic, quantum realm. The most significant difference between standing waves in the two respective realms is that damping is prevalent in the macroscopic realm, while it is not so prevalent in the microscopic realm. But before speaking of this relative absence of damping in

¹ This figure is taken from **Figure 19-15**, Resnick & Halliday, Chapter 19, "Waves in Elastic Media", p. 422.

the microscopic realm, it's important to establish that the dual, wave-particle nature of things like photons also exists in ordinary matter.

In 1924 Louis de Broglie of France reasoned that (*a*) nature is strikingly symmetrical in many ways; (*b*) our observable universe is composed entirely of light and matter; (*c*) if light has a dual, wave-particle nature, perhaps matter has also. Since matter was then regarded as being composed of particles, de Broglie's reasoning suggested that one should search for a wavelike behavior for matter.¹

Following this line of reasoning, and using the already-established fact that light has a dual, wave-particle nature,

De Broglie assumed that the wavelength of the predicted matter waves was given by the same relationship that held for light

De Broglie predicted ... the wavelength of matter waves.²

De Broglie's prediction was tested with experiments with electrons emanating from a heated filament. The evidence from such experiments, "combined with much similar evidence", provided "convincing argument for believing that electrons are wave-like".³

Not only electrons but all other particles, charged or uncharged, show wave-like characteristics. ...

The evidence for the existence of matter waves ... is strong indeed. Nevertheless, the evidence that matter is composed of particles remains equally strong Thus, for matter as for light, we must face up to the existence of a dual character; *matter behaves in some circumstances like a particle and in others like a wave.*⁴

These experiments with beams of electrons certainly proved that matter, like light, has this dual nature. But these experiments pertained to traveling waves. In order to explain how electrons can exist in "orbits" around atomic nuclei, it was necessary to translate equations pertinent to standing waves in the macroscopic realm into equations pertinent to standing waves in the microscopic realm. One of the characteristics of standing waves in both realms is that they are "quantized". Examples of this in the macroscopic realm exist in harmonics on violin and guitar strings, which are marked by nodes, as in Resnick and Halliday's figure 19-17. De

¹ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1200.

² Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1200.

³ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1203.

⁴ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1203.

Broglie was able to make such a translation of mathematics that describe macroscopic standing waves into equivalent mathematics that describe microscopic standing waves.

De Broglie was able to derive the Bohr quantization condition for angular momentum by applying proper *boundary conditions* to matter waves in the hydrogen atom.¹

Erwin Schrodinger expanded De Broglie's work into one of the crucial formulations of quantum mechanics.

The idea that the stationary states in atoms correspond to standing matter waves was taken up by Erwin Schrodinger in 1926 and used by him as the foundation of *wave mechanics*, one of several equivalent formulations of quantum physics.²

There have been countless empirical studies since the 1920s that have verified that electrons exist as quantized standing waves around the nuclei of stable atoms. This is in addition to their recognized existence as particles.

One extremely important question about such standing waves is, do they run down? In other words, the same way a guitar or violin string will eventually stop vibrating, due to the effects of damping and resistance, does an electron standing wave around an atomic nucleus stop vibrating, and cease to be a standing wave? --- The evidence is overwhelming that the same way a photon can travel countless light years through space, without having its wave nature diminished or damped, an electron in its ground state around an atomic nucleus can exist undamped for eons. So while overwhelming evidence indicates that in the macroscopic realm, standing waves are practically always damped, the evidence indicates the opposite in the microscopic realm. The law of inertia applies in both realms, as well as to traveling and standing waves and particles. The law says that every body persists in its state of rest or uniform motion unless compelled to change by an outside force. The reason damping is the general rule in the macroscopic realm is because outside forces are the rule. The surface of the earth is replete with motion and change, which is the general reason violin strings and guitar strings stop vibrating. In contrast, damping is not the general rule in the microscopic realm, which is why electrons do not stop vibrating as standing waves around stable atomic nuclei. They do not run down. Such quantum standing waves are generally not damped, and are stable unless some kind of outside force interferes.

¹ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1204.

² Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1204.

Sub-Chapter 5: Uncertainty Principle with Disclaimer

With the discovery of the dual nature of both light and matter, physicists were faced with a puzzle regarding how to explain their research data, and how to continue their research. The mathematical descriptions of these things that have both wave and particle attributes are dependent upon probabilities, because the actual location of the particle can never be ascertained, but only predicted probabilistically. Being physicists, and not metaphysicists, the limits of their science was being strained by difficulties in measurement.

Only those quantities that can be measured have any real meaning in physics. If we could focus a "super" microscope on an electron in an atom and see it moving around in an orbit, we would declare that such orbits have meaning. However, we shall show that *it is fundamentally impossible to make such an observation-*-even with the most ideal instruments that could conceivably be constructed. Therefore, we declare that such orbits have no physical meaning.

We observe the moon traveling around the earth by means of the sunlight that it reflects in our direction. Now light transfers linear momentum to an object from which it is reflected. In principle, this reflected light would disturb the course of the moon in its orbit, although a little thought shows that this disturbing effect is negligible.¹

One billiard ball hitting another billiard ball is an example of the first billiard ball transferring linear momentum to the second billiard ball. According to classical physics, the same situation should exist when a photon hits the moon. But a photon hitting the moon is negligible in the same way that the effect of a light beam from a lamp, hitting a reader's book, has no noticeable impact on the book, other than to illuminate it to the reader. It's not like the book was hit with a billiard ball. Likewise, a light beam hitting the moon has no noticeable impact on the moon, other than to illuminate it. But when an electron in an atomic "orbit" is hit by a photon, the situation is very different from macroscopic objects.

For electrons the situation is quite different. Here, too, we can hope to "see" the electron only if we reflect light, or another particle, from it. In this case the recoil that the electron experiences when the light (photon) bounces from it completely

¹ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", p. 1210.

alters the electron's motion in a way that cannot be avoided or even corrected for.

It is not surprising that the probability curve ... is the most detailed information that we can hope to obtain, by measurement, about the distribution of negative charge into the hydrogen atom. If orbits such as those envisaged by Bohr existed, they would be broken up completely in our attempts to verify their existence. Under these circumstances, we prefer to say that it is the probability function, and not the orbits, that represents physical reality.

Our inherent inability to describe the motions of electrons in a classical way finds expression in the *uncertainty principle*, enunciated by Werner Heisenberg in 1927.¹

When a photon traveling wave encounters an electron standing wave in its "orbit" around an atomic nucleus, the standard explanation says that the electron goes into an excited state, then simultaneously emits an equivalent photon and returns to its normal standing-wave status. But all attempts at measuring the location of the quantum particle distort the measurement process, because "it is fundamentally *impossible to make such an observation*". So rather than attempt to describe the motion of quantum particles by the methods used in classical physics, physicists describe such motion using a "probability function". In other words, they describe such motion as a function of chance. This is a perfectly legitimate usage of probabilistic mathematics. So the *uncertainty principle* is true in the sense that it's a necessary accommodation if physicists hope to continue research in spite of the perceptual barrier. But when physicists attempt to conceptualize what's going on, and when they attempt to communicate with one another or with lay observers about what's going on, they are prone to serious confusion. The confusion relates directly and indirectly to chance being embedded in their descriptions of objective reality. So even though this theodicy is based on the marvelous discoveries of modern physics, disclaimers are necessary to avoid serious epistemological errors that are common in modern physics.

DISCLAIMER: As long as the probability function / chance is recognized as a mere accommodation to an insurmountable perceptual barrier, such usage is innocent, legitimate, and necessary. The *uncertainty principle* is necessary to the process of experimentation, and this theodicy follows numerous reputable authorities in accepting its necessary existence in the physics enterprise. Even so, as a probability function, it expresses the concept of *chance*. Chance does not exist in

¹ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", pp. 1210-1211.

nature. Chance is a cognitive device that humans use in dealing with complexity in nature.

When scientists attribute instrumental power to chance, they have left the domain of physics and resorted to magic. Chance is their magic wand to make not only rabbits but entire universes appear out of nothing. ... The classical scientific method consists of the marriage of induction and deduction, of the empirical and the rational. Attributing instrumental causal power to chance vitiates deduction and the rational. It is manifest irrationality, which is not only bad philosophy but horrible science as well.¹

When "scientists attribute instrumental power to chance", they violate the law of causality by assuming that self-creation is possible. This happens by assuming that something exists objectively when it does not exist objectively. In essence, scientists who attribute instrumental power to chance are claiming authority to redefine the physical universe to accommodate their perceptual disabilities. Chance and probabilistic mathematics have no more ontological existence than mathematical lines and points. But this problem with attributing instrumental power to chance is not the only problem that shows how rogue modern physics has become.

Empirical scientists may disparage philosophy, ontology, and epistemology, but they cannot escape them. Science involves the quest for knowledge. Any such quest, by necessity, involves some commitment to epistemology. The epistemology of irrationalism is fatal to all science because it makes knowledge of anything impossible. If a truth's contrary can also be true, no truth about anything can possibly be known.²

Going back at least to Niels Bohr, physicists have been rejecting sound epistemological foundations not only by violating the law of causality, but also by violating the law of noncontradiction. This shows up in Bohr's dictum.

Niels Bohr's dictum "A great truth is a truth of which the contrary is also a truth" stirred up great controversy. The controversy still rages. Carl Sagan, in an appendix to his popular work *Cosmos*, writes: "To take a modern example, consider the aphorism by the great twentieth-century physicist, Niels Bohr: 'The opposite of every great idea is another great idea.' If the

¹ R.C. Sproul, **Not a Chance: The Myth of Chance in Modern Science & Cosmology**, 1994, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids, Michigan, pp. 9-10.

² Sproul, Not a Chance, p. 18.

statement were true, its consequences might be at least a little perilous." $^{\!\!\!\!^{n_1}}$

When physicists violate both the law of noncontradiction and the law of causality, they are essentially making a religious or philosophical assertion, as though they are devotees of some bizarre religion.

In conclusion, this theodicy affirms the legitimate use of the *uncertainty principle* in quantum physics. However, it also rejects as specious all claims by scientists that are based on dubious epistemological foundations. Separating the specious from the reliable is a major house-cleaning operation that is outside the scope of the present work. Even so, the science that this work relies on is generally valid and does not violate reliable epistemology.

¹ Sproul, **Not a Chance**, p. 57. --- Sproul quotes Carl Sagan, *Cosmos* (New York: Random, 1980), p. 547; (New York: Ballantine, 1985), p. 289. --- Sagan quotes Bohr.

PART I

Chapter B: Organismic Standing Waves

Sub-Chapter 1: The Wave Nature of the Human Body

The most crucial thing to understand from this rudimentary examination of wave physics is that all the objects in the human being's everyday life are constructed with both wave and particle attributes, and more specifically, they are all built through constructive wave interference. So given the massive evidence for the wave nature of matter, one would need to be a radical skeptic to reject the claim that everyday objects in the ordinary person's ordinary field of perception exist as distinct objects due to electromagnetic wave interaction. In other words, within the domain of people who understand wave physics, only radical skeptics reject the proposition that ordinary physical objects of all kinds are manifestations of electromagnetic standing waves. So regardless of whether one is speaking of animal, mineral, or vegetable; gas, solid, or liquid; animate or inanimate; human or non-human; all physical objects and substances have attributes of electromagnetic standing waves. To argue otherwise is to exercise radical skepticism that belies all claims to being a truth seeker. If the reader now understands that the evidence establishing the wave nature of matter is overwhelming, then it's possible to start moving the focus to biological systems.

If the above wave physics is accepted as true, or at least highly probable, then it's inevitably also true that all physical entities one encounters on a day-to-day basis exist as functions of both particle and wave attributes. String theorists may claim that particles are themselves the effects and expressions of standing waves. It's not necessary to indulge in such speculation in order to proceed to the point of this theodicy. It's only necessary to consider the ramifications of life forms being standing waves by way of wave interaction. So as physical creatures, all humans can theoretically be described as functions of wave interaction.

Based on wave physics, no multi-atomic physical entity can exist as a physical entity without electromagnetic standing waves glomming together at the atomic level. Electrons cleave to the atomic nucleus, forming standing waves around the nucleus and with each other. Then atoms cleave to one another by way of electron standing-wave interaction, and the atoms thereby form multi-atomic physical entities. Different kinds of atoms glom together to form molecules; so molecules and atoms glom together to form physical entities. If atoms and molecules glom together to form a rock, then all the atoms and molecules that go into that rock's existence are glomming together to form a single standing wave, where the standing wave manifests itself as a rock. If the entity is a gas or a liquid, then similar glomming electromagnetic waves exist.

If a multi-atomic physical entity is some form of life, then regardless of whether the entity is human, animal, vegetable, or microbial, standing electromagnetic-wave interference is crucial to the entity's cohesion as a living entity. So, (i)standing waves glomming together at the subatomic level is necessary to the integrity of atoms; (ii)standing waves glomming together at the atomic level is necessary to the integrity of molecules; (iii)standing waves glomming together at the molecular level is necessary to the integrity of microscopic cellular organelles; (iv)standing waves glomming together at the organelle level is necessary to the integrity of living cells; (v)standing waves glomming together at the cellular level is necessary to the integrity of endogenous organs within multicellular organismic standing waves; and (vi) standing waves glomming together at the level of endogenous organs is necessary to the integrity of the organism as a multicellular organismic standing wave. According to common sense, all of this glomming at each level happens through wave interference. So according to common sense, at each level there are standing waves, and the end result of all this wave interference is an entity that exists as a singular standing wave.

In the details, there is no doubt that this is all extremely complex. But common sense demands that the result of all this wave interference within the organism's physical body is the existence of a single standing wave based on electromagnetic standing-wave interference. There are standing waves at the atomic level whose waves superpose on one another to form molecules, whose waves superpose on one another to form organelles, whose waves superpose on one another to form cells, whose waves superpose on one another to form organs, whose waves superpose on one another to form the organism. So electromagnetic standing waves are foundational to the existence of all physical organisms. In fact, physical organisms can only exist as living entities by way of electromagnetic standing-wave interference.

Specifically how all this superposition works at every level of organization is extremely complex. That cohesion of the organism is based on superposition of standing waves is common sense and is relatively simple to understand. But a detailed description of how it works with respect to the role of DNA, cell formation, cell differentiation, cell replication, formation of organelles, and all the other phenomena that are crucial to the organism's existence and attributes cannot be ascertained by anyone right now, because much of it is still unknown. But that it is done, and that all of these endogenous processes are based on superposition of standing waves, along with other electromagnetic phenomena, is now almost impossible to deny. Before starting the theodicy, *per se*, which will begin with a discussion of the possibility of the perpetual existence of an organismic standing wave, it's important to speak further about the intermediate standing waves between the atomic level and the organismic standing wave. Such intermediate endogenous standing waves are the target of a whole field of weapons research. By briefly examining these intermediate standing waves from the angle of weapons research, it should become undeniably clear how real this electromagnetic standing-wave science is. It is not purely theoretical. It is not merely "new age" and occult fantasies. It is not based on dubious epistemological foundations, even if this weapons research has dubious moral foundations. This application of standing-wave science to biological entities encompasses a whole field of very real physical phenomena.

It's common knowledge that all living organisms consist of living cells. Some organisms are unicellular, and some are multicellular. Regardless of whether the organism is unicellular or multicellular, every organism is subject to the wave physics described above. The way that this happens is summarized well by Dr. Nicholas Begich in one of his books:

> Inside each cell is **DNA** imprinted with the **genetic code** that controls every aspect of what we are as physical beings. The genetic code controls the development of the cell and production of **proteins** within the cells. The **proteins** provide structure to the cell and serve as part of the chemical processes that combine with food, producing the energy and the components needed for cells to continue to self-generate.

> The body breaks down the foods we take into our bodies and captures the simplest molecules, and energy components, and then delivers them to the cells. This process of breaking down foods, and selecting the right molecules, represents the **chemical code** the body recognizes.

All of the chemical reactions in the cells are driven by electromagnetic oscillations, pulsations, vibrations or frequencies of the vibrating atoms and substances that make up their composition. This is the **frequency code** of all of atoms, molecules, cells, and components of any living organism. All physical matter is vibrating, energetically at some level, with the *-- rate of vibration specific to the material just like the* **genetic code** *is specific to our physical make-up*.

The body only utilizes certain **organic molecules** in its processes. The unique **frequency codes** of those organic molecules serve as the mechanical switches and regulators for living organisms. Every place in the body that there is an

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exact **resonant frequency match** activated there is **resonance**, when their unique code is recognized the correct molecules are absorbed. All cells and cell groups have their own **resonant frequencies** built into their structure with the energy exchanges taking place on the surface of each cell.

All physical matter is composed of systems in motion at their smallest atomic and subatomic levels. Everything in creation is composed of the same basic elements or building blocks, but in their unique combinations, they have the individual fingerprints of a **resonant frequency**. When a substance's natural vibration rate encounters other energy sources vibrating at the exact same rate, there is a transfer of energy between them that results in a biological reaction. The **resonating** material is coupled, or joined, with the energy source, which then directly impacts the targeted material. ...

The **resonant frequency of a substance** is defined as its vibration rate under its normal and natural condition. When a material is activated by interaction with another source of energy at the same **resonant frequency** a more powerful and intensive response occurs. If energy is **pulse-modulated** into the substance a significant change can be created in the **codes** of the human body which is why **resonance** is such an import[ant] part of any of these discussions. **Resonance** is one of the significant keys to bridging the physics of materials science with organic chemistry, which will lead to the greatest breakthroughs in medical science in the 21st century.

Another very important discovery in both electronics and physiology were **liquid crystals**. ... In living things **liquid crystals** also exist as **organic molecules** and have characteristics of both solids and liquids.

Inside and outside of each cell are **liquid crystal organic molecules** that will **resonate** with any outside source of energy where there is a **frequency match**. They will begin to vibrate at higher states of energy when an outside source is introduced, just like in electronics, when a radio station transmitter and home receiver **frequency's match**. ... The energy charge on the inside and outside of cells can also be manipulated, in various forms, to change the **liquid crystals**, sort of like living microcircuits.

All processes that build up and break down the cells and chemicals of the body are controlled by **electromagnetic oscillations**. The **metabolic processes** are processes that can be influenced through applied external energy sources of low power when they share the same **frequency codes**. When the laws of physics are applied to the materials that make up the human body a much different set of possibilities begins to emerge. Manipulation of the **frequency codes** of living things can change them in more direct and powerful ways than chemicals because the delivery systems are precise and only effect the targeted materials, elements, molecules, cells, organs, etc.¹

The most essential thing to understand in this summary is what Dr. Begich calls the "frequency code". It's certainly important that from the moment of conception, the "genetic code" is the controlling influence on the development of the physical body. And it's certainly important that the body's "chemical code" orchestrates all the biochemical interactions that are necessary for the organism's survival. But as far as understanding the basic wave nature of life is concerned, the concept of frequency is critical, and the genetic code and chemical code are subsumed thereby.

As indicated above, every standing wave has a frequency. Frequency is the number of cycles of a periodic process that occurs per unit of time. With regard to the physical body, frequency is the rate of vibration of an atom, a molecule, a set of molecules that constitute a cellular organelle (like mitochondria, cell nucleus, cell membrane, etc.), the organelles and migratory molecules that constitute cells, cell groups that are essentially internal organs (stomach, colon, lungs, heart, muscles, nervous system, etc.), all the way up to the single standing wave that is the living body. These all have frequencies, evidenced by the fact that they are all standing waves. Logic says each level is a standing wave by way of the superposition principle. Evidence in the form of research and patents confirms the conclusion of this logic. Each of these standing waves can be affected by electromagnetic radiation that vibrates at the same frequency. The frequency of the standing wave is the natural frequency of the atom, molecule, organelle, cell, etc., and in undamped systems, the natural frequency is the same as the "resonant frequency". So the resonant frequency is the frequency at which a periodic outside force of equal frequency causes the system's amplitude of oscillation to increase. So resonance can be understood to be the superposition principle as it exists between a traveling wave and a standing wave.

¹ Begich, Nick, **Controlling the Human Mind: The Technologies for Political Control or Tools for Peak Performance**; 2006; Earthpulse Press Inc., P.O.Box 201393; Anchorage, Alaska 99520; 1-907-249-9111, pp. 14-16. --- URL: http://www.earthpulse. com.

Regarding "liquid crystal organic molecules", "[L]iquid crystal structures are found throughout nature, including the cell walls of the human body."¹ These liquid crystal organic molecules are especially noteworthy because they act as radio receivers at cell walls. The same way radios and televisions work by way of resonance established by way of a frequency match between transmitter and receiver, communication between an exogenous transmitter and a living cell can be established by way of a frequency match between an outside source of electromagnetic traveling waves and liquid crystal organic molecules in and on the cell.

What happens when an external electromagnetic field is in **resonance** with a biological molecule, then the same type of molecule will experience an energy exchange through **induced electron flow** and **electromagnetic coupling**. Researchers ... have shown that the cells of the body are like filters or tuners that only recognize a corresponding electromagnetic signal that **matches** with their own. **Electromagnetic coupling** allows the creation of very specific "controlled effects" over any aspect of a living creature. Once decoded, the understanding of the **frequency codes** of the body, brain and mind can be applied to people ...

When living things are also recognized as very complex living biophysical nanocircuits, and the laws of physics applied, very specific outcomes will always follow. There is a principle of **electromagnetic induction** where an electric current can be induced in a conductive material by just moving a magnet along the material. You can also measure the magnetic field created when a current flows through a conductive material. A **transformer** is a device that transfers electrical energy from one electric circuit to another through **magnetic induction** while the **frequency** stays constant. **Induction** is how energy is transferred in living things as well.²

"Electromagnetic coupling" is also known as "radiative coupling". In physics, "coupling" is defined simply as the existence of interaction between two systems. If the two systems are a transmitter of electromagnetic radiation (like a traditional radio or television station) and a receiver of electromagnetic radiation (like a radio or television), then it makes sense that the coupling could be called either "electromagnetic" or "radiative".

¹ Clarknet News Archive, A. James Clark School of Engineering, University of Maryland, "NSF Grant Supports Liquid Crystal Research" --- URL: http://clarknet.eng. umd.edu/news/news_story.php?id=4637.

² Begich, pp. 17-18.

"Induction", also known as "electromagnetic induction", a phenomenon described by "Faraday's law of induction",¹ is essentially the creation of an electric current through a conductor by moving a magnet close to the conductor. Such movement of a magnet near a conductor causes electron flow. Radiative / electromagnetic coupling by way of resonance between exogenous electromagnetic traveling waves and organic molecules causes electrons in those molecules to go into excited states, which tends to cause electron flow / current.

> It is well known that high energy electromagnetic fields, or ionizing radiation, can cause heating, ionization and damage to living tissue. ... [T]he subtle energy of the body is much more interesting. It is at these lower levels of energy, or **non-ionizing** radiation levels, that the **resonance** effects of the **frequency code** are found. It is in the subtle energy transfers between materials where we find the drivers of living things.²

"An ion is a charged atom or molecule. It is charged because the number of electrons do not equal the number of protons in the atom or molecule."³ So "ionizing radiation" is radiation that causes atoms and molecules to become electrically charged, either negatively or positively. "Non-ionizing radiation" is electromagnetic radiation that does not cause atoms and molecules to be charged. From non-ionizing radiation, electrons may go into states of excitation, but that doesn't mean that they become dislodged from the nucleus of the atom. The research and patents cited below show that the frequency codes of the human body are generally at energy levels too low to cause ionization. This is true even though the normal electrical phenomena within the body are heavily dependent upon the existence of ions. The distinction here is that the normal, natural bodily ions came into their endogenous existence as ions through chemical mechanisms, and not generally through ionizing radiation.

> Radio and television waves are created by the production of pulsing electromagnetic charges with each different station broadcasting on a specific **frequency**. This **frequency** is always the same and where the radio or television station is on the dial. It is called the **carrier wave**. It is the information transferred on a **carrier wave** that is translated by the electronics of a radio or television receiver as either sound or sound and picture. Over one hundred years ago Nikola Tesla discovered that a **carrier wave** could be used to carry other signals called **signal waves**. A

¹ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 48, "Waves and Particles", pp. 870-873.

² Begich, pp. 19-20.

³ URL: http://qrg.northwestern.edu/projects/vss/docs/propulsion/1-what-is-an-ion.html.

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signal wave is what actually delivers the electronic **code** that the electronic circuits sort out and deliver as the image or sound.

When a **signal wave** is placed on a **carrier wave** we get what is called **modulation**. **Modulation** can be thought of as a small **pulsation** that either effects the height of the wave, also known as **amplitude**, or effects the distance between pulses, represented as pulses per second (**hertz**), or what we call **frequency**. What makes radio and television work is the combination of the **carrier wave** with a **signal wave**. When these are received by a radio or television set the combined signal is sent through the electronics of the receiver and projected on a screen as an image, or through a speaker as sound. The human body also translates external signals through its **biocircuits** in the same way.

We can also think of the whole body, an organ, cell, molecule, element or atom as a **transducer** (converting energy) and **a receiving antenna** (receiving energy) tuned to the exact signal wave on a carrier wave. When a receiving antenna picks up a signal of a broadcast station, and a circuit is tuned to that signal, resonance occurs and the received signal is increased in signal strength through **amplification** by the electronic circuit. Again, when we look at the human organism, which is constructed of what are essentially cellular **biological oscillators**, we see that the body can translate the information in the **signal wave** and transfer energy from the **carrier wave** through the same laws of physics applied to radio and television.¹

As indicated by Begich, the research shows that atoms, molecules, cellular organelles, cells, organs (meaning cell groups formed in the cell differentiation process), and the organism itself are all receivers and transducers for low energy electromagnetic traveling waves. This means that not only the lungs, the heart, the stomach, the colon, *etc.*, are subject to this kind of resonance. So is the central nervous system, including the brain. This means that thoughts and feelings are theoretically subject to such resonance. The research shows that this vulnerability to exogenous sources of resonance is not merely theoretical, but is a fact, including the manipulation of thoughts and feelings via resonance with the central nervous system.

A "transducer" is merely a device for converting one type of energy into another. For example, Edison's incandescent light bulb converts electrical power into visible light. It is therefore a kind of transducer. Likewise, a radio antenna converts electromagnetic waves into electricity if it's a receiving antenna, and it converts electricity into radiating electromagnetic waves if it's a transmitting antenna.

¹ Begich, pp. 20-21.

Likewise, the brain can be thought of as converting nerve impulses into thoughts and feelings. Even though thoughts and feelings are not strictly speaking physical, it makes sense that the brain is some kind of transducer.

Researchers are now showing that **frequency modulation** of cell membrane receptors, which function as **antennas/transducers**, transfer signals that are understood by the cells. Researchers have shown that all physiological processes from metabolic functions, nerve impulses and even thoughts are defined by their internal **codes**, which dictate how they interact with other energy sources of many kinds. The greatest advances are represented in the increased understanding of the **genetic codes** relationship to the **chemical codes**, and the **biophysics** of the **frequency codes** of living systems.¹

Sub-Chapter 2: Evidence that the Mind Is Vulnerable to Brain Manipulation

One convincing means for seeing that the wave physics described above has huge implications in theology, philosophy, and theodicy, as well as in medicine, is to glimpse the array of weapons research aimed at human beings as electromagnetic standing waves:

(i)In the early 1970s, Soviet scientists developed a machine that they used to put prisoners of war into trance. Called the LIDA machine, it emitted an Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) pulse. They also discovered that they could put the prisoners into a deep sleep by putting an extremely low voltage current through the brain, from front to back.²

(ii)Also in the early 70s, the Soviets were able to cause widespread mood alterations by transmitting pulsed ELF waves. The ELF waves were pulsed at rhythms that coincide with human brain wave rhythms, 6 and 11 Hertz.³

(iii)A number of researchers, starting in the 1960s, discovered that it is possible to simulate hearing by aiming "a plurality of microwaves in the region of the auditory cortex".⁴ These devices bypass the ears and the "normal hearing pathways to the

¹ Begich, pp. 22.

² Begich, p. 49.

³ Begich, p. 50.

⁴ Begich here quotes from U.S. Patent #4,858,812.

brain". By pulse-modulating the microwave, these devices can also induce hearing of a human voice or other information, without the normal mediation by the ears.¹

(iv)Pulse-modulated signals have been shown to "override the nervous system and produce relaxation, drowsiness, or sexual excitement". Pulsed electromagnetic fields from computer monitors and TV tubes are also capable of manipulating the nervous system in similar ways.²

(v)Neuroscientist, Dr. Michael Persinger claimed in a 1995 paper that "the brain can be altered with very little power including that which is released from the natural geomagnetic activity of the earth or via contemporary communication networks." He also claimed to be able to use ELF radiation to stimulate the five physical senses in such a way that the subject receiving the stimulation cannot distinguish the artificial stimulation from normal stimulation.³

(vi)"[I]f HAARP is tuned to the right wave forms, mental disruption throughout a region could occur intentionally or as a 'side effect' of the transmissions." ---"HAARP" is an acronym for "High frequency Active Auroral Research Project". It is a federally funded research program that has been in operation since the early 1990s. Its array of high frequency radio transmitting antennae is located in Gakona, Alaska. Its operation is overseen by numerous organizations, mostly federal and State agencies, most prominent of which are the Air Force and the Navy. The HAARP website claims its research and operations are confined to "basic and applied plasma physics and Radio Science research related to the study of the Earth's ionosphere".4 It claims that "HAARP is not designed to be an operational system for military purposes". In spite of these claims of innocence, people who are inherently prone to being suspicious of government,⁵ are inclined to not take the government at its word. The facts that humans are extremely vulnerable to ELF radiation, and that HAARP admittedly can indirectly produce ELF radiation over broad regions of the planet, is one of numerous things that makes HAARP an extremely controversial operation in the eyes of the skeptics.⁶

- 3 Begich, p. 86.
- 4 URL: http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/faq.html.
- 5 As all Americans should be as an integral part of their culture.

¹ Begich, p. 64.

² Begich, p. 66.

⁶ For an introduction to the skeptic's side of the controversy, see URL: http://www.earthpulse.com/src/category.asp?catid=1.

(vii)"When combined with the Earth's normal magnetic fields, ... ELF frequencies (1-100 Hertz, pulses per second) appear to cause biological effects."¹ In other words, ELF frequencies can be generated that resonate with the Earth's magnetic field, and that thereby have measurable influences over biological systems.

(viii)The director of the U.S. Navy's Electromagnetic Radiation Project from 1970 through 1977 (Captain Paul Tyler) was quoted in **Omni** magazine as indicating that electromagnetic radiation could be used to create physiological effects normally associated with chemicals. He even stated that "you might be able to produce the same effects as psychoactive drugs."²

(ix)At the right frequencies, the magnetic component of the electromagnetic field is psychoactive. In their laboratory, Dr. Andrija Puharich and Robert C. Beck constructed devices for transmitting ELF signals at 10 to 100 nanoteslas aimed at a human subject connected to an electroencephalograph (EEG). The ELF signals were in the range from 2 to 20 Hertz. Thirty percent of the subjects showed "brain wave entrainment". Entrainment is also known as "Frequency Following Response (FFR)", and is where the brain "mirrors the pulse rate of the ... artificial signal thereby causing changes in the body and mind". Fifty percent of the subjects showed psychophysiological reactions, or what the Air Force calls "controlled effects".³ Here are some of the effects produced:

- at 6 Hz.: headaches
- at 6.66 Hz. and lower: nausea, headaches, confusion, depressive anxiety
- at 7.8, 8, and 9 Hz.: alpha rhythms and a sense of well-being
- at 10.35 Hz.: agitated anxiety, fear, hostile aggressive behavior
- at 11 Hz.: riotous behavior⁴

In their lab, Beck and Puharich also discovered that "there was no protection from a system like this because the signals themselves passed through everything on earth".⁵

(x)According to Dr. Puharich's manuscripts, on July 6, 1976, the Soviet Union "filled the entire planet with 'radio noise' from transmitters" in the USSR. They

- 4 Begich, pp. 97-98.
- 5 Begich, p. 97.

¹ Begich, p. 90.

² Begich, p. 95. --- Begich quotes Kathleen McAuliffe, "The Mind Fields", **Omni** Magazine, 1985.

³ Begich, p. 54.

were at 5 to 15 Hertz and 25 nanoteslas. The signal was "a steerable beam". The beam was up to "42 miles wide" and could "sweep a great circle route around the planet", passing through selected cities. Twenty-five nanoteslas is an extremely small amount of energy that would be lost in natural background noise if it weren't for the fact that this was a noticeably controlled signal. --- The reason this story about July 6, 1976 is important is because of the combined facts that (i)HAARP is far more versatile and capable than the equipment the Soviets were using in 1976, and (ii)such extremely low-energy and low-frequency electromagnetism can have extraordinary "controlled effects".¹

(xi)Professor of Physiology at Yale, Dr. Jose M.R. Delgado, M.D., discovered in his research, which started in 1952, "that by changing the frequency, pulse rate and waveform on an experimental subject, he could completely change their thinking and emotional state". By 1985, Delgado was able to induce, inhibit, or modify "movements, sensations, emotions, desires, ideas, and a variety of psychological phenomena", by "using only a radio signal sent to the brain remotely". This implies that Delgado was able to modify the chemistry of the human brain remotely, "by using energy concentrations of less than 1/50th of what the Earth naturally produces". The key to generating these effects was in the "tuning" mechanisms of frequency, waveform, *etc.*, and not in the amount of energy being transmitted. It was in matching transmission to receiver.²

(xii)Real world testing of both ELF and low-energy microwave systems "has proven 'that movements, sensations, emotions, desires, ideas, and a variety of psychological phenomena may be induced, inhibited, or modified by electrical stimulation of specific areas of the brain. These facts have changed the classical philosophical concept that the mind was beyond experimental reach."³

(xiii)Two patents were issued by the U.S. Patent Office in 1989 that each pertain to sound "induced in the head" by "radiating the head with microwaves".⁴ --- These devices "provided a much more efficient delivery of the sound", valuable to the military as a "nonlethal weapon" capable of affecting presumed enemies at

¹ Begich, pp. 96-98.

² Begich, pp. 103-105.

³ Begich, p 113. --- Begich cites "Oscar, K.J. *Effects of Low power Microwaves on Local Cerebral Blood Flow of Conscious Rats.* Army Mobility Equipment Command, June 1, 1980." --- Begich quotes "Delgado, Jose M.R. *Physical Control of the Mind: Toward a Psychocivilized Society.* Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1969."

⁴ First, "US Patent No. 4,858,612, Aug 22 1989, Hearing Device, Inventor: William L. Stocklin." Second, "US Patent No. 4,877,027, Oct. 31, 1989. Hearing System. Inventor: Wayne Brunkan."

a distance. Such devices can be rightly understood to be instruments for wireless electronic telepathy.¹

This very brief sampling of scientific evidence shows the wave nature of the human body. Such research can be used either to benefit mankind or to mankind's detriment. Much of this research has been (i)classified by the military as "nonlethal"; (ii)made secret by the federal government, ostensibly for "security purposes"; and (iii) shared by the Department of Defense with the Department of Justice, for apparent use against the American civilian population.² But the most important thing to understand in this brief survey is contained in the following paragraph which appears boldfaced in Dr. Begich's book:

It is the case with any system that can be *pulse-modulated* to resonate at the frequency codes of the body, including radio, TV, power grids, computer networks, all wireless systems, the earth's magnetic fields and any other system that will allow energy to be transferred or propagated through it can be used to carry information the brain and body will understand and react to. This is the center of the issue. As Dr. Reijo Makela used to say, "it is all about resonance", which represents the corresponding harmonies between energy transmitter and energy receiver. It is like dialing up a station on a radio, only when the transmitter and receiver are in resonance can a person hear the radio station. Such is the case with all components of the human body, organs, cells, molecules, atoms and so on down to the essence of who each person is on an energetic level, from which creation projects us into physical reality. There are profound implications to the manipulation of people on an energetic level through these new technologies.3

The wave nature of the human body extends from the subatomic particle to the body as a unit, the unit being a single electromagnetic standing wave. In addition to being amply verified by the evidence, the crux of this claim is also merely common sense from the perspective of wave physics. There is no new scientific theory here.⁴ But the

4 As indicated in the "Preface", this work is not a scientific theory, but a theodicy. Even so, it contains philosophical and theological commentary on science, and extrapolation from it. To be a genuine scientific theory, it would need to propose empirical tests of its propositions. At some point in the future, God willing, the author will propose such empirical tests, thereby translating this theodicy from a philosophical-theological theory into a scientific theory.

¹ Begich, pp. 122-123.

² Begich, pp. 152-182.

³ Begich, p. 190.

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philosophical and theological implications of these well-established scientific facts are huge and profound. For one thing among many, they speak loudly regarding the relationship between mind and brain, and the extent to which the mind is vulnerable to brain manipulation.

Sub-Chapter 3: Permanence & Impermanence

If humans are little or nothing more than glorified animals, then even if the foregoing ideas have huge implications in various subfields of medicine, or to the military, they have few if any implications beyond that. If humans are little or nothing more than glorified animals, then the life, health, and death of any given human is equivalent to the life, health, and death of any given animal. But if one believes that humans are so unique that they are far more than mere animals, then one might be inclined to object to military / police use of mind-bending technologies, especially given the possibility that the police and military are deficient in accountability. If one believes that humans are so unique that they are far more than mere animals, then one might be inclined to consider the capacity for permanence of the human standing wave. If this capacity exists, then this capacity must surely be the ultimate reason why humans should be treated as far more than mere animals.

Unlike waves in the macroscopic realm of classical physics, which are always subject to damping of one form or another, waves in the atomic and sub-atomic realm are not generally subject to damping effects. There is very little, if any, evidence showing that when a photon moves freely at the speed of light through space, its wave nature is damped in any way. The light wave appears to oscillate without friction or any other kind of damping effect. If this isn't so, then (assuming that the data of old-earth creationists is reliable) how else does one explain astrophysicists regularly detecting light that originates billions of light years away?¹ Likewise, there is very little, if any, evidence to show that when an electron standing wave is in its ground state around a stable, non-ionic atomic nucleus, the electron standing wave

¹ The arguments between "young universe creationists" and "progressive creationists" have been ongoing now for a century or more with no sign of abatement. Even with an insistence on reliable epistemological foundations, some physical facts continue obstinately to favor the "progressive creationist's" paradigm. One of these is the standard definition of a "light year". Even if there are instances in which particles are able to move faster than light, the physical evidence indicates that the speed of light is an undeniable standard for photons traveling through space from sun and distant stars. This theodicy will show that this works to the creationist's advantage against the arguments of the secular evolutionist, because it shows that the rule in space and in the quantum realm is an absence of damping.

is damped in any way. If this weren't so, then (assuming that the data of old-earth creationists is reliable) how could one explain paleogeologists regularly finding rocks that they claim are billions of years old?¹ The important point is that while damping is the rule and not the exception in the visible, macroscopic realm of ordinary human life, in the atomic and subatomic realm, it is just the opposite. In the macroscopic realm of classical physics, the rule is that all oscillating wave phenomena are damped. In the microscopic, atomic and subatomic realm, the rule is that oscillating wave phenomena are not damped. In the creator's structuring of organic systems out of atomic building blocks, the implications of this discrepancy are huge.

There is ample evidence showing that there is generally resistance in macroscopic electrical circuits.² Such resistance may be cut down to a miniscule, almost non-existent status in superconductors.³ But the norm in electrical circuits in classical physics is that all such circuits contain resistance. This means that in oscillating circuits such as inductance / capacitance circuits, such oscillating wave phenomena are damped by the circuit's resistance.⁴ But there is very little evidence that an electron standing wave around an atomic nucleus has any such resistance or damping. If the atomic nucleus is stable, meaning that the atom is not prone to radioactive decay, and if the atom is not an ion, then an electronic standing wave around the atomic nucleus should continue existing as a standing wave indefinitely. It will not wind down like a pendulum or a spring; it is not subject to friction; and it suffers no electrical resistance. So the only way such a standing wave will change is as a result of some force external to the atom.

If an organismic standing wave is understood to be constructed by way of the superposition of electromagnetic standing waves at the atomic level, which yield standing waves at the molecular level, which yield standing waves at the organelle level, *etc.*, up to the organismic level, then an important question is this: What causes

¹ Based on reliable epistemological foundations, there is an overwhelming need to find the truth between old-earth creationists who are sincerely expounding what they believe to be the truth as they find it in general revelation, and young-earth creationists who are sincerely expounding what they believe to be the truth as they find it in special revelation. All claims that are not clearly grounded in sound epistemological foundations should be treated up-front as either junk science or junk theology. --- Again, this theodicy will show that the paleogeologist's claims work to the creationist's advantage against the arguments of the secular evolutionist, because it shows that the general rule in the atomic realm is an absence of damping.

² Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 31, "Current and Resistance", p. 774.

³ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 31, "Current and Resistance", p. 778.

⁴ Halliday & Resnick, Chapter 38, "Electromagnetic Oscillations", pp. 943-946.

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the resulting organismic standing wave to dissipate? What is the damping effect on the standing wave that causes death? Why does the superposition principle fail, where the failure thereby leads to death? The frictionless, resistanceless, undamped state of affairs at the atomic level starts running into friction or some other kind of damping effect as this hierarchy of standing waves superpose from the atomic into the macroscopic realm of classical physics. This is the easy and not very satisfying answer. Because this answer does not specifically identify the damping effect or the cause of the failure of superposition, and because it does not distinguish human death from animal death, people who believe humans are unique relative to other organisms should not be satisfied with such a facile explanation.

If one assumes that all material objects -- including the physical bodies of creation's variety of living organisms -- exist as distinct entities because they exist as distinct standing waves, then based on the lack of damping at the microscopic realm, it's reasonable for one to also consider the possibility that these entities could have standing-wave permanence. Common sense and common experience clearly indicate that a rock is more permanent than a human body. A human standing wave exists from the instant of conception until the instant of death, at which time the standing wave goes into relatively rapid deterioration. On the other hand, if the data of old-earth creationists is correct, then any given rock on the earth's surface may have existed as a singular standing wave for millions or even billions of years. The evident permanence of such a mineralogical standing wave is far greater than that of the human standing wave, regardless of whether one happens to be a youngearth creationist, an old-earth creationist, or an origin-by-some-other theorist. Even though the standing wave that is inherent in a rock's existence is much more permanent than the standing wave inherent in any human body, or in any other kind of organism, the rock is also not permanent. The rock could be crushed; or the rock could be eroded; or the rock could be dissolved in volcanic heat. So the standing wave inherent in a rock is also not permanent, even though physical evidence shows clearly that it has a greater capacity for permanence than any organismic standing wave.

Based strictly on physical evidence, all this talk about the permanence of rocks relative to the impermanence of living creatures is true, obvious, and practically undeniable. Although certainly destructible, a rock, as a standing wave, has a capacity for permanence that living organisms do not. According to such evidence, the human life cycle is not very different from the life cycle of any other organism. Both are pathetically impermanent compared to an ordinary rock. But for the sake of exploring the theological implications of the above wave physics, it may be edifying to consider the possibility that damping effects and/or failure of superposition that cause the disintegration of the organismic standing wave could be eliminated. If any given human is capable of being established as a permanent standing wave, then this would mean that humans in general might be absolutely unique in the realm of living organisms because of their capacity for standing-wave permanence. Furthermore, if such a capacity existed, then this capacity would not inherently denigrate any of the existing physical evidence. Using religious lingo, if such a capacity exists, then humans are unique not only relative to the inorganic realm of solids, liquids, and gases, but also relative to the rest of the organic realm, by way of a capacity for eternal life.

According to the Bible, humans die because of sin. If understood within the context of wave physics, this biblical worldview (i.e., according to Genesis 1&2) essentially assumes that the God-given norm for humans is for each to be a permanent standing wave. According to this worldview, sin is the abnormal intrusion of some kind of damping effect or failure of superposition, because sin is an act of missing the mark, where the mark is set by the God-given norm. Essentially, other kinds of organismic standing waves are designed to run down in time.¹ Even though there may be no physical evidence other than the above wave physics to prove that humans have a capacity for eternal life, it is a core tenet of the Christian religion that humans have a capacity for eternal life. In order to reconcile the wave physics with the Christian's implied assumption that the norm for pre-fall humanity was standingwave permanence, it's necessary to presume that such humans had (and somehow still have) a unique capacity to eliminate, or somehow mitigate, the damping effects and/ or failure of superposition that normally exist in the macroscopic realm. This also presumes that the onset of damping and/or failure of superposition is the root cause of death.² --- Because "failure of superposition" is verbally cumbersome, henceforth, when speaking of the failure of the superposition principle to hold, this theodicy will indicate such a failure with the word, "incohesive". The reader should not confuse this word with "incoherent". "Coherence" has been defined above as equivalent to constructive interference, following standard physics lingo. If the word, "incoherent", is understood in this more-or-less technical sense, then it means the non-existence of constructive interference. In contrast, this theodicy is using "incohesive " to mean the non-existence of both constructive and destructive interference, which is equivalent to the complete failure of the superposition principle to hold.

¹ Some creationists may claim that as originally designed, non-human organisms don't die. But there is scant evidence in the Bible that supports this claim, and there is ample evidence in general revelation that denies it.

² As this theodicy progresses, it will show that such presumptions are not merely wild speculation, but are extremely probable.

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For a multitude of reasons, the possibility of rational compatibility between the physical facts and the biblical claims deserves amplified attention and exploration. This inevitably requires a retelling of the biblical story in the lingo of wave physics. To retell the biblical story in the lingo of wave physics, it's critical to allow for the possibility that the damping and/or incohesiveness that is the root cause of death, from the perspective of wave physics, can somehow be eliminated or mitigated. In biblical lingo, it's necessary to allow for the possibility that humans have a capacity for eternal life. If this allowance is inherently wrong, then surely the facts and logic will somehow indicate as much as the story progresses.

PART I

Chapter C: Retelling the Biblical Story in the Lingo of Wave Physics

Sub-Chapter 1: Introduction

The Bible says that "the wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23). Given that this claim is true, sin is the root cause of the disintegration of the human standing wave. But if sin is the root cause of the disintegration of the human standing wave, what's the root cause of the disintegration of non-human organismic standing waves? If non-human organisms don't sin, then that raises the question, Why do they die, Why do they disintegrate? According to the wave-physics perspective, the cessation of an organismic standing wave is caused by damping and/or incohesiveness, which lead to death of the organism. According to the Bible, human death is caused by sin, but the cause of non-human death is left somewhat ambiguous. It appears that ascertaining the relationship between organismic standing waves, damping, incohesiveness, sin, human death, and non-human death, could be very valuable in telling the biblical story.¹ Explaining the difference between human death and the deaths of all other kinds of organisms could be crucial to understanding the interface between the Bible and the physical facts. Saying the same thing in the lingo of Christian theology, explaining the difference between human death and the deaths of non-human organisms could be crucial to understanding the interface between special revelation and general revelation.²

¹ It's important to emphasize that "story" is not being used here to reference fiction. It's being used to emphasize the existence of a narrative, a storyline.

² According to the Bible, God reveals his <u>eternal law</u> to human beings. Theologians generally call this "revelation". There are two overarching kinds of revelation: special and general. "The knowledge of God's existence, character, and moral law, which comes through creation to all humanity, is often called 'general revelation' General revelation comes through observing nature, through seeing God's directing influence in history, and through an inner sense of God's existence and his laws that he has placed inside every person." (Grudem, Wayne, **Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine**, 1994. Zondervan Publishing House, Grand Rapids, Michigan, pp. 122-123.) The reason general revelation is designated "general" is because (i)it is available to all people generally, and (ii)it is knowledge that is general in its content. --- General revelation manifests <u>natural law</u>, the most fundamental aspect of which is the moral law. Special revelation "refers to God's words addressed to specific people, such as the words of the Bible, the words of the Old Testament prophets and New Testament apostles, and the words of God spoken in personal address, such as at Mount Sinai or at the baptism of

According to the wave-physics perspective, non-human organisms degenerate as a result of damping and/or incohesiveness effects on the organismic standing wave. Human organisms also degenerate as a result of damping and/or incohesiveness effects on the organismic standing wave. This damping / incohesiveness in the case of humans may be equivalent to sin. This is evidenced by the facts that (i)implicit in the wave physics knowledge base, damping / incohesiveness is the cause of death, and (ii)explicit in the biblical knowledge base, sin is the cause of human death. So damping / incohesiveness and sin are probably somewhat equivalent as the root cause of human death. On the other hand, in the case of non-human organisms, there is scant evidence in Scripture, if there is any evidence at all, to indicate an equivalence between sin and death, and therefore between sin and damping / incohesiveness.

Permanence of an organismic standing wave means that the organism has "eternal life", i.e., permanent life, if it is indeed permanent. --- The physical evidence clearly indicates that neither humans nor other organisms have physical bodies that are permanent standing waves. So it's reasonable to ask if either even has the potential for being permanent standing waves. In other words, it's reasonable to ask if the allowance that humans have eternal life is reasonable. All physical evidence available to living people indicates that all animals die, and that all humans also die. But for people who are convinced that humans are more than mere animals, the mere fact that all people die like animals does not necessarily convince that humans utterly lack even the potential for their bodies to be permanent standing waves.¹ The Bible clearly indicates that mere dying doesn't negate the possibility that people have a capacity or potential for eternal life. The Bible does this by positing the resurrection of the dead. If people have a potential for eternal life, then there must be some mechanism that would allow this standing wave to continue in perpetual existence, if the capacity were somehow activated. In order to understand this mechanism that enables perpetual life, it's necessary to understand what sin is, what

Jesus." (Grudem, p. 123) Special revelation was the impetus behind the writing of the **divine law**. Some people claim that the canon is closed because God no longer speaks through special revelation, but only through general revelation. This theodicy holds that this is not accurate, because God still speaks through both general and special revelation. Nevertheless, this theodicy holds that the canon is rightly closed since the last apostle died. So understanding and implementing what is already written and revealed is the task of the times.

¹ Unlike numerous philosophies and theologies of the past, this theodicy does not treat rationality as the distinguishing difference between animals and humans. If humans are significantly smarter than animals, then they should be smart enough to avoid permanent death.

causes death, what causes this intrusion of this damping effect and/or incohesiveness, and what thereby causes disintegration of the human standing wave.

In the Bible's source languages, the words translated into English "sin" generally have roots that mean, "to miss the mark".¹ This implies that humans are aimed at something, but that they miss whatever it is they're aiming at. This implies that in order to understand how the damping effect and/or incohesiveness enters into the human standing wave, it's first necessary to understand what humans are aiming at. To understand what humans are aiming at, it might help to see humans within a larger biological framework.

It's well established in biology that all organisms occupy ecological niches.² If we use biological jargon, then the Big Question -- What are humans aiming at? -- can be expressed like this: In what ecological niche do humans belong, and to what ecological niche should they therefore confine themselves? Squirrels have a niche in the trees. Rabbits have a niche on the ground. Cattle eat grass and naturally prefer grasslands. Rain forest trees have a niche in the rain forest. What ecological niche is appropriate for humans, and that thereby defines what every human aims at, in a general sense? --- Before making a serious effort at understanding and answering this Big Question, it's important to make sure this biological question stays within the larger context of standing waves. So returning to compare rocks and organismic standing waves might help to make sure the ground is properly prepared for answering the Big Question.

In order to understand how organismic standing waves sustain themselves at all, it's helpful to conceive of them in contrast to rocks. A rock standing wave may receive numerous kinds of electromagnetic inputs, but to practically all appearances, the rock standing wave remains unchanged. Such inputs include light, radio waves, and all kinds of other radiation from space. These inputs do not appear to be processed by such a standing wave in any way. To all ordinary appearances, rocks are generally impervious to various electromagnetic radiation. Of course there are exceptions like the piezoelectric effect.³ But to ordinary human perception, rocks are impervious. They do not require inputs or outputs of any kind, and they do not appear to interact much with their environments. In contrast to this, all organismic standing waves require specific kinds of inputs for their survival. All species have a specific range of substances and/or prey organisms that are prerequisites to the

¹ In Hebrew, Strong's #s 2398, 2399, 2401, 2403. In Greek, Strong's #s 264, 266.

² URL: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/414016/niche.

³ Mechanical pressure applied to some minerals (crystals, ceramics, some organic molecules) can cause the object to take on an electrical charge, this being called the "piezoelectric effect".

organismic standing wave's continuance as a standing wave. Cattle eat grass. Squirrels eat nuts. Omnivorous humans eat a broad range of substances. Without such inputs, these various kinds of organismic standing waves become incohesive, disintegrate, and die. And of course organisms need various other inputs as well. Chlorophyll-bearing plants need the visible spectrum of light. All such plants need carbon dioxide. Animals generally need oxygen. *Etc.*

Every organism has senses by which it perceives the external environment. It therefore receives sense data and processes that sense data in a way that allows it to determine how it will respond to such sense data. Every organism is therefore a consumer of sense data, unlike rocks, which don't appear to consume anything or sense anything. In addition to sense data, every organism is also a consumer of sustenance. Plants consume minerals, water, and carbon dioxide. Protozoa consume whatever microscopic substances they consume to sustain themselves. Animals consume plants, other animals, oxygen, *etc.* Every organism, even the most passive kind of organism, performs some kind of action in order to make sure it is able to consume what it perceives as a need or desire. Every organism also excretes substances, and every species has a standard set of outputs.

With these things said, it's clear that every organismic standing wave receives or takes input from its environment, processes that input, puts output into its environment, and responds to sensory inputs in some fashion that is in some way pre-programmed into the organism. Needs and desires arise out of the organismic standing wave's endogenous, internal environment. Because different organisms have different needs and desires for sustenance, they respond to environmental stimuli in different ways. In classical (respondent) conditioning *ala* Pavlov / Skinner, the organism is a slave to its appetites and responds to stimuli strictly for the purpose of procuring whatever substances and circumstances the organism perceives as necessary and desirable for the organism's survival and sustenance.¹

It's clear that non-human organismic standing waves are aimed at something less than eternal life. Every such organism has a limited range of choices that it can make. Squirrels can choose to build a nest on one branch of a tree or on some other branch. The inclination to build a nest is built into its genes, because building a nest is necessary for its survival through the winter. But where, specifically, it chooses to build its nest depends on the squirrel's ability to choose, given that it has a limited range of choices, and a limited ability to choose. Similar circumstances exist for all organismic standing waves. To fulfill their life's calling, they exercise

¹ See definition 2 at URL: http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ respondent+conditioning.

the limited range of choices that their inherent makeup allows them to make. So every organismic standing wave has a specific range of choices, and when that range of choices is defined over the organism's life span, it's reasonable to say that that range of choices defines the organism's aim in life, and its ecological niche.

Given the research cited above that shows the vulnerability of the human brain to resonance with exogenous electromagnetic radiation, it's clear that choices are a function of inclination, where inclination begins outside the realm of consciousness. In other words, there must be some kind of feedback loop between brain and mind, where each feeds into the other and receives from the other; and where inclinations are subconscious mental phenomena that are somehow a function of physical brain phenomena. As indicated above, this theodicy is not an attempt at positing a scientific theory, and it is not an attempt at showing how things happen. It's an attempt at showing that things happen. The thing at issue regarding an organism's range of choices is the connection between brain and mind. No one knows precisely how that connection exists. But it's clearly foolish to think that it doesn't exist. ---This subconscious source of the human will is compatible with both the aforesaid research and with long-respected Christian philosophical theology. The following quotes from Jonathan Edwards' **Freedom of the Will** show how:

[T]he *will* (without any metaphysical refining) is plainly, *that by which the mind chooses any thing*. The faculty of the *will* is that faculty or power, or principle of mind, by which it is capable of *choosing* : an act of the *will* is the same as an act of *choosing* or *choice*.¹

I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of will there is an act of choice, that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the will; there is some preponderation of the mind, one way rather than another; and the soul had rather *have* or *do* one thing than another, or than not to have or do that thing; and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.²

It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, It is that motive which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will \dots^3

¹ Edwards, FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PART I, SECT. I (p. 1 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

² Edwards, FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PART I, SECT. I (p. 5 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

³ Edwards, FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PART I, SECT. II (p. 6 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

The choice of the mind never departs from that which, at that time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things considered.¹

[*T*]*he will is always determined by the strongest motive*, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of *previous* tendency to excite volition.²

After all they [(Arminians)] say, they have no higher or other conception of liberty than that vulgar notion of it which I contend for, viz., a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chooses \dots^3

Taking this as providing a reliable description of the act of willing, choosing, and exercising volition, every choice is made in accordance with the organism's strongest inclination. There are few if any reasons to think that this is not as true for animals as for humans. Given the scarcity of reasons to proceed otherwise, this theodicy will proceed under the assumption that the volition of every organism is a function of the organism's strongest inclination. This assumption pertains as much to nonhuman organismic standing waves as it does to the human standing wave. Every species has a different ecological niche. Every species therefore has a different lifelong range of choices. Every species therefore has a different aim in life. Every species of organismic standing wave has a specific worldview, a specific life's agenda, and a specific set of choices aimed at gratifying that life's agenda. For species of multicellular organisms that have nervous systems that use digital messaging, which includes all the vertebrates in the animal kingdom, it's reasonable to see an analogy between such nervous systems and digital computational devices, and to thereby see every act of volition as a call on some set of program functions that control the organism's actions.⁴ The nexus between worldview, life's agenda, set of choices, and set of possible actions, can be understood to be variables that contribute to defining an organism's aim in life. It's clear that these variables are more-or-less constant as functions of the organism's species.

Obviously, non-human organismic standing waves are not, and never have been, geared for perpetual existence. All non-human organismic standing waves

¹ Edwards, FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PART I, SECT. II (p. 13 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

² Edwards, FREEDOM OF THE WILL, PART I, SECT. II (p. 15 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

³ Edwards, **FREEDOM OF THE WILL**, "Remarks on Lord Kames' Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion" (p. 346 of Soli Deo Gloria edition).

⁴ Example: Laszlo, Ervin, **The Systems View of the World**, 1972, George Braziller, Inc., New York, pp. 93-95.

have niches, worldviews, sets of choices, and possible actions that are limited to a relatively narrow range of choices, so that there is no reason to think that any such organismic standing wave could sustain itself against all the various kinds of damping effects and/or incohesiveness over the long haul. In short, non-human organismic standing waves are clearly geared to die. It's therefore silly to think of them as missing the mark. They do what they're geared to do, and their ultimate aim, as non-human organismic standing waves, is disintegration. Or to use a more controversial theological term, their ultimate aim, as individual organisms, is their own "annihilation". Because they are aimed at species propagation, then annihilation, and nothing more,¹ it's clear that they do not miss their aim, at least not through any fault of their own. It's clear that all these non-human organismic standing waves do not sin. They do precisely what they've been geared to do, no more, no less. Each has a specific ecological niche. So animals, plants, and microbes don't sin, meaning that they do precisely what God tells them to do, and they do not miss what they aim at with respect to their overall life's agenda. They do not sin. They do not miss the mark. Each fulfills its providential function and is preprogrammed to die as a function of that preprogramming. They're geared to succumb to the damping and/or incohesiveness; even though they have a will to survive even up to the last moment of their existence as an organismic standing wave. In the lingo of traditional Christian theology, they are NOT moral agents.

In comparison with all other organismic standing waves, humans have a broad range of choices. Their worldview is much bigger. Their life's agenda is much more complex. The set of choices that go to the fulfillment of that worldview and that life's agenda is much bigger. In fact, it's so big that the Big Question still looms unanswered: What are human's aiming at? Said another way, what ecological niche are humans geared to fill? According to Genesis 1&2, humans were originally geared for eternal life.² This means that humans were geared to fill an ecological niche in which there was no damping of their organismic standing wave, and no propensity for each to become incohesive. Or at least whatever damping and/or incohesiveness there might have been was modulated or mitigated in such a way as to compensate for whatever damping and/or incohesiveness might have existed.

If this interpretation of the Bible is right, and if humans have this potential for eternal life, then this clearly explains why the Bible indicates that humans miss

¹ Regarding human afterlife, see **PART III: THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- CONCLUSION**, SOTERIOLOGY, ANNIHILATIONISM, & HELL, *Annihilationism & Hell*.

² In the terminology used in this theodicy, the first biblical covenant, the **Edenic**

<u>**Covenant</u>**, appears in Genesis 1-2. This is the Bible's foundational covenant, or what might be called its "constitution".</u>

the mark. According to this view, eternal life is a crucial aspect of every human life's aim and agenda. But all the physical evidence shows that all humans die, which means that all humans miss what their life is aimed at, which means that all humans sin. The existence of sin inevitably entails the existence of actions that are not good enough, which inevitably entails the existence of choices that are not good enough. All this leads to the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between morality, on one hand, and damping and/or incohesiveness on the other. According to the biblical worldview, humans were programmed at creation to occupy a specific ecological niche, and they had a specific range of choices within that niche, and they were thereby given a specific aim in life. But unlike other organismic standing waves, humans fell out of their natural ecological niche, and they've been missing the mark ever since. This propensity to sin, this inclination to miss the mark, has become a defining feature of the human condition. This propensity to miss the mark defines the difference between human death and the deaths of other organismic standing waves, because other organisms never miss the mark. Humans apparently have a capacity for standing wave permanence, but they also have a propensity to miss the mark that they cannot overcome through their own devices. Humans presently occupy a peculiar, limbo ecological niche in which their perceptions, choices, and actions are too flawed to allow them entrance into their natural ecological niche, even while they have a potential for occupying their natural ecological niche that's deeply hampered by their bad perceptions, choices, and actions.

The rule in nature is that organismic standing waves do whatever they can to sustain themselves for as long as they can, and then they die, meaning that the standing wave dissipates and disintegrates. No matter what kind of organismic standing wave it may be, the standing wave dissipates because the organism fails to process input in such a way as to avoid dissipation and disintegration. Death, dissipation, and disintegration are common to all organismic standing waves in nature, regardless of whether they are human, animal, vegetable, or micro-organismic. Disintegration may not be so obvious for a rock, but that doesn't mean that rocks are not also subject to the same rule. The rule is that none of these standing waves is permanent, and the reason for the lack of permanence revolves around a failure by the standing wave to process exogenous inputs in such a way as to respond in a way that enables and perpetuates the permanent standing wave status. The disconnect between endogenous needs and desires, on one hand, and exogenous inputs, on the other, leads to the standing wave's demise. In the case of a rock, the rock standing wave has no endogenous needs and desires, and it fails to process heat, wind, rain, etc., in a way that avoids corrosive / erosive influences. In the case of a tree, the tree fails to put up whatever defenses are necessary and sufficient to enable the tree to continue as a permanent standing wave. It becomes diseased and dies, or succumbs

to a saw, or fire, or whatever. Similar failures exist among animals. According to all natural appearances, similar failures exist among all humans. But according to a biblical worldview, humans are somehow an exception to this process of dying because humans were originally designed for permanent standing wave status.

Under existing circumstances, practically all organismic standing waves are not geared for permanence. At best, they pass on their genes in the reproductive process, and this form of propagation is a kind of substitute for permanent standing wave status. But if humans are exceptional in that they have a capacity for perpetual-standing-wave status, then humans must have some capacity for processing input that supercedes the capacities of all other kinds of organismic standing-wave status, leads to the conclusion that humans have a capacity for processing input that is somehow dormant, or infantile in some respect. There is a potential for actuation of the permanent standing-wave status, but the necessary ingredients for actuating that potential are presently missing. So humans must have some capacity for processing input that would satisfy the endogenous desire to eliminate or mitigate the damping effect / incohesiveness entirely, if the capacity were somehow activated. But for some reason, humans are presently unable to activate this potential.

Sub-Chapter 2: Genesis 2 & 3 in the Lingo of Wave Physics

To understand how humans can simultaneously have a capacity for standingwave permanence and have a propensity to miss the mark that cannot be overcome through mere exercise of the human will, it could help to look more closely at Genesis 2&3. Genesis 2&3 are the Bible's prototypical description of how humans acquired this propensity to miss the mark. --- To optimize the understanding of these two chapters, it's important to make a few preliminary comments about interpretational policies. To adhere to reliable policies for interpreting the Bible, and to thereby understand precisely what it's trying to communicate, it's always best to take any given passage of Scripture at face value and literally, unless there are clear and obvious reasons to do otherwise. More specifically, there are instances in the Bible in which a passage clearly needs to be understood metaphorically, because a strictly literal interpretation is so obviously wrong. What follows are three examples. (1)In John 10:9, Jesus says that he's "the door". If taken literally, one naturally assumes that he has hinges, a knob, perhaps a keyhole, and that he's made out of wood or some other substance conducive to the creation of doors. A purely literal interpretation completely misses the point of the verse. This verse is clearly metaphorical. Jesus

is clearly using the concrete expression, "door", to symbolize a deeper and more meaningful concept.

Thus, the classical method of seeking the literal sense of Scripture meant seeking a knowledge of what is being communicated through various forms and figures of speech employed in biblical literature.¹

Even though taking the Bible as entirely metaphorical and mythical is a prescription for entirely misinterpreting it, it is nevertheless sometimes critical to see a given passage metaphorically in order to interpret it and understand it properly. This quote from Sproul's **Knowing Scripture** shows that "the classical method of seeking the literal sense of Scripture" included the possibility that some passages are metaphorical. But more modern literalists tend to balk at acknowledging the inherently metaphorical nature of some passages.² Even so, because metaphors clearly exist, it's critical to know when to see them, and when not to. (2)In John 15:1, Jesus says, "I am the true vine". The modern breed of literal interpretation is as problematical here as in John 10:9. Jesus in no way intended for anyone to think he was a vine in the literal sense of the word. (3)In the same verse, John 15:1, Jesus says, "my Father is the vinedresser." Again, strictly literal interpretation REALLY misses the point.

Because Genesis 3 is the Bible's preeminent chapter with respect to narrating the origins of evil and sin, in order to properly address (i)the origin of evil; (ii) the origin of sin; (iii)the origin of human death; (iv)the origin of suffering; (v)how the existence of these things interfaces with the human understanding of God's omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence; (vi)human death in contrast to the deaths of other organisms; (vii)the nature of the human ecological niche; (viii) what the aim of humanity originally was; (ix)why humans miss the mark; (x)*etc.*; it's crucial for anyone who wants to understand the Bible's story relative to wave physics

¹ R.C. Sproul, **Knowing Scripture**, 1977, InterVarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois, p. 54.

^{2 &}quot;[M]odern literalists" can be taken here as a euphemism for people who insist on using "dispensationalist" interpretational policies. The "vital distinctions' of dispensationalism are the physical versus the spiritual seed of Abraham; the earthly Messianic kingdom of God versus the timeless, spiritual kingdom; Jesus' coming again 'for' his saints in distinction to coming again 'with' his saints, and the absolute distinction between Israel ... and the Church". --- Fuller, Daniel P., **Gospel & Law - Contrast or Continuum?: The Hermeneutics of Dispensationalism and Covenant Theology**, 1980, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Michigan, p. 3. --- The position of this theodicy is that "dispensationalists" often value these "vital distinctions" to the point of skewing the meaning of the Bible for their sake, usually by prizing the physical and literal above the rational and more probable interpretation.

to understand the extent to which Genesis 3 can be taken at face value, and the extent to which it must be taken metaphorically. If a metaphor is understood to be a relatively simple expression that symbolically represents a much more complex and all-encompassing concept, then it's clear that the fact that a passage is metaphorical in no way detracts from the Bible's veracity. On the contrary, if the concept to which the metaphor points can be properly articulated, then the concept indicated by the biblical symbolism contributes elegance and systemic integrity to the understanding of the Bible as a whole.

If the God whose attributes are being justified in a theodicy is the God of the Bible, then necessary ingredients in resolving the problem of evil are (i)the proper appraisal of the extent to which Genesis 2 and 3 can be taken at face value, (ii) the proper appraisal of the extent to which and manner in which they must be taken as metaphorical, and (iii)the articulation of the concepts that underlie such metaphors. This is especially true if wave physics is understood to be a true and trustworthy interpretational protocol. Presuming that these two chapters are utterly true and reliable, and also largely metaphorical, the rest of this section is dedicated to articulation of some of the most basic concepts that underlie the metaphors.

As a theodicy, this is an attempt at justifying God's attributes, existence, and actions in the face of claims that a genuinely good God would not allow evil to exist and run rampant on the earth. Because evils, meaning terrible things, do run rampant on the earth, theists have a huge problem in explaining why an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God allows it to run rampant. As such, this theodicy presents God as a protagonist in a story. If the story is rationally consistent with all known physical facts and all the biblical evidence, then the probability for God's existence, and the probability that God's attributes are what the Bible claims they are, should be thereby enhanced in the reader's mind. Because classical apologetics already argue well for God's existence,¹ this theodicy focuses on demonstrating that the vast amount of suffering in the world does not negate God's most basic attributes. So this theodicy is aimed more specifically at defending the attributes of God that are assailed by people who argue from evil, specifically, against God's omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.

In the first two chapters of Genesis, God clearly assigned a specific ecological niche to the humans. How the creation story in these chapters comports with the so-called "theory of evolution", and with other extra-biblical theories of origins, is outside the scope of this theodicy, and should be addressed on some other occasion. The point in this theodicy, relative to Genesis 1&2, is that multiple human

^{1 (}i) Sproul, Gerstner, & Lindsley; (ii) Sproul, **Defending Your Faith**.

organismic standing waves somehow came into existence. The biblical story holds that God caused them to come into existence. The story also holds that God gave the human species a garden as their ecological niche. As surely as other creatures (birds, fish, cattle, etc.) were given specific ecological niches, these human standing waves were given a specific ecological niche. A crucial aspect of giving the humans a specific ecological niche was the assignment of a specific set of foods. In Genesis 1:30 the story holds that God gave the humans "every green plant for food". The humans were assigned the task of cultivating and keeping the garden from whence the human's food would come. They were given the task of cultivating what to them would be food, and in the process segregating plants desirable as food from plants less desirable as food. This is by definition part of cultivating and keeping a garden. Like all activity, such gardening required that these human standing waves make choices about what to do and what not to do. Making choices naturally means prioritizing an array of options, meaning organizing such options into a continuum from best to worst. It stands to reason that any healthy organismic standing wave that had the known potential for eternal life (whether activated or not) would be inclined naturally to choose only the best, where the best is defined in terms of sustaining eternal life and perpetuating the organismic standing wave. Because these organismic standing waves were given eternal life, evidenced by the fact that they had unrestricted access to the "tree of life",1 at every moment, these human standing waves were making choices and acting on those choices, and every choice was naturally intended to sustain their status as perpetually existing, permanent standing waves, meaning that that intention was a crucial aspect of their life's aim within their designated ecological niche.

In order to have the status of perpetually existing, permanent standing waves, there necessarily existed substantial compatibility between (i)choice making, (ii)

¹ It's extremely clear that they were banned from the tree of life in Genesis 3. But it's not clear that they were banned from the tree of life prior to that. It's also clear that they were banned from the tree of knowledge of good and evil prior to Genesis 3. Genesis 1:29 says, "every tree ... shall be food". Genesis 2:9 says that the tree of life is "in the midst of the garden". The woman in Genesis 3:3 says that they were banned from "the tree which is in the middle of the garden", but the context indicates that she's speaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. --- It's apparent that their access to both trees was probationary, with dire consequences for accessing the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and no apparent bad results from accessing the tree of life. Genesis 2:16-17 indicates that they may eat from all trees, but they are banned from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and only from that tree. Integrating these facts indicates that the probation pertained to the knowledge tree, and they had unrestricted access to the life tree as long as they did not violate the probation that pertained to the knowledge tree.

acting out the choices made, and (iii) the requirement that every perpetually existing standing wave in the garden either utterly eliminate all endogenous damping and incohesiveness, or thoroughly mitigate and thereby compensate for all endogenous damping and incohesiveness. In other words, to sustain their status as permanent standing waves, the people had to make choices that would not encourage the onset of endogenous damping and incohesiveness. Their actions and the choices that gave rise to those actions could not miss the mark, or at least could not be too far off the mark. This required that they be able to process information in such a way as to facilitate the making of good decisions and good choices. Said another way, to sustain themselves as perpetual standing waves, they needed to know what they needed to know, when they needed to know it; so that they would choose what they needed to choose when they needed to choose it; so that they would do what they needed to do when they needed to do it; where need is defined in terms of sustaining themselves as perpetual standing waves. To be able to accomplish this anti-damping, anti-incohesiveness phenomenon, these people needed to be able to perceive objective, exogenous reality clearly and accurately. They also needed to be able to perceive subjective, endogenous reality clearly and accurately, meaning that they needed to have a degree of self-understanding, meaning that they needed to have a degree of understanding about how to match internal desires with external objects. The degree of understanding had to be high enough to eliminate the dangers of endogenous damping and incohesiveness. Following a correspondence theory of perception, for every object existing externally, they needed an internal, endogenous representation of that external object, with all the necessary accompanying data about the usefulness of that external object in the pursuance of the standing wave's life's aim. The life's aim necessarily included maintenance of the standing wave through elimination / mitigation of damping and incohesiveness.

According to the biblical story, the people lived in the garden for an indeterminate period of time, enjoying what some call the "beatific vision", and in possession of what some call "preternatural powers". This state of being was necessarily marked by this ability to eliminate, subjugate, or mitigate damping and incohesiveness. This beatific state came to an end, and likewise the ability to eliminate, subjugate, or mitigate damping and incohesiveness also came to an end. The events leading to the end were intimately connected to the "tree of knowledge of good and evil". This metaphorical "tree" is not difficult to understand if one thinks in terms of ecological niches. This metaphorical tree of knowledge of good and evil is clearly pointing to the process of making choices. This is clear because choices always involve an act of prioritizing an array of options onto a continuum including best and worst. Somehow this metaphorical tree of knowledge of good and evil must

necessarily involve knowledge about how to prioritize options from good to evil.¹ This prioritization process relates to the concept of ecological niches like this: Every living organism occupies an ecological niche. Within any given ecological niche, an organism occupying that niche has some finite range of choices, and is preoccupied with acting out those choices. Regardless of how rudimentary an organism may be, and regardless of how incapable of cognition it may be, the fact that it acts is evidence that it is in fact making a choice when it acts, and is thereby fulfilling its calling within its ecological niche in the process. To see how these ideas relate to the people in the garden niche, it helps to look closely at Genesis 3:22:

Then the LORD God said, "Behold, the man has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil; and now, lest he stretch out his hand, and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever" --

In the process of eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the people clearly procured a range of choices that was different from the range that they already had. It was clearly a range of choices that was God-like compared to the previous range. It's also clear that the possibility that these people would combine this new range of choices with continued access to the tree of life was a threat to the cosmic order. So in Genesis 3:23, the people were driven out of the garden niche and into some other ecological niche, meaning whatever ecological niche befitted their new range of choices. With the adoption of the new range of choices, these organismic standing waves themselves changed to fit into their new niche. Because they became a threat, God guarded the tree of life with "cherubim" to eliminate the possibility of their access.

According to the translation into English, this verse appears to be speaking only about the threat of one man. But the Hebrew word for "man" in this verse is *adam* (Strong's #120), which can be translated as the proper name Adam, as a singular man, or as mankind. At minimum, the story necessarily includes both the man and the woman. So the proper understanding is that the people were a threat, not just the one man. But how were they a threat?

Clearly, the ecological niche into which they were originally put allowed free access to the tree of life with a simultaneous ban on access to the tree of knowledge of good and evil. They had the ability to access the tree of knowledge of good and evil, but they were warned not to access it, and were thereby banned from accessing it. After they violated the ban, the new ecological niche into which they were put had a ban on access to the tree of life. Even so, there is no mention of a continued

¹ In this theodicy, sometimes the word "evil" is used as equivalent to "bad", as in this instance. It is also used as a noun to indicate a specific state of being.

ban on the tree of knowledge of good and evil. They were certainly booted out of the garden; and it's certain that both trees were in the garden; and it's certain that after they were booted out, the people no longer had access to both of those two trees. These trees are clearly metaphorical. By using concepts common in existing academia, the concepts underlying the metaphors become obvious.

Genesis 3:22 indicates that whatever was to be gained by eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they had in fact gained. It indicates that they had "become like one of Us, knowing good and evil". Clearly, eating any at all from that tree was enough to utterly change their status, and to put them into an utterly different ecological niche. In this new niche, they had an expanded range of choices and expanded knowledge of good and evil, but they lacked access to life. Superficially, one might conclude that in the garden niche, they had access to life, but not to knowledge of good and evil; but in the out-of-the-garden niche, they lacked access to life while having ample access to knowledge of good and evil. This flip-flop with respect to access to the trees -- as emblematic evidence of the change in ecological niches -- appears to carry substantial *prima facie* weight. But the evidence also appears to show that it's not quite that simple.

It's obvious that the biblical story holds that humans have a capacity for permanent standing wave status, both in the garden niche and in the out-of-the-garden niche. Evidence that this is so exists in the fact that in both the garden niche and out-of-the-garden niche, the Bible says the people were created in God's image (Genesis 1:26-27; 9:6). In the garden niche, this potential was not merely potential, but actual. In the garden niche, they clearly exercised the capacity for permanent standing wave status. Out of the garden niche, the capacity became strictly potential, and ceased being kinetic, except under rare circumstances.¹ Clearly the biblical story holds that human beings were created with a potential for permanent standing wave status.

The big mystery surrounding the tree of knowledge of good and evil can be reframed as a question: How and why did damping and/or incohesiveness come in where previously there had been none? The fact that this apparent mystery revolves around a metaphorical tree of knowledge of good and evil points to the concept that undergirds the metaphor. --- A reasonable answer to the question, even if it's also an unusual answer, it that human beings were originally designed to have both eternal life and uninhibited knowledge of good and evil. They were designed both to be

¹ Abel, Enoch, and Noah (rare exceptions from the pre-Abrahamic period) are each mentioned in Hebrews 11 as faithful, implying that their potential for permanent standing wave status was somehow actuated.

undamped perpetual standing waves, invincible to damping / incohesiveness, and to occupy an ecological niche in which they could maintain that undamped, invincible status under all circumstances. But there was a caveat built into the original design. The caveat was that they were not given the psychological processing equipment necessary to process all inputs so that they would always know what they needed to know when they needed to know it; choose what they needed to choose when they needed to choose it; and do what they needed to do when they needed to do it; where need is defined as the avoidance of damping / incohesiveness. In classical theological terms, they were put on probation. In terms comporting with modern science, they were created for an ecological niche where they would have the ability to avoid damping / incohesiveness by having the ability to make choices that never missed the mark, so that they would never choose things that would enhance damping / incohesiveness. To use another analogy, although they were created with all the hardware for living eternal, undamped, invincible, sinless lives, they were not created with all the necessary software. They had the necessary software for making sinless choices within the garden niche. But they did not have the necessary software for making sinless choices in the out-of-the-garden niche. In the out-of-thegarden niche, they would need software that would enable them to process any and all kinds of input that might confront them in the out-of-the-garden niche. They needed software so that no matter what kind of input they needed to process, the endogenous processing would produce choices that never missed the mark. Because they lacked the software, God placed them in a probationary ecological niche that would minimize the challenging inputs.

Of course this answer begs another question: Why would God create them with all the necessary hardware, but simultaneously avoid giving them the necessary software? The reasonable answer to this question relates directly to the fact that God created humans in his image. If God is truly God, then he is by definition utterly sovereign over the entire universe, from smallest subatomic particle to largest astronomical body, and everything in between. God is therefore by definition utterly omniscient and utterly omnipotent. When the biblical God created the universe, he called everything "good", even human beings. All of creation therefore has an obligation to honor its creator by being good, which means by fulfilling whatever calling their God-given ecological niche places upon them. Unlike all other creatures, humans were given the ecological niche of being miniature sovereigns, created in God's image. (i)Because humans are not God, they cannot be omniscient. But as fully functioning miniature sovereigns, they can know what they need to know when they need to know it; so that they choose what they need to choose when they need to choose it; so that they do what they need to do when they need to do it; so that they continue their existence as undamped, invincible standing waves eternally.

(ii)Because they are not God, they cannot be omnipotent. But as fully functioning miniature sovereigns, they can do what they need to do when they need to do it; so that they remain undamped, cohesive standing waves forever. (iii)Because they are not God, they are localized in space and time. They are therefore incapable of being omnibenevolent. But as fully functioning miniature sovereigns, because the calling placed on them by their ecological niche is for them to be undamped, cohesive standing waves that never miss the mark, they are therefore utterly benevolent within their local space and time.

Because humans have this unique ecological niche in which they are very Godlike, though never God, they are miniature sovereigns, and they are required by their ecological niche to behave as such. There is an element of dominion that they must exercise in order to satisfy the requirements of their ecological niche. This means that people must take dominion over their own minds. They must develop their own software.¹ This means that people must choose to develop their own software. It means that people must choose to develop the ability to process inputs so that choices that come out of that processing never miss the mark. God created people to have both eternal life and knowledge of good and evil. But people would have to go out of their way to choose the range of choices and the knowledge of good and evil that go with the out-of-the-garden niche, because God would not give these to the people for free. People would need to choose to take dominion over their own minds. So people were created with an inborn inclination to choose to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. They were created with a natural inclination to have the range of choices befitting the out-of-the-garden niche. But they were also warned, without equivocation, that if they chose to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, their standing wave would immediately start getting damped and/or incohesive. This would happen because they lacked the mental software necessary to process the flood of inputs that would come at them in their out-of-the-garden niche. So the garden niche was an act of mercy towards the people, a nursery where the people could prepare themselves for the ugly future by creating fond memories of their once unencumbered "beatific vision" of God. God mercifully put them into the garden, if for no other reason than to give humanity an object lesson. The object lesson was this: Humanity has the potential for eternal life, which means living in eternal friendship with God. But fulfilling that capacity requires never missing the mark, and it means never choosing to do anything that would cause the unmitigated onset of damping and/or incohesiveness. And to make that happen, it's necessary to have the mental equipment necessary to

¹ In biblical terms, this is done through renewing the mind in Christ. (Romans 12:2; Ephesians 4:20-24)

make it happen. But they were not given all the software; even though they were certainly given all the hardware.

Is there any biblical evidence to prove that this retelling of the story is compatible with Scripture? Yes! Clearly Genesis 3:22 indicates that the out-of-the-garden niche is a niche in which people have access to the full range of knowledge of good and evil. There's nothing in Scripture to indicate that that full range is extinguished later on. So in Revelation 22, it's clear that the final destination of God's people is to have uninhibited access to both the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil. In the garden niche they had access to unlimited life, but not to the full range of choices that goes with the ecological niche for which they were created, meaning the post-probationary niche. In this out-of-the-garden niche they had access to the full range of choices, but they lacked access to unlimited life, due to their inability to properly process information, along with all the ramifications of this inability. In the New-Jerusalem niche, they finally arrive at the niche for which they were originally created, a niche in which they have access to both the full range of choices and eternal life. But only people who take full dominion and responsibility over the full-range-of-choice requirements of miniature sovereignty are allowed into this final destination niche. The evidence indicates that entering into this final niche cannot be done willy nilly, but can only be accomplished via commitment to a very specific strategy.

Before the fall, humans were disabled from being omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent. These disabilities are immutable. They never go away, regardless of what ecological niche humans may occupy. After the fall, because humans have defective processing equipment, they lack proper understanding of the boundaries between their callings as miniature sovereigns and these abilities that God alone has. Anybody who tries to be omniscient is trying to know things beyond the human need to know. Anybody who tries to be omnipotent is trying to have powers beyond the human need for power. Anybody who tries to be omnibenevolent is exercising megalomania that does not properly recognize that humans are inherently localized in space and time. So there are certain disabilities that humans have regardless of ecological niche. Humans were disabled from these things even before the fall. The probationary period can be conceived as a test to see if the humans in the garden ecological niche would voluntarily live within both this original set of natural disabilities and the limited range of choices symbolized by the ban on the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Because God is omniscient, God knew the humans would fail the probation. The disabilities with regard to omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence will never go away. The disabilities with regard

to the overly narrow range of choices went away when the people violated the ban.¹ The disabilities of being on probation, and failing probation, will go away at the resurrection. The disabilities acquired by the humans in Genesis 3, as a result of being booted out of the garden niche for violating the ban, will also go away at the resurrection.

Sub-Chapter 3: The Devil & the Natural Law

Clearly the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil are both essentially metaphorical, where the metaphors allude to deeper and more all-encompassing concepts than a strictly literal translation would allow. It's reasonable to wonder if the serpent first mentioned in Genesis 3:1 is also essentially metaphorical, and if so, to what underlying concept the metaphor points. This is an important question because it is close to the heart of any defense of the doctrines of the biblical God's omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence, against the so-called "problem of evil". But before exploring the underlying nature of the serpent, it's important to properly lay the groundwork for doing so by setting this metaphorical serpent squarely within the context of **natural law**, which obviously requires establishing what **natural law** is.²

¹ Those pre-fall natural disabilities will not go away, even at the resurrection of the dead. Romans 6:4-6 (and other passages) indicates that Christ's people will be raised bodily, the same way that he was raised bodily. Anyone living in a body is localized in space and time, and is therefore precluded from being omniscient and omnipotent. The exception to this claim is that the disability of being on probation will not exist after the resurrection.

² The concept of **<u>natural law</u>** has been an important aspect of Christian thought at least since Thomas Aquinas. --- See Aquinas, Thomas, **Summa Theologica**, First Part of the Second Part, "Treatise on Law" (QQ 90-108);

URL: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FS.vi.html. --- <u>Natural law</u> is a subset of <u>eternal law</u>. The <u>eternal law</u> is the terms of the <u>eternal covenant</u>. The <u>eternal covenant</u> is the unchangeable, divinely imposed legal agreement between God and all of his creation, including mankind, where the agreement stipulates the conditions of their relationships. <u>Eternal law</u> is the aggregate obligations that are contained within the <u>eternal covenant</u>. The <u>eternal law</u> is subtended by the <u>natural law</u>, which is subtended by the <u>divine law</u>, which is subtended by the <u>divine law</u> refers to the Bible, which is sometimes said to be equivalent to special revelation. <u>Human law</u> is law imposed by humans upon other humans.

Natural law is best understood within the context of a correspondence theory of perception.¹ In this context, a correspondence theory of perception merely refers to the fact that whatever external object a given human recognizes must be replicated in some way and to some extent within the consciousness of the perceiving subject, in order for such recognition to take place. Given that **natural law** can be best understood within the context of such a correspondence theory of perception, natural law encompasses three things simultaneously: (i) the laws of nature that govern all natural phenomena that exist exogenously to the perceiver; (ii)the laws of nature that exist endogenously to the perceiver, which include the laws of nature that govern desire creation, digestion, respiration, idea creation, concept formation, and the process of cognition, especially endogenous cognition of exogenous natural phenomena so that exogenous phenomena are accurately understood by endogenous cognitive processes; and (iii)the field of ethics, meaning the moral law that governs human choice-making. This moral-law leg of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod consists of essentially two distinct aspects: It consists first of that aspect of the moral law that says that **natural law** is perfect and does not change, and that it's possible for humans to be perfectly conformed to such perfect **<u>natural law</u>**. The moral law in such perfection instructs humans on how to behave so that they remain perpetual standing waves. This moral law leg consists also of that aspect of the moral law that says that humans are not now perfect, and that they therefore must go through cognitive procedures as part of the process of trying to make the best decision in every choice.² The difference between the perfect aspect of the moral-law leg of the natural law and the imperfect aspect, revolves around the changeless moral law /

¹ For whatever reason, since the "enlightenment", Protestants have by-and-large abandoned the concept of "natural law", at least in terms of its theological origins. This abandonment did not start during the Reformation, evidenced by the fact that all the magisterial reformers believed in natural law, as did Reformation-era Roman Catholic theologians. The magisterial reformers may have chafed at some of the Thomist excesses with respect to natural law, but none of them considered rejecting the biblical foundations of natural law as has been done by the more recent Protestants. These latterday Protestants have abandoned the most important leg of the **natural law** tripod, the moral-law leg. Because **natural rights** are an inevitable subset and corollary of such **natural law**, American Protestants have essentially abandoned the rational foundations of the American legal system. By reasoning from the Bible, it's possible to rebuild that rational foundation, but only if one uses legal concepts and terminology that are basic in the field of jurisprudence, terms like jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, in personam jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, delict, contract, *etc*.

² With respect to the moral-law leg of the **<u>natural law</u>** tripod, <u>**natural law**</u> is the moral law to which all human beings are subject as a result of being created with the *imago Dei*. Although the moral law is changeless, the human understanding of it, and ability to apply

<u>natural law</u>, on one hand, and the changing human understanding of it, on the other.¹ As a source of moral law, the <u>**divine law**</u> is largely equivalent to the Bible. The <u>**divine law**</u> is thereby a description of the moral law in its perfection, but because humans are fallible, humans are not presently capable of comprehending the moral-law leg in its perfection.

(i)The leg of the **natural-law** tripod that pertains to the laws of nature in operation exogenously to the individual human is now understood better than it ever has been, given the advances in science that have happened over the last several hundred years. But this leg is not adequately understood, especially given the current rational fragmentation of this leg. (ii)The leg of the **natural-law** tripod that pertains to the laws of nature in operation endogenously to the given human are also not well understood, in spite of the fact that these endogenous laws are better understood than they ever have been. (iii)The leg of the **natural-law** tripod defined as roughly equivalent to the field of ethics, and which might be called the science of choice-making, is also poorly developed, given that humans generally do not know well how to behave in order to maintain themselves as perpetual standing waves.

Because the moral-law leg of this three-fold definition of **<u>natural law</u>** depends upon cognition, a core problem in getting a clear and reliable definition of <u>**natural**</u> <u>**law**</u> revolves around defining cognition. Rigorously articulating HOW cognition works would require impossible libraries. But THAT cognition works is beyond dispute, except perhaps by radical skeptics. Here, this theodicy attempts to present what's true about cognition, from a common-sense perspective. This common-sense approach should suffice to show how the concept of <u>**natural law**</u> is crucial to a rational understanding of Genesis 3, and therefore to this theodicy.

According to common sense, in order for any given person to recognize something, it's necessary for that person to have a concept of that thing. If the thing is an external object, like a tree, then in order for a person to recognize that tree, the person must have a mental category, "tree", that can allow the perceiver to re-cognize the external object. How it happens may be a great mystery to science. Nevertheless, that it happens is beyond question.

Somehow, as people grow from infancy, they learn to transform sense data into percepts, where a percept is an endogenous instantiation of an exogenous standing wave, as an internal facsimile of that external object. To be clear, "facsimile" here

it properly, change with time. <u>Natural law</u> is a subset of the <u>eternal law</u> that includes both the changeless moral law and the changing human understanding of it.

¹ For a more thorough description of the <u>natural-law</u> tripod, see **A Memorandum of** Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood.

means replication of relevant data about the external object without actually reproducing an internal duplicate of the object. Presumably, cognitive replicas of external objects get produced internally by way of one's nervous system. People generally have powers of abstraction which allow transformation of percepts into concepts, where concepts are an abstract categorization of percepts, and where concepts can be linked together into systems of concepts that are interconnected by various linguistic cues, into causal and other kinds of relationships. From early childhood forward, and throughout life, as long as the perceiver is more-or-less mentally healthy, people generally form cognitive counterparts to external phenomena, thereby allowing cognitive processing of such exogenous phenomena. Something similar to this happens for all forms of life, except that the more rudimentary the nervous system, the less the organism is able to abstract, and the more the organism is dependent strictly upon sense data, and the less it's dependent on percepts and concepts. If the organism has no form of nervous system whatever, then it's entirely dependent upon sense data.

All these claims about a correspondence theory of perception -- regarding sense data, percept formation, concept formation, the endogenous mental organization of concepts into systems of interrelated concepts, *etc.* -- are being made based purely on common sense and reason. There are numerous breeds of epistemology that speak at great length about such issues. Given the sophistication of current brain science, the author believes it's not necessary, and in fact, could be a distraction to venture much further into the epistemological weeds. So the author will only say a few more things about mind science (as distinct from brain science) in this section, only enough to establish that by way of a correspondence theory of perception, the God-given rules of epistemology are crucial to one of the three legs of **natural law**, namely the moral-law leg.

Given that the universe operates according to laws, laws are built into all the phenomena in nature. Even if scientists reject belief in a creator, and even if they reject "law" as a useful aspect of their nomenclature, it would be impossible for them to do science without acknowledging that there are laws, rules, *etc.*, by which nature operates. Without rules, mathematics doesn't exist, reason doesn't exist, physics doesn't exist, and humanity returns to a state in which all of nature is whimsical and unpredictable. These facts bear directly upon human perception. The more accurately perceiver P is able to replicate all **natural laws** that pertain to external phenomenon E, replicating E as percept PP and concept C, the more P will be able to behave with respect to E in a way that enhances P's ability to remain free of damping / incohesiveness. So **natural laws** do not exist only in external object E. There are also **natural laws** that exist in PP and C. Because these endogenous

<u>natural laws</u> pertain to morality, *i.e.*, to how P acts relative to E, they are at least as important as the exogenous **<u>natural laws</u>** that undergird E.

External phenomenon E certainly has **natural laws** that pertain to it, and that are responsible for E's existence. And it's intuitively obvious, if not objectively obvious, that perceiver P needs to have an accurate representation of external object E in his/her concept C. But P needs more than a mere internal facsimile of E. P needs knowledge about how to use E to maintain and enhance P as a standing wave that's not vulnerable to damping / incohesiveness. So not only does C need to be an accurate representation of E, but C also needs to contain P's attitudes about E, and P's knowledge about how to use E to maintain and enhance the status of P as a standing wave that is unencumbered by damping / incohesiveness. So natural law governs not only external phenomenon E, but also the replication of E as PP and C, and all the thoughts, speech, and behavior that define P's relationship to E. So **natural law** is primarily moral law. It is the moral law that God put into the creation that defines and determines how humans need to behave in order to maintain themselves as standing waves that are unencumbered by damping / incohesiveness, and so that the people thereby have eternal life. In other words, the moral-law leg dominates the three-fold nature of **<u>natural law</u>**. This is because the most important aspect of **<u>natural law</u>** is that it is law that defines how humans can know what they need to know when they need to know it; so that they choose what they need to choose when they need to choose it; so that they do what they need to do when they need to do it; where need is defined purely in terms of what it takes to be a standing wave that is perpetually unencumbered by damping / incohesiveness.

Now that it's clear what the **natural law** is, it should be easier to speak of the devil's role in this problem of evil. --- Because the biblical devil is a fallen angel, it should be helpful to examine angels and demons in general to see how the devil in Genesis 3 fits into this larger category. The Bible clearly claims that angels and demons exist. Historically the most hardened advocates of the scientific method and rationality have dismissed the Bible's claims about angels and demons as pure mythology that may have some literary value, but that does not deserve any more significant place in any "civilized" society than any other kind of mythology. But the current implementation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle should be taken by all as a prime example of why science should not be allowed to have the final say about what counts as reality, and what doesn't. The claim that angels exist should be seen by all rational people as more rational than the claim that chance is a thing that exists in objective reality. Chance is not a physical thing any more than a mathematical line is a physical thing. ---- If science, with such radical

abandon, insists that mathematical phenomena like chance exist in nature, then why should laymen not see this insistence as anything other than the creation of pseudo-scientific mythologies by people who have far more power in society than they deserve? Chance is not a physical thing any more than a mathematical line or point is a physical thing. If the scientific priesthood insists on such folly, then the scientific laity should have no reservations about eliminating all their funding of such pseudo-science.

As far as this author knows, angels have never been captured and measured by scientists. Like chance and mathematical lines and points, they may exist and be extremely useful in a purely psychic domain, and perhaps have no physical existence. The fact that no one has offered concrete evidence for their physical existence is not sufficient reason to claim that they don't exist, any more than it's sufficient reason to claim that mathematical chance, lines, and points don't exist. A purely psychic existence is still an existence, even if it's never a physical existence.

Genesis 3:24 indicates that God set angels to guard the tree of life, to thereby divert the threat that fallen people posed to the celestial order. People had surrendered themselves to damping / incohesiveness. While in that dying condition, they might have tried to access eternal life by way of a shortcut that violated **natural law**. So God set these angels as guards to eliminate that threat. It's reasonable to assume that these guardian angels were good. Before making that assumption, it's important to first know how to distinguish good angels from bad angels, assuming for the moment that angels exist. In Genesis 1, the Bible clearly indicates that God stated that the entire creation was good. The narrative leaves no doubt that angels are part of the creation. So according to the narrative, all angels are good. This should cause one to wonder if there is any such thing as a bad angel. Or it should at least cause one to wonder when the serpent went bad. Did he go bad before, during, or after the people violated the ban? --- Perhaps angels are psychic guardians of spiritual principles, and perhaps they are only evil to the extent that such principles are somehow misapplied. They might have a psychic existence like mathematical lines and points, and thereby have an existence like tools that are only as good or bad as their users make them. Before accepting or rejecting such speculation, it's first important to explore it. Likewise, before accepting or rejecting the proposition that angels exist, it's first necessary to explore what they presumably are. So it's necessary to explore more thoroughly the sequence of metaphorical events in Genesis 2-3.

By rejecting God's warning about eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the people were in effect telling God that their range of choices was too small. They were in effect claiming that the garden ecological niche was not their natural niche. They were in effect attempting to exchange the garden niche for an ecological niche which gave them a broader range of choices. A huge problem with this alternative ecological niche is that they would be unable to maintain their status as standing waves unencumbered by damping / incohesiveness in that alternative niche. By opting for this alternative ecological niche, they were entering into an ecological niche in which they would be prone to misapplying spiritual principles. So at this interface between the garden niche and the out-of-the-garden niche, the devil may be bad only because the people are commanding him to be bad. To thoroughly investigate this possibility, it's necessary to identify what spiritual principle the devil might supposedly guard. The angels in Genesis 3:24 were clearly set to guard the principle of eternal life from access by people who might try to access it without sufficient regard for **natural law**. If angels are generally psychic guardians of principles, as they clearly are in Genesis 3:24, then what principle is the serpent supposed to guard?

Scriptures like Ezekiel 28:11-19 and Isaiah 14:3-27 show what this angel guards, according to biblical fact-claims. This is the covering cherub. A reasonable interpretation of what this means is that this is the angel of appearances. When the people became confused about how to properly interpret appearances, they relied on appearances, and appearances misled them. They misperceived because they lacked the necessary mental equipment to process sensory inputs into accurate understanding. Lucifer, who in Genesis 3 (according to this interpretation) became *Ha Satan*, meaning "the enemy", is the angel over this whole process of misperception because he is the archangel over appearances. Misperception inevitably means violation of **natural law**, both the endogenous-laws-of-nature leg and the moral-law leg.¹ So the angel of appearances -- the guardian of the fact that appearances exist -- is by default also the angel over misperception. Because misperception of **natural law** by an organism that has the capacity to be a perpetual standing wave is inherently perverse, God acknowledged the curse on this angel, this covering cherub, this angel over this whole process of misperception.

The angel of appearances clearly lied, saying, "You surely shall not die!". If the people had not been inclined to believe the lie, they would not have believed it. The reason they were inclined to believe the lie is because they were designed from the beginning to occupy a different ecological niche from the garden ecological niche. They were designed to occupy an ecological niche in which their range of choices covered the entire purview of the **natural law**. They were inclined by the nature given them by God to desire to operate within an ecological niche in which their range of choices covered the full range of good and evil. God put them into the

¹ They suffered perceptual disintegration, meaning the incoherence of the previously coherent relationship between the three legs of the **<u>natural law</u>** tripod.

garden niche at creation, in order to protect them from the consequences of their own lack of information processing software. God created them to be miniature sovereigns. As such, they would need to take dominion over their own minds. They would need to take complete responsibility for their own actions. God would remain forever blameless and utterly sovereign. The fact that the man blamed the woman, and the woman blamed the serpent, is evidence that they were in no frame of mind to take complete responsibility as miniature sovereigns. They admitted no guilt. They passed the buck. They thereby proved that they were not qualified to be miniature sovereigns, even though they were designed to be miniature sovereigns, and even though they chose the broader range of choices that go with the miniature sovereign's ecological niche. As fully-functioning miniature sovereigns, they would certainly take full responsibility for their actions. By passing the buck, they proved that they were not fully functioning. But that doesn't mean that there was anything wrong with the way they were designed and created. They had the *imago Dei* before the fall, and they had it afterward. But they would need to take dominion over their own minds, meaning that they would need to learn how to avoid being deceived by appearances, and each would need to take full responsibility for all of his/her thoughts, choices, actions, etc.

Clearly the serpent is a metaphor representing the angel of appearances who turned into The Enemy. As the angel of appearances, Ha Satan is the master of disguises. When God acknowledged that the serpent was cursed (Genesis 3:14-15), God alluded to a plan that had been put in place even before the creation, a plan for redeeming at least a portion of this species that was entering into this out-ofthe-garden ecological niche.¹ The prophecy says, "He shall bruise you on the head, And you shall bruise him on the heel".² This compound sentence is also clearly metaphorical. When understood within the Bible's overall context, "He" in this prophecy is essentially referring to the only human being in existence (i)who was and is utterly sinless; (ii)who has no inclination to succumb to damping / incohesiveness; (iii)who is eternally at one and in harmony with God the Father; and (iv)who would, through a system of carefully structured covenants, over thousands of years, lead at least a portion of this species into redemption, *i.e.*, into an ecological niche in which damping / incohesiveness would be utterly eliminated / mitigated. The prophecy is metaphorically predicting everything that would unfold in all the rest of the Bible from Genesis 4:1 to Revelation 22:21. The evidence shows that the rest of the Bible is an expression of this redemptive process. Redemption means the growth of

¹ This plan is sometimes called the "covenant of redemption". --- Grudem, pp. 518-519.

² This prophecy is sometimes called the "protoevangel", meaning the first mention of "the gospel".

this species, or at least a significant part of it, into its full functionality within the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. At maturation this redemption means that the individual organisms within this sub-species have eternal life, and simultaneously have access to all the knowledge of good and evil needed by miniature sovereigns. Being a miniature sovereign, in the fullest sense, means that each organism knows what it needs to know when it needs to know it; chooses what it needs to choose when it needs to choose it; and does what it needs to do when it needs to do it; so that the organismic standing wave does not suffer from damping and doesn't become incohesive. This means that upon full redemption, each of these redeemed organisms has freedom from misperception, freedom from deception, the status of being fully qualified as a miniature sovereign, uninhibited access to eternal life, occupation of an ecological niche that includes the full range of choices available under the full purview of the **natural law**, and full freedom from damping / incohesiveness. These are basic attributes of the miniature sovereign in the final-destination, New-Jerusalem niche. But entering into this final ecological niche cannot be done willy nilly. It can only be accomplished in compliance with **natural law**. This means that it can only be accomplished through a very specific kind of strategy, and this specific strategy revolves around "He" in the Genesis 3:15 prophecy.

Regarding this metaphorical creature that "He shall bruise ... on the head", there has been a distinction made by philosophers, scientists, and theologians throughout most of Christian history between the "natural" and the "supernatural". This metaphorical creature has generally been assumed to inhabit the "supernatural". Kant tried to draw an impenetrable barrier between these two by allocating the natural domain to what he called the "phenomenal", and allocating the supernatural domain to what he called the "noumenal". Both the natural-supernatural dichotomy and the phenomenal-noumenal dichotomy should now be understood to have a dubious status, because both are arbitrary misapplications of either-or logic. If a perception / phenomenon can be tested scientifically, then the existence of that phenomenon is certainly less dubious than if it cannot be tested. On the other hand, if a perception / phenomenon cannot be tested, that by itself does not invalidate either the perception or the phenomenon. Massive experience over the last 500 years shows that what was not testable yesterday is often testable today, and what is not testable today may be testable tomorrow. Creating arbitrary barriers like these two dichotomies creates unnecessary and avoidable social schisms and conflicts.¹

¹ The author's recommended elimination of the natural-supernatural dichotomy should not be read as equivalent to a recommendation to eliminate the doctrine of God's simultaneous transcendence - immanence. The author absolutely does not recommend the elimination of this doctrine.

Under the regimes of these two dichotomies, <u>natural law</u> has generally been understood as being confined to the natural and phenomenal. If these two dichotomies are rejected, then <u>natural law</u> can be understood as being confined to the three legs of the <u>natural law</u> described above. <u>Natural law</u> can then be more easily understood to be a subset of <u>eternal law</u>, where much of <u>eternal law</u> will remain eternally untestable because humans were not designed to be omniscient.

Sub-Chapter 4: Wave Physics in the Realm of Human Thought

One of the premises of this theodicy is that compatibility exists between physics and Bible-based theology. As surely as there is no inherent conflict between general revelation and special revelation because the same rational God is the source of each, there should be no inherent conflict between science and theology. So there needs to be give-and-take between these two fields so that neither warps the other. It appears that approaching existing circumstances by submitting facts from general revelation for consideration under special revelation will be less likely to generate warping than by imposing special revelation dogmatically.¹ That's why this theodicy started with wave physics, rather than with theological posturing. The relationship between these two arenas needs to be understood to be a feedback loop. Up to this point in this theodicy, this feedback loop has been dominated by the secular-scientific / general-revelation side of the loop. The emphasis is about to shift so that the theological side will dominate this feedback loop more. In order to tell the biblical story in this theodicy, that shift is practically inevitable. But for that transition to proceed properly, a final bridge needs to be built from the general-revelation side of the feedback loop. That bridge pertains to the realm of human thought. The Bible speaks hugely about law, social relations, and life in general. Because law and social relations are inevitably embedded in the thought realm, the feedback loop fizzles out unless wave physics can cast some genuine insights into the realm of human thought. Existing physical evidence does in fact cast such genuine insight into the realm of human thought.

¹ Bible-based theology, as a serious and important pursuit, has always had a duty to speak truth into the scientific endeavor. But over the last two hundred plus years, perhaps since the death of Jonathan Edwards and the publications of Immanuel Kant, this duty has been sorely neglected. During this period of time, theology as a rational pursuit has been not only neglected, but also vandalized and plundered. Under such circumstances, it's not equipped to speak truth into the scientific endeavor, at least not until its practitioners get up to speed.

As was indicated above,¹ there is ample scientific research that shows that human mental processes are vulnerable to manipulation through resonance between the brain's frequency code and exogenous electromagnetic waves. Although there may be little or no conclusive evidence showing that thoughts exists as mental signal waves that are somehow combined with physical electromagnetic carrier waves, the evidence is overwhelming that something along these lines is highly probable.² So this theodicy will proceed by assuming henceforth that something along these lines is the truth. More specifically, subjective experiences of the mind are somehow carried as signal waves on extremely weak electromagnetic carrier waves. This means that all the rules that subtend the superposition principle apply as much to mental phenomena as they do to physical waves. This has huge implications with respect to the nature of agreements.

If a thought is somehow a wave, then an agreement between two people is composed of the thought waves of those two people, where those thought waves superpose. More specifically, in a genuine agreement there is constructive interference between the thought waves of two or more people with respect to the subject matter of the agreement. Likewise, in a disagreement, there is destructive interference between the thought waves of two or more people with respect to the subject matter of the disagreement. If two people who are agreeing or disagreeing about a particular subject matter are more-or-less mentally stable, then that agreement / disagreement exists as a standing wave between them. This means that every human being presently alive on the planet is at least hypothetically in electromagnetically interfering standing waves with every other human being with respect to the subject matter of the people's opinions, beliefs, commitments, etc. People who are utterly agnostic or ignorant with respect to a given subject matter might be excluded from this matrix of agreements and disagreements with respect to the given subject matter. People who are so far away that the signal strength is too weak to cause resonance are probably also excluded. But anyone who is not too far away and is not utterly agnostic or ignorant is inevitably a participant in such a superposition grid.

If all humanity existed in this thought matrix, then the superposition principle would apply to the matrix as a whole. This means that the thoughts, beliefs, opinions, commitments, *etc.*, of the human race would superpose to form a single standing wave. But distance diminishes the effects of such resonance, causing the superposition

¹ See CHAPTER B, Sub-Chapter 2, Evidence that the Mind Is Vulnerable to Brain Manipulation, above.

² As indicated above, in CHAPTER B, *Sub-Chapter 1, The Wave Nature of the Human Body*, "The human body ... translates external signals through its **biocircuits** in the same way" that radio and television translate signal waves in their circuits.

principle to not hold, and massive destructive interference exists because of massive disagreements. At its maturity this matrix may in fact be the same thing as the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. But under existing circumstances, the human race is obviously far from actualizing such a coherent matrix.

Even though the human race is still far from the New-Jerusalem niche, it's clear that all the mental activity of the human race -- especially the contracts, laws, beliefs, commitments, etc., that are strongly held -- tends to form a single standing wave out of this superposition of thought waves. The situation with regard to this superposition of thought waves is similar to the situation with regard to the single organismic standing wave. For each, it's reasonable to ask what it takes for the standing wave to become permanent, rather than temporary. But in the case of the humanity-wide thought wave, the superposition principle is so much failing to hold, and destructive interference is so much the rule of the day, that it's far more hypothetical to even speak of the human race's psychic standing wave as even existing. Nevertheless, for the sake of philosophical / theological inquiry, what does it take for the human race's psychic standing wave to move from the out-of-the-garden ecological niche into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche? The answer to this question is largely the same as the answer to the question with respect to the single organismic standing wave. Specifically, damping / incohesiveness have to be utterly eliminated or mitigated before it's reasonable to call the standing wave permanent. In the case of the single organismic standing wave, coherence between all three legs of the **natural law** is an absolute prerequisite to the existence of a perpetual organismic standing wave. The same absolute prerequisite exists for the human race's psychic standing wave. For the human race's psychic standing wave to be genuinely permanent, every organismic standing wave within it's thought matrix must also be genuinely permanent. So it appears that this inquiry is coming to a chicken-or-egg question. Which comes first, permanence for every organismic standing wave, or permanence for the human race's psychic standing wave?

Painting this in either-or, chicken-or-egg terms is completely inappropriate. This is a feedback loop. For reasons that should become clear as this story unfolds, both the claim that the permanence of the human race's psychic standing wave must come first, and the claim that the permanence of each organismic standing wave should come first, are wrong. According to the biblical story, both kinds of standing wave enter into permanent standing wave status according to the timing prescribed by the Genesis 3:15 prophecy: "He shall bruise you on the head". This prophecy alludes to a system of covenants that are executed and implemented over a span of millennia. Implicit in the contextual understanding of this prophecy is the proposition that the permanent standing wave status of these two kinds of standing waves depends

upon the timing established by way of this system of covenants. The covenants exist not only in the Bible. They also exist as implemented through agreements between individual people.¹

It's obvious that an individual organismic standing wave cannot metamorphose from temporary status into permanent status without complete coherence within the three-fold cord of the **natural law**. But that statement by itself does not show how unlikely such metamorphosis is for such a single, isolated standing wave. It's extremely unlikely, given that humans are social creatures. Mental interference is impossible to completely avoid as long as people are interacting with one another.² Further, destructive mental interference is practically inevitable in the out-of-thegarden ecological niche. In fact, disagreement is the rule in the out-of-the-garden niche, rather than the exception. --- Because such disagreement is so detrimental to each organismic standing wave's coherence, some mechanism is necessary to mitigate the effects of such disagreement on the side of coherence of the three-fold cord of the **natural law**, at both the individual and matrix levels. Among other things, the "He" referenced in the Genesis 3:15 prophecy offers humanity just such a mechanism for mitigating the detrimental effects of disagreement. The mechanism exists in the form of covenants, laws, and jurisdictions that have been written into the Bible. By properly defining covenant, law, and jurisdiction, and by seeing these things clearly in operation in the Bible, it becomes obvious that the author of the Bible is leading humanity, or at least a significant subset thereof, into the degree of agreement that is necessary in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. It's clear that the mechanism he's using to do this is the operation of covenants, laws, and jurisdictions. A prerequisite to seeing how this mechanism works is to understand these three concepts -- covenant, law, and jurisdiction -- as obvious features of biblical jurisprudence. So the next major task in expounding the biblical story is to expound biblical jurisprudence with a special emphasis on these three concepts. Before starting this major task, a review of the context established by wave physics is important to keep the story lucid.

¹ The reader should not understand the author as claiming here that ordinary people in every generation are the authors and instigators of special revelation. Ordinary people like the author and the reader can be implementers of special revelation, but not the authors of it. The biblical authors are the authors of special revelation, and the God-inspired protagonists of the Bible are the instigators of special revelation. Ordinary people like the author and the reader may be called to be implementers of special revelation, and rational consistency between such implementation and biblical special revelation should always be the goal.

² It's probable that distance between people diminishes the power of the interference, meaning that at some distance the superposition principle fails to hold.

Given that thought waves exist in the electromagnetic spectrum, the existence of thought content as a function of electromagnetism has huge implications for the permanence or impermanence of the individual human standing wave. Given that humans are social creatures, constructive and destructive interference of thought waves between individual humans becomes an absolutely pivotal factor in every human being's participation in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. In fact, it may be so pivotal that it goes to the core of defining the permanence or impermanence of any individual human standing wave.

If two people disagree about something, it stands to reason, under the circumstances, that the two people essentially have competing standing waves within the psychic arena, at least with regard to the subject matter of the disagreement. Assuming that the superposition principle holds with respect to the two standing thought waves, such competing standing waves interfere with one another destructively. If the two people are in close proximity, and if both people are conscious of the relevant thought content, then there are ample good reasons to assume that the superposition principle holds with respect to the two standing thought waves. Given that the superposition principle holds, and given that the two people disagree with respect to the subject matter of the given thought waves, the thought waves interfere with one another destructively as a result of the disagreement, and it stands to reason that such destructive interference has a negative influence on the organismic standing wave's coherence. --- On the other hand, if two people agree about something, and if their agreement is affirmed by **<u>natural law</u>**, then their agreement about the given subject matter superposes into a coherent standing wave, thereby contributing to the overall coherence of each organismic standing wave.

This line of reasoning leads to an expanded view of the laws that impact people. This claim probably demands explanation. --- Thus far this theodicy has identified **natural law** as the kind of law most pertinent to the perpetuity of the human standing wave. **Natural law** has been defined as (i)the laws of nature that govern exogenous phenomena; (ii)the laws of nature that govern endogenous phenomena; and (iii)the moral law that exists within the ethical arena and that governs the process of human choice-making, including definition to every human of what it takes for that human to be a perpetual organismic standing wave. Now, because the enormous influence of agreements and disagreements on human cognitive processes demands recognition, it's necessary to get a more thorough understanding of how law arises out of agreements, and how law impacts these cognitive processes. This is especially true given that virtually all humans live in societies that function by way of **human laws**. Covenants, laws, and jurisdictions are crucial to this theodicy's story.

As indicated in the Preface, this theodicy needs to develop a solid ideological foundation before starting the story, *per se.* It has gone a long way in developing such an ideological foundation by examining the ideological implications of wave physics. So this theodicy has been focused primarily on the general revelation side of this distinction between general and special revelation. This emphasis on the general side will continue as this theodicy continues to develop the ideological foundation. But now, the focus must shift to include jurisprudence in the ideological foundation. This will require increased examination of the Bible. But the focus will be on the early chapters that apply generally to all people and that contain knowledge that is general in its content. In the process of searching for reliable jurisprudential foundations, this theodicy will attempt to keep the search grounded in the wave-physics ideas already established.

Part I, Chapter C, Retelling the Biblical Story in the Lingo ...

PART II:

THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

Part II

THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

CHAPTER A:

Laws, Covenants, Jurisdictions, & Exogenous Standing Waves

It should be clear by now what **<u>natural law</u>** is with respect to its three-fold composition, at least according to this Bible-based story. But it's not yet clear how **<u>natural law</u>** fits into the larger context of biblical jurisprudence. Because the Bible is a book of covenants, and is about covenants, and is even a system of covenants knitted together into a single covenant, and because covenants are by definition legal instruments, finding <u>**natural law**</u>'s place within this larger covenantal context is equivalent to finding it in the larger context of biblical jurisprudence. Ascertaining this context is crucial to the story.

In progressive revelation,¹ there are two kinds of laws whose operation moves humanity forward in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, towards the New-Jerusalem niche. These are **natural law** and **human law**.² Later chapters of this theodicy will speak specifically about how the progressive revelation of the moral law leg of the **natural law** tripod moves humanity towards the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. Before that, this current Part of this theodicy will address how the biblical prescription of **human law** -- as distinguished from the biblical exposition of **natural law** -- is moving humanity towards the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. For reasons that will become clear as the story unfolds, it's necessary to address **human law** first. Generally, **human law** precedes **natural law** in this exposition in order to define jurisprudential conceptual tools and the overall context of biblical jurisprudence, and for the sake of developing the ideological foundation before starting the story, *per se*.

2 In order to understand the distinction between <u>human law</u> and <u>natural law</u>, it's important to know who is promulgating the law. Are humans promulgating the law, is God, or are both? It's also necessary to know who is designated to enforce it. Is the designated enforcer a human, or is it God, or is it both? Because God is the prime mover, the first cause of everything that happens in the universe, these promulgation and enforcement questions are probably better expressed like this: Is a human or group of humans a secondary cause of the promulgation and enforcement of a law, or not? If humanity is a secondary cause of the promulgation and enforcement of a law, then even though the law is also a <u>natural law</u>, the law is a <u>human law</u>.

¹ Based on Deuteronomy 29:29, it's clear that according to the biblical story, some things have been revealed to humanity, and some things have not. It's also clear that in the biblical chronology, such revelation is progressive and cumulative. So theologians commonly refer to this process as "progressive revelation". (Grudem; p. 130)

PART II, THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY -- LAW

Some well-meaning Christians, including some otherwise reputable theologians, claim that the first form of human government in the Bible is the family. Even if this claim is true, it should be challenged because the family has not been ordained by God as a generally reliable form of human government. The family is an unreliable model for government because families can exist without the enforcement of **natural rights** that is crucial to reliable government.¹ The family is certainly important, and healthy families are certainly crucial to the existence of a healthy society. But without the necessary emphasis on **natural rights**, families go rotten as certainly as governments do. Witness Cain's city, composed of his family, which was destroyed in the flood (Genesis 4:17).

Did the family arise out of coercion and fraud, or out of genuine consent? What are the **human laws** that are in operation within the family? Is the family based on a marriage contract, and if so, are the terms of the contract *lawful*? --- These questions are important because it's critical for any *lawful* human government to be a supporter and defender of **natural rights**, rather than an abuser of **natural rights**.² In fact, whether a government and its laws defend and protect **natural rights**, or abuse **natural rights**, is crucial to determining whether a human government and its laws are *lawful*, or not. --- According to the biblical story, the moral law leg of the **natural law** tripod is inevitably connected to **natural rights**. That's because **natural rights** are inseparable from the image of God that is built into every human being. So there is an inevitable nexus between human possession of the *imago*

¹ **<u>Natural rights</u>** are just claims that all people have as a result of being created with the *imago Dei*. Living within the behavioral boundaries of the *imago Dei* demands that people not only exercise their own <u>natural rights</u>, but also acknowledge the <u>natural rights</u> inherent in other people. So one person's <u>natural rights</u> are another person's <u>natural</u> <u>obligations</u>. Such just claims are called "natural" because their Creator endows all people with them.

² "The principle distinction between the terms 'lawful' and 'legal' is that the former contemplates the substance of law, the latter the form of law. To say of an act that it is 'lawful' implies that it is authorized, sanctioned, or at any rate not forbidden, by law. To say that it is 'legal' implies that it is done or performed in accordance with the forms and usages of law, or in a technical manner. ... Further, the word 'lawful' more clearly implies an ethical content than does 'legal.' The latter goes no further than to denote compliance, with positive, technical, or formal rules; while the former usually imports a moral substance or ethical permissibility." (Black, Henry Cambell, **Black's Law Dictionary**, 5th edition, 1979, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, p. 797.) --- Comparing and contrasting *lawful* and legal leads to the conclusion that *lawful* pertains to <u>human law</u> that is morally sound, while legal pertains to <u>human law</u> that is not necessarily morally sound.

Dei (image of God), miniature sovereignty, and possession of <u>natural rights</u>. So if human A behaves in a way that does not conflict with the fact that human B has the *imago Dei*, then A is abiding by the <u>natural law</u>, at least with respect to B's rights. So B's <u>natural rights</u> impose a <u>natural obligation</u> on A, such that A is obligated to recognize and respect B's rights. --- Although such considerations are not the sole determinant of whether a family is healthy or not, in order for a family to be healthy, they cannot be ignored.

Families usually arise out of marriages, but in the case of an unwed or widowed mother, adoptees, and other non-monogamous situations, they might arise otherwise. Regardless of how a family arises, it's practically impossible for a family to operate without rules, especially when children are on the scene. Rules are essentially the same thing as laws. Rules and laws that are not enforced with penalties and consequences for violation, are rules / laws in name only. Penalties are a necessary feature of rules and laws, a feature without which the rules and laws cease being genuine rules and laws. All the circumstantial evidence leads to the conclusion that a contract and/or a system of contracts is crucial to the existence of every family. So most if not all families are inherently contractual.¹ This and other evidence piles up to prove that human contracts existed before the flood, and the rules / laws that are terms of such contracts existed before the flood. Common sense and common decency demand that the right to contract is a basic **<u>natural right</u>**, a right that is built into the moral-law leg of the **natural law**. But this **natural right** to contract doesn't guarantee that the rules / laws that arise out of a contract / covenant, including out of a marriage / family, are consistent with other **natural rights**. --- At least two cases existed during the antediluvian era where people got away with murder. These cases vitiate any claim that there was significant respect for **natural rights** during this era. They also vitiate any claim that the rules arising out of families during this era had due regard for **<u>natural rights</u>**. This is especially true given that one of these two murders was fratricide, and the presumed family government did nothing to execute justice against the murderer. So the circumstances are arrayed to vitiate any claim that the family is the first reliable kind of human government. The family may indeed be a form of human government, but it's not a reliable form, at least not without an explicit commitment to honor **natural rights**. Because the family is

¹ In the case of relations between parents and children, the relationship may be more in the form of a *bailment*, in which the child's **<u>natural rights</u>** are *bailed* into the parent / *bailee's* custody for safe keeping until the child reaches an age and/or capacity for the *bailment* and custody to end. Even if this is a *bailment*, it's still contractual because a *bailment* is simply a special form of contract.

thus an unreliable basis for human government, it's necessary to look elsewhere for the biblical foundation of human government.

DISCLAIMER: Genesis 4-8 describes a period in human history from immediately after the exile of the humans from the garden ecological niche through the deluge. This was a time of massive depravity and lawlessness. According to the narrative, God flooded the earth to destroy all of humanity with the exception of Noah and his family. It's common knowledge these days that numerous scientists doubt the veracity of the flood narrative. Whether the flood actually happened or not may be an important issue in many respects. But it is not important here. The point that needs to be emphasized in this theodicy is that regardless of whether the flood actually happened or not, the sequence of events in Genesis 4:1-11:9 have absolutely profound implications for the understanding of biblical jurisprudence, especially the Bible's prescription of <u>human law</u>. The implications of this passage for jurisprudence are a primary focus of this theodicy, regardless of the historicity of the flood.

Sub-Chapter 1: Laws

There is no explicit global ordination of human government, by God, anywhere in the Bible. But there is certainly ordination of **globally** applicable **human law**. Because law without penalties and enforcement is law in name only, any biblical prescription of **human law** is necessarily prescription of whatever aspects of human government are necessary for the enforcement, adjudication, and execution of the prescribed **human law**. The prescription of **human law** is therefore implicitly prescription of human government. The first prescription of **human law** in the Bible is explicitly a mandate to enforce **natural rights** (Genesis 9:6). It is therefore implicitly a mandate to establish human government, but necessarily also a government limited to the enforcement of **natural rights**.

So what are **<u>natural rights</u>**? --- As miniature sovereigns, humans have Godgiven claims to ownership of their own bodies, along with needs and potentials for ownership of other things. The natural state of every human being is that each human owns his/her life and his/her body. All Christians, by definition, give their bodies and lives to God.¹ So Christians are stewards of what God owns. But the natural state is that all humans own their lives and their bodies. Because it's so basic it's reasonable to call ownership / stewardship over life and body "primary property". It's also reasonable to call ownership / stewardship of these other things "secondary

¹ Romans 12:1; 1 Corinthians 6:19-20.

property". Secondary property includes *real property* and *personal property*. It also includes the privileges that arise out of contracts. This is because the right to contract is a fundamental **natural right**, as surely as the right to pursue ownership of *real* and *personal property* is a **natural right**. These are extremely basic **natural rights** whose existence can be proven through biblical exegesis. This theodicy will show that such **natural rights** are the basis for the biblical prescription of **human law**. Such **natural rights** are also the basis for defining what *lawful* human government and *lawful* **human law** are, versus what counterfeit laws and governments are.

Natural rights are just claims that all people have as a result of being created with the *imago Dei*. Living within the behavioral boundaries of the *imago Dei* demands that people not only exercise their own **natural rights**, but also acknowledge the **natural rights** inherent in other people. So one person's **natural rights** are another person's **natural obligations**. Such just claims are called "natural" because all people are endowed with them by their Creator. All humans were endowed with **natural rights** before the fall (Genesis 1:27), and all humans are endowed with **natural rights** after the fall (Genesis 9:6). **Natural rights** are revealed both generally and specially.

The primary distinction between the moral-law leg of the **natural law** tripod and **human law**,¹ is that all **natural law** is promulgated and enforced by God without regard to whether or not God uses secondary causes in the promulgation and enforcement, but **human law** is promulgated and enforced by humans. In biblically prescribed **human law**, God mandates that humans act as secondary causes in the promulgation and enforcement of **natural law**. Therefore, to whatever extent **human law** genuinely enforces **natural law**, humans are acting as secondary causes in the promulgation and enforcement of **natural law**. But to whatever extent **human law** violates **natural law**, rather than enforces **natural law**, humans are operating under delusion, they're missing the mark, and they're probably violating **natural rights** in the process.

The first appearance of a biblical prescription <u>human law</u> is in Genesis 9:6. As will become clear in the upcoming analysis of that verse, that verse mandates the enforcement of <u>natural rights</u>. As such, it is the biblical prescription of <u>human law</u> in which humans act as secondary causes in the promulgation and enforcement of the <u>natural rights</u> aspect of the moral-law leg of the <u>natural law</u> tripod. --- The moral-law leg encompasses much more than <u>natural rights</u>. The most important aspect of

¹ It's important to emphasize that this is a distinction, not a separation. <u>Human law</u> that is *lawful* is always and inseparably a subset of <u>natural law</u>, specifically, of the morallaw leg of the <u>natural law</u> tripod.

the moral-law leg pertains to the human's relationship with God (*e.g.*, Exodus 20:2-11).¹ This aspect has little or nothing to do with the enforcement of **natural rights**. Another aspect of the moral-law leg pertains to the exercise of wisdom in human relations (*e.g.*: Exodus 20:12,14,16,17). This aspect of the moral-law leg also has no immediate relation to the enforcement of **natural rights**. But the moral-law leg also definitely encompasses the enforcement of **natural rights** (*e.g.*: Exodus 20:13,15,16).² In order to keep this prescribed enforcement of **natural rights** within the overall context of biblical jurisprudence, it's necessary to abstract a bit.

The whole program of redemption that was started when humanity was exiled into the out-of-the-garden niche is a program designed to establish a society in which all people are in agreement about what constitutes **<u>natural law</u>** (*i.e.*, the New-Jerusalem niche). The metaphorical statement in Genesis 3:15 indicates, among other things, that humanity would have divine assistance in this progression. The divine assistance exists in the form of the progressive revelation of <u>**natural law**</u> and the divine prescription of <u>**human law**.³ But these two kinds of law exist within a larger legal context.</u>

According to Christian theology that has been accepted historically by both Protestants and Roman Catholics, the basic categories of law are <u>eternal law</u>, <u>natural law</u>, <u>divine law</u>, and <u>human law</u>.⁴ According to the line or reasoning being followed by this theodicy, <u>eternal law</u> is the aggregate obligations that are contained within the <u>eternal covenant</u>. The <u>eternal covenant</u> is the unchangeable,

¹ In Genesis 9:6, God clearly mandated that humans punish humans. But in Exodus 20, there's no mention of humans punishing humans. Through Moses in Exodus 20, God is clearly describing **<u>natural law</u>**, law that God imposes on humans. But there is no evidence in Exodus 20 to indicate how such **<u>natural law</u>** is to be converted into <u>**human**</u> **<u>law</u>**. In other words, there's no mention of a penalty to be executed by humans. There's no certain statement that it should be penalized by humans and thereby converted into <u>**human**</u> <u>**law**</u>. Unless there is an explicit mandate for humans to penalize humans, for humans to presume, *a priori*, that they should penalize amounts to a presumption that they should usurp God's authority as the promulgator and enforcer of <u>**natural law**</u>.

² Exodus 20:13 prohibits murder; 20:15 prohibits theft; 20:16 prohibits perjury. Although these are not presented in Exodus 20 as **human law** because penalties are not readily presented there, penalties are presented elsewhere in the *Torah*, thereby confirming that these are certainly reiterations of, and elaborations on, the Genesis 9:6 prescription of **human law**.

³ Because it's clear that Genesis 3:15 is the "protoevangel", it's also clear that the progressive revelation of **<u>natural law</u>** encompasses what the New Testament calls "the gospel".

⁴ Aquinas, First Part of the Second Part, "Treatise on Law" (QQ 90-108).

divinely imposed legal agreement between God and all of God's creation, including mankind.¹ According to this line of reasoning, all other kinds of laws are subsets, either directly or indirectly, of <u>eternal law</u>. Like the <u>eternal covenant</u>, <u>eternal laws</u> are immutable. <u>Eternal law</u> is a constant that keeps the universe intact. If <u>eternal</u> <u>law</u> were not immutable, then the laws that govern the universe would be changeable, and reality would be so slippery that human science would be impossible. Likewise, if <u>eternal law</u> were not immutable, then the laws that govern human behavior would be so slippery that social cohesiveness would be impossible. According to this ancient line of reasoning, <u>eternal law</u> is subtended by <u>natural law</u>, which is subtended by the biblical prescription of <u>human law</u>. <u>Natural law</u> is <u>eternal law</u> as it pertains to humanity. As already indicated, <u>natural law</u> exists in a three-fold cord.

Natural law is the subset of **eternal law** that God imposes on humans. **Eternal law** is law that God imposes upon creation in general. Because **human law** that is in harmony with **natural law** is the outgrowth of both general revelation and special revelation, such **human law** can be rightly understood to be the outgrowth of both **natural law** and **divine law**. The **divine law** refers to the Bible, which is sometimes said to be equivalent to special revelation. **Human law** is law imposed by humans upon other humans.

In progressive revelation, the nature of **<u>natural law</u>** is progressively revealed in the Bible through special revelation that occurs over millennia. The nature of the two non-cognitive legs of the <u>**natural law**</u> does not change in progressive revelation, and neither does the nature of <u>eternal law</u>, and neither does God. But changes in the human interface with <u>**natural law**</u> are often acknowledged, and sometimes instigated, in such progressive revelation. This is because the progressive character of special revelation promotes improvements with respect to human cognitive abilities. So even though the cognitive leg of the <u>**natural law**</u> does not change, human cognitive disabilities do change through advances in individual and collective cognitive skills,

¹ In the same way that humans generally do not consent to being born, to dying, and to numerous other things that happen in every human life, because these things happen, it must be tacitly assumed that the sovereign God decrees them to happen, either mediately or immediately, and therefore at a level of existence beyond the human ability to choose, and therefore beyond the realm of human consent, the human allows it, the same way the rest of creation allows it, and therefore gives tacit consent to whatever it may be. Such tacit consent regarding issues over which humans have no real ability to choose does not eliminate moral agency. This is because moral agency is only relevant when real choice can exist, as it does indeed exist in other circumstances.

thereby gradually exchanging disabilities for abilities. But operation at full cognitive potential is not available to humans outside the New-Jerusalem ecological niche.

When this theodicy speaks of the progressive revelation found in the Bible, it means the same thing as **divine law** as it exists at a specific point in the biblical chronology. So the **divine law** and the Bible are essentially the same. According to the Bible, God reveals his **eternal law** to human beings. Theologians generally call this "revelation". There are two overarching kinds of revelation: special and general.

The knowledge of God's existence, character, and moral law, which comes through creation to all humanity, is often called "general revelation" (because it comes to all people generally). General revelation comes through observing nature, through seeing God's directing influence in history, and through an inner sense of God's existence and his laws that he has placed inside every person.¹

In other words, general revelation manifests **<u>natural law</u>**, the most fundamental aspect of which is the moral law. Special revelation

refers to God's words addressed to specific people, such as the words of the Bible, the words of the Old Testament prophets and New Testament apostles, and the words of God spoken in personal address, such as at Mount Sinai or at the baptism of Jesus.²

Special revelation was the impetus behind the writing of the **divine law**. Some people claim that the canon is closed because God no longer speaks through special revelation, but only through general revelation. This is not accurate. This author holds that the canon is closed for other reasons. God certainly still speaks through both general and special revelation. But the canon is rightly closed since the last apostle died. Understanding and implementing what is already revealed and written is the task of the times between the death of the last apostle and the second advent. --- The Bible expounds special revelation sovereignly instigated through specific people, and sovereignly authored by specific authors. People in the 21st century are not instigators or authors of this special, progressive, revealed knowledge. They can be implementers and expounders of special revelation, but not authors or instigators of it. The biblical authors are the authors of the special revelation contained in the **divine law**. People living between the 1st century

¹ Grudem, pp. 122-123.

² Grudem, p. 123

and the second advent may be called to be implementers of special revelation, but such implementation will always be rationally consistent with the biblical special revelation. The instigation and authorship are rightly closed since the death of the last apostle.¹ But people in the 21st century are certainly capable of being recipients and implementers of such knowledge, where the veracity of such extra biblical revelation is duly tested against the **divine law**.

If God is God, meaning, if God is genuinely omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, then God is sovereign over the entire universe, meaning over both visible and invisible aspects thereof. If God is God, then God is the head, the king, of the universal government. Because humans were designed to be miniature sovereigns, it follows that humans should form some kind of government as inherently subordinated to, and complimentary to, the universal kingdom. In order for human government to exist, **human law** has to exist. This is because government cannot exist without some form of law that puts the government into action. If **human law** exists, and if it is consistent with biblical jurisprudence, then the **human laws** will be terms of some covenant or contract.² This is because, in biblical jurisprudence, all kinds of laws are terms of covenants and/or contracts, with the sole exception of rules like fiat decrees by tyrants. But no one should consider fiat decrees by tyrants an aspect of biblical jurisprudence, because such rules inherently miss the mark.

The Bible is set up as a series of covenants, where each subsequent covenant is a set of appendments to the previous covenant. Each set of appendments is a manifestation of progressive revelation. Because these covenants are crucial to biblical jurisprudence, this theodicy will spend some time focused specifically on them. But because Genesis 9:6 is the core of biblically prescribed <u>human law</u>, this Part of the theodicy needs to focus even more on the meaning of that verse.

Genesis 9:6 contains the first prescription of **human law** in the biblical chronology. To interpret it properly, it's necessary to interpret it within the context of Genesis 9:4. Genesis 9:6 says,

Whoever sheds man's blood, By man his blood shall be shed, For in the image of God He made man.³

¹ This is to accord with the spirit of Revelation 22:18-19. So it's right that the canon of the **divine law** remain closed until the messiah returns in full glory.

² Evidence that this is true is based on the fact that all laws that are imposed by God in the Bible exist as terms within the biblical covenants.

³ By reading it in context, it's clear that the shed blood is metaphorical. The metaphor's underlying concept is any kind of genuine damage done by one person against another. See *Sub-Chapter 3*, "*Jurisdiction*", and CHAPTER B, "SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGATIVE-DUTY CLAUSE: REFINING THE DEFINITION OF BLOODSHED", below.

There is virtually no difference in meaning between this expression in English and the source expression in Hebrew. The same is true for verses four and five. The word "shall" in 9:6 indicates that this is a mandate. In other words, God is commanding everyone party to this biblical covenant to do what the verse says.¹ How what it says is understood depends almost entirely upon how shed blood is defined. To understand the meaning of "blood", it's necessary to look at verse four. In verse four, life and blood are equated. Because of this equation, Genesis 9:6 can be rephrased like this:

Whoever sheds man's life, By man his life shall be shed, For in the image of God He made man.

Reading 9:6 within the context of 9:4 makes it obvious that the shed blood in 9:6 is a metaphor. Many Bible readers assume that Genesis 9:6 is about murder. But it's possible to shed human blood without murder, and it's possible to murder without shedding human blood. This means that blood in Genesis 9:6 is metaphorical, because it's clearly not the core issue. Given that the shed blood is metaphorical, the obvious next question is: What does the metaphor stand for? Genesis 9:4 indicates that blood is used metaphorically to refer to life. It's possible to shed some of a human being's life without shedding all of it. So shed blood must be the same as damage to a person's life. In other words shed blood refers not merely to murder but to a *corpus delicti*, a dead, damaged, or injured human being.²

Like Bible-readers in general, many well-meaning Christian theologians have historically interpreted this verse to be about murder, and only about murder. While this interpretation is overly narrow, rabbinical literature's interpretation is overly broad. Going back into antiquity, rabbis have found the seven "Noachide Laws" in this passage. These are the Noachide Laws most acknowledged by Talmud scholars:³

¹ Wherever Hebrew *b'rit* (Strong's #1285) appears in the Old Testament, with the meaning, "God's 'covenant' with men", this is an instance of what this theodicy calls a "biblical covenant".

² See Chapter B, "Subject Matter of the Negative-Duty Clause: Refining the Definition of Bloodshed".

³ Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 56-57.--- 1961 printing of English translation by The Soncino Press, Ltd., New York.. --- URL: http//www.com-and-hear.com/sanhedrin/ sanhedrin_56.html. --- These seven precepts are listed at the bottom of Sanhedrin 56a, with discussion of them continuing in 56b and 57. Sanhedrin 56b indicates that "it has been taught: The Israelites were given ten precepts at Marah, seven of which had already been accepted by the children of Noah, to which were added at Marah social laws, the Sabbath, and honouring one's parents". By "social laws" is meant the establishment of law courts.

- 1. Prohibition of idolatry
- 2. Prohibition of murder
- 3. Prohibition of theft
- 4. Prohibition of sexual immorality
- 5. Prohibition of blasphemy
- 6. Prohibition of eating flesh from a live animal
- 7. Establishment of law courts

Given the nature of the New Testament, and especially the scathing things Jesus said in regards to rabbinical interpretations of the Torah and Tanakh, it would be foolish for this biblical story, or for any Bible-believing Christian, to accept these Noachide Laws as authoritative unless one first did due diligence with regard to reliable Christian interpretational policies. Following such due diligence, one comes to the conclusion that in the passage from Genesis 1:1-11:9, only two of these Noachide Laws are mandated as **human law**. The two mandated as **human law** are the prohibition of murder and the prohibition of theft. The mandate to establish law courts is the rational mechanism by which these two human laws are to be enforced.¹ The other four Noachide Laws may be rightly understood to be **<u>natural</u> law** revealed by the Bible in this passage. But because there are no penalties specified in this passage for these other four, they cannot be treated as **<u>human law</u>** that's being prescribed by the covenant being promulgated in chapter nine. By insisting on the interpretational policies that yield these conclusions, this theodicy is going against both Christian and Jewish theological traditions. It's reasonable to wonder how and why Jewish theological traditions, Christian theological traditions, and western jurisprudence in general have all been so wrong for so long. This theodicy's short answer is, because they all suffer from jurisdictional dysfunction. Because this theodicy is going against the grain of such long-held traditions and ideologies, and because the implications of these interpretational policies are huge, this theodicy needs to spend serious time divulging how it reaches these conclusions. So it will do so below.

Because Genesis 9:6 is a clear mandate to humans to execute some kind of justice against the human who sheds human life, this is clearly a mandate to enforce **human law**. Between Genesis 1:1 and 11:9, it is the only such mandate to enforce **human law**. Numerous other **natural laws** may be indicated in this passage, where

¹ Whether or not the establishment of law courts is implicitly mandated as **human law** will be discussed in detail below. Here's a preliminary finding: Because law without penalties and enforcement is law in name only, and because law courts are crucial to the proper enforcement, adjudication, and execution of violations of the prohibition of murder and theft, it is also necessarily a mandate to establish law courts.

God is by definition the enforcer of such law. But Genesis 9:6 is the only verse in this passage that clearly indicates that humans must act as secondary cause in law enforcement.¹ To understand specifically what this **human law** demands, it's necessary to look much more specifically at all the implications. In order to examine Genesis 9:6 in the kind of detail that it deserves, it's necessary to look closely at each phrase in the verse. Within the context of the entire verse, the first phrase, "Whoever sheds man's blood", is implicitly a negative commandment, a mandate to not do something. So henceforth, this theodicy will call this phrase the "*negative-duty clause*". Because the second phrase, "By man his blood shall be shed", is explicitly a positive commandment, a mandate to do something, this theodicy will call it the "*positive-duty clause*". The third phrase, "For in the image of God He made man", will be known as the "*motive clause*".

TO RECAPITULATE: The *motive clause* says, "for in the image of God He made man". The fact that God has endowed every human being with the *imago Dei* is the foundation of what theology and jurisprudence have called **natural law** and **natural rights**. Even after the fall, every human being still has the *imago Dei*. The *imago Dei* is the rational source of every human being's **natural rights**. The possession of **natural rights** is every human being's inherent, inevitable, and unalienable possession and property. These days governments do a huge number of things besides merely prosecute violations of **natural rights**. Whether these governmental activities are *lawful* or not is determinable by examining them within the context of **natural rights**.

While <u>natural law</u> is law imposed by God upon humans, <u>human law</u> is law imposed by humans upon humans.² Because humans are inherently flawed, it's

¹ By applying the modern concept of *jurisdiction* to Genesis 9:6, it's clear that so far this theodicy has only been addressing this verse's *subject-matter jurisdiction*. Neither *personal jurisdiction* nor *territorial jurisdiction* have been addressed. The subject matter is a human act that creates a dead, damaged, or injured human being. A "dead, damaged, or injured party" is in many respects synonymous with what ancient jurisprudence called a *delict*.

² **Human law** is nothing more than law that humans impose on other humans. Some people claim that it's the same thing as *positive law*. However, the defining characteristic of *positive law* is that it is, "Law actually and specifically enacted or adopted by proper authority" (**Black's 5th**, p. 1046). Under such a definition, <u>eternal law</u>, <u>natural law</u>, and <u>divine law</u> are each positive law. So it is improper to claim that <u>human law</u> and *positive law* are the same. So in this theodicy, <u>human law</u> is the preferred term, while "*positive law*" is generally preferred in American jurisprudence. The end of **Black's** definition says, "... adopted by proper authority for the government of an organized jural society". The underlying issue pertains to who one recognizes as "authority". One person's jural society is another's protection racket. So the less presumptuous term, <u>human law</u>, is preferable.

absolutely foolish to make any kind of *a priori* assumption or presumption that all **human law** is authoritative. All *lawful* human governments have *lawful* **human laws**, and are necessarily outgrowths of *lawful* contracts and/or covenants. On the other hand, everybody knows that human history is cluttered with bad governments that perpetrate atrocities. It's foolish to think that such tyrannies, and the laws of such tyrannies, are *lawful*. So it's definitely necessary to define the boundaries between *lawful* and legal with rigor. The former carries moral content that the latter does not. So this raises a huge question: How does one tell the difference between genuine, *lawful*, authoritative **human law**, and **human law** that amounts to nothing more than the dictates and rantings of a tyrant, a bolshevik politburo, a dictatorship by a swarm of bureaucrats, a corporate scam monger, or a glorified protection racket? For anyone who genuinely believes in the Bible, or who believes in this theodicy's global story, this question demands marking a distinction between the biblical prescription of **human law** and **human law** that is not duly prescribed.

Obviously **human law** can either be consistent with God's prescription of **human law**, or not. For example, a **human law** that protects murderers is obviously at odds with Genesis 9:6. But that doesn't stop it from being **human law**. It just stops it from being biblically prescribed **human law**. Humans have a penchant for promulgating **human laws** that are inconsistent with the biblical prescription of **human law**, and that are unmitigated evil. People need to be able to judge for themselves whether a **human law** is good or bad, and the extent to which they will cooperate with it, in obedience to their own conscience.

Strictly in terms of the <u>natural rights</u> subset of the moral-law leg of the <u>natural-law</u> tripod, as long as what person A does is not a violation B's <u>natural rights</u>, according to Genesis 9:6, person A should be able to do whatever person A wants.¹ The natural state of every human being is that each human owns his/her life and his/her body. All Christians, by definition, give their bodies and lives to God.² So Christians are stewards of what God owns. But the natural state is that all humans own their lives and their bodies. In addition to the <u>natural right</u> to own primary and secondary property, to own one's life, and to contract, there is also an obvious

¹ Of course, the moral-law leg of the <u>natural-law</u> tripod is not confined to <u>natural</u> <u>rights</u>. There is also moral law as it pertains to human relations with God; human relations with the rest of creation; human relationship with self; and human relations with other humans where <u>natural rights</u> are not an immediate issue. As will be proven shortly, as far as <u>human law</u> is concerned, all these other areas of the moral law can be governed *lawfully* via <u>human law</u> only via contracts. As far as <u>human law</u> is concerned, they are governed by contracts; they are not governed at all; or they are governed *unlawfully*.

² Romans 12:1; 1 Corinthians 6:19-20.

right to liberty. The **<u>natural right</u>** to liberty means that one owns one's capacity to move, to own things, to use one's property in whatever way one sees fit, so long as one is not damaging someone else.¹

Sub-Chapter 2: Covenants

It appears that it is part of the human condition that every human being is endowed with the duty to try to take dominion over his/her own mind.² This is because doing so is a necessary prerequisite to being a fully functioning miniature sovereign. Likewise, it appears that it's part of the human condition that human relationships naturally have an ulterior motive, which is the establishment of a coherent thought wave for the entire human race; and it appears that human governments probably have a role in that race-wide goal. But there is only one verse in the entire Bible that speaks specifically about such government, meaning specifically about how to implement **human law** that's applicable to the entire human race.³ The verse is Genesis 9:6. There is massive progressive revelation about how to implement **human law** at the local level.⁴ But how to implement **human law** that is applicable to every kind of human being, without **jurisdictional dysfunction**, depends almost entirely upon the proper interpretation of that verse.

In the terminology used in this theodicy, the first biblical covenant, the <u>Edenic</u> <u>Covenant</u>, appears in Genesis 1&2. This is the Bible's foundational covenant, or what might be called its original "constitution". There is a covenant more basic than the <u>Edenic Covenant</u>, and this more basic covenant is sometimes called the "covenant of redemption". The <u>Edenic Covenant</u> is equivalent to what traditional Reformed Theology has called the "covenant of works".⁵ According to Reformed Theology, the "covenant of redemption" logically preceded (and perhaps also

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¹ For the sake of preserving **<u>natural rights</u>** from abuse by human governments, it's important to maintain that <u>**natural rights**</u> are beyond enumeration and closed definitions.

² The New Testament calls it "renewing of your mind" (Romans 12:2; Ephesians 4:23). It's an important part of the sanctification process.

³ The Bible is loaded with manifestations of the moral-law leg of the <u>natural law</u> tripod, and it's obvious that all such <u>natural law</u> applies to all humans. But this theodicy will prove shortly that due regard for *jurisdictional* boundaries precludes all such <u>natural law</u> from simultaneously being biblical prescription of <u>human law</u>.

⁴ Meaning, by way of covenants that have a <u>local in personam jurisdiction</u>.

⁵ Grudem, pp. 516-518.

temporally preceded) the covenant of works.¹ Regarding biblical jurisprudence that's aimed specifically at expounding the biblical prescription of human law, the Edenic Covenant / "covenant of works" is as fundamental as this exposition needs to get. The focus here is on <u>eternal law</u> as it applies to humans, meaning <u>natural</u> law, especially **natural law** that the Bible prescribes as **human law**. But the fact remains, reason demands that there is a covenant that's more basic than the Edenic Covenant / "covenant of works", the eternal covenant, where the eternal covenant gives rise to eternal law, and where even the "covenant of redemption" is a subset of the **<u>eternal covenant</u>**. The **<u>eternal covenant</u>** is the unchangeable, divinely imposed legal agreement between God and all of creation, and even between the three persons of the Godhead who each transcend creation, where the agreement stipulates the conditions of their relationships. Eternal law is the aggregate obligations that are contained within the eternal covenant. Although eternal covenant / eternal **law** are important concepts in biblical jurisprudence, they are more abstract than is necessary here. So this theodicy takes Edenic Covenant / natural law as the foundational legal instrument for its exposition of biblical jurisprudence.

If the presumption that all valid laws are expressions of covenants and contracts genuinely carries biblical weight -- as this theodicy claims it does -- then the following question is a test of that claim: What is the covenant that gives rise to **natural law**? --- Genesis 1&2 testify not only to the existence of **natural law**, but also to the existence of a covenant that gives rise to **natural law**. Even though there is only marginal evidence that this covenant is explicitly identified in the Bible,² it's nevertheless obvious that whatever lack of explicit identification there may be does not detract from the rational necessity of its existence.³ For lack of a better moniker, this theodicy names this covenant after the ecological niche into which the people were originally placed, the **Edenic Covenant**.⁴ So the **natural law** described above

¹ Grudem, pp. 518-519.

² The Book of Hebrews speaks of the "eternal covenant" (Hebrews 13:20), the foundation of which could be understood to be the first two chapters of Genesis. Hosea speaks of God's covenant with Adam (Hosea 6:7).

³ The rational necessity is evident because it's obvious from Genesis 9 forward that the Bible is covenantal. If the first eight chapters don't follow the same pattern, then there is very serious irrationality built into the whole system. So the Bible's overall demand for integrity disallows the first eight chapters from being maverick, non-covenantal chapters.

⁴ The pre-fall covenant is sometimes called the "creation covenant", sometimes the "Edenic Covenant", sometimes the "Adamic Covenant", sometimes the "covenant of works", and sometimes any number of other possible things. Regardless of what it's called, there is widespread agreement among Christian theologians that God created the universe through a covenant, and likewise humanity.

is the terms of the <u>Edenic Covenant</u>.¹ The <u>Edenic Covenant</u> defines not only the <u>natural law</u>, but it also posits progressive revelation that prescribes how the humans in the garden niche should perceive <u>natural law</u> (*e.g.*, Genesis 2:16-17). So the <u>Edenic Covenant</u> defines the <u>natural law</u>, much of which is unarticulated in Genesis 1&2, and it also defines limitations on the human perception of <u>natural</u> <u>law</u> while the humans were occupying the garden ecological niche ("... you shall not eat ...", v. 17).

Following the Bible's chronological sequence, the second biblical covenant appears in Genesis 3. According to the belief that the Bible is a system of covenants, there is necessarily a covenant in the third chapter of Genesis which appends disabilities to humanity that make people subject to sin, sickness, disease, and death, because the new ecological niche demanded those disabilities. Because all humans are vulnerable to sin, sickness, disease, and death, these disabilities appear to be part of human nature. The Apostle Paul even says that such disabilities are natural (1 Corinthians 2:14; 15:42-46). But these Genesis 3 disabilities are not natural in the sense that the **natural law** is natural. The Genesis 3 disabilities are natural in the sense that a multi-millennial but temporary ecological niche is natural. There are various names for this second covenant. For lack of better nomenclature, this theodicy calls it the **Adamic Covenant**. This Genesis 3 covenant defines the **natural law** as humans would perceive it in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. It does this by appending new terms to the **Edenic Covenant**.

Neither the <u>Edenic Covenant</u> nor the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> posits any kind of law more specific than <u>natural law</u>.² Under the <u>Adamic Covenant</u>, (i)the

2 The **Adamic Covenant** is the first in the chronological sequence of blood covenants. It appears in Genesis 3:1-24. As a blood covenant, it is a set of appendments to a preexisting covenant. It is **global**, meaning that it applies to all human beings and has a universal in personam jurisdiction. Even so, it contains no terms that demand or prescribe human law. Genesis 3:1-5 is an offer feedback loop for this compact between humanity and Satan. Genesis 3:9-13 is God listening mercifully to the rationalizations of the humans, rather than destroying them totally as presumably indicated in Genesis 2:17. This listening is essentially an offer feedback loop for the establishment of the Adamic blood covenant. Because God graciously allowed humanity to continue to exist, traditional Reformed Theology has generally called this covenant the "covenant of grace" (Grudem, pp. 519-522). Genesis 3:14-15 is the penalty for Satan, which is a set of terms of the Adamic Covenant. Genesis 3:16 is the penalty / terms for the woman. Genesis 3:17-19 are the penalty / terms for the man. In Genesis 3:20, the man renamed the woman to indicate that all subsequent human beings in the out-of-the-garden niche would suffer the conditions of the Adamic Covenant. In Genesis 3:21, God clothes the people with the

¹ See PART I, CHAPTER C, Sub-Chapter 3, "The Devil & the Natural Law", above.

angel of appearances became cursed as human perception became warped; (ii) the woman's child-bearing capacity became cursed; (iii)the woman's relationship with her husband became cursed; (iv)their entire ecological niche became cursed; (v)their food-procurement capacity became cursed; (vi)they acquired a previously unnecessary need for clothing; and (vii)death became an inevitable end to their lives on earth.¹ These curses are essentially acknowledgment by God that the recipients of the curses were going into an ecological niche characterized by cognitive dissonance with respect to **natural law**. Because God is God, it's impossible for God's creation to be dissonant with God, *i.e.*, to disagree with God. But for the sake of cultivating miniature sovereigns, God gave such miniature sovereigns the capacity to imagine and believe that they could disagree with God. Such delusions are the essence of missing the mark, and are the source of all of humanity's troubles. So all of these newly acquired disabilities exist primarily within the cognitive subset of the moral-law leg of the **natural law**, although these disabilities also have profound implications for the endogenous and exogenous legs. Humans in this cognitively disabled condition are a curse on the rest of creation, because this cognitive disability sets up warfare in the psychic domain between good and evil, which impacts everything with which humanity comes in contact. So humanity is a scourge on the rest of creation for as long as humanity exists between the garden niche and the New-Jerusalem niche.

The terms expressed in the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> do not express new <u>natural laws</u>. They express the conditions under which humanity lives in the out-of-the-garden niche. They are not amendments to the <u>Edenic Covenant</u>, because God, the <u>eternal</u> <u>law</u>, and <u>natural law</u> are each immutable. They are appendments to the <u>Edenic</u> <u>Covenant</u> that are acknowledgments by God that humans in this ecological niche are cognitively impaired. These terms are the continuation of a process of progressive

skins of dead animals, which is why this is a blood covenant. Genesis 3:22-24 are terms that are essentially passed as penalties to all subsequent humanity in the out-of-the-garden niche.

¹ The Apostle Paul says, "The wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23, **KJV**). So both sin and death are disabilities that became part of human nature at the fall. By definition sin and death are permanently vanquished at the resurrection of the dead. As will be shown shortly, the people had essentially two sets of disabilities in the garden ecological niche. One set of disabilities would never be overcome because they are non-communicable attributes of God. The other set of disabilities were overcome when they ate from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and thereby acquired the overwhelming range of choices available in the out-of-the-garden niche (*i.e.*, the ability to choose mediocrity and depravity over excellence). At the fall, meaning when they moved into the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, they acquired an altogether different set of disabilities. This post-fall tier of disabilities is to be overcome at the resurrection.

revelation that started in the garden niche when God banned their full range of choices under the **natural law**, thereby protecting them from their propensity to miss the mark under this full range of choices.¹ In progressive revelation, the nature of **natural law** is progressively revealed in the Bible through special revelation that occurs over millennia. The nature of the two non-cognitive legs of the **natural law** does not change in progressive revelation, and neither does the nature of **eternal law**, and neither does God. But changes in the human interface with **natural law** are often acknowledged, and sometimes instigated, in such progressive revelation. This is because the progressive character of special revelation promotes improvements with respect to human moral and cognitive skills.²

The next biblical covenant after the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> is what this theodicy calls the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>, for lack of a better moniker. This is the first time in the biblical chronology that a biblical covenant is explicitly identified as such.³ This is also the first time that prescription of <u>human law</u> exists as a term of a biblical covenant. The prescription of <u>human law</u> is not explicitly identified as

As indicated above, in PART I, CHAPTER 2, Sub-Chapter 2, "Genesis 2&3 in the Lingo of Wave Physics", humans were created without the cognitive equipment for operating under the full range of choices available under the <u>natural law</u> because taking dominion over their minds is crucial to the process of becoming genuine miniature sovereigns.
 To clarify: The <u>natural law</u> that governs correct cognition is immutable, like the other two legs of <u>natural law</u>. But being cognitively disabled, humans don't know how to operate in obedience to the moral law in that leg of the <u>natural law</u>. Through progressive revelation, God leads humans gradually, through both personal and humanity-wide sanctification processes, into obedience within the moral-law leg of the <u>natural law</u>. So human perception of the moral law changes, even while the moral law itself doesn't change.

³ It's identified in the source text, starting in Genesis 6:18, by the occurrence of the word, *b'rit* (Strong's #1285). "*B'rit* is used over 280 times ... in ... the Old Testament. The first occurrence of the word is in Genesis 6:18. ... The KJV translates *b'rit* fifteen times as 'league'. ... These are all cases of political agreement ... The KJV translates *b'rit* as 'covenant' 260 times. The word is used of 'agreements between men,' ... In these cases, there was 'mutual agreement confirmed by oath in the name of the Lord.' Sometimes there were also material pledges ... [In some cases, covenant refers to a treaty.] In such 'covenants,' the terms were imposed by the superior military power, they were not mutual agreements. ... The great majority of occurrences of *b'rit* are of God's 'covenants' with men ... God takes the sole initiative in covenant making and fulfillment." (Vine, W.E., Unger, Merrill F., White, William Jr.; **Vine's Expository Dictionary of Biblical Words**, "Old Testament Section", 1985, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee, p. 50.) ----Wherever *b'rit* indicates "God's 'covenants' with men", this is what this theodicy is calling a "biblical covenant".

such. But all of the necessary characteristics of a prescription of <u>human law</u> exist in this third covenantal passage. Because of this prescription of <u>human law</u>, the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> is properly understood to contain the biblical ordination of human government. As already indicated, this prescription of <u>human law</u> appears in Genesis 9:6.

Genesis 6:18 along with Genesis 8:21-9:17 make it obvious that Genesis 9:6 is part of a covenant. This is usually called the "Noahic Covenant" or the **Noachian Covenant**. A covenant like this has a lot in common with an ordinary contract, but there are also big differences. One thing that covenants and contracts have in common is that they both have parties. One big difference between biblical covenants and ordinary contracts is that in a biblical covenant, God is a party, but ordinary contracts usually don't mention God as a party. A crucial characteristic of contracts is that the parties enter the contract through mutual consent. But because the biblical covenants are divinely imposed, the nature of the mutual consent in them is very different from mutual consent in ordinary contracts. Regarding consent, biblical covenants are often more like last will and testaments than ordinary contracts, because as a party to the covenant, God has a role that's more like the role of a testator than like an ordinary party to an ordinary contract.

If one reads Genesis 6 through 9, and if one understands both what the Noachian Covenant says and the context within which it was created, it's obvious that besides God, the parties to the **Noachian Covenant** include the entire postflood human race. If the Noachian Covenant were exactly like a last will and testament, then each of these millions of human parties could simply say, "I didn't sign that stinking covenant. There's no way I want to have anything to do with it.". They could just turn their backs on the covenant and refuse to be part of it, the same way a beneficiary could repudiate a will. But God isn't dead, and God hasn't been demoted into making any last will and testament. So the last-will-andtestament analogy has serious limits. This is only a fraction of the problems involved in explaining the difference between biblical covenants and contracts. The more difficult problem is in explaining how mutual consent exists in a biblical covenant, as it must by definition exist in a contract. This is intimately connected to the fact that God unilaterally imposes the biblical covenants on human beings, whereas humans can NEVER unilaterally impose contracts on other human beings without negating the contract, because contracts are by definition agreements, which by definition require mutual consent.¹

¹ A more thorough examination of the role of consent in divinely imposed covenants and contracts appears in **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood**.

Every covenant, like every contract, has terms. Covenants can be thought of as a special variety of contracts, as long as one understands the limitations on the human will, *i.e.*, the human ability to choose.¹ It's probably just as valid to claim that contracts are a special kind of covenant.² Either way, both covenants and contracts, by definition, have terms. The terms define the obligations and duties that the covenant / contract imposes on those who are party to the instrument. As impositions of duties and obligations, these terms are essentially laws. --- If one gets a definition of covenant from a law dictionary, then one runs a higher risk of getting a definition that is too specialized for biblical jurisprudence than if one uses a normal English dictionary. This is especially true given that "['covenant'] is currently used primarily with respect to promises in conveyances or other instruments relating to real estate."³ A definition from a more-or-less normal American dictionary says,

covenant --- 1: a usu. formal, solemn, and binding agreement: COMPACT 2 a: a written agreement or promise usu. under seal between two or more parties esp. for the performance of some action b: the common-law action to recover damages for breach of such a contract⁴

This definition also emphasizes the equivalence of covenants and contracts. Such a definition does not adequately account for the possibility that God is party, as God certainly is in all the major covenants in the Bible. So this means that both the law dictionary's definition of "covenant" and the vernacular dictionary's definition are inadequate in biblical jurisprudence.

Out of the more than 280 times that the Hebrew word, *b'rit*, appears in the source text of the Old Testament, it is generally translated to "covenant" in most English translations. It can mean treaty, alliance, league, constitution, or what

¹ Some things humans can choose. Many things humans cannot choose. The idea that humans have an unlimited ability to choose is negated by the fact that every human has limitations and disabilities that cannot be overcome by mere choice or mere will power. Where there is no choice, tacit consent can sometimes be assumed. Because God is God and humans are human, tacit consent often exists in the biblical covenants. But in contracts between humans, refusal to consent is always an option, with the exclusive exceptions, (1)of guardian-dependent *bailment* contracts in which the dependent's ability to choose, consent, agree is inherently impaired; and (2)when *prima facie* inculpatory evidence exists that essentially creates an allegation that one has caused another human to be dead, damaged, or injured.

^{2 &}quot;In its broadest usage, [covenant] means any contract." (Black's 5th, p. 327)

³ Black's 5th, p. 327.

⁴ **Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary**, 1967, G. & C. Merriam Co., Springfield, Massachusetts, p. 192.

this theodicy calls a "biblical covenant". So a covenant in the Bible can either be between human and human, or it can be between God and humans. This theodicy is following a convention of speaking only of biblical covenants between God and humanity as being "biblical covenants". This theodicy is therefore focused on the numerous instances in which the biblical covenants are mentioned, where the biblical covenants are limited to the <u>Edenic Covenant</u>, <u>Adamic Covenant</u>, <u>Noachian</u> <u>Covenant</u>, <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>, <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, and <u>Messianic (Christian)</u> <u>Covenant</u>.¹ Each of these covenants is divinely imposed, meaning that God imposes it on at least some of humanity regardless of human consent or agreement.

Even though the biblical covenants are divinely imposed, human consent does play a role in the implementation of each of these biblical covenants. This may seem paradoxical, how a legal instrument can be divinely imposed and decreed, on one hand, and allow for human consent, on the other. This is not an either-or impediment to deciphering Bible-based jurisprudence. On the contrary, human consent is important enough in the implementation of these biblical covenants for normal jurisprudential analysis to be applicable to them. So the basic ideas about jurisdictions, laws, and covenants / contracts sketched above are applicable, as long as due respect for the source language and plain meaning of the Bible exists. Such respect necessarily demands peaceful coexistence between God's sovereign imposition and decree, on one hand, and the human's consent as miniature sovereign, on the other. For many people who are ambivalent about being party to any of the biblical covenants, talk, in the same breath, about God sovereignly imposing laws and humans necessarily consenting, may conjure visions of Christianoid terrorists enforcing mass obedience. Wherever there's a failure to give due regard to the distinction between human law and natural law, such visions may be apropos. But if due diligence is exerted towards that distinction, then that fear is simply paranoia.

According to well-established extra-biblical jurisprudence, every contract is a type of agreement.² All agreements are not contracts, but all contracts are agreements.

¹ Some people may insist on including the **Davidic Covenant** in this list of biblical covenants. The **Davidic Covenant** is certainly important in progressive revelation. But it is not as important in biblical jurisprudence as these others... To see the role it plays in progressive revelation, see **PART II**, CHAPTER I, *Sub-Chapter 8*, *"Two-House Portal"*.

² **Black's 5th** defines agreement as, "A coming together of minds; a coming together in opinion or determination; the coming together in accord of two minds on a given proposition. ... Although often used as synonymous with 'contract', agreement is a broader term; *e.g.* an agreement might lack an essential element of a contract." (**Black's 5th**, p. 62). --- People can agree that the moon is made of Swiss cheese, but such an agreement imposes no obligations that are recognizable in a court, and the parties to the agreement receive no

A similar situation exists with respect to the relationship between covenants and agreements. Agreement, consent, assent are essential to the covenant's existence.¹ But covenants, especially biblical covenants, have unusual characteristics with respect to the nature of such consent. All agreements are not contracts or covenants because all agreements do not create obligations. In contrast to agreements, all contracts and covenants always create obligations, by definition. If biblical jurisprudence is properly understood and implemented, obligations that arise out of contracts and covenants are synonymous with laws. So all contracts, covenants, and biblical covenants generate laws, and agreement / consent is crucial to the creation, implementation, and enforcement of such laws. But because God both divinely imposes the biblical covenants, and is party to the biblical covenants, it's necessary to use a definition of consent / agreement that recognizes limitations on the ability to choose. Where there is no ability to choose, there is no ability to consent or agree. In the case of contracts, the comatose are not able to consent. Infants and children lack capacity for informed consent. The mentally ill or demented, ditto. In such circumstances, the **natural rights** of such disabled or incapacitated people are reasonably *bailed* into the custody of a guardian, parent, trustee, *etc.*, for their protection until the disabled person dies or grows out of their disability, or until the bailment ends by some other means. The custodian / bailee thereby has the capacity to consent, or not, for the disabled until the *bailment* ends. This is a kind of contract in which consent by the disabled is tacit. --- In the case of the biblical covenants, the situation is similar. Each of the biblical covenants is divinely imposed, as though the human race were *bailed* into God's custody.² Under the **jurisdiction** of several

benefit that is recognizable in a court, and there are no promises. So most courts would treat such an agreement as frivolous, and outside its jurisdiction.

1 Covenants and contracts are essentially agreements. The biblical covenants differ from contracts in that the biblical covenants are divinely imposed. In some of the biblical covenants, the consent of human parties appears to be negligible to non-existent. Because these covenants apply to all human beings regardless of the human's consent, the author calls these covenants "**global**". In the other biblical covenants, even though the covenants are divinely imposed, participation in such covenants by humans is more overtly a function of the human's consent. The author calls these covenants "**local**" because they do not apply to all humans without regard to consent. Both **global** and **local** biblical covenants contain descriptions and/or prescriptions of **natural law** and **human law**. ---The role of consent in both **global** and **local** covenants is explored more thoroughly in **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood**.

2 Because the human race is, in fact, *bailed* into God's custody. This is especially true as long as the human race exists in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, where the angel of appearances acts as a deadly goad to keep humanity moving towards the New-Jerusalem niche. of these biblical covenants, there is absolutely no ability to opt out of the covenant, therefore, no ability to choose not to participate, therefore, no ability to consent or dissent in the cognitive sense of those terms. For the other biblical covenants, there is an ability to opt out. Such **jurisdictional** distinctions will be discussed shortly.

Like the distinction between the biblical covenants and ordinary covenants / contracts, the *lawfulness* of *human law* and human government revolve around the nature of consent / agreement. Because human law can either be consistent with God's prescription of human law, or not, human government can either be lawful or unlawful. Humans have an ability to create human laws that are inconsistent with the biblical prescription of **human law**, and human governments can be likewise inconsistent. The Noachian Covenant first mentioned in Genesis 6:18, whose promulgation is recorded in the Genesis 9 narrative, certainly contains progressive revelation regarding the **natural law**. But as far as this exposition of biblical jurisprudence is concerned, the most important term of the Noachian Covenant is not merely progressive revelation about <u>natural law</u>. It is also the first biblical prescription of **human law**. For reasons explained below, the most obvious covenantal obligations in the **Noachian** prescription of **human law** are the obligation to avoid damaging other people and the obligation to execute justice against people who damage other people (9:6). The refusal by human A to acknowledge the right of human B to consent / dissent with respect to an offered contract is tantamount to a threat by A to damage B. Under both biblical jurisprudence and customary American human law, the rule is that people have a natural right to agree to participate in a contract, or not, according to their own discretion. When people operate on the assumption that other people consent, where the assumption is not reinforced by solid evidence, the people making the presumption are operating at their own risk. This has been plain, obvious, and indubitable in Anglo-American jurisprudence for several centuries.1 Normal, adult human beings are not nonconsensually *bailed* into other humans' custody, even though every human being is in many respects bailed into God's custody.

It's clear that the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> consisted of appendments (not amendments) via progressive revelation, to the <u>Edenic Covenant</u>, the two combining to form a single covenant that was applicable to the entire human race up to the moment that the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> was promulgated. It's also clear that the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> also consisted of appendments to this pre-existing biblical covenant. Also, like the <u>Edenic / Adamic Covenant</u>, the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> has <u>jurisdiction</u> over the entire human race from the moment of promulgation forward. This pattern of

¹ But as most of the world's nations gradually move towards totalitarianism, this ancient coincidence of a biblically prescribed standard and **human law** is being trashed.

appendment to the pre-existing biblical covenant by a subsequent biblical covenant continues throughout the Bible. In other words, each biblical covenant consists of a set of appendments to the pre-existing biblical covenant, where the appendments come into existence by way of progressive revelation. So the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> contains a set of appendments to the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>, thereby creating a new covenant called the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>; the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> contains a set of appendments to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> contains a set of appendments to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, thereby creating a new covenant called the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>; and the <u>Messianic (Christian) Covenant</u> contains a set of appendments to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>.

While this arrangement is an obvious aspect of the biblical story, one very radical distinction between the Edenic / Adamic / Noachian Covenant and subsequent covenants is the difference in **personal jurisdictions**. The **personal jurisdiction** of the **Noachian Covenant** includes the entire human race since promulgation. But the **personal jurisdiction** of the **Abrahamic Covenant** only includes Abraham's family, descendants, and adoptees. Rather, it's even more limited than that. The Abrahamic Covenant includes only family, descendants, and adoptees as offerees. In other words, Abraham's family, descendants, and adoptees may be offered partnership in the Abrahamic Covenant, but only those who accept, agree, assent, consent, either tacitly or explicitly, actually become party. People who are not offered partnership, or who refuse partnership, are automatically excluded. This pattern that starts in the Abrahamic Covenant continues in the Mosaic Covenant and the Messianic Covenant. In the Messianic Covenant, there is certainly a covenantbased attempt at a global offering, but to date, there has been no global acceptance. The biblical evidence appears to indicate that Messiah will probably return before global acceptance happens. But the point in this theodicy's focus on human law must be on the radical distinction between the global in personam jurisdiction of the Noachian Covenant and the inherently local in personam jurisdiction of the three subsequent biblical covenants. The Noachian Covenant has a global in personam jurisdiction. It applies to everybody whether they like it or not. But the Mosaic Covenant has a local in personam jurisdiction. This means that even though the **<u>natural law</u>** expounded in the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> applies to all humans, the **human law** prescribed by God in the **Mosaic Covenant** only applies to people who consent to being party to the **Mosaic Covenant**. The only exception is human law prescribed in the Mosaic Covenant that is clarification and reiteration of the **human law** prescribed in the **Noachian Covenant**, which still has **global in** personam jurisdiction by way of its Noachian origins. The Noachian Covenant applies regardless of consent. But with the exception of prescription of human law that is reiteration of **human law** prescribed in the **Noachian Covenant**, the **human**

<u>law</u> prescribed in the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u> applies by way of consent, not regardless of consent. Even though the <u>**Messianic Covenant**</u> attempts to make a global offer, and is distinct from the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u> in that respect, it has a <u>local in personam</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> because it is limited by acceptance / consent. So whatever <u>human</u> <u>law</u> is prescribed in the <u>**Messianic Covenant**</u> that is not reiteration of <u>human law</u> prescribed in the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u> applies by consent, exactly as in the <u>**Mosaic**</u> and <u>**Abrahamic Covenant**</u>.

The crucial point is that the only **globally** applicable **human law** prescribed in the Bible is in Genesis 9:6.¹ The three subsequent biblical covenants certainly contain progressive revelation of **natural law**. But the bottom line is that NONE of the **human laws** prescribed by the **local** covenants is applicable as **human law** to people who are not party to those covenants, except the reiterations of the Genesis 9:6 mandate. These are obvious conclusions from doing **jurisdictional** analysis of the **local** covenants.² No **human law** is prescribed in the **local** covenants that is **globally** applicable, except **human law** that is clearly reiteration and clarification of Genesis 9:6.³

Clearly, the biblical story holds that all people alive these days are party to the **Noachian Covenant** regardless of whether they like it or not. So in regards to this biblical covenant, all humans are either covenant keepers or covenant breakers. But no one gets to opt out. How this translates into **human law** is necessarily far more nuanced, but the basis for such translation is still **global personal jurisdiction**. The **personal jurisdiction** of the **Noachian Covenant** includes God and the entire post-diluvian human race. --- Claiming that someone is party to a covenant or contract regardless of whether they like it or not naturally generates apprehension among

¹ Something is **global** when it ("it" being in the nature of a covenant or a law) has an **in personam jurisdiction** that pertains to all living people.

² When something is **local**, it has an **in personam jurisdiction** that does NOT encompass all living human beings. **Local** therefore describes the **in personam jurisdiction** of contracts, compacts, and covenants, especially biblical covenants, as being limited, inclusive of some people and exclusive of others. It should be understood in contrast to **global**, which is an **in personam jurisdiction** that includes all living human beings. Of the biblical covenants, the **Edenic**, **Adamic**, and **Noachian** are **global**, while the **Abrahamic**, **Mosaic**, and **Christian** / **Messianic** are **local**.

³ Examples: Exodus 20:13 prohibits murder; 20:15 prohibits theft; 20:16 prohibits perjury. Although these are not presented in Exodus 20 as **human law** because penalties are not readily presented there, penalties are presented elsewhere in the *Torah*, thereby confirming that these are certainly reiterations and clarifications of the Genesis 9:6 prescription of **human law**.

those ambivalent or unwilling to participate. When **jurisdictional** limitations are understood, this apprehension ceases to have any reasonable basis.

As indicated above, this theodicy contends that all morally reliable laws -regardless of whether they are <u>eternal</u>, <u>natural</u>, or biblically prescribed <u>human laws</u> -- exist as terms within covenants / contracts. In order to get and keep a holistic view of Bible-based jurisprudence, it's necessary to understand every contract or covenant as defining the <u>jurisdiction</u> of the given contract or covenant. In the process of distinguishing <u>global</u> and <u>local</u> covenants, this theodicy has introduced the concept of <u>personal jurisdiction</u>. But <u>personal jurisdiction</u> is only one of the three essential components of <u>jurisdiction</u>.

Sub-Chapter 3: Jurisdictions

While **<u>natural law</u>** is **<u>eternal law</u>** as it pertains to humans and can therefore be characterized as law imposed by God upon humans, human law is law imposed by humans upon humans. Because both theology and jurisprudence ignored this distinction for so long, and because the results of such ignorance have been increasingly grim starting several millennia ago, the distinction needs to be emphasized until it is commonly understood. This is a crucial part of the biblical story. If there is no explicit mandate in a passage of the Bible indicating that humans should punish humans who violate a biblical mandate, then there is no prescription of human **law** there.¹ Under such circumstances, if humans presume that they should punish the violating human, in the absence of a biblical mandate to do so, and in the absence of a valid contract indicating that they should do so, then such people are presuming that they should usurp God's authority as the promulgator and enforcer of the **<u>natural law</u>**. Such usurpation is a violation of boundaries that is the essence of missing the mark. It is the error at the core of every tyranny. Such boundaries are identified in traditional American jurisprudence by the word, "jurisdiction". There's no good reason not to use the same word, and largely the same concept, in Bible-based jurisprudence. It identifies a perfectly rational and valuable concept that needs to be recognized and used in theology. Refusal or failure to properly apply this concept leads to what this theodicy calls jurisdictional dysfunction. The biblical story being expounded here recognizes and acknowledges such dysfunction. Recognizing a problem's existence is usually crucial to finding its solution. The Bible

¹ The existence of a negative duty does not automatically entail the existence of a positive duty to enforce the negative duty.

absolutely offers a solution, but not without acknowledgment of the dysfunction's existence.

Similar to the way the concepts of **<u>human law</u>**, **<u>natural law</u>**, and <u>eternal law</u> are subject to the encompassing concept of the biblical covenant, the biblical covenants are subject to the more fundamental legal concept of <u>jurisdiction</u>. In the same way that the <u>Edenic Covenant</u>, the <u>Adamic Covenant</u>, and <u>human law</u> are not explicitly named in the Bible, while all their necessary characteristics exist there, so that they should be identified in theology, so that it's clear that the Bible does, in fact, tacitly identify them, <u>jurisdiction</u> is not explicitly named, but all of its necessary characteristics exist.

If one gets a definition of *jurisdiction* from a law dictionary, then it's probable that one will get a definition that is too specialized for biblical jurisprudence. Resorting to a more ordinary dictionary, this is what it says:

jurisdiction --- 1: the power, right, or authority to interpret and apply the law 2: the authority of a sovereign power to govern or legislate 3: the limits or territory within which authority may be exercised¹

The second definition is obviously broad enough to encompass <u>eternal law</u> and <u>natural law</u>, as well as <u>human law</u>. To keep a holistic view of what the Bible says about law, it's necessary to comprehend that all laws, contracts, biblical covenants, *etc.*, are subsidiary to the encompassing concept of <u>jurisdiction</u>.

Jurisdiction in the normal legal sense pertains to a rudimentary concept that applies to the delineation of a court's power and authority. Biblical jurisprudence must define **jurisdiction** in an even more rudimentary sense. In the meaning that applies most directly to discerning biblically prescribed **human law**, **jurisdiction** pertains to the power and authority of any person or group of people to execute **human law**, (i)against primary property and secondary property (including human bodies, labor, *real property, chattel*, and power to contract), (ii)with regard to a specific subject matter (*e.g.*, regarding a specific type of damage), and (iii)within a specific geographical location. Based on these criteria, **jurisdiction** over the person (**personal jurisdiction**, a.k.a. **in personam jurisdiction**); (ii)**jurisdiction** over the subject matter (**subject-matter jurisdiction**); and (iii)**jurisdiction** over the geographical location or territory (**geographical jurisdiction**, a.k.a. **territorial jurisdiction**). ----Because biblical jurisprudence encompasses not merely biblically prescribed **human law**, but also **eternal law**, **natural law**, and **divine law** that transcend **human law**,

¹ Webster's 7th, p. 461.

jurisdiction has a meaning that transcends <u>human law</u>, unlike the normal legal definition.

As indicated above, the biblical story holds that all laws that are morally sound -- regardless of whether they are **eternal**, **natural**, or biblically prescribed **human laws** -- exist as terms within covenants / contracts.¹ In order to get and keep a holistic view of Bible-based jurisprudence, it's necessary to understand all contracts and covenants as defining the **jurisdiction** of the given contract or covenant. It's a long-acknowledged standard in Anglo-American jurisprudence that three aspects of *jurisdiction* must exist before a court, legislature, government, *etc.*, genuinely has *jurisdiction*.² These three components are *jurisdiction* over subject matter, *jurisdiction* over personage, and *jurisdiction* over the relevant territory.³ Because

3 By now it's clear what the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>'s <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> is. It includes the entire human race. This theodicy has also presented a preliminary description of the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of its prescription of <u>human law</u>. It includes damage, exclusively. It's also obvious what the <u>territorial jurisdiction</u> is. Based on the way Genesis 9 is written, it's obvious that wherever human beings are, the <u>Noachian</u> <u>Covenant</u> has <u>territorial jurisdiction</u>. The <u>territorial jurisdiction</u>, also known as the <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>, is everywhere.

¹ Evidence that this is true is found in the fact that all laws that are imposed by God in the Bible exist as terms within the biblical covenants.

Evidence that this is true can be found in places like the Federal Rules of Civil 2 Procedure, Rule 12. --- The three aspects of jurisdiction are, (i)personal jurisdiction, (ii)subject-matter jurisdiction, and (iii)geographical jurisdiction. Note that in Rule 12, "venue" is equivalent to territorial / geographical jurisdiction. (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective September 16, 1938 & amendments effective December 1, 2006, contained within Minnesota Rules of Court: Federal, 2007, Thomson/West, St. Paul, Minnesota. --- URL: http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/) --- Most States also recognize *in rem* jurisdiction. *In rem* jurisdiction (jurisdiction over a thing) can either be treated as the same as a combination of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction or as the kind of jurisdiction that exists in admiralty and maritime cases. In the latter kinds of cases, in rem jurisdiction suffers the same jurisdictional dysfunction as the thinking that initiates such an *in rem* legal action. Such claims to jurisdiction, and such legal actions, cannot be considered valid features of biblical jurisprudence. Only personal, subjectmatter, and territorial jurisdictions mesh with a reasonable, holistic reading of the Bible, for reasons that should be obvious as this theodicy proceeds. The reasons revolve around the fact that in order for a thing to be recognized by a court, it needs to be recognized as property that is owned by someone. To allow the existence of *in rem jurisdiction* is to allow courts to take possession, and therefore *de facto* ownership, as the court sees fit. This is a grant of power to human government that exceeds the grant called for in Genesis 9:6. It is therefore inherently jurisdictional dysfunction.

these distinctions are extremely important, and because following them is insurance against abuse of power, this theodicy adheres to these concepts, identifying these three aspects of biblical **jurisdiction** like this: **Subject-matter jurisdiction** is jurisdiction over the subject matter (*e.g.*, over the damage, in the case of Genesis 9:6). **Personal** or **in personam jurisdiction** is jurisdiction over the person (*i.e.*, over the one who allegedly caused the damage, including that person's secondary property, to whatever extent it may be involved in the case). **Geographical** or **territorial jurisdiction** is jurisdiction over the territory (*e.g.*, where the damage occurred).

Every contract, covenant, and biblical covenant either expressly or impliedly defines the subject-matter jurisdiction of the contract, the in personam jurisdiction of the contract, and the <u>territorial jurisdiction</u> of the contract.¹ If a governmental body has **jurisdiction** over each of these features of **jurisdiction**, then according to long-existing jurisprudence along with common sense, the governmental body has jurisdiction. As indicated, there are three prerequisites to jurisdiction, and each of these prerequisites must be satisfied before jurisdiction exists. Before jurisdiction exists, jurisdiction over the person must exist; jurisdiction over the subject matter must exist; and jurisdiction over the territory must exist. If any one of these three attributes of jurisdiction is missing, then all claims to jurisdiction are bogus. Because God is omniscient and omnipotent, he never lacks jurisdiction. Because humans are ignorant, finite, and flawed, they often lack jurisdiction. That's as true of government officials as it is of anyone else, which is precisely why government officials need to be under constant scrutiny. --- This conception of jurisdiction has extremely important implications for biblical jurisprudence because, among other things, it tends to minimize the abuse of biblical law.

Jurisdiction is extremely important to the proper parsing and understanding of biblical legal boundaries.² Applying the concept of **jurisdiction** to biblical law may be a novel concept among theologians. But, given the present wretched condition of practically all human societies, governments, and institutions, including the visible church, this application is desperately needed. In trying to read the Bible rationally, while using **jurisdiction** as a legitimate interpretational protocol, one comes to the conclusion that the **Noachian Covenant** has **personal jurisdiction** over all people. It has what this theodicy calls a **global in personam jurisdiction**. One also concludes that the most significant aspect of the **subject-matter jurisdiction**

¹ This is always true of the biblical covenants. Based on this fact, this theodicy claims that the biblical story holds that it should be true, and is in fact true, for all covenants and contracts.

² This includes resolving the so-called "continuity-discontinuity problem", as will be evident as this theodicy proceeds.

of Genesis 9:6 is given in the *negative-duty clause*, which mandates that all people avoid damaging other people. The second most significant aspect of the **subject**-**<u>matter jurisdiction</u>** is given in the *positive-duty clause*, which mandates that all people execute justice against people who damage other people. One also concludes that the <u>territorial jurisdiction</u> is also determined by the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> as a whole, which is everywhere.

Reading strictly to determine what humans are party to the Noachian Covenant, it's clear that all humans who survived the deluge, and all their descendants forever into the future, are party to the Noachian Covenant. This is true regardless of whether people consent to being party or not. If one does not give due regard for the distinction between **human law** and the progressive revelation of **natural law**, as each exists within the **Noachian Covenant**, then the claim that all humans alive in the 21st century are party to the Noachian Covenant, regardless of whether they like it or not, may sound terrifying. Some people may immediately assume that Christianoid terrorists intend to force the mass of the unwilling into obedience to the Noachian Covenant. By definition human force is appropriate for the enforcement of valid human law. It is not appropriate for natural law, except the human-law subset thereof. Because Genesis 9:6 is the only prescription of human law in the Noachian Covenant, it is the only term of the Noachian Covenant in which force by humans, executed against other humans, is required. But to avoid the abuse of such power, it's imperative that jurisdiction be established before enforcement proceeds. Adhering to the three components of jurisdiction: To satisfy subject-matter jurisdiction, one needs a corpus delicti, a damaged body. To satisfy **personal jurisdiction** over Person A, one needs evidence that A caused the corpus delicti. To satisfy territorial jurisdiction, one needs evidence that the corpus delicti came into existence at location X, where location X is within the enforcer / adjudicator's territorial purview. The fact that only human law can be lawfully enforced by humans against other humans (not **<u>natural law</u>** exclusive of <u>human</u> law), and the fact that this global human law is subject to these jurisdictional restrictions, should eliminate anyone's apprehension about Christianoid terrorists enforcing the **Noachian Covenant** on a **global** basis.

As indicated above, the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> contained appendments to the <u>Edenic</u> <u>Covenant</u>, thereby forming a single covenant that was applicable to the entire human race up to the moment that the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> was promulgated. Likewise, the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> contained appendments to this pre-existing biblical covenant, and like the <u>Edenic / Adamic Covenant</u>, the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> has <u>in personam</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> over the entire human race from the moment of promulgation forward. In contrast to the <u>Edenic / Adamic / Noachian</u>'s inherently <u>global in personam</u> jurisdiction, the Abrahamic / Mosaic / Messianic Covenant has an inherently local in personam jurisdiction because only people who consent to participation are party. This means that all the human laws prescribed in these local covenants -- with the exception of human laws whose prescription is reiteration of the human laws prescribed in the Noachian Covenant -- are human laws that can only be *lawfully* applied to parties. In other words, with the exception of these reiterated Noachian human laws, the human laws prescribed in these local covenants arise out of the contractual nature of these local covenants, not out of a global covenant. No human law is prescribed in these local covenants that is globally applicable, except human law that is clearly reiteration of Genesis 9:6.

Here are some examples of such reiteration: Exodus 20:13 prohibits murder. Exodus 20:15 prohibits theft. Exodus 20:16 prohibits perjury. Although these are not presented in Exodus 20 as **human law** because penalties are not readily presented there, penalties are presented elsewhere in the *Torah*, thereby confirming that these are certainly reiterations and clarifications of the Genesis 9:6 prescription of **human law**. Something is **global** when it ("it" being in the nature of a biblical covenant or a law) has an **in personam jurisdiction** that pertains to all living people. When something is **local**, it has an **in personam jurisdiction** that does NOT encompass all living human beings. **Local** therefore describes the **in personam jurisdiction** of contracts, compacts, and covenants, especially some biblical covenants, as being limited, inclusive of some people and exclusive of others. It should be understood in contrast to **global**, which is an **in personam jurisdiction** that includes all living human beings.

It's absolutely crucial to recognize that the Genesis 9:6 mandate is the Bible's only **global** prescription of **human law**. Subsequent biblical covenants certainly have reiterations and clarifications of this **global** prescription of **human law**. Subsequent biblical covenants also have prescriptions of **locally** enforceable **human law**, meaning applicable to people who have consented to participate in the **local** biblical covenant. But Genesis 9:6 is the only **human law** that the Bible prescribes for **global** implementation. That's why it's extremely important to properly understand its **jurisdictional** boundaries.

Human history is almost entirely a litany of government abuse of *lawful* **jurisdictions**. The fact that the governments of presumably Christian nations have entered into this abuse, this symptom of **jurisdictional dysfunction**, when distinction between the **personal jurisdictions** of the **global** and **local** biblical covenants is so obvious, testifies to how unbiblical even the most biblical breeds of Christianity have been. But **personal jurisdiction** is not the only kind of **jurisdiction** that gets regularly abused.

Even though the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of the Genesis 9:6 *negative-duty clause* appears to be so obviously damage, and only damage,¹ Christendom has not limited its legal actions to damage. One might conclude that the most significant aspect of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>'s <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> is that it mandates that all people avoid damaging people, and that all people execute justice against people who damage people. But it's probable that even as far back as the Tower of Babel, human governments have not limited themselves to this <u>subject-matter</u> jurisdiction</u>. Confusion about what constitutes Genesis 9:6 damage has existed for a long time. Part of this confusion relates to ordinary contracts. People enter into contracts, and contracts are often breached. Parties to the contract are inevitably damaged by the breach. The breach therefore needs to be adjudicated. If one does not include breached contracts within the ambit of Genesis 9:6 damage, then one necessarily concludes that Genesis 9:6 damage is inherently too narrow. The exclusion of contract breaches therefore invites abuse. Clearly, the nexus between contractual and non-contractual damage needs to be examined.

In ancient jurisprudence,² it was acknowledged that all people have obligations not to damage other people.³ In those days, the obligation to avoid damage was not circumscribed sufficiently and accurately enough to dodge **jurisdictional dysfunction**. Nevertheless, by using concepts from ancient jurisprudence, this theodicy's legal theory posits the elimination of **jurisdictional dysfunction** as an important feature of the biblical story. --- As already indicated, all people have **natural rights**, and all people have **natural obligations** to recognize and honor the other's **natural rights**. All these **natural obligations** can be encapsulated by saying that they are a universal mandate to avoid damaging other people.

As already indicated, all people have a **<u>natural right</u>** to contract. They have a <u>**natural right**</u> to enter into binding, obligation-creating agreements with other people. But the obligations created by ordinary contracts are not natural. Rather,

¹ With the understanding that "damage" here encompasses the whole range of a dead, damaged, or injured party, including damage to either or both primary and/or secondary property.

² In Roman law, if one person damaged another, and if the damage was quantifiable in monetary terms, then it was grounds for a legal action *ex delicto*. --- See **Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities**, 2nd ed., ed. by William Smith, LL.D., 1870, Little,

Brown, and Co., Boston, Massachusetts, p. 817. --- URL: http://www.ancientlibrary.com/ smith-dgra/0824.html.

³ It should be noted that the harm / damage was then, and is now, necessarily "proximate" if it is to be taken as the reason for a legal action. Proximate means that there needs to be a direct and identifiable linkage between cause and harm.

they are contractual. Some people might claim that **<u>natural obligations</u>** are also contractual for reasons that go something like this: All natural obligations arise out of the global covenants. The biblical covenants are kinds and types of contracts. Therefore, the **<u>natural obligations</u>** are also contractual obligations. So the distinction between **<u>natural</u>** and contractual obligations is a distinction without a difference. --- It is true that the biblical covenants are a type of contract. But as has already been made clear, (i)the biblical covenants are divinely imposed, unlike ordinary contracts, and (ii)the **global** covenants are non-optional, meaning that consent is tacit, built into the legal instrument at a level that transcends human cognitive processes, and beyond the human ability to choose, agree, or disagree. Ordinary contracts NEVER have tacit consent that is this basic. So it's appropriate that the tacit consent that's built into the **global** covenants produce **obligations** that are called **<u>natural</u>**. The **<u>obligations</u>** that arise out of the **<u>global</u>** covenants are as **natural** as the **rights** that demand their existence. On the other hand, it is well known that obligations that arise out of ordinary contracts can be extremely unnatural. They can be perverse violations of the *imago Dei*. So it's inherently wrong to presume that obligations arising out of ordinary contracts are **<u>natural</u>**. So it's critical to distinguish damage that arises from the abuse of **natural rights** by way of the breach of an ordinary contract from the abuse of **natural rights** that does NOT arise from the breach of such a contract.¹ Besides this need to distinguish damages into contractual and non-contractual, for the reasons just stated, this distinction between contractual and non-contractual is absolutely crucial to the avoidance of jurisdictional dysfunction because every contract and covenant has its own specific jurisdiction. So the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Bible's

Even while making this important distinction between legal actions that arise out of 1 contracts and legal actions that do not, the absolutely crucial thing to recognize is that all *lawful* legal actions arise out of alleged violations of *lawful* obligations, regardless of whether those obligations happen to be contractual or **natural**. To whatever extent a legal action does not arise out of such *lawful* obligations, the legal action does not arise out of Genesis 9:6. Because legal actions by definition are reactions to violations of obligations, where the reactions entail the use of force, such reactions inherently cause damage to the recipient of the force. So if the obligation being enforced is unlawful, so is the legal action, and so are the enforcing parties. So not only does such a legal action not arise out of Genesis 9:6, but it arises in violation of Genesis 9:6. --- All these claims are reliably true as long as one is speaking strictly of biblically prescribed **human law**, and not **natural law**. More specifically, the claims are reliable as long as *trespass*-free violations of **natural law** are accepted as totally outside the purview of secular human **jurisdictions**. In other words, *trespass*-free violations of **natural law** are legal under **globally** prescribed **human** law.

global prescription of **human law** exclusively includes bloodshed, where Genesis 9:6 bloodshed is defined as damage to a human being, where the damage includes death, damage, or injury suffered by primary and/or secondary property, where the damage can arise out of the breach of a contract or not.

Now that this theodicy has addressed the personal jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction of the Genesis 9:6 mandate in a cursory way, it should be obvious what personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction mean. It should also be clear by now that the territorial jurisdiction of the Genesis 9:6 mandate exists wherever human beings exist. It should also be clear that ordinary contracts either implicitly or explicitly define their own **<u>territorial jurisdictions</u>**, in the same way that they either implicitly or explicitly define their own subject-matter jurisdictions and personal jurisdictions. So every contract has its own personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and territorial jurisdiction. These jurisdictional attributes are either express or implied in every *lawful* contract. So in the process of making a cursory delineation of the **jurisdiction** of the Bible's only global prescription of human law, it should be clear what the three components of jurisdiction are. But because throughout history, humans have consistently misconstrued these crucial jurisdictional limitations, it is necessary to look more specifically at the clauses of the Genesis 9:6 mandate, to make sure the biblical story gets told correctly.

PART II, THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

Chapter B: Subject Matter of the Negative-Duty Clause: Refining the Definition of Bloodshed

> Sub-Chapter 1: Death / Damage / Injury

Ancient jurisprudence recognized the need to distinguish kinds of damage into damage that arises out of a contract and damage that does not arise out of a contract.¹ The former kind of damage was called *ex contractu* (out of a contract) while the latter was called *ex delicto* (out of a *delict*). Before addressing these two kinds of damage specifically, it's important to see damage within its broader context.

It's obvious that the damage indicated in the negative-duty clause does not include "acts of God". Most damage to human beings that is not caused by human beings is caused by vulnerabilities that are built into the human condition. Such damage has traditionally been seen as caused by "acts of God". But this theodicy holds that it's not appropriate to blame God for the human condition, or the vulnerabilities therein, because doing so is the opposite of taking responsibility for one's circumstances. Blaming God does not advance the cause of miniature sovereignty. Blaming God is therefore inherently self-destructive. So damage caused by wild animals, earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, volcanoes, plagues, etc., ad infinitum, are totally outside the scope of the negative-duty clause. But damage caused by one person or group of people against another person or group of people certainly exists within the subject matter covered by the *negative-duty clause*, regardless of whether the damage arises out of a contract or not. If there is a human cause of the damage, then the damage falls within the purview of the Genesis 9:6 prescription of human law. If it's ascertained that the damage was caused by some human, then the next question to ask is whether or not the damage arose out of the breach of a contract between the damaged party and the damaging party.

Common sense says that bloodshed / shed life is the same as damage. It says that a dead, damaged, or injured human being is the result of an act that sheds life, where the damage or injury is to primary or secondary property. Genesis 9:6 is not merely about literal shed blood. It's about damage to one person's life that's caused directly and explicitly by somebody else. --- The claim that this verse is about damaged life, and not merely about literal shed blood or murder, is reinforced by

¹ Example: **Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities**, p. 819. --- URL: http:// www.ancientlibrary.com/smith-dgra/0826.html.

two facts: (i)It's possible to kill somebody without shedding any literal blood. (ii) It's possible to shed literal blood without killing anybody. --- Regarding the first point, suffocation, strangulation, and poison are all ways to kill someone without shedding any literal blood. Under a strictly literal interpretation of Genesis 9:6, if someone murdered someone else by one of these or some other bloodless method, such a murder would be socially acceptable because it wouldn't violate the meaning of the verse. Of course, this is absurd. It shows that the *negative-duty clause* must be understood to be metaphorical. --- Regarding the second point, a pin prick, a small cut on the arm, and amputating a limb are all ways to shed literal blood without necessarily killing someone. Under an interpretation of Genesis 9:6 that says that this verse is strictly about murder, the verse provides no relief to someone who is damaged without dying. This also shows that the verse must be understood to be metaphorical.

When understood within the context of Genesis 9:4-5, it's clear that the shedblood metaphor is referring to shed life. Common sense demands that the shed life be equivalent to death, damage, or injury suffered by a human being, where the death / damage / injury includes possible damage to both primary and secondary property. The "Whoever" in 9:6 clearly refers to a human perpetrator. Whether it's possible for the perpetrator and the victim to be the same person is an issue that needs to be looked at. But the point that needs to be settled before looking at selfdamage is that the bloodshed referenced in the *negative-duty clause* is damage to a human being's primary and/or secondary property, caused by a human being.

There are numerous ways that people can become damaged: "acts of God", accidents, bad results from high-risk activities, and numerous other ways that people can become dead, damaged, or injured without any fault to anybody else. If damage is not inflicted by some other human being, or by some other human being's domestic animal, agent, machine, etc., then is there any way such damage can be Genesis 9:6 damage? If someone trips on a rock and cuts his/her hand off while mowing their lawn, is it anyone else's fault but their own? Even though there may be a dead, damaged, or injured party involved in this act, it doesn't appear likely that there is Genesis 9:6 damage here, because Genesis 9:6 damage requires both a perpetrator and a victim. Damage by itself doesn't entail Genesis 9:6 damage. So the question is, what damage is inside the scope, purview, and jurisdiction of the negative-duty clause, and what damage is outside it? It's certain that "acts of God" are extra-**jurisdictional**, because the "Whoever" perpetrator must be human, whereas God is not human in any ordinary sense of the word. But if the perpetrator and the victim are the same human, does the damage ever fall within the purview of the negative-duty clause?

If human A intentionally kills his or her self, this is certainly a violation of natural law as revealed in the divine law. But is it a violation of human law? "Selfmurder" has been acknowledged for centuries to be a violation of Judeo-Christian human law. But is suicide a violation of the global human law mandated in Genesis 9:6? To answer this question, it helps to see if it makes sense under the *positive-duty* clause. What sense does it make for human B to take the blood from human A's dead body when A has committed suicide? The positive-duty clause says, "By man his blood shall be shed". But "blood" is a place-holder for life. So the *positive-duty clause* can be restated as, "By man his life shall be shed". If human A has just killed himself, and human B comes along as a stalwart enforcer of global human law, what does B do, try to extract life from A's dead body? That makes no sense. So even though suicide is a violation of **natural law**, and even though it may be a violation of local human law, it doesn't make sense for it to be a violation of global human law, because it's not enforceable by way of the proportional mechanism established in the positive-duty clause. It makes no sense for B to execute retributive justice against A when A is already dead. The situation is similar if A cuts his hand off while mowing his lawn. If B comes along wanting to execute justice against A when A has damaged himself and no one else, B is certainly on a sadist's errand.

In cases of self-damage, even though the damage is real, the perpetrator and the victim are the same human, which means that anyone attempting to execute justice against the perpetrator is also increasing the harm to the victim. This clearly violates the spirit of Genesis 9:6, if not the letter of it. The spirit of Genesis 9:4-6 is about the protection of life. The motive behind this spirit of life-protection is given in the *motive clause*. Increasing damage to someone who has harmed himself, regardless of whether that harm is intentional or unintentional, is diametrically opposite to the purpose of these verses.

Before concluding that all self damage is outside the scope of the *negative-duty clause*, it might help to look at two other classes of self-damage, self theft and self kidnapping. Regarding theft, it's not really possible for a human to steal from his/ her self. It's certainly possible for a person to shuffle books, and thereby defraud someone else. But this is fraud, where one person damages another. It's not really self-theft. Self-damage with respect to theft is not possible. Likewise, it's not possible for a person to genuinely kidnap his/her self. It may make a great slapstick routine, but it doesn't make sense as **human law**. --- Because self-damage is so riddled with exceptions, reason demands that self-damage does not exist within the ambit of the *negative-duty clause*.

Some people claim that they have a duty to stop all damaging behavior, regardless of whether it's self-inflicted or inflicted by someone else. For example, some people

claim that they have a duty to stop people from eating certain things. Secular governments mandate the wearing of seat belts. They make it difficult to procure certain kinds of foods, like raw milk. Some States mandate the wearing of helmets. --- Parents certainly have such caretaking duties over their children, and guardians certainly have such duties over their wards. But for any adult to claim such duties over another adult demands a question: Where is the contract proving that human A has *bailed* his **natural rights** into human B's custody?

Sub-Chapter 2: Ex Delicto / Ex Contractu

As already indicated, Genesis 9:6 damage can be either to primary property (to body ownership) or to secondary property. If a *corpus delicti* is understood to be a damaged body in a general sense, then the damage can be damage to either primary or secondary property, and it can be either out of a contract or not out of a contract. However, in its common usage in American law, a *corpus delicti* pertains exclusively to a crime.

corpus delicti --- The body of a crime. The body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, *e.g.*, the corpse of a murdered man, the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, the substance or foundation of a crime; the substantial fact that a crime has been committed. The "corpus delicti" of a crime is the body or substance of the crime, which ordinarily includes two elements: the act and the criminal agency of the act.¹

Although breaching a contract can be a bad thing, and although the damage caused by such a breach is certainly included within the purview of the Genesis 9:6 *negativeduty clause*, breaching a contract is generally not considered a crime in American law unless fraud is involved. In order to understand the difference between a *corpus delicti* within the purview of the Genesis 9:6 prescription of <u>human law</u>, and a *corpus delicti* as it's presently understood in American law, it's necessary to define the terminology. (i)A *corpus* is literally a body. As implied in the definition, the *corpus* at issue could be a literal corpse (primary property), or it could be something else (secondary property). (ii)It's important to get a specific definition of *delicti*, and to see how that definition relates to Genesis 9:6. (iii)It's important to know how the word "crime" relates to Genesis 9:6.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 310.

In the expression, *corpus delicti*, *delicti* is an adjective that means "damaged". Essentially the same word appears as a noun in American law dictionaries. In American law, a *delict* is defined like this:

<u>delict</u> --- Criminal offense; tort; a wrong. In Roman law this word, taken in its most general sense, is wider ... than our English term "tort." ... [I]t includes those wrongful acts which, while directly affecting some individual or his property, yet extend in their injurious consequences to the peace or security of the community at large, and hence rise to the grade of crimes or misdemeanors. These acts were termed in the Roman law "public delicts;" while those for which the only penalty exacted was compensation to the person primarily injured were denominated "private delicts."¹

The word generally used in American law instead of *delict* is "tort".² When this definition of *delict* says that it is "wider" than tort, it's referring at least in part to the fact that torts are legal actions that are brought by private citizens, rather than by the government. In this sense, a tort is the same thing as a *private delict*. In current American law, actions that are instigated by private citizens are called "civil actions",³ and are thereby distinguished from "criminal actions", which are brought by the secular government. Neither torts nor *delicts* include damages that arise from the breach of a contract.

This theodicy uses the word *delict* instead of the word "tort" precisely because it includes both *public* and *private*. It thereby includes all non-contractual damages to primary and secondary property, regardless of whether the damages are prosecuted through a public or private litigant. --- Because the basic definition of *delict* includes "Criminal offense", as well as "tort" and "wrong", it is important to analyze how damages that fall within the purview of the Genesis 9:6 *negative-duty clause* interface with crimes.⁴

4 In passing, it should be understood that this theodicy is not quoting ancient and modern legal authorities as authorities. All of these authorities have operated within legal systems that suffered from **jurisdictional dysfunction**. This theodicy is citing these legal authorities only for the sake of manifesting the complexities involved in discovering Bible-based **human law**. By exposing the complexities, it should be possible to harmonize these details with the foundations laid in the biblical covenants. So the purpose here is

¹ Black's 5th, p. 384.

² A "tort" is, "A private or civil wrong or injury, other than breach of contract". --- **Black's 5th**, p. 1335.

^{3 &}quot;Civil" literally means "citizen". "The word is derived from the Latin civilis, a citizen." ---- Black's 5th, p. 222.

<u>crime</u> --- A positive or negative act in violation of penal law; an offense against the State or United States. "Crime" and "misdemeanor", properly speaking, are synonymous terms; though in common usage "crime" is made to denote such offenses as are of a more serious nature. A crime may be defined to be any act done in violation of those duties which an individual owes to the community, and for the breach of which the law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public.¹

To clarify what a "positive or negative act" is, it helps to recognize that obligations are commonly classified into positive and negative.² Positive obligations are obligations to actively do something. Negative obligations are obligations to avoid doing something. So, to violate a negative obligation, a prohibition, one must do the positive act that is prohibited. To violate a positive obligation, one must do a negative act, an act of omission, an act that is not really an act, but the absence of an act.

As implied in the definition of "crime", crimes include both felonies and misdemeanors. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors pertains almost entirely to the severity of the penalty. In keeping with the spirit of the *positive-duty clause*, it's crucial that the penalty be proportional to the damage. This proportionality issue raises a very troubling question about crimes under modern secular governments. The question is: Are the penalties for crimes under modern secular governments proportional to the damages? The answer is that too often they are not. To be *lawful*, the definition of crimes under modern secular governments be compatible with the definition of damages that arises out of the *negative-duty clause*. The sad fact is that modern statutes and administrative rules are clogged with crimes that are not against Genesis 9:6 damage even in the most imaginative bureaucratic mind. In biblically prescribed **global human law**, damages need to be proximate, and they must be real, because if they are not proximate and real, the

not to pay obeisance to authorities recognized in **human law**, but to pay obeisance to the authority of the biblical prescription of **human law**. To do otherwise is to deviate from telling the biblical story. This orientation is crucial if the telling of the biblical story is to avoid getting lost in the weeds of all the **jurisdictional dysfunction** that marks all of human history.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 334.

² *E.g.*: In his *Sefer Ha-Mitzvoth* (The Book of the Divine Precepts), Maimonides classified the 613 commandments of the *Torah* into 248 "Positive Commandments" and 365 "Negative Commandments". --- Maimonides, Moses; The Commandments: *Sefer Ha-Mitzvoth* of Maimonides, 2 vol., translation and helps by Rabbi Dr. Charles B. Chavel, 1967, The Soncino Press, Ltd., New York.

human law will probably be misapplied, in which case whoever misapplies it will be guilty of a *delict*. There needs to be a causal connection between the damage and the cause of the damage that is generally "beyond a reasonable doubt".¹

In order to parse this **jurisdictional** issue out, it will help to look at a few examples of how existing secular government is perpetrating jurisdictional dysfunction. ---The State of Minnesota proudly proclaims on one of its websites that another of its websites provides "licensing information on nearly 600 licenses, administered by over 45 state agencies in Minnesota".² The vast majority of the State agencies are jurisdictionally dysfunctional. That doesn't mean their goals are wrong. It means their methods are wrong. The ends sought may be fine, but the means used are absolutely not.³ This licensure set of examples of jurisdictional dysfunctionality will be examined below. Another set of examples of jurisdictional dysfunction can be found by examining the "Criminal Code" chapter of the Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 609.⁴ Although many of the crimes identified in Chapter 609 are clearly damage under the Genesis 9:6 prescription of human law, some are not. This doesn't mean that the positive or negative acts that Minnesota classifies as crimes, and that are examples of *jurisdictional dysfunctionality*, are really good activities that society should encourage. The fact that they are bad acts does not mean that the State has *lawful* jurisdiction over them. Like the overzealous program of licensure, discouraging the positive and negative actions that constitute these "crimes" may be a good and worthy goal. Nevertheless, the methods, in this case criminal enforcement

^{1 &}quot;Beyond a reasonable doubt" is part of the jury instructions in criminal trials. It is, "The standard that must be met by the prosecution's evidence in criminal prosecution: that no other logical explanation can be derived from the facts except that the defendant committed the crime, thereby overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty. ... Beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard of proof that must be met in any trial. In civil litigation, the standard is either proof by a PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE or proof by clear and convincing evidence. These are lower burdens of proof." --- URL: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Beyond+a+Reasonable+Doubt. --- It's reasonable that in private delicts and contract cases the burden of proof would also be lower in biblical jurisprudence.

² The list of "State Agencies, Boards, Commissions" is at URL: http://mn.gov/portal/ government/state/agencies-boards-commissions/. --- The licenses by Minnesota State agencies are at URL: http://mn.gov/elicense/.

³ See CHAPTER G, *Sub-Chapter 3*, <u>Section b</u>, "<u>Religious Law / Municipal Law</u>", and **PART** III, CHAPTER A, *Sub-Chapter 3*, "*The 3rd 'Coming*".

⁴ Minnesota Statutes, URL: https://www.revisor.mn.gov/ statutes/?id=609&view=chapter.

methods, are wrong in certain types of "crimes". There are other ways to discourage these things than through the *police powers* of secular government.

To parse the **jurisdictional** issue, this theodicy has thus far identified two sets of examples of **jurisdictional dysfunction**. One set arises from State licensure programs. The other set appears in the criminal code. These two sets share common motives, at least facially. Both sets of laws were established, enacted, and promulgated with presumably good intentions (*i.e.*, with what many Minnesotans proudly call, "Minnesota nice"). But they are examples of good intentions run amuck. --- Because the criminal set of examples of **jurisdictional dysfunction** are more straight-forward and less convoluted than the licensure set, this section will focus on the criminal set, leaving the nearly 600 kinds of licenses issued by the State for a later section.¹

Crimes generally suffer from jurisdictional dysfunction when the State makes either doing or not doing something a crime, and the thing being made illegal does not fit clearly within the overarching category of Genesis 9:6 damage. The act proscribed may be clearly bad, or the act mandated may be clearly good. Examples of clearly bad acts that are proscribed are sodomy and bestiality, which are both classified as "sex crimes" in the Minnesota Statutes (§§ 609.293-609.294). Practically any Christian, and most non-Christians as well, agree that both of these activities are inherently bad. Both sodomy and bestiality are what both ancient and modern legal systems have classified as acts that are *mala in se*. An act that is *malum* in se is evil in itself. According to the biblical story, there is absolutely no doubt that such acts are *mala in se*. But if these acts are completely consensual, then even though they are positively mala in se, it is not clear that they fall neatly within the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage. On the contrary, when such acts are consensual, it becomes extremely difficult to see where the damage is. In cases of murder, rape, kidnapping, theft, fraud, etc., each of which is proscribed in the local Abrahamic / Mosaic / Messianic Covenant, these mala in se are clearly clarifications of the meaning of Genesis 9:6 damage. In each there is necessarily a *corpus delicti*. Each is an instance of *trespass* by one person against another.² Likewise, sodomy and bestiality are proscribed by the **local** covenant. But sodomy and bestiality are not necessarily trespass. In neither is the corpus delicti obvious. There's no doubt that they are absolutely perverse. But perversion, by itself, doesn't constitute Genesis 9:6 damage. As will be proven below, Genesis 9:6 damage is necessarily some kind of

See CHAPTER G, Sub-Chapter 3, <u>Section b</u>, "<u>Religious Law / Municipal Law</u>", and PART III, CHAPTER A, Sub-Chapter 3, "The 3rd 'Coming".

² trespass --- "An unlawful interference with one's person, property, or rights." (Black's 5th, p. 1347)

trespass by one person against another. It is non-consensual intrusion by one person upon another person's primary or secondary property.

The proper telling of the biblical story requires the proper distinction between natural law and the biblical prescription of human law. According to the biblical story, every act that is evil in itself, malum in se, is proscribed. So all mala in se are proscribed by **<u>natural law</u>**. But whether the biblical story prescribes <u>**human law**</u> as a remedy to such *mala in se* is an altogether different issue. How the biblical story proscribes any given *malum in se* is the crucial issue, meaning whether the given *malum* in se is proscribed exclusively through **natural law**, or through the combination of natural law and human law. All mala in se, acts evil in themselves, are proscribed by **<u>natural law</u>**. But whether <u>human law</u> proscribes a given *malum in se* depends entirely upon human jurisdictions. --- Because Genesis 9 equates blood and life, Genesis 9:6 damage is the shedding of life. It appears on its face that every malum in se is a shedding of life. So it appears facially that Genesis 9:6 damage is equivalent to any violation of **<u>natural law</u>**. But this plausible assumption doesn't recognize the difference between **<u>human law</u>** and **<u>natural law</u>**, and it doesn't recognize that humans are not generally qualified to judge the hearts of other people. Humans are generally only qualified to judge crude physical manifestations of what's in other people's hearts. To assume that one is qualified to judge violations of **natural law** in general is to usurp God's authority as judge of the **<u>natural law</u>**. So even though every *malum in se* is clearly against both the establishment and maintenance of the individual standing wave and the establishment and maintenance of the human race's psychic standing wave, that doesn't mean that every malum in se should be prosecuted as violation of human law. Even though it's plausible to conclude that seemingly trespass-free mala in se like sodomy and bestiality would be within the ambit of Genesis 9:6 damage, rigorous understanding of the jurisdictions of the biblical covenants make it unlikely that God intended for his people to enforce prohibitions of trespass-free mala in se globally. It's certain that he prescribed the prohibition of many trespass-free mala in se locally, on a consensual / contractual basis. But there's virtually no biblical or other evidence that he prescribed **global** human law to remedy trespass-free mala in se. Even so, it's reasonable to put the issue into a larger context.

It's certain from the analysis done thus far that God intended for *mala in se* that are *trespasses* to exist within the ambit of Genesis 9:6 damage. But it's not clear that God intended *trespass*-free *mala in se* to exist within the ambit of Genesis 9:6 damage. Whether he did, or did not, is not made clear anywhere in the Bible. However, whether he did or did not is heavily dependent upon whether God has a high view of **human law** or a low view of it. For reasons that will be made obvious below, this

theodicy claims that God generally looks with disdain on human government and human law, even though he certainly ordains the existence of human law. This being the truth, it's not reasonable to claim that God prescribes maximal human government. On the contrary it's reasonable that he prescribes minimal and modest human government based on carefully circumscribed human law. It's also clear that even though the Bible is a book of covenants and laws, he did not reveal the entirety of what humans need to know in it, but instead chose to reveal what humans need to know piecemeal, through progressive revelation, propagating revelation through a single family, namely Abraham's family. This surely reiterates the modesty of the government and laws that God prescribes that humans impose upon one another. Given the monumental arguments for modest government and circumscribed human laws, the claim that God must have intended for all *mala in se*, acts evil in themselves, to be within the ambit of Genesis 9:6 damage must be abandoned. If error is to be made in this, then it needs to be made on the side of recognizing that God is sovereign, and that miniature sovereigns will never be genuinely sovereign. Besides, the very fact that the language in Genesis 9:6 is crude, using "sheds man's blood" rather than "sheds man's life", is an argument that Genesis 9:6 damage needs to be understood to be crude and limited, not expansive.

Synthesizing all these strains of thought into a conclusion, it's necessary to conclude that Genesis 9:6 damage includes *mala in se* that are *trespasses*, but it doesn't include *trespass*-free *mala in se*. In keeping with the biblical pattern, *trespass*-free *mala in se* need to be prohibited consensually, within the **jurisdictions** of contracts that people make who are trying to abide by the **local** covenants. Both the *trespass*-free breed of *mala in se* and the *trespass* breed of *mala in se* must be proscribed in any society that's dedicated to observing Christian standards of morality. But it's grossly error-prone to presume that a society dedicated to observing secular standards of morality must proscribe *trespass*-free *mala in se*. Because Genesis 9:6 is **global**, it is inherently secular. So it's reasonable to ask whether the secular governments in the so-called "United States of America" are secular or not. For example: Is the State of Minnesota dedicated to observing Christian standards of morality as defined via the **local** covenants? Likewise, is any of the fifty States or the general government dedicated to observing Christian standards of morality as defined via the **local** covenants?

There's no doubt that the so-called "United States of America" had predominantly Christian origins. There's also no doubt that shortly after the American War for Independence, both the general government and the States adopted into their respective constitutions statements making it obvious that both the State and general governments would enforce the free exercise of religion, and would forbid establishing any religion as a government-sanctioned religion. All fifty States have followed the same pattern. Therefore, neither the general government nor any of the States, including Minnesota, can make a credible claim to being dedicated to observing Christian standards of morality, as defined via the **local** covenants. But that demands another question: What biblical grounds did the presumably Christian founders of this country have for adopting the free exercise of religion, and for rejecting the establishment of Christianity? Were they simply abandoning their Christianity when they adopted the free exercise of religion? There have been numerous answers to these questions, but none about which this author knows has dealt properly with the **jurisdictional** issues.

The evidence indicates that the biblical literacy among this country's founding generation was extremely high; so they were not abandoning their Christianity. It was probably intuitively obvious to most of them, even if they rarely or never articulated it, that the Noachian Covenant applies to all people, regardless of their religion, while the Bible's local covenants only apply to those who consent to participation. The founding generation did its part to implement progressive revelation. They knew at least intuitively that they would need to leave many legal problems, including slavery and *trespass*-free crimes like sodomy and bestiality, to future generations. Now, this 21st-century generation cannot afford to pass the buck to the next generation. Circumstances are demanding the biblical wisdom that must have been intuitively obvious to the founding generation. People who call themselves "Christian" now have a small array of choices: (i)Implement the jurisdictional boundaries of the biblical covenants that must have been intuitively obvious to the founding generation. (ii)Try to establish Christianity as the state religion. (iii)Abandon the rigors of the biblical story for a kind of comfort-zone, quasi Christianity. --- The only palatable and viable choice is to implement the jurisdictional boundaries of the biblical covenants. Neither the State of Minnesota nor any of the rest of the secular governments in the so-called "United States" is dedicated to observing Christian standards of morality as defined in the local covenants. However, by mandating the free exercise of religion, they have already committed themselves to the *jurisdictional* boundaries of the biblical covenants, *i.e.*, to the **global** prescription of **human law**. So it's critical to get a clear understanding of what the jurisdictional boundaries are. It's necessary to continue pursuing a reasonable understanding of corpus delicti, delict, crime, trespass, etc., especially to the extent that they are compatible with the biblical story, and with biblical jurisprudence.

To continue clarifying the **jurisdictional** boundaries between the **global** prescription of **human law** and the **local** covenants, it should help to return to

examining the nexus between a *trespass*, a *malum in se*, a *malum prohibitum*, and Genesis 9:6 damage.

trespass --- An unlawful interference with one's person, property, or rights. At common law, trespass was a form of action brought to recover damages for any injury to one's person or property or relationship with another.

Trespass comprehends any misfeasance, transgression or offense which damages another person's health, reputation or property ... Doing of unlawful act or lawful act in unlawful manner to injury of another's person or property.¹

The emphasis in *trespass* is on interference by one person with another person's primary property, secondary property, and rights that go with such property. Such property is generally physical stuff that can be recognized by people in general by way of their physical senses. Physical stuff that's easily cognized is the realm of **global human law**. Common sense demands this because such issues need to be cognized in secular courts, and by witnesses and jurists that could come from any cultural or religious background. Issues like acts that are not *trespass* but are nevertheless *mala in se*, evil in themselves, because they miss the mark, because they are violations of **natural law**, and because they are impediments to the establishment and maintenance of individual standing waves and the human race's psychic standing wave, are too subtle for such secular courts. Secular courts may be able to deal with crude stuff well, but the more subtle the infraction, the more error-prone their judgment.

Another way to mark the difference between *trespass*-free *mala in se* and *mala in se* that are not *trespass*-free is to focus on consent. If someone is invited onto someone else's property, there is agreement that the invitee can be there. But if someone goes onto someone else's property uninvited, then that's *trespass*. So consent is crucial to determining whether a *malum in se* is a *trespass* or is *trespass*-free. Consent is also crucial in the distinction between a *malum in se* and a *malum prohibitum*, an act that is presumably evil simply because somebody has prohibited it.

<u>malum in se</u> --- A wrong in itself ... An act is said to be *malum* in se when it is inherently and essentially evil, that is, immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the state. Such are most or all of the offenses cognizable at common law (without the denouncement of a statute); as murder, larceny, etc.²

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1347.

² Black's 5th, p. 865.

It should be clear by now that something that is *malum in se* can either fall within the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage, or not. A *malum in se* that does not fall within the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage is "injurious in its consequences" in a way that is not sufficiently proximate under the *jurisdiction* of a secular court. Therefore, as far as the **global** prescription of **human law** is concerned, such a *malum in se* is *trespass*-free. This presents a problem to Christians regarding how they intend to prohibit *trespass*-free *mala in se* when they cannot make such prohibitions under the auspices of the **global** covenants. Sticking close to biblical jurisprudence, the solution to that problem is simple. Following the guidelines established by the **local** covenants, they enter into contracts with one another whereby those *trespass*-free *mala in se* are proscribed within the **jurisdictions** established by those contracts. This leads to another important distinction, the distinction between *mala in se* and *mala prohibita*.

It's obvious by now that the subject matter of the **global** prescription of **human law** includes *delicts* and contract violations. The *delicts* and contract violations exist within the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage. In other words, the damage must be cognizable in a secular court. Although *delicts* are always *mala in se*, everything that is *malum in se* is not necessarily a *delict*. Witness sodomy and bestiality. To Bible-based Christians, sodomy and bestiality are both *mala in se*. But to people who practice such things, they might not be *mala in se*.¹ In a secular court, a court charged with adjudicating cases and controversies about damage that is **globally** cognizable, even if the judge is a Christian, the court cannot *lawfully* cognize the damage caused by sodomy and bestiality. This is not true of murder, manslaughter, larceny, trespass, and numerous other *mala in se*, because this latter class of *mala in se* are also *delicts*. *Delicts* are activities that cause damage, where the relationship between the damage and the cause of the damage is inherently proximate. The damage in *trespass*-free *mala in se* is inherently non-proximate and difficult to define, especially to a secular court.

The situation with regard to breaches of contracts is similar. The breach must cause damage that's cognizable in a secular court in order for it to qualify as Genesis

¹ According to the biblical story, because the **<u>natural law</u>** is what it is, somewhere in the mind of every human being is a conscience that informs its owner that such acts are *mala in se.* If people insist on violating their own conscience, the biblical story holds that they will ultimately pay an extremely high price. But this doesn't mean that biblically prescribed <u>**human law**</u> necessarily allows Bible believers to use force against the actors who engage in an activity that is *malum in se*. These are two different issues at the interface between the moral-law leg of the <u>**natural law**</u> and biblically prescribed <u>**human law**</u>, and they should not be confused.

9:6 bloodshed.¹ If a group of Christians contract with one another for the sake of establishing a **jurisdiction** that prohibits *mala in se* that are *trespass*-free under the **global** prescription of **human law**, then they should be willing and able to enforce the prohibition within their **jurisdiction**, and only within their **jurisdiction**. People outside their **jurisdiction** are not subject to their contractual obligations. This means that there is a limit on *mala prohibita* that is similar to the limit on *mala in se*.

<u>malum prohibitum</u> --- A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong *because* prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law²

mala prohibita --- Prohibited wrongs or offenses; acts which are made *offenses* by positive laws, and *prohibited* as such. Acts or omissions which are made criminal by statute but which, of themselves, are not criminal. Generally, no criminal intent or mens rea is required and the mere accomplishment of the act or omission is sufficient for criminal liability. Term is used in contrast to mala in se which are acts which are wrongs in themselves such as robbery.³

So in order to be *lawfully* cognized in a secular court, the violation of a *malum prohibitum* must cause damage that's cognizable in a secular court. But there's one other extremely important thing to notice about *mala prohibita*. In order to be enforceable in a secular court, it must be a term within a *lawful* contract. It cannot simply be an edict from some tyrant or bureaucrat.

To recapitulate, there is a **global** mandate against the perpetration of *delicts* and the violation of contracts where the damage that comes out of either source is clear and obvious damage to primary and/or secondary property. This **global** mandate exists by way of the *negative-duty clause*. There is also a **global** mandate to execute justice against anyone who causes such damage, which exists by way of the *positive-duty clause*. It's important to notice in passing that these mandates don't excuse anyone. It makes no exceptions for kings, presidents, supreme court justices, bankers, stock brokers, dog catchers, police, or anyone else operating under *color of law*, or in any other way terrorizing one's neighborhood. Under a secular government, "crimes" that are not *delicts* are violations of Genesis 9:6 that are perpetrated by the government. The presumed criminal is the victim of a *delict*

¹ To be overzealous to **globally** prosecute *mala in se*, as mentioned above, is to usurp God's authority as enforcer of the **natural law**.

² Black's 5th, p. 865.

³ Black's 5th, pp. 861-862.

perpetrated by government. So non-*delictual* crimes are government-perpetrated bloodshed. If there is no *delict*, and there is no broken contract, then the secular government lacks **jurisdiction**, and it becomes a perpetrator whenever it insists on exercising such bogus **jurisdiction**.

The entire human race should make murder, rape, kidnapping, theft, arson, extortion, fraud, and numerous other kinds of *public* and *private delicts* illegal. In traditional legal systems throughout Europe, England, and America, such violations of **natural rights** gave rise to legal actions *ex delicto*.

<u>ex delicto</u> --- From a delict, tort, fault, crime, or malfeasance. In both the civil and the common law, obligations and causes of action are divided into two classes -- those arising *ex contractu* (out of a contract), and those *ex delicto*. The latter are such as grow out of or are founded upon a wrong or tort¹

Notice that in both the civil law and the common law, causes of action are divided into two classes, actions that arise out of *delicts* and actions that arise out of contracts. Because the civil law is based upon ancient Roman law,² this essentially means that this distinction has existed in Christendom's jurisprudence for almost as long as Christendom has existed.

ex contractu --- From or out of a contract. In both the civil and the common law, rights and causes of action are divided into two classes, -- those arising *ex contractu* (from a contract), and those arising *ex delicto* (from a delict or tort). 3 Bl.Comm. 117.³

Notice that in this definition of *ex contractu*, it also says that in both civil law and common law, causes of legal action are divided into actions out of *delicts* and actions out of contracts.

If one is damaged as a result of participation in a contract, why should the damager be prosecuted *ex contractu* rather than *ex delicto*? Should the *trier of fact* automatically assume that the contract takes priority, or should the *trier of fact* assume the broader **jurisdiction** of Genesis 9:6 first? --- In Anglo-American common law, American law as it exists at present, and western law as it has existed stretching back into antiquity, when there is both a damaged party and a contract,

¹ Black's 5th, p. 509.

^{2 &}quot;The term civil law derives from the Latin *ius civile*, the law applicable to all Roman *cives* or citizens. Its origins and model are to be found in the monumental compilation of Roman law commissioned by the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century CE." --- website of the School of Law of the University of California at Berkeley --- URL: https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html.

³ Black's 5th, p. 508.

the trier of fact always looks at the contract first, to see what bearing the contract may have in prosecuting the damage. So it's critical that contracts and *delicts* be distinguished because they have totally different **jurisdictions**. *Delicts* are based on the **jurisdiction** of the **global** covenants, especially of Genesis 9:6. Other contracts define their own **jurisdictions**.

Regardless of how **jurisdictionally dysfunctional human law** has been for many centuries, it has at least recognized this important distinction between legal actions *ex delicto* and legal actions *ex contractu*. However, the fact that traditional legal systems divide legal actions into these two overarching classes does not mean that Bible-based jurisprudence does the same. But there are other reasons that make it obvious that Bible-based jurisprudence must use the same basic categories: Contracts and *delicts* have inherently different **jurisdictions**. All enforcement of **human law** needs to be either *ex contractu* or *ex delicto*. If it's not one or the other, it's a sure bet that the **human law** being enforced is a tyrant's *malum prohibitum*, or a do-gooder's bad legislation, or both, because **jurisdictional dysfunction** is at hand.

Every contract has its own **personal jurisdiction**, **subject-matter jurisdiction**, and **territorial jurisdiction**. These **jurisdictional** attributes are either express or implied in every *lawful* contract. Real **human laws** are always either *ex contractu*, existing as a term within an ordinary contract, or *ex delicto*, existing as a term within the **Noachian Covenant**. These are two radically different kinds of legal actions, and there are therefore two radically different kinds of *police powers* that necessarily exist under two radically different **jurisdictions**. By understanding the difference between *delicts* and contracts, one understands the difference between these two different types of *police power*. One also understands that any other kind of *police power* is tyranny. One can use the knowledge about these two different **jurisdictions** to see what's good about the existing system, what's bad about it, and how it needs to change. By knowing about these two kinds of **jurisdiction**, one can see when one needs to hold people accountable to the Genesis 9:6 mandate, even if those people happen to be police, judges, or politicians perpetrating *delicts* under *color of law*.

It may seem a simple matter. It may seem that there are only two elements to **globally** applicable **human law**: (i)Don't encroach on other people or their property. (ii)Do all that you've agreed to do. --- No doubt if everyone did these things humanity would be better off. But even with the best of intentions, it's not always easy to know who has *lawful* title to property, and it's not always easy to keep one's promises. Worse yet, when office-holding psychopaths influence the muddled thinking of people with otherwise good intentions, the resulting government doesn't care in the least about **jurisdictional** guidelines. The laws become utterly

fiat. Even so, people willing to admit that there is a **global** prohibition against damaging people through *delictual* behavior and breaching of contracts still need to think rigorously on these issues. If nothing more, the more rigorous thinking may at least shield the innocent from being fodder for the psychopath's agenda. To minimize the muddled thinking, it's necessary to look still more closely at the **jurisdictional** limits of the two mandates contained in Genesis 9:6, the first being the mandate against shedding human blood in the *negative-duty clause*, and the second being the mandate to execute justice against bloodshed in the *positive-duty clause*. **Jurisdictional** constraints clearly apply to both mandates.

Sub-Chapter 3: Quasi Ex Delicto / Quasi Ex Contractu

Now that it's obvious that the subject matter of the negative-duty clause is damage caused by one human party against another, it's necessary to ask if there are any other limitations on damage that need to be brought out in the open before concluding that enough has been said about the *negative-duty clause*. --- As already indicated, in western jurisprudence that goes back at least as far as early Christian antiquity, there are two predominant types of legal actions, actions ex delicto and actions ex contractu.¹ In addition to these two rationales for legal action, these ancient legal scholars also recognized actions quasi ex delicto and quasi ex contractu. These four origins of legal action were "apparently viewed as exhaustive" by some of these early jurists. This theodicy has already established that legal actions *ex delicto* and ex contractu certainly fall within the purview of the negative-duty clause. The question now is whether those two are exhaustive or not. If not, then are actions quasi ex delicto and quasi ex contractu included, or are there other obligations outside of **<u>natural obligations</u>** and contractual obligations that are *lawful* origins of legal actions, *i.e.*, that are genuine and cognizable sources of damage by one human against another?

Understood broadly, a legal action is merely where one party executes justice against another party. Because both legal actions *ex contractu* and legal actions

¹ "Viewed with reference to the facts on which the law operated to give Oligationes a binding force, Obligationes arose from Contract and Quasi Contract, and Delict ... and Quasi delict (Inst. 3 tit. 13). This division of Obligationes with respect to their origin was apparently viewed as exhaustive ... Gaius divides Obligationes into these: ex contractu and ex delicto; but he intends to comprehend the obligationes quasi ex contractu under those ex contractu, and obligationes quasi ex delicto under those ex delicto." --- **Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities**, p. 817. --- URL: http://www.ancientlibrary.com/smithdgra/0824.html.

ex delicto pertain to damage by one person against another, they both obviously fall within the subject matter of the *negative-duty clause*. One arises by way of a contractual obligation, and the other arises from a **natural obligation**.

So far it should be obvious that the subject matter of the negative-duty clause includes damage by one human or group of humans against another, and only damage by one human or group of humans against another. The clause does not specify whether the damage comes out of the breach of a contract or out of a *delict*. Nevertheless the negative-duty clause clearly includes both damage ex contractu and damage *ex delicto*. These two sources of damage must be distinguished because they have two distinctly different jurisdictions. Damage ex contractu exists immediately under the jurisdiction of the given contract, and mediately under Genesis 9:6. Damage ex delicto exists immediately under the jurisdiction of the negative-duty clause of the Genesis 9:6 term of the Noachian Covenant. --- But do these sources of damage fully exhaust Genesis 9:6 damage?¹ In other words, do (i)obligations that arise out of ordinary contracts and (ii)obligations to avoid perpetrating *delicts*, exhaust and encompass the entire subject matter of the *negative-duty clause*? The answer this theodicy is defending is "Yes, they do." But the answer in ancient jurisprudence, in the English common law, and in American law as it exists at this writing, is more ambiguous. Some legal authorities essentially say "No, contracts and *delicts* do not exhaust and encompass all the possible obligations in human law." Other authorities, like Gaius, say these two do exhaust all legal actions, but then they waffle in their definitions. Most modern legal professors don't even ask the question. This theodicy contends that the ancients, the English, and the Americans are all wrong about this. Their misunderstanding of these things was a source of jurisdictional dysfunction, and such dysfunction was a core issue in the demise of their respective civilizations. This theodicy will show that all sources of legal action other than ex delicto and ex contractu are jurisdictionally dysfunctional. Because of ignorance, because of a worship of the state as though the state were God, and because of numerous other motives, governments have been jurisdictionally

¹ One way one might become properly convinced that these two DO exhaust Genesis 9:6 damage is through the following line of reasoning: The only reason *delicts* by themselves do not exhaust Genesis 9:6 damage is because contracts set up their own **jurisdictional** boundaries that are by their nature different from the **jurisdictional** boundaries of *delicts*. *Delicts* are part of the subject matter of the Genesis 9 contract / biblical covenant. **Jurisdiction** is always a contractual issue, regardless of whether the contract is a biblical covenant or an ordinary contract. No *lawful* claim to **jurisdiction** exists except by way of contracts / covenants. Therefore, no other source of damage can exist because no other thing gives a different **jurisdiction**. **Jurisdiction** is uniquely an attribute of contracts / covenants.

<u>dysfunctional</u> as though such dysfunctionality were a basic attribute of all governments. **Jurisdictional dysfunctionality** is disastrous for the establishment and maintenance of reliable **<u>human law</u>** and reliable human government.

Genesis 9:6 clearly holds that legal actions should arise against people who damage other people. Clear thinking demands that such damage can happen either ex contractu or ex delicto. Extra-biblical Roman law also recognized the existence of obligations quasi ex delicto and quasi ex contractu.¹ To be certain that damage ex contractu and damage ex delicto exhaust the meaning of Genesis 9:6 damage, it will help to examine these *quasi* sources of legal action. Because these *quasi* sources of legal action exist in American law, at least to some extent and in some ways, and because there are other kinds of legal actions in the American system that are also not clearly either ex contractu or ex delicto -- like the trespass-free crimes cited above -- it will help to look generally at legal actions that are neither ex contractu nor ex delicto, as well as specifically at quasi ex delicto and quasi ex contractu. If noncontractual, non-delictual legal actions don't fall within the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage, then they are examples of *jurisdictional dysfunction*, like the *trespass*-free crimes examined above. If they do fit within the purview of Genesis 9:6 bloodshed, then the premise that damage must be either ex delicto or ex contractu may need to be modified.

Contained within the definition of *delict* in the law dictionary is a definition of *quasi delict*.

quasi delict --- A quasi delict in Roman law was an act whereby a person, without malice, but by fault, negligence, or imprudence not legally excusable, caused injury to another. They were four in number, viz.: (1) *Qui judex litem fecit*, being the offense of partiality or excess in the *judex* (juryman). (2) *Dejectum effusumve aliquid*, being the tort committed by one's servant in emptying or throwing something out of an attic or upper story upon a person passing beneath. (3) *Damnum infectum*, being the offense of hanging dangerous articles over the heads of persons passing along the king's highway. (4) Torts committed by one's agents in the course of their employment.²

While *delicts* can happen either with or without malice, a *quasi delict* can only happen "without malice". So a *delict* can happen when the perpetrator has a *mens rea*, a "guilty

¹ **Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities**, p. 819. --- URL: http://www. ancientlibrary.com/smith-dgra/0826.html.

² Black's 5th, pp. 384-385.

mind ... wrongful purpose",1 or when the perpetrator "without malice, but by fault, negligence, or imprudence not legally excusable, caused injury to another". A quasi *delict* can only include the latter. Because it appears that a *quasi delict* is included within the encompassing category of *delict*, it appears that a *quasi delict* is really a distinction without much of a difference. The apparent emphasis in Roman law was on these four offenses. But none of these offenses demands special treatment in modern law because in each, one person caused injury to another. Regardless of how the Roman legal system may have operated, in the American system, the mens rea is not as central. In both criminal and civil cases in the American system, the intent of the accused is taken into consideration when determining the penalty. But in the American system, ascertaining the existence of the damage and a causal connection between it and the accused is more crucial in both criminal and civil cases than mens rea. So in both the Roman system and the American system, a mens rea is not a prerequisite for the existence of a *delict*. This is true with regard to both *public* and private delicts. In the American system, for a private delict -- usually called a "tort" -- to exist, it's not usually necessary for the tort to be motivated by a mens rea. Negligence is usually a sufficient cause of damage for a tort to exist under American law. Even though the word *delict* is not commonly used in American law,² because a tort is largely the same as a *private delict*, it makes sense that a *private delict*, like a tort, would not categorically require a *mens rea*.

Because this theodicy is trying to discover the boundaries of Genesis 9:6 damage, according to the *negative-duty clause*, and because Genesis 9:6 bloodshed / damage doesn't require a *mens rea*, it makes sense that a *delict*, as defined by way of the biblical story, would not require a *mens rea*. So there is not really any need in this theodicy's definitions to distinguish a *delict* from a *quasi delict*, because a *quasi delict*, as defined by Roman law, is subsumed within this theodicy's definition of *delict*. So the term *quasi delict* marks a distinction without a difference. Likewise, a legal action *quasi ex delicto* doesn't exist under a reasonable reading of Genesis 9:6 because it is also a distinction without a difference. --- But *quasi contracts* are altogether different.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 889.

² It's normally used in "civil law" systems, meaning the legal systems that are direct heirs of Roman law, specifically, of the Code of Justinian. But American law is generally a common-law system. Even so, as indicated above, even in the American system, the word *delict* is generally recognized in *corpus delicti*, in distinguishing contract cases from non-contract cases in both civil and criminal cases (*ex contractu* v. *ex delicto*), and in distinguishing *public delicts* from *private delicts*.

According to the following definition, a *quasi contract* is based on a "legal fiction".

quasi contract --- Legal fiction invented by common law courts to permit recovery by contractual remedy in cases where, in fact, there is no contract, but where circumstances are such that justice warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise. It is not based on intention or consent of the parties, but is founded on considerations of justice and equity, and on doctrine of unjust enrichment. It is not in fact a contract, but an obligation which the law creates in absence of any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others have placed in the possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it. It is what was formerly known as the contract implied in law; it has no reference to the intentions or expressions of the parties. The obligation is imposed despite, and frequently in frustration of their intention.¹

All contracts are based on the consent of the people entering into the contract. This is true by the very definition of contract. So mutual consent is crucial to the formation of contracts. This is true of all *lawful* contracts. If one finds any contract about which this is not true, then that's a sign that the contract might not be *lawful*.² With all contracts except those designed to enforce the bloodshed mandate, the contract only has **in personam jurisdiction** over the people who enter the contract.³ If this weren't true, then it would be OK for people to be forced into contracts. But *lawful* contracts can only be entered voluntarily, intentionally, and knowingly.⁴ As indicated in the above definition, in existing legal systems, the *quasi contract* is an

1 Black's 5th, p. 293.

² As indicated above, there is tacit consent, and therefore mutual consent, in the biblical covenants that are **global**. There is also tacit and mutual consent in *de facto bailment* contracts that exist between parents and children, and between guardians and wards. The fact that consent in such contracts is tacit should be a warning to human enforcers that they need to tread lightly and carefully around such tacit agreements. **Jurisdiction** may or may not exist in such cases.

³ Contracts designed to enforce the bloodshed mandate, called **jural compacts** by this theodicy, are exceptional for reasons that are addressed below.

⁴ That's true for all contracts, including **jural compacts** and guardian-dependent *bailment* contracts. These *bailment* contracts are a bit peculiar and deserve special treatment, although they nevertheless DO ultimately follow the rule that contracts can only be entered voluntarily, intentionally, and knowingly. To examine the peculiarities in regard to **jural compacts**, see CHAPTER G, *Sub-Chapter 1, "Jural / Ecclesiastical*". To

exception to this rule. *Quasi contracts* are legal fictions that are created by secular governments in direct opposition to the will of one or more of the alleged parties.

If a contract is in writing, then it's obviously an *express contract*. If it's not in writing, but there are impartial witnesses to the oral contract, then this is also obviously an *express contract*. But if there is no writing, and there are no witnesses, then the court will have to depend on circumstantial evidence to determine whether there is a contract or not, and if there is, what its terms are. If the court finds that there is a contract, based entirely upon circumstantial evidence, then the court has found that there is a contract *implied in fact*. In this situation, the facts indicate that there is a contract, even though its existence is implicit, rather than express. Based on the above definition of *quasi contract*, it's clear that a court might also find that there is something called a contract *implied in law*.

express & implied contracts --- An express contract is an actual agreement of the parties, the terms of which are openly uttered or declared at the time of making it, being stated in distinct and explicit language, either orally or in writing.

An implied contract is one not created or evidenced by the explicit agreement of the parties, but inferred by the law, as a matter of reason and justice from their acts or conduct, the circumstances surrounding the transaction making it a reasonable, or even a necessary, assumption that a contract existed between them by tacit understanding.

Implied contracts are sometimes subdivided into those "implied in fact" and those "implied in law," the former being covered by the definition just given, while the latter are obligations imposed upon a person by the law, not in pursuance of his intention and agreement, either expressed or implied, but even against his will and design, because the circumstances between the parties are such as to render it just that the one should have a right, and the other a corresponding liability, similar to those which would arise from a contract between them. This kind of obligation therefore rests on the principle that whatsoever it is certain a man ought to do that the law will suppose him to have promised to do. And hence it is said that, while the liability of a party to an express contract arises directly from the contract, it is just the reverse in the case of a contract "implied in law," the contract there being implied or arising from the liability. ... But obligations of this kind are not properly contracts at all,

examine these peculiarities in regard to guardian-dependent *bailment* contracts, see A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood.

and should not be so denominated. There can be no true contract without a mutual and concurrent intention of the parties. Such obligations are more properly described as "quasi contracts". See Constructive contract¹

An ordinary contract is clearly either *express* or *implied in fact*. In an ordinary contract, the contract is always a function of consent, and the contract's liabilities and obligations always arise out of that consent. This is because a contract is by definition an agreement. But in a *quasi contract | contract implied in law*, the obligation does not arise out of consent. It arises out of a presumed obligation. The obligation in question is therefore like a **natural obligation** that exists as a necessary outgrowth of **natural rights**. If these are in fact **natural obligations**, then there is no good reason to confuse them with contractual obligations. If these are not **natural obligations**, and they are also not contractual obligations, then their existence poses a huge question: Where, precisely, do these obligations come from?

constructive contract --- A species of contracts which arise, not from the intent of the parties, but from the operation of law to avoid an injustice. These are sometimes referred to as quasi contracts or contracts implied in law as contrasted with contracts implied in fact which are real contracts expressing the intent of the parties by conduct rather than by words. ... An obligation created by law for reasons of justice without regard to expressions of assent by either words or acts.²

So *constructive contract, quasi contract,* and *contract implied in law* are different expressions that all mean the same thing. They are all based on a concept of justice in which choice / agreement / consent is overridden by the court for the sake of satisfying an obligation manufactured by the court. The obligation does not arise contractually, and it does not arise for the sake of protecting **natural rights**. It's based entirely upon a *legal fiction*. These are not real contracts because the mutual intent, assent, and consent of the parties is missing. Rather than consent giving rise to a contract, and the contract giving rise to mutual obligations, the law presumes the existence of an obligation, then pretends that a contract exists even though there is no factual evidence to support the court's pretense.

To get to the bottom of where these fictitious obligations come from, it may help to look more closely at the definition of *legal fiction*. *Quasi contracts, constructive contracts,* and *contracts implied in law* are all *legal fictions,* and these *legal fictions* are based on "justice and equity, and [the] doctrine of unjust enrichment".

¹ Black's 5th, pp. 292-293; emphases added.

² Black's 5th, p. 284.

legal fiction --- Assumption of fact made by court as basis for deciding a legal question. A situation contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter, though it need not be created improperly; *e.g.*, fiction of lost grant as basis for title by adverse possession.¹

fiction of law --- An assumption or supposition of law that something which is or may be false is true, or that a state of facts exists which has never really taken place. An assumption for purposes of justice, or a fact that does not or may not exist. A rule of law which assumes as true, and will not allow to be disproved, something which is false, but not impossible. ...

These assumptions are of an innocent or even beneficial character and are made for the advancement of the ends of justice. They secure this end chiefly by the extension of procedure from cases to which it is applicable to other cases to which it is not strictly applicable, the ground of inapplicability being some difference of an immaterial character.²

<u>fictio legis neminem laedit</u> --- A fiction of law injures no one. 3 Bl.Comm. 43.³

It's obvious that a *legal fiction* is at least potentially false. But it's a probable falsehood that has good intentions. By way of *legal fiction*, the law is resorting to fantasy to achieve justice and equity. Rather than genuinely achieving justice and equity, the courts are practicing **jurisdictional dysfunction** at the expense of reason and justice. As indicated in the definitions, one of the pretenses they are using to achieve this **jurisdictional dysfunction** is the *doctrine of unjust enrichment*.

unjust enrichment, doctrine of --- General principle that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for property or benefits received, retained or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly. ... Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. ... Thus one who has conferred a benefit upon another solely

¹ Black's 5th, p. 804.

² Black's 5th, p. 562.

³ Black's 5th, p. 562.

because of a basic mistake of fact induced by a nondisclosure is entitled to restitution on above doctrine.¹

When a court cites this doctrine to rationalize its judgment in a law suit, this doctrine stands as a claim by the court that the intentions behind this *legal fiction* are so good that they justify the false means by which the ends are achieved. Situations in which the *doctrine of unjust enrichment* and *quasi contract* are claimed as a litigant's legal theory are similar to the *trespass*-free crimes cited above. --- *Trespass*-free crimes may be genuinely *mala in se*. But they do not cause damage that is cognizable in a secular court, *i.e.*, a court designed to execute justice immediately under Genesis 9:6. So such a court is not the right place to execute justice against *trespass*-free *mala in se*. In other words, such a court lacks **jurisdiction** over the subject matter. *Trespass*-free *mala in se* need to be addressed in religious courts, or through other mechanisms. In a Christian court where the court genuinely has **jurisdiction** by way of the accused's prior agreement, a finding against a perpetrator of such a *trespass*-free crime is justified and **jurisdictionally** sound. But in a secular court, the damage cannot be found at all, and there is therefore no proximate linkage between the presumed crime and the non-existent damage.

The situation with respect to quasi contracts | unjust enrichment is similar to trespass-free crimes. Trespass-free crimes are prosecuted as though they were public delicts. Quasi contract | unjust enrichment cases are prosecuted as though they were private delicts. Other than this difference, the situations are similar. To show how quasi contract | unjust enrichment works, this theodicy will present a hypothetical case. This case is simple for the sake of showing the underlying characteristics of *unjust enrichment.*² But there's one more important thing to notice before going into this hypothetical case. If *legal fictions* exist that genuinely and *lawfully* give rise to quasi contracts, then the idea that legal actions are limited to being ex contractu and ex delicto is shot. If quasi contracts exist in reliable jurisprudence, then some legal actions in such jurisprudence are neither ex contractu nor ex delicto. Legal fictions, unjust enrichment, and quasi contracts are therefore an obstacle to any effort at trying to build rational and reliable jurisprudence based upon the biblical covenants. That's because it becomes extremely difficult to see how the quasi contract syndrome relates to a rational reading of Genesis 9:6. If the quasi-contract legal theory is valid in secular courts, then irrationality is built into secular jurisprudence.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1377.

² Anyone who wants to look at real cases should know that screeds of such opinions are easily accessible at Google Scholar (URL: http://scholar.google.com). Choose "Legal opinions and journals" and "Advanced Scholar Search". Search for "quasi contract' 'unjust enrichment'" in any one of the fifty States.

The core problem with the quasi contract | unjust enrichment | legal fiction syndrome is that within a secular jurisdiction, the end doesn't justify the means in such cases. An obligation is created out of nothing so that the court can enforce its preconceived vision of justice and equity. The court then imposes this obligation in violation of both reason and sound jurisdictions. --- This syndrome entered into the English common law through the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan, 1760.1 This doctrine relies heavily upon the myth that human government has been explicitly ordained by God. It has not. God has explicitly ordained human law. Humans then devise human governments to implement human law because they're convinced that governments are necessary to administer the law. But human governments are *lawful* only to the extent that their laws are consistent with the biblical prescription of human law. Quasi contracts, legal fictions, and unjust enrichment fail this sniff test. Like trespass-free crimes, these actions are relics from the days when every nation had its state religion. This whole issue reduces to a question of whether it's appropriate to enforce Christianity with the sword, meaning against people who are not Christians.

How can the *unjust enrichment | quasi contract | legal fiction* syndrome exist within the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage? It cannot. Therefore, it is outside the Bible's **global** prescription of **human law**. It is an act by human government of usurping God's authority as the enforcer of **natural law**. It is therefore government trying to set itself up as God, trying to replace God, based on a combination of good intentions and fantasy / delusion. --- The victim of *unjust enrichment* is certainly damaged. But the question demands an answer: Who caused the damage? If there is a clear causal linkage between the beneficiary / defendant (B) and the damage suffered by the damaged party / plaintiff (A), then there is no need to resort to *legal fictions*, because the causal connection is a fact. The reason this fiction gets created is precisely because there is no causal connection between A's loss and B's gain. An outside observer presumes that A should be the owner, even though A lacks possession.

¹ *Moses v. Macferlan*, King's Bench 2 Burrow 1005 (1760) --- URL: http://www.justis. com/titles/english-reports.html. --- Also see, Arthur M. Cathcart, A.B.; "The Law of Quasi-Contracts", Chapter 1, "Nature and Extent of Quasi-Contractual Obligations", vol. 7, p. 363; **Modern American Law: A Systematic and Comprehensive Commentary on the Fundamental Principles of American Law and Procedure, Accompanied by Leading Illustrative Cases and Legal Forms, with a Revised Edition of Blackstone's Commentaries**, 15 vols., edited by Eugene Allen Gilmore and William Charles Wermuth, 1914, Blackstone Institute, Chicago.

Hypothetical case: Suppose someone called "Finder" lives near a lake in one of the fifty States. Suppose this lake does not have any navigable inlets or outlets, and is not under an "admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction". Suppose issues like boat traffic, algae control, pier size, pollution control, and other such issues are governed by a private consortium of concerned citizens, and the lake is considered by all to be a commons.

While canoeing across the lake one evening, Finder discovers a plastic bag floating on the surface. He picks it up for the sake of removing litter. When he gets back to shore, he opens the bag to see what it is before throwing it in the dumpster. In the bag he finds about \$100,000 in *Federal Reserve Notes* (*frns*). Over the next couple of days, Finder thinks hard about what he's going to do with this money. On his third day of having this cache of *frns*, Finder sees a notice in a local newspaper in which somebody named "Loser" begs for the return of what he claims is his money. Finder thinks about it and decides he'd rather keep it. He thinks, "I didn't steal it. I found it on the commons. That's Loser's tough luck."

After a couple of weeks, Loser somehow discovers that Finder has the *frns*. So Loser *sues* Finder in a local court for recovery of the *frns*. Loser knows from talking to his lawyer that in the *de facto* legal system, Loser has no cause of action against Finder based upon a contract, because there is no real contract between Loser and Finder; and Loser has no cause of action against Finder based upon a *delict* (a tort), because Finder has done nothing to damage Loser. But to Loser's great relief, Loser's lawyer has a cause of action that he guarantees will work. Based upon the doctrine of *unjust enrichment*, Loser's lawyer will claim that there is a fictitious contract, a *legal fiction* called a *quasi contract* between Finder and Loser, and based upon Finder's breach of this fictitious contract, the court should order Finder to return the *frns* to Loser. If Loser can prove that he owned the *frns* before he lost them, and if he can give a reasonable explanation for how they came to be floating on the lake, then the court should issue an order for Finder to return the *frns*.

When Finder is served a summons and complaint indicating that he's being sued by Loser, he does a little legal research to see if there's any way to beat Loser in court. From his perspective, Finder is being *coerced* into a *fictional* contract by the *police powers* of the court. From his perspective, *coercion* is always wrong except when it's used against criminals, or to collect reasonable taxes. Finder knows he's not a criminal. Finder thinks that if Loser wants those *frns* so much, then he should have kept a better grip on them. To Finder, this *fiction of law* is in fact injuring him by depriving him of his rightfully acquired windfall. After all, the maxim of law

says, "A fiction of law injures no one".¹ But now the court is enabling Loser to injure Finder through court-ordered *coercion*.

According to the *de facto* legal system, when this controversy comes before the court, any claim by Finder that he is being *coerced* into a *fictitious* contract will be ignored. As far as the court is concerned, Loser's *legal fiction* trumps Finder's claim of *coercion*. The court will follow long-standing precedent, which holds that *fictions of law* "are of an innocent or even beneficial character, and are made for the advancement of the ends of justice".² The court will hold that the fact that there is no contract or consent is "immaterial".

In Finder's view, creating legal fictions for the sake of procuring justice is equivalent to claiming that the end justifies the means, when the means are a fantasy enforced with the court's sword. Tyrants have used such logic for millennia to pursue their special visions of justice. Besides, in Finder's view, the court is forcing Finder to violate his religion. According to his religion, people who are not participants in his religion are inherently decadent. Finder is convinced that he's been a law-abiding citizen of the U.S.A. for most of his life, but now the court is forcing him to make a choice between abiding by his religion and abiding by the law. According to his religion, contact with people outside his religion, and assistance to them, should be minimized. After finding the frns, he decided to keep the frns instead of trying to find the previous owner because he saw no reason to return them. When Loser sued Finder in a presumably secular court on *unjust enrichment | quasi* contract / legal fiction grounds, and the supposedly secular court found in Loser's favor, Finder felt compelled to defend his religious convictions on 1st Amendment grounds. The court ordered Finder to give the frns to Loser. Finder believed that the court was violating his *free exercise* of religion, and he believed that the court was simultaneously violating the 1st Amendment's establishment clause, by coercing him to behave like a Christian. Finder was convinced that the court was trying to force him into acting like a "good Samaritan". But the court followed precedent and ruled against Finder's religion-clause arguments.

In most Judeo-Christian belief systems, the right thing to do is to return the *frns* to Loser. But in Finder's religion, refusing to return the *frns* was the right thing to do. Given that the only **human laws** prescribed by the Bible for the entire human race are the positive and negative duties that arise out of Genesis 9:6 and that pertain to the initiation of damage against other people, the right thing for the court to do is to allow Finder to follow his conscience regarding the *frns*, rather than to order

¹ Black's 5th, p. 562.

² Blacks 5th, p. 562.

coercion against him. The secular court should do its duty under **globally** prescribed **human law**. Operating according to biblically prescribed **jurisdictional** boundaries also happens to be the Christian thing to do. Under a contract administering **local** Christian law, if Finder were under such a **jurisdiction** through his prior consent, then the proper thing to do would be to return the *frns* to Loser. But of course this secular court does not have such a **jurisdiction**.

This case shows how feeble the *unjust enrichment | quasi contract | legal fiction* legal theory is. Although the Christian thing to do is for Finder to return the *frns* to Loser, for a secular court to use *police powers* to force a non-Christian to follow Christian ethics is inherently non-Christian, and even anti-Christian. This fact becomes even more conspicuous when this case is examined from a Marxist perspective.

If one asks any dedicated student of communism what maxim stands above all others in Karl Marx's system, the student will answer: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Anyone dedicated to Christian standards of morality who doesn't understand that this adage comes from someone who was a hardened atheist and materialist, may be prone to assuming that the adage is calling people to be generous to one-another. After all, doesn't this Marxist maxim merely recommend the spirit of community described in the 2nd chapter of Acts? ---- "And all those who had believed were together and had all things in common; and they began selling their property and possessions and were sharing them with all, as anyone might have need." (vv. 44-45). ---- The answer to this question is plainly "No!". The Marxist maxim doesn't merely recommend Christian generosity. The Marxist system recommends forced generosity, rather than voluntary generosity. Although most *quasi contract | unjust enrichment* cases are much more complex than this, the bottom line in the opinions in such cases is that they generally follow Marx, not Christ.

Christian generosity exists within the context of the biblical covenants, while Marxist generosity does not. Marxist generosity violates **global jurisdictions**, while genuinely Christian generosity does not. One generates a system of totalitarian bloodshed. The other does the opposite. One presumes to steal from one for the sake of providing benefits to another, while the other does not. One perpetrates *delicts* under *color of law*, under the pretense of generosity, while the other avoids the perpetration of *delicts* entirely. One operates on voluntarism and consent. The other ignores consent and relegates voluntarism to a Siberian gulag. If people adhere to the Marxist maxim without also being mindful of the distinction between the **global** and **local jurisdictions** of the biblical covenants, then they are inevitably dedicated to designing and supporting a system of government that institutionalizes the perpetration of *delicts* against its own people.

These facts about the Marxist maxim apply equally to the doctrine of *unjust enrichment*. They apply to *contracts implied in law* and *legal fictions* in general. If these legal concepts are not judiciously contained within overarching **jurisdictions** that honor consent, then they inherently lead to abuse of power, and they put a government stamp of approval on government-sponsored bloodshed.

Legal fictions are unnecessary, because operating according to biblical **jurisdictions** makes them unnecessary. *Legal fictions* are expedient when a certain remedy is needed to procure justice, but the facts in a case don't readily call forth the remedy, and the judge is left resorting to judicial sophistry in order to procure the desired remedy. Adherence to reliable **jurisdictions** eliminates this problem. *Legal fictions* exist because of legal deficiencies, in other words, because of defects in the law. They are an *ad hoc*, interim measure set in place to await the establishment of reliable **jurisdictions**.

Recognition of reliable **jurisdictions** makes the *contract implied in law* unnecessary for several reasons: (1st)because reliable **jurisdictions** derive from contracts and compacts that are *implied* or *expressed* in fact, not concocted out of thin air; (2nd)because the *contract implied in law* is inherently *unlawful* because it involves government-perpetrated *delicts*; (3rd)because all taxing and taking that is outside the *lawful* **jurisdictions** of *lawful* contracts is inherently government-perpetrated *delicts*; (ard)because *coercing* conformity to a *quasi contract* on the basis of *unjust enrichment*; is always forcing people to be generous, the same way all good Bolsheviks forced people to be generous. Forced generosity is never genuine generosity, and like all *delicts*, it generates blowback of some kind or another.

Whenever a case of *unjust enrichment* arises, where neither *delict* nor contract exists, it arises in the moral sphere, subject to the moral-law leg of the <u>natural</u> <u>law</u>, but outside the scope of biblically prescribed <u>human law</u>. The <u>natural law</u> may command all people to be generous. But being forced with bloodshed to be generous is entirely different from voluntary generosity. This is true regardless of whether church, state, economic entity, or individual initiates the bloodshed.¹ In

¹ It's perfectly *lawful* for a <u>religious social compact</u> to have rules regarding generosity. Assuming that all parties to the <u>religious social compact</u> are party by consent, for the <u>religious social compact</u> to hold the *unjust enrichment* doctrine, or the Marxist maxim, or any number of other precepts or principles, as a foundation for its <u>social compact</u>, is

both the case of the Marxist maxim and the case of *unjust enrichment*, the State is turned into a thief that redistributes wealth to whomever it chooses. If presumably *secular* courts were genuinely and consistently *secular*, they would not adhere to the doctrine of *unjust enrichment*; and they would not force people to be generous; and they would not violate the religious beliefs of people like Finder.¹

To summarize, in an effort at showing that damage ex contractu and damage ex delicto fully exhaust the meaning of Genesis 9:6 damage, this "Quasi Ex Delicto / Quasi Ex Contractu" section has examined legal actions quasi ex delicto and quasi ex contractu. This section has shown that quasi ex delicto is an irrelevant category because it is already encompassed by the definition of *delict* that exists inherently in Genesis 9:6. The section has also shown that legal actions quasi ex contractu are inherently jurisdictionally dysfunctional, like trespass-free crimes. But trespass-free crimes and quasi contracts in no way encompass the myriad mechanisms through which human governments perpetrate jurisdictional dysfunctionality. As this biblical story of the redemption of human law continues, legal actions and government actions that are neither ex delicto nor ex contractu will be examined in passing, to show that all actions besides these two are ultra vires, meaning outside the lawful scope of the **<u>global</u>** prescription of <u>human law</u>. Contracts and *delicts* exhaust the subject-matter scope of the negative-duty clause because if there is genuine damage caused by one party against another, where the damage does not arise out of the breach of a contract that presumably binds the parties, and where the damage is encompassed by the general categories of death, damage, and/or injury, then the damage is by definition *delictual*.

1 All the present *secular* governments in the *united States* are inherently <u>secular social</u> <u>compacts</u> because of their professed adherence to the 1st Amendment. As such, their primary duty is **jural**, meaning that they exist to protect property rights above all other considerations. At present, these <u>secular social compacts</u> are operating under the pretense that they are <u>religious social compacts</u>, evidenced by the fact that they force people to conform to laws against *mala prohibita* while many people have never consented to such *mala prohibita*. All these <u>secular social compacts</u> are therefore also violating the 1st Amendment by attempting to *establish* some kind of nebulous religion.

perfectly *lawful* -- as long as consent is honored, and *delicts* are avoided. But under a <u>secular social compact</u> that attempts to create a *lawful* umbrella for numerous <u>religious</u> <u>social compacts</u>, neither the *unjust enrichment* doctrine nor the Marxist maxim is a *lawful* foundation for <u>secular human law</u>. This is because <u>secular social compacts</u> by definition have <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> over all kinds of people, so that unanimous consent will virtually never exist.

Sub-Chapter 4: Conclusion

In conclusion to this investigation into the subject matter of the negative-duty clause, there is one sure argument proving that damage ex delicto and damage ex contractu fully exhaust the meaning of Genesis 9:6 damage: The only reason delicts by themselves do not exhaust Genesis 9:6 damage is because contracts set up their own jurisdictional boundaries that are inherently unique. Delicts -- meaning human-caused damage that arises outside the boundaries of ordinary contracts -are under the immediate jurisdiction of the Noachian Covenant. But damage that arises contractually is mediated by the *jurisdiction* defined by the contract. Contractual damage is certainly under the **jurisdiction** of the **Noachian Covenant** because it is damage to one person's primary or secondary property caused by another person, but such damage is mediated by the contract. Genesis 9:6 damage is limited to damage ex delicto and damage ex contractu because jurisdiction is always a contractual issue. No *lawful* claim to jurisdiction exists except by way of contracts / covenants / biblical covenants. Jurisdiction is inherently contractual. This is true in the Bible, and because it's true in the Bible, it should be acknowledged as true in human jurisprudence. No other source of damage can exist because nothing but contracts / covenants / biblical covenants can define a jurisdiction different from the Noachian Covenant. So trespass-free mala in se are outside the purview of Genesis 9:6 damage, except when a contract subject to an action ex contractu has terms proscribing one or more trespass-free mala in se. Because legal actions ex contractu and ex delicto utterly exhaust the lawful subject-matter jurisdiction of all lawful human law, and because trespass-free mala in se and delict-free mala in se are essentially the same thing, henceforth, for simplicity, this theodicy will call trespass-free mala in se "delict-free mala in se". All human actions that are mala in se violate the moral-law leg of the **natural law** tripod. But only *mala in se* that are also delicts are always violations of **natural rights**. The subject matter of the negative*duty clause* is limited to violations of **<u>natural rights</u>** that clearly damage primary or secondary property, and violations of contractual obligations.¹

¹ **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood** argues that <u>**natural rights**</u> consist of not merely primary property and secondary property, but also private jurisdiction. Although the remainder of this theodicy doesn't get this technical on this front, the cautious reader should assume that <u>**natural rights**</u> includes private jurisdiction.

This theodicy has already presented a preliminary claim that the <u>in personam</u> jurisdiction of the Genesis 9:6 prescription of <u>human law</u> covers the entire human race since the promulgation of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>. But there are two mandates in Genesis 9:6. The first mandate is to avoid damaging other people. The second is to execute justice against people who damage other people. Because there are two different mandates existing in two different clauses, it's important to look specifically at the <u>jurisdiction</u> of each mandate to make sure the biblical story is being told correctly. As indicated above, ascertaining the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the *negative-duty clause* should begin by ascertaining the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> as a whole.

Genesis 9:17 indicates that the Noachian Covenant is between God and "all flesh that is on the earth". Genesis 9:9 indicates that this covenant is between God and Noah and all of Noah's descendants. Genesis 9:12 indicates that this covenant is between God and Noah and "every living creature that is with you, for all generations". Genesis 9:13 indicates that the Noachian Covenant is between God and the earth. --- This biblical covenant may be between God and all of creation, but because the current concern is with **<u>human law</u>**, humans are the focus. Reading strictly to determine what humans are party to the Noachian Covenant, it's clear that all humans who survived the deluge, and all their descendants forever into the future, are party to the Noachian Covenant. This is true regardless of whether people cognitively consent to being party or not. As already indicated, in the same way that God forms humans in the womb without any consent from the newly conceived human, and therefore the consent to conception is tacitly given by the newly conceived, consent in the Noachian Covenant is also tacit because the covenant operates at a level so rudimentary that it exists beyond the human capacity to agree, disagree, or even choose.

Focusing specifically on the *negative-duty clause*, the **in personam jurisdiction** is clearly "Whoever" within this larger population. The larger population is the entire human race since promulgation. The "Whoever" subset of this larger population is defined by the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the *negative-duty clause*, which has already been addressed. So while the *prima facie* **in personam jurisdiction** of the *negative-duty clause* is also all people, a second glance shows that the **personal jurisdiction** is limited by the subject matter. The subject matter limits the overall **personal jurisdiction** to anyone who has allegedly perpetrated damage against someone else. The subject matter limits the **jurisdiction** as a whole, at least of the

negative-duty clause. The *prima facie* <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> may include the entire human race, but it really only includes any human who allegedly perpetrates damage against another person. So the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the *negative-duty clause* is limited to alleged perpetrators.¹

As already indicated, if the damages that arise from violating the negativeduty clause arise by way of a contract, then the contract, rather than the Noachian Covenant, has original jurisdiction. In other words, if someone is damaged by way of a breached contract, then whoever enforces against the breaching party needs to look first to the contract for a remedy, rather than to enforce against the damage as though the contract didn't exist. This is because contracts, by their very nature, define their own jurisdictions. The in personam jurisdiction of a contract exclusively includes whoever is a party to the contract. The subject-matter jurisdiction of a contract is defined by the obligations imposed by the contract, which includes whatever penalties and remedies that may be imposed by the contract's terms. The **territorial** jurisdiction of the contract is defined by whatever territorial limitations are placed on the contract according to where the contract is supposed to be implemented, in operation, and/or enforced.² Because contractual obligations define human laws, and because humans have a **natural right** to contract that is inherently as much a natural right as the right to own property, wherever damage arises from a breached contract, the contract has original jurisdiction. This means that whenever damage by one person against another arises out of a breached contract, the contract is a limitation on the subject-matter, in personam, and geographical jurisdiction of the 9:6 negative-duty clause.

Before migrating from expounding the **jurisdictional** boundaries of the Genesis 9:6 *negative-duty clause* into expounding the **jurisdictional** boundaries of the Genesis 9:6 *positive-duty clause*, it's important to reinforce one fact regarding **in personam jurisdiction**. --- The *negative-duty clause* has a **global in personam**

¹ This limitation on the **jurisdiction** is limited still further by the requirement that the damage be recognized as coming either from a *delict* or from the breach of a contract. If the damage comes from a *delict*, then the damage arises from murder, rape, kidnapping, theft, fraud, or any number of other non-contractual damages that people can suffer at the hands of other people. Such damages may be non-contractual, but they are not non-covenantal. This is because such damages are a breach of the Genesis 9:6 term of the **Noachian Covenant**.

² Based on the discovery that property is absolutely crucial to human nature according to the **global** covenant, it is crucial to include **territorial jurisdiction** as indispensable to establishing **jurisdiction**. Because **geographical jurisdiction** is relatively trivial, it doesn't require the same focus and attention as **personal** and **subject-matter jurisdictions**.

jurisdiction, while the **local** covenants have a **local in personam jurisdiction**, except to the extent that they inherit the Genesis 9:6 mandate as terms of the **local** covenants.

Part II, Chapter C, Personal Jurisdiction of Negative Duty

Chapter D:

Territorial Jurisdiction of the Negative-Duty Clause

Based on the discovery that property is absolutely crucial to human nature according to the **global** covenant, it is crucial to include **territorial jurisdiction** as indispensable to establishing **jurisdiction**. Because **geographical jurisdiction** is relatively trivial, it doesn't require the same focus and attention as **personal** and **subject-matter jurisdictions**. Even so, before focusing on the *positive-duty clause* of Genesis 9:6, this theodicy should say one more thing about the **territorial jurisdiction** of the **Noachian Covenant**. Although the earth is included as a party to the covenant, the covenant has **in personam jurisdiction** over all humans, wherever humans go, the **territorial jurisdiction** of this covenant follows. So moon walkers and space-station occupants don't escape the **jurisdiction** of ordinary contracts can be this elastic.

Part II, Chapter D, Territorial Jurisdiction of Negative Duty

Chapter E: The Positive-Duty Clause in General

The positive-duty clause of the Genesis 9:6 mandate says, "By man his blood shall be shed". As already mentioned, "shall" indicates that this clause is mandatory. All human beings are mandated to execute justice against the "Whoever" indicated in the negative-duty clause. Even though the negative-duty clause has prima facie personal jurisdiction over all people, its personal jurisdiction is really limited to people who allegedly damage other people, either ex delicto or ex contractu. Likewise, the *prima facie* **personal jurisdiction** of the *positive-duty clause* is also over all people. All human beings are thereby mandated to execute justice against "Whoever sheds man's blood". This raises huge questions that revolve primarily around capacity and willingness. Are infants required to execute justice? What about invalids? If the perpetrator is a large group of people working as a unit, is one person supposed to execute justice against the whole group? What does it mean to execute justice? Is the execution of justice under this mandate limited to a retributive subject matter (due to the fact that this clause appears to be focused not so much on the execution of justice as on blood-for-blood retribution, which is equivalent to eye-for-eye, tooth-for-tooth, lex talionis retribution)? If so, then how does one execute retributive justice against a kid who just stole a piece of bubble gum? Is the *positive-duty clause* demanding the execution of the kind of retributive justice portrayed in the famous youtube video of the Iranian 10-year-old boy having his forearm ceremoniously crushed under a car for stealing a loaf of bread?

Obviously, there are huge questions involved in defining both the **in personam jurisdiction** and the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of this *positive-duty clause*. Both are extremely dependent upon the distinction between **natural law** and the biblical prescription of **human law**. --- Finding the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the *positiveduty clause* is equivalent to answering two questions: (a)What penalty is required against the "Whoever" who violates the *negative-duty clause*? (b)Who, specifically, is the "Whoever" who violates the *negative-duty clause*? The answers revolve around three things: (i)They revolve around the explanatory power of substituting "life" for "blood": By man his life shall be shed. (ii)They revolve around keeping the *positive-duty clause* within the spirit of the *motive clause*, "For in the image of God He made man". (iii)They revolve around properly understanding the **in personam jurisdiction** of the *negative-duty clause* is equivalent to answering the question, Who is supposed to execute justice, enforce, adjudicate, *etc.*, against the "Whoever" who violates the *negative-duty clause*? The answer revolves around two other things: (i)It revolves around the **<u>natural right</u>**, even the need, to contract. (ii)It revolves around the need to distinguish damage *ex delicto* from damage *ex contractu*. Within the context of the <u>**Noachian Covenant**</u>, the *prima facie* <u>**in personam jurisdiction**</u> of the *positive-duty clause* may indeed be over all people. But how all people are supposed to execute such justice is a huge issue. It is one of the core problems at the root of every human government. This is precisely why this theodicy will spend so much time henceforth focused on this issue.

PART II, THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

Chapter F: Subject Matter of Positive-Duty Clause (nature of the penalties against "Whoever")

Each of the biblical covenants is "eternal", which means, among other things, that the terms are intended by the divine author to be meaningful to people in both ancient and modern times, and at all times in between. It's in the nature of progressive revelation that subsequent special revelations of **natural law** should assist in the proper understanding of both previous special revelations and general revelation. For anyone who takes the biblical covenants seriously, it's inevitable that progressive revelation would influence one's worldview in the direction of seeing an intimate nexus between special revelation, general revelation, and science. In fact, for such a person, the basic mental processes involved in science and Bible study are essentially the same, meaning that both involve both inductive and deductive processes.

While scientists take nature, meaning general revelation, as the subject about which they induce hypotheses, which they then test against whatever evidence they can gather from nature, biblical theologians take the Bible as the subject about which they induce hypotheses, which they then test against both biblical evidence and evidence from general revelation. Since God created both nature and the Bible, and thereby reveals himself both generally and specially, it's reasonable that the theologian would draw from both sources, and operate in both arenas, as long as his allegiance is primarily to the biblical covenants.

Given that this is the basic lay of the land for people who believe that they are party to one or more of the biblical covenants, it's reasonable that such people in modern times might find new meanings in the terms of ancient biblical covenants, meanings that have been embedded in the text since the beginning, where these meanings were overlooked in earlier times because these meanings were not relevant to them then, although such meanings are extremely relevant to modern circumstances. As long as these newly induced meanings do no violence to any part of the biblical text, and as long as they can be seen to genuinely exist in the biblical text, it's reasonable that modern people would take these meanings seriously. --- These ideas about interpretational policy are extremely pertinent to the modern understanding of Genesis 9:6, including to determining the subject matter of the *positive-duty clause*.

PART II, CHAPTER F, SUBJECT MATTER OF THE POSITIVE DUTY

By saying, "Whoever sheds man's blood, By man his blood shall be shed", the Bible is setting up a proportionality. But this is not the normal way that this verse has been interpreted historically. On its face, it appears that this is a plain statement of the *lex talionis*. The *lex talionis* is an ancient legal principle that appears in numerous legal systems, both ancient and modern:

lex talionis --- The law of retaliation; which requires that the infliction upon a wrongdoer of the same injury which he has caused to another.¹

The *lex talionis* mandates injury for injury. As such the *lex talionis* is not a proportionality, but is rather a one-to-one correspondence. This theodicy contends that the proper interpretation of Genesis 9:6 is as a proportionality, like this:

victim's shed blood		perpetrator's shed blood
	=	
victim's total blood		perpetrator's total blood

Claiming that this is a proportionality rather than a one-to-one correspondence may appear at first to be an arbitrary assumption imposed upon the text. In fact, it's no more arbitrary to assume that this is a proportionality than it is to assume that it's a one-to-one correspondence. This is akin to the difference between the assumption that Genesis 9:6 blood is literal blood, versus the conviction that it is metaphorical. For reasons scattered throughout this entire theodicy, this theodicy holds both that the blood is metaphorical and that the shed blood of both victim and perpetrator are proportional, and not merely a one-to-one correspondence. Some people who insist that Genesis 9:6 is a statement of the *lex talionis* may do so because they insist that Genesis 9:6 is a precursor to the *lex talionis* clearly mandated in the **Mosaic Covenant**. They might see a conflict between the proportionality claim and the **Mosaic Covenant**.

As secondary cause in the authorship of the *Torah*, Moses was the author of the four books of the *Torah* that contain the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> as surely as he was the author of Genesis. The <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> certainly contains the *lex talionis*, or at least that has been the accepted interpretation since numerous centuries before the Christian era. So why should anyone think that Genesis 9:6 is not also a statement of the *lex talionis*? Here is a sample of the *lex talionis* in the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>:

But if there is *any further* injury, then you shall appoint *as a penalty* life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise. (Exodus $21:23-25)^2$

¹ Black's 5th, p. 822.

² See also Leviticus 24:19-20; Deuteronomy 19:21.

This shows that the **Mosaic Covenant** certainly gives the appearance of containing the *lex talionis*, this one-to-one correspondence. But the **Mosaic Covenant** also certainly contained restitution,¹ which vitiates any claim that Mosaic law is based entirely on the *lex talionis*. --- The claim that God, through Moses, prescribed a proportionality as the basis for **global human law**, rather than the one-to-one correspondence of the *lex talionis*, appears to be contradicted by the interpretational policy outlined above, that subsequent revelations of **natural law** should assist in the interpretation of prior revelations. In progressive revelation, subsequent revelation should act to clarify the meaning of prior revelations. As is clear in this passage from Exodus, the **Mosaic Covenant**'s prescription of the *lex talionis* is so clearly one-to-one correspondence, that proportionality does not seem to be in view in this passage at all, and this appears to vitiate the interpretational policy. --- This theodicy holds that it does NOT vitiate the interpretational policy, for reasons that are made clear below.

In ancient law, both biblical and extra-biblical, the *lex talionis*, law of retaliation, was a crucial aspect of the execution of justice. But as legal systems have matured, or have become more decadent, depending upon one's perspective, they have generally tended to de-emphasize the law of retaliation. This erosion of the lex talionis, and replacement of it with restitution, exile, outlawry, and numerous other mechanisms, tends to happen largely because, when the offense is not actually murder, the one-toone correspondence tends to become easily skewed. For example, if the perpetrator has one eye, and the victim just lost one of his two eyes to the perpetrator's act, then after the execution of the *lex talionis*, the victim will be left with one eye, and the perpetrator will be left utterly blind. To lose one eye is to lose one's depth perception. To lose both eyes is to lose sight entirely, which is far worse than losing one's depth perception. So even if the penalty is deemed perfectly just in this case, it's clearly not right to claim that the victim's loss and the perpetrator's loss are equivalent. Even though there may be a one-to-one correspondence after a superficial examination, there is not really a one-to-one correspondence. It's not certain that equivalence in loss yields justice, even if the *lex talionis* appears to demand equivalence in loss.

When "blood" is understood to be metaphorical, standing symbolically for "life", the proportionality looks like this:

When the perpetrator's *delict* is murder, this proportionality is exactly the same as the *lex talionis*. For example, if the evidence in a murder case proves the perpetrator's

¹ Exodus 21:33-22:15.

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mens rea, then in modern terminology, this would be capital murder. Under such circumstances, the ratio on the left side of the proportionality is obviously one, because the victim's whole life was shed. Given the perpetrator's intent, it makes sense, according to this proportionality, that the perpetrator's whole life would also be shed. So this is the way both the *lex talionis* and this proportionality would work, given that the *delict* is capital murder. Both demand capital punishment. --- Once the victim is dead, there is no way the perpetrator can pay restitution to the victim. In some legal systems it may have been acceptable for the perpetrator to pay some kind of restitution to the victim's relatives, and to thereby attain relief from societal guilt. But restitution to relatives can never suffice as restitution to the victim. The fact that the victim is dead is proof that restitution or restorative justice can never suffice, unless the perpetrator can somehow bring the dead back to life. This failure of restitution in the case of murder, along with the sequence of biblical events leading up to the Genesis 9:6 mandate, stand as proof that interpreting Genesis 9:6 as equivalent to the *lex talionis*, at least when the *delict* is murder, is absolutely appropriate, because the proportionality and the one-to-one correspondence are exactly the same when the *delict* is murder.

Genesis 4 narrates the events surrounding at least two murders, one perpetrated by Cain and the other by Lamech. The murders by themselves are not as remarkable as their penalties. The penalties appear in Genesis 4:15 and Genesis 4:24. The penalty for Cain:

> [T]he LORD said to him [(Cain)], "Therefore whoever kills Cain, vengeance will be taken on him sevenfold." And the LORD appointed a sign for Cain, lest anyone finding him should slay him.

The penalty for Lamech, according to Lamech:

If Cain is avenged sevenfold, Then Lamech seventy-sevenfold.

Compared to either the *lex talionis* or the proportionality, this approach to punishment of murderers is absolutely bizarre. This theodicy holds that it's impossible to clearly reconcile the bizarre punishment in Genesis 4 with the proportionality mandated in Genesis 9, and with the *lex talionis* apparently mandated in Exodus 21:23-25, unless one understands two things: First, it's necessary to understand the radical distinction between **<u>natural law</u>** and <u>**human law**</u>. Second, it's necessary to understand that God is under no obligation to esteem <u>**human law**</u> with the same gravity with which humans are prone to esteem it.

<u>Natural law</u> never changes, even though God's revelation of <u>natural law</u> is progressive. Because God's prescription of <u>human law</u> is a subset of God's progressive revelation of <u>natural law</u>, one might assume that the prescription of <u>human law</u> is as straightforward and rational as the revelation of **<u>natural law</u>**. But that would be a dangerous assumption, because in <u>**human law**</u> extremely fallible creatures mediate the enforcement of <u>**natural law**</u>.

This theodicy holds that the penalties leveled against murderers in the antediluvian era stand as an object lesson given by God to the entire human race. The object lesson is essentially this: Every human, meaning Adam and Eve and each of their descendants, is incapable of acting as genuine sovereign over their mind. This is evidenced by every human's failure as miniature sovereign. Given that this is true, why should any human or group of humans be trusted as sovereign over any other human or group of humans? The obvious answer is that they shouldn't be. Neither God nor any human should trust any human to execute justice against any other human. The fall is too radical, and humanity is too corrupt.

When God "appointed a sign for Cain", he made it clear to everybody that anybody who executed the *lex talionis* against Cain would suffer tremendously for doing so. This tacit mandate to NOT execute the *lex talionis* is no more frivolous or arbitrary than God's mandate in Genesis 9:6 to execute the proportionality. In fact, it's only possible to properly understand the proportionality in Genesis 9:6 within the context of the *lex* NIX *talionis* of Genesis 4. God so loathes *color of law* <u>human</u> <u>law</u> that violates <u>natural rights</u> and <u>natural law</u> that he marked the prescription of <u>global human law</u> in Genesis 9:6 with a MASSIVE DISCLAIMER:

> I, God, hereby declare to all humanity that as long as you exist in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, you are generally not qualified to enforce the **<u>natural law</u>** against other people (Genesis 4). Therefore, with reluctance and disgust, I hereby mandate that you enforce as <u>**human law**</u> this extremely limited subset of the <u>**natural law**</u> that pertains to damage perpetrated by one person against another, and to absolutely nothing else (Genesis 9).

According to the interpretational protocol demanded by a strict distinction between **<u>natural law</u>** and the biblical prescription of <u>**human law**</u>, the Genesis 4 object lesson is absolutely rational. All other explanations for this discrepancy between the *lex* NIX *talionis* and the Genesis 9:6 proportionality are all short on reason, expository significance, and explanatory power. After making this Genesis 4 object lesson / disclaimer, God acquiesced to the need to protect <u>**natural rights**</u> based on the following line of reasoning: How can humanity ever develop the humanity-wide

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psychic standing wave without setting real boundaries for human behavior? If the boundaries are not enforced, then the boundaries don't exist. If boundaries don't exist, then there is no hope of developing the humanity-wide psychic standing wave, and no hope for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. The enforcement of these boundaries by humans, is a crucial aspect of humanity's maturation into a race of miniature sovereigns. Such societal enforcement of boundaries is to the humanitywide psychic standing wave what the individual's dominion over his/her own mind is to the individual standing wave. --- This relates directly to the interpretational policy outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

Although it's true that the Bible progressively reveals the **<u>natural law</u>**, the Bible's prescription of **<u>human law</u>** doesn't follow exactly the same pattern. The prescription of **human law** is always directly connected to some principle of the **natural law**, but the prescription of **human law** is crude and imperfect, while the **natural law** remains eternally perfect. The juxtaposition of the lex NIX talionis of Genesis 4 with the Genesis 9:6 mandate sends a message that should be clear to anyone: The Bible's prescription of **human law** is crude and imperfect because humanity is crude and imperfect.¹ The degree of crudeness is inversely proportional to the degree of human understanding of the **<u>natural law</u>**. The greater the crudeness of the Bible's prescription of **<u>human law</u>**, the less understanding of **<u>natural law</u>** the target audience has. So even though the **<u>natural law</u>** never changes, and even though the Bible progressively reveals it, the prescription of human law is not progressive, but is rather a function of the sophistication of the human parties. So when the Mosaic **Covenant** prescribes the *lex talionis*, following the principle of progressive revelation would lead to the conclusion that Genesis 9:6 must also be interpreted as *lex talionis*. But using an interpretational policy that recognizes progressive revelation, but which nevertheless emphasizes the distinction between **<u>natural law</u>** and <u>**human law**</u>, does not allow such facile misinterpretation of Genesis 9:6.

The Genesis 4 object lesson / disclaimer should be understood in juxtaposition to the Genesis 9:6 mandate. The antediluvian rejection of the *lex talionis* ended in disaster. When the core **natural right**, the **natural right** to one's primary property, is not safeguarded with severe punishment to anyone who would violate it, the society exercising such rejection self-destructs, or is destroyed by an "act of God", or both. When the core **natural right** to one's life is disregarded by an entire society, and people are allowed to get away with murder, there is no justice for the victim or for anyone else, except by way of the **natural law**. When there is no respect for

¹ This is true up to the promulgation of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, at which time both <u>natural law</u> and God's prescription of <u>human law</u> are perfectly revealed, although they are not perfectly understood by humans, because they are not systematically integrated.

primary property, there is no reason to respect secondary property. At some point, the corruption is so monumental that there is no societal hope for escape from the vortex sucking the entire society into oblivion. God always provides an escape valve for his people like Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus Christ, and their followers. But at some point the society itself is doomed and beyond redemption. This pattern is repeated over and over and over again in human history. The juxtaposition of this antediluvian object lesson and Genesis 9:6 are a core description of this societal phenomenon. God is absolutely justified in having low regard for human government, and every human who loves God needs to view human law with a similar jaundiced eye. Although human law is a necessary aspect of the road towards the New-Jerusalem niche, humans are so prone to abusing human law that only constant vigilance can keep it from going bad.

The juxtaposition of the antediluvian object lesson / disclaimer with Genesis 9:6 shows how extremely important the *lex talionis* is with respect to murder. No murderer can pay for his *delict*. Calling murder a *public delict* and claiming that the murderer can pay his debt to society by being executed totally misses the point. The victim is dead and cannot be repaid. If justice cannot be had by the victim, then justice for bystanders and third parties is nothing but a consolation / booby prize. But the *lex talionis* with respect to murder is the closest thing to justice that **human law** can provide. This is true in spite of the fact that *lex talionis* tends to appear extremely unjust and inappropriate in lesser *delicts*. Nevertheless, the life-for-life proportionality still holds for lesser *delicts*, even though the *lex talionis* doesn't.

If Genesis 9:6 is understood to be the primary article of a **global** constitution for **human law**, then the object lesson / disclaimer is the constitution's preamble. The Genesis 9:6 proportionality holds even under the **Messianic Covenant**'s dispensation of grace, evidenced by the fact that the **Messianic Covenant** never refuted the Genesis 9:6 proportionality in any way. The grace progressively revealed through the **Messianic Covenant** never refuted the Genesis 9:6 proportionality that is the basis for **global human law**. The object lesson / disclaimer in combination with the proportionality is the foundation for **global human law**, which is crucial to every human government.

In modern times the *lex talionis* has in many respects fallen out of favor. This has pros and cons. --- On the con side: Allowing murderers to live long after they've been convicted is essentially allowing them to get away with murder. --- On the pro side: In lesser *delicts*, the *lex talionis* breeds penalties that are disproportionate to the *delict*, like the case of the one-eyed man who pokes out one of the eyes of a two-eyed man. In many respects, over the last several centuries, American common law has remedied many of the excesses of the *lex talionis* with regard to lesser *delicts*. In effect,

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through common sense, the courts have devised remedies to most minor *delicts* that are decent approximations to the life-for-life proportionality. --- Strict adherence to the blood-for-blood, one-to-one correspondence misses the point of the *motive clause*. The *motive clause* says the life-for-life proportionality exists to make sure the *imago Dei* is always honored. --- In regard to legal actions *ex contractu*, penalties should always be defined either express or implied in the terms of the contract. So the *lex talionis* has practically no application to actions *ex contractu*. Even so, the life-for-life proportionality always exists as a guideline for interpreting contracts.

TO REITERATE: In this system of covenants, humans are created in the image of God, and even after the fall, in the Noachian Covenant, every human being still has the *imago Dei*. The *imago Dei* is the rational source of every human being's **<u>natural rights</u>**. Whenever <u>**natural rights**</u> are not recognized, *survival of the* fittest becomes the default rule. Natural rights are every human being's inherent, inevitable, and unalienable possession and property. If the biblical, covenantal system is discarded, then in the default system that remains, the human race emerged from the slime, gaining more and more abilities in the process of becoming grown up germs. In this system that has become the default these days, the status of human beings is measured relative to the abilities of humanity's microbial ancestry. This system is defined in Darwinian terms that make no allowance for **<u>natural rights</u>**. The Darwinian system makes room for *survival value* and the maxim that *might makes right*, but <u>natural rights</u> do not come out of Darwin's system rationally. By using contrived logic, one might superimpose *natural rights* on Darwin's system. But there's no way **natural rights** come rationally out of the bedrock of Darwin's system. On the other hand, the fact that God has endowed every human being with the *imago Dei* is the foundation of what both theology and jurisprudence have called natural law and natural rights.

These days governments do a huge number of things besides merely prosecute violations of **natural rights** *ex delicto* and *ex contractu*. Given that the shed blood is a metaphor indicating a *corpus delicti*, the punishment indicated in Genesis 9:6 must also be metaphorical. If a victim is dead, then it's impossible to restore that person's life. So *retribution* is the only penalty that satisfies the Genesis 9:6 mandate. But if someone is injured or has had their property damaged, then some other penalty is probably more appropriate, and will probably satisfy the underlying meaning of the verse better than punishment in kind. For example, *restitution* and *injunction* are both penalties that must exist within the ambit of the Genesis 9:6 penalty. The life-for-life proportionality is broad enough to allow for such penalties and remedies, whereas the *lex talionis* is not.

(NATURE OF THE PENALTIES AGAINST "WHOEVER")

Because the common law has in many respects found decent approximations to the life-for-life proportionality, the real problem with human government is not with finding proportional penalties. The real problem is statism, where statism is defined as a belief system that allows and even encourages human governments to exist that revel in **jurisdictional dysfunction**. The real problem with **human law** is not so much with finding proportional penalties, punishments, and remedies. The real problem is that human governments are allowed to exist that execute penalties that are neither *ex delicto* nor *ex contractu*, and these governments are therefore perpetrators of *delicts*. By enforcing laws that are neither *ex contractu* nor *ex delicto*, human governments operate *ultra vires* with respect to the Bible's **global** prescription of **human law**, evidenced especially by the object lesson / disclaimer. In light of biblical jurisprudence, human governments are therefore glorified crime syndicates to the degree they deviate from this standard. This **jurisdictional dysfunctionality** is a much bigger and nastier problem than making sure the punishment fits the Genesis 9:6 damage.

By claiming that common law has found decent approximations of the life-forlife proportionality, it's important to simultaneously provide a very brief description of how that has happened. When normal people need to adjudicate controversies, they need a judicial system that's adept at providing judgments and decisions based on sound principles. A judicial system can either be heavily influenced by statism, or not, although it's probably true that most have been some combination of the two. But the less influenced by statism a judicial system is, the more it's able to render decisions through unbiased principles. At various important stages in its development, the Anglo-American common-law system has been more-or-less free from statist bias. Under such circumstances, courts have been able to refine the definitions of damage and injury on a case-by-case basis, where those definitions have been refined over time through stare decisis. Stare decisis merely means, "To abide by, or adhere to, decided cases."1 It is a legal principle in common-law courts that holds that any decision in any given case should be based on decisions made in previous cases that have a similar subject matter. As long as statism and other sources of corruption don't bias such courts, the stare decisis process tends to refine the definitions of damage and injury. But if a judicial system becomes influenced by statism, then courts tend to generate statist decisions, and stare decisis tends to be a destructive tool that propagates corruption and statist poison throughout the whole system. --- So these are two sources of approximation to the life-for-life proportionality, both based on stare decisis, and one yielding good refinements to the definition of the proportionality, and the other yielding bad distortions of the

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1261.

definition. In addition to these two sources of approximation, political philosophy also sometimes has a positive influence on such approximation. But to the extent that political philosophy is statist, not so much. But even if political philosophy is not statist, political philosophers cannot refine definitions of damage and injury as well as unbiased courts can on a case-by-case basis. So definition of the life-for-life proportionality has developed slowly and gradually. When unbiased courts come into existence again, that gradual developmental process should continue again.¹

¹ See Murray Rothbard's commentary on non-statist courts in **For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto** (2nd ed.), chapter 12, "The Public Sector, III: Police, Law, and Courts", especially pp. 283-284, copyright 2006, Ludwig von Mises Institute. --- URL: http://library.mises.org/books/Murray%20N%20Rothbard/For%20a%20New%20 Liberty%20The%20Libertarian%20Manifesto.pdf.

PART II, THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

Chapter G: In Personam Jurisdiction of Positive-Duty Clause¹ (who enforces, and how)

Ever since the Noachian Covenant was promulgated, the human race has faced this problem, even if only in a collectively subliminal sense: How are humans supposed to enforce this **global** prescription of **human law**? By trying to build some kind of monolithic global government, or through some more grass-roots mechanism? --- The analysis above is clear that all humans are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of both the negative-duty clause and the positive-duty clause. So under the positive duty, every human is responsible for prosecuting any violation of the negative duty. But unlike the negative-duty clause, which globally prescribes a penalty for anyone who violates the *negative duty*, the Bible specifies no **global** penalty for people who violate the *positive duty*. The Bible does not **globally** prescribe a penalty for people who refuse or neglect to do what they are obligated to do under the *positive duty*. So even though all people are obligated by the *positive* duty to execute justice, no penalty is prescribed for people who refuse or neglect to do so, *i.e.*, for people who refuse or neglect to execute justice against people who violate the negative duty. The Bible certainly specifies a penalty for people who violate the negative duty, namely the life-for-life proportionality. But here in this global covenant, the Bible specifies no penalty for people who refuse or neglect to participate in the prosecution of people who violate the *negative duty*. Unlike the negative duty, the positive duty is NOT backed up by a penalty to be executed by other humans. Essentially, at the core of this global prescription of human law, is this stark distinction between human law and natural law.

It's crucial to remember that this theodicy is following rigorous interpretational policies that demand rigorous recognition of the distinction between <u>human law</u> and <u>natural law</u>.² Recognizing this distinction is crucial because <u>human law</u>

¹ This chapter shows how to build governments based upon biblical guidelines, and as expressions of the biblical story. To see how the principles and guidelines expounded herein apply to the existing American governmental system, see **Basic Jurisdictional Principles: A Theological Inventory of American Jurisprudence**. --- URL: http://www. bjp-tiaj.net.

² Such interpretational policies are not *eisegesis*. They are not superimposing extrabiblical concepts on Scripture for the sake of making Scripture say things that it doesn't really say. On the contrary, such policies are upholding precepts and principles induced through *exegesis* for the sake of understanding the rationally consistent message the Bible delivers in spite of human irrationality. The conviction that the Bible is rational demands

is extremely fallible. Because humans are extremely fallible, human law is also extremely fallible, and so is the human comprehension of **natural law**. Natural law is flawless and infallible, but human perception of it is not. So human law needs to be redeemed in a way that's similar to the way that every human being needs to be redeemed. So these interpretational policies demand that a necessary aspect of biblical jurisprudence be that if there is a mandate in a passage of the Bible, where the mandate is not accompanied by an explicit indication that humans should punish humans who violate the given mandate, then there is no explicit prescription of **human law** there. The existence of a *negative* or *positive duty* does not automatically entail the simultaneous existence of a distinctly different *positive duty* to enforce the first duty. A biblical mandate, a *positive* or *negative duty*, is certainly a description of ethical behavior under the **divine law**'s description of **natural law**. But to know how to implement such a mandate as human law, or even to know whether such a mandate should be implemented as human law, it's necessary to avoid jumping to the conclusion that **<u>natural law</u>** must always be translated into human law, or that it's easy to translate natural law into human law. It's foolish not to heed the distinction between a mandate that is explicitly accompanied by a penalty to be executed by humans, and a mandate that has no such penalty. The former is clearly an explicit prescription of human law. It is explicit because a penalty is prescribed for execution by human against human. On the other hand, a mandate that is not accompanied by such a penalty demands far more care in its translation into human law. In fact, the biblical author might intend for such a mandate to NEVER be translated into **human law**. A mandate that lacks a penalty is certainly a mandate that exists in the realm of the biblical description of **<u>natural</u>** law, but not necessarily in the realm of the biblical prescription of human law. So wherever a mandate from God exists in the Bible, it's critical to understand that it must necessarily have a *prima facie* status that is one of the following: (i)Because it is NOT accompanied by a penalty to be executed by human against perpetrator, and for other reasons apparent in the context, no attempt should ever be made to implement the mandate as **human law**. The mandate should remain perpetually in the realm of **<u>natural law</u>**, to the exclusion of <u>**human law**</u>. (ii)Even though the mandate is NOT accompanied by a penalty to be executed by human against perpetrator, it might be good to implement the mandate as **human law**, if some way could be found to do so without violating **natural rights** inherent in the *imago Dei*. (iii)Because the mandate IS accompanied by a penalty to be executed by human against human, it's

that principles induced exegetically elsewhere in Scripture be tested for veracity wherever any challenge to such principles might arise.

important to implement the mandate as <u>human law</u>, and to do so in a way that doesn't violate the <u>natural rights</u> inherent in the *imago Dei*.

Regarding **<u>natural law</u>** as it exists within this moral-law leg of the <u>natural-</u> law tripod, it's certain that humans need to modify their thoughts, speech, and behavior in whatever way is necessary to bring themselves into conformity with natural law. It's also safe to assume that such conformity could be enhanced when people enter into contracts with one another to help each other with such conformity. But it's radically perverse to convert any description of **natural law** into **human law**, where the **human law** violates **natural rights**. Because of the long history of abusing **natural rights** in the name of biblical Christianity, it's important to look at these three prima facie statuses of every God-given mandate in slightly more detail. If it's understood that a penalty-bearing mandate is a mandate that's accompanied by a penalty to be executed by human against human violator, then the following are generally true: (i)Some non-penalty-bearing mandates should never be implemented as human law, and they should never be seen as implicitly prescribing implementation of the mandate as human law. (ii)Some non-penaltybearing mandates do implicitly call for implementation of the mandate as human law. (iii)All penalty-bearing mandates explicitly call for the implementation of the mandate as <u>human law</u>.

(i)An example of a non-penalty-bearing mandate that should NEVER be implemented as **human law** can be seen in Mark 12:30. This mandate to love God with heart, soul, mind, and strength gives no hint of how the mandate could be implemented as **human law**. It is too far removed from proximate linkage between damage-to-other and cause of damage-to-other for it to be implemented as **human law**.

(ii)If one were to assume, for the sake of example, that the proscription of adultery in Exodus 20:14, is the only mandate against adultery in the Bible, then that verse would be a good example of a mandate that has no penalty, but should nevertheless be implemented as **human law**. Under this momentary assumption, it is a nonpenalty-bearing mandate that implicitly calls for implementation of the mandate as **human law**. But how does one distinguish a non-penalty-bearing mandate that calls for implementation as **human law** from a non-penalty-bearing mandate that does NOT call for implementation as **human law**? --- When the Bible makes it clear that adultery is something to avoid, it's reasonable for people who are committed to their belief in the Bible to enter into contracts with one another, where such contracts stipulate penalties for parties who commit adultery. Such voluntary social pressure helps the volunteers to conform to the mutually agreed-upon standard. By voluntarily entering into a contract that holds the parties to a no-adultery standard, the parties thereby translate the **divine law**'s description of a standard in the morallaw leg of the **natural-law** tripod into **human law** that is fundamentally voluntary. Evidence that it's voluntary exists in the fact that the parties only impose this standard on each other, not on non-parties. So this extra-biblical contract would implement this biblical standard of morality as **human law** that is governed by the **jurisdiction** of that **local** contract. This **jurisdictionally** valid promulgation of law against adultery is valid because it assumes that any given accuser should be able to produce a verifiable linkage between the accusation of adultery and the evidence that the adultery is fact. In contrast to this **jurisdictionally** valid translation of a non-penalty-bearing mandate into **human law**, other non-penalty-bearing mandates, such as the one in Mark 12:30, offer practically no hope of translation into **human law** because they are far too general, and the damage-to-other is far too nebulous. Mark 12:30 describes **natural law** that should never be specifically converted into **human law**.

(iii)The prime example of a penalty-bearing mandate appears in Genesis 9:6. This and all other penalty-bearing mandates in the Bible call for implementation of the mandate as **human law**. The penalty-bearing mandate is an explicit prescription of **human law**. In an explicit prescription of **human law**, like the prescription that exists in Genesis 9:6, it's necessary to know the jurisdiction of the given mandate as a first step in implementing it without violating **<u>natural rights</u>**. Under what covenant is the mandate given, and what is the jurisdictional scope of that covenant? --- Because the jurisdiction of the Noachian Covenant is global, the prima facie jurisdiction of the negative-duty clause is also global. But as already indicated above, the actual in personam jurisdiction is limited to perpetrators within this **global** population. The fact that all humans are inherently subject to this **global** covenant doesn't translate automatically into cognitive acknowledgment, acceptance, and appreciation for that fact that all humans are subject. Some people become cognitively aware of what is inherently true, and some people don't. People who become consciously aware of their inherent participation, and who choose to cooperate with that participation rather than pretend that it's not part of their nature, are people who will want to do whatever they're able to do to implement such human laws. What the interface should look like, between people who recognize and accept their participation in the **global** covenant, versus people who do not recognize and accept their participation in the **global** covenant, is crucial to the existence of any kind of human law that's based on the Bible, where such human law is not jurisdictionally dysfunctional. Likewise, if humans presume that they should punish someone who violates a biblical law, without establishing that *lawful* jurisdiction exists, then such self-appointed prosecutors are presuming that they should usurp God's authority as the promulgator and enforcer of **<u>natural law</u>**. Such

usurpation is a violation of boundaries, and such violation is the essence of missing the mark. A similar error is at the core of every tyranny and at the core of all **jurisdictional dysfunction** in **human law**. So the *lawful* interface between people who recognize and accept their participation in the **global** covenant, versus people who don't, is based entirely upon recognition of *lawful* **jurisdiction**. The core issue for people who recognize and accept, is how to build *lawful* human governments, *i.e.*, governments that are functional, viable, and honoring to such **jurisdictional** limitations.

Even though it's obvious that the biblical story holds that the *positive-duty clause* has **in personam jurisdiction** over all living humans, making all humans obligated to enforce against people who damage other people, it's not so obvious how this duty can be fulfilled without violating **natural rights**. While the *negative-duty clause* is clearly a penalty-bearing mandate that explicitly calls for implementation as **human law**, the *positive-duty clause* is clearly a non-penalty-bearing mandate that MAY implicitly call for implementation as **human law**. If the *positive-duty clause* is to be implemented without violating **natural rights**, then the only way to do that is through the kind of **local** contract described above in regards to adultery. This would be a **local** contract focused on penalizing violations of the *negative duty*, rather than on penalizing adultery. In order to focus holistically on this kind of contract, it should help to abstract a bit to see the problem from a different perspective.

Advocates of "anarcho-capitalism" claim that the state, meaning human government as it's generally recognized and understood, is inherently a violator of natural rights.¹ They claim that anarcho-capitalism must replace statism in order to eliminate the state's violation of **natural rights**. In contrast to this anarchocapitalist claim, many opponents of anarcho-capitalism simply repudiate anarchocapitalism by claiming that it's anarchy, and that anarchy by its very nature does not work. Other opponents of anarcho-capitalism recognize that its advocates are in favor of free markets and *laissez-faire* capitalism, and these other opponents, being in favor of that breed of economics (at least nominally), are sympathetic to anarchocapitalism, but nevertheless claim that it won't work. This latter group of opponents claims that it won't work because anarcho-capitalism doesn't adequately describe the contractual mechanisms necessary to make *laissez-faire* capitalism genuinely work, *i.e.*, to make it work without being tainted with the systemic violations of **<u>natural</u> <u>rights</u>** that have usually accompanied nominally free markets. So this latter group is committed to the goals of anarcho-capitalism while holding that the methods proposed are deficient and defective. --- From a biblical perspective, anarcho-

¹ For a prototypical introduction to anarcho-capitalism, see Rothbard, **For a New Liberty**, pp. 267-299.

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capitalism is not anarchy in the same sense that the antediluvian society was anarchy. That's because anarcho-capitalism advocates laws that are specifically designed to protect **<u>natural rights</u>**. That's not something that the antediluvian society did, and the antediluvian society was certainly anarchistic if any society ever has been. So anarcho-capitalism doesn't really advocate anarchy. --- Regarding the latter group's claim about mechanics, anarcho-capitalism definitely fails to adequately describe the contractual mechanisms necessary to make *laissez-faire* capitalism work.

At the core of this distinction between the *negative-duty clause* and the *positive-duty clause* is not only a distinction between **human law** and **natural law**. At the core of the distinction between these two clauses is also an implied demand for contractual mechanisms aimed at properly protecting **natural rights**. This is obvious by way of the *motive clause*, "For in the image of God He made man". Implicit in the *motive clause* is a concern for protecting **natural rights** without violating **natural rights**. So there is certainly a demand for something like anarcho-capitalism's commitment to protecting **natural rights**. But anarcho-capitalism is inadequate because of its failure to adequately describe the necessary contractual mechanisms. In order to properly address the *positive-duty clause*, this theodicy must enter into describing such contractual mechanisms. This theodicy will henceforth refer to whatever social superstructure fully implements these mechanisms as a "**natural-rights** polity". But before entering into describing these contractual mechanisms, it should help to further ground the description in Scripture, while simultaneously describing one other major flaw in anarcho-capitalism.

Anarcho-capitalism and economic libertarianism in general both claim that it is inherently bad for one human party to initiate violence against another. As far as it goes, that's probably a good and worthy claim. It approximates the *negative duty*, but it doesn't go far enough. That it doesn't go far enough becomes evident when one questions the grounds upon which such claims are made. The basis that these *isms* use to ground such claims is a more-or-less bald commitment to what they call the "nonaggression axiom", "non-aggression principle", "non-initiation of force principle", *etc.* These claims are essentially based on dogma and dicta. In contrast to bald dogma and dicta, this theodicy claims that these "libertarian" axioms and principles are encompassed by the *negative-duty clause*, and it claims that the *negative-duty clause* is grounded in agreement between special and general revelation. The *negative-duty clause* is grounded in special revelation by way of Genesis 9:6. It's grounded in general revelation by way of being necessarily built into the human genome.¹ So this theodicy is claiming (i)that all people have <u>natural rights</u>; (ii) that all people are inherently obligated to avoid violating the other's <u>natural rights</u>;

¹ See A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood.

and (iii)that all people are inherently obligated to execute justice against violators of others' **<u>natural rights</u>**. --- (i) This theodicy is claiming that the grounds for claiming that all people have **<u>natural rights</u>** can be found in the *motive clause* and the human genome. (ii)It's claiming that the innate duty to avoid violating the natural rights of other people can be found in the negative-duty clause and the human genome. (iii) The third claim is a major point of departure by this theodicy from conventional anarcho-capitalism / libertarianism. Unlike anarcho-capitalism / libertarianism, this theodicy claims that all people have an innate duty to execute justice against people who violate other people's **natural rights**. Anarcho-capitalism / libertarianism make no such claim. This theodicy bases this third claim on the combination of the positive-duty clause and the human genome. The absence of this innate duty in anarcho-capitalism is a major flaw which leads to that secular philosophy's inability to describe a comprehensive system of contracts that might make that philosophy viable. That secular ideology appears to deliberately avoid admitting the existence of such a **global** *positive duty*, presumably because statists might use such an admission as ammunition to promote statism. In contrast to anarcho-capitalism's posture of avoiding admission that this **global** positive duty exists, this theodicy holds that the **global** positive duty is what makes the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity viable. This theodicy also claims that the fact that the *positive-duty clause* is non-penalty-bearing is precisely why this system of contracts is not simply another breed of minarchism.¹ This theodicy is not simply proposing another breed of minarchism. Instead, it claims that humanity should replace the state with the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, and this includes replacement of every minarchist conception of the state with the natural-rights polity. This theodicy finds agreement between special and general revelation in this arena through the existence of pre-cognitive contracts and precognitive consent. These pre-cognitive phenomena are foundational to the **<u>natural</u>**rights polity.²

This theodicy holds that there are two fundamentally different kinds of consent, and two fundamentally different kinds of contracts, based on a rational examination

¹ Minarchism is generally understood to be minimal statism. Minarchists and anarchocapitalists usually agree about the "non-aggression principle" as a concept, even though the concept has various names. The difference between minimal statism and anarchocapitalism is that minarchists claim that the state, though minimal, is necessary, while anarcho-capitalists claim that the state is not necessary. --- This theodicy holds that the state is inherently criminal and is unnecessary, but it also holds that the **natural-rights** polity is necessary.

² This theodicy uses the expression, "pre-cognition", to literally mean, "before cognition". It is not a reference to "extrasensory perception".

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of facts about human development.¹ These are pre-cognitive consent and cognitive consent, and pre-cognitive contracts and cognitive contracts. --- Whenever anyone enters an ordinary *lawful* contract, it's necessary for the given party to cognitively consent to such participation. But in a pre-cognitive contract, something far more fundamental goes on, which can be seen through questions like these: When one is conceived, does the newly conceived person consent to being conceived? Does this person consent to having the attributes of a living human being, to having two eyes, two ears, one head, two legs, one torso, *etc.*? Certainly no one cognitively consents to, or dissents from, having such attributes at the time of their conception. Even so, because such cumulative attributes are inherently human, the newly conceived human must tacitly consent. This kind of consent can be called pre-cognitive consent. Any contract formed through pre-cognitive consent is likewise a pre-cognitive contract.

The reason it's necessary to introduce this idea that there are these two different kinds of consent and these two different kinds of contracts, is because this idea goes to the heart of the difference between the *negative duty* and the *positive duty*. It also goes to the heart of the distinction between the **global** covenants and the **local** covenants. It's also crucial to developing any genuine **natural-rights** polity. ---People who refuse to cognitively volunteer for the *positive duty* surely violate **natural law**, but **natural law** enforces itself. Or more accurately, God enforces it without any need for human intermediaries. On the other hand, **human law** never enforces itself, because human enforcers are always necessary to it.

Sub-Chapter 1: Jural / Ecclesiastical

a. <u>Core Compacts:</u>

Wherever <u>human laws</u> exist that clearly originate in some covenant or contract, as all the <u>human laws</u> prescribed in the biblical covenants surely do, "Christian" minarchists by definition see such laws as evidence that a human government, meaning the state under its long-existing definition, must exist to enforce those <u>human laws</u>. It's certainly true that wherever <u>human laws</u> exist, those laws govern something. But under a <u>natural-rights</u> polity, as necessarily distinct from the state, <u>human laws</u> that fail to conform to *lawful jurisdictions* are essentially evidence of crimes being systematically committed under *color of law*. A <u>natural-rights</u> polity is a system of contracts that systematically avoids such jurisdictional dysfunction.

¹ This rational examination appears in **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding** Natural Personhood.

To expound this **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, this theodicy will show how this polity, this system of contracts, arises rationally out of the *positive-duty clause* as understood within its surrounding context.

Ordinary contracts govern ordinary business transactions. An ordinary contract has terms, and those terms establish the **jurisdiction** of the given contract. Such a contract, and such a **jurisdiction**, essentially establish a government that governs the given transaction. The government in regard to such contracts arises quickly and dissolves as the terms of the contract are fulfilled. In addition to this kind of ordinary contract whose government arises and dissolves quickly, there are also ubiquitous contracts that are designed to have a perpetual duration. Contracts that are intended to have a perpetual duration, like those that form corporations, those that form governments in the more ordinary sense of that word, and those that clearly exist in the biblical covenants, all tend to form human governments that have an indefinite duration. To whatever extent those perpetual-duration contracts have penalty-bearing terms, those terms are **human laws**, and those contracts form human governments. A primary prerequisite to such contracts being *lawful* is that they must be entered voluntarily, *i.e.*, through cognitive consent.

In the case of the **local** biblical covenants, meaning the **Abrahamic**, **Mosaic**, and Messianic, the parties become parties voluntarily, *i.e.*, through informed, cognitive consent. This might not be clear to the casual Bible reader. That lack of clarity is probably due almost entirely to the Bible reader's failure to fully understand and apply progressive revelation, both as it pertains to the Bible's prescription of human law, and its description of <u>natural law</u>, as described above. One big objection to the claim that these **local** covenants are entered voluntarily can be seen in regard to the Mosaic Covenant. Advocates of the Mosaic Covenant might counterclaim that in the **Mosaic Covenant**, people are generally born into the covenant, and therefore do not enter it voluntarily, but by birth. There are certainly provisions for conversion of people who are not born to parents who are party. But the main emphasis, both in the text and in the history, is that people are born into the Mosaic Covenant. Or so goes the standard traditional claim, without regard to progressive revelation. But the facts don't really support that legal theory, especially when the Mosaic Covenant is interpreted through the context established by the **Messianic Covenant** combined with general revelation. The facts support the claim that humans are conceived in guardian-dependent bailment contracts, where the dependent's natural rights and abilities are *bailed* into the possession of one or more parents / guardians. Under this alternative legal theory, the parents / bailees who are guardians over their dependent children, and who are party to the Mosaic Covenant, have a duty to train their children in such covenant. But that doesn't mean that these children are genuinely

party to the **Mosaic Covenant**. They are not, and they cannot be until they reach such maturity that they are capable of cognitively consenting to being party.¹

Based on the fact that guardian-dependent bailment contracts fit law and facts better than customary and traditional explanations of how people become party to the local biblical covenants, this theodicy holds that it's obvious that the local biblical covenants can only be entered voluntarily, *i.e.*, by cognitive consent. Given progressive revelation available in the Messianic Covenant, human government that arises out of the **local** biblical covenants is completely voluntary. This means that the penalties are only executed against parties who have violated the oath they took at entry into the covenant. At least this is true for terms that do not replicate terms of the **global** covenants. As indicated above in regard to the *negative-duty clause*, human laws that proscribe human-on-human damage have a global in personam **jurisdiction**. So any such terms that are replicated in the **local** covenants are also global, even though they are enforced locally, meaning through a local contract. In contrast to terms that clearly pertain to the prosecution of *delicts*, terms in **local** covenants that clearly do not pertain to actions ex delicto do not originate in the **global** covenant. But terms that DO pertain to actions *ex delicto* certainly originate in the **global** covenant. *Ex-delicto* terms are inherited by the **local** covenants from the **global** covenant through progressive revelation. Because God is rational, and because the Bible is rationally consistent, both terms that have **global** origins, and terms that don't have **global** origins, must somehow be completely voluntary. Otherwise, such terms violate **<u>natural rights</u>**.

As **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood** makes clear, the proscription of bloodshed in Genesis 9:6 is built into human nature. Because humans are social creatures, the proscription of bloodshed is necessarily built into the genome. Because Genesis 9:6 contains the only prescription of **global human law** in the **global** covenants, and therefore in the entire Bible, the *negative duty* in that verse is describing something that is built into human nature. This duty is the root of **global human law** because this *negative duty* is built into the makeup of every human being at an extremely rudimentary level. The other duty, the *positive duty*, is also built into every human at the same rudimentary level. But the *positive duty* is not backed by a penalty prescribed for execution by human against human. So the *positive duty* exists in the realm of **natural law** outside the realm of **human law**. In both the case of the *negative duty* and the case of the *positive duty*, even though these duties are built into human nature from conception, it's certainly possible for people to refuse to admit that they are under obligation to recognize

¹ This skeletal description of the guardian-dependent *bailment* contract is fleshed out further in **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood**.

either the *negative duty* or the *positive duty*. People who refuse to acknowledge their obligation under the *negative duty* are generally recognized by modern society as psychopaths and/or sociopaths. Their cognitive denial that they are subject to the *negative duty* generally leads them to violate that duty, where the violation manifests as pathological activities of one kind or another. Their psychopathic actions are generally illegal in practically every country on earth. In contrast to these people who are a planetary scourge, people who refuse to acknowledge their obligation under the *positive duty* have a much more ambiguous status. They are more like freeloaders than mass murderers.

By observing the following hypothetical situation, it's possible to get a better feeling for the massive implications of widespread refusal to abide by the *positive* duty: If person B murders person C, and person A has personal knowledge about the murder but doesn't care, then unless there is someone else who knows and cares, person B will get away with the murder. If such apathy is widespread in a society, then such circumstances are essentially a prescription for return to the antediluvian anarchy. Unlike "anarcho-capitalism", that state of affairs is genuine anarchy, and it is a state of affairs that humans should avoid like the plague. --- There are certainly huge practical problems in making the biblical prescription of human law viable. This most crucial problem can be called the "willingness-to-enforce" problem. Another problem can be seen through another example: Suppose person A is diligently committed to observing the *positive duty*. Now suppose person B murders somebody in China, and person A doesn't know about it because person A lives on the other side of the planet. Under such circumstances, it's hardly practical to assume that person A has jurisdiction over the murder. It's reasonable to call this a "proximity" problem. --- In addition to this proximity problem, and this willingness-to-enforce problem, there are other huge practical issues involved in determining how to satisfy this *positive duty*. In spite of the difficulties, merely allowing government to do whatever it wants because of the misconception that God has ordained statism, or based upon some other lame excuse for inaction, is a clear violation of this *positive duty*.

As already mentioned, there is no explicit, **globally** mandated, divine ordination of human government anywhere in the Bible. Nevertheless, this *positive duty* is certainly **global**: "By man his blood shall be shed", meaning that all mankind shares this obligation. According to the **global** covenant, this duty is a basic part of human nature, as surely as the *negative duty* is. Nevertheless, the *positive duty* is hardly an explicit prescription of **human law**. That's because this mandate is not explicitly accompanied by penalty executable by human against human. In order for the *positive duty* to be viable, problems like the willingness-to-enforce problem and

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the proximity problem must necessarily be resolved. Obviously, the more urgent of the two problems is the willingness to enforce. Because Genesis 9:6 clearly mandates the existence of **human law** by explicitly indicating a penalty for violation of the negative duty, it's reasonable to assume that it must also implicitly mandate whatever features of human government are necessary for the enforcement, adjudication, and execution of the explicitly mandated human law. But the positive-duty mandate in this verse does not explicitly indicate a penalty for violation of the *positive duty*. The *positive duty* is therefore implicitly a **global** mandate for the existence of human government. But the jurisdictional scope of such implied government is limited by the subject matter of the mandated law. While the *negative duty* is a mandate to avoid violating **<u>natural rights</u>**, the *positive duty* is a mandate to enforce against violation of **<u>natural rights</u>**. So the *positive duty* is implicitly a mandate to establish whatever human government is necessary to enforce the *negative duty*. But where are the teeth to make it happen? Where are the penalties and enforcement mechanisms that turn this *positive duty* into **human law**? The teeth may be implied in the text, but the teeth are not explicit in the text. The fact that both duties are built into human nature means that every human gives pre-cognitive consent to abide by those duties. All people have thereby entered into a **<u>global</u>** pre-cognitive contract to abide by those two contractual obligations. But there is often a mental disjuncture between this pre-cognitive consent and the need for cognitive agreement, and also between this pre-cognitive contract and any cognitive contract that might put the positive duty into effect as human law.

Given that this *positive duty* is built into human nature by way of the **global** covenant, every human being is born with this question built into his/her conscience: "How can I enforce <u>natural rights</u>, both mine and my neighbor's, against people who damage other people?" Obviously no one is responsible to enforce against a *delict* that they don't know about, especially if the *delict* happened on the other side of the planet. On the other hand, if one's town has been taken over by a crime syndicate that systematically perpetrates *delicts* against anybody and everybody, ignorance and distance cease to be excuses to avoid enforcement. Instead, lack of capacity becomes the default excuse. What can one person do against an army of human parasites? What is one little vigilante against an armed syndicate? So in addition to the willingness-to-enforce problem and the proximity problem, another obstacle is the "capacity-to-enforce" problem. --- Under this infested-town scenario, the obvious solution for everyone in the town who is not part of the crime syndicate is to band together to fight the corruption. In other words, they need to form what has historically been called a "vigilance committee". A vigilance committee follows the maxim, Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt ("The laws aid those who

are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.").¹ It's obvious that the vigilance committee is a better form of human government for satisfying the *positive-duty clause* than enforcement by the lone vigilante, at least as a rule of thumb. Because a *lawful* vigilance committee arises out of the moral indignation of those who form the committee, it is the most basic and rudimentary form of human government that can be formed to serve the *positive duty*.

In order for a vigilance committee to operate, there have to be agreements about how it should operate. In other words, like all human organizations, a vigilance committee is based on contracts. But of course, in America, vigilance committees have a bad reputation, evidenced by the definition:

> <u>vigilance committee</u> --- a volunteer committee of citizens organized to suppress and punish crime summarily (as when the processes of law appear inadequate).²

The bad reputation is evident through this phrase, "punish crime summarily". "[S] ummarily" indicates that there is a lack of due process, and a lack of due diligence to make sure that only the guilty are punished, and to make sure that the punishment fits the Genesis 9:6 damage.

Genesis 9:6 makes it obvious that the core enforcer with respect to the *positive-duty clause* is the individual. Reason demands that in order to enforce with due diligence, individuals need to work together cooperatively, perhaps not always, but as a general rule. In other words, the core enforcer is the individual vigilante, but for the individual to execute justice properly and consistently, he needs to work with other people. So the next step in improving upon the individual vigilante is the vigilance committee. But because the vigilance committee is prone to less-than-methodical prosecution, and then to dissolve like an ordinary business transaction, a better system of contracts is needed than those that form the vigilance committee.

To improve upon the vigilance committee, what's needed is a law society, a group of people dedicated to satisfying the *positive-duty clause* with all due diligence and care. In American jurisprudence, such a law society has sometimes been called a "jural society":

jural society --- The term "jural society" is used as the synonym of "state" or "organized political community."³

"State" is a bad word to use for such a community because of its close ties to the mythology of statism. Another definition of statism is that it is the myth that the

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1407.

² Webster's 7th, p. 991.

³ Black's 5th, p. 764.

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state has been ordained by God and that it has a right to exist simply because it's the state. As far as generally applicable secular law is concerned, such "organized political communities" are privileged to exist only so long as they are genuinely committed to enforcing against Genesis 9:6 damage, and as long as they avoid turning into perpetrators of such damage. They are not privileged to exist for their own sake, for the sake of keeping a **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** myth alive, or for any other reason. Because the word "state" has been corrupted by this mythology, this theodicy uses the expression, **jural society**, to refer to the kind of organized society that is a qualitative improvement over a vigilance committee. Even so, it's imperative to remember that for enforcement against Genesis 9:6 damage to be *lawful*, forcing enforcers is *unlawful*. So all enforcement must happen through the cognitive consent of the enforcers. Enforcement must be voluntary, and whatever contracts and organizations are formed for the sake of enforcement must also be voluntary.

Given the context and language used in Genesis 9:6, it's clear that the primary focus of the negative-duty clause is on delicts rather than on contracts, and it's clear that *delicts* are also the primary focus of the *positive-duty clause*. To satisfy the positive-duty clause, it's important to distinguish between delicts about which there is public knowledge and *delicts* about which there is little or no public knowledge.¹ Historically the distinction between these two has been synonymous with the distinction between *public delicts* and *private delicts*.² In current American law, *public delicts* are brought as criminal actions, because the state brings them, whereas private delicts are brought as civil actions, because private citizens bring them. It's reasonable that a *lawful jural society* would have subject-matter jurisdiction over both *public* and *private delicts*, although it's largely irrelevant whether the given action is brought by a *jural society* member or by someone else. That's why modern America's obsession with the distinction between criminal and civil actions is largely a distraction to the process of getting justice. --- Because jurisdictional dysfunction is such a deeply embedded problem, and because contracts define their own jurisdictions, it's not so reasonable that a jural society would also have subject-matter jurisdiction over Genesis 9:6 damage that arises out of contracts. In modern America, contract disputes may also always be brought as civil actions, but because contracts define their own jurisdictions, it's prudent that a different kind of committee / community / society would form for the adjudication of

¹ This is for reasons that should be obvious as this theodicy proceeds, if it's not obvious on its face.

² See the sub-chapter above, CHAPTER B, Sub-Chapter 2, "Ex Delicto / Ex Contractu".

contract disputes. To avoid **jurisdictional dysfunction**, legal actions *ex delicto* and *ex contractu* should not both be adjudicated by the same enforcement outfit.

Human societies are composed of complex contractual networks. The more complex the society, the more complex its constituent contractual relationships. The more complex the contractual relationships, the more need for adjudication of breached contracts. If breached contracts are not adjudicated by the jural society, because the jural society focuses exclusively on *delicts* for the sake of avoiding jurisdictional dysfunction, then some other societal mechanism is necessary if Genesis 9:6 damage ex contractu is going to be properly addressed under the positiveduty clause. The situation demands another question: How do people committed to being compliant with the *positive-duty clause* form this societal mechanism that's needed for addressing damage *ex contractu*? The answer is, by way of a mechanism similar to the mechanism that formed the jural society. While the vigilance committee is formed through largely informal, short-term contracts, the jural **society** is formed through more formal contracts that have a perpetual or indefinite duration. Both are formed voluntarily, motivated by moral indignation. While the subject-matter jurisdiction of the vigilance committee is largely impromptu, the jural society's subject-matter jurisdiction is strictly over actions ex delicto. This strict subject matter is necessary to ensure that the jural society executes justice with all due care and diligence. It's reasonable to call the contract that forms the jural society a jural compact.¹ A jural compact has a very specific and limited purpose, which is to execute justice against *delicts* perpetrated by anyone within a specific geographical jurisdiction.

To execute justice against *ex-contractu* damage, a similar society / committee / community is needed, and should be formed voluntarily, with the same motives, and with the same duration, as the **jural society**. But it must obviously have a different subject matter. This theodicy calls this an **ecclesiastical society**.² It's reasonable to call the contract that forms the **ecclesiastical society** an **ecclesiastical compact**.

¹ As is clear in any law dictionary, a compact is essentially the same thing as a contract, except that the word "compact" is generally preferred when speaking of contracts between governments. This theodicy therefore tries to use the word "compact" to reference contracts that are intended to have a perpetual duration. Such compacts are the contracts that are the basis of a *lawful* society.

^{2 &}quot;Ecclesia" is a transliteration of the word that appears 118 times in the Greek New Testament (**Nestle-Aland**, 26th ed.) and is usually translated "church" (Strong's #1577). Before the New Testament was written, this word "was used among the Greeks of a body of citizens 'gathered' to discuss the affairs of state" (**Vine's**, "New Testament Section", p. 42). --- This theodicy uses this expression here for want of a better.

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The reason the **jural** and **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** compacts have strict <u>subject-matter</u> **jurisdictions** should be obvious by now. It's to avoid **jurisdictional dysfunction**. The reason these two kinds of compacts have a perpetual or indefinite duration should also be obvious. Legal knowledge, jurisprudence, develops very slowly over time.¹ This is true even in the face of voluminous screeds of court opinions produced almost daily. The screeds now simultaneously disguise and document encroaching statism, and contribute little to real legal development. Even so, the courts are repositories of legal knowledge, and it's crucial for such knowledge to be active and alive in a society in order for that society to have due process that honors **natural rights**. So the reason for the indefinite duration is essentially to keep legal knowledge about the protection of **natural rights** alive and fresh in a community's collective awareness. So the reason for the indefinite duration is largely the same as the reason for the strict subject matters: to avoid **jurisdictional dysfunction**.

Based on agreement between general and special revelation, this theodicy is hereby claiming that the biblical story holds that these are the two essential compacts that are necessary for the existence of any Genesis 9:6-observant society, the jural **<u>compact</u>** and the <u>**ecclesiastical compact**</u>. These do not necessarily create separate societies, but they absolutely must be distinct contracts, because they have radically different jurisdictions. Confusing these two jurisdictions is prescription for jurisdictional dysfunction.² To be on the safe side, it's best to have both separate societies and separate contracts. Any cause of action recognized by American common law that is genuinely ex delicto is under the subject-matter jurisdiction of a jural society, but not of an ecclesiastical society. Any cause of action recognized by American common law that is genuinely *ex contractu* is under the **subject-matter** jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical society, but not of a jural society. Causes of action in American law that are neither ex contractu nor ex delicto are instances and examples of government gone rogue. Recognizing that the jural compact and the ecclesiastical compact fit hand-in-glove with the ex delicto / ex contractu limitations on Genesis 9:6 damage is the first step in understanding how human governments are to be constructed in accordance with the biblical story. But these two legal entities, by themselves, are insufficient to describe the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity.

¹ This happens largely through *stare decisis*. See the final paragraphs of Chapter F above, "Subject matter of the Positive-Duty Clause (nature of the penalties against 'whoever")".

² This is for reasons that will be increasingly obvious as this theodicy proceeds.

b. <u>Core Distinctions:</u>

It may seem perfectly reasonable that these two compacts should be kept distinct because of their **jurisdictional** differences. Nevertheless it's important to look in more detail at how the **jurisdictions** of these two compacts differ. Otherwise it's too easy to gloss over the distinctions, to allow the two **jurisdictions** to be randomly conflated, and to follow glib approaches to human government into **jurisdictional dysfunction**. The core distinction revolves around the nature of consent.

It should be clear by now that even though the *negative-duty clause* pertains to both damage ex delicto and damage ex contractu, these two kinds of damage are subject to radically different jurisdictions. --- Because contracts define subjectmatter, in personam, and territorial jurisdictions, the given contract defines the original jurisdiction over any breach of the given contract. If the breach causes damage, the breach certainly falls within the overall jurisdiction of Genesis 9:6. But because the contract either explicitly or implicitly defines its jurisdiction, it's crucial for the <u>ecclesiastical</u> court, as an agent of the <u>ecclesiastical society</u>, to allow the contract to define the jurisdiction of the controversy. So the enforcement of a contract dispute is mediated by the jurisdiction that the contract defines. --- In contrast to actions ex contractu, legal actions ex delicto are not necessarily mediated by any contract other than the Noachian Covenant. The impetus behind enforcement against *delicts* is embedded in every human conscience, and is not mediated by the **jurisdiction** of any extra-biblical contract. That's why the lone vigilante has as much prima facie legitimacy as any kind of human government, including a jural society. The jural compact exists to facilitate the prosecution of actions ex delicto, not to construct jurisdictional barriers to such prosecution. So even though Genesis 9:6 is not human law, but is rather prescription of human law, it is still nevertheless the *raison d'etre* behind all **human laws** against *delicts*. So the **jural society** should do its best to reflect the *jurisdiction* prescribed by Genesis 9:6 in its *human-law* jurisdiction. So in obedience to the positive-duty clause, the jural society does not look to any mediating contract to ascertain jurisdiction in the case. It looks first to the alleged facts, then to Genesis 9:6 for guidance about jurisdiction. The jurisdiction defined by the jural compact is considered lastly, leastly, and only for the sake of making sure that justice is executed against the alleged perpetrator of the alleged *delict*. This consideration must necessarily include consideration of how the **jural society** is to solve the capacity-to-enforce problem, which necessarily encompasses consideration of the proximity problem, and which also inevitably influences the willing-to-enforce problem.

The fact that original **jurisdiction** in the case of *delicts* is defined by the **global** biblical covenant, rather than by an ordinary mediating contract, has huge

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ramifications. Consent to the Noachian Covenant is global and tacit at a level that transcends consciousness, cognition, and choice. It is pre-cognitive consent. It is tacit the same way every non-monstrous human tacitly consents to having two eyes instead of four, four limbs instead of eight, and one head instead of two. It is consent that is built into the genes, and outside the realm of cognition and conscious choice. In contrast to this, consent to participation in any ordinary contract is necessarily either express or implied-in-fact. Even when consent to an ordinary contract is implied-in-fact, such consent is not as tacit as the consent given to the global covenant. That's because God builds tacit consent to the **global** covenant into every human being at a level of existence that is so basic that it transcends cognitive choice. This kind of tacit consent exists at conception, when the human being is created, so it exists even before the nervous system and the ability to choose exist. In contrast to this, in the kind of tacit consent that exists in a contract implied-in-fact, the ability to choose exists, and the facts indicate that the person cognitively consented and cognitively chose to participate in the contract. So in ordinary contracts, no one gets forced into the contract because being forced into a contract automatically invalidates the contract. But because every human being consents to the positiveduty clause with a kind of consent that is so tacit that it transcends choice, and exists at a pre-cognitive or non-cognitive level of existence, the *positive duty* is as much a fundamental human obligation as the *negative duty*. On the other hand, because the *positive duty* is not accompanied by a penalty, it is not inherently enforceable as **human law**, whereas the *negative duty* is. Both the *negative duty* and the *positive duty* are enforced through pre-cognitive contracts that are entered through pre-cognitive consent. Both pre-cognitive contracts thereby exist in the realm of **<u>natural law</u>**. Because the *negative duty* is a penalty-bearing mandate, its pre-cognitive contract also exists as an explicit prescription of **human law**. Because the *positive duty* is a non-penalty-bearing mandate, its pre-cognitive contract does not necessarily exist in the realm of **human law**, although it implicitly calls for implementation as **human** law. Because of these factors, the jural compact is an immediate function of the positive duty, not of the negative duty. The jural society must assume, as a function of its subject-matter jurisdiction, that all people everywhere have given precognitive, tacit consent to abide by the *negative duty*. In contrast to this, because of the mediating jurisdictions of ordinary contracts, the ecclesiastical compact does not have **subject-matter jurisdiction** over this kind of tacit consent that transcends cognition. Even though the jural compact has subject-matter jurisdiction over this kind of pre-cognitive consent while the ecclesiastical compact does not, both of these compacts are ordinary contracts to the extent that they can only be formed through the cognitive consent of the parties. Both are also inherently designed to have a perpetual duration.

While the modern mega-state claims almost unlimited powers, according to the biblical story, God has never explicitly ordained human government for the entire human race. God has certainly ordained whatever human law genuinely and *lawfully* comes out of Genesis 9:6, and has thereby implicitly ordained whatever human government is consistent therewith. But no facts anywhere support a claim that God ordained human government willy-nilly. According to the biblical story, both the *negative duty* and the *positive duty* exist **globally**, written on the heart of every human being, including those who cognitively refuse to acknowledge the writing. In contrast to the mega-state's claim to almost unlimited powers, human government that is based upon these **global** duties is limited to powers that arise rationally out of these **global** duties. For the **natural-rights** polity to exist, there must be a rational nexus between these duties imposed by God upon all humans, and whatever human government may exist to satisfy these duties. Furthermore, the rational nexus between **<u>human law</u>** and these **<u>global</u>** duties must be explicit enough so that the jurisdictional limits on human government are clearly designated and recognizable. Otherwise, the road is open for the mega-state to claim whatever powers it wants, without even a whimper of opposition from people who claim to believe in the biblical story.

So far this theodicy has examined and expounded the jurisdictional limits and boundaries of the negative-duty clause in a way that should be clear enough. This theodicy has concluded that the *negative-duty clause*'s **<u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u>** is over damage to any human caused by one or more other humans; the in personam jurisdiction is over any human who causes such damage; and the territorial jurisdiction exists wherever humans exist. This theodicy has also examined and expounded the subject-matter jurisdiction of the positive-duty clause, showing clearly enough that its subject matter defines whatever penalty should be exacted against those who violate the *negative-duty clause*. This theodicy showed that such penalties are defined by the life-for-life proportionality, with the understanding that the proportionality must be understood broadly enough to encompass injunctions, restitution, and most if not all of the penalties that arise out of American commonlaw actions ex delicto and ex contractu. Now this theodicy is examining the in personam jurisdiction of the *positive-duty clause*. This is essentially an examination of who prosecutes. This inquiry into who prosecutes is necessarily accompanied by a corollary examination of how to prosecute. Even though the issue of how to prosecute may be understood to be more appropriately a **<u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u>** issue, the in personam issue needs to be addressed before the how-to-prosecute issue can be addressed holistically. Discovering the life-for-life proportionality is a preliminary solution to the subject-matter problem. But the how-to-prosecute problem must encompass much more than merely the penalty issue. So this examination of the in**personam jurisdiction** will address both this *in personam* problem and the broader issue of how to prosecute. So far, this inquiry has established that such prosecution should be done by way of two societies, one aimed specifically at prosecuting actions *ex delicto* and the other aimed specifically at prosecuting actions *ex contractu*. But huge questions remain: How are these societies supposed to be established? By whom? How are they supposed to operate in perpetuity? How are they financed?

To answer these questions, it's critical to recognize that these societies are formed via cognitive contracts, meaning by way of cognitive consent. For them to be formed in any other way is for them to be formed non-consensually, which means by way of *delicts*. These contracts are compacts; so every human government aimed squarely at satisfying the Genesis 9:6 mandate is inherently contractual and compactual. And all such compacts are always bound by their compactual **jurisdictions**. So in order to properly explore the **in personam jurisdiction** of the *positive-duty clause*, along with the corollary issue of how to prosecute actions *ex delicto* and *ex contractu*, it's necessary to further explore the respective **jurisdictions** of the **jural compact** and the **ecclesiastical compact**. Because cognitive consent is crucial to the formation of any kind of cognitive contract, cognitive consent is necessarily crucial to the formation of both the **jural** and the **ecclesiastical** compacts.

The crucial issues involved in determining how to form and sustain the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts pertain to taxing, taking, forced participation, and the nature of consent. As already indicated, the nature of consent is the core issue out of these four, because consent is by definition agreement, and agreement is by definition the core ingredient in the formation of any contract / compact. --- If one relies entirely upon Romans 13:1-7 and other similar New-Testament passages, and if one neglects to follow the reasoning based on the laws, covenants, and **jurisdictions** of prior biblical covenants, then one is likely to conclude that human government has been ordained by God to tax, take, and force participation almost without limits. Romans 13 is certainly as true and right as any other passage that tells the biblical story. But Romans 13 cannot be properly interpreted outside this larger context. In fact, taxing, taking, and forced participation are far more circumscribed than a face-value reading of Romans 13 would suggest.¹

Everybody knows taxation is the taking of money, or its equivalent. The state takes money from the so-called "taxpayer" under duress. In other words, modern taxation consists of secular government taking money by coercion, threats (sometimes veiled, sometimes not), and if necessary the explicit use of force. The government

¹ For more about Romans 13, see the section below, CHAPTER I, Sub-Chapter 10, <u>Section g</u>, "<u>Portal --- Ephraim's Confusion about Polity</u>".

may claim that taxation is voluntary, and most people may comply without public rancor. But if anyone doubts that modern taxation is a coercive taking, then let them test their doubt by refusing to pay, and see what happens. All modern taxation is a form of coercive taking. There are countless kinds of takings besides the taking of money, including *eminent domain*, truancy laws, forced licensure, housing codes, *etc.*, *etc.*, *etc.*, *ad nauseum*. The big problem with all takings, including taxation and forced participation, is this: How does one tell the difference between such takings and the perpetration of a *delict*? The fact that the possible *delict* is perpetrated by the state does not excuse the state, because no human or group of humans is above the law, and all humans are subject to the *negative-duty clause*, including humans who band together to form the state, and humans who become agents of the state. There is no room for *sovereign immunity* under Genesis 9:6.

Given that all humans are subject to both the *negative-duty clause* and the *positive-duty clause*, and given that all humans are thereby mandated to enter into compacts with one another to execute justice against Genesis 9:6 damage with all due diligence and care, it's clear that anyone who is committed to being obedient to the **global** covenant would acknowledge their *positive duty* by paying taxes, allowing takings, and voluntarily participating in such compacts in a way that confirms that they cognitively consent to such taxing, taking, and participation. Of course, this voluntary participation assumes that these compacts would operate within the **jurisdictional** guidelines established by the **global** covenant, and would not go *ultra vires*, exceeding **jurisdictional** boundaries, and thereby converting taxes and takings into theft, and participation in the compact into collaboration with a crime syndicate. Both how taxes are taken, and how they're spent, can easily abuse the **jurisdiction** established by the **global** covenant.

Essentially, the demand that these compacts remain within jurisdictional guidelines entails that there be a strict linkage between taxing / taking on one hand and spending / use on the other. For human government to remain *lawful*, money cannot be taxed, and property cannot be taken, for any purpose outside the *positive-duty clause*, and it cannot be taxed or taken by any means other than voluntary means. All expenditures must be rationally linked to the *positive duty*, and they must be thereby acquitted of any possible claim of jurisdictional malfeasance. Otherwise, the act of spending is an act of defrauding the tax payer and corrupting the compact.

Given that the *positive duty* pertains strictly to the execution of justice against Genesis 9:6 damage, everything said in this section up to this point is common sense based on expounding the *positive-duty clause*. But one problem in expounding the *positive-duty clause* is in determining whether all these things apply as much

to the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> as they do to the jural compact, and perhaps that has not yet been done adequately. Perhaps it's necessary to recapitulate some, and to cover this ground more thoroughly. --- On their faces, both the *negative-duty clause* and the *positive-duty clause* have **global in personam jurisdictions**. All humans are obligated by the *negative duty* to avoid perpetrating Genesis 9:6 damage against other people. Likewise, all humans are obligated by the *positive-duty clause* to execute justice against people who violate the *negative-duty clause*. On its face, this appears to indicate that what's true about taxing, taking, participation, and consent with respect to the **jural compact** must also be true about taxing, taking, participation, and consent with respect to the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u>. But this assumption deserves further scrutiny.

The **jural compact** exists to execute justice against any *delict* perpetrated by anyone, and for practical reasons, it's reasonable that such justice be limited to the jural compact's specific geographical jurisdiction. More specifically, because humans are inherently finite, the justice rendered by the **jural compact** is limited by the willingness-to-enforce problem, the proximity problem, the capacity-to-enforce problem, and probably some other limiting factors. Even so, the jural compact does not look to mediating human contracts for its jurisdiction. In the abstract, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the violation of negative duty and satisfaction of *positive duty* under the jurisdiction of the jural compact. But when the jurisdiction is limited by such practical considerations, this one-to-one correspondence between infraction and enforcement breaks down. But the reason for the one-to-one correspondence ceasing to hold in regard to the jural compact is not primarily jurisdictional. Instead, this cessation is primarily due to such practical concerns, to the limitations of human enforcers. In contrast to this, in regard to the ecclesiastical compact, the one-to-one correspondence between infraction and enforcement doesn't break down primarily for practical reasons, but for jurisdictional reasons. The one-to-one correspondence between infraction and enforcement breaks down for the ecclesiastical compact because contracts define how they are to be enforced. Either implicitly or explicitly, every genuine contract defines how it is to be enforced. So when an ecclesiastical society adjudicates a contract dispute, it must necessarily examine the jurisdiction of the contract to know how to enforce it. As the subject matter of legal action, contracts thereby eliminate the presumption of a one-to-one correspondence between *negative duty* and positive duty by establishing their own enforcement guidelines. Because of this, any given person's duty to participate in the enforcement of any given contract becomes dubious. All people have an abstract duty to execute justice against Genesis 9:6 damage that happens *ex contractu*, but unlike the duty to execute justice in the case of *delicts*, all people are precluded from actively participating in the

execution of justice *ex contractu* unless the contract specifically calls such people to do so. This means that in the execution of justice *ex contractu*, people have a duty to participate in an **ecclesiastical compact** in a general sense, but they don't have a duty to participate in a specific sense. The **ecclesiastical society** is limited by the same human limitations as the **jural society**, but its primary limitation is the **jurisdiction** of the breached contract. Further, in both general and specific senses, the duty can only be *lawfully* satisfied by way of the obligor's cognitive consent. The one-to-one correspondence between infraction and enforcement means that it should be relatively easy for the **jural society** to correlate taxing and spending. But because this one-to-one correspondence doesn't necessarily exist in regard to actions *ex contractu*, it's much more difficult for the **ecclesiastical society** should be paid mostly by litigants. Because some litigants may be paupers, it's probably a good idea for some third party to collect voluntary donations specifically for the purpose of helping indigent litigants.

In order to further explore the difference between the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts, it may help to explore it in terms of licensure: While God and only God is the judge, jury, prosecutor, executioner, in short, the enforcer or administrator of the **natural law**, God has graciously ordained that humans should act as secondary causes in the enforcement of **<u>natural law</u>** in regards to a very specific and limited subject matter that exclusively includes damage by humans to other humans. Regarding this limited subject matter, God gives a license to do something that is normally prohibited. A license is permission from a sovereign to do something that the sovereign otherwise prohibits. The prohibition is that humans are not God, and they should therefore not feign Godhood in their relations with other humans. The license is a license to act like God in regard to violations of **<u>natural law</u>** in which the given violation clearly damages other people. So biblically prescribed human law is a subset of **natural law** that exists by way of a special license. This license marks an exception to the rule that God alone enforces the **natural law**. So this license marks a disjuncture between **<u>natural law</u>** and *lawful* **<u>human law</u>**. If humans fail to recognize the disjuncture between **<u>natural law</u>** and biblically prescribed <u>**human law**</u>, then they are prone to attempting to enforce their flawed conception of **natural law**, thereby acting as usurpers of God's exclusive role as enforcer of the **<u>natural law</u>**. It's crucial to recognize the limitations on the license, and therein lies the disjuncture.

The *ex delicto / ex contractu* disjuncture has comparable limits, but these limits are based upon the license to enforce that explicitly or implicitly appears in the breached contract. On its face it appears that the *positive duty* calls all people to prosecute the damager, regardless of whether the damage exists *ex delicto* or *ex contractu*. So on

its face, it appears that damage *ex contractu* is merely a subset of damage *ex delicto*, similar to the way biblically prescribed **human law** is a subset of **natural law**. But there is also a disjuncture in the relationship between *ex delicto* and *ex contractu* that must be recognized. Otherwise, people are prone to act as usurpers of the exclusive **jurisdiction** established by the contract. It's crucial to recognize the **jurisdictional** boundaries of contracts for both the protection of those party to the contract. An example should help to clarify the nature of this licensure and the nature of this disjuncture.

For people who adhere to the Bible's *local* covenants, and for other groups that have comparable commitments, this emphasis on these biblical jurisdictions may be facially troublesome. Breeds of Christianity from western Europe often developed so that such breeds were "established" as state religions. Many Christians therefore assume that Christianity should have privileges with government that other religions do not have. Under such breeds of Christianity, some activities should be made universally illegal, even though they are not obviously *delictual*. For example, traditional breeds of Christianity hold that sodomy, bestiality, and other kinds of fornication should be made universally illegal. But this would be a violation of the strictly defined jurisdictions because such fornication is not inherently delictual, and it does not inherently breach a contract. Such a law in the secular arena would therefore be systemic violation of **<u>natural rights</u>**. In spite of this, people who adhere to the Bible's **local** covenants, especially "Christians" who are accustomed to having laws against *delict*-free mala in se, should be relieved to know that laws against delictfree mala in se can still exist within their religious communities. Contracts that define such communities give license through the consent of the parties to enforce laws ex contractu against delict-free mala in se, where enforcement is limited to the parties. Likewise, practically any religious community can be defined by a contract that is aimed at implementing the tenets of the religion. For example, a contract aimed at implementing the Ten Commandments within a given community would have ten **human laws**, each of which corresponds to an aspect of the moral-law leg of the **<u>natural law</u>**. Eight of these commandments are negative, meaning that the doing of each of these eight proscribed acts is *malum in se*, at least in the opinions of those party.¹ Two of these commandments are positive, which means that refusing to do them is *malum in se*, at least in the opinions of those party.² Only three of these ten are *delicts*.³ This means that the other seven are *delict*-free *mala in se*, and

¹ Exodus (i)20:3; (ii)20:4-6; (iii)20:7; (vi)20:13; (vii) 20:14; (viii)20:15; (ix)20:16; and (x)20:17.

² Exodus (iv)20:8-11 and (v)20:12.

³ Exodus (vi)20:13; (viii)20:15; and (ix)20:16.

are examples of contractually attempting to enforce **<u>natural law</u>** via <u>**human law**</u>. These seven are instances in which non-penalty-bearing mandates implicitly call for enforcement through <u>**human law**</u>, at least in the opinions of those party.

Given this example, it's obvious why Genesis 9:6 damage ex contractu must be limited exclusively to contractually designated enforcers. If one is not one of these contractually designated enforcers, then one is not obligated, or even allowed, to participate in such *ex-contractu* enforcement. This limitation on enforcers is essentially a license NOT to enforce such ex contractu damage, where the license is given to all humans except those designated to enforce. --- In the case of **natural law**, all humans are obligated to recognize that someone else, namely God, is judge, jury, and executioner of the **natural law**. All humans are thereby obligated to recognize that their participation in the enforcement of **<u>natural law</u>** on other people is generally banned, and can exist only through a license granted by the sovereign. The license allows humans to act as secondary causes in the enforcement of **natural law** only when a violation of **natural law** involves Genesis 9:6 damage, meaning there must be a *delict*, or there must be a contract demanding prosecution of participants for violation of the contract. In spite of the fact that all humans are called to act as secondary cause in the enforcement of **natural law** when an infraction involves Genesis 9:6 damage, this act as secondary cause is the sole exception to the rule that God alone enforces the **<u>natural law</u>**. God gives the entire human race both license and mandate to enforce ex delicto. Although the lone vigilante is thus licensed to enforce ex delicto, executing justice against other humans is inherently error-prone. There are certainly clear cases of self-defense and defense of the innocent which demand that people become lone enforcers. But in general, prudence demands that people enter into contracts with one another to facilitate following due process of law. As mentioned, such a contract is a jural compact. Regardless of whether one is party to a jural compact or not, all people are licensed to execute justice against *delict* perpetrators. But this **global** licensure doesn't extend to actions *ex contractu* because this **global** licensure is limited by whatever licenses exist within the given contract. Only humans who are designated by a contract to enforce it can enforce it *lawfully*, because only such designees are licensed to enforce. All humans who are not party are obligated to recognize that someone else, specifically, the designee, is the enforcer of that contract, and all non-designated humans have an obligation to avoid playing God, and to avoid meddling. All humans are thereby obligated to recognize that the same way they do not have license to enforce **<u>natural law</u>** generally, they do not have license to enforce a contract unless the contract specifically gives them license to do so.

Because every human gives pre-cognitive, tacit consent to abide by both the negative-duty clause and the positive-duty clause, it might be facially plausible to conclude that every human gives pre-cognitive, tacit consent to participation in both any given jural compact and any given ecclesiastical compact. Even if this could be proven true, that truth would not translate into genuine participation. This is because both of these compacts, like all ordinary, cognitive contracts, can only be entered through cognitive consent. The assumption that pre-cognitive consent suffices to make people party to such compacts is precisely and implicitly the facet of statist mythology that statists use to justify forcing people to do all kinds of statist misdeeds. From this fact, it follows that one is not obligated to provide taxes to, takings to, or participation in, either the jural society or the ecclesiastical society. **Natural law** may obligate all people to provide such things, but *lawful* **human law** does not inherently obligate anyone to provide such things. Only through a given human's cognitive consent can that human become obligated under lawful human law to provide such things. So because natural law establishes such duties, it makes sense that one would choose to voluntarily participate in both the jural compact and the ecclesiastical compact, and support each with one's voluntary goods and services, for the sake of making sure that justice is done both ex delicto and ex contractu. On the other hand, there may be good reasons for a given natural person to avoid voluntarily giving to either compact.

All laws in American common law that unambiguously prohibit *delicts* essentially flesh out the Genesis 9:6 definition of bloodshed. All such laws should be enforced **globally** by *lawful* **jural societies**, meaning against all perpetrators within the **jural society**'s **geographical jurisdiction**, regardless of the race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, *etc.*, of either the perpetrator or the victim. On the other hand, the primary function of an **ecclesiastical society** is not to enforce general laws, but to use customary methods of interpretation to interpret contracts, and THEN to see that the laws embedded in the contract are properly enforced.

c. <u>Consent Revisited:</u>

The righteous indignation that is the motive force behind the vigilance committee is precisely the same force that motivates the formation of the two compacts that are foundational to the **natural-rights** polity. History proves beyond any reasonable doubt that when human governments are based in the idea that such governments have privileges beyond those that ordinary people have, privileges like confiscatory taxation and takings, such governments turn into tyrannies. Generally, the reason people give those kinds of powers to those kinds of institutions is because people are weak, lazy, and afraid, and they want someone else to take care of them. So they voluntarily make themselves slaves of such institutions. But for someone to voluntarily make oneself someone else's slave is an altogether different act from Party A and Party B teaming up to force Party C to be Party B's slave. If A is understood to be the massive numbers of benighted statists who think that forced taxation is inherently part of being alive, and if B is the state, then C would be anyone who is convinced that confiscatory taxation is theft, and who is willing to put that belief into action by refusing to pay. This latter example is not of voluntary servitude. It is of involuntary servitude. Confiscatory taxation is inherently involuntary servitude, and no amount of pretense to the contrary will change that. Two wolves and a sheep voting on what's for dinner is no viable basis for a just society. And if B is far more powerful than either A or C, then B's forcing A and C to fork over taxes and takings is even less a basis upon which to build a just society.

When someone has enough righteous anger, he/she will act as a lone vigilante. If this person can find other people who are also righteously indignant, then they will form a vigilance committee. When they still have this righteous anger, but decide to be systematic and methodical in expressing it, they will form **jural compacts** and **ecclesiastical compacts** to express their indignation. Because there are always people in every society who are victims of someone else's misdeeds, it's crucial to have law courts and procedures to give these victims a place to vent their indignation, and a place to seek justice. Because all people need such courts from time-to-time, it's reasonable that all people would voluntarily contribute to their existence. But it's not reasonable that anyone would be forced to do so.

Both **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts should be set up to be perpetual. Some corporations are designed to have a perpetual existence, meaning that they are not intended to be consummated the same way that a sale is consummated, or in the way that some other short-term contract is consummated. A reasonable claim to perpetuity is a claim to an indefinite duration, not a claim to an infinite duration. No sane, sober, and serious human being would claim that a corporation to which he/she is party has an infinite duration. Even so, because a corporation in the general sense is simply a kind of contract aimed at some purpose and having a duration defined by that purpose, these two governmental compacts are types of corporations, in this general sense. To distinguish themselves from vigilance committees, the **jural compact** and **ecclesiastical compact** should be designed to have a perpetual existence. This is one of the main differences between these two compacts and a vigilance committee.

If people try to conform to the spirit of the Genesis 9:6 mandate, then people will try to cooperate with one another to satisfy the mandate. They will enter into compacts, where the compacts are intended to exist in perpetuity, and where the purpose of the compacts is to satisfy the mandate. Even though it's true that the

Genesis 9:6 mandate is a term of a biblical covenant, and not a term of an ordinary contract or compact, and therefore that it is part of **divine law** rather than **human law**, the biblical covenant calls all people to be enforcers of the mandate. Because of the obvious need for a division of labor in society, it stands to reason that all people are implicitly called upon by the biblical covenant to enter into compacts with one another to satisfy the mandate in a way that acknowledges the division of labor. But this requirement is a function of **natural law**, not a function of **human law**, because there is no penalty accompanying the *positive duty*.

To assume that people are not called upon to enter into compacts to satisfy the Genesis 9:6 mandate is to create huge interpretational problems with respect to Romans 13:1-7. Romans 13 speaks of governing authorities and rulers, and the Christian Covenant thereby clearly recognizes the existence of human government, even human governments like the Roman Empire, that presumes to govern a diversity of religions. Under such circumstances, the interpretational problems arise by way of the absence of any indication of where that passage's demand for respect for human government comes from. That demand for respect for human government is manifestly apparent in a face-value reading of Romans 13. If human government is not based on such compacts, then there is no biblically reasonable way to reconcile Genesis 9 and Romans 13. If human governments are not constrained to **jurisdictional** limitations that arise out of a reliable understanding of Genesis 9, then under Romans 13, human governments have free rein to abuse people as much as they please, except perhaps with the pathetically meager constraints generally recognized by modern pastors. So the need for reliable interpretational policies leads inevitably to the conclusion that all people are called by **<u>natural law</u>** to enter into compacts to satisfy the mandate to enforce against *delicts* and the violation of contracts. This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the only kind of human government that is compatible with both Genesis 9 and Romans 13, and that reconciles the two, is human government based entirely and exclusively on the natural-rights polity.

If people attempt to enforce the bloodshed mandate on one another without any thought of doing so within an organizational structure, then some people might view this as being what the biblical story disparages somewhat as, *doing what is right in one's own eyes*,¹ or *being a law unto oneself*.² On its face, Genesis 9:6 may call all people to be lone vigilantes. This is plainly to set the *modus operandi* of the *positive duty* into the guts of every human being. Even so, the means through which that motive force generally operates best over the long haul, both according to reason and according

¹ Deuteronomy 12:8; Judges 17:6; 21:25

² Romans 2:14.

to the biblical story, is through human organization. For relief from the burden of enforcing the law by oneself, people need to exercise the **natural right** to contract, and thereby enter into **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts. For people indoctrinated from birth into a statist worldview, it's tempting to assume that the Bible looks so disparagingly at lone vigilantism that it must require people to pay taxes to the **jural society**, because, after all, the **jural society** is clearly doing something noble and worthy. But before succumbing to such a conclusion, it's crucial to realize that forced taxation essentially turns the **jural society** into a protection racket. People who run protection rackets are thieves, extortionists, fraud mongers, *etc.*, and so are statists even if they like to pretend otherwise. Any time a **jural society** collects taxes by force, it turns into a criminal. Likewise, any time a **jural society** spends its receipts on anything other the execution of justice against *delicts*, the **jural society** turns automatically into the same kind of criminal. Under such circumstances the **jural society** has gone rogue, and whoever is responsible deserves to be prosecuted the same way any other rogue deserves prosecution.¹

According to this definition of consent, a jural society doesn't need cognitive consent about punishment from someone who has perpetrated a *delict*. This is because all people give tacit consent from the moment of conception to the forfeiture of their **<u>natural rights</u>**, proportional to the gravity of whatever *delict* they might later perpetrate. Likewise, all people give tacit consent from the moment of their conception, to participate in the prosecution of *delicts* in the most efficient, effective, and just manner possible, which means tacit consent to participation in any genuinely *lawful* jural society, which entails tacit consent to reasonable taxes and takings along with whatever other duties are necessary to the execution of justice against *delicts*. But unlike pre-cognitive consent to forfeiture of natural rights proportional to the gravity of whatever *delict* one may later perpetrate, pre-cognitive consent to prosecute *delicts* is not pre-cognitive consent to being prosecuted by humans. There's no penalty in the latter case, and therefore no inherent human law. People who refuse to pay taxes and takings to a *lawful jural society* are essentially covenant-breakers, but that covenant is a pre-cognitive contract. It therefore doesn't translate generally into a cognitive contract. Only the conditional license to forfeit natural rights exists in the realm of human law even when cognitive grant of that license doesn't exist. Even though people who refuse to pay taxes and takings to a *lawful* jural society are covenant-breakers in the pre-cognitive sense of the word "covenant", people who refuse to pay taxes and takings, and to provide other signs of

¹ Anyone familiar with history should know from this delineation of proper **jurisdictions** that practically every human government in history has been rogue.

participation, to an *unlawful*, pseudo-**jural society** could be covenant-keepers of the conscientious and vigilant kind.

While the ecclesiastical compact is certainly formed for the same basic reason as the jural compact, to execute justice against Genesis 9:6 damage, in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, that impetus does not extend into the actual execution of such justice, except through the convolutions and contortions built into whatever contract is subject to adjudication. This is because the possibility for such contractual laws violating **<u>natural law</u>** is huge. They could call for the violation of <u>**natural law**</u> in ways that are perverse but not *delictual*. Or they could call for the violation of **<u>natural law</u>** in ways that are clearly *delictual*. Or they might not call for the violation of **<u>natural law</u>** at all. --- No <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> should ever enforce a contract that is clearly *delictual*, for example, Party A contracting with Party B for B to murder C. Rather, whenever an ecclesiastical court discovers such a contract, the case should be handed immediately to a jural court, because *delicts* generally take priority over contract disputes, and because such a contract to perpetrate a *delict* generally invalidates the contract.¹ On the other hand, as far as **globally** prescribed human law is concerned, it's foolish to think that secular courts are qualified to judge the extent to which terms of an ordinary contract conform to **natural law**. So whether a contract conforms to **natural law** or not, is not an issue that any secular ecclesiastical compact should ever consider.² The result of this refusal to judge conformity to **<u>natural law</u>** is that the possibility for a secular <u>ecclesiastical</u> **<u>compact</u>** to violate <u>**natural law**</u> in the prosecution of a contract dispute is huge, and possibly unavoidable if the court's judgment is **jurisdictionally** sound. No one who is not party to such a contract should ever be expected to pay for any aspect of such litigation. Therefore, the thought that a secular ecclesiastical compact should be supported with taxes, takings, and participation as though the takee had given tacit, pre-cognitive consent to such takings and participation, needs to be banished like a bad dream.³

For frugality's sake, one might presume that one need not be bothered with paying anything to the **<u>ecclesiastical compact</u>**, or with participating in the

¹ In modern American courts, a similar kind of shift happens whenever *public delicts* are called for by contracts, because such contracts are illegal.

² This rule doesn't apply to non-secular <u>ecclesiastical compacts</u>. See the *Sub-Chapter*

^{3, &}quot;Secular & Religious Variants", below.

³ Religious <u>ecclesiastical compacts</u> may be very legitimate in judging a contract's conformity to <u>natural law</u>. But allowing a secular <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> to judge conformity to <u>natural law</u> is an invitation to <u>jurisdictional dysfunction</u> and tyranny. See *Sub-Chapter 3*, "*Secular & Religious Variants*", below.

ecclesiastical society's existence in any way. But this is a dangerous attitude. In modern American society, people are up to their eyeballs in contractual obligations, most of which are entirely secular. One need only consider the bills one pays regularly to get a superficial feel for how pervasive these obligations are. All of these obligations are tied to terms that indicate either explicitly or implicitly where, how, and by whom contractual disputes will be adjudicated.¹ Sadly, the American judicial system is suffering from such jurisdictional dysfunction that it's a crap shoot whether one can get justice in it or not, including with regard to actions ex contractu. That's a symptom of the disease presently being suffered by the de facto system. So if one refuses to pay taxes, takings, etc., where such monies are likely to fund a jurisdictionally dysfunctional de facto ecclesiastical compact, then such refusal may be wise in terms of keeping one's conscience clear. But that refusal may also be expensive, for obvious reasons. --- On the other hand, a refusal to participate in the **ecclesiastical compact** of a *de jure* **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, if one existed, would be a refusal to participate in judicial reform. The *de facto* judicial system is in such shambles that it is in essence begging for help. The best remedy might be to divest oneself from it for the sake of going to the *de jure* system. Such a refusal to divest from the *de facto* system and simultaneously invest in the *de jure* system would thereby be acquiescence to the status quo, and refusal to do anything to correct the dysfunction. So when one needs to adjudicate a contract dispute and one has refused to do one's part to make the court function properly, one should not expect justice or equity from it. Even though participation in the secular ecclesiastical **society** is voluntary, one should feel the weight of the Genesis 9:6 mandate enough to volunteer participation, in whatever manner is needed. Refusal to voluntarily participate in a *de jure* **ecclesiastical compact** is prescription for further social decay,

For practical reasons, the **jural society** must maintain a **geographical jurisdiction**, and consider people outside that **geographical jurisdiction** as having no say about how the **jural society** operates. So consent to the procedures used by a **jural society** is not an issue for non-citizens who live outside the **geographical jurisdiction**. But for citizens living within the **geographical jurisdiction** -- who have not committed a *delict* -- cognitive consent is crucial to the formation and maintenance of the **jural society**'s laws. Cognitive consent is what causes the **jural society** to take shape, and to take whatever form, processes, and procedures

as is refusal to participate in a *de jure* jural compact.

¹ Often statutes control such issues these days. For reasons that should be clear as this theodicy proceeds, this theodicy holds that the biblical story holds that such statutes are manifestations of **jurisdictional dysfunction**. There are other and more **jurisdictionally** sound ways to address the issue of who adjudicates, how, *etc.*

it may assume. The jural society exists to execute justice against *delicts*, regardless of where any given *delict* may have been perpetrated, but especially, for obvious practical reasons relating to the proximity problem, *delicts* perpetrated within the jural society's geographical jurisdiction. While practical considerations relating to the proximity problem tend to limit the geographical jurisdiction, practical considerations also influence assorted conventions that are necessary. There are issues like: Will the accused be tried by a jury? If so, how many people will be on the jury? What qualifications must a juror have? Will the jural society have a judge, or a bank of judges? If so, will the judge be allowed to define the prima facie parameters of a case at its initiation? What will be the rules of court? Etc. These conventions exist exclusively to fulfill this *positive duty*, and should be formed to prevent violating it in the process. The **<u>jural society</u>** procures **<u>jurisdiction</u>** automatically over anyone who allegedly perpetrates a *delict*, regardless of the perpetrator's cognitive consent, location, etc. But the existence of other jural societies may, and probably should, cause consideration of the possibility that the jural society should defer to some other jural society, where the latter has a better claim to original jurisdiction. Another practical concern is funding. As already emphasized, the jural society cannot *lawfully* tax or take without the takee's consent. But it's reasonable that the jural society would attempt to keep the population within its geographical jurisdiction informed about its financial needs. Voluntary donations could be thought of as genuinely voluntary taxation.

It's important to understand the difference between a jural society and an ecclesiastical society in terms of the different ways that rights and privileges are forfeited. In the case of *delicts* and *jural societies*, every Human A gives pre-cognitive consent to forfeiting **<u>natural rights</u>** proportionally to whatever *delictual* damage A causes to Human B. If and when the *delict* actually occurs, the forfeiture is authorized by the *delict*, and the **jural society** has authority to take **jurisdiction** over whatever person(s) allegedly perpetrated the *delict*. The consent to the conditional forfeiture is pre-cognitive. --- In the case of a contract breach and an ecclesiastical society, each party to the contract gives cognitive consent to forfeiting rights and privileges in accordance with the terms of the contract. If and when a party breaches, whatever ecclesiastical society is designated by the contract receives authority through the complaint of the offended party to execute the forfeiture against the offending party. The consent to this conditional forfeiture is entirely cognitive. So an ecclesiastical society can only exercise its authority ex contractu, against people party to the contract that's being adjudicated. Where contracts explicitly or implicitly require that contract disputes be adjudicated under the jurisdiction of a specific ecclesiastical society, the parties to that contract consent to that jurisdiction when they enter or modify the contract. An <u>ecclesiastical society</u> has no jurisdiction whatever over

people who have not entered into such contracts. By volunteering to become parties to such contracts, people are automatically at least potentially subject to such **in personam jurisdiction**. It follows from such circumstances that an **ecclesiastical society** could finance itself exclusively through fees paid by litigants. But it's also reasonable that the **ecclesiastical society** could finance itself through voluntary donations.

One of the rarely questioned assumptions in the *united States* is that the concept that governments derive "their just Powers from the consent of the governed" pertains to majority rule. In other words, the majoritarian assumption says: "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the" consent of the majority.¹ A big problem with this assumption is that it is neither confirmed in the source of the quote, the Declaration of Independence, nor confirmed in the biblical story. The assumption that consent is a function of majority rule is absolutely not confirmed by any **global** prescription in the biblical story. A majority is as capable of perpetrating Genesis 9:6 damage as an individual criminal, or an individual tyrant. To avoid the ideological swamp created by such misconceptions, it's crucial to define terms so that they are compatible with the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. In this context, a government is whatever governs the human laws that arise rationally out of the two kinds of compacts. "[J]ust Powers" are whatever powers exist within the *lawful* jurisdictions of those two kinds of compacts. "[T]he governed" are whatever humans are subject to such *lawful jurisdictions*. Because these two kinds of compacts can only be formed through cognitive consent, "the consent of the governed" can only mean the cognitive consent of the governed. It cannot mean some mythological mumbo jumbo, some "consensus" built by nefarious statists through the so-called "delphi technique", or pre-cognitive consent.

d. Police Powers:

Contractual obligations form the second kind of <u>human law</u>, the first being the obligation to avoid perpetrating *delicts.*² As already indicated, these are the only two kinds of <u>human law</u> that are *lawful.*³ Because only legal actions *ex delicto* and *ex contractu* are *lawful*, *lawful* <u>human law</u> exists in two and only two kinds: <u>ecclesiastical</u> and <u>jural</u>. <u>Ecclesiastical human law</u> derives from cognitive contracts, and is based on the prior cognitive consent of the parties to such contracts. Like

¹ Further commentary: See Porter, *u.S.* Constitution, Article I Section 8 clause 1. ---URL: http://bjp-tiaj.net/0_2_1_0_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_1.htm.

² Second in the prioritization of **human laws** based on the need to enforce, not based on chronological appearance in the biblical narrative.

³ See CHAPTER B, especially Sub-Chapter 4, "Conclusion".

jural human law, **ecclesiastical human law** demands a penalty, and it demands someone willing and able to enforce the penalty.

In traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence, the power and authority to enforce **human laws** has been called the *police power*. In this theodicy's analysis and exposition of the biblical story, *police power* is directly linked to the concept of property; property is directly linked to **natural rights**; and **natural rights** are directly linked to the *imago Dei*.

police power --- The power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. ... Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government.¹

As already indicated, this theodicy holds that the biblical story holds that there are two different types of property, primary and secondary, where contractual benefits are a type of secondary property.² So the two kinds of law-enforcement compacts, the jural compact and the ecclesiastical compact, arise as responses to violations of property, where property derives from the existence and exercise of **<u>natural rights</u>**, and where **natural rights** derive from the *imago Dei*. If *police powers* are defined within the same context, and are limited to actions ex delicto and ex contractu, then *police powers* are perfectly compatible with the biblical story. But as is evident in the above definition, *police powers* are not usually understood to have these limitations. On the contrary, they are generally understood to exist for much more nebulous purposes, like "for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals", and for "the promotion of the public convenience". Such ideas are an integral part of the mythology of statism. Statism defines *police power* as "the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, health, morals and general welfare". In the early years of the *united States*, such grandiose powers were understood to exist within "constitutional limits". Now, with constitutional government dead, moribund, or in exile, *police powers* have a *de facto* definition as "an essential attribute of government" that has no limits. So the only limits on the existing government, and on its *police powers*, are those that exist on practical grounds, and on grounds that exist in the biblical covenants. The limits defined by the biblical covenants are

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1041.

² **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood** recognizes a third type of property, namely "private jurisdiction". In this theodicy, these two types of property should be understood to encompass private jurisdiction.

those that define America's *lawful* government. Such *lawful* government can come alive if people are willing to confront rogue government, and to implement *lawful* government instead.

The type of economic system that arises naturally out of the **global** covenant is a free market.¹ A free market is a marketplace in which, even though all *delicts* are not perfectly prosecuted because this is still a fallen world, all kinds of *delicts* are systematically prosecuted. The marketplace therefore has a prevailing sense of righteousness and justice that makes people generally confident to enter into *lawful* contracts with other people. This means that monopoly capitalism, crony capitalism, communism, socialism, fascism, and all forms of economic systems that rely in any way upon statism are automatically anathema. All land that is acquired *lawfully* is acquired through free-market processes, meaning through genuine discovery and through contracts in which there is no sign of duress, coercion, or fraud. This also means that fractional-reserve banking and fiat money backed generally by legaltender laws, are both recognized as systemically perpetrated *delicts*, the former being fraud, and the latter being a form of coercive contract. In a genuine free market, lawful title to both real and personal property is acquired only through free-market processes. Free-market processes are by definition devoid of *delicts*, regardless of whether the *delicts* come from government or from elsewhere.

As already indicated, one's ownership of one's body defines one's primary property. Ownership of anything beyond one's body is ownership of secondary property, including benefits from contracts. Primary property does not have *lawful* economic value, because living human beings are not bought and sold, except when they are victims of bloodshed.² Even so, one's labor has economic value because such labor can be bought and sold. In fact, all *lawful* economic value derives from the combination of labor and land. People own their labor by **natural right**. Ownership of secondary property is also a **natural right**, as an abstract principle, a universal capacity.³ When this **natural right** to own secondary property

¹ Further commentary: See Porter, *u.S.* Constitution, Amendment V. --- URL: http:// bjp-tiaj.net/0_A_2_Am_V_(Free_Market).htm. At "The Foundation of Secondary Property".

² Or when an adult sells his/her own body parts.

³ One's ownership of one's labor is a **<u>natural right</u>**, but the ability to do productive labor is a privilege that's given by God. For example, infants are born with the natural ownership of their labor, but they are born with a lack of capacity to perform economically valuable labor. Such capacity is acquired by the grace of God, and through the efforts of the growing minor. --- The same situation applies to the ownership of land. All humans are born with the **<u>natural right</u>** to own land, because all humans are created in

is instantiated -- when it is actuated rather than allowed to exist purely as a potential – this instantiation is essentially the acquisition of a privilege under the **natural law**. It is a privilege given by God. It's essential for every such *lawful* privilege, such ownership of secondary property, to be recognized and accepted by the society at large, for the sake of minimizing property disputes. So *lawful* acquisition of secondary property -- including land (*real property*) -- happens through free market processes, and needs to be acknowledged as *lawful* by **human law**.¹

Given that the only kind of economic system that is compatible with this **jurisdictionally** limited kind of human government is a free market, a market that eschews *delicts*, and given that human beings are fallen creatures that are inherently prone to depraved behavior, it's reasonable to wonder how restraints can be placed on such a free market that will curtail its propensity to go awry. This is essentially a question about how *municipal police powers* can operate *lawfully* within such a market, and about how *municipal functions* and *municipal purposes* can be *lawfully* gratified within such a free market. These questions go to the heart of how human governments need to be structured. These are the core issues to be addressed in the next two sub-chapters, "Social Compact" and "Secular and Religious Variations".

e. To Recapitulate, Reiterate, & Reinforce:

Actions *ex delicto* generally take priority over actions *ex contractu*. This is true both in American law and in the biblical story. Actions *ex delicto* take priority over actions *ex contractu* in the biblical story because covenant-keeping people are obligated by the **global** covenant with immediate *positive* and *negative duties* regarding *delicts*, while these duties regarding contracts are mediated by contractual terms. In other words, even though all Genesis 9:6 damage is proscribed, damage via contracts is necessarily adjudicated and mediated by way of the human-ordained terms of the human-ordained contract. Damage via *delicts* is not necessarily adjudicated and mediated by way of a **jural compact** is generally better than by way of a vigilance committee,

God's image. But all humans are born with a very truncated capacity to own land. The capacity, actual ownership of land, is acquired as a privilege given by God (by God's grace, subsequent human faith, and the labor that results from such faith).

1 This theodicy holds that the biblical story posits what might be called a "propertyinterest model of secondary property". See *Sub-Chapter 4*, *Section c*, "*How a Stand-Alone Secular Social Compact Might Arise*", below. Also see Porter, "Free Market Economics, Property Acquisition, & the Settlement of America", an article about the united States Constitution's Amendment V. --- URL: http://www.bjp-tiaj.net/0_TIAJ/0_A_2_Am_V_ (Free_Market).htm. and a vigilance committee is generally better than a lone vigilante. The **jural compact** exists strictly to facilitate enforcement, NOT for the sake of modifying the **jurisdiction** in any way.

A *lawful* jural society is the network of people who, through their mutual agreement, attempt to enforce actions *ex delicto*. Because of its exclusive focus on *delicts*, it is not the same thing as a "jural society" in normal American legal jargon. Through their mutual agreement, the people who form the jural society do so by creating a jural compact. --- Every ecclesiastical society exists strictly to interpret and enforce contracts. Because laws that are not enforced are laws in name only, and because the functionality of any society that has a complex division of labor is based upon the functionality of myriad contracts that collectively aim to gratify myriad needs and desires that are inherent in the human condition, the efficacy of the ecclesiastical society.

The **<u>human laws</u>** enforced by <u>ecclesiastical courts</u> derive from the myriad contracts that look implicitly or explicitly to the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> for enforcement. The <u>ecclesiastical society</u> merely interprets and enforces contracts, and does not create the <u>human law</u> that it enforces. <u>Ecclesiastical</u> courts certainly use rules of contractual interpretation. But its laws are created by the parties to the contracts, and enforceable only upon them. In contrast to this, the <u>human laws</u> enforced by the <u>jural society</u> come from the interpretation and understanding of Genesis 9:6 bloodshed, and they are general laws enforceable generally against any perpetrator. In American law <u>human laws</u> proscribing *delicts* are generally identified by the common law. In other words, they are based on centuries of legal precedent and case law.

The impetus behind all <u>ecclesiastical law</u> is the cognitive consent of the parties.¹ God created human beings as social creatures. The myriad human desires, needs, pursuits (agreements, gifts, contracts) are the root impetus behind the formation of ordinary contracts, and the need to enforce such contracts is the root impetus behind the formation of <u>ecclesiastical societies</u> and <u>ecclesiastical compacts</u>. The myriad human social pursuits have nothing to do with *delicts* of any kind. The underlying impetus for all these pursuits is common to every society because they are built into the human condition. Even so, the manner in which these legitimate, organic desires are pursued can vary wildly, based upon diverse views of reality and a

¹ Further commentary: See Porter, "Maxims of the Global Covenant". --- URL: http://bjp-tiaj.net/1_Helps/1_0_Glossaries/1_0_2_Maxims_of_Global_Covenant_R.htm, maxim #5.

variety of resources. --- As already indicated the strict definition of an <u>ecclesiastical</u> <u>society</u> is the group of people whose function in the society at large is to adjudicate and enforce contracts whenever contract disputes arise. There is also a less rigorous definition of an <u>ecclesiastical society</u>. Assuming that a society at large is fairly homogeneous, it's likely that most of the intramural contracts within that society will look to the society's <u>ecclesiastical society</u> for adjudication and enforcement. As a result, a more general definition of an <u>ecclesiastical society</u> is, the aggregation of all the contracts whose terms call for the given strictly-defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> to adjudicate, into a single social network.

The Genesis 9:6 mandate essentially gives every human being police powers against perpetrators of *delicts*. It is to every human's advantage to enter into compacts to exercise such *police power*. This is true for the same reason society needs a division of labor. If all people have the same vocation, then the needs met by all the other vocations go unmet. Also, many people are frail or disabled, and are largely incapable of enforcing for themselves. So the need for a division of labor creates a need for a specific group of people dedicated to executing justice against *delicts*. The jural society is paid with jural taxes. This form of taxation is different from any other form of taxation because **jural** taxation exists only so that an ordinary person can satisfy his or her duty to execute justice against *delicts*, by proxy. In essence, the jural society is a servant to the tax payer, gratifying the tax payer's need under the positive-duty clause, by proxy. Under this division of labor, because the professional mechanic, for example, doesn't have time to be a policeman, he pays jural taxes to satisfy the *delictual* aspect of the *positive-duty clause* by proxy. As already indicated, all people are called to be party to a jural society, regardless of whether it's as an active agent / servant / office-holder or as a more passive, by-proxy, tax payer. Even though all this is true, jural taxation is not *lawfully* confiscatory. Under a strict construction of Genesis 9:6, no kind of taxation can be confiscatory and *lawful* at the same time. It's crucial to note in passing that a jural society's lawful penalties against any given person's secondary property are not a form of taxation, but are an execution of the life-for-life proportionality.

Because a **jural compact** is not an exception to the rule that *lawful* contracts can only be formed and entered voluntarily, intentionally, and knowingly -- because cognitive consent to participation is a prerequisite to all cognitive contracts -- it's critical that the **jurisdiction** of such a contract be very strictly construed. It's possible for a person to refuse to give cognitive consent. Refusal to give cognitive consent might be *lawful*, although refusal to give cognitive consent might also be a violation of **natural law**, even though it's not a violation of **human law**. Whether it's a violation of **natural law** or not depends upon the **jural compact**'s **jurisdiction**.

Human history is essentially documentation about all the enormous number of ways that this jural jurisdiction has been abused. The subject matter of jural compacts pertaining to *delicts* and to nothing else, human history is almost entirely a litany of instances in which **jural subject-matter jurisdictions** have been either expanded beyond *delicts*, or neglected entirely. When a jural compact expands its subjectmatter jurisdiction beyond *delicts*, it becomes tyrannical. Such a government turns into a perpetrator of *delicts* by forcing people to abide by laws against non-consensual mala prohibita, and by forcing people to enter into non-jural contracts mandatorily, unintentionally, and/or unknowingly. When a nominal jural compact neglects to prosecute *delicts*, the society becomes anarchistic. The society allows rogue elements to abuse people, and fails to do what's necessary to execute justice against these rogues. Often both tyranny and anarchy happen at the same time. With regard to some subject matters and some sectors of society, the de facto jural compact turns tyrannical. With regard to other subject matters and other sectors, the jural compact allows anarchy. To the extent that a jural society goes rogue, it loses its authority to *lawfully* collect jural taxes, even though jural taxes can only be collected voluntarily, through the consent of the taxee. Any time a jural society goes outside its narrow subject matter, that jural society is operating ultra vires, has gone rogue, and is perpetrating *delicts* by collecting taxes, and probably in many other respects as well. Under such circumstances, the nominal jural society needs to be stopped like any other perpetrator.

Jural societies easily deteriorate into protection rackets and other *delictual* scams. History shows this beyond a reasonable doubt. A major sign of such deterioration exists in the form of evidence that **jural** taxation has turned confiscatory. Because **jural compacts** are historically prone to having their **jurisdictions** misconstrued, and because when this happens, they tend to become absolutely evil, it's absolutely crucial to avoid adding any other subject matter to them. Adding extra subject matter to a **jural compact** is an invitation to **jurisdictional** misconstruction and dysfunction. Because of these things, and for numerous other reasons already cited, it's prudent for contract disputes to be adjudicated through an entirely different governmental compact. The same way that people need to work together in agreement to form **jural compacts**, people need to work together in agreement to form a governmental compact through which contract disputes can be adjudicated.

The same way the **jural society** exists purely and strictly to prosecute *delicts*, an **<u>ecclesiastical society</u>** exists purely and strictly to adjudicate contract disputes. Like the **jural society**, the **<u>ecclesiastical society</u>** cannot be allowed to collect taxes through confiscatory methods. Every litigant in a contract dispute should pay court costs mandatorily. In addition to this, everyone in the society who is

party to any contract that might be adjudicated by the <u>ecclesiastical society</u> should voluntarily support the <u>ecclesiastical society</u> financially. But again, the emphasis is on voluntary, cognitively consensual revenues, with a ban on the involuntary, and with a strict distinction between taxation and property penalties that arise out of a judgment.

As already indicated, in the typical school of jurisprudence, an "ecclesiastical society" is understood to be a religious society. In their fallen condition, all human beings are inherently idol factories. So it's impossible for human beings to avoid being religious. Even secular humanists, atheists, agnostics, and the most hardened materialists are religious. All people worship something. So all societies are "ecclesiastical societies" under such circumstances. The use of "ecclesiastical" in the expressions, ecclesiastical compact and ecclesiastical society, should not be confused with the normal legal usage, which pertains "to anything belonging to or set apart for the church" (ecclesiastical).¹ Because this theodicy focuses so heavily on the **global** covenant, its usage of "church" and **religion** are much more broadly defined than is normal in common parlance or in legal jargon. This theodicy's use of "ecclesiastical" is based on the legal definition of ecclesia, "An assembly".² But an ecclesiastical compact is more than a mere assembly. By being the default vehicle for adjudication of a society's contract disputes, under its broad definition of <u>ecclesiastical compact</u>, it is the aggregation or coalescence of all the agreements, gifts, and contracts of an assembly or society into a single system or network of such agreements, gifts, and contracts. So an ecclesiastical compact can be understood to be this system or network conceptualized as a single compact. But this single compact excludes whatever agreements, gifts, and contracts are fundamental to the existence of a jural compact. --- Because every human being, and every society, worships something, and is therefore **religious** in nature, every society is a **religious** society, even societies of barbarians, pagans, and perverts. Every human being, and every society, values something more than anything else, even if that most valued thing is nothing more than one's next meal. That human being's, or that society's, most valued thing is that human being's or society's God or gods. An ecclesiastical society, in the broad sense, is the network of people who, by their associations, agreements, and contracts, form an ecclesiastical compact, in the broad sense.

The impetus behind all **jural** <u>human laws</u> is the fact that all people are created in the image of God, and are therefore equal in <u>natural rights</u>, and necessarily equal

¹ Black's 5th, p. 459.

² Black's 5th, p. 459.

before the law.¹ Human laws that violate the spirit or letter of the global mandate against *delicts* are inherently illegitimate. The core characteristic of all human law that's consistent with this global mandate is that it observes that all people are created in the image of God, and are therefore equal in <u>natural rights</u> before such <u>human</u> law. --- Human law that derives from contracts is geared to protect contractual privileges and obligations that derive from such contracts. Even so, because jural human law trumps <u>ecclesiastical human law</u>, contractual <u>human law</u> must avoid violating the fact that all people are created in the image of God, and are therefore equal in the image of God, and are therefore equal in <u>natural rights</u>.² Contractual privileges and benefits are acquired through the same mechanism as other kinds of secondary property, *i.e.*, through cognitive consent and labor on land. Primary property is acquired through non-cognitive or pre-cognitive tacit consent.

A <u>human law</u> that cannot be enforced is not a real <u>human law</u>.³ <u>Human law</u> is law imposed by humans upon humans. For any obligation to be real <u>human law</u>, such <u>human law</u> must be enforceable. There are two obvious prerequisites to any obligation being humanly enforceable: (1)There must be a penalty to be executed by humans. (2)There must be someone willing and able to enforce it. --- There are at least eight obligations in the <u>global</u> covenant, including the two duties in Genesis 9:6.⁴ These other obligations derive from each of the three <u>global</u> covenants that appear in Genesis 1-11. None of these other obligations of the <u>global</u> covenant meets both of these two prerequisites, a penalty and an enforcer. None of these others has the jurisprudential status of being a biblically prescribed <u>human law</u>, although each has the potential for being contractually translated into <u>human</u> <u>law</u>. Each of these other obligations may be real <u>eternal law</u>, <u>natural law</u>, and/or <u>divine law</u>, but because they don't prescribe penalties and enforcement (excepting Genesis 9:6), they are not prescription of <u>human law</u>. So out of these eight or more

¹ Further commentary: See Porter, "Maxims of the Global Covenant". --- URL: http:// bjp-tiaj.net/1_Helps/1_0_Glossaries/1_0_2_Maxims_of_Global_Covenant_R.htm, maxim #4.

² Just because people are equal in **<u>natural rights</u>**, it doesn't follow that all people have the same ultimate destination, or the same capacities and/or privileges. The rule regarding secular <u>ecclesiastical compacts</u> still holds. Secular <u>ecclesiastical societies</u> should not endeavor to enforce <u>**natural law**</u>, or even <u>**natural rights**</u>, as a general rule. But when contracts call for *delicts* against non-parties, they are inherently *unlawful*.

³ Further commentary: See Porter, "Maxims of the Global Covenant". --- URL: http:// bjp-tiaj.net/1_Helps/1_0_Glossaries/1_0_2_Maxims_of_Global_Covenant_R.htm, maxim #12.

⁴ See Porter, "Maxims of the Global Covenant", maxim #1. --- URL: http://www.bjptiaj.net/1_Helps/1_0_Glossaries/1_0_2_Maxims_of_Global_Covenant_R.htm.

human obligations in the **global** covenant, only the *negative-duty clause* is directly a prescription of **human law**. Out of these eight, the *positive-duty clause*, and only the *positive-duty clause*, is indirectly prescription of **human law**. All terms of the **global** covenant are **globally** applicable as **natural law**, but all are not **globally** enforceable as **human law**.

Every real human law requires a penalty. To see how penalties are essential prerequisites to the existence of real human law, consider this scenario: Mr. X murders Fred. Mr. X is not a party to any contract or compact in Fred's society. Even so, the jural society where Fred was murdered will pursue Mr. X to execute something akin to the lex talionis against him. This is because the bloodshed mandate, like all the terms of the **global** covenant, applies to all people; but unlike the **global** covenant's other human obligations, the mandate to avoid perpetration of a *delict* has a penalty, namely, the life-for-life proportionality, which in the case of capital murder, is the *lex talionis*. So if Mr. X is within reach of the **jural society**, it will execute retribution against him. But if the **global** covenant did not stipulate this global penalty, then the proscription of murder would be natural law, but not human law. Mr. X would be as free as Cain to repeat his offense. Without a penalty, jural human law cannot exist. --- To see how the fact that lack of penalty entails lack of enforceability entails lack of human law affects an ecclesiastical society, consider the following scenario: Mr. X drinks animal blood. Mr. X has entered into a contract with numerous people in the society, and the contract forbids the drinking of animal blood. But no penalty is specified. Since no penalty is specified, there is no leverage with which to compel Mr. X to abide by the standards. So the society either gives up its standards, or puts a penalty in place. Because a lawful society operates by consent, if Mr. X refuses to consent to the adoption of a penalty, the society still has no leverage with which to compel compliance. Unless a mechanism like majority rule is a prerequisite to participation in the given contract, from the beginning, no mechanism exists by which to compel Mr. X into compliance. Another possible mechanism to persuade (but not compel) Mr. X to comply might be to refuse to buy from him or sell to him, and to refuse to make any new contracts or agreements with him. Such an embargo against Mr. X might be sufficient to make him either comply or resign participation in the given contract. This kind of embargo doesn't entail perpetration of any kind of *delict* against Mr. Х.

A real **<u>human law</u>** requires that there be people willing and able to enforce it. Even if a law has a penalty, if there's no one willing and able to enforce it and execute the penalty, it has no real existence. So if there's no one willing and able to enforce an obligation, the obligation doesn't exist as real **<u>human law</u>**, regardless of whether the obligation is **jural** or **ecclesiastical** and regardless of whether or not there is a presumed penalty.

Real <u>ecclesiastical human law</u> is based on the consent of the parties to an agreement or contract. It applies only to those parties. As a prerequisite to being real <u>human law</u>, there must be someone willing, able, and designated by contract to enforce it. Suppose Mr. X drinks blood. Mr. X has no contracts with anyone. Since his drinking blood does not result in a dead, damaged, or injured party, his blood drinking is outside the <u>jurisdiction</u> of the <u>jural society</u>. Since he has no contracts with anyone in the society, he is not subject to any of the society's contractual standards.¹ Even if the terms of the <u>global</u> covenant forbid drinking blood, this prohibition is not enforceable against all people, because no <u>human law</u> penalty is specified for it in the <u>global</u> covenant. There is therefore no one able to *lawfully* enforce it against people who do not consent to abide by it.

Real jural human law is not based on the cognitive consent of those subject to the laws, although it does require the cognitive consent of its enforcers, meaning consent to enforce. It applies to anyone who violates it. Because the mandate against any *delict* is accompanied by a penalty --- the life-for-life proportionality -- it may appear that the many **jural compacts** inherently mandated to exist would have teeth, compared to the other **global** obligations that have no mention of a humanexecutable penalty.² But this is not necessarily true. The **<u>jural</u>** obligations could be as toothless and un-enforceable as all the other obligations of the **global** covenant. This is because the existence of a penalty is not enough to make a law enforceable. In order for a law to be enforceable, there must be people who are willing and able to enforce it. Likewise, if there's no one willing and able to enforce the mandate against a *delict*, it won't be enforced. --- If a society decides collectively, by the consent of all having capacity, to abide by the **<u>global</u>** covenant's **<u>jural</u>** obligations, then the enforcement against perpetrators of *delicts* is not so problematical. For most intents and purposes, both the penalty requirement and the people-willing-and-able requirement are met. But if all do not consent, no one is delivered from the obligation. All are still obligated to abide by the **jural** obligations. --- According to the bloodshed mandate, all people are obligated to execute justice against perpetrators of a *delict*. But what if people refuse to do that, and refuse to help in the execution of justice against *delicts* in any way? --- According to the **global** covenant, there is no explicit penalty against people who exercise such a refusal. Even though refusal to recognize

¹ Unless he drinks blood in a geographical location owned by people who reject blood drinking, in which case they can expel him, based on the *delict*, *trespass*.

² See Porter, "Maxims of the Global Covenant", maxim #1. --- URL: http://www.bjp-tiaj.net/1_Helps/1_0_Glossaries/1_0_2_Maxims_of_Global_Covenant_R.htm.

the obligation to execute justice against *delicts* may be an insistence on returning to the antediluvian status of society, and even though such an insistence may be hostile to God's clear intentions in implementing the bloodshed mandate, a penalty cannot be imposed on this refusenik, except perhaps through consensual, non-violent, non*delictual* mechanisms like a boycott. The fact that taxation is necessarily voluntary is proof that Anglo-American jurisprudence is **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**.

* * *

Both *lawful* jural societies and *lawful* ecclesiastical societies need to be established, and the entire American legal system, including all branches of government, needs to be modified so that it complies with the biblical story's jurisdictionally reliable foundation. The same is true for every other nation on earth. Any kind of law or legal action that is neither *ex delicto* nor *ex contractu* needs to be repealed, rejected, and outmoded. In order for such jurisdictionally rigorous guidelines to be viable in a pluralistic, technologically advanced society, people generally need to know more about these governmental contracts and what it takes to make governments operate within these guidelines. This is especially evident when considering the scope of *municipal police powers*, *purposes*, and *functions*.

Sub-Chapter 2: Social Compact

By now, it should be obvious that **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts are necessary to **human law** and human governments that are genuinely *lawful*. Even if **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts are called by other names, it should be obvious that they are essential, and the reader should take it as undeniable that the biblical story posits them as necessary, and likewise posits their **jurisdictional** distinctions as necessary.¹

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¹ It should also be obvious that these claims are based on the broader claim that all truth is God's truth. As Abraham Kuyper is reputed to have said, "There is not an inch in the whole of temporal life about which Christ, as Lord of all men, does not say, 'Mine.'" Failure to recognize God's sovereignty over every fact is invitation to disintegration of both endogenous and exogenous standing waves. This is as true for jurisprudential facts as it is for scientific facts, mathematical facts, and biblical facts. All facts that can be known by humans are manifestations and expressions of **natural law**. In each leg of the **natural-law** tripod, facts knowable by humans are manifestations of the **natural law**. In contrast, in **human law**, facts are used as evidence to prove or disprove violations of **human law**, and not so much to manifest the existence of **human law**, although the latter is certainly

A face-value, sub-rational reading of the Bible might never lead to the conclusion that **<u>jural</u>** and **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** societies and compacts are crucial aspects of the biblical prescription of human law. But the belief that God is rational, combined with the belief that all truth is God's truth, leads relentlessly to this conclusion: Jural and ecclesiastical societies and compacts are crucial to establishing who is responsible for enforcing the *positive-duty clause*, and to establishing how to enforce this clause. --- The human impetus towards rational integrity, when properly influenced by these two beliefs about God -- that God is rational and that all truth is God's truth -- leads inevitably to conclusions that a mere face-value, sub-rational reading of the Bible could never reach. As the author of all of creation, God is bigger than the Bible, but God is still nevertheless the author of his holy book and of his holy covenant, and of all of the book's rational elegance, and of all of the covenant's **jurisdictional** elegance. Because God is the author of all, all is necessarily incorporated into the biblical story even if unarticulated. So based on the ideas proclaimed in the sub-chapters above, the biblical story must necessarily maintain that jural and ecclesiastical compacts and societies are undeniable aspects of the biblical prescription of human law. But even if the reader grants that all of these claims are true, it's probably also obvious to the reader that by themselves, these claims do not sufficiently explain how to establish viable and *lawful* human government.

In the first chapter of Luke's gospel, the mother of Jesus declares: "My soul magnifies the Lord, ... for he ... has scattered the proud in the thoughts of their hearts; he has brought down the mighty from their thrones and exalted those of humble estate."¹ --- Shortly after the promulgation of the **Noachian Covenant**, the biblical story narrates a prime example of how God "scatter[s] the proud in the thoughts of their hearts". Noah's descendants collaborated to build "a city and a tower with its top in the heavens".² The narrative indicates that they did this for the sake of making a name for themselves, and for fear of being "scattered abroad over the face of the whole earth". In other words, they did it out of pride, and out of the spirit of aggrandizing mankind and self. They did not do this building of city and tower out of a spirit of acknowledging that God is the author of all three legs of the **natural-law** tripod. Instead, they did this with an allegiance to themselves above all else, and with a collective conscience marked by fear. While gloating in humanistic pride, they had commensurate fear that perhaps this pride was not rationally consistent with the **natural law**. They were not building with a

also a function of facts in <u>human law</u>. The crucial point is that <u>jural</u> and <u>ecclesiastical</u> compacts and <u>jurisdictions</u> are crucial to the biblical prescription of <u>human law</u>.

¹ Luke 1:46-52 (**ESV**).

² See Genesis 11:1-9.

commitment to recognizing that all truth is God's truth. So they were afraid that God would break up their game and cause them to be scattered. Their pride was real, and too much an affront to the truth, so their fear was well-founded.

The Tower of Babel episode identifies a syndrome that plagues the human race to this day. The syndrome explains why the **jurisdictional** boundaries and distinctions contained within the ambit of the *positive-duty clause* have remained largely cloaked from human cognition until now, even though they were embedded in the biblical story almost from the beginning. An upcoming chapter will look at this syndrome specifically.¹ In the meantime, it's necessary to continue building on these two compacts until it's obvious how to build human governments so that such governments are consistent with the biblical covenants and the biblical story.

According to the biblical story, the Tower of Babel episode ended when God confused their language so that they could not understand one-another, and "scattered them abroad over the face of the whole earth". Shortly thereafter, these descendants of Noah were separated into distinct clans, languages, lands, and nations.² Even though all of these clans and nations were **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**, the fact that these people were organized into clans and nations provides a starting place for expounding how the **jural society** and the **ecclesiastical society** should operate as subsets of a *lawful* society.

Any time people agree to live together as a clan or nation, that agreement is implicitly contractual, if not explicitly contractual. At the very least, there is a pre-cognitive contract that binds the clan or nation. According to the biblical prescription of **human law**, such a contract should always encompass **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts as sub-compacts, even though such a pre-cognitive contract would not be enforceable as **human law**. For all the reasons already set forth, contract formation is crucial to the efficient protection of rights and property. Because no one likes having their **natural rights** and property abused,³ every clan and nation has implicit or explicit remedies for the damage that accompanies such abuse. In some clans and nations, the remedies for Genesis 9:6 damage may appear to be almost absent as a result of **jurisdictional dysfunction**. In other clans and nations the remedies may be worse than the original damage. Regardless of how

¹ See Chapter I, "The Motive Clause: Tower of Babel, Statism, & Redemption of Human Law", below.

² Genesis 10:5,20,31.

³ Some might argue that masochists and other servile personality types like having their **<u>natural rights</u>** abused. But this is a perversion of human nature resulting from a perverse perception of the <u>**natural law**</u>. Given personalities that are adequately conformed to **<u>natural law</u>**, no one likes having their <u>**natural rights**</u> abused.

jurisdictionally dysfunctional any given clan / nation may be, the demand for remedy always exists. But this demand for remedy for Genesis 9:6 damage is not the core reason for the aggregation of these people into clans and nations, although it is certainly a factor.

People aggregate into clans and nations to gratify myriad needs and desires that are far more difficult to satisfy when people are isolated. By aggregating and having a division of labor, people naturally enter into agreements with one another to gratify these myriad needs and desires. Because no one likes being burned in such agreements, there is a deep-seated propensity to put enforcement mechanisms into such agreements, tending thereby to turn the agreements into contracts. This means that within clans, tribes, and nations, the need for having some kind of ecclesiastical society for the adjudication of contract disputes is huge. Humans are social creatures, and in an imperfect world, social creatures have conflicts. So it's likely that in each of these ancient clans, tribes, and nations, there existed some kind of <u>ecclesiastical society</u>. In a primitive clan / nation, the <u>ecclesiastical society</u> may be nothing more than a tribal elder or shaman trying to remedy the contract dispute with some kind of primordial rite. Even though this attempt at remedy may be jurisdictionally dysfunctional, it is still nevertheless a sign that an ecclesiastical society / compact exists within the given clan / nation. It also shows that an ecclesiastical compact exists in the broader sense of the term.

In the broader sense of the term, an ecclesiastical compact is the aggregation of all the contracts in a clan / nation into a single system or network of contracts, excluding the **jural compact**. Even though it may be edifying in some respects to conceive of all these contracts as such a network, an ecclesiastical compact in this broad sense has no immediate bearing on human law. As long as such a broadly defined ecclesiastical compact remains informal, it is more a pre-cognitive contract than a cognitive contract. It is like a contract that merely exists subliminally within the society. Even so, because no one likes being the victim of Genesis 9:6 damage, there is huge demand in every clan / nation for some kind of **jural society** and **jural** compact. This is true even if the jural society is jurisdictionally dysfunctional, and even if the people in the clan / nation cannot conceive of how to articulate their demand. --- Clearly, even if they were jurisdictionally dysfunctional, these ancient clans / nations had both jural compacts and ecclesiastical compacts. In order for a **jural society** and a broadly defined **ecclesiastical society** to function together in the same clan / nation, there would need to be agreements about how these two compacts would function together. This need points to another crucial concept, identified in this theodicy's nomenclature as a social compact. A social compact, in the broad sense of the term, is the aggregation of all the contracts in a clan /

nation, including the **jural compact** and the **<u>ecclesiastical compact</u>**, into a single system or network of contracts. Like the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> in the broad sense of that term, this single system or network has no immediate bearing on <u>human law</u>. Its status is also essentially pre-cognitive as long as it remains informal.

Based on the proposition that the jural and ecclesiastical compacts are implicitly mandated in Genesis 9:6, lawful human government is necessarily a system of contracts. Governments that are not based on contracts and consent are not lawful governments. If governments are not based on contracts and consent, then in practically everything they do, they perpetrate *delicts* under *color of law*, and they probably violate the rule that contracts are by definition agreements, and the rule that agreements are by definition mutual consent. --- It may be true that people generally believe that government by consent is idealistic and unrealistic. Because jurisdictional dysfunction has been the norm since the Tower of Babel, ignorance about *lawful* jurisdictions has been the norm. Given this kind of norm, there's no wonder that government by consent is generally considered unrealistic and idealistic. But common sense says that government by consent is unrealistic only if the know-how necessary to make government by consent viable is missing. Even though the Bible doesn't explicitly say that governments are built with contracts, according to any reasonable reading of it, lawful human governments can be instituted among human beings only by way of contracts, and must be aimed at satisfying the duties in Genesis 9:6. The fact that jurisdictional dysfunction has been the norm since Babel indicates that government by consent has NOT been the norm. This jurisdictional dysfunction also indicates that "the mighty" abusing people "from their thrones" has been the norm since Babel. The establishment of genuine government by consent is an act by God that providentially "exalt[s] those of humble estate", because in genuine government by consent, "the mighty" are removed as the **human-law** sovereign, and the consent of ordinary people becomes such sovereign.

Regarding the know-how necessary to make government by consent realistic, it's obvious that if the **jural compact** and the **ecclesiastical compact** both exist within the same society, there has to be some kind of contractual relationship between them that will allow them to interact as needed, while pursuing their respective, distinct **jurisdictions**. As long as the respective **jurisdictions** of the **jural compact** and **ecclesiastical compact** remain distinct, it's reasonable that the interface between the two would be contractual, and interaction between the two would be by way of a mediating contract. Of course, in these rudimentary clans and nations that were the by-product of Babel's dissolution, the interaction between the **jural** societies would probably be **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**, so much

so that the two would not be distinguishable to anyone living in any one of those clans / nations.

Given a clan / nation which had explicitly formed both the jural and the ecclesiastical societies, both of these sub-societies would be in operation in the same encompassing society / clan / nation. Because every society / clan / nation has a need for both a jural society and an ecclesiastical society, it's reasonable to call the contract that binds these societies together a social compact, in the strict sense of that term. So in the strict sense of the term, a social compact is the contract that unites the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts. The **jural compact** and the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> are thereby subsets of the <u>social compact</u> in the strict sense, but they're also sub-compacts of the social compact in its broad sense. As already indicated, a social compact in the broad sense is most likely to be a precognitive contract that is generally unenforceable as *lawful human law*. But it's also possible that it could be formalized so that it is an either tacit or express cognitive contract that unites the **jural compact**, the **ecclesiastical compact**, and a society's myriad other contracts and agreements into a single, contractually networked society. This process of uniting does not override the mutual exclusivity of the jural and ecclesiastical compacts, but merely makes them able to communicate and cooperate. So in both the broad and the narrow senses, a social compact is either a pre-cognitive or cognitive contract that unites the jural compact and the ecclesiastical compact within a single society. A social compact is an integration of jural and ecclesiastical compacts into a single nation, tribe, or ethnic group, thereby instantiating some kind of human government, while presumably keeping the two sub-compacts distinct. It's reasonable to assume that the degree of jurisdictional dysfunction operating within a clan / nation is inversely proportional to the degree of distinctness of the two sub-compacts.

Even though the aggregate needs and desires of a clan / nation are obviously myriad, they must also be finite. The aggregate needs and desires that are encapsulated by the broadly defined **social compact** are necessarily finite. Given that every human being has a finite set of needs and desires -- starting with the need for endogenous standing wave cohesion and including needs for food, water, housing, clothing, *etc.* -- the needs / desires of the clan / nation as a whole must also be finite. There may be variations on the set of needs and desires from one human being to another, and from one clan to another, but because humans are finite, the variations must also be finite. The approach to gratifying needs and desires may vary drastically from one clan / nation to another. But the nature, characteristics, and attributes of human needs and desires are necessarily a function of being human. Humans are finite. So the variations are finite. The needs and desires of any given

clan / nation are a function of the given clan / nation as surely as the basic needs and desires of any given human being are a function of the given human. Given that these claims are obvious on their face, it's also obvious that the jurisprudential concepts of *municipal purposes* and *functions* are also functions of humanity's finite needs and desires. These jurisprudential concepts are therefore encompassed by the broad definition of <u>social compact</u>. Before examining *municipal purposes* and *functions*, it's important to understand the jurisprudential definition of *municipal*.

municipal --- In narrower, more common sense, it means pertaining to a local government unit, commonly, a city or town or other governmental unit. In its broader sense, it means pertaining to the public or governmental affairs of a state or nation or of a people.¹

It should be clear that in its broad sense, the word *municipal* signifies a concept that is encompassed by the concept of the cognitive <u>social compact</u> in its broad sense. But there are two significant differences between the two: (i)Under the assumption that all human government is contractual, the broad definition of <u>social compact</u> encompasses both *public* and *private contracts*, while the broad definition of *municipal* only encompasses *public contracts*. (ii)The <u>social compact</u> has <u>jurisdictional</u> constraints marked by the existence of <u>jural</u> and <u>ecclesiastical</u> sub-compacts, while *municipal* is not necessarily restrained by such <u>jurisdictions</u>.

municipal purposes --- Public or governmental purposes as distinguished from private purposes. It may comprehend all activities essential to the health, morals, protection, and welfare of the municipality.²

municipal function --- One created or granted for special benefit and advantage of the urban community embraced within the corporate boundaries. ... Municipal functions are those which specially and peculiarly promote the comfort, convenience, safety and happiness of the citizens of the municipality, rather than the welfare of the general public. Under this class of functions are included, in most jurisdictions, the proper care of streets and alleys, parks and other public places, and the erection and maintenance of public utilities and improvements generally.³

At least since the deluge, or primordially if one does not believe in the deluge as a historical fact, every clan / nation has to some degree had needs for "proper care of streets and ... other public places, and the erection and maintenance of public

¹ Black's 5th, p. 917.

² Black's 5th, p. 918.

³ Black's 5th, p. 918.

utilities and improvements generally". Even a tribe that has no roads will usually have some kind of community building and other "improvements" that fit aptly within the categories of *municipal purposes* and *functions*. Every clan / nation has to some degree had a need to pursue "health, morals, protection, and welfare" of the clan / nation. The typical way that every clan / nation has pursued the resolution of such needs is via *municipal laws*, imposed by "the mighty", and not imposed through the consent of ordinary, non-psychopathic people.¹

municipal law --- That which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state \dots .²

Because the nation-state developed in many respects from the city-state, *municipal law* has historically been synonymous with the laws of the state. In modern American law, laws specific to a given city are often called *municipal ordinances*:

municipal ordinance --- A law, rule, or ordinance enacted or adopted by a municipal corporation for the proper conduct of its affairs or the government of its inhabitants; *e.g.* zoning or traffic ordinances, building codes. Particularly a regulation under a delegation of power from the state.³

In the American system, there is a limited form of consent that goes into the enactment and enforcement of *municipal laws* and *ordinances*. Such consent is so limited that it belies any claim that government in America is government by the consent of the governed.

municipal authorities --- As used in statutes contemplating the consent of such authorities, the term means the consent by the legislative authorities of the city acting by ordinance; for example, in a town, the members of the town board.⁴

It's clear that what is generally understood to be *municipal laws*, *purposes*, and *functions* are largely the same as the laws, purposes, and functions that are the focus of *police powers*. Both *municipal laws* and *police powers* "comprehend all activities essential to health, morals, protection, and welfare", including construction and

4 Black's 5th, p. 917.

¹ In the field of "international law", "municipal law" is a term of art that is understood to indicate the domestic or internal law of any given state. It is defined in opposition to "international law" without recognition of sub-categories of a state's domestic laws. Because "international law" is controlled by statist presuppositions throughout, its conception of "municipal law" is unreliable. In this theodicy, *municipal laws* merely refer to laws that pertain to *municipal purposes* and *functions*, and this term should not be distorted by definitions from international law.

² Black's 5th, p. 918.

³ Black's 5th, p. 918.

maintenance of streets, parks, public places, public utilities, zoning, traffic laws, building codes, health codes, sewage, garbage, water, and control of "vices" like gambling, prostitution, and substance abuse. In America, both municipal laws and police powers also comprehend public education, which in many respects replaces the state religion of the historical city-state. All of these and numerous other activities fall within the ambit of the historical and current understanding of *police powers*. Because these things are all needed, any human government proposed by anyone, that doesn't propose reasonable mechanisms for addressing such issues is inherently frivolous, or at best too abstract to be practically implemented. Simply claiming that the free market can address these issues fails to convince many people that the free market can address these issues properly. People who think the free market and crony capitalism / fascism are the same thing will not be convinced that the free market can address these issues properly, simply because someone says so. --- In addition to all these readily recognizable needs, there is a need for government by consent. Government by consent must also be included among all these demands placed at the feet of human government, even if it has been neglected in the past. None of these needs and desires should be overlooked or relegated to insignificance. It is an undeniable historical fact that human governments have normally assigned consent little or no place within this finite set of needs and desires of the clan / nation. The standard has been that "the mighty" have ruled according to their own psychopathic discretion, and only rarely with genuine wisdom. This is precisely how, and why, human governments have been jurisdictionally dysfunctional. For numerous reasons -- including the fact that secular governments are in recent times the most heinous criminals in human history -- it's critical that consent be given its due seat at the table of needs and desires, along with safety, health, morals, order, general welfare, public convenience, general prosperity, and all the rest. But for consent to take its proper place at this table of needs and desires, it's necessary for consent to be given a much more prominent seat than the rest. This can only be done through an understanding of how *lawful social compacts* must operate.

In none of these "municipal" definitions is there any mention of a distinction between *delicts* and contracts. If consent is given the seat of prominence that it is due, given that all humans are created with the *imago Dei*, then none of these *municipal* definitions should relegate *delicts* and contracts to such insignificance. On the contrary, if such *municipal police powers* were constrained to operate within the **jurisdictional** limitations imposed by **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts, then these *municipal police powers* could only be put into effect by way of contracts. They could not be put into effect by way of fiat dictates and edicts of "the mighty". If *municipal police powers* are *lawful*, meaning, if the *police powers* of a given **social compact**'s *public contracts* are *lawful*, then such *municipal laws* must be inherently intended to apply to everyone within the *municipality*'s / **social compact**'s / clan's / nation's **territorial jurisdiction** who has given cognitive consent to participate in such *public contracts*. In reality, unanimous consent to *municipal* laws and ordinances has been so rare that it's probably safe to say that it has virtually never existed in any *municipality* in human history.

When the Babel project was terminated, and a multiplicity of clans, languages, and nations came into existence, many of these clans / nations had no writing. Given the human condition, and given such primitive technology, it's not reasonable to expect them to have jurisprudential sophistication. The definition of a clan / nation does not require writing, and neither does the definition of a **social compact**. The definition of a **social compact** / clan / nation doesn't even require articulation. The composition of the **social compact** / clan / nation can be passed as unarticulated customs, *i.e.*, as pre-cognitive contracts, from one generation to the next. Even so, for the **social compact** to be *lawful* **human law**, all parties must have entered it through cognitive consent.

Broadly defined **social compacts** have existed for practically as long as human beings have existed. According to biblical fact, they existed without subtending jural compacts prior to the deluge. Even after the Genesis 9:6 mandate to include the jural appendage, most social compacts / clans / nations reflect little or no distinction between the social compact's jural and ecclesiastical functions. This doesn't mean that the distinction doesn't exist. It means that there is confusion in the social compact's creation, maintenance, and implementation. Because a social compact, in the strict sense of the term, is essentially the same thing as a government, it becomes clear that most governments inadequately distinguish jural and ecclesiastical functions. As a result of this jurisdictional dysfunction, megalomaniacs took over governments in general in the 20th century, and a cabal of psychopaths and their horde of sociopathic, bureaucratic minions has apparently done the same in the *united States* in the early 21st. One government after another has ostensibly assumed the task of gratifying all the myriad needs and desires of their respective populations, without any regard to the consent that is crucial to jurisdictional sanity, and without any regard to avoiding government-perpetrated delicts. These governments have in effect promised a chicken in every pot if only the populace would cooperate with the psychopathic agenda. So in the 20th and 21st centuries, human governments have generally been taken over by con artists. These governments have assumed the task of gratifying all the municipal purposes and *functions* which have historically been the subject matter of **jurisdictionally** dysfunctional *public contracts*, and have also generally assumed the task of gratifying the subject matters of many, sometimes most, private contracts. These human

governments have generally ignored the foundational principle of sane government construction, meaning every human being's cognitive consent. These governments have thereby ignored the concept that governments violate their reason for existing by ignoring the need for them not to perpetrate *delicts*. --- God's response to the Babel society's attempt at self-aggrandizement was to break that society's <u>social compact</u> into myriad <u>social compacts</u> with a vast constellation of various mixtures of <u>jural</u> and <u>ecclesiastical</u> functions -- that is, into myriad <u>social compacts</u> with confusion about their purposes and functions. --- Because <u>jurisdictional dysfunction</u> has been the norm from the Babel venture until now, the vigilant need to ask a simple, incessant question about their government: Does this <u>social compact</u> enforce the Genesis 9:6 mandate without becoming a violator of it?

Even though ecclesiastical compacts and jural compacts may appear at first glance to be all that's necessary for the methodical and *lawful* enforcement of human **law**, practical considerations make it obvious that they are not enough. There needs to be some kind of umbrella social compact through which judges are hired, police are hired, jails are built, and all the necessary and desirable municipal functions and purposes are fulfilled. A huge problem is that the larger the population of people whom a **social compact** / *municipality* presumably encompasses, the more difficult it is to obtain universal consent, and the greater the propensity to jurisdictional dysfunction. Societies are bound together by complex systems of agreements. The more consent is ignored, and the more conformity is achieved through force or fraud, the more the seeds for the society's self-destruction are sown. In order for a society to function, it needs an ecclesiastical society to enforce these agreements and to adjudicate contractual disputes. It needs a jural society to adjudicate delicts, including, when necessary, to prosecute just wars, and to impeach and prosecute delicts perpetrated under color of law. Societies also need a strictly defined social compact to facilitate these two governmental contracts functioning together properly. Also, the municipal purposes and functions somehow have to be satisfied without violating the need for jurisdictional sanity. This means that they need to be satisfied either through *public contracts* or through *private contracts*.

Given that the need to observe **jurisdictional** boundaries generates a need to articulate and formalize the **social compact** within every clan / nation, the strictly-defined **social compact**'s **jurisdiction** clearly has to be defined. The **social compact**'s **subject-matter**, **in personam**, and **territorial jurisdictions** are necessarily outgrowths of the **jurisdictions** of the two subtending compacts, as well as of whatever other contracts the society unanimously enters. When the monoglot, Tower-of-Babel **social compact** disintegrated, the world went from a single, **jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compact** into a diversity of **jurisdictionally**

dysfunctional clans / nations, each having a distinct language, and located in a distinct land. The designated land defined each new jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compact's geographical jurisdiction. Because of the language barriers between social compacts, and because each new social compact was jurisdictionally **dysfunctional** from the beginning, each would muddle together its own unique version of human law, and its own special conception of how such human law might be compatible with **natural law**. Under such circumstances, the potential for conflict between social compacts was huge, and still is. The concepts of justice, and the concepts of just war, were diverse across social compacts. To minimize conflict, the clans / nations found it expedient to have clearly defined borders. These circumstances have had a huge impact on each jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compact's delineation of its special geographical, subject-matter, and personal jurisdictions. If each were not jurisdictionally dysfunctional, then each would be defined primarily upon the Bible's **<u>global</u>** prescription of <u>human law</u>. But the Genesis 9:6 mandate apparently faded into obscurity in all these new social **compacts**, probably as part of the transition from monoglot to polyglot. --- Now, a crucial point that this theodicy must make is that the biblical story lays out a clear plan for progress from jurisdictional dysfunction to jurisdictional sanity, and furthermore, that that plan is necessarily based on integration of jural compacts and ecclesiastical compacts into social compacts in a way that doesn't violate natural rights.

If each clan / nation / social compact were not jurisdictionally dysfunctional, then each would have a subject-matter jurisdiction defined by guidelines established by way of the principles embedded in Genesis 9:6. This means that the jurisdiction of the given social compact would somehow arise out of some kind of blending of the jurisdictions of the jural compact, the ecclesiastical compact (strictly defined), and the jurisdictions of whatever contracts the parties to the social compact unanimously enter and agree to live by.¹ These unanimously-agreedupon contracts can be understood to be "public contracts", because they are public within the given society. As should be obvious in this reading, the social compact can be seen to be implicit in the Bible. The Bible's jurisdictionally functional social compact corresponds in some respects with secular philosophy's longextant concept of the "social contract". But the secular idea of the social contract is jurisdictionally dysfunctional. While the *lawful* social compact is part of, and is rationally consistent with, the *natural-rights* polity, secular philosophy's social contract is not. Even though this is true, because there are some similarities between the social compact and the social contract, it's important to compare and contrast

¹ Unanimous consent is clearly rare. But it's crucial. More focus on it shortly.

the two to make sure that they're not confused. To do this compare-and-contrast without having to sift through voluminous works dedicated to the social contract, this theodicy will resort to the works of anarcho-capitalists. Anarcho-capitalists have already done much of this sifting.

Among anarcho-capitalists, it's common to encounter a strong inclination to completely discard the concept of the social contract. They generally repudiate the social contract because they believe that the social contract is merely a philosophical rationalization for the existence of the state. Murray Rothbard (1926-1995), the father of the modern anarcho-capitalist movement, provides an example of this repudiation:

There is one vitally important political implication of our title-transfer theory [of contracts], as against the promise theory of valid and enforceable contracts. It should be clear that the title-transfer theory immediately tosses out of court all variants of the "social contract" theory as a justification for the State. Setting aside the historical problem of whether such a social contract, whether it be the Hobbesian surrender of all one's rights, the Lockean surrender of the right of self-defense, or any other, was a mere promise of future behavior (future will) and in no way surrendered title to alienable property. Certainly no past promise can bind later generations, let alone the actual maker of the promise.¹

Because of his conception of what constitutes a valid contract, which he calls the "title-transfer theory", Rothbard is convinced that "all variants of the 'social contract' theory as justifications for the State" should be dumped. As is clear in both **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood** and **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Contracts**, Rothbard's title-transfer theory should hold up well enough within secular <u>jurisdictions</u>, but it cannot hold up well within religious <u>jurisdictions</u>. In addition to this title-transfer-theory-based objection to the social contract, Rothbard made numerous other objections. Some of these objections deserve to be examined for the sake of clarifying the distinction between the <u>social compact</u> and the social contract.

In this paragraph from Rothbard's **Ethics**, Rothbard clearly objects to "the Hobbesian surrender of all one's rights". He also clearly objects to "the Lockean surrender of the right of self-defense". Although these are certainly objections to the Hobbesian and Lockean renditions of the social contract, the objection that

¹ Rothbard, Murray, **The Ethics of Liberty**, 1998, 2002; p. 147; New York University Press, New York, New York. --- URL: http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ethics.asp.

causes Rothbard and company to dump the whole idea of the social contract is the objection based on the title-transfer theory. Arguments pro and con regarding the title-transfer theory can be found in these two memoranda, as well as later in this theodicy. The position of both of these memoranda, as well as of this theodicy, is that Rothbard's arguments in favor of the title-transfer theory are valid within secular **jurisdictions**, but they are not necessarily valid within religious **jurisdictions**. This claim obviously depends heavily upon the distinction between secular and religious **jurisdictions**. This issue is the subject of the next sub-chapter. In the meantime, because the term, **social compact**, is intended in this theodicy to be applicable in both secular and religious **jurisdictions**, it's important to focus on what is true about the **social compact** in general. So it's important to ask what else is so repugnant in the Hobbesian, the Lockean, and practically all other concepts of the social contract. In short, what else motivates Rothbard to junk them all?

Neither surrendering all of one's rights nor surrendering "the right to self-defense" is required by the **social compact**. It's safe to assume that none of the social contract theories that Rothbard and company reject is based clearly, rationally, and consistently on what anarcho-capitalists call the "nonaggression axiom" (NAA). This error, the failure to ground the social contract on the NAA, would lead every one of these social contract theories into errors repugnant to anyone who held firmly to the NAA. On the other hand, this theodicy discovers in the **Noachian Covenant** a proscription of other-inflicted damage that easily encompasses the NAA, and the concept of social compact being expounded herein grows rationally out of that discovery. So the failure to adhere rationally to the NAA that is implicitly a reason for rejecting all social contract theories, cannot be a reason for rejecting the **social compact**. Even though this is true, for the sake of exposing the general characteristics of the social **compact**, it should help to examine a few of the serious flaws in historical concepts of the social contract. This is especially important given that the governmental system of the united States was established to a large extent upon Locke's concept of the social contract, and the American governmental system is therefore inherently tied to social contract theory. To find these flaws, these objections to historical concepts of the social contract, it should help to look at a couple of other quotes from Rothbard's Ethics.

Appended to the above paragraph from Rothbard's **Ethics** is the following footnote:

As Rousseau states, "Even if a man can alienate himself, he cannot alienate his children. They are born free, their liberty belongs to them, and no one but themselves has a right to dispose of it ... for to alienate another's liberty is contrary to the natural order, and

is an abuse of the father's rights." Rousseau in Barker, ed., *Social Contract*, pp. 174-75. And four decades before Rousseau, in the early 1720s, the libertarian English writers John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, in their *Cato's Letters*—widely influential in forming the attitudes of the American colonies--wrote as follows:

All men are born free; liberty is a gift which they receive from God himself; nor can they alienate the same by consent, though possibly they may forfeit it by crimes. No man ... can ... give away the lives and liberties, religion or acquired property of his posterity, who will be born free as he himself was born, and can never be bound by his wicked and ridiculous bargain.

Cato's Letters, no. 59, in D.L. Jacobson, ed., *The English Libertarian Heritage* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 108.¹

This footnote clearly adds to Rothbard's objections to social contract theory. Up to but not including this footnote, Rothbard has posited the following objections: (i) The Hobbesian version of the social contract requires that people surrender their rights in order to participate in the contract. (ii) The Lockean version of the social contract requires that people surrender their right to self-defense in order to participate. (iii) The social contract inherently contains a "promise of future behavior" without regard to surrender of "title to alienable property", which violates Rothbard's title-transfer theory of contracts. --- With this footnote, and by quoting Rousseau, Trenchard, and Gordon, Rothbard posits a couple of additional objections to social contract theories: (iv)Even if it's possible for a human to surrender his/her natural rights in order to participate in a social contract, that doesn't mean that the parent can surrender the rights of his/her child. (v)People cannot "alienate" (surrender) their natural right to liberty through consent, except through forfeiture "by crimes". --- This list of objections to the so-called social contract theory is by no means exhaustive. This theodicy will not attempt to answer an exhaustive list of such objections, but will herein address these and a few more for the sake of showing that such objections to the social contract cannot be valid objections to the **social compact**.

In the twenty-eighth chapter of his **Ethics**, Rothbard attempts to show the errors in F.A. Hayek's concept of "coercion". According to Rothbard, Hayek defines coercion so that "there are only relative degrees, or quantities, of 'coercion'." According to Rothbard, "Hayek [also] states that 'coercion ... cannot be altogether

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 147n.

avoided because the only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion."¹ So Hayek commends controlling coercion by allocating to the state the power to make coercive threats. Rothbard marks Hayek's claim that coercion is inherently quantitative and unavoidable with a counterclaim that there is a qualitative difference between coercion that exists in "the sphere of physical violence" and coercion that does not exist in the sphere of physical violence. Rothbard also marks a qualitative difference between aggressive violence and defensive violence. Rothbard's reproof of Hayek's handling of these issues becomes even weightier through examination of the state's relation to this fuzzy definition of coercion. Rothbard says Hayek "goes on to compound the error by adding that 'free society has met this problem by conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state and by attempting to limit this power of the state to instances where it is required to prevent coercion by private persons."² Rothbard answers Hayek's statism by suggesting that the word "coercion" should be abandoned because of its being so contaminated by fuzziness. He also implies that the aggressive breed of violence can be addressed entirely through contractual mechanisms, rather than through the state. Rothbard characterizes such contractual mechanisms as "purchasing the services of defense agencies".³ This theodicy agrees with Rothbard that such aggressive violence can be addressed through contractual mechanisms, rather than through the state. But this theodicy holds that such defense agencies are inadequate, although they are probably better than the state. Although private defense agencies are not inherently unlawful, any more than self-defense and vigilance committees are inherently unlawful, they are inherently insufficient for reasons similar to those given above in the case of vigilance committees. Nevertheless, Rothbard continues to critique Hayek's attempt at establishing a "systematic political philosophy" by positing several criticisms of the whole concept of the social contract:

> [I]n any and all historical cases, "free society" did not "confer" any monopoly of coercion on the State; there has never been any form of voluntary "social contract." In all historical cases, the State has seized, by the use of aggressive violence and conquest, such a monopoly of violence in society. And further, what the State has is not so much a monopoly of "coercion" as of *aggressive* (as well as defensive) violence, and that monopoly is established and maintained by systematically employing two particular forms of aggressive violence: taxation for the acquisition of State

¹ **Ethics of Liberty**, p. 225. Rothbard is here quoting Hayek's **The Constitution of Liberty**, p. 21.

² Ethics of Liberty, p. 225, Rothbard quoting Hayek's Constitution, p. 21.

³ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 225.

income, and the compulsory outlawry of competing agencies of defensive violence within the State's acquired territorial area. Therefore, since liberty requires the elimination of aggressive violence in society (while maintaining defensive violence against possible invaders), the State is not, and can never be, justified as a defender of liberty. For the State lives by its very existence on the two-fold and pervasive employment of aggressive violence against the very liberty and property of individuals that it is *supposed* to be defending. The State is qualitatively unjustified and unjustifiable.¹

There are several additional objections here: (vi)"[T]here has never been any form of voluntary 'social contract.'" Therefore, (vii)no society has ever genuinely conferred a "monopoly of coercion on the State". (viii)Historically, all states, including those that supposedly exist by way of the social contract, establish and maintain a monopoly on both aggressive and defensive violence by way of confiscatory taxation, *i.e.*, by way of theft. (ix)Historically, all states, including those that supposedly exist by way of the social contract, establish and maintain a monopoly on both aggressive and defensive violence by way of "compulsory outlawry of competing agencies of defensive violence". --- These are four more objections to philosophy's historical social contract theory, especially to its use to justify the existence of the state. By combining these four objections with the five objections indicated above, these nine objections form a decent sample of objections to the social contract, and this sample should help to compare and contrast the secular social contract and the social **compact**. Even though this list of objections is not exhaustive, it should be obvious through this kind of exercise that objections to the social contract generally do not apply to the **social compact**.

(i)The objection that some social contract theories require participants to surrender their rights in order to participate in the contract: In order to deal with this issue holistically, it's necessary to define terms. If **natural rights** are defined as being just claims that are inherent in being human, then it's necessary to distinguish such rights from privileges that arise through the allocation of powers. The subject matter of every cognitive contract is inherently about the allocation of powers. They are not about the giving and taking of **natural rights**. So any social contract that requires the surrender of **natural rights** is inherently perverse. A **social compact** based on voluntary allocation of powers, for the sake of protecting and enforcing **natural rights**, cannot be negated by this objection.

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, pp. 225-226.

(ii) The objection that some versions of the social contract require participants to surrender their **natural right** to self-defense in order to participate in the contract: Because the **natural right** to self-defense is inevitably linked to powers exercisable for the same purpose, it's monumentally important to surrender such powers only with extreme caution. When people are incapacitated in some respects, like infants, children, some elderly, and some aspects of the entire category of people who are mentally and/or physically disabled, then surrender of such power for the sake of some kind of guardian-dependent contract may be necessary. But any social contract that presumes to incapacitate participants in a similar manner is inherently perverse. A **social compact** based on the voluntary allocation of powers makes no such demand that people sacrifice their power or **natural right** of self-defense.

(iii) The objection that the social contract is based on promises of future behavior, and that the social contract thereby violates the title-transfer theory of contracts, and that the social contract is thereby invalidated: Rothbard's title-transfer theory essentially holds that for any legal action *ex contractu* to even get started, the plaintiff must have a plausible claim that the defendant has unlawful possession of some property to which the plaintiff has *lawful* title. In other words, the contract must govern transfer of title to property, from one party to another, where the defendant has taken possession without satisfying his/her duties under the contract, so that title cannot *lawfully* transfer to the party that possesses. So under such circumstances, the defendant, the party who possesses, is essentially stealing.¹ By emphasizing the existence of theft of property that's evaluable in concrete terms, as a prerequisite to a lawful action ex contractu, Rothbard is essentially claiming that actions ex contractu that are based on the "promise' or 'expectations' theory of contracts" should not be recognized by *lawful* courts as justiciable controversies. For reasons given in both of the memoranda of law and facts mentioned above, as well as later in this theodicy, this theodicy claims that if the title-transfer theory were properly understood and implemented within secular jurisdictions, it would probably work quite well. But if religious **jurisdictions** had to operate under the same constraints, then this would be a serious impediment to the operation of most religions. So no religious jurisdiction should be forced to operate under the strict constraints of the title-transfer theory. Further evidence will be given shortly to show that the title-transfer theory has a place within secular **jurisdictions** that are governed by the **global** covenant, even if the title-transfer theory has no place within religious **jurisdictions**.

¹ See chapter 19, "Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts", p. 133, Rothbard, **Ethics of Liberty**.

It may be absolutely true that "the social contract ... was a mere promise of future behavior ... and in no way surrendered title to alienable property".¹ It may also be true that if a given social contract presumed to have jurisdiction over a variety of different religions, *i.e.*, to be secular, then it would be constrained to the title-transfer theory, and the "promise theory" would be invalid within the given **jurisdiction**, and the social contract would therefore be non-justiciable and unenforceable. So under such circumstances, the social contract theory would not be valid as a contract, much less valid as justification for the state. Given that the state, under its long-existing definition, is inherently jurisdictionally dysfunctional, there is no "justification for the State" under any other circumstances either. However, because the "promise theory" might be valid within a religious jurisdiction, some "variants of the 'social contract' theory" might be valid within such jurisdictions. An exhaustive survey of social contract theories produced historically would certainly show that they are all jurisdictionally dysfunctional. So both historical social contract theories and the state are invalid based on *jurisdictional dysfunction*. But the fact that the title-transfer theory invalidates the promise theory under some circumstances does not invalidate all possible social contract theories, even though it invalidates every social contract theory posited historically. In fact, the title-transfer theory does not invalidate the social compact, even though some people might claim it's a form of social contract theory.

As already indicated, this objection is based on a failure to distinguish contracts that have secular **jurisdictions** from contracts that have religious **jurisdictions**. If no allowance were made for religious **jurisdictions**, then people would be disallowed from freely choosing their religion, and from binding themselves voluntarily and contractually with other people who choose the same religion. The resulting exclusively secular society would thereby be its own special breed of tyranny. So religious **jurisdictions** must be allowed, and so must the **social compact** theory. The promise-expectation theory of contracts must be allowed to exist within religious **jurisdictions**, even though it may be utterly repudiated within secular **jurisdictions**.

(iv)The objection that many (if not all) social contract theories impose participation involuntarily on descendants of voluntary participants: Given that all people have <u>natural rights</u>, children have the same <u>natural rights</u> as their parents. So the <u>natural rights</u> of children are as unalienable as the <u>natural rights</u> of parents. So any social contract that fosters the alienation of the rights of children is inherently perverse. The <u>social compact</u> negates such perversion. Given a <u>social compact</u> that has been created through the cognitive consent of a number of people within a given

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 147.

generation, it's critical to see how such a social compact would interface with the children of the original generation. --- Given that the social compact subsumes no *public contracts* other than its **jural compact** and its strictly defined **ecclesiastical compact**, if one of the original generation has a child who has come of age who refuses to cognitively join the **social compact** and its **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts, then it might behoove those party to the social compact to allow this offspring to continue living among them with the simple proviso that he/she not damage anyone else's primary or secondary property. If those party to the social compact are called "citizens", then such a person born among them who refused to be a citizen might be called a "denizen".¹ Given such a bare-bones social compact, the denizen's presence within that **territorial jurisdiction** should not necessarily disturb any of the parties. --- Given that the **social compact** does in fact subsume *public contracts* in addition to its **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts, where the original generation unanimously agreed to abide by these additional *municipal laws*, and one of their offspring refuses to comply with some or all of the broadly defined social compact's municipal laws, then when the refusenik reaches the age of majority, the citizens will need to figure out how to deal with this refusenik within their midst. It's certain that they cannot force him/her into participation, and it's certain that they cannot *lawfully* commit any *delicts* against him/her.

It should be noted in passing that the existence of a bare-bones, strictly-defined **social compact** and its **geographical jurisdiction** does not require that all people within such territory cognitively consent to being party. Such a bare-bones **social compact** is essentially a strict implementation of the **global** covenant. It can therefore allow all kinds of people and *private contracts* to exist within its **jurisdiction**, the only common obligation being avoidance of damage by one against another.

¹ This theodicy uses the word **denizen** to refer to a person born within the **geographical jurisdiction** of a **secular social compact** that may be **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**, but who, upon reaching the age of majority, refuses to take the oath of citizenship. Under such circumstances, the **denizen** is relieved of the normal duties and benefits relating to citizenship. But the **denizen** is still under the basic obligations of the **jural compact**'s **jural** law as long as he abides within its **territorial jurisdiction**. The **denizen** cannot be *unlawfully* deported or have his property *unlawfully* seized, or be subjected to any other kind of *delict*. **Denizenship** is a necessary alternative to citizenship for the natural born, because citizenship cannot be properly procured without consent. ---- For more about **denizenship**, see Sub-Chapter 4, *The Metaconstitution*, section b, *Political Laws & Denizens*, below. For more on this theodicy's view of *alienage* and *naturalization*, see Porter, Article I § 8 clause 4 of the *u.S.* Constitution, "Alienage and Naturalization". ----

(v) The objection that some social contracts allow, even if they do not require, participants to alienate and surrender their **natural rights**: It's certain that people can alienate their rights through commission of *delicts*. Whether they can do it voluntarily without commission of *delicts* is a different issue. Within a secular **jurisdiction**, it's certain that it's not possible for such voluntary self-alienation to *lawfully* happen, because such alienation would be based purely on a promise, without genuine transfer of title. So such alienation could not be enforced in a secular court. However, things that cannot *lawfully* happen within secular **jurisdictions**. It's certain that **natural rights** cannot be voluntarily alienated in any **jurisdiction**. But within religious **jurisdictions**, it should be possible for people to create the illusion of self-alienated rights by the given person voluntarily alienating his/her powers in exchange for someone else's promises or property.

(vi)The objection that there has never been any form of voluntary social contract: It's certainly true that no **jurisdictionally** *lawful* social contract has ever existed. So all these political philosophies that posit a primordial social contract to rationalize the existence of the state are inherently wrong. Even though this is true, and even though Rothbard's objection in this case is perfectly valid, the non-existence of the voluntary social contract in the past fails to preclude the existence of a voluntary **social compact** in the future.

(vii)The objection that no society, through any kind of social contract, has ever conferred a "monopoly of coercion on the State", even though states have normally seized such monopoly by force: Using coercion in the normal legal sense of the word, rather than in Hayek's tortured sense, coercion is inherently unlawful. But violence is not *unlawful* if it's defensive, or if it's protective of the innocent. So this objection really pertains to the statist monopolization of both aggressive and defensive violence. Any social contract theory that promotes such statist monopoly is inherently perverse. Because this kind of monopoly is part of the normal definition of the state, statism is inherently perverse. But this linkage doesn't exist in the definition of the social compact. This can be shown in reference to the jural compact, assuming the jural compact can be taken as a microcosm of the social compact. --- If two jural societies have overlapping geographical jurisdictions, there is no good reason for them to see one another as inherently inimical, so that each must force the other into unconditional surrender. On the contrary, these two both have **subject-matter** jurisdictions that preclude either from initiating force or fraud against the other. So if each abides by its inherent jurisdiction, then the relationship between the two will be marked more by cooperation than by competition. Given this genuine commitment to abiding by lawful jurisdictions, the same kind of cooperation

should exist between a **jural society** and a private defense agency, between a **jural** society and a vigilance committee, and between a jural society and an individual self-defender. The statist drive to monopolization of force derives from delusion and the psychopathic lust for power. Given rational jurisdictions, there is no more room for this kind of psychopathic monopoly in a **social compact** than there is in a *lawful jural compact*. Even so, because religious <u>social compacts</u> are inherently dominated by a single religion, regardless of what religion it may be, a monopoly of the use of force within its geographical jurisdiction may be allowed, or even demanded, by voluntary participants in a religious **social compact**. Given that such a religious community can be voluntarily bound together by a land covenant, if they are, then their refusal to allow *trespass* by outsiders, whether the outsiders be in their own social compact or not, is perfectly *lawful*. Because there is ample potential for aliens to enter into the *territorial jurisdiction* of a *social compact*, every *social* compact needs to make provisions for this. In a bare-bones social compact, it's reasonable for the social compact to allow aliens free entry into the territory. But if the alien is a threat, for example, if the alien is traversing a border with an enemy state by entering the territory, and the alien has no citizen of the social compact to vouch for the alien, it could be reasonable for the social compact to make it illegal to thus traverse.

(viii) The objection that social contracts inherently create states whose existence depends upon confiscatory taxation, *i.e.*, theft: Clearly the social contract theories of the past have all been prone to generating this kind of systematic, statist theft. But that fact does not prove that there's a necessary causal connection between every conceivable social contract theory and such theft. In a genuine **natural-rights** polity, social compacts that are genuine functions of that polity should NEVER perpetrate such theft. Even so, there's no doubt that economic scarcity inevitably will tend to create economic pressure on social compacts, as surely as it presently creates such pressure on jurisdictionally dysfunctional governments. Given that a strictly defined **social compact** is a combination of the **jural compact**, the strictly-defined ecclesiastical compact, and whatever other contracts the parties to the social compact unanimously agree to live by, for frugality's sake, as long as it doesn't conflate jurisdictions, it might be wise for the jural and ecclesiastical societies to share jails, police, judges, courtrooms, borders, and perhaps numerous other things. Because labor and various forms of secondary property are required for the procuration of each of these, where money is usually spent for such procuration, they have to be paid with some kind of revenues. Under statism, such things have always been paid for with taxes, takings, fees, etc. Every social compact consistent with the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity will inevitably need to deal with the same kinds of economic pressure, and will need to deal with it without violating natural rights.

Because this sub-chapter merely introduces the **social compact** as a necessarily existing contract, these funding issues will not be further addressed here. They will be addressed later in this chapter. In the meantime, it should be understood that involuntary taxation by a **social compact** is inherently *unlawful*.

(ix)The objection that social contracts inherently create states whose existence demands "compulsory outlawry of competing agencies of defensive violence": As shown by way of the jural-society example in objection seven above, there's no good reason for compulsory outlawry of a jural society that shares some or all of its geographical jurisdiction with another jural society. The same applies to selfdefenders, vigilance committees, and private defense firms. In each case, there is no inherent reason for one entity to outlaw another. There is no necessary causal connection between a **social compact**'s **jurisdiction** and the outlawry of any of these other entities. Any social compact that's soundly based on principles consistent with this **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity should never outlaw these other entities, unless these other entities commit, or threaten to commit, some form of aggressive violence. The social **compact**, by way of the **jural compact**, should hold *delict* perpetrators accountable for their *delicts*, without turning greedy for power. Given that "competing agencies of defensive violence", including individuals, are ostensibly committed to the principles of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, "compulsory outlawry" would clearly be anathema to those shared principles. So under such circumstances, coexistence rather than outlawry should be the rule. On the other hand, if two such entities that share territorial jurisdiction operate under competing principles, then there is likely to be conflict inherent in their trying to share that territory. For example, if a statist government run by a fascist dictatorship claims the same territorial jurisdiction as a **social compact** that's committed to operating in accordance with the **<u>natural</u>**. rights polity, then conflict is inevitable, and the dictatorship is a standing threat of *delict*-perpetration against the **social compact**. So the **social compact** would need to adjust its policies in regard to the shared territory, which might entail outlawing the inimical government within that territory.

Through these nine objections, and through this process of comparing and contrasting historically standard social contract theories with the <u>social compact</u> that is a necessary component of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, it should be evident that the flaws in the social contract are not necessarily flaws in the <u>social compact</u>, and reasonable objections to social contract theories do not necessarily impugn the <u>social</u> <u>compact</u>. Even so, this compare-and-contrast exercise doesn't sufficiently show how the <u>natural-rights</u> polity resolves these problems, or numerous other impediments to the viability of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity.

If a society gives consent to some *municipal purpose*, where the consent is less than unanimous, then by default, such consent is the basis for a private contract, not a *public contract*. In this context, the difference between a *private contract* and a *public contract* is that a *public contract* has consent that is unanimous among the parties to the society / clan / nation, and it thereby creates a *lawful municipal law* that applies only to those parties. But a private contract only includes some subset of the society's population, and does not have the general force of law, but only the specific force of law defined by the *private contract*. These distinctions between *public* contracts and private contracts are very pertinent to discerning how a bare-bones social compact works versus a social compact that has more than the bare minimal *public contracts*. The bare minimal *public contracts* are the **<u>jural compact</u>** and the ecclesiastical compact. Every jural compact has geographical jurisdiction over whatever physical territory it is physically able to reach. This claim is clearly vitiated by practical concerns, including the possible presence of an inimical clan / nation nearby. If a group of people, say ten people, decide to set up a jural compact within a territory that's bounded on all sides by statist regimes, it's not necessary for this group of people to have absolute ownership, title, and possession of such territory before exercising *police powers* under the jural compact. Geographical jurisdiction is emphatically NOT the same thing as ownership. Because of this fact, such a **jural society** has no *lawful* power to stop people from immigrating into the territory, unless the immigrants clearly pose a threat, a threat being a *delict*. Also, people other than these ten who live within the territory and who are not party to the **jural compact** naturally have a view of the **jural compact** that says that such jural compact is a private contract to which they are not party. This view of the outsiders that the jural compact is a private contract also includes that compact's associated ecclesiastical compact and social compact, as private contracts. But from the perspective of these ten, these compacts to which they are party are *public* contracts. This is because the proscription of *delicts* applies generally. In other words, such proscription has the general force of law.¹ From the perspective of these ten, non-parties who abide within the given territory are essentially **denizens**, people who have all their **<u>natural rights</u>**, but who don't participate in these *public contracts*.

¹ It may be true that **jural** laws have the general force of law while laws arising out of the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> and the <u>social compact</u> do not have the general force of law. Under such circumstances, only the **jural compact** is a *public contract*. If these ten people were **jurisdictionally** astute, they would know this. Even so, assuming they are **jurisdictionally** astute, assuming their <u>social compact</u> is bare-bones, and recognizing that all three compacts are necessary for long-term implementation of the **global** proscription of other-inflicted damage, it's not necessarily an invitation to **jurisdictional** <u>dysfunction</u> for them to conceive of the three-fold package as a *public contract*.

Even though these are *public contracts* to the ten, and have **personal jurisdiction** only over the ten, if a non-party, a **denizen** within the territory, perpetrated a *delict*, prima facie evidence of the *delict* would be grounds for the **jural society** to take personal jurisdiction over the perpetrator. --- Although an ecclesiastical society is **jurisdictionally** barred from taking this kind of **in personam jurisdiction** over someone who has never consented to being under its *jurisdiction*, every *ecclesiastical* **<u>compact</u>** has **<u>geographical jurisdiction</u>** only over physical territory that is specified explicitly or implicitly in contracts being adjudicated by the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u>, and similar practical concerns necessarily apply here as well. For practical reasons, the geographical jurisdictions of all three of these compacts, the social, jural, and <u>ecclesiastical</u>, might, and perhaps even should, overlap entirely. --- Within the geographical jurisdiction of a bare-bones social compact, these three compacts can either be viewed as *public contracts* or *private contracts*, depending upon participation. For a **social compact** to exercise *lawful* authority in regards to any *municipal police* power, it needs prior, unanimous consent from all parties and non-parties whose property is impacted,¹ except that no consent is needed from *delict* perpetrators.

If this bare-bones social compact composed of these ten people were to grow, so that most of the people within that territory volunteered and consented to being party, then these compacts would still be *public contracts* to participants and *private* contracts to denizens. Contracts between individual people within this territory, meaning contracts that did not attempt to be jural compacts, ecclesiastical compacts, or social compacts, would be purely private contracts. Even private contracts that attempt to gratify all the myriad municipal purposes and functions are *private contracts* because they do not include all the people within the territory. Because these other *municipal purposes* and *functions* are not functions of the **global** covenant, they can make no pretense to being *public contracts* unless every human being who's capable of giving cognitive consent, and who abides within the territory, consents to being party to the given contract. There may indeed be otherwise private contracts to which the people in the territory unanimously agree to live by, thereby converting the contracts from *private* to *public*. Given unanimous consent, such *public contracts* would certainly be *lawful*, as long as they didn't call for the perpetration of *delicts*. The aggregate subject matters of such unanimous, *public* contracts would also fall naturally within the ambit of the lawful social compact. But whenever such unanimous *public contracts* came into existence, they would

¹ Of course *municipal purposes* and *functions* might be satisfied through *private contracts*. But being a *public contract*, a **social compact** is precluded from administering a *private contract*.

naturally cause the <u>social compact</u> to shift away from being a bare-bones <u>social</u> <u>compact</u> into being something else.

The difficulty in attaining unanimous consent about anything points to the need to distinguish two different kinds of *lawful social compacts*. If a group of people came to unanimous agreement about how to form a bare-bones social compact, then such a social compact would have a jural compact and an ecclesiastical compact, and the social compact would have no other unanimously consensual, public contracts, other than these two sub-compacts. In other words, it would have no public contracts other than the jural and ecclesiastical compacts, along with a strictly defined **social compact** that does nothing other than integrate and mediate its two sub-compacts. The governmental activities of such a bare-bones social **<u>compact</u>** would be dominated by the **<u>jural compact</u>** and its exercise of *police powers* pertinent to *delicts* and only to *delicts*. --- If a group of people came to unanimous agreement not only about how to form a bare-bones social compact, but also about the adoption, enactment, and enforcement of other *municipal laws*, then the social compact would not only adjudicate private contracts via the ecclesiastical society, and not only prosecute *delicts* via the *jural society*, but it would also administer and adjudicate these other *public contracts*, these other unanimously adopted *municipal* purposes and functions, by way of the broadly defined ecclesiastical society and whatever other compacts may be established. --- For reasons that go to the core of how to revive America's foundational system, the distinction between the bare-bones social compact and the not-so-bare-bones social compact is absolutely crucial.

Sub-Chapter 3: Secular & Religious Variants

The way that *municipal purposes, functions*, and *laws* have developed over the last several millennia is closely related to religion. Until the *united States* was formed, virtually every clan / nation / municipality / <u>social compact</u> had a single religion that was sanctioned by the clan / nation / municipality / <u>social compact</u>. In other words, prior to the formation of the *united States*, every <u>social compact</u> had an established religion or state-sanctioned belief system. Even if the <u>social compact</u> was barely recognizable, the people in the given society shared beliefs that modern academia generally recognizes as religions. Out of these beliefs, and out of the demands of everyday life, the standard collection of <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u> *municipal laws* developed.

As a result of the commitment made in the *united States* Constitution's 1st Amendment, there was an attempt in the *united States* at separating the religious from the secular. The 1st Amendment states,

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...

Because it was understood that only Congress could create **human laws** that would operate under the *original jurisdiction* of the general government of the *united States*, the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the Constitution meant, literally,

The general government of the *united States* is hereby prohibited from enacting, promulgating, or enforcing the governmental establishment of any religion, and is hereby likewise proscribed from prohibiting the free exercise of any religion.

When the American States united under the Constitution and Bill of Rights, the framers of those documents intended for the general government to encompass a plurality of Judeo-Christian denominations. This is obvious from an even superficial reading of the 1st Amendment. In the 21st century, it's obvious that the general government must encompass a plurality of religions, and not merely a plurality of denominations.

By making this commitment, the general government of the *united States* implicitly committed itself to being a bare-bones **social compact**.¹ But because the American system has been **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** from the beginning, the general government has failed in its commitment to being a bare-bones **social compact**. By examining the nexus between (i)*municipal laws* and *police powers*, (ii) religion, (iii)the bare-bones **social compact**, and (iv)the not-so-bare-bones **social compact**, it should be possible to discover the core of what's necessary to build *lawful* governments. These four things are important factors in the construction of *lawful* human governments. The examination of the nexus between these things should manifest how to build *lawful* governments from the combination of the two basic compacts and these four factors. This examination should thereby solve the problem of discovering who is responsible for enforcing the *positive-duty clause*, and how they are to enforce it.

Regardless of whether the <u>social compact</u> created by way of the Constitution and Bill of Rights is intended to encompass a plurality of denominations or a plurality of religions, such a <u>social compact</u> demands special terms that distinguish

¹ This should be obvious by way of the fact that unanimous cognitive consent to anything is so rare, combined with the fact that no religion (under the normal meaning of that word) exists that encompasses all other religions without inherent rancor. So the default government is the bare-bones **social compact**.

it from a <u>social compact</u> that is intended to encompass only a single religion. In this theodicy's nomenclature, a <u>social compact</u> that is intended to encompass only a single religion is identified as a <u>religious social compact</u>, and a <u>social compact</u> that is intended to encompass multiple religions is identified as a <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u>. Because *municipal laws* and *police powers* developed historically under city-states, where each city-state had a single established religion, *municipal laws* and *police powers* fall naturally within the ambit of the <u>religious social compact</u>. But *municipal laws* and *police powers* are within the ambit of <u>religious social compact</u>. But *municipal laws* and *police powers* are within the ambit of <u>religious social compact</u> but *municipal laws* and *police powers* are within the ambit of <u>religious social compact</u>. But *municipal laws* and *police powers* are within the ambit of <u>religious social compact</u> but *municipal laws* and *police powers* are within the ambit of <u>religious social compacts</u> only with massive <u>jurisdictional dysfunction</u> that accompanies the historical failure to include consent prominently among the needs and desires encompassed by *municipal purposes, municipal functions*, and religion.

To maximize clarity as this examination proceeds, it's necessary to define terms. According to American law, this is what religion is generally understood to be:

<u>religion</u> --- Man's relation to Divinity, to reverence, worship, obedience, and submission to mandates and precepts of supernatural or superior beings. In its broadest sense, includes all forms of belief in the existence of superior beings exercising power over human beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct, with future rewards and punishments. Bond uniting man to God, and a virtue whose purpose is to render God worship due him as source of all being and principle of all government of things. ...

As used in constitutional provisions of First Amendment forbidding the "establishment of religion," the term means a particular system of faith and worship recognized and practised by a particular church, sect, or denomination."¹

It's obvious to anyone who has studied any non-monotheistic religion that this definition is biased. It's not particularly inclusive of these other religions. This bias has existed in American law for practically as long as American law has existed. Any survey of the *u.S.* supreme Court's religion-clause opinions shows that all efforts at correcting this bias have muddled the issue, not clarified it and relieved the bias.² To correct this bias in the *de facto* laws, it's necessary to have definitions of **secular** and **religion** that are rationally consistent with the biblical story, and it's necessary to avoid relying upon definitions that are not rationally consistent with the biblical story, and that exacerbate **jurisdictional dysfunction**.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1161.

² For example, see Porter, series of articles on the 1st Amendment, starting with "Introduction & Original Intent". --- URL: http://bjp-tiaj.net/0_TIAJ/0_8_0_Am_I_ (Intro_-_Orig_Intent).htm.

According to extremely reliable theology that goes back to the origins of Christianity, and that is amply reinforced by the New Testament's didactic passages, human beings are idol factories.¹ Since being booted out of the garden ecological niche, humans are inherently idol factories. Given that this is true, it's impossible for human beings to avoid being religious. Humans may be inherently prone to false religion, but a false religion is still a religion. So even secular humanists, atheists, agnostics, and the most hardened materialists are **religious**. All humans worship something, even if whatever any given human worships is something far less than the God who created the **natural law**.

Common sense demands that all people have value systems. What any given person does at any given point in time is a function of that person's prioritization of all the things that that person could do at that time. Out of all the options, people always choose to do whatever their value system dictates. Every value system has one or more gods and is marked by varying degrees of rationality. One person's god may be eating. Another's may be smoking pot. Another's may be watching TV. Another's may be doing whatever is necessary to honor the God of Christianity. Another's, the god of Islam. Another's, the pantheon of gods in Hinduism. Another's, the void in Buddhism. This goes on endlessly. The point is that all people have value systems, and all people worship something. Because these things are all obvious, it's necessary to have a definition of **religion** that reflects these facts. This is especially true given that the Bible's **global** prescription of **human law** is clearly intended to encompass all people, and therefore all **religions**, the same way the *united States* Constitution must encompass all <u>religions</u>. But the legal definition of *religion* is obviously deficient because it doesn't adequately reflect all of these facts. Whatever any given human being values most, over all, is that person's God or gods. Likewise, whatever any given society values most, over all, is that society's God or gods. Whatever belief system exists to support those values is that person's or that society's **religion**. Here's a definition of **religion** that is compatible with these facts.

religion --- That human being's, or that society's, most valued thing is that human being's, or that society's, God or gods. The belief system and behaviors that purportedly exalt this most valued thing is that human being's, or that society's, **religion**.

¹ Consistent with a clear lineage of similar thinking going back to the Apostle Paul through Augustine, John Calvin stated that "the human mind is, so to speak, a perpetual forge of idols". --- Calvin, John; **Institutes of the Christian Religion**, Book I, Chapter 11, Section 8, translated by Beveridge, Henry. --- URL: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/ institutes.html.

Given that American government has been intended from the founding era to encompass people from all kinds of different religious backgrounds, the compacts that constitute such a government need to be written broadly enough to encompass all kinds of different people. It's providential that the Noachian Covenant inherently encompasses all people. The Noachian Covenant's prescription of human law is the only prescription of human law that comes out of the Judeo-Christian Scriptures that has this **global** in **personam jurisdiction**. Some people may claim that imposing human laws on everyone, where the human laws are based on the **Noachian Covenant**, constitutes the imposition of Judeo-Christianity on the mass of people who are not Judeo-Christian. But the subject matter of the human law prescribed in Genesis 9:6 is *delicts* and contract violations, and only *delicts* and contract violations. So the claim that this prescription of **human law** is a violation of the religion clauses of the 1st Amendment is inherently bogus, unless the people making such claims are defending the perpetration of *delicts* or the violation of contracts as part of their **religion**. If people defend *delicts* and contract violations based on their **religion**, then their **religion** is inherently criminal, and deserves to be treated as such. Every **religion** that eschews *delicts* and contract violations is compatible with this **global** prescription of **human law**.¹

Even though jurisdictional dysfunction has marked clans / cities / states / social compacts / nations since primordia, biblical jurisprudence demands that whatever element of jurisdictional sanity may exist within such entities needs to be recognized and acknowledged, for the sake of bringing such sanity into the foreground so that people can live by it. This is because biblical jurisprudence is about honoring covenants. So to whatever extent a <u>social compact</u> is consistent with biblical jurisprudence, that compact needs to be honored. Based on these claims about biblical jurisprudence, it's reasonable to claim that for all these millennia, jurisdictional sanity has been gestating within all of these jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compacts, waiting to be brought into the foreground of people's consciousness. Given that this is true, it's possible to start marking the two basic varieties of <u>social compacts</u> with their respective labels, even as they have existed in history.

¹ For people who insist that this **global** proscription of *delicts* and contract violations is inherently **religious**, it's necessary to admit that this **global** proscription can be construed as a **religion**. If understood within that context, it's necessary ton concede that this **global** proscription is the only *lawful* **secular religion**. Even so, traditional religions that refuse to acknowledge that this **secular religion** is *lawful* are inherently prone to *delict* perpetration. But generally such rogue religions should not be held accountable under the **secular religion** except when their rogue beliefs turn into rogue actions.

If a group of people come to unanimous agreement not only about how to form a bare-bones **social compact**, but also about the adoption, enactment, and enforcement of other *municipal* and **religious** laws by way of *public contracts*, then this theodicy calls such a **social compact** a **religious social compact**. A **religious social compact** will not only adjudicate *private contracts* via its **ecclesiastical society**, and not only prosecute *delicts* via its **jural society**, but it will also administer other *public contracts* and adjudicate other unanimously adopted *municipal* and **religious** laws via its broadly defined **ecclesiastical society**. Even though this is a fairly clear description of a **religious social compact**, the ramifications of such distinctions is probably best understood in contrast to a **secular social compact**. But before defining **secular**, it's important to first bring one other thing into the foreground.

In the last paragraph of the "Social Compact" sub-chapter above, this theodicy made the following statement: "If a group of people come to unanimous agreement not only about how to form a bare-bones **social compact**, but also about the adoption, enactment, and enforcement of other *municipal laws*, then the social compact will not only adjudicate *private contracts* via the ecclesiastical society, and not only prosecute *delicts* via the *jural society*, but it will also administer and adjudicate these other *public contracts*, these other unanimously adopted *municipal purposes* and functions, by way of the broadly defined ecclesiastical society and whatever other compacts may be established." Now this theodicy is enhancing this statement by speaking not only of the adoption, enactment, and enforcement of *municipal laws*, but also of the adoption, enactment, and enforcement of religious laws. Before moving on, it's important to articulate a reasonable explanation for this enhancement. --- If a person or group of people have a belief system that esteems municipal purposes and *functions* as valuable, and therefore worthy of being converted into *municipal* laws, then such person or group of people include such purposes and functions as subsets of an encompassing belief system. In this theodicy's nomenclature, that belief system is their religion. So it's obvious that municipal laws, purposes, and *functions* are included within the definition of **religion**. So what was said at the end of the last sub-chapter is still true when the same social compact is identified as a religious social compact. A religious social compact not only adjudicates private contracts via its ecclesiastical society, and prosecutes delicts via its jural society, but it also enforces **religious** laws, which includes *municipal laws*.¹ This is in contrast to

¹ From some perspectives, the most preponderant variety of <u>religious social compact</u> in 21st century America is not based on a religion in the conventional sense of the word, but is the large, often international, corporation. Each of these corporations has a specific product line that it vends to the world. The people who work for such corporations

a bare-bones **social compact** which by definition encompasses a **jural compact**, an **ecclesiastical compact**, and no other *public contract*.

Now that <u>religion</u> is defined so that it doesn't generate conflicts with the biblical prescription of <u>global human law</u>, it's necessary to understand <u>religion</u> in contrast to its alternative. In American jurisprudence, *religious* and *secular* are generally understood to be opposites, as implied in this legal definition:

secular --- Not spiritual; not ecclesiastical; relating to affairs of the present (temporal) world.¹

This definition of *secular* may indeed be the opposite of the above legal definition of *religion*. But it is not the opposite to this theodicy's definition of **religion**. That's because, according to the definition of **religion**, there is no such thing as "Not spiritual". Everything that is cognizable by humans is "spiritual". That doesn't mean that it's holy. In fact, most things that enter into human consciousness are not holy. Most things that enter into human consciousness, especially in 21st century America, are both "affairs of the present (temporal) world", and all kinds of other, spiritually un-holy stuff as well. So this definition of *secular* is inherently biased. In addition to this bias, the standard legal definition of "ecclesiastical" does not coincide well with this theodicy's definition of <u>ecclesiastical</u>. So this definition of *secular* is thoroughly inadequate for the purpose of expounding the biblical prescription of <u>human law</u>.

In regards to bias built into the American legal system, it's common knowledge that the American legal system was originally based on English common law. During the founding era, England had a state religion. If the bias that was built into England's laws by way of its state religion got into the American legal system via America's adoption of the English common law, and if such bias continues to exist in the American legal system now, then it appears that this religious bias is

necessarily give unanimous consent to abide by the corporate by-laws. Such by-laws would be equivalent to *municipal laws* if such corporations were municipalities or states. The fact that they are not municipalities or states, and the fact that their <u>territorial jurisdiction</u> is ambiguous and diverse, do not change the fact that it might be appropriate to identify them as <u>religious social compacts</u>. These corporations are based on belief systems whose god or gods are the pursuit of money and power through the vending of their product line. So the corporate by-laws could be considered to be subsets of their encompassing belief system / <u>religion</u>. So under such a view, they would be a special variety of <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compact</u>. The fact that corporations are given special treatment by the *de facto* governments reinforces this particular view. But the *de facto* treatment is really an aberration, because such corporations are really nothing more than another breed of *private contract*.

1 Black's 5th, p. 1214.

inappropriate in a legal system that claims to be pluralistic. The extent of this bias is hinted at by the above legal definition of *secular*. The common law's religious bias in favor of the English state religion is still a source of a lot of **jurisdictional dysfunction**. This is especially evident when one considers the claim that England's *de facto* state religion has long been statism, not Anglicanism.¹

To meet the **jurisdictional** demands of the biblical prescription of **human law**, it's necessary to define **secular** to mean an encompassing of all **religions** without favoring any. Rather than attempt to eliminate religion, the way the *de facto* definition of *secular* does, the *de jure* definition of **secular** encompasses all **religions**. Even a superficial study of American history makes it obvious that the *framers* did not intend for the *united States* to be *secular* in the legal sense, meaning "Not spiritual", *etc.* Instead, it was clearly intended to encompass all Judeo-Christian denominations. But the nature of the **global** covenant makes it unavoidably obvious that if the American compact is to be *de jure*, it must encompass people from all **religions**, and not merely people from any Judeo-Christian denomination. So the following definition should suffice for these purposes:

<u>secular</u> --- The word <u>**secular**</u> indicates an encompassing of all <u>**religions**</u>.² --- This is a necessary corollary to the claim that the bare-bones, <u>**secular**</u> <u>**social**</u> <u>**compact**</u> must have <u>**jural**</u> and <u>**ecclesiastical**</u> sub-compacts that do not play favorites in any way.

So a <u>secular social compact</u> is not only interdenominational. It must by definition be inter-<u>religious</u>. It's primary characteristic is that it has <u>jural</u> and <u>ecclesiastical</u> compacts and societies while having no <u>religious</u> laws, which necessarily includes an absence of *municipal law*. A <u>secular social compact</u> is therefore a bare-bones <u>social compact</u>.

¹ If it's true that England's *de facto* state religion is statism, then it's also true that Anglicanism has generally been used by English power brokers to disguise their statism, since the Restoration in 1660.

² The English "secular" originates from the Latin *saeculum I saecularis*, whose meanings are intimately bound to ages, times, temporality, chronology, years, *etc.* It may seem a gross distortion of the word's origin to use it here to encompass a multiplicity of belief systems. However, given that **human law** was not part of the garden ecological niche (because **human law** was not prescribed until the **Noachian Covenant**), **human law** and government characterize a specific chronological subset of the out-of-the-garden niche, and the foundations of human government are intimately bound to the **global** nature of these **global human laws**. **Secular** is therefore still inseparable from chronology, in contradistinction to the church, which is ultimately eternal.

As a sidebar, it's important to explain this theodicy's use of the expressions, *de jure* and *de facto*.

<u>de jure</u> --- Descriptive of a condition in which there has been total compliance with all requirements of law. Of right; legitimate; lawful; by right and just title. In this sense it is the contrary of *de facto* (q.v.).¹

De jure is often used to describe a government that has been driven into exile by what is considered to be an *unlawful* government. For example, the Allies during World War II considered de Gaulle's Free French Forces to be the *de jure* government of France, while they considered the *de facto*, Vichy government to be *unlawful*.

<u>de facto</u> --- In fact, in deed, actually. This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs, which must be accepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate. ... In this sense it is the contrary of *de jure*, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional.²

As is clear by these legal definitions, the *de facto-de jure* dichotomy does not necessarily refer to the split between a displaced government and the government that displaced it. In keeping with these facts, the **human-law** subset of this theodicy is expounding *de jure* **human law**, in contrast to the *de facto* **human law** that continues to plague humanity with **jurisdictional dysfunction**.

Given these definitions of <u>religious</u> and <u>secular</u>, it's fairly obvious how a <u>religious social compact</u> and a <u>secular social compact</u> differ. A <u>religious social</u> <u>compact</u> is most easily defined in contradistinction to a <u>secular social compact</u>. A <u>secular social compact</u> is by definition <u>secular</u>, meaning that it is intended to encompass, or presumes to encompass, multiple <u>religions</u>, without favoring any.³

In contrast to the minimal *lawful police powers* of a <u>secular social compact</u>, a fully developed <u>religious social compact</u> has maximal *lawful police powers*. In a fully developed <u>religious social compact</u>, all parties give prior consent to the full gamut of *police powers*. In other words, every adult with capacity enters into a contract with the other people in the community, where the contract allows the community at large to punish people for violations of the <u>religion</u>'s moral code, including whatever *municipal laws* may be a part of their <u>social compact</u> as *public*

¹ Black's 5th, p. 382.

² Black's 5th, p. 375.

³ The only exception to this claim is that the <u>secular religion</u>, meaning the <u>global</u> proscription of other-initiated damage, encompasses all other <u>religions</u>. This disclaimer is a necessary concession to anyone who insists that the <u>global</u> proscription is inherently <u>religious</u>.

contracts. **Religions** can govern practically everything within the moral sphere -including sexual practices; whether hybridization of crops and livestock is allowed; education; treatment of the dead; building construction; dress codes; personal hygiene; hairstyles; feasts, sabbaths, and holy days; liturgy; on-and-on, almost endlessly, and inclusive of *municipal purposes* and *functions*. If an adult in his or her right mind enters such a **religious social compact** voluntarily, then it's reasonable that the **religion** would provide penalties for such people when such people fail to keep the terms of the compact. If the **religious social compact** were fully functional then it would be assumed by anyone who volunteered to participate in the **compact**, that if such person violated the **compact**'s terms, a designated enforcer of the **religion**'s *public contract* would be authorized to bring a legal action against the offender in the **ecclesiastical** court. The more all-encompassing the terms established in the **religious social compact**'s *police powers*.

In contrast to a secular social compact, a religious social compact, by definition, is a <u>social compact</u> that is intended to encompass only a single <u>religion</u>. <u>Religion</u> designates any belief system, including any of the normally recognized religions, and any philosophy, including secular humanism, atheism, agnosticism, the "occult", etc. A secular social compact presumes to encompass all faiths within a single umbrella compact. It does this by rendering justice under the Bible's **global** prescription of **human law** to all people who exist under the **in personam jurisdiction** of the global covenant, and who happen to also be under the in personam jurisdiction of the secular social compact. A secular social compact, such as the jurisdictionally dysfunctional general government of the united States, can presume to encompass numerous religious social compacts, as well as numerous other secular social **<u>compacts</u>** like those that form the **<u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u>** States. secular social compact is primarily jural. This is because the most obvious kind of Genesis 9:6 damage is *delicts*; *delicts* are the exclusive **subject-matter jurisdiction** of jural compacts; and the secular social compact's subject-matter jurisdiction over Genesis 9:6 damage deriving from contract breaches is limited to its ecclesiastical society's subject-matter jurisdiction over secular, private contracts, which means that the subject matter of the secular ecclesiastical compact is much more limited than if it also included jurisdiction over public contracts.¹

¹ The exception to this extreme limitation on the <u>secular ecclesiastical society</u>'s <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> is some of the <u>secular social compact</u>'s "political law", which exist as terms immediately under the <u>social compact</u>, and are therefore terms of a *public contract*. For more about this exception, see *Sub-Chapter 4*, <u>Section</u> b, "<u>Political</u>

According to the biblical story, all *lawful* social compacts must have both jural and ecclesiastical sub-compacts and societies. But one set of these subcompacts / sub-societies preponderates according to whether the social compact is secular or religious. --- If it is secular, then common sense demands that it is primarily jural. The primary ecclesiastical functions of a secular social compact are the adjudication of secular, inter-religious, private contract disputes. This means that it has almost zero public contracts available for adjudication.¹ --- If the social compact is religious, then common sense demands that it is primarily ecclesiastical. This is because a religious social compact administers religious laws, including *municipal laws*, that a secular social compact doesn't, and the lawful and methodical adjudication and enforcement of such religious / municipal laws must be by way of <u>ecclesiastical</u> courts. So a <u>religious social compact</u> must adjudicate not only private, intra-religious contracts, but also public, intra-religious, religious / municipal contracts.² --- There need be no inherent distinction between a religious social compact's jural society and a secular social compact's jural society, because the subject-matter jurisdiction in each kind of jural society is exactly the same. The differences between secular and religious jural compacts pertain only to differences in geographical jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, not to differences in **<u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u>**.

Although the above definition of *municipal law* is correct, it is a truncated definition. It appears truncated above for the sake of focusing on the subject matter of that definition. The following is the full definition:

municipal law --- That which pertains solely to the citizens and inhabitants of a state, and is thus distinguished from political law, commercial law, and international law.³

Laws & Denizens", below. As indicated below, another exception may be certain kinds of *international law*.

¹ The exception to "zero" is the existence of some "political law" that is encompassed immediately by the **social compact**. Regarding this exception, see *Sub-Chapter 4*, <u>Section</u> *b*, "<u>Political Laws & Denizens</u>", <u>Section</u> *c*, "<u>How a Stand-Alone Secular Social Compact Might</u><u>Arise</u>", and <u>Section</u> *e*, "<u>Confederation of Secular Social Compacts</u>", below. Certain kinds of international law may be another exception.

² Reminder: According to this theodicy's nomenclature, a *public contract* is a contract that has **in personam jurisdiction** over the entire population governed by a **social compact**, by way of unanimous consent of all those party to that **social compact**. In contrast, a *private contract* is a contract that has **in personam jurisdiction** only over an incomplete subset of the **social compact**'s population.

³ Black's 5th, p. 918.

In order for this exposition of how to build *lawful* human governments to be complete, it needs to encompass not only *municipal laws* and **religious** laws, but also "political law, commercial law, and international law". It needs to show how all of these kinds of laws interface with one another and with the biblical prescription of human law. --- Any human government proposed by anyone, that doesn't propose reasonable mechanisms for addressing municipal laws, purposes, functions, and police powers, as well as **religious** law, "political law, commercial law, and international law", is inherently frivolous. This theodicy holds that the biblical story's prescription of human law is not frivolous, and neither is the human government that it implicitly proposes. --- To show how the Genesis 3:15 prophecy relates to the redemption of **human law**, it's necessary to show how the biblical prescription of **human law** encompasses "political law, commercial law, and international law", as well as these other kinds of laws, purposes, functions, powers, etc. Before getting to other laws, purposes, functions, etc. it's necessary to focus more explicitly on religious law. The way that **religion** is defined herein, **religious** law is far more rudimentary than any of these other kinds of law. Given that **religion** is a belief system held by one person or shared by a group of people, and that **religion** necessarily includes whatever rituals, acts, behaviors, etc., are necessary to putting the belief system into action, religious law is merely human law that derives from some belief system. But in regards to a **religious social compact**, it is a belief system that's shared by those party to the compact, and that manifests itself as public laws, *i.e.*, as terms of *public contracts*, meaning contracts that are unanimously consensual within the jurisdiction of the religious social compact.

Because the **religious** law that's expounded by the biblical story is Bible-based Christianity, where such **religious** laws are applicable within Christian **social compacts**, it's reasonable that this theodicy would use the Christian **religion** as an example of such **religious** law, as is done below. But before that, it's necessary to address a possible objection, an objection that would preempt this whole exposition of Bible-based **human law** if the objection were based on truth and logic.

a. An Objection from the Continuity-Discontinuity Debates:

In the New Testament, the Apostle Paul says the following to people who are presumably members of the Christian church at large:

Do not be bound together with unbelievers; for what partnership have righteousness and lawlessness, or what fellowship has light with darkness? Or what harmony has Christ with Belial, or what has a believer in common with an unbeliever? ... "[C]ome Taken at face value and without regard to the God-given inclination to seek rational symmetry, this passage clearly indicates that Bible-believing Christians should avoid entering into contracts with non-Christians. If Christians are forbidden from entering into contracts with non-Christians, then this presents a huge obstacle to this whole contract-based exposition of **human law**. With this kind of proscription, presumably by the Christian holy book, Christians cannot participate even in a **secular social compact** if they take their book seriously. Either there is something wrong with this face-value reading of 2 Corinthians 6, or there is something wrong with this theodicy's unpacking of the biblical story and the biblical prescription of **human law**. There appears to be a conundrum. The claim that Christians should avoid contracts with unbelievers (should "not be bound together with unbelievers"), and the claim that Christians must enter into **secular social compacts** with unbelievers, cannot both be true simultaneously.

To clarify: This theodicy has claimed that there is something it calls a "secular social compact". It simultaneously claims that not just Christians, but all people, are obligated by pre-cognitive consent to participate in *lawful jural compacts* with people regardless of whatever else those other people may believe. This claim about jural compacts appears to be contradicted directly by this didactic passage from 2 Corinthians 6, which appears to forbid Christians from entering into contracts with unbelievers. But because the *jural compact* is likely to exist as a sub-compact of an over-arching social compact, this claim about the global in personam jurisdiction of the positive-duty clause does not necessarily conflict with this didactic passage. Whether it conflicts or not depends upon whether the social compact at issue is secular or religious. If the social compact is religious and the religion is Christianity, then the **jural compact** subtends a Christian **religious social compact**, so that the people with whom the Christian enters into the **jural compact** are also Christian. So there is no conflict in that case. But if the social compact is secular, and if the Christian is obligated by the **<u>global</u>** covenant to enter into such a <u>secular</u> social compact, then there appears to be a genuine conflict between Genesis 9 and 2 Corinthians 6. So this theodicy's legal analysis poses a possible conflict with 2 Corinthians 6:14-17 in the case of a secular social compact, but not in the case of a religious social compact.

If a face-value reading of 2 Corinthians 6 says plainly that Christians should not enter into contracts with non-Christians, and if this theodicy says plainly that all people, including Christians, are obligated to enter into <u>secular social</u>

^{1 2} Corinthians 6:14-17 (NASB).

compacts because all people are obligated to participate in jural compacts, then there's a conflict, and something must give. The conflict is resolved by looking more closely at the subject matter of 2 Corinthians 6. The Apostle is not speaking there about *delicts*. In fact the Apostle Paul was operating under the rubric of the Messiah's First Coming.¹ The First Coming was the appearance of the Messiah as "suffering servant". The emphasis of the First Coming was not on the protection of natural rights. The emphasis of the First Coming was on saving people, meaning incorporating living souls into the eternal exogenous standing wave as a precursor to the Second Coming. The emphasis of the First Coming was on marking the path to redemption of the human race from its fallen condition. This necessarily includes encouraging respect for the **<u>natural law</u>**, recognition of God's holiness, and recognition of God's grace in light of the human inability to abide by the **natural** law. Recognition of God's holiness, the natural law, and God's grace relative to the **natural law**, are prerequisites to genuinely caring about the *imago Dei* in other people. If one doesn't care about God, how can one care about the image of God in other people? So respect for all three legs of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod, recognition that God created the **natural law**, and recognition of God's overwhelming grace towards humanity, are motivational precursors to entering into compacts to protect the imago Dei. Appended to all the glorious things accomplished by the First Coming is this seemingly coincidental effect of satisfying the prerequisite to the global establishment of the biblical prescription of human law. Under the rubric of the First Coming, neither the Messiah nor Paul was focused on human law. They were focused on far more important and fundamental things that happen to be prerequisites to fulfilling the Genesis 3:15 prophecy with respect to human law. In other words, the First Coming's nexus with the prescription of global human law is that it supplies the motivation to people to enter into these **<u>human-law</u>** compacts. Such motivation is an integral part of the God-given desire to build the kingdom of God.

If one does not have the heart to abide by a covenant, then the duties of that covenant will appear odious. But if one has a heart for the covenant, then the duties become a joy. So Paul's emphasis in operating under the rubric of the First Coming was on manifesting God's grace so that people would voluntarily and gladly enter the **Christian Covenant**, an appendage of which is the **Noachian Covenant**. The compacts regarding the protection of the *imago Dei* are subsets of this larger covenant. Paul was clearly encouraging the Corinthians to avoid binding themselves contractually to people who would pour cold water on their passion for God's holy covenant. He knew the people were not prepared to make a serious

¹ See CHAPTER I, Sub-Chapter 10.

effort at extending the moral-law leg of the <u>natural law</u> into <u>human law</u> with all the jurisdictional ramifications of that extension. Some people claim the extension of Christianity into the <u>human-law</u> arena must wait for the Second Coming. But as long as the Messiah tarries, his people are obligated under the covenant, and under the moral-law leg of the <u>natural law</u>, to do what is morally sound. So as long as the Messiah tarries, and as long as the rational extension of the moral-law leg into the <u>human-law</u> arena is jurisdictionally correct, his people are obligated to go forward with that extension. Paul didn't have these <u>human-law</u> problems. Now, Paul's spiritual progeny do have these problems. Because the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> is an appendage of the <u>Christian Covenant</u> that happens to have been on the back burner during the First Coming, it's extremely unlikely that Paul was proscribing Christians from entering into <u>secular social compacts</u> with non-Christians. But his proscription in regards to being bound together with unbelievers is absolutely a warning about the dangers of entering into other kinds of contractual ties with non-Christians.

By comprehending 2 Corinthians 6 in its proper context, it's clear that there is no rational conflict between it and this theodicy's exposition of the Bible's prescription of human law. All Christians are called to enter into secular social compacts with non-Christians, even if the non-Christians are the kinds of idolaters referenced by Paul. Paul surely did not expect his biblically ignorant, first-century audience to have any contradictory answers to his rhetorical questions: What partnership has righteousness and lawlessness? What fellowship has light with darkness? What harmony has Christ with Belial? What has a believer in common with an unbeliever? What agreement has the temple of God with idols? --- The obvious answer to each of these rhetorical questions is "None.", or at least, "Practically none." That was certainly the right answer at that time, and given the same context, it's the right answer now. The first-century church had virtually no immediate hope of correcting the flaws in the Roman Empire, or the flaws in any other human government then extant. In contrast, 21st-century Christians must extend the moral law into the human-law arena, or risk standing accused at the Judgment of sitting idle and silent, and thereby giving tacit consent, while psychopaths gang rape Christ's bride. --- As long as idol worshipers are capable of knowing a *delict* when they see one, and of knowing that it's wrong, Christians are obligated under their covenant to enter into secular social compacts with them, with strict observance of the jurisdictional boundaries of such compact. Strict observance of the jurisdictional boundaries of the biblical covenants leads inevitably to this conclusion, with all due strict observance of the priorities of the First Coming.

Strict observance of the **jurisdictional** boundaries of the biblical covenants also leads inevitably to the conclusion that Christians are obligated under their covenant to enter into **religious social compacts** with one another. Where **secular social compacts** are as all-inclusive as they can get, Christian **religious social compacts** are exclusive. This presents the Christian with a problem: How can the Christian be party to both a **secular social compact** and a **religious social compact**? Answer: Through confederation. Before discussing confederation, it's important to make sure the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the **religious social compact** is sufficiently explored.

b. <u>Religious Law / Municipal Law:</u>

To explore how the typical, *lawful* religious social compact operates, and to thereby expound its jurisdictional parameters, this theodicy will use a hypothetical Christian community as an example. This **religious** community could as easily be Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, animist, or any other religion one may choose. This **religious** community has entered into a set of unanimously consensual contracts with one another, where this set of contracts defines what this community will do to honor the God of their shared religion. This Christian community's members contract with one another to set aside one day a week as a day of rest. They contract with one another to follow a certain set of **religious** doctrines. They contract with one another to follow a certain kind of liturgy. They contract with one another to share the ownership and upkeep expenses of their meetinghouse. They might even enter into a *real property covenant* so that some or all of the people in the community could live as a **religious** community on a contiguous piece of land. Under this regimen, what are typically understood to be *municipal laws* are included within the same **social compact** with **human laws** that are usually understood to be *religious*. So this hypothetical community might have unanimously consensual laws governing water treatment, sewage treatment, animal husbandry, zoning, street maintenance, internet connectivity, community education, and numerous other things that are typically understood to be *municipal laws*.

Even if this church community did all these things, including taking care of the community's widows, orphans, and indigents, there would still be one extremely important aspect of this community that would be missing. It's the same thing that's missing from all the Christian churches in America right now. --- Given that a **religious social compact** contains a subtending **jural compact**, it's reasonable that the people who are active in the **jural compact** would be armed for the sake of satisfying Genesis 9:6. Even though armed, they might prefer to take the perpetrator of a heinous *delict* into custody to hand him over to agents of a **jural compact** that subtends a **secular social compact** that encompasses the given **religious**

social compact. These days the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compacts** in America generally do not have subtending **jural compacts**. This means that one of the essential things that **religious social compacts** need to do is form subtending **jural societies**. One of the most important things that such **jural societies** need to do these days is protect their **religious social compact** against **jurisdictional** violations perpetrated under *color of law* by the existing **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** governments.

In a <u>religious social compact</u> like this, the jural sub-compact exists to defend the community against the perpetration of *delicts*. Regardless of whether the *delict* is perpetrated from inside or outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the <u>social</u> <u>compact</u>, and regardless of whether it's a *public* or *private delict*, the jural subcompact exists to execute justice against the perpetrator. This clearly means that such a jural society needs to be able to defend the society at large against *delicts* perpetrated under *color of law* by the *de facto* rogue government. This means that the jural society needs to be steeped in knowledge about the difference between *de jure* law and *de facto* law, so that it knows when and how to defend. So this study of this particular topic is a *lawful* sub-function of the jural compact.

In a **religious social compact** like this, the **ecclesiastical** sub-compact exists to execute justice with regard to contract disputes. This includes contract disputes in regards to both *public* and *private contracts*. As indicated above, *public contracts* are contracts that have the unanimous consent to the terms of the contract within the given **social compact**. The terms of *public contracts* include both what this theodicy is calling *municipal laws*, and what this theodicy is calling **religious** laws.¹ Such *public contracts* also include "political laws" that govern the internal politics of the **religious** community. Such *public contracts* might also include "international law", depending on the nature of the specific international law.² --- The **religious** social compact's ecclesiastical sub-compact also exists to execute justice in *private contract* disputes. As indicated above, a *private contract* by definition has **personal jurisdiction** over some incomplete subset of the **social compact**'s population, meaning that the contract lacks unanimous consent of the entire population. A *private contract* between members of the **religious social compact**'s **ecclesiastical** under the **religious social compact**'s **ecclesiastical**

^{1 &}quot;Municipal law" is italicized here to indicate a jurisprudential definition of the term, as distinguished from a definition custom made by this theodicy, which would generally be bold underlined. This jurisprudential definition is not the same as the term of art used in the field of international law.

² Regarding political law, international law, and commercial law, see *Sub-Chapter 4*, *"The Metaconstitution*", below.

sub-compact. Many of these *private contracts* would probably be contracts whose terms are "commercial law" adopted by the parties to govern their intra-**religious** commercial dealings.

Before this focus on the **religious social compact** is considered complete, it's important to compare and contrast the *lawful* religious social compact with two other kinds of perpetually existing contracts, the *municipality* and the corporation. This is because these other kinds of perpetual contracts may be confused with the religious social compact. --- From some perspectives, the most dominant variety of **religious social compact** in 21st century America is not based on a *religion* in the conventional sense of the word. From this perspective, most dominant kind of **religious social compact** is the large, often international corporation. Each of these corporations has a specific product line that it vends to the world. The people who work for such corporations necessarily give unanimous consent to abide by the corporate by-laws. If such mega-corporations were municipalities or states, then their corporate by-laws would be equivalent to *municipal laws*. The fact that they are not municipalities or states, and the fact that their territorial jurisdiction is ambiguous and diverse, do not change the fact that they share characteristics with religious social compacts. These corporations are based on belief systems whose god or gods are the pursuit of money and power through the vending of their product line.¹ So the corporate by-laws are subsets of their encompassing belief system / religion. From this perspective, these corporations form a special category of **jurisdictionally** dysfunctional religious social compact. They are jurisdictionally dysfunctional not because they are focused exclusively on the pursuit of money and power, although they might rightly be judged immoral on that basis. They are jurisdictionally dysfunctional because they don't have jural compacts that are dedicated to prosecuting *delicts* regardless of whether the *delicts* originate internally or externally. These corporations exist within a hideously corrupt economic environment that is corrupt primarily because of the moral spinelessness of the people involved in it, but also because of the general society's gross jurisdictional dysfunction that is enhanced by the IRC § 501 church's inane theologies. In fact, the 501(c)(3) corporate, "Christian" "churches" generally operate with belief systems and practices

¹ This characterization of such corporations as being based on belief systems whose gods are money and power is not necessarily true. However, under *de facto* American law, publicly traded corporations are legally bound to put a premium on making a profit. This is conducive to monopoly capitalism, which is driven by greed and the lust for power, and is a perversion of free market capitalism, which is based on *delict*-free trade. The *de facto* laws also give preferential treatment to such corporations over the interests of private people. The law therefore gears such corporations to be corrupt, even if they start out otherwise.

more akin to their publicly traded cousins than to those of real Christian churches. If these presumably <u>religious social compacts</u> / corporations encompassed genuinely functional <u>jural societies</u>, then the <u>jural society</u> would systematically root out the corruption starting from the inside, prosecuting everyone responsible for it. --- On the other hand, these large corporations are not really <u>religious social compacts</u>. They are really *private contracts* that are criminal under *de jure* law because of the way that they siphon tax monies and public privileges within the *de facto* system.

The way that cities and States have developed in the *de facto united States*, they are all jurisdictionally dysfunctional. According to the *de facto* law, they all have municipal police powers that are legitimate. According to the *de facto* law, they are all religiously pluralistic, but they have non-consensual police powers. The situation is such that anyone who moves into a city or State, or who happens to have been born in a given city or State, is considered by the *de facto* law to have given tacit consent to abide by all the city / State's municipal laws. But this assumption of tacit consent is a ruse. People who are fully aware of all the city / State's municipal laws are extremely rare. Without awareness of such laws, tacit consent doesn't exist, because the parties are not fully informed. Because consent is lacking, no contract exists. So when such municipal laws are enforced, the city / State perpetrates delicts under color of law on people over whom the city / State lacks lawful jurisdiction. Because these cities / States generally have massive municipal police powers, they in effect operate under the tacit assumption that they are *lawful* religious social compacts. But because their presumed in personam jurisdiction is over a pluralistic population that has not given genuine consent, these cities / States are jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts, at best.¹ To whatever extent the general government of the united States enforces municipal laws -- and make no mistake, the extent is huge -- it likewise perpetrates *delicts* under *color of law*. So according to the biblical prescription of **human law**, the *de facto* American government at all levels is criminal. This statement of this fact should not be misidentified as a call by this theodicy for immediate execution of *lex talionis* justice against government officials and employees. The government is criminal because people allow it. People allow it because people are generally so ignorant that they don't know jurisprudential truth when they see it. They don't even know where to start in correcting the problem. So the problem is primarily educational. Many government officials and employees are as much in the dark as their victims, and they're so compartmentalized that they don't understand the ramifications of what they do. The solution to this situation is the formation of Christian jural societies, appendages to the existing jurisdictionally dysfunctional

¹ This is because they could much more easily turn into *lawful* <u>secular social compacts</u> than they could <u>religious social compacts</u>.

religious social compacts, with accompanying educational programs that focus on educating all Christians about their responsibilities under the *positive-duty clause*.

Lamentably, activation of Christian **jural societies** by existing **religious social compacts** would not be sufficient to reverse the existing **jurisdictional dysfunction** in America's "Christian" communities. It would certainly be a major step in the right direction. But these **religious social compacts** also generally lack functional **ecclesiastical compacts** / **societies**. The lack of the **human law** sub-compacts is a problem that was addressed with pristine clarity by the Apostle Paul:

> Does any one of you, when he has a case against his neighbor, dare to go to law before the unrighteous, and not before the saints? Or do you not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world is judged by you, are you not competent to constitute the smallest law courts? Do you not know that we shall judge angels? How much more, matters of this life? If then you have law courts dealing with matters of this life, do you appoint them as judges who are of no account in the church? I say this to your shame. Is it so, that there is not among you one wise man who will be able to decide between his brethren, but brother goes to law with brother, and that before unbelievers? Actually, then, it is already a defeat for you, that you have lawsuits with one another. Why not rather be wronged? Why not rather be defrauded? On the contrary, you yourselves wrong and defraud, and that your brethren. Or do you not know that the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived; neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor homosexuals, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor swindlers, shall inherit the kingdom of God. And such were some of you; but you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God.¹

Here are clear guidelines for establishing Christian <u>ecclesiastical</u> courts, and for establishing Christian <u>jural societies</u>, and for moving steadfastly towards <u>jurisdictional</u> sanity. If Christian churches continue to neglect their duty to form Christian <u>jural societies</u> and Christian <u>ecclesiastical societies</u>, then they will be incapable of operating as genuine Christian <u>religious social compacts</u>. They will continue to be incapable of enforcing against *delicts*, meaning that they continue repudiating the Bible's <u>global</u> prescription of <u>human law</u>. They will continue being incapable of properly enforcing their own Bible-derived <u>religious</u> laws, which means that by default, they cease being genuine Christian churches. They will be incapable

^{1 1} Corinthians 6:1-11 (NASB).

of properly enforcing <u>religious</u> laws that are characterized by current American law as *municipal laws*, which means that they will continue failing to operate as real Christian communities because they cannot band together on a single contiguous piece of land divided up into family plots, and operating with all the necessary *municipal laws*. All of these failures are indictments against the American church that come directly out of a rational reading of the Bible.

It's crucial to recognize here that de jure municipal laws are necessarily a subset of religious laws. This is true regardless of whether the religious social compact is Christian or some other religion.

c. <u>Continuum / Confederation:</u>

It should be clear enough by now that there is a continuum between secular and religious social compacts. A secular social compact has zero religious / municipal laws under its immediate jurisdiction. In contrast, a tightly controlled religious social compact might have unanimously consensual religious laws so abundantly that it might look almost totalitarian to an outside observer. Between these two extremes are a variety of lawful social compacts that might have only a few unanimously consensual religious (including municipal) laws. This in-between variety of social compact is still referred to by this theodicy as a religious social compact because, if it's lawful and in-between, it still has an underlying belief system that has given rise to at least one unanimously adopted religious law. So this continuum of lawful social compacts is composed mostly of religious social compacts, and only at one extreme is the bare-bones social compact, also known as the secular social compact. So based on prior consent, the various kinds of social compact range on a continuum from social compacts with minimal lawful police powers, to social compacts with maximal lawful police powers. So based on this continuum, the degree of prior consent given to any given social compact's police powers defines the kind of social compact it is. At each end of the continuum, there is one kind of social compact. There's a fully formed religious social compact at one end, and a fully formed secular social compact at the other. And of course there are variants between these two extremes, and everything in between is called a religious social compact, because all in between have at least one unanimously adopted religious (municipal) law.

By definition, a fully functional secular social compact presumes to govern all religions. It does this not because it interferes in religious matters, but because it prosecutes delicts and adjudicates contract disputes with no regard to religious issues. Among other things, this means that if a religion enables or encourages delictual behavior, that religion must be treated as criminal to the degree that it is, in fact, an accomplice. Every perpetrator who perpetrates intentionally has a belief system that

generates delicts. Whether such a delict-manufacturing belief system / religion is held by one person or by millions of members of a supposedly respectable religion is irrelevant. What's relevant to a jural society is that perpetrators be prosecuted regardless of their numbers, and regardless of what colors they may fly. This is the iconic blind-folded bearer of the scales of justice in operation. Because secular social compacts must presume to be blind to religious issues, by definition, secular social compacts have a bare minimal subject-matter jurisdiction, exactly the opposite of a fully developed religious social compact. The subject-matter jurisdiction of a jural compact as it can get and still have a functional ecclesiastical compact. The secular ecclesiastical compact exists to adjudicate secular contracts, and that's all it exists to do. Because of the necessity of "political law", "international law", and "commercial law", the secular ecclesiastical compact bears the responsibility of adjudicating infractions of such laws, but always as such laws exist as terms of secular contracts and compacts.

In contrast to the secular social compact, in the fully functional religious social compact, the people party to the social compact unanimously consent to collectively keep a specific religion. In other words, in a religious social compact, the people party to the social compact unanimously consent to abide by the standards of their shared religion with respect to how their god is (gods are) to be worshipped, how children are to be raised, how streets are to be paved, how products are to be produced, and a multitude of other issues that are outside the lawful scope and purview of a lawful secular social compact, but well within the definition of religious laws, which include municipal laws.

If people want to destroy themselves, either quickly or slowly, a <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u> has no lawful grounds upon which to stop them. But this is not true for a <u>religious social compact</u>. A <u>religious social compact</u> might have prior consent from people to keep such people from hurting themselves, including stopping people from damaging their own secondary property. Because unanimous consent about most things is practically impossible in a pluralistic society, <u>secular social compacts</u> cannot be expected to stop people from destroying themselves. Secular social compacts, by definition, do not have unanimously adopted public contracts that govern self-damage. On the contrary, secular social compacts have extremely limited but extremely focused police powers. On the other hand, religious social compacts have police powers over participants that are as broad as the unanimous consent of the parties allow them to be. --- In contrast to these strict jurisdictional guidelines for secular and religious social compacts, existing de facto governments are enforcing non-consensual mala prohibita in violation of the need for prior consent. To get a feeling for the extent of this non-consensual mala prohibita problem, one only needs to consider the statute-based regulations enforced by the "over 45 state [regulatory] agencies in Minnesota".¹ Generally, the other 49 States are no better. All the States are enforcing non-consensual mala prohibita including truancy laws, zoning laws, occupational licensing, etc., ad nauseum. But this problem has origins in the common law. To see how, and to clarify the distinction between de jure government and de facto government, and between religious social compacts and secular social compacts, it should help to examine how these governments and compacts treat the principle of unconscionability and the concept of the unconscionable contract.

unconscionable bargain --- An unconscionable bargain or contract is one which no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man would accept, on the other.²

unconscionability --- Basic test of "unconscionability" of contract is whether under circumstances existing at time of making of contract and in light of general commercial background and commercial needs of particular trade or case, clauses involved are so one-sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise party. ... Unconscionability is generally recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties, to a contract together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. ...

Typically the cases in which unconscionability is found involve gross overall one-sidedness or gross one-sidedness of a term disclaiming a warranty, limiting damages, or granting procedural advantages. In these cases one-sidedness is often coupled with the fact that the imbalance is buried in small print and often couched in language unintelligible to even a person of moderate education. Often the seller deals with a particularly susceptible clientele.³

To see how this applies to this theodicy's description of the redemption of **human law**, suppose a woman has transmission trouble. She goes to a local mechanic to have it worked on. Before beginning the work, the mechanic has the woman sign a contract which stipulates that the mechanic has absolutely zero liability if he increases the damage to the car; and that the woman has 100 percent liability if the mechanic increases the damage to the car. The mechanic works on the car, and

¹ The list of "State Agencies, Boards, Commissions" is at URL: http://mn.gov/portal/ government/state/agencies-boards-commissions/. --- The licenses by Minnesota State agencies are at URL: http://mn.gov/elicense/.

² Black's 5th, p. 1367.

³ Black's 5th, p. 1367.

renders the transmission worthless. The woman sues the mechanic for *damages*. In his defense, the mechanic submits the contract as evidence to the court. The *de facto* court stipulates that the contract is *unconscionable*, and refuses to enforce it. Instead, the judge demands that the mechanic should pay half of what it costs to replace or repair the transmission, and the woman should pay the other half. The question is whether this decision is correct in a *de jure* court. To answer this question, it's crucial to know whether the court is <u>secular</u> or <u>religious</u>. But all that's known is that it's a State court in the *united States*.

The woman foolishly entered the contract. No one forced her into it. Seeing this case within the context of the biblical prescription of **global human law**, the following conclusion is necessary: Even though there may be Genesis 9:6 damage here, there is no *delict*. This is because the damage caused by the mechanic was damage that the woman consented contractually to absorb. If she had been coerced into the contract, then that would be totally different. If she had been coerced or defrauded, then such coercion / fraud would be grounds for nullifying the contract. Coercion and fraud are both *delicts*. Assuming that the woman sued the mechanic in a State court of the existing *de facto* system, the woman sued in a <u>secular</u> court. That's because all these *de facto* governments in effect openly declare themselves to be secular social compacts in the religion clauses of their constitutions. Under such a **dysfunctional jurisdiction**, the fact that the *de facto* court found that it was an unconscionable contract, even though there was no delict, raises the question of whether the decision of the *de facto* court was *lawful*. In other words, where does the judge get the authority to override the prior consent of the parties, when there is no *delict* built inherently into the contract?

Based on a rational reading of Genesis 9:6, a contract to commit a *delict* is obviously a violation of that verse. So if a mafioso makes a contract with someone to have a third party knocked off, the contract is *unconscionable* in the sense that "no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make [a contract to murder someone]". This contract between the woman and the mechanic is not *unconscionable* in this sense because it is not a contract to commit a *delict*. It's *unconscionable* in the sense that there is "gross one-sidedness" in it. It is totally favorable to the mechanic, and totally unfavorable to the woman. It may be unscrupulous of the mechanic to offer the contract, and it may be stupid of the woman to accept it. But there is no *delict* built into the contract. Such a contract therefore is not illegal under a **secular social compact**, and not illegal under a **jural compact**. On the other hand, the mechanic did damage her transmission, so it's still important to explore the possibility that the damage is Genesis 9:6 damage. Assuming that the woman was fully informed of

the risk she was taking, the damage cannot be blamed primarily on the mechanic. The woman took a big risk and lost. The *onus* is on her, and not on the mechanic. Because she entered a contract in which she consented to take total responsibility for the damage, this was an act of self-damage. As already indicated above, self-damage cannot be included within the original **jurisdiction** of Genesis 9:6. This is therefore not Genesis 9:6 damage. --- Assuming that the woman and the mechanic were total strangers before entering into the contract, and assuming that they were not coparties to a **religious social compact**. Because self-damage is excluded from the **jurisdiction** of a **secular social compact**. Because self-damage is excluded from the **jurisdiction** of a **secular social compact**, the woman would lose if she took this case into a *de jure* **secular** court.¹ Because States in effect declare themselves to be **secular social compacts** in their constitutions, State courts should act like *de jure* **secular** courts, and dismiss the woman's complaint for failure to present a cause of action.

On the other hand, if the woman and the mechanic were members of the same **religious social compact**, and if their **religious social compact** made the one-sidedness breed of *unconscionability* forbidden, and if part of their agreement was that their dispute would be heard in their **religious social compact**'s court, then it's perfectly reasonable for such a *de jure* **religious** court to find the contract *unconscionable* and to reach a decision practically identical to the one reached by the *de facto* court. This is yet more evidence that the *de facto* courts are declaring themselves to be **secular** on one hand, and operating as though they are **religious** on the other. They are thereby enforcing non-consensual *mala prohibita*, and manifesting **jurisdictional dysfunction**.

Given that the relationship between the woman and the mechanic is purely **secular**, the solution is for the consumer, the woman, to always refuse to do business with anyone who uses unscrupulous business practices like this mechanic's lopsided contract. For this solution to work, it's crucial for people like this woman to have access to alternative business people who are committed to dealing fairly. Why should she go to someone who uses unconscionable contracts when she can go to someone else who doesn't? Likewise, why should she volunteer to live in a society

¹ If she tried to take it into a *de jure* <u>secular</u> <u>ecclesiastical</u> court, the court would find the case non-justiciable, because the contract was not breached. From the perspective of the title-transfer theory of contracts, this contract is non-justiciable because there is no transfer of title in the contract and no inherent theft of some secondary property. There is not even a broken promise, so the case is also not justiciable under the promise-expectation theory of contracts.

dedicated to crony-, even monopoly-, capitalism, if she can opt to live in a free-trading, fair-trading community instead?

In contrast to this mechanic's *unconscionable* contract, most *unconscionable* contracts in early 21st-century America are *adhesion contracts*:

adhesion contract --- Standardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially "take it or leave it" basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or services except in acquiescing in form of contract. Distinctive feature of adhesion contract is that weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms. ... Not every such contract is unconscionable.¹

Anyone who has signed a contract to get a credit card is a "weaker party" to an *adhesion contract*. The same is true for most bank loans, mortgages, software use licenses, and practically any standardized instrument that requires a signature. In fact, *adhesion contracts* are everywhere. They appear convenient. But they generally have a hidden cost that eventually trumps their convenience.

When the *adhesion* variety of contract becomes common in a society, it's a sign that the entire society has been taken over by an oligarchy of monopoly capitalists. Monopoly capitalism takes control of an otherwise free market whenever bad laws and bad law enforcement allow and foster mass-fraud and collusion. This is especially true when a private central bank becomes the issuer of legal tender. The *united States* has had such a central bank since the Federal Reserve Act legalized "fractionalreserve banking" in 1913. The united States had a problem with "fractional-reserve banking" for long before 1913.² But 1913 was when the *united States* committed itself to descend emphatically into corruption. England has had a similar central bank for much longer. It should be obvious to any modestly intelligent observer that the international banking establishment is now working overtime to establish a global central bank. This may be a fine plan to make a small minority of psychopathic people enormously wealthy. But it's a hideously evil plan for plunging the vast majority of humanity into a global, scientific, totalitarian regime like this world has never seen before. Anyone who reads the Bible knows that the good guys are diametrically opposed to this plan to the core of their being. Any Christian who is not explicitly opposed to this plan should be suspected of pure nominalism. It

¹ Black's 5th, p. 38.

² See Rothbard, Murray; **The Mystery of Banking**, URL: http://mises.org/books/ mysteryofbanking.pdf. Also, Rothbard, Murray; **The Case Against the Fed**, URL: http://mises.org/books/fed.pdf.

appears that the first step to dealing with such mass fraud is to refuse to do business with them, and to refuse to cooperate / collaborate with such monopoly capitalists and their corporations. The American system has been in the grips of this mass fraud for so long that most people are essentially like serfs or share-croppers. They're not in a financial position to refuse to do business with their creditors. This is more evidence that it's time for real Christian churches to stop collaborating with the oligarchs. Instead, it's time for real Christian churches to establish Christian **jural societies**, and to bring the banking fraudsters to justice. Fraud is a *delict*, as surely as a murder is a *delict*, and like murder, legalizing it doesn't eliminate the mandate to execute justice against it. Unlike this mechanic who is not breaking any laws under a *lawful* **secular social compact**, even though he is certainly using business practices that would, and should, prove fatal to his business in a genuinely free market because he is clearly violating **matural law**, these crony capitalists have conspired to build a system based entirely on open fraud. Like the mechanic, they deserve to reap what they sow.

One of the most important things to understand from this example of an unconscionable contract is how religious social compacts and secular social compacts should interface. Even though the constitutional structure of the united States has been jurisdictionally dysfunctional from the beginning, it's still nevertheless true that whatever degree of jurisdictional sanity existed within the original **social compact** of the *united States* needs to be recognized and acknowledged, for the sake of bringing such sanity into the foreground, so that people can live by it. The fact is that this clan / nation / social compact was originally designed to be a "confederate republic".¹ Even though the original system was **jurisdictionally** dysfunctional, it nevertheless made an attempt, evidenced by the 1st Amendment's religion clauses, to establish the general government as a secular social compact, and the States, counties, and municipalities as **religious social compacts**. This bit of jurisdictional sanity has been overlaid with tons of jurisdictionally dysfunctional laws and judicial decisions. Nevertheless, Christians who take the biblical story seriously have a mandate to build on the jurisdictional sanity, in spite of the overlayment of vast jurisdictional dysfunction. So the question that Christians who are inclined to form jural societies need to ask is this: "How do we do this?"

¹ This expression is found in Madison's Federalist Paper #43, "The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (continued)", and Hamilton's Federalist #9, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection". --- Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John; **The Federalist Papers**, introduction & editing by Clinton Rossiter, 1961. Mentor; NAL Penguin Inc., New York. --- Both essays cite Montesquieu's **The Spirit of Laws** (1748) as the source of this concept.

The start is in assuming that the confederation still exists, and is a foundation to build on. The *de facto* general government has gone almost utterly rogue. But somewhere underneath all the corruption is a *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u>. This *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u> was the creation of the States through what is essentially a treaty between them. The treaty was the *u.S.* Constitution. To whatever extent the organic Constitution and Bill of Rights form a *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u>, it still has a binding effect. But these days this <u>secular social compact</u> exists almost entirely as a disembodied idea. Only when living people stand on that idea does it become embodied.

Beneath all the corruption of the *de facto* States, each State is a *de jure* <u>secular</u> <u>social compact</u>. Even though the States have borne *municipal laws* since before their inclusion in the confederation, none of them is *lawfully* a <u>religious social compact</u> because none of them has ever had unanimous consent for their exercise of <u>religious</u> and *municipal* laws. The same is true for every municipality and county within every State. *De facto* State, county, and municipal governments are encumbered by massive <u>jurisdictional dysfunction</u>, and have been since their conception as such governmental entities. If each of these governments were pared down to a *lawful, de jure* <u>secular social compact</u>, then each would be a *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u> within a *lawful* confederation of <u>secular social compacts</u>.

Originally, each State in the 13 colonies was some kind of religious social **compact** to whatever extent the people there consented to the *municipal* and **religious** laws in operation. But during the decades immediately after the Declaration of Independence and Constitution were ratified, each of these States adopted religious freedom clauses into its constitution, thereby officially making itself a secular social **compact** operating with a good deal of **jurisdictional dysfunction**. Now it's time for these State, county, and municipal governments to abandon the pretense that they are **religious social compacts**. It's also time for real **religious social compacts** to be formed to take on the *municipal* and **religious** purposes and functions that *lawfully* belong to *de jure*, unanimously consensual <u>religious social compacts</u>, as well as to *private contracts*. This is a radical overhaul of the existing social superstructure. Some might call it "revolutionary". But this is not necessarily a violent revolution, and violence is certainly not what this theodicy is calling for. This theodicy is only remarking in passing that Christians should behave as Christians, and do what the biblical story and their own consciences call them to do. It's certain that the enemy of the biblical prescription of human law is statism. Statism is an idea, a bad idea, a delusion, a powerful weapon in the serpent's hands. The real enemy of the biblical prescription of human law is the delusion, not all the people who happen to be suffering from the delusion.

Sub-Chapter 4: The Metaconstitution

Overhauling the American social superstructure so that it reflects the biblical prescription of **human law** will result in a confederation that is built on genuine consent, rather than in a "confederate republic" that pretends to be built on consent, but isn't.¹ What this theodicy is describing here is what constitutional lawyers sometimes call a *metaconstitution*. A *metaconstitution* is usually understood to be a set of interpretational policies for the proper interpretation of the *u.S.* Constitution. The *legal positivists* who currently dominate the legal profession notoriously eschew any kind of *metaconstitution*, especially one that claims to be based on the Christian Bible. This is a good reason for people who genuinely adhere to the biblical story to relegate the views of such *legal positivists* to the dung heap of history.

Anyone who compares this Bible-based *metaconstitution* with the organic Constitution knows that a face-value, sub-rational reading of the organic Constitution is not perfectly compatible with this Bible-based *metaconstitution*. Even so, a literalist's understanding of the organic Constitution is vastly more compatible with this Bible-based *metaconstitution* than the *constitution* that's being expounded these days by *legal positivists*, including by almost the entire American judicial system and legal professions.

Because it encompasses the entire field of **human law**, and not merely the Constitution, this Bible-based *metaconstitution* is much more comprehensive than the u.S. Constitution. For this reason, it may at first seem inappropriate to call it a *metaconstitution*. But if "constitution" is understood broadly, it is not inappropriate.

<u>constitution</u> --- The organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be written or unwritten, establishing the character and conception of its government, laying the basic principles to which its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the government, and regulating, distributing, and limiting the

¹ The focus here is on America only because America's organic documents (including the common law) lay a foundation for this overhaul that is difficult to find anywhere else. If America is "exceptional", it's only because of these organic documents. But if Americans allow those documents to utterly expire from their polity, then America provides no more foundation for this overhaul than any other society.

functions of its different departments, and prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of sovereign powers.¹

This broad definition of *constitution* encompasses the organic Constitution and Bill of Rights. It also includes the common law in its current state, subsequent amendments to the Constitution, the State constitutions, many federal and State statutes, many regulations generated by bureaucrats that happen to pervert statutory authority, case law that interprets all these sundry laws, rules of court, rules of evidence, and whatever written or unwritten assumptions may exist that influence the law. The ordinary layman generally understands constitution to be limited to the organic Constitution and Bill of Rights, and maybe some or all of the other amendments. So laymen generally have an understanding of the constitution that is narrower than this broad definition. In contrast to laymen, legal positivists generally use this broad definition of *constitution*. They do this largely because they lean heavily upon judicial opinions, where such opinions dominate their perception of the law by way of legal precedent, and where such case law generally leans heavily towards the broad definition. In contrast to both *legal positivists* and laymen, people who believe in the biblical story's prescription of human law should use the broad definition of constitution for the sake of comprehensiveness, but they should lean heavily upon the biblical prescription of **human law** to get the correct understanding of the *constitution*, not upon legal-positivist flim-flam or upon "strict constructionism" that ignores the Bible. In other words, people who adhere to the biblical story should use this Biblebased metaconstitution to properly understand the real, human-law constitution of the *united States*. There are extremely reliable historical reasons for using the biblical metaconstitution to properly interpret American law, and the reasons for doing so are not limited merely to the Christian hope of living consistently with the biblical covenants

The historical evidence indicates that the rate of biblical literacy in the 13 colonies during the founding era was extremely high. It follows from this evidence that what the founding generation was attempting, even with their sober recognition of the practical difficulties, was the establishment of the biblical prescription of **human law**. This historical evidence should be combined with the need to see **jurisdictional** sanity gestating in the existing social order. The combination of history and the need to bring **jurisdictional** sanity into the foreground yields an unusually large area of compatibility between the organic Constitution, Bill of Rights, and common law, on one hand, and the Bible-based *metaconstitution*, Bill of Rights, and common law, on one hand, and the *metaconstitution* on the other. In addition to large areas of compatibility between the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and common law, on one hand, and the *metaconstitution* on the other, there is also compatibility

¹ Black's 5th, p. 282.

between this *metaconstitution* and other aspects of the broadly defined *constitution*, including some supreme Court and lower court opinions, some amendments, aspects of State constitutions, some federal and State statutes, and some rules of court and rules of evidence. In contrast to this unusually large area of compatibility between the biblical *metaconstitution* and the broadly defined American *constitution*, there is massive incompatibility between the biblical *metaconstitution* and the biblical *metaconstitution* and the *legal positivist*'s *constitution*.

This Bible-based *metaconstitution* demands that all the currently existing *secular* governments of the united States be recognized, collectively, as a confederation of secular social compacts. At its core, every town, city, county, and State, as well as the general government, is a <u>secular social compact</u> that is now defined primarily by its existing **geographical jurisdiction**, its commitment to being pluralistic, and its inherent inability to get unanimous consent for anything, with the possible exception of the bare minimal attributes of a secular social compact. To bring these de facto governments into conformity with the metaconstitution, the subjectmatter jurisdiction of each of these secular social compacts must be dramatically reduced so that it conforms to *de jure* law. This should not be a process of merely eliminating or repealing *municipal* and **religious** laws that are currently on the *de* facto books. It's also not merely a process of "privatizing" entities and enterprises that are currently in the possession of these de facto governments. It must be more than merely a matter of repealing laws because these laws generally pursue lawful purposes and functions, but they do so in a way that is jurisdictionally dysfunctional. So-called "privatization" is also not a good idea. Privatization has gotten an extremely bad reputation because it has generally been a process whereby entities are moved from the possession of jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular governments into the possession of monopoly capitalists. This kind of "privatization" is not conducive to a free market. Instead, it's conducive to the neo-feudalism that is the *de facto* goal of monopoly capitalists. In the existing system, monopoly capitalists are using the *de facto* governments as their henchmen and stooges. Many people call such a system "fascism". Regardless of whether the system to which monopoly capitalists are guiding the ship of state is called fascism, monarchy, socialism, communism, collectivism, totalitarianism, or utopia, the system they're pushing is a jurisdictionally dysfunctional system of government that perpetrates *delicts*, often by way of a maze of obfuscation. What currently passes for "privatization" merely plays into the hands of these rogues and their rogue systems.

In order to revamp the local, low-level <u>secular social compacts</u>, and to do so *lawfully*, the revamping cannot happen without due consideration of the consent of everyone within the <u>geographical jurisdiction</u> who has capacity. Given that

these <u>secular social compacts</u> are pluralistic, leaning on unanimous consent to accomplish almost anything the local government does may seem foolish. But before abandoning hope because unanimous consent is absurd, it's important to consider where unanimous consent is needed, and where it isn't.

Unanimous, pre-cognitive consent already exists with regard to the *negative-duty clause* and the *positive-duty clause*. So unanimous pre-cognitive consent already exists in regard to the subject matters of these two clauses. But unanimous pre-cognitive consent does not exist in regard to the massive stuff outside these subject matters, stuff that has glommed onto the *de facto* system like cancer. By looking at these glommed **religious** / *municipal* laws from the point of view of taxes and takings, limitations on consent become obvious. It's crucial to explore these limitations before going deeper into applying the *metaconstitution*.

The *de facto* governments are perpetrating *delicts* against all their tax payers by way of taxation. They're doing this by using confiscatory taxation to pay for religious / municipal purposes and functions. Some people may refuse to give cognitive consent for such taxation, and they may make explicit objections and pay under duress. But the majority of Americans pay such taxes as though they were happy to do so, or as though they were all suffering from the Stockholm syndrome. This is not genuine consent because government is pointing the threat of force at the tax payer. Paying in such quiet desperation may be acquiescence, but it's not consent. It's not even pre-cognitive consent because **global** pre-cognitive consent does not exist in regards to religious / municipal purposes and functions, but only in regards to Genesis 9:6 duties. This is also not cognitive consent because genuine cognitive consent cannot exist when the party presumably giving it is being threatened with a *delict*, and is thereby the victim of extortion. Genuine cognitive consent can only exist when the decision-making process is not being clouded by human threats. Because the linkage between taxing and spending is undeniable, through taxation, the *de facto* secular governments are perpetrating *delicts* in regards to their religious / municipal laws, because these governments are using extortion to pay for the administration of such laws.

No *lawful* <u>secular social compact</u> has *lawful* authority to collect taxes (or takings) willy-nilly to pay for governmental functions that exist willy-nilly. Haphazard taxes and takings are inherently *delictual*, and turn such government into a criminal operating under *color of law*. If taxes (or takings) exist to fund <u>secular</u> enterprises like building "Post Offices", "post Roads", highways, railroads, airports, ditches, canals, pipelines, shopping malls, *etc.*, then the taxes (and takings) are inherently bloodshed, because these things are being paid for with stolen money. Precisely the same is true if the taxes (and takings) are spent to pay for *lawful* functions of a

secular social compact, meaning *lawful* functions of the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts that are implicitly required by the Genesis 9:6 clauses. But at least there is **global** pre-cognitive consent to these **secular** purposes and functions. There is no **global** pre-cognitive consent to the governmental implementation of these **religious** *I municipal* purposes and functions.

Because everyone gives pre-cognitive consent to enforce against *delicts*, every party to these <u>secular social compacts</u> has given pre-cognitive consent to the elimination of these jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious / municipal laws. Everyone has also given pre-cognitive consent to the prosecution of those responsible for perpetrating these *delicts* under *color of law*. On the other hand, even though there is ample pre-cognitive consent to the elimination of these laws and the prosecution of those responsible, there is very little cognitive consent regarding either. There is cognitive dissonance one would expect of people suffering from the Stockholm syndrome.

In the implementation of the *metaconstitution*, an emphasis needs to be placed on elimination of **religious** / *municipal* laws from the *de facto* **jurisdictions** of the de facto secular governments. The emphasis should not be on prosecution of the numerous government officials perpetrating such tax extortion under color of law. Both ending the crime and prosecuting the criminals are important. But common sense demands that terminating the crime should take priority. As long as there is a shortage of methodical, viable plans to terminate the crime by eliminating nonconsensual **religious** / municipal laws, it makes little or no sense to set the primary focus on prosecution. Under the circumstances, in many respects, the people responsible are the people themselves, the "governed". By itself, the elimination of such **religious** / municipal laws is such a huge problem that a frontal assault on this problem should probably be avoided. It's probably more constructive to be circumspect, like circling Jericho seven times. So this theodicy will take a roundabout approach to the migration of *religious* / *municipal* purposes and functions out of the immediate scope and purview of the **secular social compacts**. It's reasonable to call this the "Great Migration". Rather than focus immediately on that migration, it will probably be more constructive to focus on how *lawful* secular social compacts should be funded, and how they should function.

Given that every town, city, county, and State is a <u>secular social compact</u> according to the *metaconstitution*, and given that they are all integrated into a confederation recognizable by the *metaconstitution* as an overarching <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u> generally called the *united States*, there is a huge question regarding how, exactly, these sundry <u>secular social compacts</u> are supposed to interact with one another. If their *de jure* <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> is so limited, then it appears

that there might be no way for them to interact without violating their **jurisdictional** boundaries. This situation hints at two problems that demand resolution as part of the implementation of this *metaconstitution*:

- (i) If these <u>secular social compacts</u> are genuinely in confederation, then there must be some treaty or set of treaties that define how the individual <u>secular social compacts</u> are to interact. For this confederation to be genuinely viable, these treaties must be real contracts that have real force of law. As far as each of these <u>secular social compacts</u> is concerned, such law is essentially *international law*. To implement this *metaconstitution*, it must be clear what the jurisdictions of these treaties are, so that it's certain that *delicts* are not being built into the treaties.
- (ii) Given that each of these <u>secular social compacts</u> is as limited in its *lawful* <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> as has been described above, there is still a huge set of problems in regards to how offices necessary for making these <u>secular social compacts</u> viable are to be filled. If no mechanisms are designed into the <u>secular social compact</u> to facilitate the filling of the necessary offices by way of unanimous consent of those party to the <u>social compact</u>, then the <u>social compact</u> is not any better than a vigilance committee. This is because the absence of office-filling mechanisms indicates that the compact lacks perpetuity. So how are offices to be filled without violating the rule that compacts are built with cognitive consent?

The crucial issues in these two concerns are *international law* and *political law*, respectively. Without *political law*, there's no way *international law* crucial to the existence of a confederation can exist, because without *political law*, there is no way to form a perpetually existing compact.

In addition to these two very significant problems, in order for these <u>secular</u> <u>social compacts</u> to be viable, and in order for this confederation of <u>secular social</u> <u>compacts</u> to be viable, and in order for this *metaconstitution* to be viably implemented, five other issues need to be addressed:

- (i) How is commerce to be carried on between the various **jurisdictions** within the confederation, and also with the world outside the confederation?
- (ii) What are the **jurisdictional** limitations on this confederation's treaties with the world outside the confederation?
- (iii) How are taxes and takings to be *lawfully* collected within these <u>secular</u> <u>social compacts</u>, and what are the <u>jurisdictional</u> limitations on such taxes and takings?
- (iv) How are these secular social compacts supposed to interface with

religious social compacts?

(v) Given that practically all the necessary *municipal purposes* and *functions* are presently being satisfied by way of the grossly overreaching *de facto* governments, how does transition from the current jurisdictionally dysfunctional status to the *lawful* status happen with minimal violence? Regarding religious laws in general, with such a huge part of the population currently laying claim to ill-gotten gain through mechanisms built into the *de facto* laws, how can these welfare recipients (especially corporate welfare recipients) be weaned without a revolutionary tantrum?

If this theodicy provides viable answers to these seven concerns, and if this theodicy provides a reasonable description of how the Great Migration should happen, then this theodicy will conclude that the *metaconstitution* has been viably represented here; that the theodicy has presented a viable description of how to build human governments based on the biblical prescription of **human law**; and that the theodicy has fairly represented the aspect of the biblical story that prescribes **human law** by describing the **in personam jurisdiction** of the *positive-duty clause*, along with **subject-matter** and **territorial jurisdictions**.

a. Preview of the Great Migration:

Under the present circumstances, the general government is still offering the federal judicial system as a crucial part of this *de facto* confederated structure. The federal judicial system might be reliable if its judges and juries properly understood and appreciated the law through this *metaconstitution*. Admittedly, this is a big IF. That *de facto* system is unreliable because most of its laws need to be dumped. They are inherently incompatible with the definition of **secular** law as being limited strictly to legal actions arising out of Genesis 9:6 damage. Also the judges and juries are operating under the assumption that such dumping is not an option. All the religious / municipal laws that currently exist under the subject-matter jurisdiction of each of these *de facto* governments must somehow be eliminated, or migrated to some other jurisdiction. On its face, this is a huge undertaking. Every town, city, county, and State has screeds of municipal laws that are inherently outside the *lawful* jurisdiction of any *lawful* secular social compact. The so-called "federal government" is no better, and in many respects, it is monumentally worse. It's monumentally worse because the "military-industrial complex" is controlling the general government in ways that it is not yet controlling these lower-level de facto governments. The fact that the "military-industrial complex" includes the Federal Reserve and the international banking cartel should help to clarify the magnitude of this complex. So at every level of this confederation, all of these secular, de facto governments are bloated with unlawful municipal laws. Many of these municipal laws

represent legitimate *purposes* and *functions*, but they are being pursued *unlawfully*, *ultra vires*, and with monumental **jurisdictional dysfunction** by governments that at best are **secular social compacts** gone rogue. The result is massive corruption that is typically the death knell of civilizations. Somehow the legitimate *municipal purposes* and *functions* need to be migrated over to *lawful* **religious social compacts** and/or **secular** *private contracts*. As already indicated, the big question is, How?

On its face this problem is so gargantuan that it pauperizes the mind. As with all big problems, the way to deal with it is to break it down into manageable pieces. Considering the historical origins of the problem should also help to make it manageable. Crucial to whatever efforts are made in the right direction is that such efforts respect every human's **natural rights**, and avoid the perpetration of *delicts*.

Since the States united under the Constitution, non-consensual *municipal laws* have grown like weeds in cities, towns, counties, and States. Since the contractual nature of American government was negated by the legal system,¹ there has been a *de facto* migration of welfare, education, and numerous other traditionally *religious* functions away from the Christian churches and into the *de facto* **jurisdictions** of *secular* governments. This latter process must be reversed. All the **religious** purposes and functions that are rightly within the **jurisdictional** ambit of Christian **religious social compacts**, need to go through a Great Migration back to the churches and other **religious** institutions, whence they were commandeered by the *de facto* **secular** governments. Because churches are inherently local, the most fundamental place

The negation of the contractual nature of American government occurred officially 1 by way of Chief Justice Chase's opinion in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1869). This opinion says, "The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union of indestructible States." --- URL: http://supreme.justia.com/us/74/700/case.html. --- "Chase's Texas v. White opinion assumed what ought to have been proved ... Its oftquoted sentence - 'The Constitution ... looks to an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States' ... - explains little and strictly speaking is false." (Keir Nash, A.E., "State Sovereignty and States' Rights", The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, editor in chief, Kermit L. Hall, 1992. Oxford University Press, Inc.; New York, pp. 831-832.) --- Texas v. White "was the epitaph for the 'compact theory' that so long had been championed by states' rights advocates in the antebellum era." (Scheiber, Harry N., "Federalism", Oxford Companion, p. 282.). --- There is a huge problem in believing that the Union is "perpetual" in the sense that no State, once in the Union, is allowed to opt out of it. The problem is that consent is totally ignored from inception forward. The consent of the grandfather is not the consent of the grandson. Consent of father is not consent of son. So this assumption violates the Declaration's claim that "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the consent of the governed". It also violates the *metaconstitution* because it violates consent.

for this Great Migration to happen is at the level of the local church. If the local Christian churches start this process at the basic level of forming jural societies and having massive educational drives to educate people about biblical jurisdictions, the difficulty of revoking, rescinding, renouncing, voiding, and eliminating all the churches' fraudulent contractual ties with the *de facto*, **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** governments will be mitigated.¹ But even if a local Christian church is amazingly successful at disengaging itself from the jurisdictionally-dysfunctional de facto system, and even if it is successful at educating massive numbers of people about biblically reliable *jurisdictions*, and even if it is successful at establishing welfare, education, and numerous other programs that are rightly and historically within the Christian **religious** ambit, that still will not solve the problem of what to do about municipal laws, laws pertaining to water, sewage, streets, vices, etc., laws that are historically more *municipal* than religious (although *municipal laws* are encompassed by the concept of *de jure religious* laws). The fact that this Great Migration must encompass municipal laws is what makes this Great Migration an especially obstinate problem, and it's why this theodicy needs to take a very circumspect approach to this Great Migration.

At each level of the jurisdictionally dysfunctional de facto superstructure, governments currently claim ownership of the means of production with respect to water treatment, sewage treatment, street management, and all the other things that currently fall within the ambit of *municipal purposes* and *functions*. Do these governments really own these things? Do they have *lawful* title? --- No! They practice confiscatory taxation to pay for these things, against a population that has in no way given unanimous cognitive consent to this confiscation of property. These governments use this confiscated property to pay for these monopoly enterprises. This is true not only of towns and cities, but also of counties, States, and the general government. But in spite of the fact that *municipal laws* are a huge impediment to the Great Migration, most Americans are oblivious. Most Americans pay practically no attention to *municipal laws* beyond paying their utility bills. Most Americans are far too distracted to care. But reason demands that in spite of public opinion, if the *metaconstitution* is not consistently applied at the local level, then applying it to more distant governments is mere window dressing. No doubt all levels of the confederacy need to be worked on. But the crucial role in this Great Migration is the role of the visible, universal church, and the role of the individual Christian. The church's role, and the Christian's role, are primarily at the local level. That's because this is the primary place where the Great Migration of *religious* / *municipal* laws from the

¹ This means the process of rejecting the 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) corporate status, and everything that goes with it. --- URL: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/501.

de facto governments into the ambit of the *de jure* **religious social compacts** and *private contracts* needs to happen. The core motivation for this Great Migration is recognition of *delicts* as *delicts*, and recognition of the need to avoid perpetrating *delicts*, especially *delicts* perpetrated under *color of law*, which necessarily includes *delicts* perpetrated through taxation.

The denial, by governments, that consent is a necessary precursor to the existence of **human law** is a rudimentary *delict*, because it's essentially a threat to initiate force under color of law. The fact that all governments, throughout history, have been based on such denial of consent -- flowery language to the contrary notwithstanding -- is an indictment of all human government. The fact that people are accustomed to this denial of consent does not justify it. As indicated above, consent must take a prominent seat at the table with all other municipal purposes and functions if American civilization is going to survive as something worthy of survival. If it doesn't go back to its roots in government by consent, meaning real consent, and not some pseudo-consent, then it doesn't deserve to survive any more than any other defunct civilization. At the level of the local municipality, the big question is how to make government by consent practical. If it can be made practical at the local level, then making it practical at the State and general levels should be simple. That's because the counties, States, and general government are naturally secular social compacts because they are the umbrella entities in the confederation. Cities and towns are naturally **religious social compacts**, because they have traditionally been where *municipal* and **religious** laws have developed and prevailed, and they are not naturally umbrella entities. Because cities and towns in America are extremely pluralistic, proposing to make them work as secular social compacts while at the same time ensuring that all the necessary municipal purposes and functions are satisfied in a way that does not deny consent, may seem like so much baying at the moon. But by focusing first on the least complex variety of social compact, the secular social compact, then focusing on more complex social compacts, it should become clear how to make these transitions with minimal violence, and with practical advantage. So even though the core of the battle is at the local level, this exposition will focus first on the non-local, secular level of the confederacy, and expand from there to encompass religious social compacts.

b. Political Laws & Denizens:

As implied above, without *political laws*, there's no way a <u>secular social compact</u> can be any more viable than a vigilance committee. The advantage that a <u>secular</u> <u>social compact</u> has over a vigilance committee is essentially the same advantage that a <u>jural society</u> has over a vigilance committee. If the <u>jural society</u> is to have any advantage over a vigilance committee, then the compact that comprises the

jural society needs to be formal and long-term. There must be a rational nexus between the primordial *duties* imposed by God on all humans in Genesis 9:6, and whatever human government presumably arises to satisfy those *duties*. Questions that relate to how **jural societies** are to be established, by whom, how they operate in perpetuity, how they are financed; all these questions are questions about *political law* that determine the viability of a **jural society**. Because **jural compacts** are generally sub-compacts of **social compacts**, these questions about *political law* as it exists within **jural compacts**. For the sake of eliminating unnecessary complexity in the exposition, the initial focus here will be on *political law* as it exists within a **secular social compact**. Again, it's crucial to define terms:

political law --- That branch of jurisprudence which treats of the science of politics, or the organization and administration of government. More commonly called "Political science."¹

politics --- The science of government; the art or practice of administering public affairs.²

Again, these standard definitions are too broad. If **<u>human law</u>** is to be confined to strict **<u>jurisdictional</u>** limits, then the definition needs to be refined substantially. To get a definition of *political law* that is useful in this exposition of Bible-based **<u>human</u> <u>law</u>**, it's necessary to distinguish two different kinds of *political law*. To make the necessary distinctions, it's necessary to go back to reasoning from the ground up.

If a vigilance committee formed every time a *public delict* was perpetrated, the agreements that went into the formation of the vigilance committee would generally be informal and short-term, and therefore lacking in whatever rigor is necessary to the existence of a perpetual **jural society**. For such a vigilance committee to be transformed into a **jurisdictionally** reliable **jural society**, the vigilantes would need to build terms into the compact that would allow for the election of officers, the collection of revenues, definitions of due process, rules of court, the passing of power from one officer to another at the end of the one officer's time in office, and things of that nature. These compactual terms are what this theodicy is calling "*political laws*". It's critical to distinguish such *political* terms of a given compact from the Genesis 9:6 *negative duties*, and from terms that are designed specifically to implement those duties as **human law**. Towards that end, it's critical to understand that *political laws* as defined herein are not the same as laws against *delicts*.

• *Political laws* as they exist as terms of a **jural compact** are the terms necessary for the transformation of a *lawful* vigilance committee into a

¹ Black's 5th, p. 1043.

² Black's 5th, p. 1043.

lawful jural society.

- *Political laws* as they exist as terms of an <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> are the terms necessary for the transformation of an *ex contractu* vigilance committee into a *lawful* <u>ecclesiastical society</u>.
- *Political laws* as they exist as terms of a <u>secular social compact</u> are the terms necessary for the establishment of a strictly defined <u>social compact</u>.

Even though *political laws* can exist in all three of these kinds of compacts, understanding how they can exist within a *lawful jural compact* will form a prototype for understanding how they can exist in these other two kinds of *lawful* compacts.

In order to successfully transform a vigilance committee into a jural society, it's absolutely critical to maintain the distinction between jural laws and political laws as the vigilance committee adopts the necessary political laws. Jural laws can be understood to be terms of the jural compact that have the same subject matter as actions ex delicto. The Genesis 9:6 proscription of other-initiated damage is necessarily limited to damage ex delicto and damage ex contractu. Jural laws are laws against damage *ex delicto*. In contrast to **jural laws**, a **jural compact**'s *political* laws do not pertain specifically to delicts. They pertain to the tangential issue of how to make the **jural society** perpetual and efficacious. --- Because this biblical story's prescription of **human law** implicitly limits the subject matter of all laws to legal actions ex delicto and ex contractu, the prima facie evidence appears to indicate that any laws within the jural compact that are not clearly jural laws must be laws that can only be prosecuted ex contractu. Although this is generally true, the **jurisdictional** boundaries are too intricate to make an *a priori* claim that it's "clearly" true. --- While **jural laws** have an **in personam jurisdiction** that includes anyone who perpetrates a *delict*, terms within the **jural compact** that are not **jural laws** only have in personam jurisdiction over people who are explicitly party to the jural compact, meaning over people who have given cognitive consent to participation. So the prima facie conclusion is that non-jural laws, meaning political laws, are necessarily adjudicated ex contractu. But this prima facie conclusion is too facile, because the nature of jural political laws is more nuanced than this. It's true that these non-jural laws are simply agreements about how to keep the jural society lawful, effectual, and perpetual. While jural laws define the wide variety of delicts, drawing distinctions between them and defining their relationships to the life-forlife proportionality, *political laws* include definitions of due process, rules of court, procedures for revenue collection, and procedures for filling offices. Included within these agreements about *political laws* are also extra-compactual agreements, meaning agreements with people outside the **jural society**. These terms include (i)agreements

with the ecclesiastical society about how the jural society and the ecclesiastical society should operate together; (ii)agreements with the social compact about how the **jural society** should interface with the society at large; and (iii) agreements with other **jural societies** in other **social compacts** pertaining to things like extradition and appellate processes. These kinds of agreements with external entities can be viewed and treated as *political laws* within the internal confines of the jural society, but they can also be understood to form *international law*, especially when the agreements are with entities outside the immediate social compact. So from the perspective of parties to the jural compact, jural political laws include all compactual provisions other than **jural laws** that are necessary to keep the **jural society** *lawful*, efficacious, and perpetual. Such jural political laws necessarily include terms that pertain to due process, rules of court, procedures for revenue collection, procedures for filling offices, agreements with the ecclesiastical society, agreements with the social compact, and agreements with external jural societies that pertain to extradition and appellate procedures. So jural political laws include a very limited form of *international law* that pertains to extradition and appellate procedures that pertain to the jural society's fundamental function of prosecuting delicts.

None of the lists of *political laws*, including *international laws*, in the immediately preceding paragraph are intended to be exhaustive. Even so, they are all intended to have a *prima facie* status of being outside the *delict*-oriented arena of jural laws, and of assisting the **jural society** in being effectual and perpetual. Because they are intended to make the *jural society* effectual and perpetual, it's necessary to shift from focusing on them primarily as **human laws** that need to be adjudicated ex contractu, to focusing on them primarily as agreements that need to be administered. In doing so, it becomes evident that there is a sub-category of *political laws* embedded in these lists that tends to go rogue more readily than the other sub-category. These rogue-prone terms aim at making the **jural society** perpetual, having an indefinite duration, and having continuity. Essentially, the above lists can be divided into two sub-categories of jural political laws, and this theodicy claims that together, these two sub-categories encompass all jural political law. The sub-category of political laws that are aimed at continuity include things like revenue collection and procedures for filling offices. The sub-category of jural political laws that are not aimed specifically at continuity / perpetuity are *political laws* that are focused on things like due process, rules of evidence, and rules of court. So while all the terms of the jural compact fit into two and only two categories, where the categories are jural law and political law, jural political law also consists of two and only two sub-categories, where these sub-categories are *procedural political law* and *continuity* political law.

The main reason vigilance committees are inadequate is because they arise spontaneously out of a perceived need to prosecute *delicts*, and they disband when the need disappears, so that they are incapable of being permanent repositories of knowledge about due process, rules of evidence, and rules of court. The advantage that a **jural society** offers is that it's aimed at being perpetual, and can therefore act as a repository of such knowledge. However, there's a danger in such continuity / perpetuity. That danger exists in the form of conflicts of interest. Is an agent of the **jural society** more interested in prosecuting *delicts*, or in the continuity of the **jural society**? Conflicts of interest exist whenever agents put their own self-aggrandizement, or the aggrandizement of the **jural society**, ahead of the fundamental purpose of the **jural society**. This continuity sub-category of **jural** *political laws* includes things like procedures for revenue collection and procedures for filling offices. So while vigilance committees have practically no *political laws*, **jural societies** have two fundamental kinds of *political laws, procedural political laws* and *continuity political laws*.

It's important to recognize in passing that one of these two kinds of *political laws* offers practically nothing other than advantages over vigilance committees. The other certainly offers advantages, but because of conflicts of interest, it also offers disadvantages in the form of hazards. Procedural political laws clearly offer advantages by helping to ensure that what the jural society produces is justice. Although continuity political laws certainly offer advantages, they also offer disadvantages by being a source of conflicts of interest for agents of the jural society. In fact, it's conceivable that the hazards in *continuity political laws* are the root source of the whole mythology of statism. --- To recapitulate: Because evil doers working together can so easily overwhelm the individual vigilante, individual vigilantes need to band together to form vigilance committees. Because vigilance committees are prone to summary prosecution, they need to transform themselves into jural societies in which the *positive-duty clause* can be satisfied with all due diligence and care. Forming a viable **jural society** requires the existence of *political laws*, and for the sake of keeping the **jural society** from turning into a protection racket, its *political* laws must be enforced based entirely upon cognitive consent. This fact poses two sets of problems to the efficacy and perpetuity of a **jural society**. The problems arise out of the human capacity to make bad choices. One set of problems arises out of procedural political laws, while the other arises out of continuity political laws. This theodicy will address the problems in procedural political laws first.

While **jural laws** apply to *delict* perpetrators through the perp's pre-cognitive consent, and without regard to the perp's cognitive consent, the *prima facie* claim here is that **jural** *political laws* cannot *lawfully* apply to anyone except through

cognitive consent. But this *prima facie* claim cannot stand up to close examination. Often people may be treated as *delict* perpetrators when in fact they are not *delict* perpetrators. Trials and due process exist to determine whether someone is guilty or not. This process often entails that a person will be arrested (kidnapping), handcuffed (assault and battery), and thrown in jail (false imprisonment) before he/ she is actually found guilty. If the person is ultimately not guilty, then this is a case in which he/she has given neither pre-cognitive nor cognitive consent to that kind of abuse. This is essentially a violation of the rule that people can sacrifice their natural rights only by violating someone else's natural rights. That rule arises immediately out of the life-for-life proportionality. If this suspect has not been proven guilty, then how can it be right to violate his/her natural rights? --- The jural society must apply procedural political laws, like due process, rules of court, rules of evidence, etc., to alleged perpetrators without regard to whether the accused cognitively consents to such laws or not. Application of these procedural political laws starts with probable cause. Because every suspect is innocent until proven guilty, there is an initial appearance that *procedural political laws* must exist in some kind of gray area between jural laws and political laws. But whether procedural political laws are really jural laws or really political laws depends upon whether the alleged perpetrator is found guilty or not. Either way, they apply without the defendant's cognitive consent. The rules of court allow the defendant to object to (dissent from) the manner in which the court administers such procedural political laws. As the case proceeds, the court decides whether the defendant's objections are valid or not. If the given **jural society** has entered a contractual treaty with another jural society to allow the latter jural society to act as a court of appeals, then after a guilty verdict, the defendant could appeal the decision of the first court to the second. The second court would overrule the decision of the first if the defendant's objections in the first court were valid objections to the misadministration of court rules and procedures. So essentially, this system allows the appellate court to decide whether the defendant's objections are valid or not, and to overrule the first court when appropriate. This means that the defendant's cognitive consent / dissent to his/ her treatment at the hands of the original jural society should be duly considered in the appellate process, as well as in the original jurisdiction. So regardless of whether there is an appellate court or not, the jural society's procedural political laws fall naturally into one of two different arenas depending upon the court's verdict and depending upon whether the accused gives cognitive consent to such procedural political laws.

If the final decision of the court(s) is that the defendant is guilty, then in effect, the *procedural political laws* used in finding the defendant guilty necessarily fall into the arena of **jural laws** that are grounded in the defendant's pre-cognitive consent to

avoid perpetrating *delicts*. If the final decision of the court(s) is that the defendant is not guilty, then the procedural political laws used in reaching the not-guilty verdict remain within the arena of *political laws* whose validity in the case is based entirely upon the cognitive consent of the not-guilty defendant. Because the defendant surely did not volunteer, in his/her innocence, to be dragged before the court under the accusation of being guilty of the given *delict*, it's important to examine whether the defendant ever gave cognitive consent to being subject to those procedural political laws. If the not-guilty defendant at no time gave his/her cognitive consent to being subjected to those procedural political laws, then it appears that these procedures end up perpetrating *delicts* (via handcuffs, arrests, jail time, *etc.*, perpetrated against the innocent). If the not-guilty defendant is not party to the **jural compact**, then he/she never gave cognitive consent to abide by those procedural political laws, which means that in this case, those *political laws* were used as accessories to *delicts* perpetrated by agents of the **jural society** against the not-guilty defendant. Because the defendant did not volunteer to be accused, it's crucial to see where his/her cognitive consent to being subjected to those *procedural political laws* comes from, and if it exists at all.

Because it's extremely unlikely that the wrongfully accused, not-guilty defendant volunteered to be accused, and to be thereby subjected to the procedural political laws that were used in the trial, it's critical to know if the defendant's genuine cognitive consent came into existence after the trial, and after the court's judgment. If it did not, then from an ideological perfectionist's perspective, that casts a pall over the whole idea of consensual human laws. --- It's critical to understand that human law, especially human law as prescribed by Genesis 9:6, exists only because humans are imperfect. If humans were perfect, then there wouldn't be any need for human law, because in their perfection, humans would not damage other humans. But in their imperfection, humans often damage other humans. To think otherwise is inherently utopian. If there's anything that the human race should have learned over the last century or more of mass democide, it's that utopian conceptions of human government generate dystopia, not utopia. Under the circumstances, it's very foolish for any human to go through life expecting never to be falsely accused. After the trial, the not-guilty defendant needs to decide whether he/she wants to sue whoever is responsible for the false accusation, or not. If the falsely accused was party to the **jural compact**, then that law suit can proceed *ex contractu* in the **ecclesiastical <u>court</u>**. If the falsely accused was not party to the **<u>jural compact</u>**, then that law suit can proceed *ex delicto*, either in the same or in some other **jural society**. Whoever is responsible for the false accusation may need and deserve to be sued. If so, then such a law suit would in effect be a public service. On the other hand, the falsely accused defendant may simply be tired of legal actions, and may choose instead to simply be grateful that justice was eventually done.

By cognitively consenting to being subjected to those procedural political laws after the fact, the not-guilty defendant expresses an attitude that is necessarily a companion to the fact that **<u>human law</u>** is inherently imperfect because humanity is inherently imperfect. This attitude is a companion to the recognition that justice and freedom have never been free in the entire history of the human race. These court procedures have developed very slowly and begrudgingly over the course of human history. They are crucial to the preservation of **natural rights**. The price for the development of human law, including these court procedures, has been steep, and it's often been paid in blood. This attitude of being grateful for the existence of these procedural political laws is accompanied by the fact that all humans have given precognitive consent to abide by the *positive duty*. Whenever such pre-cognitive consent becomes cognitive, there is recognition that all people have a duty to protect justice, because liberty cannot exist without justice. So all people have a duty to seek justice, to understand it, to work for it, and to be grateful when they find it through these procedural political laws. These procedural political laws do not come out of nowhere. They come from centuries of blood, sweat, and tears of people fighting for justice in human courts. They come from centuries of earnest prayers seeking wisdom, peace, and justice. Genuine courts of justice exist only through such sincere fortitude. Out of gratitude for having such courts, the falsely accused defendant may display such gratitude by choosing to grant that he/she has cognitively consented to abide by the procedural political laws that led to the finding that he/she was not guilty. To spurn those procedural political laws as though true anarchy would be better than suffering under them is certainly available as a choice. But surely pure anarchy would not really be better.

Genuine anarchists may claim that the above argument in favor of *a posteriori* cognitive consent to *procedural political laws* is just more argumentation for the statist mythology. But genuine anarchy doesn't recognize that any **human law** is necessary. It doesn't recognize that **human law** develops and evolves through progressive revelation in the general sense, meaning progressive revelation of the special kind, complemented by the development of "natural theology" in regard to general revelation. Genuine anarchy therefore has no appreciation for the fact that after a century of mass democide, the human race has finally reached a point at which statism must end, along with the most obvious evidence of its existence, confiscatory taxation. But the end of statism doesn't mean the end of the hands of tyrants into the hands of every human willing to participate in such sovereignty. That shift is another good reason for the falsely accused to be grateful, and to express cognitive consent to being subject to the *procedural political laws*. But if the not-guilty defendant refuses to give cognitive consent to these procedures after having been subjected to them,

then he/she still has a presumably valid complaint against whoever is responsible for the false accusation. The false accuser, and everyone who cooperated with him/ her, has in fact perpetrated a *delict* against the not-guilty defendant. This certainly points to a weakness in this **natural-rights** polity, but it's not a weakness that is likely to disappear as long as humans are imperfect, and as long as **human law** is necessary. Whenever anyone decides to execute justice against anyone else, they run a risk of being wrong. That includes the **jural society** as much as it does anyone else, because all humans are fallible. So there's no way this **natural-rights** polity, or any other kind of polity, can be perfect, because humans are not perfect. Nevertheless, this **natural-rights** polity, if properly implemented, would be substantially better than any form of statism. This is because statism inherently presumes that the state is above the law, and perhaps even perfect. Statism is therefore a source of gross delusion. No human or group of humans is above the law, and this is especially true of the posturing crime bosses that are currently transforming *de facto* governments around the globe into totalitarian regimes.

Although procedural political law may appear to be a weakness in this naturalrights polity, it is nowhere near as hazardous as continuity political law. While violations of *procedural political laws* mark a **jural society**'s misapplication of its procedures, procedural political law tends to remain within the arena of actions ex delicto, because such violations tend to be remedied through the court's procedures themselves, including through the appellate process, and, if necessary, through subsequent legal actions.¹ Both **jural** procedural political laws and **jural laws** arise out of the agreements that form the jural compact,² and are therefore administered ex*contractu*. But they tend to be adjudicated *ex delicto*. --- In contrast to this relatively benign weakness in *procedural political laws*, demonstrated through this hypothetical not-guilty defendant, continuity political law marks an area of vulnerability in which conflicts of interest may abound so much that they may be understood to be the source of statism. --- It's important to note in passing that administering a contract is the act of attempting to satisfy the obligations of the contract. In contrast, adjudicating a contract is a court's act of attempting to present justice and equity to the parties when the contract has been breached and one of the parties has been damaged by the breach. To avoid conflicts of interest, it's generally prudent to keep the administration of laws separate from their adjudication. This idea was

¹ As already mentioned, the exception to this tendency is the legal action *ex contractu*, when that option happens to be available.

² In the common law, definition of **jural law** happens through court decisions. Under such circumstances, parties to the **jural compact** would be agreeing to enforce those decisions and definitions.

implemented in the organic Constitution of the *united States* as the "separation of powers doctrine".¹

If a jural society's office-holders slip into thinking it's more important for them to keep their jobs than it is for them to do what their jobs require of them, then working for perpetuity conflicts with the interest defined by their office. In contrast to continuity political laws, procedural political laws do not generally create a conflict of interest because such rules exist to ensure the proper administration of justice. ---Because it's a conflict of interest for jural continuity political laws to be administered by the **jural society**, they should be administered by the **social compact**, or perhaps by a board composed of people from both the **social compact** and the **jural compact**. Such conflict of interest is evident by examining taxation and the process of filling offices. --- Normally revenue collection, taxation, would form a conflict of interest. If a law society had power to force people to pay taxes, then the people in that law society might be more inclined to collect taxes for the sake of enriching themselves than for the sake of spending exclusively on the purpose of the given society, which is to prosecute either *ex delicto* or *ex contractu*, depending on the type of law society. But the fact that under the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, taxation is entirely voluntary, removes this conflict of interest. So the conflict of interest ceases to exist in regard to revenues to those societies. But the conflict of interest still exists in regard to expenditures. Agents of these law societies might still be more inclined to spend the society's money on their own self-glorification than on the purpose for which the society exists. This is obviously a good reason to have some kind of oversight on the expenditure process by people who are more-or-less disinterested, like this kind of oversight board.

For reasons that should be obvious shortly, if they're not already obvious, both *procedural political laws* and *continuity political laws* must exist in both the **ecclesiastical society** and the **jural society**. In both of these societies, *procedural political laws* should be subject to appeal. Because the **social compact** does not exist to adjudicate controversies, but for administrative purposes, there's no reason for a **social compact** to have *procedural political laws*. But all three kinds of compact need *continuity political laws*. Continuity political laws are inherently administrative, rather than adjudicative. --- For both the **jural** and **ecclesiastical societies**, office filling might entail a conflict of interest, and should therefore be administered by the **social compact** and the law society. --- If someone in office is up for re-election, he/

¹ One of the sure signs of national decline exists in the fact that an entire administrative (read bureaucratic) fourth branch of the general government now exists in violation of this doctrine.

she might be tempted to use society funds to ensure re-election. That temptation constitutes a conflict of interest, and such a conflict demands oversight from people more disinterested.

At least four mechanisms are crucial to a **jural society**'s proper implementation of its *continuity political laws*: (i)the allowance for **denizenship** for people who refuse to be party to the **jural compact**; (ii)the citizen's prior cognitive consent to abide by majority rule with regard to *continuity political laws*; (iii)the administration (as opposed to adjudication) of the **jural society**'s *continuity political laws* via the **secular social compact**, or via some unbiased, informed, and disinterested board composed of agents of both **jural compact** and **social compact**; and (iv)the adjudication of the **jural society**'s *continuity political law* disputes in an unbiased **ecclesiastical** court.¹ ---- If it's understood that the **jural society** is being presented here as a prototype for both the strictly defined **ecclesiastical society** and the strictly defined **secular social compact**, then it should be simple to understand that much of what's generally true for the **jural society** is also generally true for these other societies and compacts.

(i) <u>allowance for denizenship</u>: There may be numerous people within a <u>jural</u> <u>society</u>'s <u>geographical jurisdiction</u> who refuse to consent to the <u>jural society</u>'s <u>continuity political laws</u>, or to some or all of its other laws. If people who consent to being party to the <u>jural compact</u> call themselves "citizens", then it's reasonable for such citizens to recognize the class of dissenters by some other label, where this other label is defined to acknowledge that the dissenters retain their full <u>natural rights</u>. For lack of better nomenclature, this theodicy calls such dissenters "<u>denizens</u>". The word *denizen* has a long history in Anglo-American law, but it has always been tainted by a statist bias:

<u>denizen</u> --- In English law, a person who, being an alien born, has obtained ... letters patent to make him an English subject ... A denizen is in a kind of middle state between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of the *status* of both of these. ... In American law, a dweller; a stranger admitted to certain rights in a foreign country or as one who lives habitually in a country but is not a native born citizen; one holding a middle state between an alien and a natural born subject. ... A denizen, in the primary, but obsolete, sense of the word, is a natural-born subject of a country.²

¹ Such an <u>ecclesiastical</u> court is a starting place for such adjudication between parties to the <u>jural compact</u>. But if fraud is discovered, then the case must shift to a <u>jural</u> <u>society</u>, because fraud is a *delict*.

² Black's 5th, p. 391.

It's clear from this legal definition that this word does not properly coincide with the legal status of one dwelling in a **jural society**'s **geographical jurisdiction** who refuses to be a citizen. In some respects, it might be true that person A has "a kind of middle status between an alien and a natural-born subject, and partakes of the status of both of these". But there are serious problems in calling person A a "subject". Person A may be "natural-born", and if so, is certainly a "natural-born" "dweller". As indicated above, there is a need for a status that is not that of a citizen of a **jural society** (*i.e.*, a cognitively consenting party to the **jural compact**), even though the person was born and dwells habitually within the **jural compact**'s **geographical jurisdiction**. This "middle state" is necessary because citizens become citizens by cognitive consent, not by birth and not by force. Birth may create the option for citizenship, but only cognitive consent can actually create *de jure* citizenship. In any genuine **social compact** theory of government, cognitive consent is the glue that holds the system together, not force.

In the historical origins of the American "confederate republic", law held that *natural-born* citizenship existed by way of *jus sanguinis*, literally, "right of blood". So a human of European descent who was born within the **territorial jurisdiction** of one of the confederated States was considered by such State to be a citizen, and the federal judiciary followed the State's lead, and recognized that person's State citizenship. But the States often denied citizenship to humans of African or Native American descent born within the given State. In 1857, this variety of *jus sanguinis* was officially and explicitly adopted by the federal judiciary by way of *Dred Scott v. Sandford.*¹ After the War Between the States, American law shifted so that it rejected *jus sanguinis* and adopted *jus soli* instead. *Jus soli* literally means, "right of land", and citizenship based on *jus soli* is citizenship based entirely on place of birth. It is essentially the *de facto* law of the land. --- There are huge problems with both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. Both deny or neglect cognitive consent as a prerequisite to citizenship.²

There is clearly the possibility that a person born within the **geographical jurisdiction** of a **jural compact** could refuse to consent to citizenship therein because of some conflict of conscience. Such a person is not a *denizen* according to the Anglo-American legal definition of that term. In England in Blackstone's day, a *denizen* was a human who was born an alien, who was given a status by the monarch

^{1 60} U.S. 393 (1857) --- URL: http://supreme.justia.com/us/60/393/case.html.

² See Porter, commentary on Article IV § 2 clause 1 of the u.S. Constitution, the

[&]quot;Privileges and Immunities Clause". --- URL: http://bjp-tiaj.net/0_TIAJ/0_5_Art_IV-VII. htm..

that was more than that of an alien, but less than that of a "subject". Even though there is a need in this Bible-based system for a legal status that is between that of citizen and that of alien, there are attributes of both the English and the American legal definitions of *denizen* that make the word inappropriate in the *metaconstitution*. One huge problem is that if the *united States* is a *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u>, even though it certainly has citizens, it cannot have subjects. American case law indicates that the *de facto* American system does not have subjects,¹ especially according to Chief Justice John Jay's opinion in *Chisholm v. Georgia* (1793):

[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects ..., and they have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.²

So given that *denizen* is a word that denotes a legal status between alien and subject, in the *united States*, it is more appropriately a status between alien and citizen. In the *metaconstitution* it is also more appropriately a status between alien and citizen because there is no place for subjects under the *metaconstitution*.

In the *de facto* American system, citizens can be either *naturalized* or *natural born*. In the *de jure* system, regardless of whether they are *naturalized* or *natural born*, they are citizens only by way of their cognitive consent. But in the *de facto* system, they are citizens regardless of their consent. Putting a premium on cognitive consent entails making allowances for dissent. So there is absolutely a need to identify the legal status of one who is *natural born*, but refuses citizenship based on conscience, or for whatever reason. The same status needs to be available to the *naturalized* inhabitant of the **territorial jurisdiction**, for the same reason. To satisfy all the demands of this in-between legal status, this theodicy's nomenclature identifies the status as that of a **denizen**, but with necessary changes in the definition.

denizen --- A person *natural born* in a country who has not consented or acquiesced to citizenship status, or a person who was a *naturalized* or *natural-born* citizen who rejected citizenship while continuing to dwell in the territory of the rejected law society.

¹ In spite of this, the *de facto* system creates *de facto* subjects by creating citizens without their consent. Forced citizenship is essentially forced subjection / subjugation.

^{2 2} U.S. 419, 471 (1793). --- URL: http://supreme.justia.com/us/2/419/case.html.

It's necessary to use this customized definition of "denizen" because there is apparently nothing in the American legal lexicon that is equivalent.¹ The "primary, but obsolete" definition of *denizen* turns the *natural-born* person automatically into a subject. The more modern definition, as "one holding a middle state between an alien and a natural born subject" is equally inappropriate for the same reason. ---The **denizenship** status is necessary because as long as humans are fallible, **secular** social compacts will virtually never have unanimous consent to participation. Because of this, the allowance for **denizenship** is a prerequisite to the existence of a *lawful* secular social compact, and to the existence of the social compact's two subtending public compacts. Given that humans are as fallible as both the biblical story and the evidence of the senses portray them to be, it's obvious that human governments are prone to being equally as fallible. Given the extraordinary fallibility of human government, it's critical that people who dissent against such government have protection against this propensity of governments to go rogue. That is precisely why **secular social compacts** need to allow and protect **denizenship**. **Denizenship** is a status that should be available to anyone who is *natural born* or naturalized within a secular social compact's geographical jurisdiction, but it should not be available to aliens, except after aliens have converted their status to naturalized citizen by going through a naturalization process. --- Even though these statements about **denizenship** in a **secular social compact** are reasonable, it does not necessarily follow that a **religious social compact** must allow **denizenship** within its geographical jurisdiction. Even though a religious social compact should always have a **jural** sub-compact, whether a given **religious social compact** allows denizenship or not should be determined by two things: (i)Because allowance for **denizenship** is the default, there must be unanimous consent in the **religious social compact** to denying it. (ii)If they opt to deny **denizenship**, then they must establish a *lawful land covenant* through which they could exclude *trespassers*, because a **religious social compact**'s **geographical jurisdiction**, by itself, is not capable of doing that, because **geographical jurisdiction** is not the same thing as ownership.

In conclusion: When there is cognitive dissonance between a person's precognitive consent to abide by Genesis 9:6, on one hand, and the person's cognitive dissent against a **jural society**'s *political law*, on the other, it's reasonable for the dissenter to be able to opt out of citizenship and complete participation in the **jural society**, as long as the **jural laws** remain in force against the dissenter as much as against anyone else. Human governments are so prone to **jurisdictional dysfunction** that it's reasonable for every **jural compact** to have a built-in safety

¹ Examination of expatriation makes it obvious that the current concept of expatriation is also inappropriate.

valve, where such safety valve exists through what this theodicy calls the "<u>denizen</u>". **Denizenship** is especially important when the **jural society** is prone to exercise confiscatory taxation.

(ii) prior consent to majority rule: Because, in many respects, American democracy has been an abysmal failure, the reader may wonder why this list of essential mechanisms includes majority rule. Government by consent and democracy are two radically different forms of government. The popular understanding of democracy is that it is majority rule, but with an unarticulated corollary that it neglects **<u>natural</u>** rights. Government by consent is necessary to giving due regard to natural rights because consent / dissent is a necessary attribute of **natural rights**. If, as part of a given person's participation in an agreement, the person gives prior consent to abide by the majority rule of those party to the agreement, for as long as he/she is party to the agreement, then this is a form of democracy that is first government by cognitive consent. In <u>secular</u> environments, prior consent to abide by majority rule is valid as long as the consent to abide by majority rule doesn't perpetrate *delicts* or violate the title transfer-theory of contracts. In religious environments, the promise-expectation theory of contracts may prevail, which would mean that within such environments the constraints of the title-transfer theory would not inhibit prior consent to abide by majority rule. In both environments, majority rule as a function of prior consent is a necessary substitute for unanimous consent because unanimous agreement is rare. But majority rule devoid of prior consent to abiding thereby is merely "two wolves and a sheep voting on what's for dinner". It inherently neglects natural rights, and that's precisely why democracy doesn't work when it doesn't prize consent and **natural rights** more highly than majority rule.

Given that this relationship between **natural rights**, consent, and majority rule, is fully understood and appreciated, it becomes clear that majority rule is a useful, and probably a necessary, attribute of a law society's administration of its *continuity political laws*. So this theodicy is proposing that one of the core mechanisms in the administration of these law societies is prior consent to abide by majority rule. Majority rule without people's prior consent to abide by majority rule is prescription for dictatorship by a majority. But majority rule when people have given prior consent to abide by majority rule is genuine government by consent of the governed. A person would give cognitive consent to abide by majority rule in the administration of *continuity political laws* because participation in the society would be more important than variations in the ways such *laws* could be administered. Likewise, a person would give prior cognitive consent to pay **jural** taxes as long as the taxes were reasonable, which leaves open the possibility for a dispute over reasonableness. Obviously, such issues demand answers to questions like:

- (i) How are a **jural society**'s *continuity political laws* to be administered?
- (ii) How are disputes over its *continuity political laws* to be adjudicated?
- (iii) How are **jural** taxes to be collected?
- (iv) Because jural taxes are entirely voluntary, there shouldn't need to be any need for adjudication of tax disputes, because there wouldn't be any, because they would always be voluntary. But there's plenty of danger of spending disputes. How would spending disputes be adjudicated?

The first two items in this list will be addressed below in separate segments. The latter two will be addressed in this segment on majority rule, but only after addressing majority rule more thoroughly.

When the people in a vigilance committee contemplate the formation of a **jural** compact, they face this problem of how to ensure the jural society's indefinite duration. In history, this problem has almost always been solved by using force against anyone who hinted that they might not cooperate. Before the formation of the united States and the popularization of so-called "democracy", people were generally not consulted, and strongmen generally did whatever they thought best. In the history of Christendom, such strongmen have often whitewashed their foul deeds with "blessings" from the *de facto* leaders of the visible Church. With the formation of the American "confederate republic", democracy, meaning pseudo-consensual majority rule, was adopted as a mechanism that would presumably facilitate government by consent. But among the numerous problems with this concept of "representative democracy", there is one that stands out as most rudimentary. If person A refuses to consent to abide by majority rule, then how does the society at large gain *lawful* power to enforce its **jural** continuity political laws against person A? Without prior consent, there is no way. As long as unanimous consent about every issue is not a realistic option, prior cognitive consent to abide by majority rule is a prerequisite to genuine government by consent. Without prior cognitive consent, majority rule simply turns into another breed of dictatorship. This indicates two other problems. First, how does this prospective jural society get cognitive consent from person A in regards to operating by majority rule in regards to the **jural society**'s continuity political laws? Assuming that the jural society's continuity political laws are administered by some kind of board or committee that operates at the interface between a secular social compact and its subtending jural compact, this question gets converted into another: How does the board / committee get such cognitive consent? Second, what kind of legal status will person A have if he/she refuses to consent to abide by majority rule, or to even participate in the **jural society**?

The answer to the first question is simple. Contracts are formed when one human makes an offer to another, the offer is accepted, and each party puts up some

consideration. In the case of a **jural compact**, every party administers the offer, acceptance, and consideration to every other party. The consideration in this case would be something like this: Person A agrees to assume some obligation whose performance will help enable the *continuity political law*. Person B and every other member of the **jural society** acknowledges person A's participation. But the real administration of person A's participation in the **jural society** is handed over to this board / committee at the interface between the **secular social compact** and the **jural compact**. So the answer to the first question is that the **jural society**'s *continuity political law*, whenever person A accepts the offer. This is because the offer stipulates majority rule, and acceptance contains an oath to abide by majority rule is not foisted on everyone without any genuine consent from anyone, as is done in the present *de facto* system.¹

Given that the people forming the **jural society** acknowledge that **denizenship** is a valid status, the answer to the second question is also fairly simple. If someone has lived within that **geographical jurisdiction** his/her entire life, has reached the age of majority, and still refuses to consent to majority rule or to become party to the **jural compact**, then that person is a **denizen**. If an alien immigrated into the **geographical jurisdiction**, but did so before the **jural society** was formed, and this alien refused to participate, then this person would also be a **denizen**, rather than an alien. *Etc.*

Because a <u>secular social compact</u> is by definition pluralistic, it's inherently unrealistic to expect any vote on any *continuity political law* to result in unanimous approval. As long as the results of any given vote don't result in a conspiracy to perpetrate *delicts* against anyone, the dissenting faction, along with all those committed to *a priori* dissent (<u>denizens</u>), should not be victims of *delicts* perpetrated under *color of law*. But if the majority votes to fund the <u>jural society</u> through forced taxation, then this would clearly be a conspiracy to perpetrate theft against anyone not in the majority. <u>Jural</u> taxes must necessarily be voluntary. It's reasonable for a <u>jural society</u> to make reasonable efforts to inform the people within its <u>geographical</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> about the needs of the <u>jural society</u>. If the <u>jural society</u> is *lawful*, then it's reasonable for people in that <u>geographical jurisdiction</u> to fund it. But it's not reasonable for the <u>jural society</u> to force anyone to pay <u>jural</u> taxes.

¹ Objections to this proposal from exponents of the title-transfer theory of contracts are reasonable and must be addressed. They are addressed primarily in **A Memorandum** of Law & Fact Regarding Natural Personhood and **A Memorandum of Law & Fact** about Contracts.

It's reasonable for a **jural compact** to stipulate that its citizens be required as part of their oath of citizenship to commit themselves to abide by majority rule in regards to the **jural compact**'s *continuity political laws*. Because such an oath might be odious to someone *natural born* or *naturalized* in the **geographical jurisdiction**, the terms of the jural compact should allow this kind of human being to opt out of citizenship and to be a <u>denizen.</u>¹ No one in the <u>jural society</u>'s <u>geographical</u> jurisdiction should be allowed to opt out of duties and benefits that arise from laws / terms of the jural compact that emanate directly from the negative-duty clause. Such duties include exclusively blanket proscription of all *delicts*. Such benefits are those that arise from living in a *delict*-free society. On the other hand, no one should be forced into opting into the duties and benefits of the *positive-duty clause*. This is because the *positive-duty clause* has no penalty, and therefore exists outside the domain of human law. Such duties include things like acting as a policeman, a judge, or a prosecutor, or acting as any of these agents by proxy by funding such activities. --- The capacity to opt out, and to become a denizen within the jural society's geographical jurisdiction begs a question: What does the denizen gain by becoming a **denizen**? If the **jural society** makes no pretense to being committed to being *de jure*, then the answer is, "Probably nothing other than the knowledge that one is not aiding and abetting criminals operating under *color of law*." But if the jural society does claim to be *de jure*, in this *metaconstitutional* sense of that expression, then claiming **denizenship** is comparable to posting one's property with "No Trespass" signs. It acts as a warning to trespassers that they will be prosecuted, perhaps summarily. If one understands that *de jure* government excludes practically all of the existing assumptions about the statist mythology, then one knows that the trespass against a denizen can be prosecuted far more under de jure government than under the existing statist regime. --- If denizenship has these qualities under a *de jure* **secular social compact**, then that begs another question: What does the citizen gain by becoming a citizen? All humans are called by the *positive-duty clause* to implement *de jure* government. The citizen's payoff is his/her knowledge that he/she is doing what he/she is called to do. The denizen is merely a conscientious objector, acting as a goad to the rest of the community, but doing little or nothing to satisfy this primordial calling -- other than obeying the negative-duty clause. In contrast, the citizen has the capacity to vote, to be on a grand jury, to be on a petit jury, to be an officer of the court, to hold public office, all of which are critical to the success of the secular social compact.

¹ For more on this *metaconstitution*'s application of **denizenship** to the *constitution*, see Porter, commentary on Article I § 8 clause 4 of the u.S. Constitution, "Alienage & Naturalization". --- URL: http://bjp-tiaj.net/0_TIAJ/0_2_1_3_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_4.htm.

While it's clear that a jural society and a secular social compact have no *lawful* authority to deport a <u>denizen</u>, it might not be so clear that they also have no lawful authority to deport an alien, unless the alien has committed a delict. Deportation that is neither ex delicto nor ex contractu is inherently outside the lawful jurisdiction of all secular social compacts. The ecclesiastical compact can only get *jurisdiction* over an alien by way of the alien's participation in a contract being adjudicated by the *ecclesiastical society*. So there is a *prima facie* appearance that the **secular social compact** is extremely vulnerable to being inundated by waves of aliens. If aliens cross a border between two **geographical jurisdictions**, where each jurisdiction is clearly committed to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, and the immigrating aliens show no sign of being inimical, then it's probably true that the secular social **compact** can do practically nothing *lawful* to stop the immigration. On the other hand, if the aliens are crossing a border from a **jurisdiction** that has no commitment to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, into a **<u>jurisdiction</u>** that DOES have such a commitment, then the aliens are inherently a threat to the **<u>natural-rights</u>**-polity-honoring society. Unless the aliens are clearly identified as refugees, on a person-by-person basis, a flood of aliens from an inimical territory is inherently a threat, and therefore a *delict* perpetrated by each alien. The **jural society** is therefore *lawfully* authorized by the circumstances to address the threat according to the life-for-life proportionality, and thereby to do whatever is necessary to stop the flood. --- If aliens choose to *lawfully* immigrate from a **jurisdiction** that is not committed to the **natural-rights** polity, into the jurisdiction of a lawful secular social compact, then, depending upon the length of time the alien stays in the *lawful* jurisdiction, there should be some kind of voluntary supervision of the alien's stay by citizens knowledgeable about the **natural-rights** polity who would act as sponsors and teachers of the alien. --- Limitations on immigration from inimical territories exist further on another basis. The vast majority of the land over which a stand-alone secular social compact has geographical jurisdiction is privately owned, which means that it would be extremely difficult for an alien to enter into such territorial jurisdiction without trespassing on someone's land. Such trespass would certainly be grounds for deportation because it is a *delict*. Furthermore, if the country from which the alien comes has no explicit commitment to abide by the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, then it would be foolish for such a secular social compact to assume that someone crossing into its **geographical jurisdiction** from this foreign country, without going through the proper channels, was not inimical. Being inimical, the alien is a threat, and a threat is a *delict*. So the **jural society** has **jurisdiction** under such conditions, and therefore power to deport.

Under present circumstances, it's normal for people to suffer cognitive dissonance between paying confiscatory taxes and their knowledge that they're paying for boondoggles and sundry political vices. In fact, people are accomplices to massive criminal operations that have taken over the government. It's absolutely critical to pull the plug on the crime. So in addition to confiscatory taxation being *unlawful* according to a strict exegesis of Genesis 9:6, it's also necessary to reject it from a practical perspective. So **jural** taxation is necessarily voluntary, or else it's perpetration of theft under *color of law*. So there's this conundrum about how **jural societies** are to be funded. The only solution to this problem that's consistent with the primordial duties, is for them to be funded by people voluntarily, where the people's motives are the same as those that motivate the formation of *lawful* vigilance committees. People must be motivated by a sincere desire for justice and righteousness, with righteous indignation against *delict* perpetrators.

(iii) <u>administration of other *continuity political laws*:</u> To recapitulate, in order for a vigilance committee to transform itself into a **jural society**, there has to be some mechanism for filling offices like sheriff, judge, prosecutor, *etc.* As indicated above, the mechanism within a pluralistic environment like that defined by a <u>secular social</u> **compact**, is election governed by <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring majority rule. Given that <u>natural rights</u> are clearly defined, and that prior consent to abide by majority rule is a prerequisite to voting, this solution to this continuity problem is similar to the voting process that has existed in the *united States* from its early days. The main difference is rigorous adherence to jurisdictional boundaries, especially the rigorous limitation of <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> to actions *ex delicto* and *ex contractu*. So this voting process should be administered *ex contractu* by the <u>social compact</u> for offices within the <u>jural society</u>, or it should be administered by a board composed of agents from both the <u>social compact</u> and the <u>jural compact</u>, where none of the agents from the latter are up for election.

(iv) <u>adjudication of *continuity political laws:*</u> Merely having an <u>ecclesiastical</u> <u>society</u> available to adjudicate disputes arising from <u>jural</u> *continuity political law* is not sufficient to make sure that <u>jural</u> *continuity political laws* are *lawful*. The *continuity political laws* need to be structured so that they're not prone to turning the <u>jural society</u> into a *delict*-perpetrating protection racket. They need to be structured so that they're not prone to being disputed.

Because the **jural society** exists exclusively to prosecute *delicts*, if it adjudicates *continuity political laws* that exist exclusively to assure the **jural society**'s perpetuation, then there is an inherent conflict of interest. Because disputes over a **jural society**'s *continuity political laws* are inherently actions *ex contractu*, such disputes need to be adjudicated by the **ecclesiastical society**, not by the **jural society**.

It's clear from the line of reasoning that has been followed thus far, that the separation of powers doctrine leads to the conclusion that *continuity political laws* in

both the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts need to be administered by some entity other than these two compacts. Following the separation-of-powers doctrine, it's critical for this entity to be free from being influenced by either the **jural society** or the **ecclesiastical society**. Because this is simply the entity that makes the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts functional as perpetual entities, this *continuity-political law* administering entity is simply the narrowly defined **secular social compact** exclusive of the **jural** and **ecclesiastical** sub-compacts, or it's a board composed of neutral agents from these compacts. This *political* entity simply administers *continuity political laws* to make the two sub-compacts function as they should. It administers the *continuity political laws* in each of the two sub-compacts, or such administration happens through boards / committees, as already mentioned.

There's an important question about whether the *continuity political laws* that are terms of a *lawful* **jural compact** have the attribute of being *public*, or *private*. It's certain that the **jural laws** are *public*, meaning that they apply to everyone without exception. But because the **jural compact**'s *political laws* are not subject to pre-cognitive consent, but only to cognitive consent, there is inherently the possibility that such terms are *private*, and not *public*, because some dwellers within the **geographical jurisdiction** might refuse to consent to them. Regardless of whether the **jural compact**'s *political laws* are *public* or *private*, it's reasonable that the **ecclesiastical society** that is the sister sub-compact of the given **jural society**, would have **jurisdiction** over the adjudication and enforcement of both *public* and *private contracts*. This means that it would have **jurisdiction** over *continuity political laws* that are terms of the **jural compact**, regardless of whether those terms are *public* or *private*. At least these claims are true to whatever extent **jural** *political laws* can be adjudicated and enforced *ex contractu*.

According to a strict construction of the biblical covenants, the strictly defined **ecclesiastical society** pertains to legal actions *ex contractu*, and only to legal actions *ex contractu*. So it has no more *lawful* authority to administer contracts than it does to prosecute *delicts*. The strictly defined **ecclesiastical society** exists to adjudicate both *public* and *private contracts*, and to enforce its judgments that pertain to such *contracts*. But it's inherently *ultra vires* for a strictly defined **ecclesiastical society** to administer a contract when no legal action exists. The only possible exception to this rule is an **ecclesiastical society**'s administration of some *political laws* that exist in its **ecclesiastical compact**. Some **ecclesiastical** *political laws* pertain to the day-to-day operation of the **ecclesiastical society** necessarily has its own variety of *procedural political laws*. It certainly doesn't create any inherent conflicts of interest for the **ecclesiastical society** to enforce such *procedural political laws*.

On the other hand, <u>ecclesiastical</u> continuity political laws, like those that pertain to the election of judges, would certainly create conflicts of interest if they were administered by the <u>ecclesiastical society</u>. For the latter, there is an inherent conflict of interest for the strictly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> to be involved in the administration of such <u>ecclesiastical</u> continuity political laws. So it's reasonable for the <u>social compact</u> to administer such <u>ecclesiastical</u> continuity political laws, or for them to be administered by some board composed of agents from the <u>social</u> <u>compact</u> and the <u>ecclesiastical compact</u>.¹

So the strictly defined <u>ecclesiastical compact</u> is available to adjudicate controversies that arise out of <u>jural</u> and <u>social</u> *continuity political laws*. But if an action *ex contractu* arises out of <u>ecclesiastical</u> *continuity political laws*, then it's reasonable for the <u>ecclesiastical society</u> to recuse itself, and for the controversy to be tried in some other <u>ecclesiastical society</u> in some other <u>social compact</u>.

c. How a Stand-Alone Secular Social Compact Might Arise:

Suppose two vigilance committees are each trying to metamorphose into a **jural society**. Suppose they both claim the same **geographical jurisdiction**. Suppose these two groups are extremely suspicious of one another, perhaps even paranoid. If both groups are genuinely committed to the bare minimal **jurisdiction** of a *lawful* **jural compact**, then they should be flexible enough with one another, and able to subdue their paranoia well enough, so that they can avoid perpetrating *delicts* against each other. On the other hand, the most dismal outlook on how to build **jural societies** and **secular social compacts** says that they will not overcome their paranoia and their will to dominance, but they will rather go to war with each other and kill each other off with huge "collateral damage". If humanity in general is this psychopathic, then there's not much more to say, and this theodicy should have abandoned the pretense that <u>human law</u> is redeemable long before now, because under such circumstances, humanity in general probably would not be salvageable. But if humanity in general is not this psychopathic, and if humanity in general has

¹ It's important to note in passing that the broadly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> within a <u>secular social compact</u> immediately encompasses only *private contracts*. The broadly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> within a <u>religious social compact</u> immediately encompasses *private contracts*, but it also encompasses at lease one *public contract* that is publicly administered (meaning public within the <u>religious social compact</u>, but not outside it). So in the <u>secular social compact</u>, the broadly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> doesn't administer anything, while in the <u>religious social compact</u>, the broadly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> administers at least one *public contract*. In neither case does the broadly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u> adjudicate anything.

the good sense to at least attempt to follow the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, even if it's only known intuitively, then it's reasonable to assume that the two groups will try to work out their differences peacefully.

Universalism is certainly absurd.¹ Evidence from practically every sector, other than the Pollyanna zone, indicates that it's silly to think that every human will be saved, in the ultimate sense of that word. On the other hand, the claim that it's naive to hope for widespread implementation of the **natural-rights** polity, because humanity in general is too psychopathic, is as delusional as universalism. Refusal to accept the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity as a societal goal worth pursuing, and even as a necessary aspect of human development, is by default acquiescence to the statist status quo. It is acquiescence to the maintenance of a yoke on the human race in the form of a caste system, where the caste system is composed of masters and slaves, statist insiders and statist outsiders. Even though all people will not be saved in the ultimate sense of that word, the natural rights of even the doomed must be treasured because all people, including the doomed, are created in God's image, being endowed with the imago Dei. No human knows, in the ultimate sense, who is saved and who is not. It's certainly possible to know what thoughts, speech, and behavior promote salvation, in the ultimate sense. But it's gross delusion for any human to claim he/she knows who will be saved and who won't be, in this ultimate sense. It's certainly possible for the Christian to have some faithful assurance about some things, but faithful assurance doesn't pass as knowledge in a secular milieu. It's important for people in general, regardless of religion, to supplant statism by implementing the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. Promoting <u>**natural**</u> rights is inherently better than maintaining a system of slavery. Although the intricacies of ultimate salvation are completely foreign to people who are short on exposure to biblical Christianity, the principles of the *natural-rights* polity are so much a part of common grace that people from every background can grasp them easily. So it's reasonable to assume that these two vigilance committees that share this geographical jurisdiction will not be hasty in initiating violence against one another, even though they are admittedly operating in a secular milieu. This is not because human nature is inherently good, but because they have some exposure to the **natural-rights** polity, and the principles thereof are inherently part of being human and are built into every human's conscience.

If all parties involved in these two vigilance committees comprehended and complied with the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, then all parties would avoid the perpetration of *delicts*. Obviously, this is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity. Rather than fight for dominance, as has been the historical norm in

¹ See the sub-chapter, *Soteriology*, in **PART III**.

similar circumstances, all parties in both groups would at least attempt to follow the principles of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. This means that if they preferred minimal interaction, each law society would tolerate the other in this shared geographical jurisdiction. This may also mean that if they could tolerate more than minimal interaction, they would carry on discussions with one another aimed at discovering terms of a compact that would unite the two vigilance committees into a single jural **compact**. Suppose that those in the two vigilance committees enter into negotiations and eventually agree to most of the terms of a unifying jural compact. Suppose they come to terms about everything, except the *continuity political laws* regarding funding. So the two vigilance committees agree to form a single **jural compact** with the single geographical jurisdiction, except that they cannot agree to the nature of jural taxation. Suppose the problem is that one of these vigilance committees is composed primarily of minarchists, and it therefore does not genuinely adhere to the natural-rights polity as it pertains to jural taxation. In contrast, the other vigilance committee is not minarchist, and is genuinely committed to the natural-rights polity, including voluntary taxation. --- Increasingly, Americans genuinely oppose the current *de facto* governments because these governments are increasingly rogue. Increasingly, such Americans are forming a faction where the people in this faction generally claim to be either "libertarian" or "constitutionalist", or both. Because this opposition coalition is characterized far more by minarchist beliefs than by beliefs in the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, it's important to examine the ideological forces at work in the discussions between these two hypothetical vigilance committees, assuming both of these committees are part of this faction. Examining these ideological forces should be essentially an examination of the differences between the **natural-rights** polity and minarchism.

The vigilantes who are committed minarchists believe that all people are obligated to pay taxes, and so they believe that **jural** taxation should apply to every adult within the **territorial jurisdiction**, regardless of whether any given person consents to the tax or not. The minarchists agree with the **natural-rights** polity that the revenues from **jural** taxation should be spent to prosecute *delicts*, and only to prosecute *delicts*. They agree that these expenses include the costs of paying those prosecuting the *delicts* and the costs of bare-minimal *continuity political laws*. So the two sides agree that these costs will be paid out of these tax funds. The minarchists claim that because there is a direct linkage between taxing and spending, where spending is limited to such prosecution of *delicts*, **jural** taxation will amount to a pittance to each person with capacity who dwells within the **geographical jurisdiction** of the proposed **jural compact**. The minarchists claim that such extraordinarily low tax rates will mean that the people living within this **geographical jurisdiction** will be vastly better off than they've been under the *de facto* government. The minarchists also

cite the fact that the people within the **geographical jurisdiction** are habituated to paying taxes. They claim that because people are accustomed to being forced to pay taxes, if **jural** taxation ever became utterly voluntary, the people would not pay, and the jural society would go unfunded. --- To counter these minarchist arguments for forced taxation, the vigilantes who adhere to the **natural-rights** polity argue that what the minarchists are proposing is nothing more than a protection racket. They claim that by forcing the people to pay, they will be perpetrating *delicts* against the people, and they will be setting a precedent to re-establish precisely the same kind of caste-based government from which both groups of vigilantes are trying to escape. Natural-rights advocates claim that if the jural society adopted forced taxation, in so doing, the **jural society** would be setting itself above the law, because the jural society members would in effect be claiming that it's good for them to steal from the people within their geographical jurisdiction, while it's not good for the people to steal from each other. --- Suppose that by carrying on this discussion long enough, the minarchists eventually admit that forced taxation is theft, because the rationality behind that argument is undeniable. Nevertheless, the minarchists refuse to abandon forced taxation because they claim the people are too stupid to pay voluntarily, and they claim that for precisely that and similar reasons, the minimal state must exist.

This little scenario divulges persistent difficulties in transitioning from statism to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. Similar difficulties that have marred Christian history throughout this religion's existence. On one side people are reasoning rationally and validly based on reliable premises, even premises to which both sides agree. On the other side the people refuse to follow the reasoning no matter how valid it may be, and no matter how much they admit that the foundational principles are valid. This kind of dichotomy has existed historically in regard to numerous subjects, and not exclusively in regard to **natural rights** versus statism. As long as the reasoning and premises are valid, in the long run, the rational side will win. But in the short term, the side of valid premises and reasoning often loses. The power of love lines, traditions, mythology, irrational exuberance, the love of money, spite for the common man, and countless other passions can easily overwhelm sound reason and undeniable facts. --- In the case of these two vigilance committees, when discussions have been exhausted and it's clear that the minarchists will not yield, it's necessary for those genuinely committed to the *natural-rights* polity to bid the minarchists farewell. With a difference as radical as whether jural taxation is voluntary or not, there's no way these two groups can work together as equals within the same jural **society**. For the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity to prevail, reason combined with a passion for holistic justice must prevail over every protection racket masquerading as a good thing.

This scenario's split between minarchists and <u>natural-rights</u> advocates marks another pressing need: If even people who claim to be "libertarian" and "constitutionalist" have such shallow commitments to <u>natural rights</u>, how can this nascent jural society expect to be funded by people who have no such commitments at all? It's not reasonable for them to expect to be funded by anyone except voluntarily. Generosity begets generosity. If the jural society helped people within their **geographical jurisdiction** to prosecute *delict* perpetrators, the people would naturally respond in kind. But in a <u>secular</u> environment, if knowledge of the jural society's good deeds is spread merely through word of mouth, it may be extremely difficult for the jural society to survive long enough to generate the necessary funding. That being the case, this nascent jural society might need to seek funding from somewhere other than from people within their own jurisdiction. In the meantime, they could persist as some combination of vigilance committee, legal study group, militia, and neighborhood watchdog group, all voluntary and essentially unfunded.

It might be easier for people committed to biblical Christianity to start a genuine jural society than people who have no commitments to biblical Christianity. This is because the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity is embedded in, and arises rationally out of, the Christian Bible. Bits and pieces of the natural-rights polity have manifested at various times and places throughout Christendom's history. This combination of history, tradition, Scripture, and reason appear to indicate that there are better prospects for development of *jural societies* within Christian milieus than within secular milieus. If a jural society developed within a Christian environment, then it's reasonable to expect that those predominantly Christian participants would be aimed at transforming that environment into a Christian religious social compact. This is a reasonable hope, but under present circumstances, it's also an expectation that's difficult to maintain. --- In the united States in the early 21st century, most nominally Christian churches have abdicated their holistic duties as genuinely Christian churches in favor of being charitable organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 501. To a huge extent, elders in nominally Christian churches have worked together to bifurcate biblical Christianity so that the version of Christianity that they expound fails to properly represent biblical law, a holistic understanding of the Bible, or an understanding of both special and general revelation adequate to articulate harmony between biblical theology and natural theology. Their theology fails to even provide fertile ground for knowledge of biblical law to germinate. Because the elders in these 501(c)(3) churches generally have stronger commitments to their love lines, traditions, mythology, irrational exuberance, and love of money, than they do to biblical Christianity in its holistic sense, it's reasonable to expect them to spurn any Christian jural society member who might try to convince them to convert

their church from its 501(c)(3) status into a real church, meaning into a Christian **religious social compact**. Even so, wherever there is genuine commitment to biblical Christianity, it should be easier to convince elders to make commitments to the **natural-rights** polity than it would be to convert **secular** minarchists to the **natural-rights** polity.

Because the **natural-rights** polity arises naturally out of biblical Christianity, it's reasonable that it would be easier for people committed to biblical Christianity to develop genuine jural societies within their communities than it would be for secular people within a secular milieu to develop genuine jural societies. This being the case, and because there really is no other viable alternative to the social decay currently being wrought through the *de facto* system, it's reasonable to expect that communities committed to biblical Christianity would eventually become committed to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. The only viable alternative to the utter destruction of almost everything good humanity has ever developed is genuine commitment to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, as an aspect of God's providence. Given that this is true, it's reasonable to believe that most people committed to biblical Christianity will eventually become committed to voluntary support of Christian jural societies, Christian ecclesiastical societies, and Christian religious social compacts. It's also reasonable that such **<u>natural-rights</u>**-honoring Christian communities would become committed to voluntary support of secular social compacts. Here is the most reasonable source of funding for the nascent secular jural society. Such funding may not be available now, but it certainly should be eventually. It should be clear shortly that building stand-alone secular social compacts from scratch is not the only way to build genuine secular social compacts.

It should be abundantly clear by now that taxation under the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity can be *lawful* only if it's completely voluntary. American government has been wrong on this front since its inception. This shows that at best, American government has been minarchist. In fact, American government has never conformed itself completely to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, and has rarely even been genuinely minarchist. This is evident by looking at another fact about American history. The final phrase in the 5th Amendment states:

[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

All by itself, rational interpretation of this phrase is an argument against involuntary taxation. Money can certainly be "private property". So if the general government takes money from somebody who has *lawful* title to it, then according to the plain meaning of the Constitution by way of this clause, the general government must necessarily remedy the taking by supplying "just compensation". This is assuming

that the government is taking the privately owned money "for public use". If the money were taken for private use, then it should be obvious to all who care that the government would be stealing. That means that whatever officials took it would be thieves operating under *color of law*, which would mean that they needed to be prosecuted like any other thieves, and perhaps even more vigorously. But if the money were genuinely taken "for public use", then under this minarchist government, the government presumably would be justified in its taking if it bore this fig leaf called "just compensation". There are at least two big problems with this minarchist fig leaf. The first is that even if the takee were justly compensated, the taking would not be voluntary, which means that the just compensation would merely disguise theft. The second big problem is that ultimately, just compensation can only be evaluated subjectively. One person's just compensation may not suffice as just compensation to someone else. The amendment is clearly not allowing for subjective evaluation in its definition of just compensation. Both according to plain meaning and according to historical interpretation by the courts, just compensation refers to some figment of the collective imagination called "fair market value".¹ Fair market value has the pretense to objectivity, but it's really just collective subjectivity, at best. It's therefore government imposing the collective evaluation of the given object on an owner who is likely to have a completely different subjective evaluation. --- Because money "taken for public use" is usually called "taxes", a rational reading of this clause is an argument against taxation.

With it understood that all taxes "taken for public use" are involuntary takings unless there is absolutely no coercion involved, and with it understood that "just compensation" is not a valid penalty for this *delict* because the *delict* is not being prosecuted, but excused, it becomes clear that this phrase from the 5th Amendment can be interpreted as an argument against involuntary taxation. It's also clear that taking is a fundamental concept that encompasses taxation, even if the American courts have not acknowledged that this is the truth. All this presumes a rational interpretation of the 5th Amendment. Historically, the courts have been far too fixated on their love lines, traditions, mythology, irrational exuberance, spite for the common man, and love of money to be able to render a genuinely rational interpretation. This is especially evident in view of the fact that in applying this clause of the 5th Amendment, the courts have rarely, if ever, applied it to money and taxation, even though money can be "private property". This clause has been understood to apply most emphatically to eminent domain. Because this concept of eminent domain represents a crucial distinction between minarchism and the natural-rights polity, it's crucial to examine it closely.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 537.

To explore eminent domain, takings, and just compensation, consider another hypothetical case. Suppose that there are again two vigilance committees trying to metamorphose into a **jural society** Suppose again that these two groups claim the same geographical jurisdiction, are suspicious of one another, and enter into discussions to try to resolve their differences. But this time, suppose that minarchists far outnumber genuine adherents to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. In fact, suppose there really aren't any adherents to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity within either of these vigilance committees. Suppose further that in spite of the fact that these people claim to want to build a **jural society**, they really don't know how. They know all about *delicts*, the life-for-life proportionality, due process, rules of court, rules of evidence, etc., but they don't understand how to properly implement the continuity *political laws*. They believe that both involuntary **jural** taxation and involuntary **jural** takings are necessary and unavoidable. They believe that basing their jural society on voluntary jural taxation and takings is naive and inherently doomed to failure. They go ahead and build their pseudo-jural society based on confiscatory taxation. After functioning as a pseudo-jural society for a while, even convincing many of the people in the **geographical jurisdiction** that the pseudo-**jural society** is *lawful*, many of these people in the territory become party to the pseudo-jural compact. But there are still a few **denizens** left in the **territorial jurisdiction**. Suppose the pseudo-jural society targets, for a jural taking, land *lawfully* owned by one of these denizens. The land to which this denizen has *lawful* title is situated in the middle of the **geographical jurisdiction**. Those party to the pseudo-**jural compact** have inserted a term into their compact that stipulates that the pseudo-jural society will build a courthouse / jailhouse in the middle of this territorial jurisdiction, and that is precisely why this **jural society** is targeting this **denizen**'s land. All those party to the pseudo-**jural compact** agree that the pseudo-**jural society** will execute a jural taking against this targeted denizen, and take the required land, giving "just compensation" to the takee. The attitude of the **denizen** is that there's no way the so-called "compensation" can be "just". He doesn't want to sell. He doesn't want to trade. He doesn't want to give up his land. Whatever his reasons for refusing to sell, he's convinced that it's nobody else's business. He simply refuses to sell, or to acquiesce to the taking. He's convinced that the act by these people of singling him out for a special sacrifice that goes well beyond the sacrifice that anyone else is making, is inherently an act of trying to build the jural compact on the perpetration of a *delict*. In his mind, this is inherently extortion being perpetrated by the majority against this lone dissenter. He thinks his neighbors have turned into a band of thieves. He utterly refuses to go along with it. But he also knows that if he fights it with force he will lose, and die. So he eventually acquiesces, but he makes it

plain to everyone that he does not consent, no matter what the "just compensation" amounts to.

Because he's convinced that the pseudo-jural taking of his land is a violation of *de jure* law, this <u>denizen</u> chooses to be a goad to the pseudo-jural society until the pseudo-jural society becomes genuinely *lawful*. He makes it clear to all parties that he intends to sue to stop the taking. Because jural takings and taxes are administered by the administrative entity that exists immediately under the newly formed but jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compact, the <u>denizen</u> names this administrative entity as the principal defendant in the case.

By following the issues in this case, it should be possible to excavate some of the most basic mistakes made at the foundations of American law, and to thereby compare and contrast the *de facto* system at its best with the *de jure* system. Two basic questions need to be decided by whatever court tries the case: (i)Does the <u>denizen</u> have *lawful* title to the land before the taking? (ii)As collector of the pseudo-jural compact's pseudo-jural taxes and takings, does the jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compact's administrative entity have *lawful* authority to take the land? --- To answer these questions, the court will need to determine these things: (a)what it means to own property and to have *lawful* title to it; (b)whether it's *lawful* for a jural society to own anything, including land; (c)the differences between ownership by a single human and ownership by a jural society; (d)the distinction between a jural society's geographical jurisdiction and its ownership of land; and (e)most importantly, whether the jural taking is *lawful*, even if it happens to be executed by a *political* entity directly under the <u>secular social compact</u>.

Does the **denizen** have *lawful* title? To answer this question, it's necessary to determine what *lawful* title is and how it arises. --- In some respects, a **jural** taking by a **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compact** is equivalent to what has been traditionally known as an exercise of *eminent domain*. The idea behind *eminent domain* is essentially feudal. It was adopted officially into American law when the States, during the founding era, adopted the English common law. Although the power of *eminent domain* has been used often in the *united States*, it has never been properly justified relative to the Declaration's claim that governments derive "their just Powers from the consent of the governed". Likewise, it has never been justified relative to the biblical *metaconstitution*. Either for the sake of justifying *eminent domain* and **jural** taking relative to the metaconstitution, or for the sake of refuting it as inherently *unlawful*, examining the meaning of *domain* is a good place for the court to start its research on this case. *Domain* is defined like this:

domain --- The complete and absolute ownership of land; a paramount and individual right of property in land. ... The

inherent sovereign power claimed by the legislature of a state, of controlling private property for public uses, is termed the "right of eminent domain".¹

Eminent domain is defined like this:

<u>eminent domain</u> --- The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good. ... Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people in their sovereign capacity.²

Notice that according to this definition, the "highest" claim to "property", and the preeminent interest in "property", belongs to the de facto "government". Notice that this is justified by claiming that the sovereign of the *de facto* government is "the aggregate body of the people".3 Clearly the "right of eminent domain" is de facto government's power to exert dominion over land within its geographical jurisdiction. Dominion is "perfect control in right of ownership".⁴ In regard to land, domain and dominion are synonyms. According to the concept of eminent domain, the government owns the land over which it has geographical jurisdiction so that it has an absolute, primordial, indomitable *dominion* over it. According to this concept of eminent domain, the government allows private citizens to come into a form of secondary possession of parcels of such land. Since this concept of eminent domain is so ancient, it's reasonable to consider the possibility that it is merely an aspect of feudalism that deserves to be left on the dung heap of history. When the framers of the Bill of Rights wrote in the 5th Amendment that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation", they were clearly relying on this English tradition of blending feudal concepts of property with common-law concepts of rights.

The *de facto* law of *real property*, even in the 21st century, is heavily dependent upon concepts that derive from the feudal system. The feudal concept of property and the concept of property that grows out of biblical exegesis are largely incompatible. This incompatibility existed during the nation's founding era, and it continues to

¹ Black's 5th, p. 434.

² Black's 5th, p. 470.

³ This is an example of how common it is in American law to set up "the people" as a strawman that can be manipulated by power brokers, when in fact the people never consented to such machinations. This ploy is inherently a function of majority rule that disparages genuine consent.

⁴ Black's 5th, p. 436.

exist in American law to this day. As evidence that feudal concepts of property still plague the legal landscape, consider Article I § 15 of the Minnesota Constitution, which states,

All lands within the state are allodial and feudal tenures of every description with all their incidents are prohibited.

It's certainly good that "feudal tenures ... are prohibited". But without knowing the meaning of "allodial", it's not certain whether this section of the Minnesota Constitution is really an improvement over the feudal system, or merely a shell game run by the ruling elite to take advantage of suckers.

"Allodial" is a concept of land that derives from the *feudal system*. Under another name for allodial land, a name that is still common in the modern law of real property, allodial land is defined as "fee simple" real property. Both allodial and fee simple absolute mean that the land at issue is owned absolutely, i.e., without encumbrances. In contrast to allodial, fee simple absolute title, in the feudal system, it was understood that the king had preeminent *title* to all the land in his *dominion*; and if someone had a secondary *claim --* even if it was a *claim* to *allodial | fee simple* land whose *title* the monarch respected and accepted -- that secondary *claim* existed only because the monarch allowed it to exist. If the monarch decided to condemn land, thereby eliminating the secondary *claim* to it, and thereby returning the land to its primordial *owner*, the king himself, presumably to satisfy some royal objective, the king was within his *feudal rights* to do so. It was the monarch's prerogative to take land, because the land was really his in the first place, and he merely allowed the vassals, serfs, and other tenants to use the land at his own discretion. With the progress in jurisprudence entailed in things like Magna Carta, the monarch was eventually obliged to supply just compensation for takings.1 But the fact that the monarch had preeminent *claim* to all land in his *dominion* was never seriously challenged in England, even to the present day. The united States adopted this approach to defining its geographical jurisdiction almost without question. The united States does not have a monarch, and there is a presumption instead that the people are the sovereign.² --- It doesn't take a genius to discern that massive

^{1 ...} and eventually proof that the *sovereign*'s need for the taking was real and not whimsical. --- Sadly, in recent times, monopoly-capitalist corporations have superseded individuals as America's *sovereign*, and takings have become far more whimsical. See *Kelo v. New London*, 545 U.S. ____ (2005) --- URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/04-108/.

² *Chisholm v. Georgia*, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793) (URL: http://supreme.justia.com/ us/2/419/case.html): "[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects ...,

bureaucracies being controlled through "revolving doors" by massive corporations that are controlled by interlocking boards whose members are generally in collusion with a cabal of international bankers who run the privately owned and operated Federal Reserve are now this nation's surrogate monarch. So this horde of parasites is the de facto sovereign of the nation. Now it's clear that this de facto sovereign has dominion, meaning primordial de facto ownership over all the land. Given that the nation's currency is fiat money created by the Federal Reserve, just compensation is not merely a fig leaf to hide naked theft, because this fig leaf is nothing more than a virtual rabbit being pulled out of a con artist's hat. --- So in the 21st century, this is what the framers' blending of feudal concepts of property and common-law concepts of rights has evolved into.

The framers of the nation's organic documents allowed the traditional power of eminent domain to remain in both the general and State governments, thereby investing in the loosely defined *sovereign* of these governments the monarchial dominion, primordial ownership, over all the lands. Between the framers' days and the 21st century, with a great deal of help from fractional-reserve and fiat-money bankers, private land owners have reached a point at which they rarely own land that is truly allodial. Instead, they own land that is heavily encumbered with claims and interests of secular governments, and easements and encumbrances of every conceivable public and private kind. For all practical purposes, every State's organic constitution claims that the land within its boundaries is *allodial*. Because of this, it's clear that the framers intended for land within this nation to be as free from encumbrances as they could conceive. They could not -- or at least did not -- conceive of how government could exist without the power of *eminent domain*. They apparently believed that government needed to retain *dominion* -- primordial *ownership* of land -- in order to survive. But they also intended for land to be owned *allodially*, as a fee simple absolute, meaning with the fewest encumbrances possible. The framers did the best they could with what they knew. But they bestowed the dregs of *feudalism* on their progeny, mixed with a deficiently defined compact theory of government. (1) Their definition of *sovereignty* attempted to be a *consent*-based, *compact*-oriented definition, but it left one foot in the *feudal* world. (2)Their definition of the relationship between government and the land over which the government had

and they have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty." --- It's critical that *sovereign* in the **human-law** sense not be confused with sovereign in the **natural-law** sense. There is only one sovereign in the **natural-law** sense, and that is God. This is true even though there is certainly a place for miniature sovereigns in the **natural law**. The *sovereign* in the *de jure* **human-law** sense is formed through agreements between miniature sovereigns in training.

geographical jurisdiction may have been adequate for their time, but it is not adequate for the 21st century. (3)Their definition of the most *encumbrance*-free form of privately owned land was certainly an attempt at freeing the ordinary human being from *feudal* bondage, but it was a definition that left government with the power to lay *encumbrances* on private land that far exceed any powers allowable under a more rigorous de jure definition of *sovereignty*. --- All the States claim the *sovereign right* to exercise *eminent domain*, and simultaneously claim that their land is *allodial*. According to any rational view of these two things, the two are about as compatible as (a)claiming that all people have natural rights, then (b)claiming that slaves do not have natural rights.

An allodium is defined like this:

<u>allodium</u> --- Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of any lord or superior; land not subject to feudal duties or burdens. An estate held by absolute ownership, without recognizing any superior to whom any duty is due on account thereof.¹

Notice that *allodial* land is "held", meaning possessed, without any *encumbrances*. But it's nevertheless assumed that the *de facto sovereign* has *dominion* over the land, and it's assumed that that *dominion* supersedes the *allodial* holding. This assumption was made under feudalism, and it is still made under the 21st-century *de facto* government. It is a crucial feature of the statist mythology. --- *Allodial* land is defined like this:

allodial --- Free; not holden of any lord or superior; owned without obligation of vassalage or fealty; the opposite of feudal.²

The "feudal tenures" mentioned in the Minnesota Constitution are, "The tenures of real estate under the feudal system".³ The *feudal system* is, "The system of feuds".⁴ A *feud* is defined like this:

feud --- An estate in land held of a superior on condition of rendering him services.⁵

There are clearly *encumbrances* under a *feud*, while there are no *encumbrances* under an *allodium*. The *de facto sovereign* has *dominion*, and can thereby exercise *eminent domain*, over both an *allodium* and a *feud*. A *feud* is a holding of *real property*, where the title to the property really belongs to an aristocrat or someone comparable, and where -- by permanently owing this aristocrat rent, service, or something else of

¹ Black's 5th, p. 70.

² Black's 5th, p. 70.

³ Black's 5th, p. 560.

⁴ Black's 5th, p. 560.

⁵ Black's 5th, p. 559.

value -- the aristocrat's *interest* in the *real property* is maintained permanently. In other words, a *feud* is an *interest* that a *serf* holds in the *real property* that his lord really owns, and an *allodium* is an *interest* that an aristocrat holds in *real property* that the king really owns. Because the lord really owns it, the lord has control of the wealth that emanates from the land that the *serf* lacks. A *feud* "is the same as 'feod', 'feodum', 'feedum', 'fief', or 'fee'."¹ --- On the other hand, a *feodum simplex* is essentially the same thing as a *fee simple absolute title*, which is essentially the same thing as an *allodium*. A *fee simple absolute* is defined like this:

fee simple absolute --- an estate limited absolutely to a man and his heirs and assigns forever without limitation or condition.²

According to ancient English law, the monarch was the "universal lord and original proprietor" of all the lands in England. It was impossible for anyone to legally possess title to land except through a series of transfers "which could ultimately be traced back to an enfeoffment or patent from the Crown".³

<u>enfeoffment</u> --- The act of investing with any dignity or possession; also the instrument or deed by which a person is invested with possessions.⁴

patent (land) --- A muniment of title issued by a government or state for the conveyance of some portion of the public domain.⁵

The monarch was the only source of legal *title* to land. Therefore, even a *fee simple absolute*, an *allodium*, could suffer *condemnation* (confiscation) by the monarch under the doctrine of *eminent domain*. Essentially the same system continues under the present *de facto* government, with a veneer of righteousness to flummox the serfs. *Secular* governments regularly impose *encumbrances* on supposedly *allodial*, *fee simple* land, through zoning, property taxes, and other laws. The private banking system that issues *legal tender* regularly imposes *encumbrances* on supposedly *allodial*, *fee simple* land, via mortgages.

This conflict, this inconsistency, between *allodial*, "absolute" ownership of land, on one hand, and the State's claim to have a *sovereign* right to exercise *eminent*

& The Fall of the South, 1990, Northwest Publishing Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah., p. 29. --- An *allodium* was a *fee simple absolute* whose title was recognized by the Crown. Even so, the monarch still had *dominion*, and could *condemn* the land under *eminent domain* with *just compensation*.

4 Black's 5th; p. 474.

5 Black's 5th; p. 1013.

¹ Black's 5th, p. 559.

² Black's 5th, p. 554.

³ Graham, John Remington; Principles of Confederacy: The Vision and the Dream

domain, on the other, cannot be justified under the **global** covenant. If the land is allodial in a sense that's lawful under the metaconstitution, then the State or general government has no sovereign right to act like a feudal lord over the land, doing whatever it will, even if it claims to provide "just compensation". --- On the other hand, if the State's claim to have a sovereign right to exercise eminent domain is valid, then the land is not really owned in a genuinely *absolute* sense, because the government can *condemn* the land whenever its officers feel compelled to do so, excusing their *condemnation* with claims that they provide "just compensation", and that they have a *compelling state interest* (whatever that may be). --- Rationally, land is either owned *absolutely*, or it's not. It cannot be both. Because the land that's genuinely owned *absolutely* is not subject to the State's claim of *dominion*, land that's genuinely owned *absolutely* is land that's owned with **absolute title** and absolute ownership. Absolute in this sense means that the ownership is limited only by Genesis 9:6 duties. So land that's owned with absolute ownership and with **absolute title** is land over which no *lawful* **jural compact** has any *interest* other than its strictly defined jurisdiction. Such land is not subject to any kind of ownership claim by any *lawful*, secular government, because such a claim by such a government would make the government jurisdictionally dysfunctional. So the concept of governmental dominion is inherently dysfunctional. --- Under these circumstances, it appears that the **denizen** has a valid complaint against the **jural** takings administrative entity of the new **jural society**'s encompassing **secular** social compact. The complaint is correct in its claim that the taking is unlawful. The *lawful* **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the *lawful* **jural compact** severely limits the claims that the **jural society** and its encompassing **secular social compact** can *lawfully* make against the **denizen**'s land. Nevertheless the minarchist's claim that the government retains the power to take is obstinate. This obstinacy needs to be addressed. There's also the possibility that the **<u>denizen</u>** does not have *lawful* title to this land in the middle of the **geographical jurisdiction**. So if it's assumed that the court into which the **denizen** files his complaint is a *lawful* court, then the court should be willing to hear all of these claims against the minarchist concept of land ownership. But to get to the bottom of this problem, it's necessary to show where *lawful* title comes from if it doesn't originate in an *enfeoffment* from the monarch, or from some chain of title that originates in a strawman sovereign.

In contrast to feudalism, from the perspective of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, neither the *de facto* government nor a <u>secular social compact</u> can be the ultimate owner of the lands under its <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>, and be *lawful* at the same time. Through genuine agreement, people form the *sovereign*, but unanimous agreement among parties to a <u>secular social compact</u> is not sufficient to enable them to compactually own all the land within the <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>. For

one thing, the authority of a *lawful* secular social compact, over its geographical jurisdiction, is limited by its subject matter jurisdiction. For another, geographical jurisdiction and land ownership are two radically different things. --- In contrast to the severe limitation on a secular social compact's capacity to own the land within its geographical jurisdiction, it's possible for a religious social compact to overcome this severe limitation. In fact, if the parties to a religious social compact claimed utter dominion, eminent domain, over the land within its geographical jurisdiction, such a claim would not necessarily conflict with how "religious social compact" is defined. A religious social compact is defined as a social compact in which the parties are in unanimous consent to more than the bare minimal subject matter that defines a <u>secular social compact</u>. As such, it's possible for the parties to a **religious social compact** to have unanimous agreement about the property status of the land within their geographical jurisdiction. But mere agreement among the parties cannot suffice to allow a *lawful* claim to *dominion* over their **geographical** jurisdiction. So eminent domain can be lawful within a religious social compact, but mere agreement is not sufficient to make it so. Not only must the land at issue be subject to the religious social compact's geographical jurisdiction, but for eminent domain to be lawful within that social compact, the land at issue must also be subject to a *lawful* land covenant that is a *public contract* within the **religious** social compact, and that land must be held with absolute title by way of that land covenant. --- On the other hand, there's no way eminent domain can be lawful within a lawful secular social compact. This is because the subject-matter jurisdiction of the <u>secular social compact</u> is strictly limited. So as a <u>secular</u> government, a State's exercise of eminent domain is essentially an act by the State of forcing the victim into selling his land. For the rare case in which this forced sale is executed for the sake of satisfying a *lawful* jural function, like in this hypothetical case of building a courthouse and jail for the minarchist pseudo-jural society, the jural taking itself is not *lawful* even though the **jural** function is. The **jural** function certainly exists within the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the *positive duty clause* as a function of the jural society's *political law*. But because the taking is involuntary, and is therefore a form of involuntary servitude and theft, the jural taking for this instantiation of this jural function is not *lawful*.

No <u>secular</u> government can *lawfully* tax, take, or confiscate unless the takee consents without being subjected to duress. Such purely voluntary consent may require that the <u>secular</u> government supply genuinely just compensation. Under such circumstances, the taking is really not a taking, but a sale, and the compensation is not a fig leaf to cover naked theft. This is a crucial aspect of contract law, that contracts involve the voluntary exchange of benefits and obligations. So every **jural** <u>society</u> needs to be ready to explain what people get in return for its taxes and takings. Even if it proposes to give just compensation, its power and authority to take must not violate the boundary between **<u>natural law</u>** and <u>**human law**</u> upon which the *positive duty* exists. All efforts at creating human government exist within natural law, and can grow into the arena of human law only through contracts that are not conspiracies to perpetrate *delicts*. So this power and authority to take desperately needs to be curtailed to the point that it's consistent with the compact's rigorously delineated jurisdictions. To minarchist ears, such radical curtailment may appear to be utopian, and to doom the whole enterprise to failure. То minarchists, limitations on taxing and taking may be sufficient if understood within the context of Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).¹ In that opinion, Marshall said, "[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy". It appears from this quote that Marshall and the minarchists would curtail taxation down to a degree of destructiveness that they deem acceptable. But that begs the question, How is the degree of destructiveness to be measured, and by whom? This lack of rigor clearly invites corruption. This lack of rigor applies to the power to take as much as it does to the power to tax. In fact, it's especially true that the power to take involves the power to destroy. When taking is understood to be distinct from taxing, because taking aims the confiscatory power of the state at specific individuals and at specific property, rather than at the population in general, the takee's rights in regard to the taken property are generally destroyed completely. So taking as distinct from taxation, rather than as encompassing taxation, is generally an especially destructive power. This is precisely why all the encumbrances on -- and titles to -- land, that have been placed on the land by secular governments and their cohorts in fraud (secular banks, the Federal Reserve, the monetary system, etc.) must be meticulously scrutinized to determine whether they are *lawful* or not. --- If property taxes, *easements*, zoning, and other encumbrances are not rigorously curtailed, it will be impossible for religious social **compacts** to establish comprehensively viable **geographical jurisdictions**, because it will be impossible for anyone to establish genuine **absolute title**. By itself, this is a serious impediment to the Great Migration. But this impediment to the Great Migration cannot be sufficiently curtailed when using minarchist conceptions of taxing, taking, and title acquisition. This is because such minarchist conceptions violate this boundary between human law and natural law by basing human governments on something other than genuine contracts and *lawful* consent.

Regarding this <u>denizen</u>'s case, the minarchists will claim that the court should determine that the pseudo-jural society has *lawful* authority to condemn his land based upon the minarchist definition of jural taking, and upon the minarchist

¹ URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/17/316/case.html.

conception of what constitutes *lawful* title to land, and upon the refutation of the <u>denizen</u>'s claim to have *lawful* title. To counter the minarchist legal theory about land ownership, the <u>denizen</u> will need to present his own legal theory to show that land title doesn't originate in the state by way of some *patent* or *enfeoffment*. The <u>denizen</u>'s legal theory must show where *lawful* title to land comes from.

proof of primary property:

Suppose the <u>denizen</u> is utterly committed to the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, and his legal theory arises immediately therefrom. The **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity holds that all human ownership of secondary property arises out of self ownership, *i.e.*, out of primary property. This **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity holds that every human is a self owner, starting at conception.¹ So this <u>denizen</u> bases his legal theory about property ownership and land ownership upon his conception of **natural law** and natural rights. He posits the natural-law tripod before the court, and explains that by common sense, all humans with cognitive capacity should acknowledge the three legs of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod, the leg dominated by the exogenous laws of nature, the leg dominated by the endogenous laws of nature, and the leg dominated by ethics and moral judgments. --- After laying this foundation in **natural law**, the **<u>denizen</u>** continues by explaining that property ownership starts with primary property, ownership of one's body and mind, which he explains, is what some economists call "self ownership". He goes on to explain that a necessary companion to primary property is secondary property, the ownership by a given person of things external to his/her self, things in the exogenous leg of the natural-law tripod. He explains that *lawful* title to land is acquired by essentially the same process that leads to *lawful* title to *personal property*.

Suppose that at this introductory point in the presentation of his legal theory, the **denizen**'s minarchist adversaries interrupt. Suppose they attempt to discredit the **denizen**'s presentation by pointing out to the court that the **denizen**'s theory of property is merely classical economics that has been resurrected in recent decades by economists like Murray N. Rothbard and the Austrian School of economics, whose work, the minarchists assert, has been largely discredited by mainstream economists. The minarchists claim that even among economists who claim to favor "free market economics", this theory of property ownership and title acquisition is derided as "Crusoe Economics", and is treated as quaint, antiquated, and useless by the field as a whole. Suppose the judge stops the minarchist spokesman and tells the **denizen** to

¹ Self-ownership and primary property as the basis for ownership of all secondary property are expounded in much greater detail in **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood**.

continue presenting his legal theory without further interruption. --- Now that it's understood how important legal theories are in adjudicating disputes, this theodicy can drop the pretended dispute between this lone <u>denizen</u> and his minarchist adversaries. So the focus in the remainder of this section will be on the <u>denizen</u>'s legal theory, without the pretense of a trial. The <u>denizen</u>'s legal theory is essentially a theory of secondary property ownership, possession, and title acquisition, with an emphasis on ownership of land. For the <u>natural-rights</u> polity to work, it must encompass some conception of property ownership, of ownership of secondary property, especially of title, ownership, and possession of land, that more accurately reflects <u>natural law</u> as it pertains to human interactions, than do feudal conceptions of property.

Regardless of how much mainstream economists may disparage Crusoe economics, the **natural-rights** polity and Crusoe economics are largely congenial. No alternative theory of property exists, as far as this author knows, that is congenial to **natural rights**. Even so, in making this claim to congeniality, it's also necessary to make a disclaimer. Although Crusoe economics, as presented by Rothbard,¹ is a relatively reliable description of a theory of property that should suffice to replace the feudalism that still haunts American law, it is not utterly without problems. Some of these problems will need to be worked out on a piecemeal basis by the courts in the process of adjudicating disputes. But some are more foundational and need to be addressed in advance. One of these problems involves Rothbard's conception of "free will", which inherently conflicts with the "compatibilism" inherent in this theodicy's presentation of the **natural-law** tripod.²

It should be obvious in the presentation of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod that's been made thus far, that the laws of nature as they exist in the exogenous leg of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod, and in the endogenous leg, operate deterministically. But within the ethical leg of the <u>**natural-law**</u> tripod, every human being is generally endowed with a capacity to experience his/her choice making as an exercise of "free will". This perception of free will is a necessary aspect of the choice-making process, because moral responsibility is a necessary aspect of moral free agency, *i.e.*, of being morally responsible, where moral responsibility is a necessary prerequisite to miniature sovereignty. Accompanying these facts about "free will" is the fact that

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, pp. 29-37, 47-50, 72, 249-250.

² *"Compatibilism* is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed in terms of a compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism." --- **Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy** --- URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/.

no human or group of humans is omniscient or omnipotent, which means that no human or group of humans has a deterministic grasp of everything. Because every human is localized in space and time, by definition of human being, every human is limited in his/her ability to grasp deterministically, and will thus be limited indefinitely into the future. Although humans are certainly capable of exercising a deterministic perspective in day-to-day problem solving, humans are ultimately incapable of exercising determinism in regard to all knowledge, because humans are finite, being localized in space and time, and are therefore incapable of omniscience and omnipotence. Even though this is true, every human who is destined to avoid the disintegration of their organismic standing wave will necessarily know what he/ she needs to know when he/she needs to know it, so that he/she does what he/she needs to do when he/she needs to do it, where need is defined in terms of standingwave coherence. Such standing wave coherence is therefore heavily dependent upon right choice making. Ethics is therefore an absolutely critical concern to every human who intends to sustain his/her standing-wave coherence. This demands cogitation to reach wise choices and wise decisions. This choice-making process certainly gives the chooser the impression that he/she is exercising "free will" in making choices, but because humans are finite, while God is not, humans can exercise such freedom of choice only within an ecological niche in which God determines everything. This arrangement is the essence of compatibilism, which is a doctrine that determinism, when properly defined, and free will, when properly defined, are compatible. Such compatibilism is crucial to any theology that arises rationally out of the Bible. But such compatibilism is apparently not foundational to Rothbard's Crusoe economics.

In his Ethics of Liberty, Rothbard states:

Indeed, the very fact that the knowledge needed for man's survival and progress is not innately given to him or determined by external events, the very fact that he must use his mind to learn this knowledge, *demonstrates* that he is by nature free to employ or not to employ that reason—i.e., that he has free will.¹

By itself, this statement is not particularly troublesome. The trouble can be seen in the footnote with which Rothbard accompanies this statement. In the footnote, he says:

> For one thing, a person cannot coherently believe that he is making judgments and at the same time that he is being determined by a foreign cause to do so. For if that were true,

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 31.

what would be the status of the judgment that he is determined? This argument was used by Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 115f.¹

It's probably safe to assume that "coherently" in this reference to Kant means essentially the same thing as rational consistency. (It certainly doesn't mean the same thing as what physicists mean when they speak of "coherence" in laser physics.) So it's clear that Rothbard is saying that he and Kant agree that it's impossible for a human to believe simultaneously that his/her choice is "determined by a foreign cause", and that in making the choice, one is making a judgment. --- Kant and Rothbard are here teaming up to make a false dichotomy. The false dichotomy is between freely choosing (*i.e.*, "free will") and "being determined". The false dichotomy results from adopting either-or logic when in fact the circumstances demand both-and logic. It's certainly true that in making a judgment, one is taking moral responsibility, as a miniature sovereign, for the given judgment, and in so doing, one is foregoing the option of blaming some "foreign cause" for the repercussions of the judgment. It's therefore difficult to hold in one's mind simultaneously the judgment, *i.e.*, the choice-making process, and the fact that the judgment is being determined by a "foreign cause". Nevertheless, for anyone to refuse to recognize the coexistence of free choice making and the determination of such choice making by a "foreign cause" is essentially to refuse to recognize the relationship between the sovereign and the miniature sovereign. There's no good reason to believe that this relationship is irrational. --- According to Aristotelian logic, following a cause-and-effect chain from a given effect back to the ultimate cause always results in discovery of a rationally necessary primary cause. Christian theologians have traditionally called this primary cause "God", where God is in no way an effect, but can only be the ultimate cause, the ultimate sovereign. This ultimate sovereign is thereby the ultimate cause, the deterministic source, of every effect in the universe. Because humans are by definition finite, humans are incapable of omniscience and omnipotence, and are incapable of even perceiving all the cause-and-effect relationships that contribute to any one of their choices. Humans are incapable of being the ultimate cause, but are nevertheless morally responsible. It's reasonable to call humans "miniature sovereigns" because within their given ecological niche, moral responsibility and miniature sovereignty are rationally necessary companions. The ecological niche for humans is the entire realm of the **natural law**. Likewise, where the ecological niche for God is the entire universe in all its dimensions, and is therefore the entire realm of the eternal law, God is the ultimate sovereign and is morally responsible only to

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, pp. 31-32, footnote 4.

God. People who refuse to recognize that this line of reasoning is unassailable have a formidable burden to show where the error lies in this logic. The **natural-law** tripod assumes that this logic is true and reliable, and it therefore assumes that determinism exists, that God exists, and that human "free will" (*i.e.*, freedom to choose) exists. The **natural-law** tripod and this line of reasoning must necessarily include the fact that every miniature sovereign is a self owner, and is therefore inherently owner of the self's primary property, meaning the self's body and mind. Contrary to this line of reasoning, starting largely during the so-called "Enlightenment", there has been a sustained assault on the Aristotelian law of causality, on the related doctrine that free will and determinism are compatible, and implicitly on the related doctrine of primary property.

Starting in the eighteenth century in what is euphemistically called the "Enlightenment", there has been a sustained assault by supposedly intelligent people on the law of noncontradiction, the law of causality, the basic reliability of sense perception, the analogical use of language, the reliability of the Bible, and the existence of God. These things have been under constant attack for about three centuries, and the attacks have resulted in the statist takeover of academia, among other things. To the intellectually honest and informed, each of these doctrines has withstood these sustained assaults and has proven itself unassailable.¹ But because the enemies of these doctrines have become entrenched and fortified not only in academia, but in practically every institution in human society that might otherwise defend these doctrines, society in general is awash in anti-intellectualism, anti-logic, and crass materialism.² So if someone committed to facts, logic, and truth, as Rothbard certainly was, happens to be mistaken in his understanding of human choice making relative to determinism, and if this person thereby manifests a warped view of who and what the universal sovereign is, and a warped view of the human's finite role in the human's finite ecological niche, then it appears that it might be wise to overlook this mistake for the sake of taking advantage of whatever this person was right about. So this theodicy will attempt to appreciate what is so true and right about Rothbard's views, while simultaneously deprecating his errors. First the deprecation and disclaimer.

It's reasonable to inquire, upon what basis do Rothbard and Kant make the judgment that, "a person cannot coherently believe that he is making judgments and

¹ See Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics.

² Anyone interested in an introduction to how these institutions have been taken over should watch the documentary, **Cultural Marxism: The Corruption of America**. --- URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gldBuK7_g3M.

at the same time that he is being determined"? The fact that they cannot conceive of it doesn't eliminate the truth of it. Every day, organisms make choices, and philosophical people have no apparent problem conceding that those choices are determined. But philosophical people may often balk at conceding that humans are determined the same way animals are. Under the pretense that humans have cognitive skills that animals don't, and that humans therefore have "free will" that utterly transcends any and all determination by a "foreign cause", these philosophical people may claim dogmatically that animal choice making is determined while human choice making is not. At its essence, this reveals a stunted conception of God. If it's true that animals are determined even though they choose, merely because they lack cognitive skills relative to humans, then it's equally valid to claim that humans are determined even though they choose, merely because they lack cognitive skills, relative to God. All organisms, including humans, exist within, and make choices within, some ecological niche. The difference between humans and other organisms is that humans have a much broader ecological niche than other organisms, the human ecological niche encompassing the entire natural law, and thereby allowing humans to have a capacity for perpetual standing-wave coherence, which animals lack.

By claiming that determinism and free will are incompatible, Rothbard is clearly negating the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod, *i.e.*, the conception of **<u>natural law</u>** that gives rise to **<u>natural rights</u>**, to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, and to a conception of <u>**natural law**</u> that's compatible with Crusoe economics. Although Rothbard doesn't appear to be negating free will, *per se*, or determinism, *per se*, he does appear to be negating the idea that they are compatible with one another. Negating that concept of noncompatibility is one of the purposes of this theodicy. If the theodicy is taken as a whole, then the entire theodicy should suffice as a negation of Rothbard's commitment to non-compatibilism. So with Rothbard's non-compatibilism sufficiently deprecated and disclaimed, it's now possible to move on to appreciate his Crusoe economics. But before doing that, it's important to make a few passing comments about present circumstances.

Although this theodicy may suffice as negation of Rothbard's non-compatibilism, it might not suffice as negation of numerous other ideological errors posited during the "Enlightenment" and still cursing world culture up to the present day. Such errors include (i)David Hume's presumptive negation of the law of causality through his radical skepticism; (ii)John Stuart Mill's and Bertrand Russell's presumptive negation of the law of causality through their belief that the law of causality states that every THING has a cause, rather than that it states that every EFFECT has a cause; and (iii)Niels Bohr's rejection of determinism by in effect claiming that chance exists

in nature, rather than that chance is merely a mathematical construct that humans use to compensate for human ignorance. --- Although the absurdities currently entertained by statist "intelligentsia" go far beyond what most books can negate directly, there are books other than this theodicy that go far in negating these and similar absurdities.¹ This theodicy will go no further in trying to negate them all, but will merely rely on abundant evidence that these absurdities have not been posited on solid ground.

With Rothbard's non-compatibilism deprecated, it's now possible to start showing the congeniality between this **natural-rights** polity and Crusoe economics. To make sure the Crusoe economics being expounded herein is compatible with the biblical story, it's crucial to see that secondary property arises out of primary property, where primary property is a necessary attribute of the *imago Dei*. This relationship between primary property and secondary property is not adequately explored in Rothbard's Crusoe economics. So what immediately follows is essentially an enhancement of Crusoe economics, presented here as a precursor to sketching Crusoe economics, *per se.*²

primordial secondary property:

Although it may be beyond dispute that infants are born economically incapacitated, it's nevertheless also true that humans must own themselves as a necessary attribute of being human. So even newborns own themselves and therefore have primary property. Ownership of primary property is a **<u>natural right</u>** with which every human is naturally endowed, but newborns obviously have a limited capacity to exercise that <u>**natural right**</u> in an economically meaningful way. Infants certainly own their labor as a <u>**natural right**</u>, but they lack the ability to do productive labor. Infants are born with the <u>**natural right**</u> to, and natural ownership of, their labor, but they are born with a lack of capacity to perform economically valuable labor. From the perspective of <u>**global human law**</u>, such capacity is acquired through natural growth and the efforts of the growing minor. A similar relationship between a <u>**natural right**</u> and a capacity to exercise that <u>**natural right**</u> to own land, because all humans are created with the *imago Dei*. Under <u>**global human law**</u>, people can get away with refusing to recognize God and with refusing to recognize

¹ For example: (a)Sproul, Gerstner, and Lindsley; Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Classical Apologetics; and (b)Sproul; Not a Chance: The Myth of Chance in Modern Science & Cosmology.

² This enhancement is expounded in more detail in **A Memorandum of Law and Fact Regarding Natural Personhood**.

the *imago Dei*, but if such refusal leads people to damage other people, such damage is within the subject-matter jurisdiction of global human law. Although all people are born with the **natural right** to own land, all people are born with an extremely truncated ability to exercise that capacity. Every infant certainly has an *interest* in his/her point-of-contact with the earth, the land immediately being contacted by the infant. But the infant has an extremely limited capacity to use the land, or to enforce his/her possession of it through laboring on it. --- This distinction between **<u>natural rights</u>** and the capacity to exercise <u>**natural rights**</u> is crucial to understanding the mechanisms involved in acquisition of secondary property. The distinction between rights, just claims, and powers to put claims into effect, to manifestly instantiate them, is crucial to the interface between primary property and secondary property. The relationship between the potential to do labor and the exertion of labor are crucial to this relationship between primary and secondary property. Crusoe economics has generally held that labor on land is crucial to any valid claim to own land. But closer inspection shows that even the infant's point-ofcontact with land must necessarily endow that infant with some ownership *interest* in the land.

In order to get to the core of the concept of ownership of secondary property, and to be delivered from minarchist misconceptions, it's essential to think in extremely rudimentary terms. Towards that end, suppose Fred invites Jim over to his house. Jim arrives at Fred's house, and is standing in Fred's living room. Who owns the two shoe-sized areas of the floor that Jim is standing on, Jim or Fred? --- The obvious answer is that Fred owns the house, so Fred owns those two shoe-shaped areas of the floor. If Fred has absolute ownership of the house, then it appears that he has absolute ownership of those two areas of the floor. One might then conclude that Jim has no rights to be standing on those two areas of the floor. --- That's obviously an absurd conclusion. Every human being has an *interest* in the territory that he/she is standing on, sitting on, lying on, etc., even if someone else owns that property. Every human has an *interest* in the points at which the human's body contacts the earth. The *interest* may be extremely temporary and extremely minute, but it's nevertheless an *interest* that needs to be recognized, especially if the *interest* is disputed in court. The *interest* entails that Fred will not suddenly pull the carpet out from under Jim under the pretense that he's replacing it, because he will recognize that Jim has a safety-related *interest* in the stability of the property that Jim stands on.

Now suppose Jim comes into possession of a key to Fred's house. Fred is unaware that Jim has the key. When Fred goes out of town, Jim goes over to Fred's house and uses the key to get in. Jim stands around Fred's living room proving to himself that he can violate Fred's *absolute title* with impunity. Then Jim goes home, locking the

door without doing any damage. --- While Jim was standing around Fred's house this time, Jim still had an *interest* in every portion of the floor that he stood on. But Jim's *interest* this time is different, because this time, he was not invited. --- Because all human beings have corporeal bodies that are weighed down on the earth, every human being has an *interest* in the point-of-contact at which the body is grounded. This point-of-contact is part of being alive on planet earth. This *interest* is necessarily understood by any rational legal system to be a partial ownership of that point-ofcontact by whoever is making the point-of-contact.

If Jim is walking through a primordial forest, which is owned by no one, it's valid for Jim to claim at least temporary title to each point-of-contact where his body meets the earth. This includes the air that he breathes, the water he drinks, the ground that he walks on, and the trees that he touches. When Jim inhales, the air becomes his. When he exhales, it ceases to be his. When Jim touches the ground or a tree, the point-of-contact is his. When he lifts his foot, or his hand, the point-of-contact ceases to be his. So Jim has a temporary *interest*, which can be understood to be a temporary ownership, temporary possession, and temporary title. Common sense, respect for the fact that every human being has **natural rights**, and the *negative-duty clause*, combine to demand recognition and honor of this primordial *interest*.

In both the case in which Jim was invited to Fred's house, and the case in which Jim went without invitation, Jim had this primordial *interest* in Fred's floor as Jim stood on it. In these illustrations, there are three different cases in which Jim has a primordial *interest* (a primordial temporary ownership / possession of his point-of contact): (i)in the unclaimed forest; (ii)in Fred's living room at Fred's invitation; and (iii)in Fred's living room without Fred's invitation. Even though primordial possession exists in each case, Jim's overall *interest* is different in each case because of the differences in pre-existing *title*.

- (i) Because this forest is not *claimed* by anyone, Jim's *interest* in his points-of-contact in the forest are defined purely in terms of his <u>natural right</u> to live and breathe and have his being at those points-of-contact. Jim's *interest* is strictly primordial. He can expand or contract his ownership of those points-of-contact in space and time according to his own discretion, and his own desire to possess. There are no competing *interests* to limit expansion and contraction.
- (ii) When Jim was invited over to Fred's house, as he was standing in Fred's living room, Jim still had this primordial *interest* in his pointsof-contact with Fred's living room. But added to this *interest* was the implicit acknowledgement that Fred *owned* the house, and that Jim would

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respect Fred's *ownership* by behaving in certain ways. Jim wouldn't start a campfire on Fred's living room floor, as though it were the floor of a primordial forest. Jim wouldn't urinate in a corner as though it were a tree in the forest. Jim wouldn't pick up items in Fred's living room and put them into his pockets as though they were doodads Jim picked up off the forest floor. In short, Jim's *interest* in this case is the combination of his primordial *interest* and the implicit acknowledgment of Fred's *title*; implicit acknowledgment of Fred's *interest* and *ownership* of his *real property*; and implicit acknowledgment of the fact that Jim's primordial *interest* in Fred's living room exists only because Fred allowed it by inviting Jim to his house, and because Jim *consented* to the invitation. Jim cannot expand his ownership of these points-of-contact in either space or time without entering into competition with Fred's pre-existing claim.

(iii) When Jim went over to Fred's house without being invited, Jim still had his primordial *interest* in his points-of-contact as he stood in Fred's living room. But Jim's overall *interest* in Fred's *property*, this time, was a combination of Jim's primordial *interest* with an implicit repudiation of Fred's *title*; an explicit violation of Fred's *interest* in and *ownership* of his *real property*; and an implicit act of *theft* against Fred. Jim was imposing an *interest* on Fred's *property* without Fred's *consent*. Jim was thereby stealing an *interest* in Fred's property, or at least attempting to exercise some kind of *adverse possession*. Jim's overall *interest* in this case is a combination of his primordial *interest* with the *interest* that he was taking from Fred.

These hypothetical situations show that a natural person's physical presence on land must necessarily invest a genuine interest of the given person in the land occupied. The interest may be momentary or temporal, but it's certain that the interest is real. In each of these three situations, Jim's points-of-contact don't qualify facially as acts of labor on land. One's first impression might be that these don't qualify as having economic value under Crusoe economics. But further consideration demands that every human being's points-of-contact with land are every natural person's most primordial secondary property. Without those points-of-contact, human beings don't have the vantage point necessary for doing labor on land. So such points-of-contact are necessarily primordial secondary property. Without this kind of primordial secondary property, any kind of labor would be impossible. So primordial secondary property forms a bridge between primary property and secondary property, and is a necessary enhancement to Crusoe economics. With this necessary enhancement, it will become more obvious how free market processes are a more reliable source of title than an *enfeoffment* or *patent* from the alleged *sovereign*.

In passing, it's important to recognize that point-of-contact land has purposes beyond economic purposes. Even when one is not working, laboring, one still has these points of contact. Similar to the way point-of-contact land ownership is a prerequisite to doing economically productive labor, land set aside for religious purposes is a prerequisite to ensuring that labor is genuinely dedicated to genuinely constructive projects, rather than to what Austrian economists call "malinvestment". In this context, natural parks can be understood to be important to the worship of God in nature, while church and other religious properties can be understood to be important to the worship of God in cities and communities. Such properties, like point-of-contact land, transcend the normal claim that all wealth derives from land and labor. That's because in these exceptional cases, there is no labor involved, but only presence of primary property on land. For this reason, it's necessary to expand Crusoe economics' definition of labor to include the relatively sedentary activity of merely existing on land.

homesteading:

Because land is the most fundamental of all secondary properties -- because all products that are crucial to physical survival (food, clothing, shelter, *etc.*) derive ultimately from land by way of labor -- it's far more foundational to understand how *lawful* title to land is established than it is to understand how title to some other kind of secondary property is established. By understanding ownership of *real property*, ownership of *personal property* becomes easy to understand. Ownership of land must necessarily exist to some extent by way of one's point-of-contact. If the land on which one has one's points-of-contact is un-owned by anyone else, then the *interests* formed by those points-of-contact constitute **absolute ownership**. This is true even though such **absolute ownership** is always finite in space and time, because humans are finite in space and time. But if a person claims more than mere points-of-contact, then, within reason, it's reasonable for such primordial ownership to expand. Rothbard addresses this issue like this:

> Crusoe finds virgin, unused land on the island; land, in short, unused and uncontrolled by anyone, and hence *unowned*. By finding land resources, by learning how to use them, and, in particular, by actually *transforming* them into a more useful shape, Crusoe has, in the memorable phrase of John Locke, "mixed his labor with the soil." In doing so, in stamping the imprint of his personality and his energy on the land, he has naturally converted the land and its fruits into his *property*. Hence, the isolated man *owns* what he *uses* and *transforms*; therefore, in his case there is no problem of what *should be* A's property as against B's. Any man's property is *ipso facto* what he *produces*,

i.e., what he transforms into use by his own effort. His property in land and capital goods continues down the various stages of production, until Crusoe comes to *own* the consumer goods which he has produced, until they finally disappear through his consumption of them.¹

Hans-Hermann Hoppe also summarizes these ideas in the Introduction:

[E]very person owns his own physical body as well as all naturegiven goods which he puts to use with the help of his body before anyone else does; this ownership implies his right to employ these resources as one sees fit so long as one does not thereby uninvitedly change the physical integrity of another's property or delimit another's control over it without his consent. In particular, once a good has been first appropriated or homesteaded by "mixing one's labor" with it (Locke's phrase), then ownership of it can only be acquired by means of a voluntary (contractual) transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner. These rights are absolute. Any infringement on them is subject to lawful prosecution by the victim of this infringement or his agent, and is actionable in accordance with the principles of strict liability and the proportionality of punishment.²

Homesteading, in these economists' views, is clearly related to doing labor on land. Although labor is certainly important, so is resting from labor. So in the view of this theodicy, the definition of labor should be expanded to include preparing land as a place to rest, as well as actively using the land as a place of rest. With this slight modification of what it means to mix one's labor with land, it's clear that homesteading is the act of mixing one's labor with land, where the land is otherwise un-owned. So homesteading is the act of extending one's ownership of primary property, to ownership of secondary property in the form of points-of-contact, to ownership of secondary property by mixing labor with land, and thereby producing capital goods and consumer goods (*personal property*) through this mixture.

Hoppe indicates that the other way to acquire ownership of land, meaning other than through point-of-contact and homesteading, is through "a voluntary (contractual) transfer of ... property title from a previous to a later owner". Rothbard indicates that out of these two methods of ownership acquisition, homesteading and voluntary, contractual transfer,³ entire economic systems can arise. The third

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 34.

² Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. xvi.

³ Which should be understood in this context to include gifting.

method, every person's *interest* in his/her point-of-contact, is necessary, but becomes more a background method as the economic system develops.

We have been describing the free society as one where property titles are founded on the basic natural facts of man: each individual's ownership by his ego over his own person and his own labor, and his ownership over the land resources which he finds and transforms.¹

land & labor:

The type of economic system that is the automatic outgrowth of the **global** covenant is a free market, meaning an economic system in which all *delicts* are proscribed. All land that is acquired *lawfully* is acquired through free market processes. So lawful title to land derives from free market processes. According to common sense, everything that has economic value derives from the combination of land (to be understood generally, like the word, "terra", earth, which includes oceans and atmosphere as well as soil and minerals) and labor (meaning any expenditure of human mental and/or physical energy). Even things that are stolen have their origins in these two sources. According to common sense, one's ownership of one's body defines one's primary property. Ownership of anything beyond one's body is ownership of secondary property. Primary property does not have economic value, because living human beings are not bought and sold, except when they are victims of *delictual* behavior. But one's labor has economic value because such labor can be bought and sold. In fact, all *lawful* economic value derives from the combination of labor and land. People own their labor by **<u>natural right</u>**. Ownership of secondary property is also a **<u>natural right</u>**, as a universal capacity, a potential.

Although all secondary property is acquired ultimately through labor on land, either through homesteading or through mutual consent (via gifting or trading), every human being's points-of-contact with land are every natural person's most primordial secondary property. Without those points-of-contact, human beings don't have the vantage point necessary for doing labor on land. So such points-ofcontact are necessarily primordial secondary property.

> A man then, can acquire "wealth"—a stock of useful capital or consumer goods—either by "producing" it himself, or by selling to its producer some other product in exchange. The exchange process reduces logically back to original production. Such production is a process by which a man "mixes his labor with the soil"—finding and transforming land resources *or*, in such cases as a teacher or writer, by producing and selling one's own

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 41.

labor services directly. Put another way: since all production of capital goods reduces ultimately back to the original factors of land and labor, all production reduces back either to labor services or to finding new and virgin land and putting it into production by means of labor energy.¹

A man may also obtain wealth voluntarily in another way: through gifts. $^{\rm 2}$

So in the **secular** free market, all ownership reduces to (i)"ownership by each man of his own" primary property, including his labor; (ii)primordial *interest* in one's points-of-contact, meaning primordial secondary property; (iii)"ownership by each man of land which he" homesteads; (iv)"the exchange of the products" of mixing land and labor; and (v)gifts of such products.

> In the free society we have been describing, then, all ownership reduces ultimately back to each man's naturally given ownership over himself, *and* of the land resources that man transforms and brings into production. The *free market* is a society of voluntary and consequently mutually beneficial exchanges of ownership titles between specialized producers.³

trading & conveyancing:

Before addressing *conveyances*, meaning transfer of titles to land, it's important to establish the context of trading in general within a free market.

Economics has revealed a great truth about the natural law of human interaction: that not only is *production* essential to man's prosperity and survival, but so also is exchange. In short, Crusoe, on his island or part thereof, might produce fish, while Friday, on his part, might grow wheat, instead of both trying to produce both commodities. By exchanging part of Crusoe's fish for some of Friday's wheat, the two men can greatly improve the amount of both fish and bread that both can enjoy. This great gain for both men is made possible by two primordial facts of nature—natural laws—on which all of economic theory is based: (a) the great variety of skills and interests among individual

^{1 &}quot;That capital goods reduce back to land and labor as original factors is a fundamental insight of the Austrian School of economics. In particular, see Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, *The Positive Theory of Capital*, vol. 2 of *Capital and Interest* (South Holland, Ill.: Libertarian Press, 1959)." --- This note is in Rothbard's text, **Ethics of Liberty**, p. 37.

² Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 37.

³ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 40.

persons; and (b) the variety of natural resources in geographic land areas. $^{1} \ \ \,$

So this is how a society, and an economic system, that bases ownership entirely upon **<u>natural law</u>**, develops. Rothbard notes further that what's exchanged within the free market is title, meaning rights of ownership, not the goods, services, products, land, *etc.*, themselves.

What is really being exchanged is not the commodities themselves, but the *rights of ownership* of them.²

It's extremely important to understand that this approach to property, exchange, and ownership traces all valid titles back to these five origins of ownership indicated above. This applies to ownership of land as much as it does to ownership of anything else. What's exchanged is not the land, but the titles to the land. So ownership of land that's based in **natural law** eliminates the need to rely on *patents* and *enfeoffments* issued by statists, as though such instruments could ever constitute genuine source of land title. It's crucial to note that this source of title also eliminates *allodial*, *fee simple absolute* title. This latter breed of statist title is "an estate limited absolutely to a man and his heirs and assigns forever without limitation or condition".³ Given that human beings are localized in space and time, and given that occupancy, possession, and usage are more natural measures of genuine ownership than title that originates in a statist sovereign, "an estate limited ... to a man and his heirs and assigns forever" is a form of title that recognizes no limitation in time. This is comparable to concepts of title that have grandiose claims spatially. Rothbard recognized the latter as a "Columbus complex".

[S]uppose that Crusoe decides to claim more than his natural degree of ownership, and asserts that, by virtue of merely landing first on the island, he 'really' owns the entire island, even though he had made no previous use of it. ...

Some theorists have maintained—in what we might call the 'Columbus complex'—that the first discoverer of a new, unowned island or continent can rightfully own the entire area by simply asserting his claim.⁴

In supreme Court jurisprudence, this has been called the "doctrine of discovery", and the supreme Court REALLY has upheld this line of stupidity. This is evident by looking at John Marshall's opinion in *Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh*, 21

¹ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 35.

² Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 36.

³ Black's 5th, p. 554.

⁴ Rothbard, Ethics of Liberty, p. 47.

U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).¹ --- For Crusoe, or anyone else, "to claim more than his natural degree of ownership", either in time or in space, manifests delusions of grandeur that deserve to be tested by anyone inclined to make the test.

adverse possession versus trespass:²

(i)Given that *allodial* title is bogus because its claim is grandiose because it stretches indefinitely into the future; (ii)given that title that finds its origins in the "doctrine of discovery" is bogus because it originates in the "Columbus complex" rather than in one of these concepts of ownership that is consistent with **natural law**, and its claim is thereby grandiose because it stretches delusionally in space; (iii)given that humans are limited in time and space, and titles to land necessarily are also likewise limited; (iv)given that *patents* and *enfeoffments* from statists are incapable of being *lawful* origins of a chain of title; (v)given that both *de facto* State and general governments are claiming massive expanses of land that they do not possess *lawfully* according to these ownership principles; and (vi)given that fraudulent banks claim that they own massive expanses of land to which they do not have *lawful* title; huge expanses of American land are subject to *lawful* claims through *adverse possession*.

adverse possession --- A method of acquisition of title to real property by possession for a statutory period under certain conditions. ... It has been described as the statutory method of acquiring title to land by limitation. ...

Because of the statute of limitations on the bringing of actions for the recovery of land, title can be acquired to real property by adverse possession. ...

Adverse possession depends on intent of occupant to claim and hold real property in opposition to all the world ...; and also embodies the idea that owner of or persons interested in property have knowledge of the assertion of ownership by occupant ...

Adverse possession consists of actual possession with intent to hold solely for possessor to exclusion of others and is denoted by exercise of acts of dominion over land including making of ordinary use and taking of ordinary profits of which land is susceptible in its present state.³

Given that title to land is claimed *unlawfully* by criminals, even criminals operating under *color of law*, *adverse possession* in regard to such land is essentially a form of

¹ URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/21/543/case.html.

² Given the acquisitive nature of the *de facto* corporate-fascist system, and its lack of legitimacy, all property, both public and private, is now vulnerable to *adverse possession*.

³ Black's 5th, p. 49.

homesteading. Because title to land is never as absolute as statists and feudalists claim, *adverse possession* becomes a very genuine free-market mechanism for acquiring title consistent with **natural rights**. On the other hand, wherever land is possessed and owned through these free-market mechanisms, anyone who attempts to claim such land through *adverse possession* is essentially perpetrating *trespass*.

conclusion:

Given this brief sketch of how property rights and land ownership arise naturally out of **<u>natural rights</u>**, it's possible to return to the core issue in this section, which is how a stand-alone <u>secular social compact</u> might arise. In this hypothetical legal action, the <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring <u>denizen</u> would present this <u>natural-rights</u>based conception of land ownership to the court, and his minarchist adversaries would attempt to rebut the <u>denizen</u>'s legal theory with their own feudalism-based conception of land ownership. If the court is *lawful*, it will naturally find in favor of the <u>denizen</u>, which would naturally undermine the pseudo-<u>jural society</u>'s conception of itself as a real <u>jural society</u>. If the court is *unlawful*, then it will find in favor of the minarchists, and in favor of continuing the statist mythology indefinitely into the future.

Regarding whether or not the **denizen** had *lawful* title to the land at issue, if the **denizen** acquired the land through *lawful* free-market processes, and if the land were *unencumbered*, then the **denizen** would have **absolute ownership** and **absolute title**. Of course, if the **denizen** lacked *lawful* title to the land, then even though the court accepted his legal theory of land ownership as valid, whether the pseudo-**jural society** could take *lawful* possession of it or not would become much more complicated.

Regarding whether it's *lawful* for a *lawful* secular social compact to own land, it's reasonable for this court to determine that it is *lawful* for a jural society to own *real* and *personal property* only to the extent that such secondary property is necessary to the fulfillment of the jural society's purpose. Ownership by a jural society is absolutely not equivalent to its geographical jurisdiction, because such equivalence requires *dominion*, and *dominion* is *ultra vires*. But ownership of land by a jural society, where the purpose of the ownership is exclusively to fulfill a *lawful* jural function, like establishing a courthouse and jail, must be allowed if the jural society is to fulfill its purpose and function.

This section shows that it may be very difficult for stand-alone <u>secular social</u> <u>compacts</u> to develop in the current cultural milieu. Although it's important for people to try anyway, in many ways, it may be easier to convert the *de facto* governments which are in fact <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social</u> <u>compacts</u> into <u>jurisdictionally functional secular social compacts</u>. The latter development is obviously a massive undertaking. Many hands make light work. If the educational process is thorough, it might be easier and more effective long term to convert the *de facto* compacts. This possibility will be addressed shortly.

d. Conclusions About Stand-Alone Secular Social Compacts:

<u>Question:</u> What does it mean to own property and have *lawful* title to it?

Every human being is born with **absolute title** to his/her body. Because Answer: every human is born with a lack of capacity to abide by the **natural law**, every human is born with an inability to exercise full dominion over his/her body / primary property. Such dominion is so lacking that the infant is not even capable of providing for his/her self the basic essentials of day-to-day survival. Therefore, the infant's **absolute title** is *bailed* into the guardianship of parents or other guardians who, according to the *de facto bailment* contract, will care for the infant until the infant acquires the basic essentials of dayto-day survival. When the *bailment* contract ends at the transition from childhood to adulthood, the new adult assumes full legal responsibility for his/her absolute title to his/her primary property. If the bailee is a good *bailee*, and if the young adult has acquired the necessary skills, then the *bailee* will leave the young adult with *unencumbered* **ownership** of his/her primary property, meaning unencumbered by any contractual obligations for which the young adult has not given genuine consent.

After the rite of passage from childhood to adulthood, and the end of the *bailment* contract, the young adult still has an inability to exercise full dominion over his/her primary property because he/she still lacks full capacity to abide by **natural law**. But as far as **human law** is concerned, an adult who is not an idiot or moron and who is not in a coma or severely disabled in some other respect, has *capacity*. All other humans must treat any human with *capacity* as having **absolute title** and **absolute ownership** of his/her primary property, even though such ownership is always mitigated by normal disabilities. Normal disabilities are instances in which a human is unable to keep the **natural law** in one or more of the three legs of the **natural-law** tripod. Because every *lawful* **jural compact** is established on the principle that all humans have **absolute title** to their primary property, every **secular social compact** is based on the same principle. Clearly, anyone with disabilities could be party to contracts aimed at mitigating those disabilities, as every child should be *bailed* into *bailment* contracts with trustworthy *bailees*.

While **<u>ownership</u>** is the exercise of property rights, <u>title</u> is the recognition

that one is entitled by circumstances to <u>own</u>. So <u>absolute title</u> and <u>absolute</u> <u>ownership</u> are close, but not the same. <u>Absolute ownership</u> indicates an *interest* in the owned object that is *unencumbered* by *lawful* challenges to the ownership. As far as <u>human law</u> is concerned, every human has <u>absolute</u> <u>ownership</u> of his/her primary property, with two exceptions: (i)<u>Absolute</u> <u>ownership</u> of primary property can be mitigated by *lawfully* consensual contracts. Because infants lack capacity to give cognitive consent, the infant's consent to being *bailed* into the custody of a worthy *bailee* is tacit. (ii)<u>Absolute</u> <u>ownership</u> of the primary property of a perpetrator is negated in proportion to the damage done by the perpetrator's *delict*.

The principles of property ownership that apply to secondary property are largely the same as those that apply to primary property. In regards to both primary and secondary property, **absolute ownership** indicates an interest in the owned object that is unencumbered by lawful challenges to the ownership. If one stands in a primordial, un-owned forest, then it's true that one has **absolute ownership** of one's points-of-contact with the earth. One's ownership of such points-of-contact is unchallenged by anyone else's *lawful* claim to have an *interest* in those points-of-contact. If one decides to extend one's points-of-contact in time and space, then one might set up a permanent camp in this primordial forest, complete with demarcation of the boundaries of such *real property*. As long as no one else is around, no one else can make any *lawful* claim to having an *interest* in such *real property*. The same is true for whatever *personal property* one might produce through one's labor on such land. Because no one else has any lawful interest in any of this secondary property, regardless of whether it's real or personal, this human has absolute title and absolute ownership of all of it, in the human-law sense. Such **absolute ownership** of such secondary property could be lost either through adverse possession or through the human's entry into a contract. Although absolute ownership of primary property can never be lost through adverse possession (which would be slavery), it can be encumbered contractually. But such encumbrances are mitigated by the proscription of delicts.

Question: Is it lawful for a jural society to own anything, including land?

<u>Answer:</u> A jural society's subject-matter jurisdiction is extremely limited. Everything it does is *lawfully* limited by its *lawful* jurisdiction. In the same way that no one expects a vigilance committee to own anything, a jural society's capacity to own things is limited by its purpose for existing. If it claims anything outside that purpose, then it is operating *ultra vires*. If a jural society determines that it's critical to its fulfillment of its purpose for it to own a courthouse, a jailhouse, or some other facility, then it's *lawful* for the **jural society** to procure such land and to do the necessary construction. But this recognition of the **jural society**'s capacity to own land needs to be accompanied by a disclaimer: **Jural societies** are inherently fallible, and therefore need to be subject to constant scrutiny by those who dwell within their **geographical jurisdiction**. Both citizens and **denizens** need to be constantly vigilant to the *lawful* **jurisdiction**.

- *Question:* What are the differences between ownership by a single human and ownership by a **jural society?**
- Answer: The ownership by a jural society is no different from the ownership of real or personal property by a group of people who own the property together through a contract. Such ownership by a jural society needs to be administered not only by office holders within the jural society, but also by the secular social compact's administrative entity. In keeping with the separation of powers doctrine, the social compact's administrative entity administers continuity political laws of both the jural and ecclesiastical compact, as well as jural taxes and takings. If ownership by a jural society is likely to create conflicts of interest, then it should be administered by the political law administrative entity that operates immediately under the secular social compact. Otherwise, it defaults to being administered by the jural society itself. In joint ownership by a group of people, each person has an interest.

Obviously ownership by a single human is not subject to all these complexities. Even so, in any *lawful* <u>ecclesiastical</u> court, neither ownership by a single human nor ownership through contract by multiple people should receive preferential treatment over the other.

- <u>*Question:*</u> What's the distinction between a **jural society**'s **geographical jurisdiction** and its ownership of land?
- Answer: To avoid jurisdictional dysfunction, both a jural society's geographical jurisdiction and its ownership of land are subject to subject-matter constraints. Other than that commonality, the two are very different. The *lawful* jural society does not and cannot own its geographical jurisdiction in the sense of having *dominion* over it. Such *dominion* would be an absolute perversion of its purpose. Its *interest* in its geographical jurisdiction is limited to its purpose, its subject-matter jurisdiction. The *lawful* jural society's ownership of *real property* is also limited by the jural society's subject-matter jurisdiction. But there is a major difference between geographical jurisdiction and ownership. The *lawful* jural society's interest in its real property is exclusive. Because its interest is limited by its subject-matter jurisdiction, it's not appropriate to say

the **jural society** has **absolute ownership** of its *real property*. Nevertheless, it's a perversion of the **jural society**'s purpose for it to be in any kind of debt bondage to anyone, or to allow its ownership to be compromised by any kind of competing *interest*. Such debt-slavery is an inherent conflict of interest, and so is any kind of such competing *interest*. So the **jural society** needs to own its *real property* exclusively. The same is true of its *personalty*.

One of the reasons it's crucial that a <u>secular social compact</u>'s <u>jural</u> subcompact be limited in its ability to own *real* and *personal property* is because it needs to allow <u>religious social compacts</u> to exist within its <u>geographical</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> without going into competition with them. Another is that it needs to allow <u>secular social compacts</u> to exist within its <u>geographical</u> <u>jurisdiction</u>, like a county within a State.

- <u>Question:</u> In the example case, if the court had determined that the **jural society** had **jurisdiction** to take the **denizen**'s land, how would the **jural society** administer that taking?
- <u>Answer:</u> If the jural society took the land itself, there would be an obvious conflict of interest. Because of conflicts of interest, it's always best for the administrative entity immediately under the <u>secular social compact</u> to administer jural taxes and takings. In other words, this administrative entity is the <u>secular social compact</u>'s tax collector. This arrangement assumes the taxes and takings are utterly voluntary. It also assumes that the taxes and takings are allocated exclusively to *lawful* jural functions.
- <u>*Question:*</u> If title doesn't come from the State by way of some *patent* or *enfeoffment*, then where does it come from?
- <u>Answer:</u> It's inherently unlawful for a jural society of any kind, and for a social compact of the secular kind, to claim dominion, meaning absolute ownership, over anything. No one can give something that he/she doesn't own. So lawful secular social compacts are incapable of giving patents and enfeoffments. Neither can any lawful jural society, even if the jural society is part of a religious social compact.

A genuinely free market is defined by the proscription of *delicts* and the requirement for just penalties for contract breakers. So the free market operates by processes that proscribe such Genesis 9:6 damage. No *secular* government can *lawfully* grant *patents* and *enfeoffments* to anything.¹ Such

¹ On the other hand, it is perfectly *lawful* for a court to recognize title that has been procured *lawfully* through free-market processes. It may also be *lawful* for the <u>secular</u> <u>social compact</u>'s administrative entity to keep records of such *lawfully* procured title.

free-market processes are based on property ownership. So such processes must necessarily recognize mechanisms for such property procuration. There are essentially five such mechanisms, as indicated above. These are the only sources of genuine title, even if a group of people share the title.¹

Regarding intellectual property, meaning title to copyrights and title to patents of technological processes, these are clearly outgrowths out of the creator's point-of-contact over secondary property. Every *lawful* **jural society** needs to recognize them as such. On the other hand, it's silly to think such point-of-contact extends infinitely into the future, given the finite nature of the creator's life, and it's silly to think that such point-of-contact can be contractually conveyed to secondary parties *ad infinitum*. So the courts need to set reasonable limits on intellectual property titles. Otherwise they breed monopolies, which are inherently prone towards destructiveness of societies. If the creator of such intellectual property were to make it clear to all concerned what limits he/she wants to see on his/her intellectual property rights, and to enforce those reasonable limits contractually, this would probably facilitate a solution.

- <u>Question:</u> In regards to a **jural society**'s *continuity political laws*, how does the <u>secular</u> <u>social compact</u>'s **jural society** get cognitive consent from anyone to operate by majority rule?
- <u>Answer:</u> Because a jural society needs to operate for an indefinite duration, unlike a vigilance committee whose duration is limited to the consummation of a single case, a jural society needs to operate by majority rule in regard to its *political laws* that stipulate elections. Because all of a jural society's elections are otherwise prone to conflicts of interest, the secular social compact's administrative entity should administer such *continuity-political law* elections.

Because this arrangement is crucial to the **jural society**'s success, it's reasonable and probably crucial for the **jural society** to require a commitment to abide by majority rule in regard to such elections, as part of the oath of citizenship.

<u>*Question:*</u> How will a <u>secular social compact</u> define its relationship to a <u>denizen</u> within its <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>?

¹ What about gifts and inheritances? --- If the gift-giver has *lawful* title, and he transfers title to someone else by giving the gift, then the recipient procures genuine title through the second mechanism, by expanding his points-of-contact over the thing in time and space.

- <u>Answer</u>: The <u>secular social compact</u> will treat the <u>denizen</u> within its <u>territorial</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> as being subject to its <u>jural laws</u>, but not generally subject to its *continuity political laws*.
- <u>Question:</u> What if someone within the <u>secular social compact</u>'s presumed <u>in</u> <u>personam jurisdiction</u> refuses to cooperate with any of its *political laws*, where the *political laws* could be administered by <u>jural society</u>, <u>ecclesiastical</u> <u>society</u>, or administrative entity immediately under the <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u>?
- Adoption by a citizen of such a posture would be the beginning of the Answer: citizen's transition into **denizenship**. Adoption by an alien of such a posture would not be a concern to the secular social compact because aliens are not generally subject to its *political laws* anyway.¹ Adoption by a *minor* of such a posture, where the *minor* was *natural born* in the **<u>territorial jurisdiction</u>**, and where the *minor* grows into *majority* without changing that posture, means that this person is a **denizen**, and the **secular social compact** would generally treat him as such. This means that the secular social compact's administrative entity would not have any dealings with such a denizen / alien unless the denizen / alien allegedly damaged someone else ex delicto or ex contractu. If either the jural society or the ecclesiastical society get jurisdiction over this alien / denizen through the normal procedures for establishing jurisdiction, starting with a legal action, then those two societies will proceed against this person without regard to whether he is an alien, a denizen, or a citizen, and without regard to whether he objects to the procedural political laws or not.
- <u>Question:</u> If person A refuses to consent to abide by majority rule, then how does the society at large gain *lawful* power to enforce its **jural** *political laws* against person A?

Answer: If person A refuses to abide by majority rule, then the society at large

¹ If the existence of the alien within the <u>secular social compact</u>'s <u>geographical</u> jurisdiction comes to the attention of the <u>secular social compact</u>, then it's reasonable for its administrative entity to check whether the alien comes from a <u>jurisdiction</u> that is committed to the <u>natural-rights</u> polity or not. A <u>jurisdiction</u> that is not is inherently inimical. This doesn't mean the alien is inimical, but it does mean that the alien's presence should be held to a higher scrutiny than an alien who comes from a <u>jurisdiction</u> that is committed to the <u>natural-rights</u> polity. The alien from an inimical <u>jurisdiction</u> should go through channels to be in the <u>natural-rights jurisdiction</u>, channels not required of other aliens. This is because the non-<u>natural-rights jurisdiction</u> is inherently a threat, and any alien from such a <u>jurisdiction</u> should also be treated as inherently a threat, a *delict*, which is grounds for deportation.

cannot gain *lawful* power to enforce jural *political laws* against person A to the extent that those *political laws* are *continuity political laws*. But if the *political laws* in question are the jural society's *procedural political laws*, then the only extent to which the society at large can enforce those *political laws* is through normal procedures for establishing the jural society's jurisdiction. In other words, a plaintiff needs to present evidence to a *trier of fact* that establishes that the jural society has in personam jurisdiction, subjectmatter jurisdiction, and territorial jurisdiction in regards to some *delict* allegedly perpetrated by this person.¹ When jurisdiction is established in an action *ex delicto*, the defendant is subject to the jural society's *procedural political laws* regardless of whether he consents to it or not.²

- <u>Question</u>: How does the <u>secular social compact</u> remain *lawful* when some people within the <u>territorial jurisdiction</u> dissent from its political decisions, and may even openly contend that the <u>secular social compact</u>'s existence is <u>unlawful</u>?
- <u>Answer:</u> The <u>secular social compact</u> remains *lawful* by staying focused on its purpose. Its purpose is to execute justice in regards to Genesis 9:6 damage. It does this by refusing to be biased by race, <u>religion</u>, sex, social status, titles of nobility, citizenship, <u>denizenship</u>, *alienage*, or anything else that is irrelevant to its purpose.
- <u>Question:</u> Given that a <u>secular social compact</u> cannot rely upon pre-cognitive consent as its ticket to perpetuity, how can its *political laws* be structured to allow it to have a perpetual and efficacious existence?
- <u>Answer:</u> It's important for the <u>secular social compact</u> to follow the guidelines sketched above in regards to the citizen's oath to abide by majority rule, the allowance for <u>denizenship</u>, the implementation of the separation of powers, strict adherence to <u>jurisdictional</u> boundaries, *etc.*
- <u>*Question:*</u> Do the *political laws* that are terms of a *lawful secular social compact* and its two sub-compacts have the attribute of being *public* or *private*?
- <u>Answer:</u> As defined in this theodicy, a *public contract* is a contract that has all parties to a **social compact** as parties to the contract. The *public contract* includes everyone with capacity within the **social compact** as party. In contrast, a

¹ *Trier of fact* indicates a petit jury, a judge if trial by jury has been waived, or a grand jury as a preliminary *trier of fact*. If the *delict* is a *public delict*, then the plaintiff is by default the **jural society**. If the *delict* is *private*, then the plaintiff is a private citizen.

² *Procedural political laws* include rules of court, rules of evidence, rules of practice, and other such essentials, as indicated above.

private contract only includes some fraction of this total population as party to the contract. Because a **secular social compact** and its two sub-compacts are *public contracts*, the *political laws* within each of these three kinds of compacts are also *public*. The *political laws* are terms of *public contracts*. Even so, there are limitations on the applicability of such *political laws* to any given human within the population, according to whether the sub-compact has established *lawful* **jurisdiction** in a given legal action, in regards to *procedural political laws*.

- <u>Question:</u> How are taxes and takings to be collected within a <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u>?
- Taxes and takings are essentially requests for voluntary support. If they Answer: ever become threatening, they cease to be voluntary and become *delictual*. As much as possible, these requests for voluntary support should be made uniformly, meaning that the requests should be spread evenly across the population. Because the secular social compact must avoid preferential treatment of litigants, it's absolutely crucial that no attention be paid to how much any given litigant has volunteered. When courts become biased by such information, and play favorites based on such donations, the courts automatically cease being *lawful*, and become corrupt instead. As long as spending is maintained within the jurisdictional scope of the two secular sub-compacts, the tax burden should be relatively small, and should be easy to satisfy, so that the society's propensity to bias is minimal. In general, ecclesiastical court costs should be paid via fees imposed on litigants. In regard to *private delicts*, the same is true for **jural** court costs. **Jural** court costs in regard to *public delicts* should be paid with jural taxes that are collected by the secular social compact's administrative entity. Fees for court costs in regard to such *public delicts* should also be collected via this entity. **Jural** taxes should also be collected by this entity to pay for the maintenance and expenses of the militia and the police.

<u>Question:</u> What is a militia, and why should a <u>secular social compact</u> have one?

<u>Answer:</u> Every jural society should have some kind of militia. This is true of jural sub-compacts of both secular social compacts and the more fully functioning religious social compacts. The militia exists to prosecute *delicts*, similar to the way a jural society's police prosecute *delicts*. However, while police prosecute *delicts* within the jural compact's geographical jurisdiction, the militia exists to prosecute *delicts* that originate from outside the geographical jurisdiction. If the need for a militia is minimal, then it could be extremely

informal and voluntary. If there are external threats by large inimical forces outside the **geographical jurisdiction**, then the need for a militia is probably maximal. If the need is maximal, then the militia should be formal and rigorous. It would still be voluntary, but it might demand the participation of every citizen, meaning every party to the **secular social compact** who has taken an oath of citizenship, where the oath stipulates prior consent to participation.

History shows that standing armies are a menace. It also shows that vulnerability to attack is also a menace. Between these two extremes, the militia should be maximized and minimized as the need is foreseen.

One big difference between a militia and a **jural society**'s internal police force is that the internal police should be very aggressive in prosecuting *public delicts*, whereas a militia should be almost entirely defensive. No *lawful* **social compact** can be involved in war and remain *lawful* at the same time unless its cause is just. When there is an alleged *delict* -- like the attack on the Maine, the attack on the Lusitania, the attack on the Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the attacks on 9/11/01 -- and where first-hand, personal knowledge about the alleged *delict* is relatively scarce, meaning the information is filtered by multiple second-hand sources, alleged knowledge about the *delict* becomes unreliable because it is mostly hearsay.¹ Under such circumstances, the possibility for false-flag operations with nefarious ulterior motives is huge. It's therefore crucial, for the sake of making sure the militia has a just cause, that the evidence piles so high that there is no doubt about whether it's a just cause or not. This takes great self-restraint, and a huge capacity for self-criticism.

Under these circumstances, every **jural** sub-compact of a **secular social compact** should have a militia.

e. <u>Confederation of Social Compacts:</u>

As indicated, by definition, a *lawful* <u>secular social compact</u> presumes to encompass all faiths within a single umbrella compact. It does this by strictly

¹ Notorious false-flag operations intended as pretexts for war include: "Mukden incident" (1931), "Gleiwitz incident" (1939), "Mainila incident" (1939), "Operation Ajax" (1953), "Lavon Affair" (1954), and "Operation Northwoods" (1962). --- URL: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_flag. --- Other possible, controversial, and disputed false-flag operations to manipulate public opinion and public policy include the Reichstag fire (1933), the first World Trade Center bombing (1993), the Murrah building bombing (1995), and the "terrorist" incidents on September 11, 2001..

observing its purpose and refusing to deviate from the **jurisdiction** that arises from that purpose. By constraining itself within its *lawful* **jurisdiction**, it allows the people dwelling within its **geographical jurisdiction** to exercise their **natural right** to contract. As long as contracts do not call for the perpetration of *delicts*, people can bind themselves into **religious** communities, or not, as they see fit. They can also bind themselves into **secular social compacts** as they see fit. So within the population of a given **secular social compact**, by way of the liberty to contract, a multiplicity of **religious** and **secular social compacts** can arise under the umbrella of the original **secular social compact**.

If one ignores the fact that America's extant *secular* governments have gone rogue, and that the States are all **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**, it's easy to conceive of the States as multiple **secular social compacts** that have arisen under the umbrella of the original **secular social compact**, the "general government". Although it's conceivable that the States are **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts** that have arisen under the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional general** government, in fact, the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** States gave rise to the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** general government. But for the sake of understanding the confederation of **social compacts**, order of formation is nowhere as important as **jurisdiction**. In fact, all the States are **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts** that exist under the umbrella of the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** secular social compacts that exist under the umbrella of the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** the towns is a **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compact** that exists under the umbrella of a **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** encompassing **secular social compact**.

Because all humans are mandated to abide by the *negative-duty clause* and the *positive-duty clause*, **jural** and **ecclesiastical** compacts need to exist, at least in contemplation, in each of the **religious** and **secular social compacts** that is encompassed by a **secular social compact**. --- If a **secular social compact** lacks either a **jural compact** or an **ecclesiastical compact**, then it's clear that this is not a *de jure* **secular social compact**. Existing **secular** governments may contain these sub-compacts, but these *de facto* sub-compacts are ill defined. All extant *secular* governments are **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts**, and they are therefore progenitors of Genesis 9:6 damage perpetuated under *color of law*. *Delictual* behavior needs to be opposed no matter where it comes from. ---- If a **religious social compact** is also **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**. But there's little or nothing that an outside observer can *lawfully* do to change such a **religious social compact**, as long as the compact is not causing Genesis 9:6 damage.

The fact that jurisdictions are embedded within jurisdictions in the *metaconstitution's* network of **social compacts** presents the opportunity for *appellate* review of the judicial decisions of encompassed jurisdictions. According to the metaconstitution, such appellate review already exists, but in a jurisdictionally dysfunctional condition. As long as the subject matter of an appellate case is confined to Genesis 9:6 damage, it should be possible for the case to originate from either a religious social compact or a secular social compact. Even so, it would be extremely imprudent for any secular appellate court to acquiesce to a petition for *appellate review* of a case involving breach of a **religious social compact**'s *public* contract, where the breach involved a *delict*-free malum in se. If such a case were to go into an appellate process at all, it should be appealed into an umbrella religious social compact within the same religion. --- The embedding of social compacts within social compacts also presents the opportunity for extradition agreements and other possibilities for collaboration to satisfy the Genesis 9:6 *positive-duty clause*. According to the *metaconstitution*, such extradition and other collaboration already exist, but in a jurisdictionally dysfunctional condition.

If one assumes that every <u>social compact</u> that's embedded in this network of <u>social compacts</u> is like an independent nation, regardless of whether the <u>social</u> <u>compact</u> is <u>religious</u> or <u>secular</u>, then it's clear that these <u>social compacts</u> are bound together by treaties. According to the *metaconstitution*, these treaties do, in fact exist, but they are <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u>. If all the *de facto secular* governments were *de jure* <u>secular social compacts</u>, and if all these *de jure* compacts were bound together by *de jure* treaties, then this network would be a confederation of <u>secular</u> <u>social compacts</u>. Because the organic *u.S.* Constitution can be understood to be a treaty aimed at creating a "confederate republic", and because all these <u>secular social compacts</u> networked together by a single set of treaties are a confederation, it's crucial to understand how this *metaconstitutional* confederation operates.

According to the *metaconstitution*, treaties are simply contracts that exist between governmental compacts. In the case of both <u>religious</u> and <u>secular social compacts</u>, the primary <u>jurisdictional</u> constraints on treaties are the same as constraints on all contracts: Treaties cannot *lawfully* call for the perpetration of *delicts*. Also, because they are contracts, they are based on the consent of those party to them. Under the *metaconstitution*, the parties are not mythological sovereigns posited by the statist <u>religion</u>. Instead, the parties in *de jure* treaties arise out of the unanimous consent of individual human beings, the same way all other contracts do. To whatever extent such consent is circumvented, the treaties are *unlawful*. Because the <u>subjectmatter jurisdiction</u> of <u>religious social compacts</u> can be extremely broad, the subject matter of treaties between <u>religious social compacts</u> can be equally as broad. On the other hand, because the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of <u>secular</u> <u>social compacts</u> is extremely narrow, the subject matter of treaties entered by <u>secular social compacts</u> is limited to the same narrow subject matter. So treaties between <u>secular social compacts</u> and <u>religious social compacts</u> are constrained to being no broader than the subject matter of the <u>secular social compact</u>. Regardless of what the subject matter of any given *de jure* treaty may be, the terms of such treaty are essentially *de jure international law*, as long as *international law* is defined so that it is compatible with the biblical *metaconstitution*. Again, the standard legal definition is not compatible:

international law --- The law which regulates the intercourse of nations; the law of nations. The customary law which determines the rights and regulates the intercourse of independent nations in peace and war.¹

Problems with this definition exist because the defining terms are inherently unreliable. The *de facto* definition of "nation" is unreliable. The same is true of the "law of nations" and the "customary law...". Because *de facto international law* is severely dysfunctional, virtually all *de facto international law* needs to be dumped. A brief examination of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties shows why *de facto* treaties generally deserve to be repealed or repudiated. Article 27 of this "convention" states,

A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.²

"[P]arty" here indicates a *de facto* government that is party to the given treaty. The "party" is sometimes referred to as a "person in international law". Like "person" in *de facto* corporate law, "person" in *de facto international law* is a *legal fiction*. --- To see why this convention is inherently erroneous, suppose a *de facto* treaty conflicts with the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of a *de jure* **secular social compact**, while it does not conflict with the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the *de facto* government, where the *de facto* government is gestating the *de jure* **social compact**. If people living under the *de facto* government decide to repudiate the **jurisdictional dysfunction**, and insist on the birth of *de jure* government, *de facto international law*, according to the Vienna Convention, will present an obstacle to such transition to *de jure* government. It will do so by insisting that the *de facto* international law for the *de jure* government. This shows a disregard in *de facto international law* for the

¹ Black's 5th; p. 733.

² This convention can be found at the "United Nations Treaty Collection": --- URL: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.

consent of the governed. It manifests a conception of human government that is utterly devoted to statism. This examination of Article 27 may be a mere glimpse at *de facto international law*, but such law is so utterly committed to statism that it should be simple for anyone to prove that it generally is not compatible with the biblical prescription of **human law**.¹

The only possible exception to the general need to dump de facto international law pertains to the few terms of de facto treaties that appear to protect natural rights. But de facto international law has redefined natural rights as "human rights", where "human rights" are not given by God, but are rather privileges that are dispensed by human governments. This is a ruse to keep organized crime out of sight, like "the Great Oz" running a confidence game on the gullible. Statism is thus a facade to disguise massive international crime. Because almost the entire de facto infrastructure of international law depends upon the existing fiat-money, fractional-reserve banking infrastructure to such a huge extent, the entire system has been absorbed by byzantine fraud. It's therefore inherently dangerous to try to find anything good in *de facto international law*. This *de facto* system is devoted to a belief that the common man is too dumb to consent to its doings, and that the common man's consent is therefore irrelevant. In fact, the common man knows little about what these globalists do or about the great impact their connivings have on his everyday life. Because of its profound disregard for **natural rights**, almost all de facto international law needs to be allocated to the dung heap of history.

As far as Americans are concerned, the only really significant exception to this general allocation to the dung heap is the organic *u.S.* Constitution. The *u.S.* Constitution established a "confederate republic", and if properly interpreted by way of the *metaconstitution*, this "confederate republic" can be understood to be a confederation of **secular social compacts**, and the organic Constitution can be understood to be a treaty that needs to be tweaked a bit to make it *lawful*. Like any **secular social compact** that presumably encompasses other compacts, the Constitution serves a dual purpose. (i)It is a stand-alone **secular social compact** to the extent that it has *original jurisdiction* over its **geographical jurisdiction**. (ii) It is simultaneously a treaty uniting encompassed compacts into a confederation to the extent that it does NOT have *original jurisdiction* over its **geographical jurisdiction**, there needs to be some kind of treaty between the encompassing compact and the encompassed compact is deferential in its

¹ The United Nations Treaty Collection (URL: http://treaties.un.org) is a great place for the gullible to get brainwashed in the *secular* globalist agenda.

exercise of **jurisdiction**. The encompassing compact needs to be deferential to the encompassed compact's exercise of **jurisdiction**.

If one assumes that treaties are always confined to a subject matter that is compatible with, and encompassed by, the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the narrowest subject matter of the participating **social compacts**, treaties and *international law* are simple and straightforward. But of course *de facto international law* does not presently follow this simple guideline. The biggest problem with *de facto international law* is that it has been utterly statist for so long. It has a momentum towards global empire that is masked by a facade of beneficence. Because of this momentum, it's probably important, for the sake of dispelling the globalist delusion, to go through the following Q&A:

- <u>Question:</u> If a *de jure* <u>secular</u> or <u>religious</u> <u>social compact</u> has *original jurisdiction* over all of its <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>, then what *lawful jurisdictional* claim does an encompassing *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u> have over that <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>?
- <u>Answer</u>: In the same way that a **jural compact**'s exercise of **jurisdiction** over its geographical jurisdiction is limited by its subject-matter jurisdiction, a secular social compact's exercise of jurisdiction over its geographical jurisdiction is limited by (i)its subject-matter jurisdiction and (ii)its contractual deference to the encompassed compact's *original jurisdiction*. Such deference requires that the encompassing secular social compact will have mostly an oversight function. (i)It will offer appellate courts and *judicial review* of encompassed court decisions. (ii)It will intervene within the encompassed compact's geographical jurisdiction only when the encompassed social **compact** requests it, or when there is evidence of Genesis 9:6 damage within the encompassed compact's **territorial jurisdiction**, where the damage is not being properly addressed by the encompassed social compact. (iii)It will offer a militia to which the encompassed compact can send a contingent, and it will offer the assistance of such militia if the encompassed compact suffers an attack from inimical military forces. So the encompassing social compact's deference will allow the encompassed social compact to exercise its jurisdiction first, and the encompassing compact will intervene only when their treaty allows such intervention. In passing, it's important to note that for reasons indicated below, it's inherently imprudent for a religious social compact to encompass a secular social compact.¹

¹ One reason is based on the structure of the biblical covenants. The <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u> is essentially based on the <u>global</u> prescription of <u>human law</u> that appears in

- <u>Question:</u> What *lawful* powers to tax and take does an encompassing <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u> have relative to the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of an encompassed <u>religious</u> or <u>secular social compact</u>?
- Answer: The voluntary nature of taxing and taking do not change in a secular social compact simply because it happens to encompass one or more religious or secular social compacts. It may be a duty for a secular social compact to keep people within its immediate, original geographical jurisdiction informed about its financial needs, but this doesn't necessarily mean that it should cross borders into an encompassed jurisdiction to transmit similar messages. The treaties that bind various social compacts into a confederation should probably spell out whether an encompassing secular social compact, or instead go through office holders within the encompassed compact to achieve similar communication.
- <u>Question:</u> Article I § 8 clause 17 of the *u.S.* Constitution allows for the federal government to own land within the States. Under the *metaconstitution*, is this allowable?
- <u>Answer:</u> Article I § 8 clause 17 makes it clear that the general government can own land within a State only under certain circumstances. If a State legislature approves a sale of land within its borders to the general government, Congress approves of the purchase and allocates the funds for it, and the purpose of the *conveyance* is within strict subject-matter guidelines (the purpose being almost entirely for military defense and appellate judicial processes), then the original Constitution approved of such ownership of such land by the general government. Something very similar to this arrangement is allowable under the *metaconstitution*.

If an encompassing <u>secular social compact</u> offers proof that it needs a parcel of land within an encompassed <u>social compact</u>'s <u>geographical</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> in order to satisfy the encompassing <u>social compact</u>'s extremely limited purposes, and if the encompassed <u>religious</u> or <u>secular social compact</u> acknowledges the validity of the encompassing compact's claim, and does so through unanimous consent, then it's reasonable for the *conveyance* to

the **Noachian Covenant**. Subsequent biblical covenants contain **local** prescriptions of **human law**. They thereby provide a model for **religious social compacts**. So **religious social compacts** are certainly called to have **jural** and **ecclesiastical** sub-compacts. But for them to encompass **secular social compacts** is for them to turn the structure and priorities of the biblical covenants upside down, a great **jurisdictional** hazard.

go forward. However, because neither the encompassing compact nor the encompassed compact has *dominion* over the land within the encompassed **geographical jurisdiction**, *condemnation* through *eminent domain* is not an option, while it is an option under a strict reading of the organic document. This means that if the land at issue is privately owned by someone within the encompassed **jurisdiction**, cession of the land could only be accomplished through a genuinely voluntary sale / *conveyance* / contract.

- <u>Question</u>: It appears that in the *metaconstitution's* confederation of <u>social compacts</u>, encompassing compacts must necessarily be <u>secular</u>. Is this a correct assumption?
- <u>Answer:</u> No, but it's close. The distinction between <u>secular</u> and <u>religious social</u> <u>compacts</u> is this: <u>Secular social compacts</u> exist strictly to enforce laws against Genesis 9:6 damage. By definition, their <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> is limited to Genesis 9:6 damage and only to Genesis 9:6 damage. It is possible for <u>secular social compacts</u> to exist because there is universal, pre-cognitive, tacit consent to abide by the Genesis 9:6 *positive* and *negative* clauses. However, there is no universal consent regarding any other subject matter in <u>human</u> <u>law</u>. This means that all other <u>religious</u> / *municipal* and contractual purposes and functions must be satisfied by some mechanism other than through the <u>secular social compact</u>.

This line of reasoning relates to the metaconstitutional confederacy like this: It is inherently dangerous for religious social compacts to encompass secular social compacts within their jurisdictions. This is because such a situation is inherently prone to jurisdictional dysfunction. Religious social compacts can be set up in whatever way the parties want, the only limitation being that they cannot build the perpetration of *delicts* into their compacts. Genesis 9:6 calls such participants to build jural compacts and ecclesiastical compacts into the religious social compact, but no one is mandated to enforce this calling on religious social compacts, except through the individual party's conscience. So whether any given religious social compact has *lawful* jural and ecclesiastical compacts is largely a crapshoot. In order for such *lawful* jural and ecclesiastical compacts to be lawful in their encompassment of a lawful secular social compact, these two sub-compacts would need to function together as though they were a secular social compact. Given the world's current state of jurisprudential ignorance, it's extremely unlikely that such a *lawful* treaty would ever arise and remain lawful over an extended period of time. Given that religious social compacts are by definition committed to enforcing *delict*-free *mala in*

se,¹ the propensity to **jurisdictional dysfunction** under such circumstances is huge. It's therefore inherently a bad idea for **religious social compacts** to ever attempt to encompass a **secular social compact**.

On the other hand, it's inherently *lawful* for a <u>secular social compact</u> to encompass a <u>religious social compact</u>, because a *lawful* <u>religious social compact</u> shares the proscription of Genesis 9:6 damage with the <u>secular social compact</u>. However, the *lawful* <u>religious</u> and <u>secular social compacts</u> do NOT share common definitions of *malum in se*. It's therefore critical for the encompassing <u>secular social compact</u> to avoid claiming that the <u>religious social compact</u>'s law against a *delict*-free *malum in se* is *unlawful*. A <u>religious social compact</u>'s enforcement of its law against a *delict*-free *malum in se* is *unlawful*. A <u>religious social compact</u>'s enforcement of its law against a *delict*-free *malum in se* is only *unlawful* if the party being prosecuted did not give prior consent to abide by the law against the *delict*-free *malum in se*. If there were such a question about the party's prior consent, then that would be a valid issue for *judicial review* by the encompassing <u>secular social compact</u>. Otherwise, the <u>secular social compact</u>'s private affairs.

In order for a <u>religious social compact</u> to get *judicial review* of its opinions in cases involving *delict*-free *mala in se*, it's crucial for the <u>religious</u> <u>social compact</u> to affiliate itself into an umbrella <u>religious social compact</u> within the same <u>religion</u>. So within the *metaconstitution's* confederation of <u>social compacts</u>, it's possible and *lawful* for a <u>religious social compact</u> to encompass another <u>religious social compact</u> within the same <u>religious social compact</u> to an umbrella <u>religious social compact</u> to encompass another <u>religious social compact</u> within the same <u>religion</u>. It's outside viable jurisprudence for a <u>religious social compact</u> to encompass another <u>social compact</u> that's outside its <u>religion</u>.²

- <u>Question:</u> If <u>religious</u> / *municipal* laws have no place within the bounds of the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of a <u>secular social compact</u>, then it appears that they have very little place within this *metaconstitution's* confederacy. If this is the case, then how do the *municipal purposes* and *functions* get satisfied?
- <u>Answer:</u> As indicated above, <u>religion</u> is defined broadly enough to encompass the idols of publicly traded corporations. It should be obvious from this fact that <u>religion</u> is also defined broadly enough to encompass the idols of *municipal*

¹ Which are by definition *mala prohibita* to people who don't believe the activity is evil in itself.

² The **jural** and **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** compacts can certainly be encompassed, because they should be encompassed within every <u>religion</u>. But these sub-compacts are not <u>social</u> <u>compacts</u>.

corporations. Under the *de facto* system, *municipal* corporations are generally satisfying *municipal purposes* and *functions*. Also, some *municipal* corporations hire private, often publicly-traded (and highly regulated) corporations as subcontractors to fulfill some or all of the municipality's *purposes* and *functions*. Under the *metaconstitution*, municipalities are **secular social compacts**. So *de jure* municipalities do not have **subject-matter jurisdiction** over either the pursuit or the satiation of *de facto municipal purposes* and *functions*. Somehow, *municipal purposes* and *functions* must be satisfied by way of **religious social compacts** or by way of some other kind of contract. This means that these purposes and functions must somehow be migrated from the *de facto* **subject-matter jurisdictions** of some other kind of contract. Under these circumstances, it is not true that there is no place in the *metaconstitution*'s confederacy for the satisfaction of *municipal purposes* and *functions*.

- <u>Question:</u> Does the requirement that an encompassing <u>secular social compact</u> defer to the <u>jurisdiction</u> of an encompassed <u>social compact</u>, limit the encompassing compact's execution of *police powers* within the encompassed compact?
- <u>Answer:</u> By definition, within the *metaconstitution*, *police powers* can be *lawfully* executed only as a function of *de jure* legal actions. The existence of *police powers* under any other circumstances is inherently the perpetration of *delicts* under *color of law*, which should be treated as an even more heinous crime than perpetration of *delicts* outside *color of law*.² *De jure* legal actions are always reactions to alleged Genesis 9:6 damage, either *ex delicto* or *ex contractu*.

The requirement that an encompassing <u>secular social compact</u> defer to the <u>jurisdiction</u> of an encompassed compact does indeed limit the encompassing compact's execution of *police powers* within the encompassed compact, but it does not stop such execution entirely.

If an encompassing <u>secular social compact</u> becomes aware of the alleged perpetration of a *public delict* within one of its encompassed compacts, then it should immediately contact the **jural society** of the encompassed compact. If the encompassed compact indicates that it cannot or will not take legal action against the alleged *delict*, then the encompassing compact should take legal action. But if the encompassed compact indicates that it can and will take

¹ See the next section, <u>Section f</u>, "<u>The Great Migration</u>".

² This is because *color of law delicts* convert the <u>social compact</u> into a criminal organization, and therefore destroy the social fabric more grievously than an ordinary *delict*.

legal action, then the encompassing compact should exercise restraint and deference to the encompassed **social compact**.

Regarding an encompassing compact's execution of *police powers* when it becomes aware of a *private delict* or a contractual breach within one of its encompassed compacts, the police within the encompassing compact should defer entirely, and wait for a pertinent *order* from the encompassing compact's court of appeals.

- <u>Question:</u> If a <u>denizen</u> exists within an encompassed <u>religious</u> or <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u>, what kind of <u>jurisdiction</u> would the encompassing <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u> have over the <u>denizen</u>?
- Answer: Denizens can exist within *de jure* secular social compacts because denizenship status is a necessary alternative to political participation in a secular social compact. It's necessary because political participation is a function of cognitive consent, not pre-cognitive consent. However, there is no requirement that a religious social compact recognize denizenship status within its geographical jurisdiction. This is because participation in a religious social compact, unlike a secular social compact, is capable of having both jurisdiction that arises out of the global covenant and a land covenant that would convert any denizen within the territory into a *trespasser*.

If a **denizen** exists within an encompassed **secular social compact**, the encompassing **secular social compact**'s **jurisdiction** over the **denizen** can exist only *ex delicto* or *ex contractu*. However, by becoming a **denizen**, the **denizen** has put the encompassed **secular social compact** on notice that the **denizen** considers the encompassed **secular social compact** to be *unlawful*, and not *de jure*. Under such circumstances, the encompassing **secular social compact**'s appellate court should be more open than usual to issue an *extraordinary writ*, requested by the **denizen** for the purpose of controlling the behavior of the encompassed compact.¹

- <u>Question:</u> In *international law*, treaty negotiations require the presence of the sovereigns, or the presence of their duly designated agents. How can the sovereign, as defined by the *metaconstitution*, appear at treaty negotiations?
- <u>Answer:</u> According to the biblical story, every human being is a miniature sovereign in training, and God alone is truly sovereign over the universe, because God

^{1 &}lt;u>extraordinary remedies</u> (<u>extraordinary writs</u>) --- "The writs of *mandamus*, *quo warranto*, *habeas corpus*, and some others are often classified or termed 'extraordinary remedies,' in contradistinction to the ordinary remedy by action." (**Black's 5th**, pp. 527, 528)

alone is the creator and sustainer of the universe, doing so through eternal law and natural law. The *de jure* sovereign in biblically prescribed human **law** exists whenever two or more people contract with one another to enforce the negative duties of Genesis 9:6.1 Sovereignty in the human-law sense exists whenever *jurisdiction* is established, as described above. At least such jurisdiction defines the internal sovereign, the sovereign formed through agreement between individual people and applicable according to *lawful* jurisdiction. In contrast to internal sovereignty, de facto international law is concerned almost entirely with external sovereignty. External sovereignty pertains to the face that a social compact presents to entities outside the compact's territorial jurisdiction. In keeping with the spirit of Paul's admonition in 2 Corinthians 6:14-17, it is extremely imprudent for a *de jure* social compact to enter into any treaty with an entity in the international community that does not adhere to the Bible's **<u>global</u>** prescription of <u>human</u> **law**. Entry into such a treaty is a sign to all that the otherwise *de jure* **social compact** willingly cooperates with the *secular* globalization agenda that all humanity should now recognize as a "giant sucking sound". Because de facto international law is a smoke-and-mirrors minefield, no de jure social compact should negotiate with a non-de jure government. It's probably a good idea to send ambassadors to educate and investigate. But it's not a good idea to negotiate until the *de facto* entity is well on its way to becoming *de jure*.

Because there is presently tremendous momentum towards the international centralization of power, refusal by some international entities to acknowledge the kind of sovereignty described herein is probable. It's not reasonable for a sovereign entity as described herein to seek to negotiate a treaty with an international entity that does not already declare itself to adhere to the **natural-rights** polity.² In fact, it's not reasonable for a *de jure* entity to even seek recognition from those *de facto* governments. However, if two or more *de jure* **secular social compacts** acknowledge each other's existence, then it's reasonable for these entities to send representatives to negotiate to form a treaty. As long as it doesn't change the basic **subject-matter jurisdictions** of

¹ Because every human being is mandated to execute justice under the *negative duty clause*, every miniature sovereign is called to be a vigilante. So to whatever extent genuine justice can come out of vigilantism, the vigilante is a *de jure* sovereign under biblically prescribed **human law**. But because vigilantism is error prone, the procuration of justice is more reliable under *lawful* compacts, and so is *de jure* sovereignty.

² If the international entity adheres to the <u>**natural-rights**</u> polity, but does so by using some other nomenclature, then such an entity is worthy of negotiations.

the compacts, such a treaty would be like the agreement between the States that formed the u.S. Constitution.

According to statism, the state has some right to exist as the supreme sovereign over its population. According to this exposition of the **natural-rights** polity, this is a gross distortion of the truth. The truth is much closer to what Chief Justice John Jay stated in *Chisholm v. Georgia:*¹ "[A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects ..., and they have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty." If interpreted by the *metaconstitution*, this view of sovereignty is compatible with the *de jure* confederation.

The centralization of power that is built into *de facto international law* embodies the Tower-of-Babel syndrome. In repudiation of that syndrome, the sovereign formed by a secular social compact that is an umbrella compact for a confederation of *de jure* compacts presents itself to the outside world as a glorified vigilance committee. The *de jure* sovereign is formed by the agreement of miniature sovereigns. The sovereign is the agreement. This de jure sovereign presents the same face on both internal and external fronts. If it turns two-faced, it turns unlawful. The agreement, the face, and the de jure sovereignty all stipulate the de jure sovereign's territorial jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and in personam jurisdiction. If this de jure sovereign sends any agent, as ambassador, to any external place, the subject matter of the ambassador's negotiations should be limited to two questions: (i) How can my social compact help yours to satisfy its extremely narrow jurisdictional calling, and how can your social compact help mine to satisfy its extremely narrow jurisdictional calling, given that both *de jure* compacts contain a **global** in personam jurisdiction over perpetrators of *delicts*? (ii) Regarding legal actions ex contractu, how can our two social compacts help each other to execute justice?

- <u>Question:</u> One of the biggest presumptions presently existing in *de facto* American law is that the capitalist system, which many people equate with a free market, must be "regulated" by regulatory and administrative bureaucracies. Is this presumption true under this *metaconstitution*? If so, why? If not, why not?
- <u>Answer:</u> Concrete proof has never been provided by any of the proponents of governmental market regulation to establish beyond any reasonable doubt

^{1 2} U.S. 419, 471 (1793). --- URL: http://supreme.justia.com/us/2/419/case.html.

that government-run agencies are capable of doing a better job of bringing justice and equity to an otherwise free market than regulatory processes that are built into the free market. The laws of supply and demand are inherently regulatory. They are built by nature into the free market. The belief that government must regulate the market is inherently a belief that the laws of supply and demand are inadequate regulatory mechanisms. Because a genuinely free market has never existed anywhere on any significant scale, because **jurisdictional dysfunction** has been the norm throughout human history, a genuine test of whether the laws of supply and demand are adequate regulatory mechanisms has never been run.

In contrast to this claim, some people claim that America once had a *laissez-faire* economy, a free-market system. These people claim that regulatory agencies were needed because the free-market system was running amuck. These beliefs manifest a statist bias that plays loose with the facts. The facts show that neither the general government nor any of the States ever had a genuinely free market.

Article I § 8 clause 7 of the *u.S.* Constitution gives Congress the power, "To establish Post Offices and post roads". Postal service is a *lawful* function of a free market. If the organic Constitution and Congress did not conspire to create a postal monopoly backed by the force and the sanction of *secular* government, then the postal function could be performed contractually through a free-market entity. The Post Office was the first of the general government's "administrative agencies". As an administrative agency, the Post Office operated like a corporation, the parameters of whose existence was defined by statute. One problem with all administrative agencies is that they violate the separation of powers doctrine. The same way corporations implement by-laws to define the rules by which they function, administrative agencies define rules, also known as "administrative law", to define how they function. This rule-definition process is inherently legislative. Like all corporations, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

Shortly after the Post Office was created, the general government created another agency, the Customs Office. With the exception of the creation of the central bank, which some people might consider to be an administrative agency, the general government's bureaucracy-creation process mostly went into hiatus until the War Between the States. During and after that war, the general government went into granting what were essentially *patents* and *enfeoffments* on a grand scale, mostly via huge tracts of land and subsidies to railroad barons.

As a result of this massive collusion between *de facto* government and these nominal agents of *laissez-faire* capitalism, these monopoly capitalists stopped seeking to satisfy the demands of their customers and instead spent their time and energy bribing politicians. Railroad shipping rates became egregiously high, and railroad customers complained. As a result, in 1887, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which spawned an administrative agency which again violated the separation of powers doctrine.¹ The real problem with violating the separation of powers doctrine is that checks and balances tend to evaporate. So when any branch of government delegates its powers to an administrative agency, the agency is always **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**.

During the 1930s, the *u.S.* supreme court wrote three anti-New Deal opinions based on the premise that "Congress had improperly provided for delegation of legislative powers".² However, these opinions were later overturned, and the "administrative branch" of the general government has subsequently grown into a monstrosity. The administrative branch is now a source of tyranny. As an adjunct to this administrative branch, the *de facto* courts have created an arbitrary dichotomy between the violation of administrative law and the violation of criminal law. So criminal law is still adjudicated in the judicial branch, but administrative law is adjudicated in administrative courts. Because States have always operated under the pretense that they are imbued with the full scope of *police powers*, they have developed their own administrative branches that are also serious threats of unimpeded tyranny.

This situation gives huge latitude to bureaucracies to do whatever they want. When rule by bureaucrats at the level of the general government is combined with rule by bureaucracy at the State and local levels, the Bill of Rights becomes completely irrelevant. Likewise, **<u>natural rights</u>** become completely irrelevant. When <u>**natural rights**</u> become irrelevant to a government, that

¹ It's generally understood in American constitutional law that "no totally pure system of separation of powers can exist". This is because, "Every branch of government of necessity exercises rule-making, enforcement, and adjudicative powers." Even so, separation of powers is a necessary prerequisite to "checks and balances", and checks and balances tend to evaporate when powers are delegated. --- Quotes are of Kurland, Philip B., "*Delegation of Powers*", **Oxford Companion**, p. 224.

² Kurland, Philip B., "Delegation of Powers", Oxford Companion, p. 224. --- The opinions are Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). --- URL: http://supreme.justia.com.

government is inherently criminal.

This brief history shows why government regulation of the economy is a giant mistake. The proposition that the free market must be regulated by the government, which is inherently the act of destroying the free market by perpetrating *delicts* under *color of law*, is not true under the *metaconstitution*, for the reasons just given. The presumption that the free market must be regulated is not based on fact, and it also violates Bible-based rationality. The *metaconstitution* therefore holds that all administrative agencies presently operating under the *secular* governments are inherently *unlawful*.

- <u>Question:</u> How does the *metaconstitution's* conception of *international law* govern human travel and commerce across borders, (i)between a *de jure* <u>religious</u> <u>social compact</u> and an encompassing *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u>; (ii) between a *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u> and another *de jure* <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u>; and (iii)between a <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u> foreign nation that is totally outside the confederation, and the confederation's *de jure* umbrella <u>secular social compact</u>?
- <u>Answer:</u> As indicated above, the *metaconstitution* holds that the *united States*, when properly understood, is a confederation of <u>secular social compacts</u>. It also holds that within each <u>secular social compact</u> there can be multiple <u>religious social compacts</u>. Under present circumstances, all these compacts are <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u>. If these compacts were *de jure*, then the confederation would be held together by *de jure international law*.
 - (i) A de jure religious social compact can have almost any attitude towards its geographical borders that its parties may unanimously choose. It can refuse to allow any kind of commerce or travel across its borders. If this were the case, then the people in a *lawful* encompassing secular social compact would be obligated to accept the impenetrability of the border, based on the fact that to do otherwise would be to allow *trespass.*¹ --- This posture by the religious social compact is obviously not very practical. It's more likely that the religious social compact were *de jure*, meaning that it entered into a minimal treaty with the encompassing *de jure* secular social compact, where the treaty indicated that the the treaty indicated the

¹ Of course, the encompassing <u>secular social compact</u> would still *lawfully* exercise **appellate jurisdiction**, with the accompanying *police powers* of **appellate jurisdictions**, as described above.

people in both compacts recognized and agreed to abide by the legal principles that arise out of the **global** prescription of **human law**, then the **secular social compact** would allow free flow of traffic to and from the **religious social compact**, and would not interfere with it as a general rule. Under such circumstances, the encompassing **secular social compact** would be deferential to the **religious social compact**'s exercise of its **jurisdiction**, and would intervene in it only as stipulated above. If the **religious social compact** made no commitment to abide by the principles of **global human law**, then the encompassing **secular social compact** would treat the **religious social compact** like any other contract, and would exercise *original jurisdiction* over the **religious social compact**'s **geographical jurisdiction**, thereby going into and out of its **geographical jurisdiction** as the law-enforcement needs of the **secular social compact** required.

- Within the *de jure* confederation, there will certainly be a need for travel (ii) and commerce across borders between *de jure* secular social compacts. Under the *de facto* system, people and commerce have moved for many decades across borders between States, across borders separating States from the District of Columbia, between counties, and across city limits. According to the *metaconstitution*, these are all borders between **secular** social compacts. As such there is no reason to erect any kind of barriers to travel and commerce across such borders. Since the administrative branch has grown gargantuan, massive barriers to commerce have been erected and prosecuted through administrative laws. To a huge extent, these regulatory agencies are based on a gross misinterpretation of the Commerce Clause (Article I 8 clause 3 of the *u*.*S*. Constitution). They all need to be eliminated, and all barriers to interstate commerce need to be eliminated, including the highway "checkpoints" that appear to be the new rage among administrative agencies.
- (iii) Regarding commerce and travel between a *de jure* confederation and a jurisdictionally dysfunctional foreign nation, a specific kind of filter needs to be set up. Because the foreign nation is not committed to the *metaconstitution's* basic jurisdictional principles, it would be foolish for the confederation's umbrella <u>secular social compact</u> to enter into treaty negotiations with this foreign nation for the purpose of procuring bilateral agreement about the nature of the filter. This being the case, the <u>secular social compact</u> would need to take a unilateral approach to developing a filter. The filter is necessary because jurisdictionally dysfunctional foreign nations should not be trusted,

as a general rule. So the filter should look something like this: People and material should be allowed to move across the border from the confederation to the foreign nation without any restraints imposed by the confederation. Regarding commerce and travel in the other direction, if people are citizens (or **denizens**) within the confederacy, then they should be allowed entry into the confederation without any prerequisites other than a show of documentation or other evidence to prove that they are a citizen / denizen. The same free entry should be allowed for whatever commercial products they may be importing. Regarding imports across such a border, even though they are tariff-free and duty-free, some citizen / denizen should be required to vouch for the safety of the goods before entry is allowed, because someone must be accountable for their safety. If the people of a foreign nation cannot abide by **<u>globally</u>** prescribed **<u>human law</u>**, then no one should presume that their exports are safe. Regarding entry of aliens, no alien from such an inherently inimical country should be allowed entry unless there is a citizen / denizen to vouch for the alien, a time limit on the alien's sojourn, and an affidavit sworn by the alien and the vouching citizen / denizen indicating that the alien has taken a short course on the confederation's laws, along with an oath by the alien indicating that he/she will abide by such laws while abiding within the confederation.

- <u>Question:</u> How are **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** corporations to be converted into *lawful* perpetual contracts, and how do such contracts fit into this *de jure* confederation?
- Answer: In some respects the current spate of corporations deserve to be treated as **jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compacts**. This is so because the built-in presumption in this labeling is that whatever purposes or functions the corporation is designed to satisfy are essentially idols. The corporation is therefore designed to worship that set of idols. To whatever extent a *secular* corporation is a paragon of righteousness, this would be a slur and would be undeserved. But given that corporations in America are under huge external pressure from externally imposed *de facto* laws, where this external pressure tends to mold corporations into a cornucopia of perversions, the slur generally fits. Nevertheless it's true that there may be exceptions. The point in labeling *secular* corporations **jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compacts** is to emphasize that under the *de facto* system, *secular* corporations are designed to have a perpetual existence; they are inherently contractual; and they therefore need to have **jural** and

ecclesiastical sub-compacts. They have these characteristics in common with more fully developed **religious social compacts**. But *secular* corporations have the absence of **jural** and **ecclesiastical** sub-compacts in common with IRC § 501 corporations, most notably "churches". *Secular* corporations therefore share both these requirements and these deficiencies with more fully developed, gestating **religious social compacts**. The absence of these sub-compacts does not imply that *secular* corporations have no right to exist. Like **jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compacts**, no one on the outside has a license to force the *secular* corporation to form such subcompacts. So there is no externally imposable formula for converting a *secular* corporation into a *lawful* perpetual contract, just as there is no externally imposable formula for converting a church, a mosque, a synagogue, an ashram, *etc.*, into a *lawful* **religious social compact**. **Religious social compacts** can form these sub-compacts only through the unanimous consent of the parties, and the same is true of private perpetual contracts.

If a *secular* corporation established genuine **jural** and **ecclesiastical** subcompacts, then the **jural** sub-compact would be inherently obligated to drive all internal fraud and other *delictual* behavior out of the corporation's internal culture. This would inherently change the nature of the corporation. It would from the time of the sub-compacts' establishment forward, need to pursue its purposes and functions *lawfully*, or to be subjected to the wrath of these *lawful* sub-compacts. If the people party to one of these **secular**, private, perpetual contracts persist in refusing to have a genuine internal **jural** sub-compact, then to whatever extent this contract is a conspiracy to commit *delicts*, it is vulnerable to prosecution by an external **jural society**. This means that the parties to the private contract are vulnerable, and the private contract itself is vulnerable to being dismantled.

If the confederation were *de jure*, and if the *secular* corporation turned into a *lawful* perpetual contract, then this corporation would fit into the *de jure* confederation something like this: Under the *metaconstitution*, corporations are essentially private contracts that exist within an encompassing <u>social</u> <u>compact</u>. The same way corporations within the *de facto* system are generally based within States, a corporation in the *de jure* confederation needs to be based in some encompassing <u>social compact</u>. Under the *de facto* system, corporations are generally required to register their existence with the Secretary of State or some comparable office within a given State. *De facto* corporations are required to get a license to operate. In the *de jure* system, no <u>secular social compact</u> should require such a license to operate or such registration, although a **<u>religious social compact</u>** certainly might require them. Corporations are *private* contracts, and parties thereto are subject to **<u>global human law</u>** just like anybody else.

- <u>*Question:*</u> How are *municipal purposes* and *functions* to be satisfied within this *de jure* confederation?
- Answer: Within a dejure religious social compact, the people can pursue satisfaction of their municipal purposes and functions in whatever way they agree through unanimous consent to do so, as long as the perpetration of delicts is avoided. Within a secular social compact, the satisfaction of municipal purposes and functions can only be pursued through free-market processes. This means that people can either satisfy those purposes and functions through their own private devices on their own private property, or people can enter into contracts with one another to satisfy those purposes and functions, where the contracts are private within the given social compact.

f. <u>The Great Migration:</u>

As already indicated, the road to **jurisdictional** sanity requires a Great Migration of **religious** / *municipal* purposes, functions, and laws away from the purview of the present **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts**, and towards free-market procedures for satisfying those purposes and functions. Why this migration is necessary should be obvious by now. How it is to be accomplished may still demand clarification.

Because the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of *lawful* **secular social compacts** is limited to Genesis 9:6 damage, all purposes, functions, and laws of the existing **secular** governments, that are outside this subject matter, must either be migrated out of the **jurisdiction** of each of these **secular** governments to some other **jurisdiction**, or extinguished entirely. As indicated above, this theodicy has placed all of these purposes, functions, and laws that need migration or elimination into the singular category of **religious** / *municipal* laws. This category has been called "**religious** / *municipal*" to emphasize two things: (i)that **religious** is being defined broadly enough to encompass *municipal purposes*, and laws fall naturally into a common category with what this theodicy is calling *delict*-free *mala in se*.¹ The current *de facto* **secular** governments impose countless *positive* and *negative* laws outside of genuine contracts, in violation of consent, and in violation of reliable **jurisdictions**. Such *de facto* laws include any activity mandated by the **secular** government, where

¹ The latter are what many political libertarians call "victimless crimes".

such government penalizes the refusal or neglect to perform the mandated act. Such *de facto* laws also include any activity prohibited by the <u>secular</u> government, where such government penalizes the doing of the prohibited act. Under this theodicy's definition of <u>religion</u>, all *positive* and *negative* laws that are within the historic purview of any given *religion*, with the exception of laws that pertain to Genesis 9:6 damage, are <u>religious</u> laws. Because they are <u>religious</u>, they are outside the *lawful* purview of the *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u>. --- As indicated, *municipal laws* are a type of <u>religious</u> law. So are all kinds of administrative laws that are by definition intended to regulate the economy or replace free-market enterprises with government-run enterprises. *Municipal* and administrative laws are inherently **religious**, because they are outside the scope of Genesis 9:6 damage.

In order for these **religious** laws to be evacuated from the **secular jurisdictions**, they need to have somewhere else to go. In the case of *delict*-free mala in se, every Bible believing **religious social compact** will naturally implement unanimously consensual laws against prostitution, substance abuse, gambling, and all the other notorious vices that currently feed the flourishing black market. This process of vacating the secular jurisdictions will clearly make delict-free mala in se legal within those secular jurisdictions.¹ Religious social compacts that aspire to being de jure will also implement laws pertaining to keeping Sabbath, worship, holidays, education, child-rearing, and numerous other things that are perfectly *lawful* within the <u>religious jurisdiction</u> and perfectly *unlawful* within the <u>secular</u> jurisdiction.² In some <u>religious social compacts</u>, such *positive law* will certainly include offering welfare, soup kitchens, thrift stores, help for the homeless, nursing homes, hospices, and numerous other charitable ministries to people who are not necessarily party to the religious social compact. This way all the "entitlement programs" that are currently being performed by way of extortionate tax monies can be performed voluntarily and *lawfully*. This is essentially a reversal of the decadeslong usurpation of church functions by secular governments, and this is the core of this Great Migration. It is emphatically NOT the "faith-based initiative" redux.

¹ This clearly poses a serious question to all Bible-believing Christians, specifically, whether it's right to impose biblical standards of morality without regard to **jurisdictional** considerations.

² *Negative* laws prohibiting *delict*-free *mala in se* are *unlawful* and not *de jure* under the immediate jurisdiction of a <u>secular social compact</u>, but *lawful* and *de jure* under a <u>religious social compact</u>, by definition of <u>secular</u> and <u>religious</u>. *Positive* laws mandating *religious* activities are also *unlawful* and not *de jure* under the immediate jurisdiction of a <u>secular social compact</u>, but *lawful* and *de jure* under a <u>religious social compact</u>, by definition of <u>secular</u> and <u>religious</u>.

That initiative was further usurpation and co-optation of the church by delusional statists, regardless of whatever good intentions they may have proclaimed.

Regarding *municipal purposes* and *functions*, like park maintenance, water supplies, sewage treatment, and other things that are generally done by municipalities, there is no reason to assume that municipalities must do them. --- Although the core of the Great Migration is necessarily a reversal of the *de facto secular* commandeering of purposes and functions that are rightly within the **jurisdictional** ambit of Christian **religious social compacts**, the most obstinate obstacle to this migration is historical *municipal laws*. This is because these are purposes and functions that have historically been within the ambit of local governments, and they have almost always been treated as *secular*. Nevertheless, there is no good reason for these purposes and functions to remain within the ambit of **secular** governments.

The standard list of municipal purposes and functions are usually monopolies that are run by local governments: water treatment, sewage treatment, storm drainage, garbage disposal, street construction and maintenance, park construction and maintenance, etc. These are usually run directly by municipal and county governments, sometimes with grants and subsidies from the State and federal governments.¹ There are other *municipal purposes* and *functions* that are not as traditional but are nevertheless common in modern America, such as electricity, gas, cable television, public education, public hospitals, and sports stadiums. Usually some of these local monopolies are sub-contracted by the local government, but some are not. Those in which the local government does not hire a subcontractor are usually implemented immediately by the local government. --- With the exception of functions that are sub-contracted, the local tax payers own the entities that perform these purposes and functions. Bureaucrats and technocrats may control them, but the tax payers in fact own them. Regarding purposes and functions that the secular government sub-contracts, the tax payers pay for those purposes and functions, and the tax payers own those contracts.

After all these introductory remarks, it's now possible to summarize the scope of this Great Migration by saying the following things:

(i) All *negative* laws against *delict*-free *mala in se* that are presently on the books of <u>secular</u> governments need to be repealed, and at the same time, people need to establish *de jure* <u>religious social compacts</u> so

¹ These grants and subsidies are always conditional. These days the conditions usually demand that the local government cooperate with some United Nations, globalist, corporate-fascist, or other **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** agenda.

that these *delict*-free *mala in se* are illegal within the <u>religious social</u> <u>compact</u>'s <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>, as any given <u>religious social</u> <u>compact</u> sees fit to make them so.

- (ii) All *positive* laws that are outside the subject matter of Genesis 9:6 damage, and that are presently on the books of <u>secular</u> governments, need to be repealed, and at the same time, people need to establish *de jure* <u>religious social compacts</u> so that these positive acts are performed within the <u>religious social compact</u>'s <u>geographical jurisdiction</u>, as any given <u>religious social compact</u> sees fit to make them so.
- (iii) Included within the ambit of the *negative* and *positive* laws that need to be repealed are all administrative laws that were implemented to regulate the free market. As long as *delicts* are properly prosecuted and contracts are properly enforced, the free market regulates itself, and it doesn't need any other help from <u>secular</u> government. So these laws need to be repealed immediately. Laws that have been implemented specifically for the purpose of regulating the otherwise free market are laws that can be repealed without any serious repercussions, because the free market is self-regulating. All such laws within all such <u>secular</u> government should be repealed immediately, regardless of what level of the confederacy the <u>secular</u> government may occupy. All government employees of such regulatory agencies should be fired immediately, and such ex-employees should be very grateful if they leave their employment without being prosecuted.
- (iv) Privatization is merely the process of selling government assets to monopoly capitalists on the cheap, and it is insidious and disastrous. The collapse of the Soviet Union during the 1990s is a perfect example of such privatization run amuck. Crony capitalists infiltrated the process like feasting rats, and the society in general suffered as a result. Unlike Russia's disastrous example of privatization, the true owners, meaning the tax payers, must remain in control of their assets. Under present circumstances, the tax payers are generally NOT in control of these assets. Under privatization, as it's been practiced in recent years, the owners / tax payers lose not only control, but also all legal claim to ownership, without being properly compensated. In other words, they get robbed.
- Merely repealing *municipal laws* that have been promulgated specifically and strictly for the sake of regulating the free market may work fine. These are laws that converted the free market into the un-free market,

and they need to be eliminated. On the other hand, in regard to government-run and government-subcontracted monopolies upon which people depend on a day-to-day basis, mere repealing could be disastrous. Especially regarding *municipal laws* that involve significant assets, like water treatment facilities, storm sewage facilities, parks, sewage treatment plants, and others, merely repealing the laws that are crucial to the funding of these things could be as disastrous as privatization. For such purposes, functions, laws, and enterprises, some other method of migration is necessary.

(vi) Regarding these significant municipal assets upon which people daily depend, an approach to returning the control of these assets to the people who genuinely own them is crucial. The *de facto* governments have already *unlawfully* squandered some assets.¹ All *unlawfully* held assets, including those that have been *unlawfully* squandered by the *de facto* governments, need to be returned to the proper owners. Only when such assets are under the active, consensual control of the tax payers should anyone entertain any other disposition of them.

The only aspect of this Great Migration that has not yet been sufficiently addressed is the problem of migrating assets that are *unlawfully* held out of the control of *de facto* governments and other corporations, into the control of the rightful owners. The remainder of this section focuses on this problem.

In order to approach this problem holistically, it should be possible to get a list of assets of *de facto* <u>secular</u> governments. Because these governments have grown so gargantuan, such a list for practically any one of these <u>secular</u> governments will probably be huge. If such a list is comprehensive, then it is more detailed than this theodicy needs to be to prove its point. For the purposes of this theodicy, a short sampling list should suffice:

- (i) <u>parks</u>: all national parks, State parks, regional parks, county parks, city parks, national forests, State forests, national seashores, national rivers, national monuments, ...;
- (ii) <u>roads:</u> all national interstate highways, State highways, county roads, city streets, ...;
- (iii) <u>lands</u>: all non-park lands, waters, waterways, watersheds, mountains, *etc.*, that *de facto* governments are *unlawfully* claiming;

¹ For example, the general government has signed over national parks as collateral on the national debt, making the United Nations and other globalists and criminals the *de facto* owners.

- (iv) <u>water:</u> all publicly owned water purification plants, water towers, sewage treatment plants, storm sewage systems, dikes, canals, dams, ...;
- (v) <u>education</u>: all public schools, State colleges and universities, community colleges, other colleges and universities that are in any way subsidized by <u>secular</u> governments, ...;
- (vi) <u>science:</u> all laboratories, aircraft, NASA rocketry and spacecraft, satellites, publications, laboratory equipment, *etc.*, that are owned or funded in whole or in part by any <u>secular</u> government;
- (vii) <u>postal service</u>: the United States Postal Service and any other postal monopoly owned and operated by a <u>secular</u> government;
- (viii) <u>healthcare:</u> all hospitals, health insurance, clinics, medical laboratories and equipment, *etc.*, owned by <u>secular</u> governments;
- (ix) <u>liquor:</u> all liquor stores owned by municipalities;
- (x) <u>airports</u>: all airports owned by <u>secular</u> governments, including military airports whose use in defense of the *de jure* confederation is dubious;
- (xi) <u>arsenals and munitions:</u> all arsenals and munitions claimed by the <u>secular</u> governments, including those claimed by militarized police forces at every level of the confederacy; and
- (xii) <u>numerous other assets</u> *unlawfully* held by <u>secular</u> governments.

By adhering to the principles clearly implicit in the biblical prescription of **global human law**, as expounded above, it should be possible to develop an algorithm for migrating these assets from the *unlawful*, *de facto* **jurisdictions** of **secular** governments into *lawful*, *de jure* **jurisdictions** of other entities. This theodicy will not attempt to expound a fully developed version of this algorithm. It will instead attempt to expound the prerequisites for developing an initial draft of this algorithm.

The most important factor in the migration of these assets out of lawless hands into *lawful* hands is to make sure the *lawful* owners acquire and retain proper control of their assets, and to make sure that if the *lawful* owners relinquish control, they do so only through express and fully-informed consent, with proper compensation, and without influence from the Federal Reserve, the mafia, or other organized criminals including all monopoly capitalists and statists of every other kind.

It's critical to always bear in mind that the owners of all these assets are the tax payers within the given <u>secular jurisdiction</u>. Bureaucrats and politicians have generally ceased being answerable to the true owners. They have usurped control of these assets, and they are now generally accountable to organized criminals,

including compartmentalized bankers, lawyers, and corporate officers. Organized criminals influence the bureaucrats and politicians through collusion, often relying on bad laws and wearing authoritarian masks. People who are genuinely committed to migrating control of these assets back into the hands of the rightful owners need to be simultaneously committed to these things:

- (i) to identifying and repudiating the bad laws;
- (ii) to identifying and exposing the criminals wearing the authoritarian masks;
- (iii) to identifying and exposing the bureaucrats and politicians who are involved in collusion; and
- (iv) to getting the true owners involved in taking control of their assets.

Getting the owners to act like owners instead of like serfs may be the most difficult part of this problem.

To see how this migration process might go, suppose a <u>secular</u> municipality is the *de facto* owner of the following water-related system:

- (i) three water towers;
- (ii) a water purification plant;
- (iii) a system of water pipes for delivery of tap water to the homes and businesses within the municipality's geographical jurisdiction;
- (iv) a source of water going into the purification plant;
- (v) a system of pipes for carrying sewage (white, gray, black, whatever) from homes and businesses to a sewage treatment plant; and
- (vi) a system of pipes for carrying clean water from the sewage treatment plant to the local river.

There may be many ways that a water system like this could be improved.¹ But compared to many municipal water systems around the world, American municipal water systems are fairly reliable, and they are generally valuable assets. Many people may be satisfied with the status quo on this front, and they may not want to migrate an asset like this water system out of the hands of the <u>secular</u> municipality. But the only way this asset can *lawfully* stay in the municipality's possession is for the <u>secular</u> municipality to turn into a *lawfull* <u>religious social compact</u>. To go through

¹ For example, water fluoridation is essentially the imposition of a medical treatment on an entire population without each individual's specific consent. This fact, by itself, proves that "public water fluoridation" is wrong, without even questioning its efficaciousness as a dental treatment, its side effects, or its use by Bolsheviks and Nazis to keep incarcerated populations dumb and docile.

this kind of metamorphosis, there must be unanimous consent about the disposition of all the municipality's **religious** assets, and there must be unanimous agreement among the people who abide within the **geographical jurisdiction** to go through the metamorphosis. If unanimous consent can be achieved, then the *de facto* **secular** municipality is transformed into a **religious social compact**. If unanimous consent cannot be achieved, then this remains a **secular** municipality. As such, all *unlawful* assets must somehow be divested from the **secular** government. Such assets must be put under the control of the true owners, the tax payers within the municipality.

It's reasonable for every tax payer within a municipality to receive notice that he/ she must take control of his/her assets by some reasonable date of divestiture. This requires that people committed to the migration do all the preliminary study so that they know what the assets are worth when measured in terms of some reliable commodity currency; they know who the owners of the assets are; and they obtain proof that the owners abide within the geographical jurisdiction. For the sake of escaping jurisdictional dysfunction, it's an important requirement that the owners be actual and true citizens or **denizens** within the **geographical jurisdiction**. It's important that the assets be divvied up proportionally among the citizens / denizens, so that each citizen / denizen is publicly acknowledged as having shares in the assets that befit his/her tax contributions. Based on how much a citizen / denizen has paid in municipal taxes, it's reasonable for such an owner to receive shares in whatever perpetual private contracts are formed by divvying up the municipal assets. As a precursor to divvying shares, the municipality's unlawfully held assets must be divided up into distinct entities. For example, the water system, as described above, might be made a single, distinct entity because it's severable from the rest of the municipal assets. The storm sewage system might be another separate, distinct entity. Or the storm sewage system might be glommed together with the street system because the two are not really severable. The parks might be another distinct entity. A municipal airport might be another distinct entity. All the municipality's unlawfully held assets need to be allocated into distinct private contracts to which the rightful owners are party. So a perpetual private contract needs to be formed for each distinct entity that can be identified within the secular government's set of unlawfully held assets.

Based upon these criteria, whoever is committed to the migration should develop a proposal, and should send the proposal to all the tax payers within the municipality's **geographical jurisdiction**. The proposal should propose to each tax payer / owner a date of the divestiture, a division of the overall assets into unique private contracts, the shares owned by the owner / tax payer, and the need for the asset owner to participate in the divestiture process. This communiqué should also

include notification about the availability of all the public data upon which this divestiture is being proposed, and all other related information. It's critical that every owner / tax payer have ample opportunity to participate in the process. Otherwise, this process will deteriorate into another corrupt privatization. Anyone who refuses to acknowledge the need for divestiture should be given ample opportunity to seek unanimous consent to reject the divestiture, and thereby turn the **secular** municipality into a *de jure* **religious social compact**. Even though given ample opportunity to oppose the divestiture, it's important that there be a reasonable time limit on this period of deciding whether to go through with the divestiture or not. Because unanimous consent is extremely unlikely, after the reasonable time period, the divestiture should go forward.

Given that the divestiture goes forward, the **secular** municipality after divestiture will be a *lawful, de jure* **secular social compact**. Upon the date of divestiture, the **secular** municipality's former *unlawfully* held assets will be in the control of the *lawful* owners. Based on each owner's holding of voting stock, and their shares in the various new private contracts, the owners will take control of the assets and will assume governance of the *de jure* private contracts. After the date of divestiture, whether the divestiture turns into another corrupt privatization or not will depend entirely upon the decisions of the various share holders. If the date of divestiture arrives, and the private contracts all become *lawfully* and beneficially governed, then the community should be grateful. If the divestiture never happens properly, then it's probably because criminals insist on keeping control, and because serfs refuse to take their responsibilities under the *positive-duty clause* seriously.

If the divestiture process goes rogue before the date of divestiture, then it's probably the fault of corrupt bureaucrats, politicians, crime syndicates, and an ignorant and/ or apathetic population. If public employees are subjected to constant scrutiny, as is necessary and *lawful* under the circumstances, then it should be possible to ensure *lawful* divestiture. But it's crucial to understand that the corruption in this country runs extremely deep. Given the depth of the corruption, safeguards need to be established pervasively to make sure that parasites do not ruin the process.

The basic pattern outlined in this description of divestiture applies to every *unlawful* asset currently being held by the *de facto* <u>secular</u> governments at every level of the confederation. So it's reasonable to expect to be able to convert this basic pattern into a more rigorous algorithm. But it's also reasonable to expect that such an algorithm would need to be tweaked according to the specific circumstances of the given asset. For one thing, this is because each of these different kinds of assets has its own peculiarities. It's also because each level of the confederation has its own peculiarities.

As an example of how this algorithm should be tweaked, consider an armory that exists within one of the fifty States. Suppose the armory is designated by the *de facto* State for exclusive use by the State's National Guard units. In order to know how to proceed in regard to these assets, it's crucial to know whether they even need to be migrated. --- Each State must be divested of its *unlawful* assets if it is to be converted into a *lawful* secular social compact. The question is whether the National Guard armory is *lawful* under a secular social compact. For the sake of defending itself against massive *delicts*, every secular social compact should have a militia.¹ Because every State's National Guard units have become tools of "officials" who enjoy wallowing in jurisdictional dysfunction, it's important to form each militia from scratch. So all of the National Guard's assets should go through this divestiture process. However, it's reasonable that the newly formed, *de jure* militia would be given preferential treatment by the tax payers / owners after the date of divestiture, meaning that the owners might naturally be inclined to allocate the armory to the new militia after the divestiture.

As this example illustrates, there are special considerations that should go into every divestiture. Even so, the pattern is largely the same across the board. The divestiture process is all about vigilantes taking control of *unlawfully* held assets, and putting control of those assets back where it belongs.

g. Conclusion Regarding the Metaconstitution:

Every aspect of this Great Migration is similar to every other aspect in that each aspect is about establishing **jurisdictional** integrity. This is true regardless of whether the migration involves assets or not, and regardless of whether the migration is from a **secular** government to a **religious social compact**, to a perpetual private contract, or to oblivion. The *metaconstitution* demands these changes. The truth of the *metaconstitution* should be intuitively obvious to anyone with common sense, and it should be embraced as an absolutely glorious feature of God's plan for humanity by anyone who claims to be a Bible-believing Christian.

¹ A <u>secular social compact</u> emphatically does NOT need a militia for any other purpose. For example, "acts of God" and other non-*delictual* mass catastrophes are *ultra vires* for a <u>secular social compact</u>'s militia. The manpower needed to deal with such catastrophes needs to come from individuals and from <u>religious social compacts</u>, not from <u>secular social compacts</u>, for the sake of <u>jurisdictional</u> integrity.

Sub-Chapter 5: Conclusion Regarding In Personam Jurisdiction of Positive-Duty Clause (Who Enforces, and How)

The Soviet Tower of Babel was built overnight, after a violent revolution and a civil war. The American Tower of Babel has been built much more gradually through corrosive notions like *secular unjust enrichment*, banking fraud, and the advancement of the administrative / welfare state. Both Towers ignored consent. The Bolsheviks murdered scores of millions, and those millions have never found justice in **human law**. If Americans don't generally start taking their responsibilities under the *positive-duty clause* seriously, their system will remain on track to murder billions worldwide, with even less evidence of justice from **human law**.

PART II, THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

Chapter H: Territorial Jurisdiction of Positive Duty Clause

As has already been amply indicated, the **<u>territorial jurisdiction</u>** of the *positiveduty clause* exists wherever humans exist.

Part II, Chapter H, Territorial Jurisdiction of Positive Duty

PART II, THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- LAW

Chapter I: The Motive Clause: Tower of Babel, Statism, & The Redemption of Human Law

> Sub-Chapter 1: Portals & Syndrome

Up to this point, this theodicy has been focused on developing its ideological foundation. With the *negative-duty* clause and the *positive-duty* clause unpacked, the foundation is laid. So it's now possible to start telling the story.¹ This is largely a retelling of the biblical story, so there's an obvious question at the beginning, regarding how this story differs from the biblical story. --- In order to tell the biblical story and the story from general revelation at largely the same time, and in a way that's consistent with the ideological foundation, the story needs to be told with an emphasis on wave physics, covenants, laws, and **jurisdictions**. More specifically, the story needs to be told in a way that emphasizes these things as attributes of the *imago Dei*, especially as the *imago Dei* appears in the *motive clause*.

By focusing on the *motive clause*, "For in the image of God He made man", it's undeniable that contained rationally within this clause is the motive for establishing *de jure* human government. It's odd that this motive receives so little respect and attention from the mass of humanity, even including most Christians, given that this is the foundation for *de jure* human government, and given that this clause should establish a *modus operandi* for human government. Humanity has absolutely not followed the **jurisdictional** guidelines described above, and has generally shown very little interest in doing so. Any superficial reading of either the Bible or secular history proves this. Instead of displaying a straightforward progression towards the adoption of *de jure* human government, the Bible shows a peculiar pattern in the redemption of **human law**.

This theodicy is aimed at showing that God is in the process of redeeming humanity, not all humans, but a significant number. It aims at showing that the redemption process includes a plan for the redemption of **human law**. Even though the redemption of **human law** is important, it is not as crucial as the metamorphosis into creatures who live eternally and never miss the **natural-law** mark. The redemption from missing the **natural-law** mark is the crux of this redemption process, but the redemption of **human law** is an important secondary issue that

¹ It's important to emphasize that "story" is not being used here to reference fiction. It's being used to emphasize the existence of a narrative, a storyline.

no one should ignore. That's why this theodicy has gone to such lengths to explore this subject. To conclude this exploration of the redemption of **human law**, this theodicy will now show that the lack of a straightforward progression from the promulgation of the Genesis 9:6 mandate into the above polity / jurisprudence does not negate the polity / jurisprudence. On the contrary, in spite of the fact that there is a lack of a straightforward progression, there is nevertheless a clear pattern that defines the movement towards *de jure* government, even if the pattern is sometimes byzantine and mysterious.

The biblical prescription of **human law** is undeniably based on **natural rights**, and **<u>natural rights</u>** are undeniably a subset of <u>**natural law**</u>, specifically, of the morallaw leg of **<u>natural law</u>**. It follows that this peculiar pattern must be grounded in natural law. More specifically, this peculiar pattern must be grounded in humanity's inability to abide by **<u>natural law</u>**. It's clear that this byzantine road to the redemption of **human law** must exist based on the following line of reasoning: The sequence of events after the promulgation of the **Noachian Covenant** do nothing to suggest that the interpretation of Genesis 9:6 expounded above was implemented in any serious, straightforward manner in biblical history. Quite the contrary, shortly after the **Noachian Covenant**, the human race settled on a "plain in the land of Shinar" (Genesis 11:2), and after building the Tower of Babel there, their languages were confused, and they were segregated into numerous clans, languages, lands, and nations. Thereafter these nations were generally inimical to one another, and prone to warfare, quite the opposite of the general peace that one would expect from the *lawful* and systematic implementation of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity described above. Because *de jure* human law and government were not the straightforward norm after the promulgation of the **Noachian Covenant**, it must be true that either there is a non-straightforward path to the adoption and implementation of the legal system described above, or there is no path at all. If there is no path at all, then that opens up the possibility that *delicts* are allowable; there's nothing wrong with murder; and defrauding one's neighbor is perfectly fine. This would be regression into the state of affairs that existed before the flood. So even if one doesn't believe in the flood, belief in no path should not be tolerable to anyone who abhors murder and mayhem. So anyone who recognizes the depravity of human nature manifest so clearly in 20th century history, should prefer a path to the above polity over no path. Belief in no path to adoption of Genesis 9:6-based jurisprudence is equivalent to a complete negation of such jurisprudence, and a negation of the **<u>natural rights</u>** upon which such jurisprudence is based. So even if one goes no further into Bible-examination than Genesis 9, reason and a preference for justice over injustice should lead one to wonder if perhaps there is some circuitous, serpentine, convoluted, perhaps even mysterious path to the adoption and implementation of the above legal and

governmental standards. This *motive-clause* section of this theodicy is dedicated to exposing this path. The manifestation of this path should make it obvious that this redemption of **human law** is a part of this progression from the out-of-the-garden niche to the New-Jerusalem niche.

If it's certain that the above jurisprudential claims about Genesis 9:6 are true, then why didn't the Bible, meaning God through special revelation, make these claims obvious? Practically all the above jurisprudential claims pivot around this one verse. So it's obvious that the Bible is extremely terse regarding the subject matter of that verse. So why should anyone believe that reliable theology can come out of a single verse in the Old Testament, and why should anyone give such a narrowly focused jurisprudence any credence? --- The answers to these questions revolve around three things: (i)the nature of miniature sovereignty, (ii)the nature of the relationship between general revelation and special revelation, and (iii)the nature of the road to redemption. The path to redemption as it relates to **natural law** first appears in Genesis 3. The path to redemption as it relates to **human law** first manifests itself in Genesis 9. To maintain proper context, it's crucial to find the redemptive path of **human law** within the redemptive path of **natural law**. It's therefore necessary to refocus this excavation of the road to redemption of **human law** on Genesis 2&3, and on **natural law**, by reviewing.

a. <u>Miniature Sovereignty:</u>

God did not hardwire human cognition, but left it open for humans to develop. There is an element of dominion that humans must exercise in order to satisfy the requirements of their ecological niche. People must take dominion over their own minds. They must develop their own cognitive software.¹ This means that people must choose to develop their own software. It means that people must choose to develop the ability to process inputs so that choices that come out of that processing never miss the mark. People need to choose to take dominion over their own minds. People were created with an inborn inclination to choose to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. They were created with a natural inclination to have the range of choices befitting the New-Jerusalem niche, a range larger than the range of choices available in the garden niche. But they were also warned, in effect, that if they chose to eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil start getting damped and/or incohesive. The garden niche was God's act of mercy towards humanity, a nursery where the people could prepare themselves for the ugly future by creating fond memories of their once

¹ In biblical terms, this is known as renewing the mind in Christ. (Romans 12:2; Ephesians 4:20-24)

unencumbered "beatific vision" of God. Unlike all other known corporeal creatures, humanity has the potential for eternal life, a potential for living in eternal friendship with God. But fulfilling that potential requires never missing the mark, and it means never choosing to do anything that would cause the unmitigated onset of damping and/or incohesiveness. To avoid missing the **natural-law** mark, it's necessary to have the mental equipment necessary to avoid missing the mark. But the miniature sovereigns in the garden ecological niche were not endowed with all the software necessary in the broader ecological niche; even though they were certainly given all the hardware.

When God created the people and put them into the garden of Eden, he created them with an element of cognitive dissonance. They experienced the "beatific vision" and were certainly inclined to continue living in harmony with God and with his **natural law**. But they also had an element of dissatisfaction. Otherwise they never would have chosen to eat from the forbidden tree. They ate from the forbidden tree because they had been created with an inclination to do so. Theologians generally treat the condition into which the humans were created as a state of probation. But merely calling it a state of probation or testing doesn't really describe the situation adequately.

The tree of knowledge of good and evil was essentially a portal or a doorway. The first clause in Genesis 2:17 clearly looks like a prohibition:

from the tree of knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat

But the second clause in Genesis 2:17 makes it clear that the prohibition is more a warning than a prohibition:

for in the day that you eat from it you shall surely die

On their faces, the combination of these two clauses appears to be a conditional threat. The verse appears to have the form of all negative laws: "Don't do thusand-such, because if you do, then this bad thing will happen to you." But looking past the surface reveals something more like a kind and emphatic warning than a ruthless, authoritarian edict. So there's a significant difference between a face-value reading and a rationally contextual reading. --- The face-value reading of this verse leads to the conclusion that God created human beings with a desire to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, then prohibited them from eating from that tree. The face-value reading thereby paints God as creating humanity in an unsolvable dilemma, a "catch-22". The face-value reading thereby leads to the conclusion that God is a trickster who loves torturing small animals. It leads to the conclusion that God is some kind of mad scientist in a white lab coat, who loves tormenting rats in mazes. And of course this leads to the conclusion that humans are little more than rats that exist so that the powers that be, most prominent among whom is God, can play with them as the PTB see fit.

If the face-value interpretation of this verse is taken as a foundational premise of a rational system, then it leads to the misinterpretation of the entire Bible. It also leads to a gross misunderstanding of the God who orchestrated the Bible's writing and compilation. Part of the misinterpretation revolves around the phrase, "in the day". By insisting on a face-value reading, one comes to the conclusion that God threatened that he would kill the people on the same day that they ate. But they didn't die on the same day that they ate, which re-enforces the misidentification of God as an arbitrary and capricious trickster. According to Geerhardus Vos, "Some knowledge of the Hebrew idiom is sufficient to show that the phrase in question simply means 'as surely as thou eatest thereof'."¹ So this verse does not contain a threat of immediate death. In fact, it doesn't contain a threat at all. Instead, it is a statement of fact, intended as a kind, prophetic warning. It is a warning that by opening that door, each eater's standing wave would immediately become vulnerable to damping and incohesiveness, and that this vulnerability would lead to certain death.

In addition to problems with misinterpreting the meaning of "in the day", there are several other words and phrases in verse 17 that must be properly defined if the verse is to be properly understood: (i)What does the verse mean by "die"? (ii)What does it mean to "eat from it"? (iii)What is "knowledge of good and evil"? (iv)What is the "tree of knowledge of good and evil"? --- These are all correctly understood to be symbolic. Understanding what the "tree of knowledge of good and evil" symbolizes is the core problem in interpreting this verse. Understanding the other items is a necessary prerequisite to resolving the core problem.

(i)The question, "What does 'die' mean in this verse?", has already been answered. It means the onset of damping / incohesiveness and the certainty of disintegration. But this answer leads to the question of whether death is death merely of the body, or death of the soul as well. This issue, whether the Bible posits the death of the soul, also known as "annihilationism", is addressed in more detail below.² For now, the focus remains on **human law**, and on **natural law** only so much as it necessarily interfaces with **human law**. The answer is that "die" in this context means the onset of damping / incohesiveness and the certainty of disintegration.

¹ Vos, Geerhardus; **Biblical Theology: Old and New Testaments**; 1948, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.; 1975, reprinted 2004, Banner of Truth Trust, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, p. 38.

² See PART III, CHAPTER B, Sub-Chapter 2, "Annihilationism & Hell".

(ii) The question, "What does it mean to 'eat from it'?", obviously revolves around what it means to eat. There's no great controversy about the Hebrew word for "eat" in this verse. But this verse is highly symbolic and metaphorical. So what does this common verb symbolize? --- It's critical to understand this in terms of standing waves. Within this larger context, eating must simply refer to input, any kind of input, from food to drink to air to electromagnetism of any kind. So eating in this verse symbolizes input of any kind. --- If one cannot digest what one eats, then the eaten thing will either pass without harm, or it will act as some kind of poison. Generally, things eaten that are not properly digested are harmful. This rule of thumb is as true of psychic input as it is of physical input. It's as true of sensory input, information, and various kinds of data as it is of food. Generally, if things are not properly processed, then they become psychic poison. For example, people who suffer from "post traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD) manifest this failure to adequately process. People who suffer PTSD are suffering from improperly or inadequately processed input, the same way that someone who drank poison would suffer from improperly processed input. In either case, if the input were effectively processed endogenously, then it must be true that the eater must have the endogenous equipment necessary to take from the input whatever is good, and discard whatever is not, so that the input does not result in damping / incohesiveness in either the mental or physical sphere.¹ In short, "eat" in this verse refers to the process of opening a portal for the processing of input. In the case of all the other trees in the garden, the people were able to process the input so that they did not suffer damping / incohesiveness. But in the case of this one tree, they did suffer damping / incohesiveness. With the one exception, the people in the garden were well able to process the inputs they received in the garden ecological niche. God warned them that they would not be able to process the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thereby indicating that they did not have the endogenous equipment necessary for processing that input. But they were created for that kind of input, and that's why they wanted to eat it. But they needed to learn to process that kind of input, which required acquisition of an ability they then lacked.

(iii)The question, "What is 'knowledge of good and evil'?", is also best answered within the standing-wave context. Before opening this portal, Adam and Eve had

¹ If the input is processed properly, then the proper processing is evidence that the eater knows what he/she needs to know when he/she needs to know it, and does what he/ she needs to do when he/she needs to do it, so that the eater doesn't suffer from damping / incohesiveness, and so that need is defined in terms of the avoidance of damping / incohesiveness. But of course, complete avoidance of damping / incohesiveness is not presently available to anyone in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche.

individual standing wave coherence, and they were enjoying the "beatific vision". They were called to miniature sovereignty and were thoroughly enjoying the fruits of that calling. But God had called them to a much larger definition of miniature sovereignty, a definition that required them to have knowledge about things that were outside the garden ecological niche. Using Vos' phrase, they were called to a kind of "knowledge of good and evil" that is equivalent to "maturity in the ethical sphere".¹ In 2 Samuel 14:17-20, knowledge of good and evil is spoken of as a good thing. Likewise, common sense says that knowledge of good and evil is critical to the process of making good decisions. So it makes sense that Vos would equate the possession of knowledge of good and evil with "maturity in the ethical sphere". Of course this begs the question, if knowledge of good and evil is a good thing, then why did God forbid the people from eating this particular kind of fruit, and simultaneously provide free access to it? Or if Genesis 2:17 is understood to be a warning, as indicated above, then why did God put this dangerous thing in the midst of the garden, warn them about the dangerous thing, and give them a desire to do the dangerous thing, all at the same time? This is especially puzzling if the dangerous thing happens to be a good thing.

Adam and Eve were not mature in the ethical sphere because the miniature sovereignty for which they were created required "knowledge of good and evil" appropriate for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, not merely for the garden ecological niche. As miniature sovereigns, they needed to choose to open that "knowledge of good and evil" door, and to take full responsibility for doing so. So this portal was not merely a "probation-tree". It was "the tree of choice of good and evil".² It was a choice between maturity and immaturity. God made it extremely clear that the opening of this door would result in pain. Opening this portal would entail the exploration of new territory, and the price of that exploration would be the disintegration of their individual standing waves, and extensive pain along the way to that disintegration.

"Evil" used to describe one end of a continuum between good and bad is easy enough to understand. It is the worst end of a continuum of choices. "[M]aturity in the ethical sphere" refers to this continuum. It refers to the ability to make choices that always affirm the good and eschew the evil.³ The concept of evil as one end of a

¹ Vos, p. 30.

^{2 &}quot;[I]n Hebrew 'to know' can signify 'to choose'. The name would then really mean 'the tree of choice of good and evil'." --- Vos, pp. 30-31.

³ It may at first appear that the ability to choose based on such "maturity" is always a good thing. However, this assumption is inherently hazardous because as long as humans

continuum is a necessary aspect of choice-making in everyday life, and it's fairly easy to understand. In contrast to this continuum, there is another conception of evil.

"Evil" can also be conceived as a label for a pervasive feature of the human condition. This is not as easy to understand. This pervasive kind of evil is characteristic of the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. This pervasive kind of evil permeates human existence in this niche, and its most prominent symptom is suffering. This kind of evil, and the suffering that accompanies it, exists because of a lack of "maturity in the ethical sphere".¹ --- One thing that humans have in common with animals is that both animals and humans suffer, and both animals and humans die as the acme of such suffering. In both cases, suffering and death are the expressions of standing-wave damping / incohesiveness. One could say that this damping / incohesiveness epitomizes this pervasive kind of evil. But this claim does not properly mark the differences between humans and animals. Being created in the image of God, humans have a dormant capacity to avoid death and suffering, which animals do not have.

If the people in the garden had completely understood the stakes, they would naturally never have chosen to eat off that particular tree. But that knowledge about the stakes was part of the tree's fruit. Knowledge about the stakes was available to them only through the tree or by taking God's description of the stakes as sufficient. One can blame God for setting things up this way. Or one can accept that God set it up this way for a good reason, specifically, because this broader range of choices is a necessary feature of full maturity in the ethical sphere, and full maturity as miniature sovereigns, and choosing this broader range of choices is a necessary prerequisite to dominion as miniature sovereigns.

Animals were not created with the capacity to avoid damping / incoherence. The suffering and death that they suffer is therefore natural. There is no reason to believe that they have souls that last beyond the deaths of their physical bodies. Reason demands that annihilation and recycling is their final destination, and they have no sin in any aspect of their life cycle because they do what they were created to

1 Although "maturity in the ethical sphere" may be an appropriate expression in many respects, words like "ethics" and "morals" have become tainted over the last couple of centuries by the tendency to define them in terms of actions taken in response to stimuli. To sidestep this kind of language pollution, this theodicy insists that this kind of "maturity" can only exist when there is rational consistency and harmony between exogenous stimuli, endogenous processing (which is largely cognitive), and the moral and legal standards established within the biblical covenants and their respective jurisdictions.

exist in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, genuine "maturity in the ethical sphere" is out of reach as surely as the sinless life is out of reach.

do. But this is not true of humans because humans have the capacity to live forever. So human suffering is not equivalent to animal suffering, and human death is not equivalent to animal death and annihilation. Likewise, the suffering and death of animals is not evil, because suffering and death are inevitable aspects of the animal's existence. On the other hand, suffering and death are symptoms of pervasive evil that mark the human condition in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, because humans have the capacity for eternal life without suffering and death, even though they lack the processing equipment necessary to realize that capacity. When the human race in general acquires this processing equipment, it will be graduating from the out-of-the-garden ecological niche.

The difference between pain and suffering is crucial to understanding the difference between evil as one end of a continuum of choices, and evil as a pervasive feature of the human condition. Pain is important and useful. If pain doesn't communicate something to avoid, then one tends not to avoid what should be avoided. If one has no nerve endings for feeling heat, then one might naturally walk into a furnace and feel no pain, and burn to a crisp. So pain is good, because it communicates important information into the endogenous information processing center. Because pain is crucial to the whole process of choosing, it is something that will probably exist even when "maturity in the ethical sphere", the necessary processing equipment, is attained. But this is not true of suffering. Suffering is pain that continues even after pain's message has been properly delivered to the endogenous processing center. It continues to exist because the organism has not responded in a manner that holistically alleviates the pain. This failure generally happens when knowledge about the cause of pain and capacity to alleviate the pain do not cooperate to alleviate the pain. The knowledge, the capacity, or both, are deficient. So pain turns into suffering. Such suffering marks the entire animal kingdom. It also marks humanity in the out-of-the-garden niche. The suffering of animals may be undesirable, but it's not evil, in the pervasiveness sense of the word. This is because suffering and death are built into the animal's existence, because they were not created for eternal life. They were not created in the image of God. But the suffering of humans is both undesirable and evil, not because of any fault of God, but because of the failure of the human race as a whole to attain the necessary endogenous processing equipment.

The bottom line is that good and evil need to be defined in terms of standing wave cohesion. But they cannot be defined strictly in terms of the individual human standing wave or of the human race's psychic standing wave. These two sets of standing waves are interdependent. There is a feedback loop between the single, race-wide psychic standing wave on one hand, and each of the multitude of human

organismic standing waves, on the other. In general, what generates standing-wave permanence is good, and what tends to damping / incohesiveness is evil. But there are certain situations at which this generality breaks down. When there are conflicts between the needs of the group and the needs of the individual, this generality generally breaks down. It doesn't break down in the sense that the conflict between standing-wave permanence and damping / incohesiveness becomes irrelevant. It breaks down in the sense that there is generally insufficient knowledge about how to parse the **jurisdictional** boundaries between the individual and the group. The massive **jurisdictional dysfunction** during the 20th century is evidence that this is a fundamental problem. In fact, this theodicy claims that this is such a fundamental problem that it goes to the core of why the people in the garden chose to open this sinister portal.

(iv)The short answer to the question, "What is the 'tree of knowledge of good and evil'?", is that it's the portal to destruction above all portals to destruction. In the history of redemption, there are times when God has allowed the existence of portals that lead humans to destruction. God always warned people about the dangers relating to such portals. He also made provision for humanity's neglect of his warning. Essentially he said, "I warn you not to go through that door. That door leads to your destruction. But here, here are the keys if you insist on opening that door and going through it." For the sake of understanding the nature of the door, and thereby understanding why it's crucial to keep the door closed, people have sometimes needed to open it, just enough to figure it out. This is always because people evaluate God's warnings as not being good enough. Sometimes, even God would agree that the warning is not good enough, as is the case with this first portal. Usually, God's warnings should be deemed good enough, and the portal should be kept closed whenever he warns against opening it.

The first such portal was the "tree of knowledge of good and evil". This *motive-clause* section of this theodicy will provide evidence that these portals are recursive, like Russian nested dolls or Chinese nested boxes. Opening one leads to another. Because **human law** is a subset of **natural law**, each such portal usually has implications for **human law**. The big question to the human race, even now, is whether these nested portals are an infinite recursion leading to hell, or not? The infinite recursion issue will also be addressed in the annihilation section below. In this *motive-clause* section, suffice it to say that this recursion is governed by the overall need and desire for standing-wave cohesion. This *motive-clause* section will only examine the portals that have major implications for **human law**, and thereby manifest the road to redemption of **human law**.

The subtitle to each of the portals examined in this *motive-clause* section is the same thing that Joseph said to his brothers, paraphrasing: "What Satan meant for evil, God meant for good" (Genesis 50:20; Romans 8:28). So the crucial issue permeating each of these portals is, "What is the difference between good and evil in regards to this portal?". Each portal encompasses a specific subject matter. So the crucial question is, "What is the difference between good and evil in regards to this particular conflict between the needs of the group and the needs of the individual?"

To remain in communion with God, humans must know what they need to know when they need to know it, so that they can do what they need to do when they need to do it, where need is defined in terms of standing-wave coherence. The endogenous equipment necessary to processing all kinds of inputs is crucial to standing wave coherence both in regards to the group and in regards to the individual. Verse seventeen's prohibition and the whole milieu's probation were a state of alert and warning provided by God to the people, that if they did not comprehend the distinction between necessary knowledge and unnecessary knowledge, they would be vulnerable to delusion. Ultimately their knowledge would fail whenever they did not properly discern the boundary between the miniature sovereign's *lawful* **jurisdiction** and God's *lawful* **jurisdiction**. This is the crux of why opening the "tree of knowledge" portal was dangerous. It's also the crux of why every subsequent portal in redemptive recursion has been dangerous.

The issue at each portal is this: The portal represents a need for knowledge (or more broadly, a need for the ability to process a specific kind of input). Regardless of whether the demand for knowledge is coming primarily from the race-wide psychic standing wave or from the individual organismic standing wave, the question is, "What knowledge is necessary to maximize overall coherence?". The people in the garden apparently were using a definition of overall coherence that included more people than merely Adam and Eve. It was a definition characteristic of the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, rather than of the garden ecological niche. If they had confined themselves to a definition of overall coherence that included only Adam and Eve, a definition appropriate for the garden, then they would have seen no reason to eat of the tree, and they would have had no motive for doing so. The fact that they chose to open that portal shows that they had a deep-seated inclination to do so. They were created to do so. They were immediately bombarded with inputs that they could not properly process, which resulted immediately in their missing the mark.

The people chose to open this sinister portal for the reasons given in the Bible. But the reasons given in the Bible are obscure unless they are interpreted within the

kind of context being established by this theodicy. In keeping with Deuteronomy 29:29, God reveals things on a need-to-know basis. Given advances in secular science that illuminate the content of general revelation, at least for anyone who cares to see them, it's now possible to say that the people opened the garden portal to satisfy a demand for knowledge arising out of damping / incoherence they sensed in the race-wide psychic standing wave. Their organismic standing waves were both in perfect shape. But because they were made for the New-Jerusalem niche rather than the garden niche, they must have sensed imperfections in the race-wide psychic standing wave because there was so much missing from the garden race-wide psychic standing wave. So this was the first conflict between individual and group **jurisdictions** that presented a need for knowledge hidden behind a closed door. It was the first iteration in this recursive process of redemption.

b. <u>Revelation:</u>

Immediately after the people ate, and started disintegrating, God could have easily annihilated them. Because they were created to live in eternal friendship with him, and they chose to drop into desolation and suffering instead, he would have been justified in annihilating these perverse creatures. Instead, as indicated in Genesis 3, he put them on the road to redemption.¹ As amply indicated throughout the remainder of the Bible, this is not redemption of the entire human race. It is redemption of the race in general, but not in the whole. It is redemption of some individuals, but not all.

Because the primary problem is cognitive, as indicated symbolically by the name of the portal, "tree of knowledge of good and evil", the redemptive process is necessarily focused on cognition, broadly defined. It is therefore appropriate that the redemptive process focuses on revelation, revelation being an act that enlightens cognition. Vos makes an extraordinary and extremely important connection between redemption and revelation by saying that "Revelation is the interpretation of redemption".² Although Vos may have been speaking specifically of special revelation in saying this,³ this theodicy holds that both general revelation and special revelation are primarily about interpreting redemption.⁴ Such redemption includes

¹ That's why the covenant manifest in Genesis 3 is generally called the "covenant of grace" in Reformed Theology. --- Grudem, pp. 519-522.

² Vos, p. 6.

³ He says, "Special Revelation is ... inseparably attached to ... *Redemption*." --- Vos, p.
5.

⁴ This is because the whole purpose of human life in the out-of-the-garden niche is to advance into the New-Jerusalem niche, by way of conformity to "Man's chief end" (*i.e.*,

both redemption of $\underline{human \ law}$ and redemption from missing the $\underline{natural-law}$ mark.

As indicated above, **<u>natural law</u>** is the subset of <u>eternal law</u> that impacts humans, *i.e.*, that can be known by humans. This same system indicates that **<u>divine</u>** law is a subset of natural law. In this system, divine law refers to the Bible, more specifically, the Reformed canon of the Bible. As already indicated, this system posits two overarching kinds of revelation: "special" and "general". "General revelation" means God's disclosure of his eternal law as natural law. So general revelation is God's self-disclosure of the three legs of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod: (i)the laws that govern exogenous natural phenomena; (ii)the laws that govern endogenous natural phenomena (the most important feature of which is cognition, *i.e.*, the digestion of perceptual input); and (iii)the laws of the ethical field, meaning the moral law that instructs people in how to behave so that they remain perpetual standing waves. So the things manifest by general revelation are manifestations of God's "existence, character, and moral law".1 The reason this kind of revelation is called "general" is because it is knowledge that God makes available to all people generally, and because it is general in its content. "General revelation comes through observing nature, through seeing God's directing influence in history, and through an inner sense of God's existence and his laws that he has placed inside every person."2

As indicated above, the covenants that preceded the Abrahamic Covenant were all **global**. The **Edenic**, **Adamic**, and **Noachian** covenants, according to the evidence in the Bible, have been revealed to the human race generally. But of course much of humanity would deny any knowledge of these things if queried. This shows that the general revelation of **<u>natural law</u>** does not necessarily register as knowledge in the consciousness. It always exists in the consciousness, subconsciousness, or unconsciousness, but in the fallen condition, humans generally suppress most **<u>natural</u>** law and most general revelation (Romans 1:18). Nevertheless, the natural law is generally revealed. Given that all "Revelation is the interpretation of redemption", general revelation is the interpretation of the process of gaining full cognition of natural law. But because humans are finite, localized in space and time, even if they live for an infinite temporal duration, they are not omniscient. Even in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, humans will never be omniscient. So full cognition of **natural law** means knowing what one needs to know when one needs to know it, so that one does what one needs to do when one needs to do it, where need is defined in terms of maintenance of the perpetual standing wave. This is not omniscience, but

[&]quot;to glorify God, and enjoy him forever" --- Westminster Shorter Catechism, answer 1).

¹ Grudem, pp. 122-123.

² Grudem, pp. 122-123.

it's also not vulnerability to disintegration. --- If science is understood to be part of the general process of the sanctification of the human race, then science is a process of retrieving general revelation from the subconscious / unconscious, and making it available for the general edification and betterment of humanity. If science exists outside this context, then it is just another adventure in human arrogance, and another idol to delude the masses.

In contrast to general revelation, special revelation is God's self-disclosure to an exclusive and specific set of people. Evidenced by their local in personam jurisdictions, the Abrahamic, Mosaic, and Christian covenants are each a manifestation of special revelation. --- In order to properly frame special revelation within the system that has been described thus far in this theodicy, it's important to focus on redemption, rather than revelation, because "Revelation is the interpretation of redemption". Contained within **<u>natural law</u>** is a very specific process of redemption that is manifest initially in Genesis 3, but which was planned originally from the beginning of time. According to Reformed Theology, there was a covenant between the three Persons of the Godhead from the beginning of time, known as the "covenant of redemption".¹ In this covenant, "the Son agreed to become a man, be our representative, obey the demands of the covenant of works on our behalf, and pay the penalty for sin, which we deserved."² This special process of redemption that started unfolding in Genesis 3 has been accompanied by a special process of revelation of this special process of redemption. --- General redemption of humanity was built into creation as surely as the **<u>natural law</u>** was built into creation. The evidence supporting this claim exists in the fact that the "covenant of redemption" was an agreement between the Persons of the Godhead from primordia.³ So the covenant by which the **natural law** was promulgated logically included laws pertinent to the redemption of humanity, where the laws pertinent to the redemption of humanity are a subset of the **<u>natural law</u>**. So the whole process of redemption that's described in the Bible is a subset of **<u>natural law</u>**. Likewise, the Bible's prescription of <u>**human**</u> law is a subset of the redemption that's described in the Bible. --- So natural law encompasses divine law, and divine law encompasses the divine law's prescription of **human law**. But if **divine law** is nothing more than the Bible, then there is a huge question regarding how, exactly, it became written and promulgated out of its natural law foundation. In its own way, the field of so-called "historical criticism" / "higher criticism" has addressed this subject thoroughly enough. But that field

¹ See PART II, CHAPTER A, *Sub-Chapter 2*, "*Covenants*". --- Also see Grudem, pp. 518-519.

² Grudem, pp. 518-519.

³ For Scripture citations supporting this claim, see Grudem, pp. 518-519.

of study has not established how <u>divine law</u> fits into this larger legal context. By discussing the relationships between <u>eternal law</u>, <u>natural law</u>, <u>divine law</u>, <u>human</u> <u>law</u>, redemption from missing the <u>natural-law</u> mark, redemption of <u>human law</u>, general revelation, and special revelation, that's what this theodicy intends to do, establish the manner in which <u>divine law</u> fits into this larger legal context.

Geerhardus Vos claims that "Redemption is partly objective and central, partly subjective and individual." He also says that "revelation accompanies the process of objective-central redemption only".¹ He claims that "objective-central acts" are "redeeming acts of God", like "the incarnation, the atonement, the resurrection of Christ".² He says that "acts in the subjective sphere are called individual, because they are repeated in each individual separately. Such subjective-individual acts are regeneration, justification, conversion, sanctification, glorification."³ He says that "revelation accompanies the process of objective-central redemption only".⁴ Vos claims that "revelation comes to a close … where redemption still continues".⁵ Vos says that revelation and redemption "are not entirely co-extensive, for revelation comes to a close at a point where redemption still continues." --- As indicated above, Vos is speaking of special revelation in making these claims. He is not speaking

2 In the remainder of this *motive-clause* section of this theodicy, this theodicy will use the expression, "objective-central redemption", to refer primarily to "the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection of Christ". This theodicy will use the same expression to refer secondarily to ancillary activities that preceded and succeeded the incarnation, like the construction of the tabernacle and temple, the daily ritual sacrifices, the cycles of feasts and sabbaths, the institution of the passover, and didactic passages in the New Testament. The difference between the primary meaning and the secondary is essentially that the secondary prepares and explains the primary. Whether a given usage is the primary or secondary meaning should be clear from the context. --- The dual usage of this expression is based on this thought: "[T]he sacrifices of the Old Testament were the main of all the Old-Testament types of Christ and his redemption; ... and so prepared the way for the reception of the glorious gospel". (Edwards, Jonathan, History of the Work of Redemption, 1774, included in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, 2 vols., "Reprinted from an 1834 edition originally published in Great Britain", 3rd printing, 2003, Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., Peabody, Massachusetts; vol. 1, Period I, Part I, Section III, p. 538. --- Edwards' book is essentially an exposition of how most of the Bible is preparatory, through divine providence, for objective-central redemption in its primary sense, and whatever is not either primary or secondary is part of what he calls "the grand design".

3 Vos, p. 6.

5 Vos, p. 6.

¹ Vos, p. 6.

⁴ Vos, p. 6.

of general revelation.¹ To avoid errors that accompany compartmentalization, it's necessary to explore the relationships between redemption, general revelation, and special revelation, rather than arbitrarily leave general revelation out of the picture. As indicated, this theodicy holds that both general and special revelation are the interpretation of redemption. But this is only a small step towards unraveling the complexity of this predicament. Although many of Vos' claims are true, inclusion of general revelation in the picture both complicates things and explains things.

In addition to avoiding errors introduced through compartmentalization, it's also necessary to avoid errors that arise through equivocation. Towards that end, it's necessary to recognize that contrary to what has been claimed above, the Bible is not the same thing as the **divine law**. To be more precise, the Bible is the medium through which the **divine law** is expressed, in the same way that a law book is not the law, but is a medium through which the law is expressed. --- "Christians affirm the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible because God is ultimately the author of the Bible."² "Christians affirm the infallibility and inerrancy of the Bible because" it contains or expresses the **divine law**. It is the medium through which the **divine law** is expressed.

Contrary to what some people believe, the Bible is also not the same thing as special revelation. To explain this it should help to recognize that revelation is not merely the interpretation of redemption. More precisely, it is God's explanation of redemption, which is generally accompanied by humanity's attempt to interpret that explanation. The explanation exists both generally and specifically. The divine law contains elements of both general revelation and special revelation. The entirety of the local covenants is expressions of special revelation. Largely, the Bible from Genesis 11:10 through Revelation 22 identifies, explains, and interprets "objective-central acts", where objective-central redemptive acts include not only "the incarnation, the atonement, the resurrection of Christ", but also every theophany, Christophany, word spoken by God, and each of the local covenants. In contrast to this, the covenants in Genesis 1 through Genesis 11:9 are **global** rather than **local**. The recordation of facts, laws, and covenants that are inherently **global** is not recordation of "objectivecentral" material. But this **global** material is crucial to establishing the context of the subsequent objective-central redemptive acts. The redemptive acts by God that appear in Genesis 1-11:9 are therefore being called objective-general redemptive acts, rather than "objective-central". These acts clearly include the prescription of **global**

¹ Vos is focused on what is normally known as "Biblical Theology", which he says is more aptly called the "History of Special Revelation". --- Vos, p. 14.

² Sproul, R.C., **Essential Truths of the Christian Faith: 100 Key Doctrines in Plain Language**; 1992, Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., Carol Stream, Illinois; p. 16.

human law. The descriptions, interpretations, and explanations of law and fact that appear in Genesis 1-11:9 are therefore expressions of general revelation, including the **global** promise of redemption in Genesis 3:15.¹

Another distinction that needs to be recognized is the difference between subjective-individual redemptive acts by God, on one hand, and objective-central and objective-general redemptive acts by God, on the other. Among other things, this is critical because it impacts the integrity of the definition of the five solas of the Reformation.² The focus of the **divine law** is obviously on objective-central redemptive acts. Each human author of the Bible was a witness to such objectivecentral redemptive acts in some way or another, and was providentially moved to record the revelation of those acts through whatever media he found providentially appropriate. As a perceiver of such objective-central redemptive acts, those objective acts emitted sense data that acted as objective-individual revelation to the perceiver. Such sense data cannot be confined to the five physical senses, because electromagnetic radiation, and who knows what else, can impact the human organism in such a way as to both bypass those five sense organs and cross the threshold of consciousness. So for every perceiver of an objective-central act, there was objective-individual revelation of that act to that individual. So objective-individual revelation is a necessary precursor to both (i)recordation of objective-central redemptive acts, and (ii)subjective-individual redemption. This in no way diminishes God's power to influence the subjective inclinations of that individual. On the contrary, when the objective-individual revelation crosses the threshold of the senses, God sovereignly influences the subjective inclinations of the perceiver towards subjective-individual redemption, or not. Thereafter, God likewise influences the perceiver's subjective inclinations towards recordation of the objective-central redemptive acts, or not, as God sovereignly chooses.

The reason this description of the process of recording revelation is crucial is because it shows how utterly dependent the canon of Scripture is upon the existence of objective-central redemptive acts. Because objective-central redemptive acts have ceased since the last witness to Christ's earthly ministry died, so has the special

¹ By way of Genesis 1-11:9, the **divine law** is broader than special revelation. It's also narrower than all special revelation by way of the following fact: "Special revelation ... is not limited to the words of Scripture, for it also includes, for example, many words of Jesus that were not recorded in Scripture, and probably there were many words spoken by Old Testament prophets and New Testament apostles that were not recorded in Scripture either." --- Grudem, p. 123.

^{2 (}i) *Sola scriptura* (by Scripture alone); (ii) *sola fide* (by faith alone); (iii) *sola gratia* (by grace alone); (iv) *solus Christus* (Christ alone); and (v) *soli Deo gloria* (glory to God alone).

revelation that deserves not only recordation, but also inclusion in the canon. *Sola scriptura* and the other four *solas* are therefore not threatened by this description of the facts. At the same time, people who think that the gifts of the spirit (1 Corinthians 12:4-11) have ceased because objective-central redemptive acts have ceased until Christ's return, have no grounds for making their argument.

With this sketch of the process of Scripture recordation in hand, it's important to focus on Vos' other distinction. He said that "Redemption is partly objective and central, partly subjective and individual"; and "revelation accompanies the process of objective-central redemption only". It's important to look at "subjective-individual redemption" to see if it's really true that revelation accompanies only objectivecentral redemption, and not subjective-individual redemption. When Vos says that revelation and redemption "are not entirely co-extensive, for revelation comes to a close at a point where redemption still continues"; and "revelation accompanies the process of objective-central redemption only"; his claims need close scrutiny.

Given that the <u>natural law</u> is characteristically three-fold, it's crucial that the perception and recordation of objective-general and objective-central redemptive acts be understood within this three-fold context. It's also crucial that "subjective-individual redemption" be understood within this context. To neglect this context is not only to fall prey to compartmentalization, but also to equivocation. --- Vos says,

Now revelation accompanies the process of objective-central redemption only, and this explains why redemption extends further than revelation. ... Subjective-individual redemption did not first begin when objective-central redemption ceased; it existed alongside it from the beginning.

There lies only one epoch in the future when we may expect objective-central redemption to be resumed, viz., at the Second Coming of Christ.¹

These claims depend entirely upon how redemption and revelation are defined. Herein, redemption is defined as anything salvific, where salvation is ultimately defined as residency in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. So far, objective-general, objective-central, and subjective-individual redemption have been identified. This theodicy concurs with Vos that subjective-individual redemptive acts are acts like "regeneration, justification, conversion, sanctification, glorification". This theodicy also concurs that "Subjective-individual redemption did not first begin when objective-central redemption ceased"; and instead, subjective-individual redemption accompanied objective-central redemption. But this theodicy disagrees with Vos'

¹ Vos, p. 6.

claim that "revelation accompanies the process of objective-central redemption only", largely because this theodicy is not restricting the definition of revelation to special revelation only. Also, the disagreement revolves around the need to understand revelation within the context of the three-fold definition of **natural law**.

This theodicy agrees that between the objective-central redemptive acts of the First Coming and the objective-central redemptive acts of the Second Coming, there is a cessation of objective-central redemptive acts. But equivocation tends to seep in when revelation is referenced without an identification of what's being revealed and the means by which it's being revealed. There seems to be an assumption that everyone knows that "revelation" means the Bible. But this is a dangerous assumption for numerous reasons, even if one is convinced that the Bible's source texts are inerrant and infallible. To sidestep discussion of translation errors, this discussion will focus exclusively on the biblical source texts. This is a dangerous assumption that "revelation" means the biblical source texts. This is a dangerous assumption because it does not adequately account for the way that revelation happens.

Revelation is self-disclosure by God, regardless of whether it's general selfdisclosure or special self-disclosure. The self-disclosure is always by way of redemptive acts.¹ If the redemptive act is in the nature of an objective-general redemptive act, then it is general self-disclosure and general revelation. If the redemptive act is in the nature of an objective-central redemptive act, then it is special self-disclosure and special revelation. If it is genuine revelation, then not only is God revealing, but there is also at least one human perceiving the revelation, or at least registering the revelation subconsciously.

Given that it's true and undeniable that objective-general and objective-central redemptive acts are God's acts of self-disclosure whenever there is at least one human recipient of such self-disclosure, then it's true that all acts of revelation exist by way of objective-general or objective-central redemptive acts. So special revelation ceases when objective-central redemption ceases. But objective-general redemptive acts continue during this period of cessation, and so do subjective-individual redemptive acts. It's foolish to think that God's self-disclosure does not accompany these latter two kinds of redemptive acts. So it's reasonable to believe that objective-general revelation of objective-individual revelation. This begs the question, what are the objective-general revelation and subjective-individual revelation?

¹ This statement is based on the belief that even sending some humans to hell is a good and redemptive act because it delivers the rest of humanity from the influence of people who belong in hell.

It's reasonable to assume that objective-general revelation is equivalent to general revelation, as general revelation has been described above, but with the addendum that objective-general revelation always arises out of objective-general redemptive acts, such as those described in Genesis 1-11:9, and those that are implicit in Paul's references to general revelation in Romans 1. But the three-fold nature of **<u>natural law</u>** demands that whenever objective-general revelation exists, any human perceiver of such objective-general revelation necessarily perceives it as objective-individual revelation. When such sense data crosses the sensory threshold and enters into the individual's consciousness, it then exists as subjective-individual When the individual receives subjective-individual revelation into revelation. consciousness, the individual might experience subjective-individual redemption. Whether the individual is regenerated by subjective-individual revelation or not is entirely dependent upon a sovereign act of God to modify the human's subjective inclinations from beyond the realm of sense data. Even so, the more subjectiveindividual revelation crosses the threshold of consciousness, the more likely God will sovereignly change the subjective inclinations in the direction of regeneration, redemption, and sanctification.

"Objective-central redemption" is redemption pertinent specifically to the racewide psychic standing wave. But because of the three-fold nature of **natural law**, which includes the correspondence conception of perception built into this **naturallaw** tripod, such race-wide redemptive acts are capable of triggering a subjectiveindividual redemptive act by God. God can and does change human subjective inclinations every day. Some such changes lead ultimately to redemption, and some do not. Cognition is an absolutely critical aspect of **natural law**. To emphasize cognition's role in redemption and revelation, it may help to recapitulate.

Objective-central redemptive acts are acts by God. To a human observer, such acts are special revelation. The human's perception of such objective-central redemptive acts, when combined with God's sovereign act of modifying the subjective inclinations of the observer, lead to subjective-individual redemption of that particular individual. In the case of all the biblical writings, God providentially followed up this combination of objective-central redemptive acts, special revelation, God's sovereign act of modifying the observer's subjective inclinations, and subjective-individual redemption of that individual, with motivation of that individual towards the act of recordation. Because of the way human cognition operates, the special revelation strikes the observer's senses (which should not be understood to be limited to what has traditionally been known as the physical dimension), and such special revelation is an objective-individual redemptive act by God, and simultaneously, God sovereignly modifies the observer's subjective inclinations in the direction of

redemption. So the objective-individual redemptive act and the subjective-individual redemptive act exist together rationally, even if they are not in fact simultaneous. This process of redemption can happen as a sovereign act of God even when the redeemed individual has no objective knowledge of the set of objective-central redemptive acts described by the Bible. Such redemption of apparent heathens may be extremely rare, but it is described in the Bible itself, and should not be overlooked. For example, Abel and Enoch were both heathens as far as special revelation is concerned. Abel and Enoch were saved before the Bible existed (Hebrews 11:13), and were seemingly outside the objective-central redemptive process described above. But they were not saved through the observation of an objective-central redemptive act by God that struck their senses as special revelation. Instead, because all true regeneration occurs through Christ alone, *i.e.*, through the objective-central redemptive acts like "the incarnation, the atonement, the resurrection of Christ", there must have been some extraordinary knowledge of these objective-central redemptive acts that was communicated somehow by God to these men. They witnessed objective-general redemptive acts that spawned objective-individual revelation, which they must have surely perceived. The moral law leg of the **<u>natural law</u>**, being written on the heart, was sovereignly cleansed from the normal suppression. They must have gained hope for the objective-central redemptive acts, and such hope must have been sufficient to enable subjective-individual redemption which only happens through Christ alone (Acts 4:12). This shows that God can sovereignly save people who have no knowledge of objective-central redemption. It may be rare. But the fact that it can exist, and is even described via objective-general revelation, should cause all who are prone to pass judgment on people outside Christendom to pause, and take great care about such judgments. The spirit of Christ is more all-pervasive than is objectively obvious. It is an aspect of the **<u>natural law</u>** that is generally suppressed.¹ --- The salvation of people in the Christian era is similar to the salvation in the pre-biblical era, in that there is no objective-central redemptive act by God to be observed. Instead, the individual has the objective record of special revelation that's left in the Bible (which pre-biblical people did not have), and the objective-individual redemptive act by God that comes to them through general revelation.

¹ The central point is that God is sovereign, and it's extremely unhealthy to assume that God is not sovereign over something when he is in fact sovereign over it. God can save whomever he wants, and in their fallen condition, people are not privy to whom he saves and whom he doesn't. If people who have no explicit consciousness of objective-central redemption can be saved through "forward-looking faith", the same principle applies to all people-groups who have no awareness of objective-central redemption. Such "forwardlooking faith" may be rare among such people, but rarity is not the same as non-existence.

By adhering to this understanding of the process, it becomes clear that both objective-individual redemptive acts and subjective-individual redemptive acts continue, even though objective-central redemptive acts have ceased until the Second Coming, just as Vos says. So objective-central acts and special revelation of objective-central acts have both ceased. However, objective-individual redemptive acts continue, and so does the revelation of such objective-individual acts. Such objective-individual acts by God accompany subjective-individual acts by God. The fact that objective-central acts and the special revelation of those acts have ceased is why the canon is necessarily closed. All use and involvement of the Bible in the salvation, sanctification, *etc.*, of any individual is essentially the collaboration of the objective text, the objective-individual act by God, and God's general revelation, so that this three-fold influence causes the subjective-individual redemptive act. As indicated, this in no way subverts the *solus Christus* indicated by Peter in Acts 4:12.

In passing, with all of the above established, it's important to make a few comments about terminology and the upgrading of definitions of such terminology to keep pace with advances in technology. Historically, some theologians have referred to general revelation as being equivalent to "natural revelation". Likewise, the same people have referred to special revelation as being equivalent to "supernatural revelation". The use of the word, "natural", begs scrutiny because there is a gulf between the way the word is used by Apostle Paul (1 Corinthians 2:14, 15, 42-46) and the use of the word in expressions like "natural law". --- Because all humans are vulnerable to sin, sickness, and death, people in the out-of-the-garden niche consider these disabilities part of human nature. But these disabilities are not natural according to the conditions of either the garden niche or the New-Jerusalem niche. The line between the natural and the supernatural is essentially cultural, meaning that it varies from culture to culture, and from ecological niche to ecological niche. What's natural to the people in the garden is different from what's natural when Paul uses that word. In contrast to the way that Paul and most people use the word "natural", "natural" in the more rudimentary sense refers to a state of things in which there is no sin, sickness, or death. Because of these disabilities, "natural" in the normal, Pauline sense refers to a state in which general revelation and objective-general redemption appear to be in conflict with special revelation and objective-central redemption. But "natural" in this more rudimentary sense doesn't recognize these disabilities as "natural". So from the perspective of the garden niche, the New-Jerusalem niche, and the **<u>natural law</u>**, general revelation and objective-general redemption never conflict with special revelation and objective-central redemption in any way. The two kinds of redemption / revelation remain distinct, but they are never in conflict because they were both created by the same rational God. This rudimentary use of the word "natural" conforms, or at least attempts to conform, to these facts. In

contrast, the use of the word "natural" by Paul does not conform to these facts, but rather operates within the confines of these human disabilities.

At no time do the processes of objective-individual revelation and subjectiveindividual redemption exist outside the three-fold character of the natural law, except with one extremely limited exception. All revelation and redemption operate with due deference to the correspondence concept of perception. Because this claim is vulnerable to misunderstanding, it's important to explain it relative to variations in the definition of "natural". Historically, what people have meant by "natural" is whatever fits into their conception of everyday life. Words like "physical", "mental", "spiritual", "soul", etc., have been defined relative to the cultural assumptions about what is natural, and what is supernatural. People have generally defined any perception that has arrived in the human consciousness by way of the organs of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing, as being a natural perception. Any perception that arrives in the consciousness by any other means has been called "supernatural".¹ Now that so-called "natural science" has established that things can arrive in the consciousness by means other than through the five "physical" senses, there is a demand for redefinition of "natural" and of all the words that are dependent thereon.²

As long as God is God, and humans are no more than miniature sovereigns, God will have sovereign power to modify the inclinations of human beings by whatever means he chooses, either through normal human processes of cognition, or not, as he sees fit. God can use human sensory organs as secondary causes in his communications to humans, or not, as he sovereignly chooses. However, God has created humans to take dominion over their own minds, which necessarily includes dominion over all sense organs, regardless of whether those organs have been defined historically as being physical, mental, or spiritual. Therefore, with the exception of input coming directly and immediately from God, all input comes into the individual human's perceptual domain through such organs, and in conformity with the three-fold concept of the **natural law**. If humans suppress such input, that may be normal and common, but it's not natural.

The general revelation that is largely the focus of this theodicy merely fills out the details of special revelation. This filling out is true both of science and of jurisprudence. The organism (the "body of Christ") created by redemption and special revelation is embedded in general revelation. Therefore, there is a feedback

¹ Things like dreams have generally been treated as being in some kind of gray area between natural and supernatural.

² See **PART I**, CHAPTER B, Sub-Chapter 2, "Evidence that the Mind Is Vulnerable to Brain Manipulation".

loop between general revelation and the organic structures created by way of special revelation. This feedback loop is extremely obvious in the realm of human law. Because the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the common law are all extremely indebted to biblical scholarship expounded within the visible church, and to this millennia-long heritage, American jurisprudence is hugely indebted to this feedback loop. It's only by way of this feedback loop that the *metaconstitution* described above could ever come into existence. The proper parsing of the Genesis 9:6 duties, and the proper filling out thereof, are functions of both general revelation and special revelation, and not exclusively one or the other. More precisely, the popular application of special revelation has led to the establishment of legal principles, which are manifestations of general revelation. The human race has discovered crucial legal principles by way of their prior existence in general revelation. Such legal principles are a form of objective-general redemption expressed in the Bible. They are functions of the biblical covenants, and probably would not exist meaningfully in any jurisprudence without the Bible's influence. --- Something very similar to this feedback loop in jurisprudence also exists as a feedback loop in science, the feedback loop being between the societal organism created by way of special revelation and subjective-individual redemption on one hand, and the search for knowledge, the excavation of suppressed and unconscious natural law, on the other.

c. <u>Road to Redemption:</u>

In the introductory paragraphs of this *motive-clause* section of this theodicy, there are several questions:

- If it's certain that the above jurisprudential claims are true, then why didn't God makes these truths obvious in the Bible?
- Why should anyone believe that reliable theology can come out of a single verse in the Old Testament?
- Why should anyone give such a narrowly focused jurisprudence any credence?

It was claimed that the answers to these questions depend upon three things, the natures of (i)miniature sovereignty, (ii)revelation, and (iii)the road to redemption. Now that the natures of miniature sovereignty and revelation have been examined, it's possible to give preliminary answers to these questions. Confirmation of these answers will appear throughout the examination of the road to redemption that appears throughout the remainder of this *motive-clause* section.

As indicated, there's a feedback loop between knowledge gained from special revelation and knowledge gained through general revelation. There should be no

disagreement between special and general revelation because the same rational God made each. But in humanity's fallen condition, it's sometimes difficult to see the agreement. On the road to redemption, it must be true that the agreement will eventually pile so high for anyone inclined to see it that the disagreement will fade into oblivion. God didn't make these jurisprudential truths obvious in the Bible for the same reason he didn't make all truth obvious in the Bible. God made "central" truth obvious in the Bible. But it's a necessary part of growing into miniature sovereignty for the miniature sovereigns to extend central truth into the extremities, which requires that miniature sovereigns discover many things seemingly on their own.

If general revelation combines with the rest of Scripture to confirm a single verse, then it would be silly for anyone NOT to believe the truth displayed by such agreement. The same is true for the narrowly focused jurisprudence expounded above. Further confirmation of this agreement is on display as this description of the road to redemption unfolds below. So the question needs to be reversed: Why would anyone not believe that the theology that hinges on Genesis 9:6, as indicated above, is reliable? After the examination of Scripture that appears below, the answer is necessarily that there isn't any good reason. People need to give this narrowly focused jurisprudence credence because it's true.

Even though Genesis 1-11:9 is revelation of objective-general redemption, there is an element of objective-central redemption in it. Objective-central redemption started with the "covenant of redemption".¹ An element of objective-central redemption appears in Genesis 3:15 in the form of a prophecy and promise made by God to the serpent. In marking the "curse" on the "serpent", "the LORD God said to the serpent",

I will put enmity Between you and the woman, And between your seed and her seed; He shall bruise you on the head, And you shall bruise him on the heel.

As indicated by Vos, both appearances of "seed" in this verse have "collective" meanings: "As to the word 'seed' there is no reason to depart from the collective sense in either case."² So the seed of the woman should be understood to be a multitude of the woman's human offspring. Likewise, the seed of the serpent can be understood to be the serpent's demonic followers, which can conceivably include demonically possessed humans.³ The collective nature of "seed" in both instances

¹ Grudem, pp. 518-519.

² Vos, p. 43.

³ Which, given this interpretation, would include an offscoured portion of the woman's offspring.

contrasts with the singular pronoun used subsequently to reference the woman's seed. This pronoun usually appears in English translations as "He" or "it", meaning he or it will *shuf* the serpent's head.¹ According to Vos, "The promise is, that somehow out of the human race a fatal blow will come which shall crush the head of the serpent. Still, indirectly ... in striking the fatal blow the seed of the woman will be concentrated in one person, for ... it is not the seed of the serpent but the serpent itself whose head will be bruised. ... [W]e are not warranted ... in seeking an exclusively personal reference to the Messiah here, as though he alone were meant by 'the woman's seed'."²

Given the profound nature of objective-central revelation, it is probably "warranted" to find primarily a "personal reference to the Messiah" in the singular pronoun, "He" or "it", even if not in the "collective" "seed". But given that "the woman's seed" is clearly a multitude, it's clear that the serpent and his "seed" have a multitude of enemies in "the woman's seed". Given this multitude, it's reasonable that the woman's seed, in this collective sense, would do some serious damage to the serpent's "seed" and domain. This is especially pertinent to the redemption of human law because the American church is now largely paralyzed by the doctrine that Christians must wait for Christ to fix their rogue governments. In fact, the head of the serpent has already been crushed through objective-central redemption, especially the crucifixion, atonement, resurrection, and ascension. It's the responsibility of Christ's people to enforce that crushing wherever they go, and in everything they do. Even though the head is crushed, the little demons continue wiggling everywhere. A primary front upon which to enforce this crushing is in the field of human law. So, essentially, the American church's paralysis is based almost entirely upon its bad theology. As long as the Messiah chooses to tarry, his followers have a duty as his followers to enforce the victory won in objective-central redemption, and to do so in every possible field of endeavor, and to do so according to the jurisdictional guidelines established by his covenants.

According to the legal analysis that appears above, Genesis 3:15 is a term of the <u>Adamic Covenant</u>. In this verse, God may be speaking to the serpent, but for the reasons just given, there are real implications for "the woman's seed", possibly including Adam and Eve, but most certainly including a substantial portion of their offspring. --- To make sure that the relationship between <u>natural law</u> and the biblical prescription of <u>human law</u> is maintained throughout the analysis of the redemption of <u>human law</u> that follows, it should help to look more broadly at Vos' view of the first three chapters of Genesis. Vos claims that, "Four great principles are

¹ Shuf, Hebrew, Strong's #7779, usually translated "bruise".

² Vos, pp. 43-44.

contained in this primeval revelation, each of them expressed by its own appropriate symbol. These were:"

[1] the principle of life in its highest potency sacramentally symbolized by the tree of life;

[2] the principle of probation symbolized in the same manner by the tree of knowledge of good and evil;

[3] the principle of temptation and sin symbolized in the serpent;

 $\left[4\right]$ the principle of death reflected in the dissolution of the body.^1

Although there is certainly truth in Vos' characterization of these symbols as "principles", it tends to be misleading to leave these things outside the context established in this theodicy, more specifically, outside the context established by the pervasive nature of standing waves and by the rudimentary nature of **jurisdictions**. There are subtle errors that arise out of the neglect of this context, and these subtle errors have profound implications for the overall understanding of God and the Bible.

Regarding "the principle of life in its highest potency ... symbolized by the tree of life", Vos says,

It appears from Genesis 3:22, that man before his fall had not eaten of it ... The tree was associated with the higher, the unchangeable, the eternal life to be secured by obedience throughout his probation.²

There is no sure evidence in the Bible to indicate that the people never ate from the tree of life prior to their fall. The claim that they did not thus eat is therefore based on speculation that arises by characterizing the tree of life as "the principle of life". Because the people had ready access to this tree as long as they resided in the garden, it's an act of subtle eisegesis to draw the conclusion that they never ate of it from the claim that this tree symbolizes "the principle of life". --- Rather than regard the tree of life as "the principle of life in its highest potency", it's more accurate to characterize the tree of life as the symbol of organismic standing wave health, meaning the state of the organismic standing wave when it is completely free from damping and incohesiveness. The verbiage certainly supports the belief that "the man" did not eat of the tree of life between the time of eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil and the eviction notice in Genesis 3:22-24. Even so, the possibility exists that the people ate of the "tree of life" before eating of the

¹ Vos, p. 27.

² Vos, p. 28.

tree of knowledge of good and evil. The belief that the tree of life symbolizes "the principle of life in its highest potency" exalts the tree-of-life symbol into a concept of eternal life that transcends probation. If it transcends probation, then why was it in the garden of probation in the first place? True graduation from probation into perpetual life in paradise is attained through the tree-of-knowledge portal, and the objective-central redemption that is activated through that portal. "What Satan meant for evil, God meant for good."

As has been shown above, the tree of knowledge of good and evil certainly symbolizes the principle of probation. But it also symbolizes more than merely probation. It also symbolizes the portal through which objective-central redemption was introduced to the human race, through which the road to the New-Jerusalem niche was opened, and through which humans assumed -- albeit with fear, loathing, resentment, bitterness, and infantilism -- full responsibility for their choices.

As amply indicated above, it's certainly reasonable to believe that the serpent symbolizes sin and temptation. However, because sin is the act of missing the **natural-law** mark, and because temptation is the motivational inclination to miss the **natural-law** mark, the serpent symbolizes more than merely the principle of temptation and sin. Because mis-perception is a crucial ingredient in the process of giving into temptation, temptation involves the whole process of cognition. It therefore involves all three legs of the **natural-law** tripod. It's therefore important to include all three legs in the conception of temptation and sin if one is to have a holistic view of this principle.

Vos' equation of death with the "dissolution of the body", with the concurrent belief that death does not include the dissolution of the soul, is an important proposition. There are certainly biblical passages that appear to support his view. This theodicy will address this proposition specifically in the annihilation section below, and will withhold further discussion of it until then.

The biblical narrative is not only rationally divisible into God-ordained covenants, as indicated above. It is also divisible into milestones in human choices. The biblical covenants are certainly the most prominent milestones in the history of redemption. This is because they mark agreements between God and humanity, and between humans. But there are other milestones that are tangential to the biblical covenants, where such choices are so profound that they demand examination. These extracovenantal milestones are like doorways or portals into destruction. They mark things that were done by humans in biblical history, where those things can now be seen, in retrospect, as things that humans should generally endeavor to avoid. So these other milestones and portals can be characterized as things that were done that should generally be systematically avoided. They are things that lead to mass standing-wave disintegration. However, to operate in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche without disintegration, humans must learn how and why to avoid these portals to destruction. This is the nature of this secondary class of biblical milestones. --- Where the covenants are marked by agreement between God and humans, the milestones are marked by disagreement, *i.e.*, by human violation of **natural law**, traditionally referred to as "disobedience".

Because the redemption of **human law** is so profoundly intertwined with these portals, this motive-clause section of this theodicy must address these portal-todestruction milestones by focusing on those milestones that are most prominent. There is a pattern that marks these portal milestones. --- In the history of redemption, there are times when God allowed the existence of doors that lead to destruction. God always warned people not to go through the doors. He also made provision for humanity's violation of his warning. Essentially he said, "I warn you not to go through that door. That door leads to destruction. But here, here are the keys if you insist on opening that door and going through it." For the sake of understanding the nature of the door, and thereby understanding why it's crucial to keep the door closed, people have at times needed to open it, just enough to figure it out. Each portal represents a query about **jurisdictional** boundaries, and the opening of each portal marks the beginning of a protracted struggle to discover those boundaries. (i) The first portal was the "tree of knowledge of good and evil", which has already been examined. (ii) The second portal was the anarchy portal, which was opened by the grossest violation of **natural rights** shortly after the fall. (iii)The third portal was group-think, which was the portal opened at the Tower of Babel, and which is a syndrome that has characterized all human governments ever since. (iv)The fourth portal was slavery and statism. (v)The fifth portal was genocide, which explores the boundaries of annihilation by one group of another group. (vi)The sixth portal was monarchy, the exaltation of a single human being to create and enforce fiat law. (vii)The seventh portal was the two-house portal, which was opened at the end of Solomon's reign. (viii) The eighth portal was the rejection of objective-central redemption manifest in the perfect King, by one of the two houses. (ix)The ninth portal was the conflation of statism with the monarchy of the perfect King, by the other of the two houses. --- These nine portals to destruction have all been opened, and God has made provision for their closure. As the human race in general learns the lessons of these portals, the human race in general can start reversing this recursion into hell. These doors should be thought of as being like Russian dolls. The compartment exposed by opening a door contains another door. That door contains another door, ad infinitum, unless holistic wisdom prevails.

Sub-Chapter 2: Anarchy Portal

The **Edenic Covenant** clearly states that humans are created in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27). They were clearly created to be miniature sovereigns. As such, all people have **<u>natural rights</u>**, so all people have been created with an innate obligation to avoid violating the **<u>natural rights</u>** of other people. So all people are also created with **<u>natural obligations</u>** to recognize the **<u>natural rights</u>** of other people. These rights and duties are inherent in the *imago Dei*.

Shortly after the people opened the tree-of-knowledge portal, and the basic attributes of the out-of-the-garden niche were established through the <u>Adamic</u> <u>Covenant</u>, the people confronted another portal. When they were created, by the very act of being created with the *imago Dei*, they were implicitly warned not to violate <u>natural rights</u>. Apparently Cain felt an urge to explore the boundaries of this warning. To gratify the urge, he murdered his brother with anger and psychopathic curiosity, asking, "Am I my brother's keeper?" (Genesis 4:9). This is clearly a portal dedicated to exploring the boundaries of the duties everyone owes to everyone else, and to exploring the extent to which humans are the keepers of other humans.

There were no jural societies before this murder. At this time, God enforced against violations of **natural law** without human mediation. One might think that if God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, then God could have easily prevented this murder. That's true, but it doesn't sufficiently account for the possibility that God has an ulterior motive in allowing the murder. If God's goal is a population of miniature sovereigns who all abide by **natural law**, and it's in the nature of miniature sovereignty for each such miniature sovereign to take dominion over his/her mind and body, then that goal would justify not only the allowance of that murder, but the allowance of many murders. This is certainly not because God likes murder. It's because he likes fully formed miniature sovereigns, and he's willing to forbear human perversion in order to get those miniature sovereigns. One factor that complicates this process of cultivating mini-sovereigns is that their maturation requires that they collectively develop the social structures necessary to support the entire population of fully formed miniature sovereigns. This societal factor is precisely why maturation into miniature sovereignty is a protracted process. Formation of social structures requires cooperation, which inevitably requires contract / compact formation, which can be extremely difficult, especially when people don't know why murder is a bad idea.

Rather than intervene to fix this population run amuck, as he certainly could, being omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, God set the whole population on the road to an unforgettable object lesson, one of the primary lessons of this portal. Genesis 4 narrates the events surrounding not only Cain's murder of Abel, but also a murder committed by Lamech. As indicated above, these murders by themselves are not as remarkable as the penalties imposed by God. The penalty for Cain was that God would put up a major obstacle to any human executing justice against Cain. Whoever killed Cain would suffer vengeance seven times worse. Genesis 4 clearly indicates that Lamech also believed that he'd get away with murder.

(1)Cain kills Abel. (2)God responds to this murder by telling Cain, among other things, "you shall be a vagrant and a wanderer on the earth". (3)Cain responds by complaining to God that, among other things, "it will come about that whoever finds me will kill me". (4)God responds by saying to Cain that "whoever kills Cain, vengeance will be taken on him sevenfold". (5)Then "the LORD appointed a sign for Cain, lest anyone finding him should slay him". --- If someone wanted to bring Cain to justice as a murderer, God would have taken "vengeance" on this interloper "sevenfold". In other words, anyone who laid a hand on Cain, in the name of bringing the latter to justice, would have received a punishment from God that would have been seven times worse. This is radically different from the treatment that murderers deserve under the Noachian Covenant. Some people might think that Cain was receiving some kind of special treatment from God, and that this special treatment was not characteristic of a whole era in Biblical history. Anyone who believes this, that is, anyone who is not convinced that this was an ordinance against anyone bringing any murderer to justice, should consider these things: (1) There is nothing in the Bible that says that Cain was so special that he deserved to have his murder treated differently from other murders. On the contrary, the Bible indicates clearly that "God is no respecter of persons" (Acts 10:34; KJV), that God "shows no partiality" (Acts 10:34, Deuteronomy 10:17; NKJV). If God does not allow Cain the murderer to be punished by other human beings, why should he allow any murderer to be punished by other human beings? It makes much more sense that God's sentence on Cain -- that he would be a vagabond, and would be protected from anyone who tried to avenge his murder of Abel -- was the standard sentence that God gave to murderers during this epoch. In short, Cain wasn't special. During this period God sentenced every murderer to being an unpunished vagabond. (2) Lamech told his wives that he had also killed someone. Then he told his wives that, "If Cain is avenged sevenfold, Then Lamech seventy-sevenfold". In other words, if God would protect Cain by punishing anyone who tried to bring Abel's murderer to justice, Lamech believed he deserved even more thorough protection. If Lamech believed this about his murder(s), is it likely that there were other people who had

similar exalted views of their *delicts*? Given the commonplace nature of *delicts*, it's likely that there were other *delicts*. It's also likely that if a ban on human punishment of murder was the norm, then a ban on human punishment of other *delicts* was also the norm. That means that this antediluvian society was an anarchy.

This may be difficult for some people to swallow. Why would the God who clearly mandated against murder in the Ten Commandments also clearly mandate for the protection of murderers during this period immediately after the fall of mankind? How could he be so seemingly fickle? The doctrine of immutability says emphatically that God is not fickle.¹ Even so, as the sovereign of the universe, God puts human beings -- as individuals, as groups, and as a race -- through difficulties for the sake of teaching them. More precisely, with God as prime mover and miniature sovereigns in training as secondary causes and sole claimants to moral agency regarding the issue, humans put themselves through these trials. --- But why does God put humans not only through difficulties, but also through something as weird as anarchy? --- Because in their fallen condition, humans suppress the truth, and they are therefore so dense that they have difficulty learning any other way. But this begs the question: What are humans supposed to learn from anarchy? --- That it doesn't work, among other things.

If God protected murderers by promising to punish people who punished the murderers, what would happen to thieves, liars, and rapists? If God didn't want people to punish murderers, is it likely that he wanted people to punish these lesser sins? --- No! It's likely that no one received any kind of official punishment from anyone for anything during this era. That's practically a definition of anarchy. The result was that "the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and ... every intent of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Genesis 6:5), and "the earth was corrupt ... and the earth was filled with violence" (6:11). God flooded the earth to drown all the undesirables, and this was the end of the *anarchy epoch*.

These facts along with other evidence scattered throughout the rest of the Bible work together to show that during this antediluvian era, prosecution of *delicts* was banned, and anarchy was thereby encouraged. After the flood, this antediluvian breed of antinomianism was banned by way of Genesis 9:6. This is the first prescription of **human law** in the Bible. Because the **Noachian Covenant** is a perpetual covenant, and because it is therefore still in effect, and because it contains this term, this prescription of **human law** that's applicable to all humans, it's reasonable to call the epoch that follows the flood the "*law-enforcement epoch*", to distinguish it from the *anarchy epoch* that preceded the flood. Obviously, the human race is

¹ On the contrary, God is immutable. See Grudem, pp. 163-168.

still in the *law-enforcement epoch*. --- This portal that was opened by Cain, the anarchy portal, was opened for the purpose of discovering the boundaries of the duties that everyone owes to everyone else, and for the purpose of exploring the extent to which humans are the keepers of other humans. The most fundamental answer to this question was answered by the object lesson: Anarchy doesn't work, because it leads to the destruction of the human race and the end of the pursuit of miniature sovereignty. So the extent of these duties is much greater than no duties whatever. Even so, the fact that the human race is still in the *law-enforcement epoch* shows that the human race is still exploring the parameters of the tree-of-knowledge portal, humanity is still exploring the parameters of the anarchy portal for the sake of discovering the proper jurisdictions of human law.

This mandate to execute justice against bloodshed is what officially marks the end of the *anarchy era* and the beginning of the *law-enforcement epoch*. This is the defining attribute of the entire *law-enforcement epoch*, that Genesis 9:6 damage is proscribed.

As indicated above, the reason for this bizarre treatment of murder, and the entire *anarchy era*, relates specifically to the difference between **<u>natural law</u>** and <u>**human**</u> law. Under unmediated natural law, God has a one-to-one relationship with each human. In human law, one or more human enforcers mediate the natural law. Another way of understanding the object lesson of the anarchy portal is to see that God prefers unmediated **<u>natural law</u>** over <u>**natural law**</u> that is mediated by humans. This is because the one-to-one relationship between God and his creatures is the rule throughout all of creation. In contrast, **<u>natural law</u>** that is mediated by fallen creatures is inherently prone to being **<u>natural-law</u>** enforcement in which humans pretend to be God over other humans. It's a kind of idolatry in which humans set themselves up to be worshipped. So God generally prefers anarchy to human government. But humans are so depraved that anarchy is not viable. The fact that he later mandated **human law** shows that God knows that pure anarchy will not work in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche between Eden and the New Jerusalem. Humans are incapable of meeting this ideal in their fallen condition. Even so, they can come much closer to it than they've come thus far in human history, and the colossal abuses of statism make it obvious that humanity MUST move closer to the unmediated natural law.

The fact that God established a major impediment to any human executing human justice against murder shows God's disdain for **human law**, as compared to the regime of unmediated **natural law**. If this is true in regards to murder, there's no reason to think it's not also true of other *delicts*. So the penalties leveled against

murderers in the antediluvian era stand as an object lesson given by God to the entire human race. The object lesson is essentially that humans are too depraved for anarchy, and they're too depraved to be trusted to act as sovereigns over any other humans.¹ The default position is that God doesn't trust humans to execute justice against other humans. So why should humans trust other humans in this? The answer is that they shouldn't. Neither God nor any human should trust any fallen human to execute justice against any other human, but this refusal to trust human government is not boundless. The fall is too radical, and humanity is too corrupt, for humans to be naive about their governments. This is one of the basic lessons of this antediluvian, out-of-the-garden era. It's one of the primary lessons of this anarchy portal, although it's certainly not the only lesson.²

God so loathes *color of law* **human law** that violates **natural rights** and **natural law** that he marked his prescription of **global human law** with a massive disclaimer.³ The *anarchy epoch* is, in effect, the disclaimer. In the disclaimer, God tells all humans that they are not qualified to enforce the **natural law**. Despite the disclaimer / object lesson, God acquiesced to the need to protect **natural rights** based on the following line of reasoning: How can humanity ever develop the humanity-wide psychic standing wave without setting real boundaries for human behavior? If the boundaries are not enforced, then the boundaries don't exist. If boundaries don't exist, then there is no hope of developing the humanity-wide psychic standing wave, and no hope for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. The enforcement of these boundaries by humans, is a crucial aspect of humanity's maturation into a race of miniature sovereigns. Such societal enforcement of boundaries is to the humanitywide psychic standing wave what the individual's dominion over his/her own mind is to the individual standing wave.

¹ It could be argued that this couldn't be true, because God certainly allows parents to be sovereigns over their children. This theodicy holds that the Bible describes parents more in the role of *bailees* of their children's rights than as sovereigns over their children. See **A Memorandum of Law & Fact Regarding Natural Personhood**.

² This call to distrust humans in regards to **human law** needs to be mitigated by the fact that all humans should trust God completely. This means that all humans need to recognize that God has chosen to use humans as secondary causes in the enforcement of the specific subset of **natural law** called **natural rights**. It's crucial to avoid the tendency for skepticism about human capacity to execute justice to turn into skepticism about God's will. After doing all one can to make the implementation of **human law** good and *de jure*, there comes a time to accept the limits of **human law** and thereby allow the **natural law** to take precedent.

³ To see this disclaimer, see Chapter F, "Subject Matter of the Positive-Duty Clause (Nature of the Penalties)", above.

Although it's true that the Bible progressively reveals the **natural law**, the Bible's prescription of **human law** doesn't follow exactly the same pattern. The prescription of **human law** is always directly connected to some principle of the **natural law**, but the prescription of human law is crude and imperfect, while the natural law remains eternally perfect. The juxtaposition of the lex NIX talionis of Genesis 4 and the Genesis 9:6 mandate sends a message that should be clear to anyone: The Bible's prescription of **human law** is crude and imperfect because humanity is crude and imperfect. The degree of crudeness is inversely proportional to the degree of the target audience's understanding of the **<u>natural law</u>**. In other words, the degree of sophistication of the prescription of human law is directly proportional to the target audience's understanding of the **<u>natural law</u>**. The greater the crudeness of the Bible's prescription of **human law**, the less understanding of **natural law** the target audience has. So even though the **<u>natural law</u>** never changes, and even though it is progressively revealed by the Bible, the prescription of human law is not progressive, but is rather a function of the sophistication of the audience. The sophistication of the fallen antediluvian people was low. The sophistication of the survivors of the flood was only slightly better. That's why the mandate in Genesis 9:6 is so terse, and why it must wait for millennia, and for the expansion of human knowledge, to be fleshed out.

The primary lesson of this second portal is that when primary and secondary property are not safeguarded with punishment to anyone who would violate it, the society exercising such neglect self-destructs, or is destroyed by an "act of God", or both. When the core **natural right** to one's life is disregarded by an entire society, and people are allowed to get away with murder, there is no justice for the victim or for anyone else, except by way of the **natural law**. When there is no respect for primary property, there is no reason to respect secondary property. At some point, the corruption is so monumental that there is no societal hope for escape from the vortex sucking the entire society into oblivion. This pattern is repeated over and over again in human history. When God saw that every intent of the thoughts of man's heart was only evil continually, he terminated the whole epoch. God is absolutely justified in having low regard for human government, and every human who loves God needs to view human law with similar skepticism. Although **human law** is a necessary aspect of the road towards the New-Jerusalem niche, humans are so prone to abusing human law that only constant vigilance can keep it from going bad. This is the most basic lesson of this *anarchy era*. The anarchy era was officially terminated by the Noachian Covenant, more specifically, by the bloodshed mandate (Genesis 9:6). The **Noachian Covenant** was thereby the inauguration of the *law-enforcement epoch*, an epoch that humanity still inhabits. The *law-enforcement epoch* is built on a disclaimer stating that <u>human law</u> is necessary, but one should always be vigilant about its implementation.

Similar to the way that the opening of the tree-of-knowledge portal was followed by the fall, where the fall was a major change in humanity's ecological niche, which required appendments to the existing covenant, likewise, the opening of the anarchy portal resulted in the *anarchy era*, and the *anarchy era* was terminated by the flood and the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>. The <u>Noachian Covenant</u> is the inauguration of the *law-enforcement epoch*, which lasts practically until the move into the New-Jerusalem niche.

Sub-Chapter 3: Group-Think Portal

After the promulgation of the **Noachian Covenant**, the next major portal is identified with the Tower of Babel. These events are described in Genesis 11:1-9. Like much else in the Bible's revelation of objective-general redemption, Bible readers often treat this as a quaint myth or fable that has little or no bearing on reality in the 21st century. This is the case because Bible readers generally follow a traditional interpretation of these verses that characterizes the protagonists' motives as being a bit frivolous. This theodicy holds that their motives were more heinous than frivolous. This theodicy also holds that these verses describe far more than a quaint fable. At the very least, these verses define another object lesson, and in effect, there is an extremely serious question that these Babel builders were trying to answer by opening this portal. The portal marks a syndrome that is practically always the cause of the demise of human governments. The syndrome is what this theodicy calls "group-think". The portal is what this theodicy calls the "group-think portal".

After the flood and the promulgation of the **Noachian Covenant**, Noah's descendants, and perhaps Noah himself, "journeyed east", and "they found a plain in the land of Shinar and settle there". Then they said to one another, "let us make bricks and burn them thoroughly". Why would they do that? Because, according to the next verse, they also wanted to "build for [themselves] a city". They would need bricks to build a city. But why would they want to build a city? And why would they want to "build ... a tower whose top will reach into heaven"? The motives behind making bricks, building a city, and building a tower are indicated by something else they said to one another. They said, "let us make for ourselves a name". Before trying to figure out why they would want to "make a name".

This is where traditional interpretations fail to grasp the gravity of the circumstances, and these interpretations thereby turn these verses into little more than an amusing fable.

In the typical understanding of what it means to make a name for oneself, the expression is synonymous with gaining a reputation or fame. So *shem* (Strong's #8034, translated "name") "can be a synonym for 'reputation' or 'fame'."¹ On the other hand, sometimes "an individual's 'name' reveals his essence". For example, "the names by which God revealed himself ... do reflect something of his person and work".²

In the ancient world, knowledge of a person's name was believed to give one power over that person. A knowledge of the character and attributes of pagan "gods" was thought to enable the worshipers to manipulate or influence the deities in a more effective way than they could have if the deity's name remained unknown.³

With these things said, it's clear that in "the ancient world", a name could carry far more significance than merely reputation and fame. This greater significance certainly doesn't eliminate the motive to acquire reputation and fame, but rather encompasses and undergirds it. So the claim that they wanted to "make ... a name" for the sake of reputation and fame may be true, but it doesn't get to the bottom of what's going on in this passage. The claim that "an individual's 'name' reveals his essence" may appear to be a superstition that is negligible in the light of supposedly sophisticated, high-tech, 21st-century knowledge. But there are other sources that make similar claims about names, and these other sources act as a warning against dismissing this understanding of names as mere superstition. Both wave physics and other passages in the Bible demand a much more discerning approach to this issue than the mere reputation-and-fame explanation allows.

According to Genesis 1, God spoke the universe into existence. According to John 1, the Word existed before the universe, and the universe came into existence by way of the Word. These biblical facts relate directly to wave physics by way of the fact that speaking and words exist in essentially two different but related states.

¹ Vine's, "Old Testament Section", p. 158.

² **Vine's**, O.T. section, p. 158. --- The concern about the use of a name that reveals the essence of a person reaches its zenith in the concern about uttering the Tetragrammaton. For a short history of the use of this "four letter name" of God, as well as the twelve-letter name, see Cohen, Jeffrey M.; **Blessed Are You: A Comprehensive Guide to Jewish Prayer**, 1993, Jason Aronson, Inc., Northvale, New Jersey; pp. 7-8.

³ Vine's, O.T. section, p. 96.

The spoken word is sound, and sound is transmitted by way of waves of vibrating air. Words that are thought may have an electromagnetic and chemical counterpart in the brain, but it's likely, given the research cited above, that thought waves, including thought words, have a radiative quality, which means that they can exist as waves of electromagnetic radiation. Wave physics thereby agrees with the Bible that it's at least possible that the universe came into existence via the transmission of thought waves, and the transformation of such waves into what is recognizable to ordinary humans as physical stuff.

Given these facts, a name could be an extremely important aspect of someone's existence. If the name resonates with the named person's or thing's standing-wave frequency, then whoever knows the name could potentially have power to manipulate the named person or thing through the creation of some kind of resonance effect. The research cited above should make it clear that this is not mere mumbo jumbo and superstition. It may be difficult to create a given resonance effect, but it's not impossible.

Assuming that all these things are true, the question remains: How does wave physics relate to the people's attempt at making a name for themselves? --- Above, this theodicy has proposed that the New-Jerusalem ecological niche is characterized by a perpetual psychic standing wave formed by way of agreement of all fully formed, mature miniature sovereigns. This psychic standing wave necessarily has a specific waveform, and this waveform would resonate only with certain specific resonance frequencies. It's reasonable to understand such a resonance frequency to be equivalent to a "name" for this New-Jerusalem ecological niche. This relates to the Tower of Babel episode like this: The people on the plain of Shinar were in effect trying to form a fully coherent psychic standing wave. But they were trying to do this without including a very important component. The component that they neglected to properly include in their "tower" was God. They were attempting to form the New-Jerusalem ecological niche without properly including God. They were attempting to form this fully coherent psychic standing wave based in idolatry. The idol was their own self-aggrandizement.

The reason this Tower of Babel episode is far more important and significant than a quaint fable about reputation and fame, is because seeing the depth of this object lesson divulges a syndrome that marks almost all human group activities. Humans are prone to prefer following one another over following the <u>natural law</u>. Humans are prone to being agreeable with one another, even at the expense of the truth, rather than to demand the truth even if it means being disagreeable. A genuine and holistic preference for truth will always see God at the center and apex of such truth. A genuine and holistic preference for truth will always prefer obedience to <u>natural</u> **law** over agreement with other people, and God will always be recognized as the giver of such **natural law**, and the enabler of agreement based on such **natural law**. Putting agreement and people first, and truth and God second (or third, or nth), is what this theodicy is calling "group think". It is a syndrome that marks practically all human activity in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, in one way or another. It is a disease that is the root cause of the destruction of all human societies. It is therefore at the core of the demise of all human governments. At some point, people decide that it's more important to go along with the crowd than it is to follow God. Cooperating, even with fraud and *delicts*, becomes more important to people in general than truth and righteousness.

Group think is what was uniting the people in what they did to make a name. If it had been God and the **natural law** that was uniting them, then there would have been no reason for God to confuse their language. But they were motivated by something other than devotion to God, truth, grace, and **natural law**. They were motivated to make a name for themselves under this wave-physics description of what that means, and they needed to make this name to avoid being "scattered abroad over the face of the whole earth". They apparently presumed that if they had been able to form a genuinely coherent psychic standing wave through their agreement, then they would have stayed together, and they would not have been scattered. This is the impetus towards social cohesion based on group think as opposed to social cohesion based on devotion to God and truth.

Given that God is God, and these people were the pathetic creatures that they were, God's response to their antics looks like measured sarcasm, the same kind of sarcasm that appears in Genesis 3:22. In Genesis 11:6-7, God said,

"Behold, they are one people, and they all have the same language. And this is what they began to do, and now nothing which they purpose to do will be impossible for them. Come, let Us go down and there confuse their language, that they may not understand one another's speech."

Being omniscient, God knew that there was absolutely no way that they would ever attain a genuinely coherent psychic standing wave based on group think. So the statement that "nothing which they purpose to do will be impossible for them" is pure sarcasm. --- In Genesis 3:22, God said,

"Behold, the man has become like one of Us, knowing good and evil; and now, lest he stretch out his hand and take also from the tree of life, and eat, and live forever" ---

This is sarcasm. "Oooh, look, they wanted the full range of choices available under the **<u>natural law</u>**, and now that they've got it, they think they can dodge the repercussions by eating off the tree of life. They're in for a big shock. Just because

they have the full range of choices, that doesn't mean that they know how to choose so that they are able to maintain eternal life. There's no way they're going to do that. Time to disabuse them of this delusion by booting them out." --- In 11:6-7, the sarcasm is similar. "Oh, look, these people think they can attain a genuinely coherent psychic standing wave based on group think, and without going through the necessary procedures. How pathetic! If they could, then they'd be able to do practically anything. But they can't. Let's go down and disabuse them of this delusion as well, and make it clear that they have no viable choice but to esteem truth higher than human opinions. When they have language in which there is a measure of harmony between name and form, they go on a flaming power trip. So let's teach them a lesson by splitting them up into a multitude of clans, languages, lands, and nations, where there is minimal harmony between name and form in each of these various languages."

Because God spoke things into existence, there was necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between what God named and the actual things, objects, entities that his naming created. In other words, God's naming had generative power because of consistency between the name and the form generated by his speaking the name. In contrast to this, the man's naming (Genesis 2:19) did not have the same generative power. Even so, because the man was created in God's image, it's reasonable to assume that there was much more harmony between name and form in the man's language than there was in the languages of the people after God confused them.

The motive behind this project is very much like the motive indicated in Genesis 3:22. The people wanted the advantages of complete obedience to **natural law** without paying the price by actually obeying **natural law** in a way that enabled standing wave permanence. The line of reasoning in Genesis 3:22 was, "Maybe we can sneak past God and get standing wave permanence without actually paying the price for it." The line of reasoning in Genesis 11:1-9 was something like this: "Even if God won't allow us to have individual standing wave permanence, we can sneak around God and attain permanence of our collective thought wave simply by being in agreement about our collective goals." God's response was exactly the same as it was in Genesis 3: "You pathetic little creatures are not sneaking around God in any way, ever. No amount of human self-glorification will change this, ever." Human motives are so deeply and inherently flawed that humans can never attain either individual standing wave permanence by any human-initiated mechanism. It is only by the sovereign grace of God that any humans can ever attain either.

God created human beings to be in community with him. For human beings to maintain such community with God, they must be able to recognize and acknowledge him. If people value God's creation more than they do its Creator, they fail in this recognition and acknowledgement. In short, they are idolaters. ---In this passage there are two demands, which in some respects are complementary, and in other respects are at odds. --- The (i)demand to recognize God, and the (ii) demand to recognize the "image of God" in people, are complementary in this sense: If one fails to recognize God, how can one adequately recognize the "image of God" in people? One cannot. Likewise, if one fails to recognize the "image of God" in people, how can one adequately continue one's recognition of God? One cannot. --- The (i)demand to recognize God, and the (ii)demand to recognize the "image of God" in people, are at odds in practice, even though they are not at odds in theory. The neglect of the former under the pretense of recognizing the latter is one way of understanding group think. In practice, the human race is on the horns of this dilemma. In theory, there's no reason for this dilemma to exist, because eitheror logic is not appropriate here, but both-and logic is appropriate here.

Above all the other things that this story may say, it expresses God's displeasure at social organizations that are aimed at something other than his glorification. Social compacts that are focused on idols are always doomed to failure. This tower was a man-made artifice geared to "reach into heaven". The "heaven" that this artifice reached into was probably the physical sky. But their intention was to build this tower into what the apostle called "the third heaven", where true happiness lies. They were trying to gain happiness through a process that circumvented God and created a counterfeit heaven. This story is a warning against any human or group of humans attempting to develop social programs and organizations that glorify man to the exclusion of God. All such attempts are ultimately doomed. This is a cycle in human history that has repeated itself through countless iterations: People start a social organization for seemingly good intentions. The organization takes on a life of its own. It thrives for a time. Motivations relevant to the organization go askew. The organization starts going awry. It becomes more and more obvious to more and more people that the organization's purpose is perverted. People start abandoning the organization due to lack of interest. It ultimately ceases to exist altogether.

As a result of being split up into numerous clans, languages, lands, and nations (Genesis 10:31), answers to another portal question started pouring in. The portal question in this case was, "Can we develop a fully coherent, perpetual psychic standing wave based purely on human agreement?" "No!" being the answer, any effort in that direction that does not pay due diligence and honor to God and truth is doomed, and is justifiably denigrated as group think. The object lesson is that

group think doesn't work. So any effort at building or maintaining any kind of human government based on group think will be a disaster.

Regarding the abandonment of the Babel project, Vos says, quoting Delitzsch, "'the immoral and irreligious products of one nation are not equally destructive as those of an undivided humanity', and 'many false religions are better than one, since they paralyze one another'."¹ So God imposed a primitive form of "checks and balances" on the entire human race to neutralize the power of group-think.

Now it is through maintaining the national diversities, as these express themselves in the different language, and are in turn upheld by this difference, that God prevents realization of the attempted scheme. Besides this, however, a twofold positive divine purpose may be discerned in this occurrence. In the first place, there was a positive intent that concerned the natural life of humanity. Under the providence of God each race or nation has a positive purpose to serve, fulfillment of which depends on relative seclusion from others. And secondly, the events at this stage were closely interwoven with the carrying out of the plan of redemption. They led to the election and separate training of one race and one people. Election from its very nature presupposes the existence of a larger number from among which the choice can be made.²

(1)Under this regime of "checks and balances", each clan, language, and nation will develop uniquely, in its own land, and will develop attributes that will be valuable at the consummation of this age, when these nations again start becoming one nation, but this time, with an inborn aversion to group think. (2)The breakup of the single nation into many nations laid the foundation for "the plan of redemption", in which God would work through a single nation to bring wholeness to them all.

When God broke up the Tower of Babel party, and sent humanity into many nations, languages, families, and lands, all of these new nations, *etc.*, were obviously lacking the proper motivation to properly fulfill their obligations under Genesis 9:6. They didn't properly appreciate God, and they didn't properly appreciate the "image of God" in people. So they lacked the proper motivation to enforce **natural rights**. As a result, practically every one of these nations fell into institutionalized abuse, *i.e.*, institutionalized perpetration of *delicts*.³ This means that the obligations

¹ Vos, pp. 59-60.

² Vos, p. 60.

³ This is obvious if one looks at how slavery became part of their lives. Slavery is a form of institutionalized perpetration of *delicts*. It is by definition ownership by one human being of another human being. For one person to own another, the property rights of

of the **Noachian Covenant** were not being properly passed from one generation to the next. Perhaps they were passed to some extent. But they were not passed to an extent adequate to meet the Genesis 9:6 standard. There may have been some consent from the younger generation, but it wasn't adequate. In summary, the Tower of Babel fell because the whole project was riddled with violations of **natural law**.

Sub-Chapter 4: Transition into Objective-Central Redemption

Now that this theodicy has examined three portals, it should be obvious that portals and covenants combine in biblical history to establish various epochs and eras. In some cases very little time elapses between the human act of opening a portal and God's subsequent act of making revelatory appendments to the existing covenant. In other cases, more time elapses between the human opening the portal and God's subsequent revelatory act. --- Whereas this theodicy calls the ecological niche that humans occupied prior to the fall the "garden ecological niche", it calls that period of time the "*Edenic epocb*". God apparently responded to the opening of the tree-of-knowledge portal quickly, with the Adamic Covenant, in which the basic parameters of the out-of-the-garden ecological niche were established. Out of respect for the **Adamic Covenant**, and for the sake of establishing a contrast with the *Edenic epoch*, it's reasonable to call the period of time in which the human race is between the garden niche and the New-Jerusalem niche the "Adamic epoch". Given that the *Adamic epoch* covers a huge amount of history, it's reasonable that this time span would be subdivided into smaller subsets, like the *anarchy era* and the *law-enforcement epoch*, as indicated above.

It's important to note in passing that God's marking of Cain, and by rational extension, his marking of all *anarchy-era* perpetrators of *delicts*, was an act of progressive revelation. Somehow such progressive revelation of **natural law** needs to be marked as covenantal. For brevity's sake, this theodicy only marks the terms of the biblical blood covenants as covenantal. In a more thorough, detailed, and technical exposition of the Bible, this theodicy would go out of its way to indicate how progressive revelation that is outside the covenantal context, like the marking of *anarchy era* perpetrators, relates to the pre-existing covenant. This more rigorous process would certainly include progressive revelation that appears in Genesis 11:1-9. This more thorough theodicy would identify such progressive revelation as statutory or case-law implementations and expressions of the pre-existing covenant.

the latter must be denied and deprived. Active denial and deprivation of another person's property rights is by definition perpetration of a *delict*.

Given that the *law-enforcement epoch* covers a huge amount of history, it's reasonable that it would also be bifurcated into subsets, like the *Adamic epoch* is bifurcated. Providentially, the Bible clearly indicates that it is. A *one-nation epoch* existed from the start of the *law-enforcement epoch* at the promulgation of the *Noachian Covenant* until the splitting of that nation into many nations. So the *law-enforcement epoch* and the *many-nation epoch*, and the human race in the 21st century still exists in the *many-nation* subset of the *law-enforcement epoch*. --- Even though this process of neatly bifurcating history clearly exists in the first eleven chapters of Genesis, this rational elegance does not extend so easily into the *many-nation epoch*. The start of the *many-nation epoch* marks the end of the Bible's neat bifurcation of time spans.

The inauguration of the *many-nation epoch* essentially marks a major transition in biblical revelation. From this point in biblical history, after the human race is settled into a multitude of clans, languages, lands, and nations, it's reasonable to see this settling as the demarcation between objective-general redemption and objective-central redemption. This is evident from the fact that immediately after the Tower of Babel episode, the Bible narrates the genealogy of Abraham. The transition from narration of objective-general redemption to narration of objectivecentral redemption carries with it the fact that "dispensations", epochs, and eras cease carrying the same weight and significance. When clear delineation of epochs ceases, how can subsequent claims to the existence of such epochs carry so much weight and significance? Subsets of the *many-nation epoch* are nowhere near so clear cut. Throughout the *many-nation epoch*, meaning from Genesis 11:10 to Revelation 21-22, it's much more reliable and productive to think in terms of covenantal jurisdictions than it is to think in terms of epochs, eras, and dispensations. Biblical history shifts almost entirely to focus on a single family that God uses to manifest his law, covenants, and jurisdictions. Being far from perfect, this family opens portals important to the discernment of the biblical prescription of **human law**. The passage of time is better understood in terms of laws, covenants, and jurisdictions than in terms of epochs and dispensations, because the latter are too nebulous, and because such concepts are too prone to leaking exceptions and exemptions.

The biggest problem that needs to be solved in this *motive-clause* section of this theodicy is this: How can the high view of human government expounded in the above interpretation of Genesis 9:6 be reconciled with all the hideous evil that happens in the *many-nation epoch*, especially evil that might influence the understanding of <u>human law</u>? It's clear already how the antediluvian murders can be reconciled. But there are at least five major events during the objective-central portion of the history of redemption that appear to be abject repudiations of this

high view: (i) This family that supplies the supporting cast of objective-central redemption is a major practitioner of slavery and statism, both of which on their face repudiate this high view of human law. (ii) This family perpetrated genocide, even wars of total annihilation, against seven nations, apparently without "just war" provocation, and this genocide is a prima facie repudiation of this high view. (iii) This family established a monarchy, and thereby exalted a series of fallen creatures to create and enforce fiat law, and to in effect run a dynastic protection racket, in clear violation of the high view. (iv)As a result of abuse of power by the monarch, this family split into inimical factions, where the factions continue to exist to the present day, and these factions certainly do not agree about this high view of human law. (v)A representative segment of this family participated in the murder of the only sinless human being who has walked the planet since Adam and Eve, the same human being who is the paramount focus of objective-central redemption. On its face, this murder is a repudiation of this high view. (vi)A representative segment of this family has conflated the rule of this sinless King with rule by tyrants and rule by various evil political systems. Such conflation is a clear repudiation of this high view. --- Without cogent explanations for these things, there is no reason to believe that this high view is in fact the biblical view. So without cogent explanations for these things, there's no reason to believe that the God of the Bible has a viable plan for the redemption of **human law**. It may be true that the God of the Bible has a viable plan for the redemption of his elect. But without cogent explanations for these abject repudiations of the high view, there's no reason to believe that he has a plan for redeeming **human law**. Without a plan for redeeming **human law**, Genesis 9:6 and the whole **<u>natural rights</u>** argument become mere biblical anomalies.

After the splitting of Noah's offspring into myriad societies, the Genesis 9:6 mandate appears to have been lost, at least to a large extent. Even though all people are subject to the bloodshed mandate,¹ this knowledge has not been consistently integrated into any of these nations. Virtually no nation shows significant evidence that they have cultural cognizance of the difference between *de jure* **human law** and **human law** that's inherently criminal. Presumably, one of the secondary purposes of objective-central redemption is to remind the nations of this high view of **human law**. How this presumption can be believed when the people designated to carry the message are so derelict in its delivery, this is the great task of this *motive-clause* section. Why should anyone presume that one of the secondary purposes of objective-central redemption of **human law**, given all the evil on display in the process of objective-central redemption?

¹ Because the **Noachian Covenant** is **global** and perpetual.

In some respects, it may be reasonable to conclude that the transition from the one-nation epoch to the many-nation epoch is the beginning of the age of the Gentiles (Luke 21:24; Romans 11:25). Evidence that the start of the *many-nations* epoch is also the start of the "times of the Gentiles" is affirmed by the terms of the Abrahamic Covenant. Among the terms of the Abrahamic Covenant are promises by God to Abraham that the latter will be made "a great nation" (Genesis 12:2), and also that the latter will be "the father of a multitude of nations" (Genesis 17:4-5).¹ If it's true that the ultimate destination of objective-central redemption is the single social compact that exists in the New-Jerusalem niche (and the biblical evidence certainly indicates that this is true), and if it's true that the Abrahamic Covenant is everlasting (and the biblical evidence certainly indicates that this is true),² then it must also be true that somehow this "multitude of nations" promise to Abraham will be fulfilled before entry into the New-Jerusalem niche. There is no evidence in the Bible that indicates that this promise was fully satisfied before the death of the last apostle.³ The *metaconstitution* expounded above certainly shows how those still party to the Abrahamic Covenant could move towards the fulfillment of the "multitude of nations" promise. But here, in 21st-century America, even though American Christians have the potential to move towards the fulfillment of this promise, there is a major impediment to doing so. The impediment is the lack of will. The lack of will relates in part to the ambiguity built into the Genesis 3:15 prophecy.

The visible church of Jesus Christ in America shows signs of being paralyzed, like a deer in headlights, frozen with anxiety and ignorance. It appears that the visible church is waiting to be beamed off the planet in the rapture, or for Christ to come fix the rogue governments. This paralysis is a function of confusion about the division of labor that exists implicitly in Genesis 3:15. The battle lines are certainly

¹ Vos (p. 80) indicates that there were three great promises that God made to the patriarchs: (1) "the chosen family would be made into a great nation"; (2) "the land of Canaan would be their possession"; and (3) "they were to become a blessing to all people". His error of omission, but not of commission, is forgivable because precision in this part of Genesis was apparently not the focus of his book.

² Genesis 17:7,13,19.

³ Some people may claim that the "great nation" promise has been fulfilled, based on verses like Genesis 46:3, where God promises to Jacob that he would make him "a great nation" in Egypt. However, this theodicy holds that the "great nation" / "multitude of nations" dichotomy is a motif that marks God's covenantal people practically to the gates of the New Jerusalem. Perception of this motif is enhanced by the fact that there is even less evidence of the fulfillment of the "multitude of nations" promise than there is of the "great nation" promise.

drawn between the collective seed of the woman and the collective seed of the serpent. But the seed of the woman, in America in the 21st century, appears to operate on the assumption that it's called to act like a gold brick while the Messiah bruises the serpent's head. If people are genuinely party to a covenant, then they have duties under that covenant. To presume that they've been delivered from such duties because they're now "under grace" and not "under law" is to pervert the understanding of the covenant and turn oneself into a covenant breaker. As long as a party to the **Abrahamic Covenant** is alive on planet earth, he/she has an obligation to behave as such. By grace, through faith, certainly. But grace doesn't negate law. Rather, it operates to keep the law in proper perspective. If the biblically savvy parties to the **Abrahamic Covenant** who founded the *united States* had adopted the doctrines of the paralyzed gold brick, then the *united States* would have never come into existence, and the *metaconstitution* that appears above would have never been written, and the paralyzed gold bricks might have an excuse for remaining paralyzed and ignorant. On the other hand, if the perverts referenced in Romans 1:18-25 "are without excuse", there's no reason to think that nominal Christians in the 21st century have an excuse. Anyone who refuses to stand up for truth and righteousness should stop operating under the pretense that they are part of the "remnant".

In fact, when people neglect to do their duty under Genesis 9:6, they become prone to being followers of whatever trend seems to be dominant in the culture at the given time. This is group think in action. It caused the demise of the Babel society, and it will cause the demise of the *united States*, unless people wake up and put their priorities straight. Whether the *united States* falls or not should not be a central concern to any covenant keeper. But whether the *metaconstitution* is implemented or not should influence every covenant keeper's course of action. The *united States* is raw material through which the *metaconstitution* could be implemented, and all real covenant keepers who still have the ability to think should recognize this possibility. So given these considerations and priorities, whether the *united States* falls or not matters, even if it's not a central concern.

The fact that God split the human race into a "multitude of nations" in response to humanity's attempt at building the Tower of Babel, and the fact that God intends eventually to bring all his "elect" into one "holy city" called "new Jerusalem" (Revelations 21), deserve to be considered simultaneously. The process of redeeming humanity will go from a condition in which there are a "multitude" of <u>social</u> <u>compacts</u>, to a condition in which there is only one <u>social compact</u> for all of God's "elect", and all other people will be offscoured. So Bible-believing people are bound to believe that they are progressing in time from a "multitude of nations" to being one "great nation". This is the primary way to explain how Abraham can be both

a "great nation" (Genesis 12:2) and the "father of a multitude of nations" (Genesis 17:4,5). But this migration from (i)a multitude of nations that are outside Abraham's influence, to (ii)a "multitude of nations" for whom Abraham is the patriarch, to (iii) one "great nation" for whom Abraham is the patriarch, must necessarily, at some point, come into compliance with the *metaconstitution*'s **jurisdictional** guidelines. At least this is the case if the redemption of **human law** is an aspect of redemption. Given that the many nations as they presently exist, and as they have existed historically, exist far removed from these **jurisdictional** guidelines, and given that this presumption is valid, it should surprise no one that God uses both tyranny and group think as Machiavellian goads to steer this process of migration.¹

The promise to Abraham that he would be the "father of a multitude of nations" (Genesis 17:4,5; 22:18) is repeated to Isaac (Genesis 26:4) and Jacob (Genesis 35:11). This term of the covenant regarding the "multitude of nations" is critical to American Christians because it relates directly to how much they should expect all the pluralistic peoples that constitute the American "melting pot" to be assimilated, to conform to a single standard of behavior, and the extent to which they should NOT expect this.

Because jurisdictional dysfunction has been the norm since the Tower of Babel, ignorance about *lawful jurisdictions* has been the norm. Given this kind of norm, there's no wonder that government by consent is generally considered unrealistic and idealistic. But common sense says that government by consent is unrealistic only if the know-how necessary to make government by consent viable is missing. Even though the Bible doesn't explicitly say that governments are built with contracts, according to any reasonable reading of it, *lawful* human governments can be instituted among human beings only by way of contracts, and only by way of the duties in Genesis 9:6. The fact that jurisdictional dysfunction has been the norm since Babel indicates that government by consent has NOT been the norm. All this goes to show that covenant-keeping people should not model their jurisprudence after what's been biblically normal, but only after what's been biblically prescribed. Because there has been so much jurisdictional dysfunction and confusion among Christians for so long, this statement should be repeated: Covenant-keeping people should not model their jurisprudence after what's been biblically normal, but only after what's been biblically prescribed.

¹ The claim that God uses Machiavellian goads should not be misunderstood as a claim that God is the author of sin. All humans are moral agents and are responsible for their own sin. Even so, there are providential patterns and currents in the sin that humans swim in.

When the monoglot, Tower-of-Babel social compact disintegrated, the world went from a single, jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compact into a diversity of jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compacts, each having a distinct language, and located in a distinct land. The designated land defined each new jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compact's geographical jurisdiction. Because of the language barriers between social compacts, and because each new social compact was jurisdictionally dysfunctional from the beginning, each would muddle together its own unique version of **human law**, and its own special conception of how such **human law** might be compatible with **<u>natural law</u>**. Under such circumstances, the potential for conflict between social compacts was huge, and still is. The concepts of justice, and the concepts of just war, were diverse across social compacts. The Genesis 9:6 mandate apparently faded into obscurity in all these new social compacts, probably as part of the transition from monoglot to polyglot. As far as the biblical prescription of human law is concerned, the big problem at the beginning of the *many-nation epoch* is whether there's a migration path from jurisdictional dysfunction to jurisdictional sanity, and if so, how to identify it. God's solution to this problem is counter-intuitive. This is because fallen creatures are prone to think in top-down terms when they should be thinking in bottom-up terms.

One major reason the *metaconstitution* sketched above has never worked before, even though bits and pieces of it appear scattered throughout human history, is because there has always been a deficit in people willing to go out of their way to enforce **<u>natural rights</u>**, in short, a deficit in genuine vigilantes. Assuming the Biblebased *metaconstitution* is valid, there must be some point in human development at which this vigilante-deficit is overcome. If not, then either there is no plan for the redemption of human law, or the plan manifest in the metaconstitution is erroneous. Bible scholars have generally failed to exegetically produce a biblical prescription of human law that is comprehensive other than, "Jesus will return and reign over humanity as King, and all his laws will be perfect because He is perfect." This is hardly adequate. Without the kind of **<u>natural-rights</u>**-based system posited above, Bible-based legal systems generally cannot work because they propose jurisdictionally dysfunctional "theocracies" that exalt oligarchs as mediators between humans and God. As long as Jesus chooses to tarry, the metaconstitution is the only Bible-based jurisprudence that can work, because it avoids jurisdictional **dysfunction** by focusing on rigorous delineation of **jurisdictional** boundaries. To make it work, people willing to go out of their way to enforce **<u>natural rights</u>** are the necessary base ingredient. Such vigilantes are willing by definition to go out of their way to avoid group think, to enforce the Genesis 9:6 mandate, and to avoid violating jurisdictional boundaries.

In baking bricks, in building a city and a tower, and in trying to make a name for themselves, the people must have been mindful of the **Noachian Covenant** to some extent. Their ability to cooperate on the bricks, the tower, the city, the name, could not have existed without relatively *delict*-free social relations. But like every other aspect of creation, humans can turn **natural rights** into an idol, and they're even prone to doing so. It's probable that the Babel builders esteemed natural rights to the exclusion of **natural law**. This idolatry led to the disintegration of the Babel society, and the relative loss of the knowledge of Genesis 9:6. So each new social **compact** defaulted into being dominated by group think. Under group think, with the loss of clear standards and clear thinking, the societies became dominated by whoever or whatever was most persuasive, where the use of force was NOT excluded as a persuasion technique. This domination by the group-think syndrome explains why the jurisdictional boundaries and distinctions contained within the ambit of the *positive-duty clause* have remained largely cloaked from human cognition until now, even though they were embedded in the biblical story almost from the beginning.

Violations of the Genesis 9:6 guidelines saturate both biblical history and extrabiblical history. The message sent by the demise of the Tower of Babel is the same to all government builders. First, people must have God's grace to even get started properly. Second, human governments must obey the guidelines implicit in Genesis 9:6. Human governments easily deteriorate into protection rackets and other scams. Nevertheless, from a reasoned reading of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, it's clear that all human beings alive in the 21st century should be under the **personal jurisdiction** of *lawful* **jural compacts**, and *de jure* **social compacts**, and each should feel blessed by any opportunity to go out of the way to enforce **natural rights**.

Sub-Chapter 5: Slavery & Statism Portal

Although it's certain that Jesus Christ is the focal point of all objective-central redemption, the God of the Bible has used the earthly family started by Abraham and Sarah as bit players to support this production's only true protagonist. So this family is the supporting cast for objective-central redemption. --- Throughout biblical history, this family practiced slavery. Even if Abraham was the most beneficent slave owner in history, it's still undeniable that he owned human beings as private property, in clear violation of **natural rights** and the *imago Dei*. --- It's also true that Abraham's descendants were notoriously statist, following a pattern started by the story of Joseph. Both statism and slavery are violations of the *metaconstitution*. So these circumstances appear to be evidence that the Bible is irrational. On one hand,

according to this theodicy, the Bible posits the *metaconstitution*. On the other hand, a face value reading of the Bible makes it clear that God's people have consistently violated the *metaconstitution*. This presents a major obstacle to this theodicy, specifically, how can it be true simultaneously that the Bible prescribes <u>natural-rights</u>-based <u>human law</u>, on one hand, and that the Bible's author facilitates his covenant people in the practices of slavery and statism, in violation of the prescription, on the other hand?

Above, this theodicy claimed that slavery and statism are a portal, like the treeof-knowledge portal, the anarchy portal, and the group-think portal. This is true, but it's not precise. By themselves, slavery and statism did not open a new portal. So this situation needs to be clarified. --- The human race generally allowed slavery, in violation of the bloodshed mandate. As a result of the general abandonment of the **Noachian Covenant** that must have happened at the multiplication and confusion of languages, the human race started practicing slavery out of expediency, and out of neglect for the fact that slavery is by definition a violation of **natural rights**. In many respects, since the beginning of the **many-nation epoch**, humans have been concerned about food, shelter, clothing, money, survival, *etc.*, to the exclusion of concerns about God and morality. So if one nation in this new **many-nation epoch** defeats another in warfare, then the victor might see an advantage in enslaving some or all of the conquered population. This has been a fact about the human condition since before the **Abrahamic Covenant** was promulgated.

If slavery existed before promulgation of the Abrahamic Covenant, and if the adoption of slavery didn't open a new portal, why has this theodicy claimed that slavery and statism mark the opening of a new portal? --- This theodicy has claimed that each biblical covenant, starting with the Adamic Covenant, is a set of appendments, through progressive revelation, to the pre-existing covenant. This implies that the **Abrahamic Covenant** is a set of appendments to the pre-existing **Noachian Covenant**. But the fact that Abraham practiced slavery appears to refute the claim that the biblical covenants are set up this way. If it's so clear that the Abrahamic Covenant incorporates the Noachian Covenant, then why do parties to the Abrahamic Covenant, especially Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, show no scruples about violating the Genesis 9:6 mandate? Answering this question, in regards to both slavery and statism, gets much closer to the core of what this portal is about. This portal is not about slavery and statism in general. In general, they are mere functions of the fall, and there's nothing new or interesting about them. But how to justify the practices of slavery and statism by people who have entered a covenant that presumably prohibits such practices, this is a question that demands an answer. So in effect, after Abraham and the other fallen parties to his covenant entered into

this covenant with God, each time they exercised their participation in slavery and statism, they opened this portal. The real portal question, even if they preferred not to articulate it, was, "How can I exercise this violation of God's prescription of **human law** and claim to be in covenant with him at the same time?" --- Obviously, hypocrisy has been built into the **local** covenants since the **Abrahamic Covenant** was promulgated. In order to understand this portal, it's necessary to understand God's toleration of hypocrisy.

Early in the *many-nation epoch*, God started a new phase in the process of redeeming and cultivating miniature sovereigns. Given humanity's need for redemption at this time, nihilists may agree that the kindest thing that God could have done would have been simply to annihilate the race. God clearly did not and does not agree. This new phase entailed the promulgation of the <u>local</u> covenants. The portals in this <u>local</u> phase of the history of redemption all pertain to breaches of the <u>local</u> covenants by human parties thereto.

The world in the 21st century is plagued by institutionalized warfare, international banking fraud, institutionalized perpetration of *delicts*, slavery, and many other hideous evils. The difference between now and Abram's day is not merely that 21st-century humans possess technology that massively exacerbates these plagues. The difference between now and then is that now there are people who know that these things are evil, and who are actively opposed to them. But in Abraham's day, the evidence indicates that if Abraham had been actively opposed to such things, he would have been alone, even more than he was already alone. He and his small band of relatives and slaves abandoned their place of origin and ventured into unknown territory, largely in pursuit of Abram's God-given vision of becoming "a great nation". If he had understood this term of his covenant to exist alongside another term that made him responsible for being a vigilante against the shedding of "innocent" blood, this may have been more than his mind could bear. Given that slavery, bloodshed, and fear of foreigners and strangers were part of everyday life among people throughout the world in his days, it would have been a piece of megalomaniacal, masochistic insanity for him to embark on a crusade to bring all the thieves, robbers, murderers, kidnappers, fraudmongers, and slavers to justice. The existence of such things on the borders between nations was normal, even if there were periods of uneasy peace between neighboring nations.

Under these circumstances, it was an act of grace from God to Abraham to not burden the latter with a thoroughgoing commitment to the Genesis 9:6 mandate. But this act of grace does nothing to negate the inclusion of the <u>Noachian</u> terms as part of the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>. It merely allows the <u>Noachian</u> terms to remain dormant for as long as it takes for those party to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>

to acquire real-world capacity to convert the *positive-duty clause* into human law.¹ Acquisition of such capacity and implementation of such human law is a multimillennial process of which the 21st-century heirs to Abraham's covenant are still a part. Throughout, from Abraham forward, there is an element of hypocrisy built into the covenant for all who become party to it, because none except the Messiah himself has been able to live up to the standard. This allowance for hypocrisy is necessary as a concession to the group-think syndrome. Group think is the norm in all human societies, and has been since before the *many-nation epoch* was inaugurated. This is why the portals that open under the regime of the local covenants, *i.e.*, during the time span of objective-central redemption, are all sub-portals of the group-think portal, and symptoms of the group-think syndrome. Because these portals during objective-central redemption all involve parties to the **local** covenants, the subject matter of the portals is not so much what the parties did wrong, as how to reconcile these wrongs with their participation in the **local** covenants. The general answer in regards to each of these five portals is, the parties' wrongs are reconciled with the covenants through God's grace. But the answers can be, and should be, much more specific than that.

This theodicy holds that slavery and statism should be treated as two manifestations of the same syndrome. To see why this is the case, it should help to see how statism arises out of slavery. --- At the beginning of the *many-nation epoch*, it's clear that some societies were tribal while some were more sophisticated. Tribal, hunter-gatherer cultures do not, by definition, accumulate significant amounts of surplus food. In contrast, more "advanced" agrarian cultures, like those in Egypt and Mesopotamia during Abraham's lifetime, were capable of creating large stores of food. Such stores of food were the basis for the accumulation of wealth. In contrast, without the ability and practice of accumulating massive amounts of food, huntergatherer cultures generally did not accumulate other kinds of physical wealth either. Without the accumulation of physical wealth, it was not practical for hunter-gatherer cultures to engage in mass enslavement. This is because there's no point in having a slave if the slave cannot produce something of value in excess of what it costs to keep the slave. In the more advanced agrarian cultures, where slaves could produce much more than they cost, practicing slavery was both practical and a source of economic

¹ This dormancy of the Genesis 9:6 covenantal duties is also evident under the **Messianic (Christian) Covenant**. But this dormancy under both the **Abrahamic** and **Messianic** covenants does not negate the Genesis 9:6 duties as terms of these covenants. It only gives the parties huge leeway regarding performance. In other words, these covenants are very gracious in regards to these duties.

advantage. So tribal cultures generally did not practice large-scale slavery, while more agrarian cultures generally did.

Although these tribal, hunter-gatherer cultures had rudimentary social compacts, and therefore rudimentary governments, governments did not become monolithic except in the more agrarian cultures. Governments grew strong for the sake of controlling the slave populations. In other words, the larger the population of slaves, the larger and stronger the population of slave controllers needed to be. So the growth of government coincided with the accumulation of wealth, and those who accumulated the wealth were the same people who funded the government and the population of slave controllers. In many respects, the government operated as a slave-controlling mechanism for the wealthy. In other words, the governments were run primarily by a ruling class of slave owners. Because slaves could produce more than they consumed within these agrarian cultures, it was worthwhile for the ruling class to hunt and capture foreigners for the sake of converting them into slaves. In fact, and in violation of Genesis 9:6, these agrarian empires can be accurately conceived as large plantations in which people were turned into domesticated farm animals. In order to keep these animals docile and obedient, the ruling class of slave farmers employed a propagandizing class to persuade the farm animals to stay on the plantation, and a brutalizing class to force the farm animals to stay on the plantation. The propagandizing class consisted of priests, intellectuals, and artists, all of whom were paid by the farm owners to expound a worldview that would keep the slaves on the plantation. The brutalizing class consisted of police, military, slave hunters and traders, hired slave masters, etc., whose primary function was to force the slaves to stay on the farm. --- Although these circumstances existed in Abraham's day, they have also existed since, up until the Industrial Revolution.¹ The adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire may have stimulated the conversion of slaves into serfs, but European Christianity was always too shallow and spread too thin to improve circumstances much more than that. The story of Joseph in Egypt provides a dramatic example of this kind of slave-based economy. In this story, Joseph rises

¹ Some people may claim that capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, and perhaps other factors since the Reformation, have tended to eliminate slavery. Although it's true that the express form of slavery has been retarded in recent centuries, more devious forms have arisen that tend to achieve the same end by other means. Via banking fraud, violations of just weights and measures in money, adhesion contracts, "wage slavery", and numerous other similar mechanisms, the war between slavery and freedom continues to the present. This is true on top of the fact that the express form of slavery continues in many cultures.

from being an unjustly accused prisoner to being the prime minister of Egypt. It is a good example of how statism is about slave-farming.¹

Essentially, slavery is one of the curses that falls by default on people who ignore their duties under the *positive-duty clause*. For slaves to exist, there must be slave masters. So this dichotomy between psychopathic masters and Stockholm-Syndrome slaves has marked millennia. Both master class and slave class suffer in their own peculiar ways. --- Generally, tribal cultures have been the base resource for this slave-based economy. So herding cultures and hunter-gatherer cultures have been vulnerable to slave hunters from the empires. They've also been vulnerable to conquest from neighboring tribes. Both the psychopathy of the master class and the Stockholm Syndrome that marks the slave class are perversions of the mental health that comes naturally to those who mind their duties under the *positive-duty clause*.

While Jacob's son Joseph was in prison in Egypt for a crime that he did not commit, he was called upon by Pharaoh to interpret a couple of dreams that Pharaoh found troubling. The first dream concerned fourteen cows, and the second dream fourteen ears of grain. In the first dream, seven gaunt cows ate seven sleek cows, and in the second dream, seven scorched ears ate seven plump ears. Joseph interpreted the dreams as both being about seven years of plenty followed by seven years of famine. As part of his interpretation, Joseph recommended that Pharaoh appoint a prime minister and a set of "overseers" to "exact a fifth *of the produce* ... in the years of abundance ... and store up the grain for food ..., and let them guard *it*" (Genesis 41:34-35). The grain collected during the abundant years would be "a reserve ... for the seven years of famine" (v. 36). Convinced that the interpretations were correct, Pharaoh delivered Joseph from prison and made him prime minister.

In order to interpret this passage properly, it's critical to remember that confiscatory taxation is not *lawful* even for for **jural** purposes and functions. Confiscatory taxation is never *lawful*, but if it were done for purely **jural** purposes and functions, it would at least satisfy the minarchist breed of political libertarianism. But because it's not exacted for **jural** purposes and functions, it's purely despotic and not even minarchist. So this exaction of one fifth of the produce is not **jural** taxation, because it's not for the prosecution of *delicts*. It is a confiscated property to distribute during the years of famine. But this taxation is really theft by Joseph and his overseers in the name of Pharaoh and the entire Egyptian government. --- Under statism, the state gets to take whatever it wants and to do practically whatever it wants. Under

¹ In history, slavery has been acceptable as long as the other guy's group has been the enslaved group, and unacceptable whenever one's own group is the enslaved group.

the Bible-based legal system described above, the government cannot do whatever it wants, and it cannot tax for any purpose under the sun. Under the natural-rights polity, revenues can be collected only through voluntary donations. Revenues collected through force are perpetration of *delicts*, even if they are spent to prosecute ex delicto or ex contractu damage. In this story, what Joseph was recommending was mass theft from the Egyptian people. Perhaps it was mass theft with good intentions, but good intentions, by themselves, are not capable of converting an evil into a good. If he had done the collections properly during the years of plenty, then he would have entered into contractual agreements with each person from whom he took, before he took. But this clearly wasn't done. It wasn't done because the people were conditioned and accustomed to having their rights abused by the slave-master class, and like all those who suffer from the Stockholm Syndrome, they considered such violations of rights to be a normal and acceptable part of everyday life. Besides, because Joseph was a good and upright fellow, he would surely return the fifth he took during the seven years of plenty whenever the seven years of famine got under way, wouldn't he?

After the famine started, and became severe, Joseph did not open the storehouses to return to the people what he had taken. Instead, when the famine got severe, Joseph opened the storehouses to sell to the people what was rightly theirs (Genesis 41:56; 42:6), the fruit of their labor and the bounty of Joseph's robbery. By selling grain from the storehouses,

Joseph gathered all the money that was found in the land ..., and Joseph brought the money into Pharaoh's house. And when the money was all spent ..., all the Egyptians came to Joseph and said, "Give us food, for why should we die in your presence? For *our* money is gone." Then Joseph said, "Give up your livestock and I will give you *food* for your livestock, since your money is gone." So they brought their livestock to Joseph ...; and he fed them with food in exchange for all their livestock that year. (Genesis 47:14-17)

In addition to establishing a monopoly in the grain market early in the famine, Joseph also practiced such price gouging that he collected virtually all the Egyptians' money. He put all this money into Pharaoh's treasury, thereby removing it from circulation. Joseph also took control of virtually all the livestock in Egypt. So early in the famine, by selling goods to people from whom he had stolen them, at exorbitant prices, Joseph was able to convert a famine-based recession into a major depression, in which people were being threatened with starvation.

By proceeding in the way that he did, Joseph caused an economic collapse on top of the famine, and the people became genuinely afraid of starvation. In this state of fear, they could be easily enslaved. Why did Joseph proceed in this manner? --- As Pharaoh's employee, Joseph naturally wanted to please his employer. Because Pharaoh was the head of a government that had a slave-based economic system, it was normal and good in the eyes of Pharaoh to enslave people, even his own people. Early in the famine, Joseph parlayed a monopoly in the grain market into monopolization of the nation's currency, and then into control of the nation's livestock industry. This was all satisfactory, and perhaps even pleasant, to Pharaoh. The people were being squeezed in a vice by famine on one side and a monopolistic ruling class on the other. The ruling class started out with a monopoly on the use of force, since the slave state's brutalizing class worked for the government. With the help of the famine, the people's fear of the famine, and the people's fear of the brutalizing class, the monopoly on the use of force was parlayed into a monopoly on grain, then a monopoly on money, then a monopoly on livestock.¹

If the people had done their duty under the *positive-duty clause*, then there would have been no monopoly on the use of force, and Joseph would not have been able to extort a one-fifth rate of taxation from the people. Instead, he and Pharaoh would have published their beliefs about the seven years of abundance followed by the seven years of famine, so that the people could prepare on a voluntary basis, rather than on a coercive basis. But starting with a monopoly on the use of force, and the power to tax, Pharaoh and Joseph were able to parlay that monopoly into a system of monopolies that would drive the entire population, excluding the ruling class, the propagandizing class, and the brutalizing class, into slavery.

> [T]hey came to him the next year and said to him, "We will not hide ... that our money is all spent, and the cattle are my lord's. There is nothing left for my lord except our bodies and our lands. Why should we die before your eyes, both we and our land? Buy us and our land for food, and we and our land will be slaves to Pharaoh. ... ". So Joseph bought all the land of Egypt for Pharaoh, for every Egyptian sold his field, because the famine was severe upon them. Thus the land became Pharaoh's. And as for the people, he removed them to the cities from one end of

¹ In the *united States* something similar has happened. Tax rates rise causing the cost of living and the cost of labor to rise. Business people lobby the government about the high cost of labor, and rather than lowering or eliminating the taxes, the government contrives to export manufacturing to foreign nations, and to allow the business people to use cheaper foreign labor markets in place of more expensive domestic labor markets. When industries, jobs, and means of production relocate to foreign countries, the domestic labor starves, or goes on welfare. The latter is a governmental mechanism for controlling dependent people.

Egypt's border to the other. Only the land of the priests he did not buy, for the priests had an allotment from Pharaoh, and they lived off the allotment which Pharaoh gave them. Therefore, they did not sell their land. Then Joseph said to the people, "Behold, I have today bought you and your land for Pharaoh; now, *here* is seed for you, and you may sow the land. And at the harvest you shall give a fifth to Pharaoh, and four-fifths shall be your own for seed of the field and for your food and for those of your households and as food for your little ones." So they said, "You have saved our lives! Let us find favor in the sight of my lord, and we will be Pharaoh's slaves." (Genesis 47:18-25)

Without using the brutalizing class, Joseph induced these people to volunteer to be Pharaoh's slaves. They even instigated the offer to become his slaves. By using monopolies, starting with the monopolization of the use of force, the people willingly sold their land, meaning their means of production, and themselves, to Pharaoh. --- By enslaving people in this manner, the master converts the slave's mind to slavery before converting the slave's body. It's seemingly a violence-free road to slavery. But of course it starts with a monopoly on the use of force, so the threat of force saturates the whole scheme. But because the people don't have an initial objection to the monopoly on the use of force, they don't see that they're under duress throughout. And even if they did see the duress, they were so cowed from the beginning of the process that they had no objection to the duress. This is a description of the Stockholm Syndrome in action. From the beginning, these are not free people, because from the beginning, they don't want the duties inherent in being free. Instead, they are dedicated practitioners of group think, and they will go along with the group, the established order, instead of suffering the consequences of bucking that system.

The reason Joseph moved the people off the land and into the cities was to make sure that they didn't relapse into thinking that the land was theirs.¹ Even so, he allowed them to keep working the land, even though they now lived in the cities. It seems that after Joseph had divested the people of their land, he offered to do them a big favor. He offered to give the people free seed so that they could "sow the land". Except it wasn't really free. It was loaned. Anyone who took the loan was expected

¹ These days, U.N. "Agenda 21" proposes to move people out of rural areas and into metropolitan areas. Plausible reasons for this include the same reasons cattle ranchers move cattle into stockyards before butchering, rather than leave them out on the range. They're much easier to manage in stockyards. This is the eugenics explanation. Anyone who believes that eugenics is not alive and well should consider Planned Parenthood as proof to the contrary.

to repay Pharaoh one-fifth of the subsequent harvest. So Joseph piled debt on top of slavery.

The evidence in this passage clearly indicates that there was never any real grain shortage. Early in the famine, Joseph could have given the people the grain that he had taken from them, perhaps charging them a pittance for his performance of a *bailment* contract. This way, all the money would not have been removed from circulation, and the people would not have felt compelled to sell their livestock, their land, and their freedom to the monopolists. Instead of allowing things to proceed in this manner, by operating with the statist monopoly on the use of force, Joseph artificially restricted the grain supply, thereby driving the people into poverty, and then slavery. Then Joseph put the unemployed, city-dwelling slaves to work on the land that they once owned, raising crops that would have been theirs, on the condition that they give twenty percent of whatever they harvested to Pharaoh.

This biblical passage is a picture of how governments whose populations are under the spell of the statist myth are easily able to parlay a monopoly on the use of force into the enslavement of the entire population. In other words, the ruling class, the propagandizing class, and the brutalizing class, given the proper external threat, are able to parlay the external threat and the monopoly on the use of force into a totalitarian regime, in which they live like gluttons while the population starves. --- In the case of 21st-century America: (i)The ruling class is the owners of the privately owned Federal Reserve System, and all the public and privately owned entities that support and benefit from this private system. This includes the entire "federal" government, with very rare exceptions, the "federal" bureaucracy, all publicly traded corporations, and State and local entities that have elected to collaborate with the ruling class. (ii) The propagandizing class includes practically all public-education institutions, all publicly-traded media corporations, tax-funded broadcasters, corporate broadcasters, and all pastors, preachers, rabbis, imams, priests, etc., who have volunteered to be FEMA "clergy response team" members. (iii) The brutalizing class includes DHS, CIA, FBI, BATFE, FEMA, Secret Service, and all police and military who have not publicly declared that they intend to keep their oath to the Constitution, meaning as interpreted through the *metaconstitution*. --- As long as the people of the *united States* remain statist, this population is headed for the same ruination as this population under Joseph.

The Egyptians were too ignorant or too cowardly to recognize that they had been hustled and conned by Joseph. Instead, they were grateful. They thanked him, the way any sufferer of the Stockholm Syndrome thanks his/her abductor. The secret to Joseph's success was not only that he was blessed with an ignorant, statist population, but also that he was smart enough and unscrupulous enough to connive

these suckers into his trap. Each step of the way was marked by the population's assent. They agreed to every step towards their enslavement. Starting from the position of agreeing to allow a monolithic government to have a monopoly on the use of force, they agreed to each new stage of their demise.

This biblical passage displays not only how a statist population can be enslaved. It also displays how God has used his covenant people as goads to move objectivecentral redemption forward. By aiding Pharaoh to enslave his people, Joseph was doing something inherently perverse. At least that's the way it appears to anyone who genuinely believes in **<u>natural rights</u>**. On the other hand, both the people in the master class and the people in the enslaved class were inherently violating their Genesis 9:6 duties well in advance of Joseph's appearance. If someone doesn't care if he/she becomes enslaved, and thereby volunteers for such slavery, that may be perverse in regards to **natural law**, but like suicide, it does not violate the **global** prescription of human law. So if Person A goes along with Joseph's scheme, from statist government forward, Person A is not violating the negative-duty clause because Person A is not perpetrating a *delict*. However, if there is even a single Person B who objects to Joseph's scheme, where Person B gets caught in this large, group-think net, and gets trapped in it simply because everyone else is going along with the scheme, then Joseph is perpetrating a series of *delicts* against Person B. Because Person B is the victim of a *delict*, and because Person A should know that there are probably numerous Person Bs caught in Joseph's net, Person A is guilty of violating his/her duty under the *positive-duty clause*. If there is even a single Person B caught in Joseph's group-think net, then all the Person As who volunteer for the net are guilty of violating the *positive-duty clause*. Likewise, if there is even a single Person B caught in Joseph's net, then Joseph, Pharaoh, and the entire master class, including the ruling class, the propaganda class, and the brutalizing class, are guilty of violating the negative-duty clause, and of conspiring to do so.

Because group think is the norm in the *many-nation epoch*, which means that statism is the norm in all societies but those that live more-or-less hand-to-mouth, God did not burden those party to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> with the Genesis 9:6 mandate. Instead God allowed that mandate to go dormant, and those party to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> to be hypocrites. So as a party to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>, Joseph was a hypocrite. But God used Joseph's hypocrisy and his violations of <u>natural rights</u> as a goad to advance objective-central redemption. Through Joseph, Jacob and his family became the beneficiaries of this largesse from Pharaoh's coffers, where such coffers were filled through Joseph's scam. Even though these parties to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> benefited tremendously from Joseph's scam, and even though God used Joseph's sin in what appears superficially to be Machiavellian

manipulation, God never suspends the <u>natural law</u>. Because the <u>natural law</u> is never suspended, violations of it always follow the law of sowing and reaping (2 Corinthians 9:6; Galatians 6:7).¹ When God's people violate the <u>natural law</u>, God covers their infractions with grace, imputing Christ's righteousness to them to deflect the full consequences of their act of missing the mark. It's reasonable to assume that Jacob, Joseph, and many within Israel's family were thereby relieved from the full consequences of their violation of the <u>natural law</u>. But there were nevertheless consequences relating to the law of sowing and reaping. Eventually, the Egyptians became disgusted with this favored class of foreigners, and they enslaved the Hebrews, thereby showing that group-think saturated societies and nations are not immune to the law of sowing and reaping. "What goes around comes around."

Because group think is usually more important to people than **<u>natural rights</u>**, when humans form governments, the government's first and highest priority is usually the survival of the state. The state becomes a servant of itself, rather than a servant of the people. Because its purposes and functions are nebulous rather than strictly defined, the government pursues its own Babel-like purposes and functions, especially its own survival and prosperity. It puts itself at odds with its only *lawful* purpose and function, and it thereby becomes a perpetrator of bloodshed, rather than an enforcer against it. This was the nature of Pharaoh's slave farm before Joseph arrived. Joseph was surely led providentially throughout his imprisonment and his regime as prime minister. Joseph clearly had little or no concern about the **<u>natural</u>** rights of the people he was enslaving. Even though the Genesis 9:6 mandate was certainly part of the Abrahamic Covenant, and even though it's certain that Joseph was in violation of both the spirit and the letter of that mandate, it's still nevertheless certain that God was leading Joseph providentially throughout. It was necessary for the Genesis 9:6 terms of the Abrahamic Covenant to go dormant for the sake of advancing the agenda of objective-central redemption. If Joseph had insisted on being observant of the Genesis 9:6 mandate, Pharaoh probably would have treated Joseph the same way he treated the chief baker (Genesis 40:22). To advance the agenda of objective-central redemption, it was absolutely crucial for the 9:6 mandate to go dormant. After all, Pharaoh was in fact a slave farmer. It was therefore necessary for Joseph to operate within the slave farm's existing rules.

Even though the Genesis 9:6 mandate came out of dormancy under the <u>Mosaic</u> <u>Covenant</u>, at least in regards to people party to that covenant, it remained dormant in the pre-Mosaic <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>. For precisely the same reasons that it was dormant during Joseph's administration as prime minister, it went dormant

¹ In physics, the equivalent law is generally stated, "For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction." (Newton's Third Law of Motion)

under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. However, it does not necessarily remain dormant under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. To know whether or not the Genesis 9:6 mandate remains dormant for Christians in 21st-century America, it should help to compare present circumstances with Joseph's.

In every statist culture, meaning in every culture that has a government in the conventional sense of the word, every human within that culture is confronted daily with a dilemma. The dilemma is, "Will you follow group think, like Joseph, or will you do the right thing?" There is clearly a price for doing the right thing, and Joseph clearly decided that the price was too high. Assuming that Joseph was truly a God-honoring, covenant-keeping man, his daily decision to go along with the group-think corruption was clearly covered by God's grace. Even though there may have been repercussions against Joseph in the earthly realm, God swept aside these daily sins by imputing the righteousness of Christ to him, thereby seeing him in his celestial courtroom as having never missed the **natural-law** mark. This is the ultimate reward for participation in the **<u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>**. Even though the sin of collaborating with group-think corruption was ultimately paid in the celestial tally through the redemptive price paid by Christ in the objective-central act of atonement, the repercussions in the realm of human law continue, seemingly reverberating for as long as the injustices in **<u>human law</u>** continue without correction. So under the **<u>natural law</u>**, Joseph has been forgiven. But in the realm of <u>human</u> law, Joseph's collaboration with group-think corruption continues to stand as an example of how God's people can be morally corrupt in their overt actions, and they will still be saved in the final analysis. This appears to be a license to sin given by God to his ultimate in-group. It appears to be a message saying, "It's OK to go along with group think as long as your group is the right group. You can even join the mafia and murder people if your mafia group is the right mafia group. If it's the right group, God will still save you." --- This is obviously the wrong message to take away from this story of Joseph. It's critical to put this story in proper perspective before moving on to examine the next portal.

The **Abrahamic Covenant** is the first covenant in objective-central redemption. As such, it is the foundation for what will eventually metamorphose into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. The **Abrahamic Covenant** is a set of appendments to the pre-existing covenants. Even so, it, and not any of the previous covenants, is the basis for building a society in which God has a direct and unmediated friendship with each miniature sovereign in the society. **Human law**, through which the relationship between God and miniature sovereign is mediated by other humans, will not exist in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. However, the attitudes, thoughts, speech, behaviors, *etc.*, that are encouraged by the biblical prescription of **human law** will be thoroughly established in the endogenous makeup of every miniature sovereign well in advance of their entry into the New Jerusalem niche. They will not fit into this ecological niche unless these standards are hardwired, on a voluntary basis, into the miniature sovereign's core circuitry. In the mean time, **<u>human law</u>** is what has often been called a "necessary evil". But calling it a "necessary evil" doesn't really do justice to the role that **<u>human law</u>** plays in the *law-enforcement epoch*.

Extending these ideas from the context already established by the above wavephysics-based approach to these issues, it's clear that the New-Jerusalem ecological niche is the human race's perpetually existing psychic standing wave, which could also be called the perpetual humanity-wide thought wave. In this perpetual standing wave, each miniature sovereign will have the status of a perpetually extant organismic standing wave. The fact that the **Abrahamic Covenant** is the foundation for the construction of this perpetually existing psychic standing wave also known as the New-Jerusalem ecological niche has huge implications for the understanding of Joseph's sojourn in Egypt.

In Genesis 3:15 there is clearly enmity established between the serpent's "seed" and the woman's "seed". It's clear that the woman's seed refers to the woman's offspring. It's also clear that the serpent's seed refers to the serpent's demonic followers. But when it says "He" (NASB) or "it" (KJV) shall bruise the serpent's head, that demands further parsing of these two sets of seed. The woman's offspring are really divided between those actively involved in opposing the serpent's agenda and those who collaborate with the serpent's agenda. But the nature of the woman's seed is not really even that clear cut, because within every human being who is on the side of bruising the serpent's head, there are parts of that person that collaborate with the serpent and parts that don't. In regards to any given human, whether the human is on the serpent's side or on the Messiah's side depends upon a sovereign act of God that saves that person from ultimate doom. The core issue in any given human's salvation is whether God has sovereignly elected that person, sovereignly regenerated that person, paying that person's debt under the **<u>natural law</u>** through the redemptive act of the Second Person of the Godhead. --- Obviously, the Messiah, the Second Person of the Godhead, is at the core of the Genesis 3:15 prophecy, the Abrahamic Covenant, and the New-Jerusalem perpetual standing wave.

The calculation that Joseph had to go through, subconsciously if not consciously, is something like this:

As a true party to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>, and a true believer in the God of that covenant, I am willingly and voluntarily compelled by my own best inclinations to advance the cause of this covenant in whatever way I can, and in whatever way I'm convinced I'm called. Should I focus on the

universal **<u>natural-rights</u>** angle? --- Given that few if any of these Egyptians are party to the **Abrahamic Covenant**, and the vast majority if not all are therefore doomed, it looks like a focus on the **natural-rights** angle would be superfluous, and therefore a waste of my energy and life. I know that there are people who are not part of what I can see to be Abraham's family who have been called by God to be adoptees into this family and this covenant, and these people have existed from even before Abraham's birth. But I can't tell whether any of these Egyptians are among this company of adoptees or not. I have to proceed based on what is certain, not based on idle speculation. So if there are any adoptees among the Egyptians, I have to assume that God will take care of them. I have to do what he's calling me to do. I have to make the best of my life on this slave farm. I have to do whatever I can to help God's people to prosper. My focus has to be on God and God's people, not on people who are mostly doomed. I have to do what I can to advance the objectivecentral redemption, and not be distracted by any pretense that objectivegeneral redemption is sufficient. Even though concerns about **natural rights** certainly have a place within objective-central redemption, **natural rights** are nowhere near the core of objective-central redemption. The Messiah is the core of objective-central redemption. He determines what is most needful at any given point in time, where need is defined in terms of the cohesiveness of the perpetual New-Jerusalem standing wave. The New-Jerusalem standing wave exists in the Messiah's mind, and through his Word, it is coming into existence on earth. I cannot be concerned about **<u>natural rights</u>** under these circumstances, except those of my own people. Most of the people on this slave farm have no regard for their own **natural rights**, so why should I be concerned about them, especially if my concern about them would be a hazard to myself and to my people, given that the head slave farmer on this slave farm has already proven that he has no regard for **<u>natural rights</u>**, and is willing to abuse mine and those of my people, according to his own discretion.

Essentially, throughout the entirety of the *many-nation epoch*, God's people, meaning the people who are party to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>, must each go through a calculation comparable to this, regarding practically everything each party does. This calculation is essentially about where to draw the line between <u>natural law</u> that is enforced immediately by God and <u>natural law</u> that should be enforced by God through human mediators. Since the beginning of the *many-nation epoch*, there is disagreement about this everywhere. So anyone who takes Genesis 9:6 seriously is inherently on a collision course with the economic interests of slave farmers. Being power people in this world, it's inherently imprudent to make enemies of slave farmers without extremely good reasons. So the survival of

the covenant-keepers needs to enter into the calculation, and such survival may even become the dominant expression in the calculation, as is clearly the case for Joseph. For Joseph, it's best to treat the **natural rights** expression as null or non-existent. The calculation by a party to the **Abrahamic Covenant** who happens to live in the *united States* in the 21st century would have precisely the same priorities, but with somewhat different concerns about slave farmers.

The calculation that every 21st-century American who's party to the <u>Abrahamic</u> <u>Covenant</u> must go through, subconsciously if not consciously, in regards to practically everything this party does, is something like this:

As a true party to the Abrahamic Covenant, and a true believer in the God of that covenant, I am willingly and voluntarily compelled by my own best inclinations to advance the cause of this covenant in whatever way I can, and in whatever way I'm convinced I'm called. Should I focus on the universal **<u>natural rights</u>** angle? --- Given that the gospel was once preached and taught broadly in this country, so much so that some people claim that this country is based on principles derived from the **Messianic Covenant**, and given that this country may now be a pagan country, I can't really tell who in this country is party to the Abrahamic Covenant, and who is not. I have no idea who is doomed and who isn't. All I know is what speech and behavior are compatible with the biblical covenant and what speech and behavior are not. For all I know, many of these people are elect but backslid or unregenerate. Even with all this backsliding and ambiguity, there is absolutely no doubt that the base legal system in this country has been heavily influenced by **natural**rights terms that were once dormant features of the Abrahamic Covenant. In other words, at least in this country, the **<u>natural-rights</u>** agenda that is in fact part of the Abrahamic Covenant can no longer be treated as dormant. It is a real feature of this nation's polity. I cannot therefore assume that it is irrelevant and superfluous. I know that there are people who are not part of what I can see to be Abraham's family who have been called by God to be adoptees into this family and this covenant. In fact, I am one of them. There may be people who have never heard of Abraham or Christ who have been called to be adoptees. God is sovereign, and he can save whomever he wants, so that issue of who he saves is totally out of my hands. But living in accord with the gospel, and administering it wherever I can and in whatever way I'm called, this is what I need to be doing. Under the circumstances this includes the administration of the *natural-rights* agenda. I have to proceed based on what is certain, not based on idle speculation, and not based on circumstances that existed in Joseph's day, but that don't exist in mine. One thing that's

certain is that God takes care of those who have entered into covenant with him, and those he calls are glad to do what he calls them to do. So to whatever extent he calls me to work on the *natural-rights* agenda, I'm glad to do that, and to whatever extent he calls me to work on some other feature of the covenant, I'm glad to do that. I know that the degree to which his people are called to administer some facet of the covenant is a function of giftings and callings. It's certain that the **<u>natural rights</u>** agenda is no longer dormant here, and it would be a huge mistake for me to think otherwise. Even though in many respects this is still a slave farm, in many respects it isn't. I still have to do whatever I can to help God's people and God's agenda to prosper. Under the circumstances, I can't assume that any of these people are doomed, even if they insist on acting like it for the present. Even though objective-central redemption has ceased until Christ's return, and even though it doesn't make sense for me to pretend otherwise, I need to keep building this organism that had its birth in the Abrahamic Covenant. This process of building this organism includes speaking the truth in love about **natural rights** as surely as it includes speaking the truth in love about other aspects of objectivecentral redemption. So I must be concerned about the **<u>natural rights</u>** of all people, even if this is a slave farm, and even if many of these people don't care about their own **<u>natural rights</u>**. Even if the slave farmers are the worst kind of satan-worshipping eugenicists and murderers, these days, in this country, building God's Kingdom on earth necessarily includes the natural rights agenda, even if it's risky. At least it's not as risky as it was for Joseph.

The priorities in this calculation are exactly the same as those of Joseph's calculation. But because the milieu is radically different, the **<u>natural-rights</u>** expression cannot be null or non-existent. Obvious slave farmers have been replaced by cloaked slave farmers who are fraud-mongering eugenicists. Because overt murder is not as acceptable as it once was, these modern-day slave farmers are forced to keep themselves cloaked. Because of technological advances, and because modern slave farmers are much more difficult to identify, they may be far more dangerous to humanity on the whole. But because the united States has a history of having had the **<u>natural-rights</u>** expression built into the calculation, the option of assuming that it's dormant, null, or non-existent no longer exists. This is still a calculation to determine where to draw the line between **natural law** that is enforced immediately by God and **<u>natural law</u>** that is enforced by God through human mediators. Even though things may be different elsewhere, any party to the covenant in the united States who has capacity to think about these things is essentially being given an opportunity to participate in the conversion of this nation from a glorified slave farm into the earth's first genuinely natural-rights observant nation. Given that

the Messiah's day was something that Abraham rejoiced to see (John 8:56), the advent of the first **natural-rights** observant nation is something that Noah rejoiced to see. Given that humans must protect **natural-rights**, the duty to such protection should not be utterly neglected by anyone who calls himself a Christian. There is an opportunity now, a providential prospect, that the slave farm could be anachronized, starting in the *united States*. But this will only happen if Christians understand that they are called to make it happen.

Every statist slave farm has had its own customized approach to livestock management. Regardless of whether the livestock management system is called monarchy, oligarchy, plutocracy, communism, socialism, fascism, democracy, state capitalism, or whatever, as long as group think rather than **<u>natural rights</u>** dominate the concerns of the people running the system, statism reigns, and **natural rights** are abused. Some of these livestock management systems are better than others, because some have more regard for **natural rights** than others. But all of these systems are dominated by group think. This claim is proven by the fact that in each, one group of people, the in-group, always becomes dominant over other groups in a way that violates the **<u>natural rights</u>** of the people in the out-groups. This is true even of livestock management systems that are supposedly based on the so-called "social contract theory of government". Under such social-contract systems, even when the **natural rights** of the founding parties are honored well, the **natural rights** of future generations, and of other people, are not honored. Because this is the case with the system formed by way of the united States Constitution, it's necessary to use the metaconstitution to interpret the Constitution so that the system graduates from being a slave farm.

In concluding this section on the slavery and statism portal, it's fitting to address Paul's treatment of slavery, statism, and distinctions between the <u>Abrahamic</u> and <u>Mosaic</u> covenants, at least in an introductory and cursory way. Regarding statism, the gross misinterpretation of Romans 13:1-7 is now a huge problem in the *united States*, as it was in Nazi Germany. This issue will be addressed in examining another portal.

Like the problem faced by Joseph, slavery and statism were both too entrenched during the early Christian era for the Genesis 9:6 mandate to be brought out of dormancy. Instead, in regards to **natural rights**, the circumstances under the **Christian Covenant** were similar to the circumstances of the patriarchs. Even so, Paul makes it clear in Philemon and 1 Corinthians 7:20-24 that if it's possible for a slave to legally leave the slave condition, then he/she should do so, even though such transition should be low priority relative to being God's friend, as Abraham was God's friend.

In the words of Geerhardus Vos, Paul's

main contention with the Judaizers was that they insisted upon interpreting the patriarchal period on the basis of the Mosaic period. ... [T]hrough ... Abraham the relation between God and Israel was put on a foundation of promise and grace; this could not be subsequently changed¹

Under the Abrahamic Covenant, the global natural-rights laws were dormant, even though they were part of the Abrahamic Covenant as surely as they were global and perpetual. The Abrahamic Covenant was a religious social compact, but its covenantal requirements were so sparse that there's no doubt that it was based on God's promises and God's grace, and not on human performance. In contrast, the **Mosaic Covenant** is so thick with laws that it tends to have the appearance of being based on human performance. Clearly the Judaizers misconceived the Mosaic Covenant as being based on human performance rather than on God's promises and grace. Paul knew that the Judaizers misconstrued the Mosaic Covenant, and he knew that they emphasized human performance at the expense of promises and grace. It's clear that the Pauline approach is that human performance must grow out of promises and grace, not supplant them, diminish them, or usurp them in any way. --- The approach to bringing Genesis 9:6-grounded natural-rights law out of dormancy necessarily follows the Pauline standard. To put the emphasis on human performance is to put the emphasis on group think. This emphasis is a mental act of esteeming the opinions of men more highly than the promises and grace of God. If efforts at bringing **<u>natural-rights</u>** law out of dormancy are to be successful, then the emphasis must be on promises and grace. The emphasis must be on God, because only by genuinely loving God can the image of God in other people be esteemed highly enough to maintain an emphasis on **<u>natural rights</u>** for all people.

Sub-Chapter 6: Genocide Portal

How can a group of people commit genocide against another group, claim to be God's chosen people, and claim to be the bearers of God's prescription of <u>human</u> <u>law</u>, all at the same time? --- This is an oversimplified way of asking the question at the genocide portal. The easy answer is that the <u>natural-rights</u> terms of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> must still be dormant under the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>; so it's OK to commit "genocide". This dormancy answer is not satisfactory for at least two reasons. First, the dormancy claim is not entirely true. Second, even if the

¹ Vos, p. 79.

dormancy claim were true, it would be too facile, because it's one thing for God's covenants to allow parties to be hypocrites, but it's something else entirely for God's covenants to encourage parties to be psychopathic murderers.

Another possible answer to this portal question revolves around group think. Throughout human history, people have been prone to follow the traditions of their group much more than they have been prone to follow **natural law**. So throughout the *many-nation epoch*, group think has been dominant over awareness of **natural law**, awareness of the sovereign Creator of **natural law**, and awareness of **natural rights**. So it's credible to posit group think as the answer to the portal question. --- It's true that the genocide around which this portal question revolves is saturated with group think on all sides. This fact is certainly part of the answer to this portal question, as surely as dormancy is part of the answer. But both dormancy and group think are too facile unless they appear as part of a much larger picture. Even though group think needs to be included in this larger and more thorough answer to this portal question, one of the reasons it is inherently inadequate is because the biblical evidence indicates that the genocide was mandated by God, and was not merely an effect arising out of group think.

After Abraham's descendants and those party to his covenant were in Egypt for over four hundred years; after they were liberated by way of the sovereign acts described in Exodus; after major appendments to the existing covenant were made by way of the **Mosaic Covenant**; and after wandering in the desert for forty years; these parties to this **local** covenant were on the verge of starting the process of taking possession of the land that God had promised to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Now that Abraham's descendants had turned into "a great nation", their **religious social compact** needed its own **geographical jurisdiction**, a **jurisdiction** more permanent than the *ad hoc* territory they occupied in their wanderings. God had promised the patriarchs a specific territory. Now that this wandering nation was finally about to take possession of part of that territory, there was one major obstacle. The territory was already in the possession of seven other nations.

If God's primary purpose in the establishment of the **jurisdiction** of the **Mosaic Covenant** was to make sure that it was explicitly consistent with his **global** prescription of **human law**, then it's clear that God would have had his covenant people use some kind of free-market mechanism for the procuration of the promised land. Perhaps he could have loaded them down with so much wealth that they could simply purchase all that land from the existing inhabitants. Or perhaps God could sovereignly send some variety of plagues to rid the land of the existing inhabitants through "acts of God" unmediated by human hands. Or perhaps the promised land could have become available to the people by some other mechanism that did

not cause the people to violate Genesis 9:6. But God didn't do anything to rid the land of the existing inhabitants in a way that would ensure explicit consistency between Genesis 9:6 and the land procuration. Instead, God had his people employ a strategy for ridding the land of the existing inhabitants that would ensure that his people would go down in history as genocidal murderers. At least they would be so classified by anyone who understood and believed in the bloodshed mandate in Genesis 9:6, and who could not simultaneously see how this genocide was rationally consistent with Genesis 9:6. Obviously, explicit consistency with Genesis 9:6 was not a primary concern in the establishment of the Mosaic Covenant, or in Israel's taking possession of the promised land. Like the Abrahamic Covenant, explicit consistency between the Mosaic Covenant and Genesis 9:6 was not high priority. So Genesis 9:6 remained largely dormant as it pertained to non-parties, even though it was implicitly included as a term of the covenant. The primary concern of the Mosaic Covenant was the unfolding of objective-central redemption. Even though it's true that objective-central redemption was the core issue, somehow, if God is indeed rational, then there must be some way to find rational reconciliation between the bloodshed mandate and the mandate to genocide.

If God's sovereignty is acknowledged as fact, then it follows that if he wants to destroy the entire human race, he can do that without incurring guilt of any kind. If he wants to destroy all but a few people, ditto. If he wants to have one group of people utterly destroy another group of people, thereby using the first group as a medium through which to execute justice under the **<u>natural law</u>** against the second group, ditto. --- The evidence indicates that in the Canaanite genocide, God did in fact use his covenant people as a medium through which to execute justice under the natural law against the indigenous nations. This line of reasoning makes it clear that if God is in fact sovereign, then he suffers no guilt by mandating the Canaanite genocide. Even given this presumption of God's sovereignty, anyone who claims that the Bible has rational integrity still has the burden to prove that there is rational integrity between the bloodshed mandate and the genocide mandate. Somehow, God's execution of justice under the **<u>natural law</u>**, by using humans as secondary causes, must be reconciled with the fact that this particular execution of justice causes these secondary causes to violate the Genesis 9:6 negative-duty clause, i.e., to violate the **<u>natural rights</u>** of those prosecuted.

In order to find such rational consistency between the mandate against bloodshed, on one hand, and the mandate to perpetrate genocide, on the other, it's necessary to remember the priorities established by way of the sequence of events that led up to the genocide. The message of the anarchy portal is that God esteems **<u>natural</u>** <u>**law**</u> much more than <u>**human law**</u>, and he encourages humans to be mediators in

the enforcement of **natural law** only with serious reservations. The message of the group-think portal is that fallen miniature sovereigns would generally rather follow each other than follow God, truth, and natural law. They generally see following the latter as being too much trouble, and as having too few rewards. As is clear in the tree-of-knowledge portal, in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, humans tend to flounder in ignorance and grab for flotsam like drowning men. They demand autonomy on one hand, and are terrified by it on the other. They clearly need leadership. But the Babel episode clearly indicates that the default leaders mis-lead. So God initiated the process of objective-central redemption by way of the **Abrahamic Covenant**. He did this for the sake of supplying a leader who never mis-leads. The first phase of objective-central redemption would culminate in the earthly ministry of the ultimate leader, God manifest in the form of a sinless human being. Between the initiation of the first phase of objective-central redemption via the Abrahamic Covenant, and its consummation in the ultimate objective-central events, God would provide leaders of Abraham's religious social **compact**. These leaders would not be sin-less, but they would at least recognize the superiority of this **religious social compact** over group think. This **religious social compact** would be the foundation for what would eventually metamorphose into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche.

As has been made clear above, because God created miniature sovereigns as social creatures, it's not possible for individual humans to attain the status of perpetual organismic standing waves in isolation. The development of perpetual organismic standing wave status is inherently dependent upon the existence of a perpetual psychic standing wave that encompasses all the miniature sovereigns. This psychic standing wave is necessarily based on agreement between the miniature sovereigns, because overall disagreement is equivalent to incohesiveness / damping, and it would disable the psychic standing wave. But of course this agreement is necessarily based on the truth of the **natural law**, and not on flim-flam or falsity of any kind. There is ample biblical evidence that indicates that the **religious social compact** formed through the **Abrahamic** and **Mosaic** covenants is the foundation for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. The evidence appears in passages like this one:

And the LORD spoke to Moses saying, "Speak to all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say to them: You shall be holy, for I the LORD your God am holy." (Leviticus 19:1)

Even though the human parties to this covenant were fallen, fallible, and prone to miss the mark, the mechanisms necessary to keep the congregation, as a whole, holy, were built into the **social compact**. For this **religious social compact** to

be holy, so much so that it is the foundation for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, it needed to contain some core set of truths from **<u>natural law</u>** as the basis for agreement between the parties. Without such truths, and without such agreement, there is no reason to believe this religious social compact was any better than any of the jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compacts by which it was surrounded. If the existence of such truths and agreement about such truths cannot be established, then it's difficult to see any reason to believe this religious social compact was exceptional, and it's difficult to see why it should be OK for the people of this religious social compact to commit genocide against people of other religious social compacts. In fact, this religious social compact does contain such core truths from **natural law**. The most profound are that God exists, is personal, is holy, keeps covenant, and never violates his own laws. Another profound set of core truths of the Mosaic Covenant is that all human beings are created in God's image, and therefore have *natural rights*. This latter set of core truths was dormant under the **Abrahamic Covenant**, even though they were necessarily terms. As applied to parties, they came out of dormancy under the Mosaic Covenant. As applied to non-parties, they did not come out of dormancy.

As is clear in the above exposition of the *positive-duty clause* and the *negative-duty clause*, the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> most certainly brought these clauses out of dormancy, at least in regards to cases and controversies between parties to the covenant. But if it's a fact that God commanded that parties to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> execute genocide against seven nations, then it's extremely difficult to see how the <u>natural-rights</u> terms of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> came out of dormancy in regard to non-parties. It's obvious that by default all the laws of the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> were intended for covenant insiders, precisely as one would expect of a <u>religious social compact</u> that does not assume its <u>global</u> duties in regards to <u>jural</u> subject matters. The fact that the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> was <u>global</u> did not emerge from dormancy. This is true even though the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of the *negative-duty clause* was articulated in more detail in the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of those <u>Noachian</u> terms remained pertinent only to parties to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, not <u>globally</u>.

In the fortieth year of wandering, after Aaron the high priest died on Mt. Hor (Numbers 20:23-29; 33:38-39), the Canaanite king of Arad fought against Israel. The Israelites "utterly destroyed them and their cities" (Numbers 21:1-3). Without more details, it's difficult to ascertain specifically what is meant by "utterly destroyed them", and whether this destruction was part of a "just war" executed by Israel. But the evidence provided by the record of Israel's subsequent encounters with the indigenous nations is sufficient to show that this utter destruction at Hormah employed the same *modus operandi* as was used throughout the conquest of Canaan.

After the Israelites' victory at Hormah, they migrated to the vicinity of the northeastern shore of the Dead Sea. There they warred against Sihon, the Amorite king of Heshbon. It's important to note that the Israelites deliberately avoided conflict with the Moabites, the Midianites, the Edomites, and the Ammonites during this migration. These groups did not generally inhabit the targeted territory, and they were also distant relatives through Abraham, Lot, and Esau (Genesis 19:36-38; 25:1-6; 36:8-43; Deuteronomy 2). The Israelites' treatment of Sihon and his followers was completely consistent with their treatment of the Canaanites at Hormah. They took Sihon's cities, and they utterly destroyed the men, women, and children, leaving no survivors, in each city (Numbers 21:21-32; Deuteronomy 2:34). If they were attacked, and were therefore justified in retaliating under "just war" theory, it's also clear that they murdered non-combatants. So "just war" claims are not sustainable.

After utterly destroying Sihon and all of his people, the Israelites headed east towards Bashan. It's clear that Bashan's King Og and his followers perceived them as an invasion force. So again, there's no place for "just war" claims. Besides, they treated the Amorite King Og and his followers the same way they treated the Amorite King Sihon. They took all of his cities and utterly destroyed his men, women, and children, leaving no survivors (Numbers 21:33-35; Deuteronomy 3:3-7).

The *modus operandi* in the battles against the Canaanites at Hormah, against the Amorites near Heshbon, and against the Amorites near Bashan, is the same in each case. The Israelites utterly destroyed men, women, and children, leaving no survivors. There is no chance that this genocide can be justified on "just war" terms. --- One outstanding issue that needs to be addressed is whether the Israelites perpetrated this genocide through group think, meaning through their own collective sin and fallibility, or by way of a commandment from God, *i.e.*, through a covenantal obligation. Another issue that must be addressed is, if they did it through covenantal obligation, then why did God command such pitiless and thorough annihilation?

In numerous places in the Pentateuch and Joshua, seven nations are listed as the targets of utter destruction: Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites, Hittites, Hivites, Jebusites, and Perizzites.¹ These seven nations, at least in regard to their inhabitation

¹ In some places six or fewer are listed, as at Exodus 3:8; 13:5; 33:2; 34:11; Deuteronomy 20:17; Joshua 9:1; 11:3; 12:8. At Deuteronomy 7:1; Joshua 3:10; 24:11, all seven are listed.

of the promised land, were slated for utter destruction. Because the statement that God intends to drive these nations out, to destroy them, and to cast them out, is pervasive, it's clear that God is the prime mover of this utter destruction, and the Israelites are intended to be mere secondary causes thereof. It's therefore clear that any claim that the Israelites were perpetrating the genocide through group think simply does not fit the biblical facts. What fits the biblical facts is that Moses and Joshua were not merely speaking on their own authority in directing the genocide, but they were acting as mediators of the covenant. It's clear that as prime mover of the genocide, God had each of these seven nations slated for destruction. But the treatment of ancillary nations is somewhat different, and does not follow the same *modus operandi*.

After the Israelites had conquered Sihon and Og, and were again encamped in the vicinity of the northeastern shore of the Dead Sea,

[T]he people began to play the harlot with the daughters of Moab. For they invited the people to the sacrifices of their gods, and the people ate and bowed down to their gods. So Israel joined themselves to Baal of Peor, and the LORD was angry against Israel. (Numbers 25:1-3)

Midian and Moab worked together to seduce Israel. Some of the Israelites were in fact seduced. As a result, a plague broke out in Israel. The plague was thwarted by capital punishment of those seduced. One of these Israelites brought the Midianite woman who seduced him into the camp. Phinehas killed both the Midianite woman and the Israelite (Num. 25:4-17). So the plague was abated. Thereafter, the LORD commanded Moses to "Be hostile to the Midianites and strike them" (Num. 25:17). The Israelites thereafter went to war against the Midianites, "killed the males", "the five kings of Midian", and Balaam the son of Beor. They did not kill the women or the children, probably because the Midianites were not one of the seven nations (Num. 31:3-10). Afterward, Moses, as mediator of the covenant, had all the male children and all the females who were not virgins killed, because it was the women who had been used to seduce (Num. 31:12-18). --- This shows that during the period of the conquest, the Israelites did not always attempt to utterly annihilate their enemies. Because the Midianites were distant relatives, and because they did not inhabit the targeted territory, they didn't murder the Midianites' virgin daughters. But they murdered the rest of the men, women, and children. The word "murder" is being used here because this was essentially a war of aggression. There was no "just war" basis for it. The Israelites clearly escalated the situation. This claim that it's murder is based on the Bible's global prescription of human law. According to this

global prescription, the Israelites during the conquest were definitely committing mass murder. But it was murder prescribed by God.¹

Even though this is clearly mass murder under the Bible's prescription of **global human law**, the fact that it is murder mandated by God as part of the authority of his holy covenant changes the overall nature of the murders entirely. As Vos says,

The statement that God commands Abraham to offer up Isaac distinctly implies that in the abstract the sacrifice of a human being cannot be condemned on principle. It is well to be cautious in committing oneself to that critical opinion for it strikes at the very root of the atonement.²

Even though humans are obligated to obey the **global** prescription of **human law**, God is not. God knows who is saved and who is not. Humans don't. God also knows what humans deserve to die, how, and when. Despite arrogant claims to the contrary, humans don't know such things, except when the **global** prescription of **human law** leads clearly to capital punishment.³ God also knows what nations deserve to be exterminated, how, and when. Generally, humans don't know such things. However, if God clearly communicates to some human or group of humans that he wants such human or group of humans to act as secondary cause in his termination of one or more human lives, then anyone who values their friendship with God needs to do as he directs. With this said, it's important to note that when objective-central redemption ended, so did God's extraordinary callings to murder.⁴ This leads one to question why such God-ordained murders were included as part of the process of objective-central redemption.

God's explanation for the Canaanite genocide has been given explicitly:

"Do not say in your heart when the LORD your God has driven them out ... 'Because of my righteousness the LORD has brought me in to possess this land,' but **it** *is because of the wickedness of these nations that* the LORD is dispossessing ... It is not for your righteousness or for the uprightness of your heart that you are going to possess their land, but **it** *is because of the wickedness of these nations that* the LORD your God is

¹ Because the perpetrators are all long dead, no 21st-century human has any basis for calling for justice against any living human or group of humans based on this genocide. This is at least true under the prescription of **global human law**, which would be the only *lawful* basis for such a claim.

² Vos, p. 92.

³ Which, by its nature, includes the prosecution of "just war".

⁴ How and why this is the case should be clear through examination of the subsequent portals in this *motive clause* chapter.

driving them ..., *in order to confirm the oath* which the LORD swore to ... Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Know, then, ... you are a stubborn people." (Deuteronomy 9:4-6, *emphases* added)

This clearly shows that God demanded that these seven nations be eliminated from the promised land because they were wicked, and he did not want this prototype of the New-Jerusalem niche polluted by this evil influence. It's also clear that driving them out was a necessary precursor to giving the Israelites undisputed possession of the promised land. --- The claim that these nations were wicked begs the question: What's the nature of such evil? Moses clearly answers that question:

> "When the LORD your God cuts off before you the nations which you are going in to dispossess, and you dispossess them and dwell in their land, beware that you are not ensnared to follow them, after they are destroyed before you, and that you do not inquire after their gods, saying, 'How do these nations serve their gods, that I also may do likewise?' You shall not behave thus toward the LORD ..., for every abominable act which the LORD hates they have done for their gods; for they even burn their sons and daughters in the fire to their gods." (Deuteronomy 12:29-31)

So each of these seven nations was guilty of abominable acts, the most prominent class of such acts being child sacrifice. They roasted their children the same way Israelites offered animals as burnt offerings. Moses continues:

"When you enter the land which the LORD your God gives you, you shall not learn to imitate the detestable things of those nations. There shall not be found among you anyone who makes his son or his daughter pass through the fire, one who uses divination, one who practices witchcraft, or one who interprets omens, or a sorcerer, or one who casts a spell, or a medium, or a spiritist, or one who calls up the dead. For whoever does these things is detestable to the LORD; and because of these detestable things the LORD your God will drive them out before you. You shall be blameless before the LORD your God. For those nations, which you shall dispossess, listen to those who practice witchcraft and to diviners, but as for you, the LORD your God has not allowed you *to do* so." (Deuteronomy 18:9-14)

So abominable acts included not only child sacrifice, but also divination, witchcraft, interpretation of omens, sorcery, casting spells, being a medium, being a spiritist, and necromancy. It also included giving heed to such witchcraft and divination.¹

¹ Given the nature of the 613 *mitzvot* that rabbinical Jews often see in the *Torah*, many of which are based on reliable exegesis, there are certainly other abominable acts in

--- It's important to notice a crucial distinction here. The distinction is that roasting children is murder, and is therefore a *delict* under Genesis 9:6; but none of these other classes of witchcraft and divination is a *delict*. It's clear that the **Mosaic Covenant** gloms *delicts* together with prohibitions that arise as **local** terms of the covenant, as though these two kinds of terms were unworthy of distinction. So *delicts* and *delict*-free *mala in se* (*mala prohibita*) were not distinguished under the **Mosaic** regime. ----If the witchcraft and divination classes of *mala prohibita* are detestable, abominable, and evil, it's because they are first idolatrous. The same is true of *delicts* like murder,¹ but *delicts* are violations of **natural rights**, whereas *delict*-free *mala in se* are not. Making these distinctions was clearly not paramount in those days. It was far more important to the covenant, meaning to all parties thereto, to distinguish syncretistic activities in perspective, both those that are *delictual* and those that are not, it's important to return to this basic question: What does it mean to "eat from it" (Genesis 2:17)?

As indicated above, Genesis 2:17 is highly symbolic and metaphorical. This fact has profound implications for the understanding of syncretism. --- "Eat" in Genesis 2:17 simply refers to input. Given that syncretism is the attempted reconciliation and merger of the terms and practices of distinct religious social compacts, syncretism involves both input and output, both in regard to one or more individual humans within the given social compact and in regard to the given social compact as a unit. For example, if the Girgashites practice of necromancy is treated by a party to the **Mosaic Covenant** as something worthy of assimilation, then this party would go out of his/her way to learn how to practice necromancy. Whatever he/she learned would be input. Because humanity in general suppresses the truth of God's existence, whatever spirits the foreign practitioner calls up is likely to be demonic. So the potential for reconciling the foreign practice and the God-centeredness of the **Mosaic Covenant**, and to do so without diminishing the God-centeredness, is extremely low. The position of the Mosaic Covenant is that it's impossible, and should not be attempted by any party. So when the party goes to learn necromancy at some kind of necromancy ceremony, the events at that ceremony are input into the party's perceptual system. Because the inputs are not processed in such a way as to maintain God-centeredness, these inputs are essentially poison, meaning improperly or inadequately processed stress. These inputs are a kind of food that cannot be properly digested. They generally therefore act as a kind of poison. Such inputs

addition to these.

¹ This is evident by the fact that valuing anything more than God is idolatry, and idolatry is the core sin.

generally enhance damping / incohesiveness in the mental and physical spheres. So going to a necromancy ceremony is essentially opening a portal for the processing of input, where the perceiver lacks the endogenous equipment necessary for the proper processing of the input.

It's crucial to understand the relationship between this prohibition of syncretism and wave cohesiveness. If the input were processed properly, then the proper processing would be evidence that the syncretist knew what he/she needed to know when he/she needed to know it, and did what he/she needed to do when he/she needed to do it, so that the syncretist didn't suffer from damping / incohesiveness, where need is defined in terms of avoidance of damping / incohesiveness. Complete avoidance of damping / incohesiveness is not available in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. So how does the syncretist deal with such imperfection? The **Mosaic** solution to this problem is to avoid syncretism entirely, even to the point of killing anyone caught trying it. Under such circumstances, any party contemplating the intake of dubious inputs needed to do some serious analysis of the risks, costs, and benefits, beforehand.

Although it's certain that the system of biblical covenants starting with the **Abrahamic Covenant** was promulgated for the sake of objective-central redemption, it's also crucial to understand that this system of covenants was also promulgated as a system that would eventually metamorphose into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. This means that the society formed by way of the **Mosaic Covenant** had a collective thought wave, and this collective thought wave was intended by God to eventually become a fully coherent perpetual standing wave. The core truths of the covenant would act as the core coherence for this standing wave. Because these core truths never change, the standing wave should be perpetual. This fact about the core nature of the **Mosaic Covenant** has profound implications for the whole process of syncretization and fusion of different systems of belief and practice. It also has huge implications for any attempt at justifying the Canaanite genocide.

As Vos said, "Under the providence of God each race or nation has a positive purpose to serve, fulfillment of which depends on relative seclusion from others."¹ There is ample biblical evidence that shows that this claim is true. But there is nevertheless this major problem in explaining how to reconcile this claim with the **Mosaic Covenant**'s severe anti-syncretism. Merely claiming that the anti-syncretism exists to ensure "relative seclusion from others" does not suffice, because this covenant is the prototype for the New-Jerusalem niche, which inherently requires that all these sundry nations be syncretistically united into a single belief system. This

¹ Vos, p. 60.

predicament is resolved by recognizing two things: (i)There's a distinction between nations that arise out of the Bible's <u>local</u> covenants and nations that do not arise out of these <u>local</u> covenants. (ii)The <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> had this severe anti-syncretism as a necessary prerequisite to the advent of the Messiah on earth.

(i) The biblical covenants are based on core truths that are in many respects held uniquely by nations based on such covenants. For example, among such core truths are, God exists, is personal, is holy, keeps covenant, and never violates his own laws.¹ In contrast to this, for example, the culture out of which Pythagoras arose is missing numerous of these core truths. Likewise, the philosophy and mathematics that he developed based on whatever data were available to him in his culture, also missed such core truths. Because his system lacked these core truths, and for numerous other reasons as well, his system doesn't qualify as the prototype for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. Even so, because the Pythagorean Theorem is fundamental to modern mathematics, his school stands as evidence of how "each race or nation has a positive purpose to serve". Something very similar to what is being said here about Pythagoras' mathematics can be said about Aristotle's logic. Such logic and mathematics are not mere vain creations of heathens that need to be offscoured with the heathens themselves. They are truths of **<u>natural law</u>** that were discovered by people who were alien to the local covenants. Because all truth is God's truth, syncretism in regard to such truth is appropriate. At least it's appropriate in the overall scheme of things. Because the Israelites at the time of the Canaanite conquest had such a shallow grasp of the core truths of their covenant, and the covenant mediator certainly knew well about their shallowness, it was necessary to make severe anti-syncretism a hard and fast rule. This fits neatly with the fact that the primary and immediate purpose of the **Mosaic Covenant** was not to pose as the foundation of the New-Jerusalem niche, but it was to prepare for the advent of the Messiah through objective-central redemption, the core of which was the Messiah himself. Syncretism would need to wait until after the Messiah's ascension. After that, it could be carried on only with great care focused specifically at maintaining the God-centeredness of the religious social compact. --- In conclusion, when Vos says that "each race or nation has a positive purpose to serve", it must be true that such "positive purpose" pertains to some non-core aspect of **<u>natural law</u>**, with the exception of nations that arise out of the local covenants, whose "positive purpose" pertains primarily to core aspects of **<u>natural law</u>**, and to non-core aspects only in a very secondary sense.

¹ Any Reformed systematic theology should provide a more exhaustive list of such core truths.

(ii) The Messiah is holy. To come to earth as a human being, it's necessary for him to come as a social being. To exist as a social being, there must be basic agreements that allow the society to exist. For a holy being to exist in a society, the society must at least have commitments to such holiness. Otherwise there would be too much friction for the Messiah to even grow up in such a society. To prepare this society for the advent, it took hundreds of years and monumental strife. It also took severe anti-syncretism. If the people had been tampering with syncretism, as though such tampering were OK, it would essentially be the destruction of the covenantal walls, the destruction of **jurisdictional** boundaries, and the loss of the milieu conducive to the advent. Severe anti-syncretism was therefore absolutely crucial to the establishment of the proper environment for the advent of the Messiah and the consummation of objective-central redemption.

Only by recognizing the importance of objective-central redemption and the importance of this prototype of the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, is it possible to fully excuse the Canaanite genocide. If this **religious social compact**'s collective thought wave is a genuinely coherent perpetual psychic standing wave, then this organism created by way of this covenant must operate cognitively in a way that is similar to the way a perpetual organismic standing wave must operate. In other words, the basic *modus operandi* of the individual organismic standing wave is identical to the *modus operandi* of the collective thought wave. The mechanism that allows the individual organismic standing wave to be perpetual is the same as the mechanism that allows the collective thought wave to be perpetual. To be perpetual, the society must know what it needs to know when it needs to know it, so that it does what it needs to do it, so that the collective standing wave does not suffer from unmitigated damping / incohesiveness.

Because positing the collective thought wave as though it were an organism appears on its face to concede the validity of group think, it's important to delineate distinctions here. Group think has no inherent commitment to **natural law**. It therefore has an inherent propensity to social disintegration. Once the herd is running fast in the direction of going over the cliff, the herd is clearly aimed at disintegration. Agreement, by itself, cannot change **natural law** any more than an edict from a tyrant can change **natural law**. --- In contrast to group think, a perpetually existing collective thought wave must recognize the cliff and turn from it before going over it. It must take recognition of **natural law** as crucial to its perpetuity. As a subset of this emphasis on **natural law**, there must necessarily be a commitment to **jurisdictional** boundaries, which necessarily entails a commitment to **natural rights**. --- Now that this collective standing wave is distinguished from group think, it's necessary to see the implications for the Canaanite genocide. In order for the Canaanite genocide to be justified, it's necessary for there to be certainty that what God was doing by mandating the genocide was justified. This begs the question, What was God doing by mandating the genocide? --- In mandating the Canaanite genocide, God was doing what was necessary under the *modus operandi* of a perpetually existing collective thought wave. The people party to the **Mosaic Covenant** did not know what they needed to know when they needed to know it, so that they did what they needed to do when they needed to do it, so that each party, as an individual organismic standing wave would have a perpetual existence. This failure goes with being fallen creatures who are destined to die. But the **Mosaic Covenant** was intended to establish a perpetual collective thought wave that would not succumb to damping / incohesiveness, ever. Given the propensity to disintegration, the depravity of the human race at the time, and the prevalence of group-think based societies at the time, the damping / incohesiveness that would need mitigation would be massive.

Essentially, no other social compact on earth has ever had the prerequisites for a perpetual existence. All other social compacts have been designed by their creators and maintainers to either disintegrate or be assimilated into Bible-based social compacts. Regardless of human intentions, they're all either destined for assimilation into a secular social compact or complete disintegration.¹ So when Vos says that "each race or nation has a positive purpose to serve", it must be admitted that "positive purpose" can have a rather Machiavellian definition. Did each of these seven nations that practiced ritual murder have a "positive purpose"? Only in the sense that Hitler and Nazism had a "positive purpose". Hitler led groupthink sheep over the cliff. Given a few more A-bombs, it could have easily led to the complete annihilation of the German people. The Allies would have done this if they had thought it necessary to their survival. Likewise, God covenantally mandated the annihilation of the seven nations because at least trying to drive them out of the Mosaic social compact's designated geographical jurisdiction was a necessary prerequisite to the perpetual existence of this society's collective standing wave. A standard needed to be established: "We will not tolerate these things on the geographical jurisdiction of our religious social compact." This legal posture was a necessary precursor to establishing the religious social compact's perpetual existence. The Mosaic Covenant essentially created a social organism, and this organism is a standing wave, and for this organism to exist perpetually, it must know what it needs to know when it needs to know it, so that it does what it

¹ This is not a prescription of what should happen. It is a description of what has been happening and what will continue happening all the way to the gates of the New-Jerusalem ecological niche.

needs to do when it needs to do it, where need is defined in terms of avoiding and mitigating damping / incohesiveness. All they needed to know at the time of the Canaanite conquest was that all the religious practices of the seven nations were evil, and these nations had to be eliminated without mercy. Because the entire redemption was dependent upon the existence of this perpetual collective standing wave, the needs of this standing wave took priority over the **natural rights** of those in the seven nations. The merciless annihilation of those seven nations for the sake of redemption through this perpetual collective standing wave was much better than no redemption at all.

Although it's true that this covenant is absolutely crucial to the ultimate survival of any human, it's also true that its human parties are fallen, fallible, and error prone. This Mosaic society is therefore vulnerable to being led astray by the parties' propensity to group think. This is precisely why the history of these people appears to manifest as much foolishness as any other history. But this history also shows the difficulty of this portal, which is something that no other people group has faced. The demand that God made on these people is that they be holy, even as he is holy, and that they act as impartial instruments of justice against the seven nations, the same way the wind, waves, and water was God's impartial instrument of justice during the flood. Part of the portal question involves whether they would be capable of that kind of impartiality. It is the same kind of impartiality that's required of a court in the execution of justice against a *delict*. As indicated by Deuteronomy 7:16, the covenant people were called to this objective, pitiless approach to the seven nations. But as Psalm 106:33-40 indicates, they were not very successful at it. The modus operandi used in the Canaanite conquest under Joshua was the same as the modus operandi that had been initiated in the Transjordan under Moses. But the people had only partial success. Even so, as one would expect of a social standing wave destined for perpetual existence, and as confirmed by biblical passages like Genesis 50:20 and Romans 8:28, the basic knowledge gained by this portal is that the perpetual existence of this line of covenants is more important to human life than anything except God himself. So the perpetual existence of this line of covenants is certainly more important than **<u>global</u>** <u>**natural**</u> <u>**rights**</u>. This is true even though it may also be true that there are numerous parties to the **Mosaic Covenant** who sell out to group think, and who are even prone to psychopathy of the most tragic sort.

The same way God can sovereignly save individuals, God can sovereignly save **social compacts**. God sovereignly chose to establish the Mosaic **social compact** by destroying the **social compacts** of those seven nations. Because God is God, God can choose to execute such destruction by whatever secondary causes God pleases. God can destroy displeasing humans by flood as a secondary cause, or God

can destroy them by using other humans as secondary cause. The message of the mandated Israelite extermination of all the existing inhabitants of the promised land is clear: God is sovereign over every human soul, over every human body, and over every human social compact. God is not obligated to abide by the human law that God mandates humans to live by. To lay the foundations for objective-central redemption, God mandated that the human parties to a specific social compact violate the **human law** that God mandated they generally obey. God did this for the sake of establishing a **social compact** destined for permanent standing wave status. The enforcement of the **<u>natural rights</u>** subset of the moral-law leg of the <u>**natural**</u> law tripod would be necessarily trumped, during this period of objective-central redemption that preceded the Messiah's advent, by the most important subset of the moral-law leg, the subset pertinent to humanity's relationship with God. During this unique era, the **<u>natural rights</u>** subset of the moral-law leg would be so utterly trumped that the mandate to enforce **natural rights** would be utterly ignored for the sake of establishing a social compact dedicated primarily to the humanrelationship-with-God subset of the moral-law leg. Without this unique occasion, it's unlikely that this social compact would have ever been established. This was a unique situation that has never existed since. There is no reason to think that it could ever exist again.

Because it was God who created *natural rights*, and God who mandated their protection, only God has authority to override them. Natural rights create limits and obligations for humans, and only for humans. Because God mandated the genocide, it was not a violation of **natural law**, but an enforcement of it. The Mosaic Covenant established a prototype of the kind of society in which all parties honor God above all else, and all parties honor the image of God in all other parties. A society based on these priorities is based on something that is utterly contrary to a society based on group think. Group think esteems the opinions of men more highly than **<u>natural law</u>**, truth, and God. In fact, <u>**natural rights**</u> can be esteemed to the exclusion of **<u>natural law</u>** in general, holistic truth, and the prime mover behind it all. This is the underlying message of the group-think portal: Beware! Natural rights can be turned into an idol just like virtually all other aspects of creation. Because of this fact that **natural rights** can be thus perverted, in the *many-nation* epoch, it's necessary for God to deal with humans on the extremely crude basis to which they have devolved. Humans have devolved to a status at which they worship all kinds of idols, and at which they trash **<u>natural rights</u>** even to the point of sacrificially roasting children. Against this backdrop, to lay a foundation for objective-central redemption and the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, God built this psychic standing wave from scratch, starting with one person, Abraham. God did not do this to make these people better than other people, although that may be

a side effect. He did this for the sake of objective-central redemption and the New-Jerusalem niche. These people, then and now, are only good to the extent that they are utterly committed to these purposes.

Sub-Chapter 7: Theocracy-Monarchy Portal

After the seven nations were more-or-less subdued, after each of the Israelite tribes was more-or-less settled in its designated territory, and after Moses and Joshua were both dead, the people of the **Mosaic Covenant** were left in the conquered land trying to figure out how to make their society function. The society was **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** primarily because of the general ignorance and group think of the people, rather than because of any alleged flaw in the **Mosaic Covenant**. Under this **religious social compact**, the people did not have a government in the ordinary sense of the word. They did not have a monarchy, an oligarchy, a plutocracy, or any of the numerous other kinds of political structures that generally dominate statist societies. Theologians usually call this polity a "theocracy", but this description fails to adequately describe how this polity was supposed to operate.

For 350 or more years after Joshua's death, the people of the **Mosaic Covenant** existed in a kind of malaise. As described in the Book of Judges, this entire period can be characterized by a single cyclical process. The cycle goes like this: First, a preponderance of Israelites indulged in syncretism with regard to the nations that they failed to adequately drive out, and with regard to the nations by which they were surrounded. Because the Israelites lacked the endogenous equipment to properly process such syncretistic input, they fell deep into idolatry. They became alienated from God. God providentially corrected them by delivering them over to their foreign oppressors. The people repented and cried out to God for help. God providentially provided a leader (a "judge") to lead the people out of the foreign oppression. God delivered them, and there was peace for a time. The leader died, and shortly thereafter the cycle started another iteration. --- In the Book of Judges, this cycle repeats twelve times, once for each such leader.

There are two refrains that are used to characterize this apparent addiction: (i)"[T]he sons of Israel did evil in the sight of the LORD".¹ (ii)"In those days there was no king in Israel; everyone did what was right in his own eyes".² These two refrains mark a need to identify how things should have been relative to how they were. On one hand, the Israelites were immersing themselves in flawed syncretism.

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¹ Judges 2:11; 3:7,12; 4:1; 6:1; 10:6; 13:1.

² Judges 17:6; 21:25.

On the other, they were doing as they pleased; what they pleased did not satisfy the obligations for which they volunteered under the **Mosaic Covenant**; and they had no group-think based government mandating that they do otherwise. This situation deserves comparison to two alternatives. The most obvious alternative is the alternative that actually happened, the metamorphosis of this neurotic cycle into a monarchy. The other alternative would have required that the people diligently observe their duties under the **Mosaic Covenant**, especially the Genesis 9:6 mandate to the extent that it clearly awakened from dormancy under the **Mosaic Covenant**. This other alternative was what the people actually obligated themselves to do by volunteering to be party to the **Mosaic Covenant**. The monarchy alternative was a kind of booby prize available upon the condition that the people failed to adequately keep their covenantal obligations.

The Israelite polity during this period between the death of Joshua and the inauguration of the monarchy was essentially a loosely knit confederation. As exemplified by all the problems suffered by the united States under the Articles of Confederation, confederations that are knit too loosely are inherently prone to precisely the kind of malaise suffered by the Israelites under the judges. The American founders tried to solve this problem by trying to change from a loosely knit confederation under the Articles of Confederation into a more centralized but restricted government that some called a "confederate republic".¹ This American system has certainly not been perfect, largely because it has inadequately minded the universal recognition of **<u>natural rights</u>**. The Israelite polity after the settlement of the promised land suffered from largely the same inadequacy. But because **natural rights** were much more dormant in the Israelite mind during this period, their ability to construct viable, **jurisdictionally** functional government based on **natural rights** was even more foreign. But if the Israelites had stuck to the covenant, and had been thorough and rational in their interpretation of it, the resulting confederacy would have been practical enough to eliminate the need for the monarchy.

When the people demanded of Samuel, "Now appoint a king for us to judge us like all the nations" (1 Samuel 8:5), it would have been reasonable for Samuel to respond, "Judge yourselves by implementing the covenant that you entered." Clearly, these people were too ignorant to make their covenant work. They knew it. Samuel knew it. God knew it. --- Because the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> did not call for a strict distinction between <u>jural societies</u> and <u>ecclesiastical societies</u>; because

¹ **Federalist Papers**, Madison's Federalist Paper #43, "The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (continued)"; Hamilton's Federalist #9, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection"; both citing Montesquieu's **The Spirit of Laws** (1748).

it did not mark a strict distinction between legal actions ex delicto and legal actions ex contractu; because it did not call for the universal recognition of **natural rights**; and because it did not distinguish "just war" from war of annihilation; the people of this 350-year, ante-monarchial period were at a huge disadvantage relative to Christians in the Christian era. Nevertheless, the terms of their covenant would have been sufficient for them to construct a viable, strongly knitted confederacy, if they had stuck to the terms of the covenant diligently, and applied them rationally. But the people during this period failed to develop rationally consistent responses to delicts, and to Genesis 9:6 damage in general. Out of the impetus to form vigilance committees, this Israelite society should have formed a system of police that would be in constant existence regardless of whatever else may have been going on in the society. Likewise, out of the impetus to defend the society against external attack, this Israelite society should have formed militias that had a constant existence regardless of whatever else may have been going on in the society. Out of such social structures a strongly knitted confederacy should have developed naturally, if the society had been composed predominantly of people committed to rationally applying the underlying principles. Because these Israelites had access to the Torah, they had access to Genesis 1-11, and they had access to the idea that God created all people with **<u>natural rights</u>**.¹ But because they also had a need to avoid syncretism, to the point of committing genocide for the sake of such avoidance, they were unable to reconcile the need for universal recognition of **natural rights** with the need to avoid syncretism. So building the **<u>natural-rights</u>** based society was not as much an option for them as it now is for 21st-century Americans. Even so, this period under the judges was to the monarchy what the *anarchy era* was the *law-enforcement* epoch. Through an object lesson, God has communicated that he prefers this kind of **natural-rights** based confederacy over a slave farm. As surely as it's still true that God prefers unmediated, one-to-one relationships with his miniature sovereigns, over relationships mediated by other humans, it's also true that he prefers a **<u>natural</u>**rights based confederacy over a slave farm.

By forgoing the **<u>natural-rights</u>** based confederacy, the Israelites made the following kind of bargain: Rather than see God in every person, and base the

¹ It's important to note that Jonathan Edwards is probably right when speaking of the period of Jewish history immediately after the Babylonian Exile: "The work of redemption was carried on and promoted during this period, by greatly multiplying the copies of the law, ... It is evident, that before the captivity, there were but few copies of the law." ---- Edwards, **History**, p. 566. --- So even though it's true that the people of this "theocratic" period had the *Torah*, it's also true that they didn't have many copies of it, and were therefore not properly equipped to be the vigilantes and militiamen that are necessary to a **natural-rights**-based polity.

political system on that recognition, they would opt for pretending that one fallen human is God, and all must be subservient thereto. In other words, the people would opt for monarchy, which is just another kind of slave farm that's prone to idolatry. So according to this analysis, the Israelites during this era were on the horns of a dilemma, and the dilemma was between making the confederation work correctly, on one hand, and a slave farm, on the other. Of course, this is not exactly the way Christian theologians usually see this situation. This is usually treated as a dilemma between theocracy and monarchy, as articulated in 1 Samuel 8:4-22a:

> Then all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at Ramah; and they said to him, "Behold, you have grown old, and your sons do not walk in your ways. Now appoint a king for us to judge us like all the nations." But the thing was displeasing in the sight of Samuel when they said, "Give us a king to judge us." And Samuel prayed to the LORD. And the LORD said to Samuel, "Listen to the voice of the people in regard to all that they say to you, for they have not rejected you, but they have rejected Me from being king over them. Like all the deeds which they have done since the day that I brought them up from Egypt even to this day-- in that they have forsaken Me and served other gods-- so they are doing to you also. Now then, listen to their voice; however, you shall solemnly warn them and tell them of the procedure of the king who will reign over them."

> So Samuel spoke all the words of the LORD to the people who had asked of him a king. And he said, "This will be the procedure of the king who will reign over you: he will take your sons and place them for himself in his chariots and among his horsemen and they will run before his chariots. And he will appoint for himself commanders of thousands and of fifties, and some to do his plowing and to reap his harvest and to make his weapons of war and equipment for his chariots. He will also take your daughters for perfumers and cooks and bakers. And he will take the best of your fields and your vineyards and your olive groves, and give them to his servants. And he will take a tenth of your seed and of your vineyards, and give to his officers and to his servants. He will also take your male servants and your female servants and your best young men and your donkeys, and use *them* for his work. He will take a tenth of your flocks, and you yourselves will become his servants. Then you will cry out in that day because of your king whom you have chosen for yourselves, but the LORD will not answer you in that day."

Nevertheless, the people refused to listen to the voice of Samuel, and they said, "No, but there shall be a king over us, that we also may be like all the nations, that our king may judge us and go out before us and fight our battles." Now after Samuel had heard all the words of the people, he repeated them in the LORD's hearing. And the LORD said to Samuel, "Listen to their voice, and appoint them a king."

This passage clearly portrays God as the *de jure* King of the Israelites. This is in fact implicitly the same claim made by any genuinely **natural-rights** based confederacy. The recognition of **natural rights** is based on the recognition that all humans are created in the image of God, which necessarily requires the recognition of God as King over all of creation.¹ So this theodicy is claiming that the **natural-rights** based confederacy posited in the above *metaconstitution* is in fact a theocracy; although the recognition and acknowledgement that it is in fact a theocracy is purely voluntary.² Even though the confederation described by Judges was a theocracy, and was inherently dependent upon voluntary action and contractual obligations, the Israelites were too jaded to recognize and acknowledge all these rational connections sufficiently enough to make the confederation viable. This jading is a terse explanation for their choice in this dilemma.

Deuteronomy 17:8 indicates that if any case or controversy is too difficult, regardless of whether it's *ex delicto* or *ex contractu*, a *delict* or a *delict*-free *malum in se*, if the dispute is heard within the vigilance committee's designated court and found to be too difficult, then the vigilance committee should take the case "to the Levitical priest or the judge who is *in office* in those days", and the vigilance committee should inquire *of them*".³ After the judge or priest passes verdict in the case, the vigilance committee is to execute the judgment with diligence. --- This shows that a rudimentary appellate process was built into the Mosaic <u>religious</u> <u>social compact</u>, which is evidence that the Mosaic system was indeed calling for a <u>natural-rights</u> based confederacy that was in fact a theocracy. This preference for confederation based on the vigilance of the people, giving rise to local courts, which give rise to a system of appellate justice, where this system of justice exists

¹ Even though these claims are true, it's nevertheless critical to allow people to believe in <u>natural rights</u> without believing in God. To do otherwise is to conflate <u>secular</u> and <u>religious social compacts</u>. If they refuse to believe in <u>natural rights</u>, they should be allowed to exercise that refusal as long as they don't violate <u>natural rights</u>.

² The voluntary nature of and recognition that the *metaconstitution* is a theocracy exists by way of the strict distinction between the **secular social compact** and the **religious social compact**.

³ Deuteronomy 17:9.

in parallel with the covenantally obligatory **religious** practices, is what theologians have generally called the "theocracy". But the same way that God made provision for bad choices at each of the previous portals, he made provision for bad choices at this portal. If it's accepted that the following is the basic question at this portal, then it follows that all the tragic history of the Israelite dynasties is the answer to the question:

What happens when God's covenant people reject Him as the *de jure* King over them, and adopt a fallen human as king instead?

Even in the same chapter of Deuteronomy, God makes provision for the failure of the confederacy by indicating prophetically that the preferred confederacy would be replaced by a kind of booby prize, the Israelite monarchy.

Even though the **Mosaic Covenant** had to keep the **global** nature of **natural <u>rights</u>** in abeyance, for the sake of discouraging syncretistic inclinations for which the people were ill prepared, Deuteronomy 17:2-13 clearly indicates that legal structures were built into the Mosaic Covenant that would have facilitated the development of a non-group-think based polity. If the people had had the heart for it, they could have stuck to the Mosaic Covenant closely and still developed this kind of polity. In spite of the fact that **<u>natural rights</u>** came only partially out of dormancy in the Mosaic Covenant, the people's failure to develop this kind of polity was not primarily because of a legal or covenantal failure. It was because of heart failure. The Mosaic Covenant brought the Genesis 9:6 mandate out of the complete dormancy that it was in under the Abrahamic Covenant. But it came out of dormancy only in regard to parties to the Mosaic Covenant. So it was only partially out of dormancy. The global in personam jurisdiction of the global covenant was not given any practical consideration, because that would have been far too idealistic. It would have required the people to attempt to solve syncretistic problems beyond their capacity. Merely bringing the subject matter of the **global** mandate out of dormancy within their own Mosaic camp was the full extent of their capacity and obligation in this regard, at least at that time. But this partial release from dormancy called for the formation of vigilance committees and militias, as well as this system of appeals. The prerequisite for vigilance committees is the existence of vigilantes, *i.e.*, of people who care enough about the **<u>natural rights</u>** of other people to execute justice against violators. A similar prerequisite exists for the existence of militias. People who don't care about God are unlikely to care about the image of God in other people, and are unlikely to offer defense of the *imago Dei*

in anyone. This kind of sociopathy is probably the root cause of the failure of the ante-monarchial confederacy. This is confirmed by the final verse in Judges.¹

The Book of Judges ends with the refrain, "In those days there was no king in Israel; everyone did what was right in his own eyes". According to Romans 1, "right in his own eyes" should be interpreted as meaning that the eyes themselves were subject to **natural-law**-violating delusion. Everyone's eyes colluded with his/her delusional propensity to suppress the truth. "[E]veryone" was ignoring his/her duties under the religious social compact, and everyone was doing what his/her private worldview told him/her to do. So everyone was ignoring his/her Genesis 9:6-related duties, and the theocratic confederation was going dysfunctional. One of the reasons this malaise went on for so long is because there was a taboo in ante-monarchial Israel against setting up any fallen human as king over Israel. Evidence of this taboo appears in several passages. In Judges 8:23 Gideon says, "I will not rule over you, nor shall my son rule over you; the LORD shall rule over you". This comports with the claim that God prefers a one-to-one relationship with all of his creatures, so that **natural law** unmediated by **human law** is God's preference. Other passages clearly indicate that God is Israel's true King, not any fallen creature.² In spite of these barriers to the abandonment of the theocratic confederacy, other prophetic passages clearly indicate that Israel would eventually have a human king.³

In contrast to this clear exposition of what the covenantal priorities are, and of why this history unfolded as it did, Bible expositors have traditionally posited other explanations for this transition into monarchy. For example, according to the **New Geneva Study Bible**,

It is not that Israel is never to have a human monarch, for a king has long been anticipated. What is objectionable is for the people to want a king 'like all the nations' (8:5), because this desire is a rejection of ... God Himself (8:7).⁴

¹ As indicated above, it's certainly possible for people to extract the concept of **<u>natural</u> <u>rights</u>** from the biblical context, and to create humanistic systems based on such <u>**rights**</u>, to the exclusion of God. This clearly converts <u>**natural rights**</u> into an idol. This was probably one of the underlying problems in the Babel society. The fact that <u>**natural rights**</u>, as part of creation, can be converted into an idol, is no good reason for Christian theologians to convert <u>**natural rights**</u> into a theological anathema.

² Example: 1 Samuel 8:7; 12:12; Psalm 5:2; Malachi 1:14.

³ Genesis 17:6, 16; 35:11; Deuteronomy 17:14-20; 28:36.

⁴ **New Geneva Study Bible**, 1995, Foundation for Reformation, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee, Preface to 1 Samuel, p. 375.

Although it's true that wanting a king "like all the nations" is objectionable, it's also true that wanting any fallen king, like the nations or not, is objectionable. This is because monarchy, like all slave farms, is inherently a **natural-law**-violating system. The only exception to that claim exists when the king is absolutely perfect, sinless, and deathless. But no fallen human king, including David, has ever come up to the required standard. Kingship inherently empowers fallen creatures with fiat lawmaking powers and fiat enforcement and adjudication powers. God made prior provision for the opening of this portal, the same way he made prior provision (1) for their failure to fully drive out the unholiness from their territory, (2)for their violating **natural rights** through slavery and statism, (3) for their group think, which is preference for human carnality over God, (4) for their disintegration under anarchy, and (5) for their eating banned fruit. The fact that God made provision for the people's insistence on having a monarchy does not change the fact that monarchy is inherently a bad idea. All the bad things that Samuel prophesied in 8:11-18 are general characteristics of slave farms regardless of whether the fallen monarch is classified in biblical history as a good king or a bad king. Either way, the monarch has, and will use, the power to conscript people into forced labor, into the military, and into being his servants. The monarch has and uses the power to steal property, both through statism-approved taxes and takings and otherwise. But the worst characteristic of choosing a slave farming system over a righteous confederacy is that by putting a fallen creature as their mediator between God and themselves, in this group-think system, the people alienate themselves from God to such an extent that when they "cry out" to him when they weary of the slave farm (8:18), they will be so jaded that their prayers won't move much.

Monarchy is clearly another door that God clearly warns people not to go through. He also clearly makes provision for their going through it. God concedes in 1 Samuel 8 to the weakness of his covenant people. This concession is done by way of the provision that God will work through the human king to steer the covenant people in the fulfillment of the covenant promise. That ultimate promise is the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. The more immediate promise was objective-central redemption. Along the way, history unfolds in such a way as to prove that monarchy, along with every other slave-farming system, is inherently **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**. The sole exception is when the only sinless human being is King. But as already indicated, that sinless King demands the replacement of slave farming with a **natural-rights**-based confederacy.

Geerhadus Vos expresses an interpretation of this portal that is much like the interpretation of many other expositors of the Old Testament. He says:

At first, when the people asked for a king, Jehovah disapproved of the un-theocratic spirit in which the request was made, and declared it tantamount to rejection of Himself. Nevertheless the desire was granted, obviously in order that through the wrong conduct of the office by Saul, its true conception might be more clearly taught.

This was also the reason why for such a long time during the period of Joshua and the Judges the institution of the kingdom was kept in abeyance.¹

Contrary to Vos' claim, the reason the institution of the kingdom was kept in abeyance during the period of Joshua and the Judges was not so that "through the wrong conduct ... its [(the monarchy's)] true conception might be taught". During the period of Joshua and the Judges, the people were obligated to satisfy their need for human government through terms of their **religious social compact**. That means that by default, they were to be something very much like vigilantes. Because of their lack of regard and understanding of the terms of their covenant, they were destined to fail. That doesn't mean the monarchy was an improvement. The monarchy partially plugged the hole in the sinking ship, thereby slowing the ship's descent to the bottom. But the bottom was nevertheless reached by way of the Babylonian Exile, when the Israelite ship of state was salvaged from the bottom and put into dry dock. Shortly thereafter, Israel's true King came as a lamb for sacrificial slaughter, and they did not recognize him any more than they recognized the polity that he demanded.

Even though Vos is correct in saying that Saul was guilty of "wrong conduct of the office", it's also true that all the Israelite kings were guilty of the same, including David and Solomon. The true conception of the office of monarchy is that Jesus, and only Jesus, is qualified to be King. All the rest are usurpers and pretenders because monarchy is a slave-farming system. There are certainly some kings who were better than others. There may even have been a few who actually attempted to "write for himself a copy of the law on a scroll ... and ... read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the LORD his God ... that his heart may not be lifted up above his countrymen and that he may not turn aside from the commandment, to the right or to the left" (Deuteronomy 17:17-20). Very few of the Israelite monarchs even tried to do this, and each who tried failed. Nevertheless, it has been in God's providence to allow this portal to be opened, and to allow all the abuse of power that has gone with the opening.

¹ Vos, p. 185.

Because the so-called "separation of church and state" is such a fundamental issue in the American system, and because this theocracy-monarchy portal is sometimes treated as the original split between the two, it's probably important to examine this issue more exhaustively before concluding this examination of this portal. In regard to this issue, Vos says the following:

> The union of the religious lordship and the national kingship in the one Person of Jehovah involved that among Israel civil and religious life were inextricably interwoven. If the union had happened to exist in any other person but God, a division of the two spheres of relationship might have been conceivable. The bond to God is so one and indivisible that no separation of the one from the other can be conceived. Hence the later prophetic condemnation of politics, not merely wicked politics, but politics *per se*, as derogatory to the royal prerogative of Jehovah.

> Further it ought to be noticed that between these two concentric spheres the religious one has the pre-eminence. It is that for the sake of which the other exists. For our system of political government such an interrelation would, of course, seen a serious, intolerable defect. Not so among Israel. The chief end for which Israel had been created was not to teach the world lessons in political economy, but in the midst of a world of paganism to teach true religion, even at the sacrifice of much secular propaganda and advantage.¹

Vos indicates that the "theocratic principle" was not unique to Israel, because this principle was shared with "other Shemitic tribes".² According to Vos, the theocratic principle is "the principle of the deity being the supreme authority and power in national life".³ This conception of the theocratic principle is not inherently in conflict with the views presented in this theodicy. However, Vos' neglect of covenantal **jurisdictions** does lead his exposition of the theocratic principle into error. Vos steps into error when he claims that all politics derogates from "the royal prerogative of Jehovah." This is not so much an error of commission as of omission. He's not supplying all the necessary **jurisdictional** information to support this claim. But if he did supply all this missing information, it would be clear that the claim, as stated, is not accurate.

As has already been expounded, it's true that **<u>human law</u>** of any kind derogates from "the royal prerogative of Jehovah". This is because God prefers for the

¹ Vos, p. 125.

² Vos, p. 125.

³ Vos, p. 125.

natural law to go unmediated by human law. However, for the sake of cultivating miniature sovereigns, and for the sake of their migration from the out-of-the-garden ecological niche into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, he makes an allowance for the existence of human law and even mandates its existence. Politics is an inevitable sub-function of human law. So when God makes allowances for, and mandates the existence of, human law, it's certain that he is likewise allowing and mandating politics. --- The inextricable interweaving of "civil and religious life", based on the "union of the religious lordship and the national kingship in the one Person of Jehovah" was not an interweaving in which jurisdictional boundaries were trashed. On the contrary, the more this covenant is studied, the more obvious the jurisdictional boundaries should become. The "civil" subject matter is grounded primarily in the **Noachian Covenant**, while the "religious" subject matter is founded in the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants. To the extent that these jurisdictions are perverted into a slave farm, the politics that derive from the civil side are indeed "derogatory to the royal prerogative of Jehovah". Like all sin, it misses the naturallaw mark, and it is an affront to God and deserves his wrath. But on a slave farm, something similar to this is also true of the religious side.

It's true that the religious and civil are two concentric spheres, and that the religious has pre-eminence. This is evident by the fact that the first appearance of the Messiah was the fulfillment of objective-central redemption, and this was the primary purpose of almost everything recorded in the Old Testament. The Messiah made it clear that his kingdom is not of this world. Does this mean that his kingdom is utterly other worldly? If that were the case, then why would he come here in the first place? --- Notice that the core problem with the confederacy was heart failure. The people did not have the heart to be vigilantes. They did not care enough about the image of God in other people. That's because they did not love God enough, and they therefore did not love their neighbor enough. In Christ's kingdom, people love other people enough to be vigilantes in the protection of their **natural rights**. As long as that love does not predominate on this earth, Christ's kingdom is not of this world.

Vos is right in saying that, "The chief end for which Israel had been created was not to teach the world lessons in political economy, but ... to teach true religion, even at the sacrifice of much secular propaganda and advantage." Christ disdained the "propaganda and advantage" offered by slave farmers. It's certain that he did not come primarily to teach "lessons in political economy". Even so, lessons in political economy grow naturally out of objective-central redemption, even if they are secondary. If it weren't for the fact that the **Mosaic Covenant** clearly stipulated that its human parties were to engage in political activities, like policing, judging, soldiering, *etc.*, it would be much more difficult to find grounds upon which to fault this quotation of Vos. Because the slave farm is the default in human history, it's not quite true that "the later prophetic condemnation" of all politics related directly to the interweaving of "civil and religious life". It's true that in the **Mosaic Covenant**, civil and religious life were inextricably interwoven via God's "religious lordship and national kingship". This goes hand-in-hand with the fact that the **Mosaic Covenant** was a monotheistic **religious social compact**. Under such a compact, it's perfectly reasonable for these things to be interwoven, at least in regard to the compact's domestic interactions. Through this inextricable interweaving, the **Mosaic Covenant** is a prototype for the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. However, none of this eradicates the distinction between **secular social compacts** and **religious social compacts**, because this distinction is built into the structure of the covenants.

On the next page, Vos claims that in "the perfected kingdom", the "consummate state of Heaven", this "ideal state", "there will be no longer any place for the distinction between church and state. The former will have absorbed the latter."1 --- It's certainly true that in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, there will be no distinction between church and state. That's because there will be no need for the state because there will be no need for human law. There will be no need for human law because all the miniature sovereigns will have all the required laws written on their hearts (Jeremiah 31:33). Even though this is all true, as long as the Messiah tarries, it's critical that the distinction between secular social compacts and **religious social compacts** be recognized as the more biblically reliable approach to the church-state issue. The distinction between church and state is essentially a statist concept, because there is a presumption built into it that the state has a right to exist simply because it's the state. This is wrong. It has no such right to exist, any more than slavery and slave farms have rights to exist. Instead, people need to be forming jural compacts, ecclesiastical compacts, secular social compacts, and religious social compacts voluntarily, based on consent. The resulting confederacy is the proper approach to solving basic human needs, first among which is the proper honoring of their Creator.

¹ Vos, p. 126.

Sub-Chapter 8: Two-House Portal

Shortly after the Israelites demanded a monarchy, they adopted Saul as king (1 Samuel 9-10). Through tortuous events, David eventually replaced Saul, and Solomon eventually replaced David. Shortly after the death of Solomon, the Israelite kingdom split into two kingdoms, and the unified monarchy ended. The two resulting kingdoms were largely inimical. Israel's split into two kingdoms was the manifestation of a process that is still ongoing in the 21st century. It is a process that can be aptly characterized as a sibling rivalry, because it involves rival factions among people who are all ostensibly party to the **local covenants**, where all these people are ostensibly covenanted into Abraham's family. But this sibling-rivalry process is a subset of a much larger process, where this larger process has its roots in the **global covenants**. In order to properly make the argument about this sibling rivalry, it's necessary to thoroughly expose the larger process that subsumes the sibling rivalry.

On its face, it's apparent that when Saul became king, the system under the judges became obsolete. But the system under the judges, when understood within the context of the **global covenants**, was an attempt at establishing, through divine providence and with much **jurisdictional dysfunction**, a God-honoring, **natural-rights**-honoring confederacy. So the obsolescence of the system under the judges was essentially the obsolescence of a polity, where the polity is implicitly demanded by the biblical prescription of **human law**. So it's not really correct to say that that polity became obsolete, because it went dormant, not obsolete.

As should be clear from the above portal examinations, when God's covenant people violate the covenant, the term(s) they violate don't become obsolete, any more than the covenants themselves become obsolete. The **natural law** never sleeps. But because humans are extremely disabled, God graciously allows humans to sleep on many of their covenantal obligations. So dormancy of terms is a necessary feature of God's grace in his plan of redemption. The covenantal recognition of **natural rights** was largely dormant before and during the age of the patriarchs, up to the cutting of the **Mosaic Covenant**. At the cutting of the **Mosaic Covenant**, **natural rights** came partially out of dormancy. The process by which terms go in and out of dormancy is the process by which the **natural-rights**-honoring polity should eventually come out of dormancy. This process by which terms go in and out of dormancy also subsumes the sibling-rivalry process that will be examined in this part of this *motive-clause* chapter of this theodicy. The sibling rivalry is a subset of this larger process that puts covenantal terms in and out of dormancy. The siblingrivalry process appears scattered throughout the prophetic and historical books of the Old Testament. Before describing this sibling-rivalry sub-process, it's important to spend some time focused on this larger process, so that there's no doubt about what the encompassing process is.

a. <u>Recapitulation:</u>

It should be clear already that the overriding polity prescribed by the Bible is a <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring confederacy, which is what this theodicy has been calling "the <u>natural-rights</u> polity". It should also be obvious that in general, the polities that develop naturally and normally in societies that are not influenced by the Bible are tribal and slave-farming polities.¹ Historically, all polities have been jurisdictionally dysfunctional, and none has come close to the biblically prescribed, <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring confederacy, regardless of whether the society giving birth to a given polity is influenced by the Bible or not. The system under the judges can be rightly understood to be the first attempt at establishing a <u>naturalrights</u>-honoring confederacy. But there's no doubt that it was jurisdictionally dysfunctional to a huge extent.² Even so, it was at least an attempt, flawed though it may have been, at the correct kind of polity.³ In contrast, the transition from the system under the judges to a monarchy was a transition from a correct polity, poorly performed, to a slave-farming pig with Mosaic lipstick. Monarchy is inherently a

¹ Some academics may claim that the "democracy" that developed in ancient Athens was more **<u>natural-rights</u>**-honoring than the system under the judges. This may be true. But whether it is or not is beside the point. One crucial fact is that all people are subject to <u>natural law</u>, and <u>natural rights</u> are a crucial aspect of <u>natural law</u>. So there's a <u>global</u> propensity for the development of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity. Nevertheless, the Bible is unique in that it manifests a process for the eventual maturation of this polity. So it is not an overstatement to say that extra-biblical societies are generally limited to various kinds of tribalism and slave farming, including Athenian democracy.

² And there's no doubt that such **jurisdictional dysfunction** was built into the terms of the **Mosaic Covenant** as a set of concessions or allowances that God made out of mercy for the depraved people.

³ Evidenced by the fact that the Genesis 9:6 mandate remained dormant in regards to the **<u>natural rights</u>** of non-Israelites, and by the fact that the Israelites during this period never came close to **<u>jurisdictional functionality</u>**, the polity under the judges was <u>naturalrights</u>-honoring in a purely **<u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u>** way. Nevertheless, the system under the judges was at least posited in human history as a polity that is an alternative to both tribalism and slave farming, and it is clearly the polity prescribed by the Bible, at least in the sense that that polity had the potential for being **<u>jurisdictionally functional</u>**.

slave-farming polity because it is by definition a system in which a single, flawed human has fiat law-making powers.¹ Even so, correct polity is no guarantee of correct implementation of such polity, even though the core of the correct polity is (i)honor God, and (ii)honor the image of God in other people. --- Logically, the situation on a **global** scale, and on a scale that includes the entire *law-enforcement epoch*, looks something like this:

- (i) It's possible to have the correct, <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring polity, but to put it into effect poorly, meaning in a way that does not really honor <u>natural rights</u>. This was the situation under the judges.
- (ii) It's possible to have the correct polity, and to put it into effect well. There is no historical record of this ever happening anywhere on planet earth.
- (iii) It's possible to have a bad polity, usually a slave-farming polity, and to implement it well, meaning in a way that maximizes <u>natural rights</u> under the given polity. After the Israelite people adopted monarchy, this was the default goal, rarely if ever attained.
- (iv) It's possible to have a bad polity, and to implement it in a way that minimizes <u>natural rights</u>. Being the century of mass democide (murder by government), the 20th century provides the most profound examples of this in human history.

After the biblically-prescribed polity went dormant, being replaced by a slavefarming polity, how could the Bible-based society's polity ever metamorphose from slave farming back into the polity that is prescribed by God, *i.e.*, into the **naturalrights**-honoring confederacy? Furthermore, how could this polity that has been prescribed by God be subordinated to various slave-farming polities for millennia, and somehow re-emerge as a viable alternative to slave farming? ---- Because the **natural-rights** polity is based on the *motive clause*, answers to these questions necessarily hinge on (i)honoring God and (ii)honoring the image of God in other people. Honoring the image of God in other people is crucial to the *motive clause*, and honoring God is a prerequisite to honoring the image of God in other people. Evidence affirming this claim appears in the **Mosaic Covenant** in at least two verses:

> (i) Deuteronomy 6:5, "And you shall love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might."

¹ Of course, God's Kingdom falls outside this characterization because God is not a flawed human. Also, his laws are not fiat, arbitrary, or capricious.

(ii) Leviticus 19:18, "You shall ... love your neighbor as yourself; I am the LORD."

This claim is also affirmed in the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> in numerous places.¹ In Luke 10:29, "a certain lawyer", in response to the proposition that "You shall love ... your neighbor as yourself", asked Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?" This question pertains to one of the core distinctions between the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> and the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Under the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, one's neighbor is anyone who is party to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>. Under that covenant, the distinction between neighbors and non-neighbors was absolutely critical, because recognition of the <u>natural rights</u> of neighbors was critical under the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, while recognition of <u>natural</u> rights of non-neighbors was not. This changed under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, as is evident by the way Jesus answered this lawyer's question. Rather than answer in a straight-forward manner, Jesus answered by telling the parable of the good Samaritan. The point of the parable is clearly that under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, one's love and mercy are not to be limited to people who are explicitly covenant was mandated under the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>.²

In all of these New Testament statements about love, the Greek word being used is variations on the verb, agapao (Strong's #25). Verses like John 3:16; 17:26; and Romans 5:8 show that this is the kind of love that God has towards the elect portion of humanity, if not towards humanity as a whole. The fact that this is the kind of love that God has towards humans who are in covenant with him is evidence that this is the kind of love that is an integral feature of the **<u>natural law</u>**. It is an integral feature of all of the biblical covenants, so it's appropriate to claim that this kind of love is *covenant love*. It is the kind of love that must exist in feedback loops, God to human, human to God, human to human, in order for the covenants to be fully satisfied. God's side of all these covenants is always satisfied, because his love for his creation is as constant, as unchanging, and as steadfast as the **natural law**. But the human side of these covenants, both from human to God and from human to human, is as imperfect as fallen humanity. This imperfect love is crucial to a full understanding of dormancy. To understand dormancy completely, it's crucial to understand it in contrast to the *covenant love* that drives human parties to the biblical covenants to do whatever they can to satisfy the terms of the covenant, and to thereby manifest God's Kingdom on earth.

¹ For example, Matthew 22:36-40, Mark 12:28-31, and Luke 10:27.

² This relates directly to Jesus' statement in John 13:34 that he was giving a "new commandment", "that you love one another, just as I have loved you".

In the same way that the Genesis 9:6 duties went dormant shortly after the Noachian Covenant was cut, the natural-rights-based polity went dormant several centuries after the Mosaic Covenant was cut. To get a clear and holistic understanding of these two dormancies, and of all biblical dormancies, it's crucial to understand both the *covenant love* that impels human parties to push terms of the biblical covenants out of dormancy, on one hand, and the forces that cause such terms to go dormant, on the other. The love for God and for the covenantal vision that he gives to his people is the crucial ingredient that motivates his people to implement the terms of the covenants in their lives on earth. Even though their motives are good enough and their visions are clear enough to cause them to go into action, they are not good enough and clear enough to keep their actions from being imperfect. Their actions are always tainted, and they are always prone to falling into sin, even while in the midst of doing God's work. As a result of seeing themselves pollute their own work, usually with ample accusations from both Satan and people who observe their misdeeds, their passion wanes, and they stop trying to advance the terms of the covenants. The terms may then go almost completely dormant, and seemingly have no existence on earth. Generations may pass until there's a reawakening of love for God and for his covenants. This cycle can be identified in Judges, but it exists on a much larger scale, and can even be identified as the reason for the **<u>natural-rights</u>**-based polity going dormant at the inauguration of the monarchy polity. --- Because this cycle is so crucial to biblical history, and because it is the overriding process within which the sibling-rivalry process is couched, it's crucial to make sure the broad foundation for this process that subsumes the sibling rivalry has been properly presented.

b. Broad Foundation for the Process that Subsumes the Sibling Rivalry:

This theodicy has claimed that the Genesis 9:6 mandate was almost entirely dormant under the **Abrahamic Covenant**, and that it was partially dormant under the **Mosaic Covenant**. Because the **Noachian Covenant** has a **global in personam jurisdiction**, it necessarily applies to all people for all time. However, because corruption existed so massively and broadly during the period of the patriarchs, the Genesis 9:6 term of the **Noachian Covenant** was dormant under their implementation of the **Abrahamic Covenant**. Under the **Mosaic Covenant**, the Genesis 9:6 mandate came out of dormancy in regard to interactions between parties to the Mosaic **religious social compact**; but the mandate remained dormant relative to non-parties. It's also clear that the polity under the judges that many theologians call a "theocracy" went dormant at the transition into monarchy. To understand dormancy, and how dormant terms of the biblical covenants are supposed

to come out of dormancy, it should help to consider several more passages from the New Testament.

In 2 Corinthians 12:2-4, the Apostle Paul speaks of being "caught up to the third heaven". He describes this "third heaven" as "Paradise". Given that Paul's claim is true, that there is a third heaven and that it is Paradise, there must be at least three heavens. If the third heaven is Paradise in the sense that the entities that live there live in complete harmony with **natural law** and **eternal law**, then there is a question appertaining to what other heavens there may be, and what the nature of the other heavens is, relative to the third heaven. If it's true that whatever entities live in this third heaven live in complete harmony with, and obedience to, **eternal law**, then there must be all good and no evil there. There must also be something more than mere resemblance between the garden ecological niche and this third heaven. Even if the garden niche was probationary, there must be some grounds for comparing the garden niche and the third heaven. Otherwise, it would not be reasonable to believe the people in the garden lived in communion with God, and lived with the "beatific vision". So the garden niche and Paul's third heaven must be comparable.

As expounded above, all life forms make choices. The more rudimentary the life form, the less cognitive the choice-making process, and the more the organism's choices are mere functions of stimulus-response, classical (respondent) conditioning, genetics, and other basic rules built into the organism through wave mechanics. In contrast, the more advanced the life form, the more cognitive the choice-making process. Given that Paul, the people in the garden, and Jesus Christ each had access to the third heaven, and were each capable of moving and making choices while there, it follows that they were making choices at the most advanced kind of cognition, the kind that allows an entity localized in space and time to know what it needs to know when it needs to know it, so that it does what it needs to do when it needs to do it, where need is defined in terms of what it takes for an entity to be an eternally cohesive standing wave. When such an entity makes a choice in the third heaven, the entity necessarily chooses on a continuum. This is because choice by definition implies the existence of alternatives which must be consciously or unconsciously arrayed on a continuum between best and worst. The fact that Paul returned to his ministry on earth after having the third-heaven experience, and the fact that the garden people were booted out of the garden, are evidence that it's possible for an entity in the third heaven to choose something that causes him/her to depart from

the third heaven. No doubt God is the prime mover in such choice making, but Paul, the garden people, and any other such entities, would be volunteering, through some secondary cause / choice, to depart from the third heaven. So it's clear that to stay in the third heaven, it's necessary to confine one's choices to a range of choices that is conducive to perpetual abiding and perpetual standing-wave cohesion. By definition, in the third heaven, there can be no deviating from obedience to <u>eternal</u> <u>law</u>, unless one is choosing to depart therefrom.¹

To see how this line of reasoning relates to the cycle between passionate implementation of terms of the covenants, on one hand, and dormancy, on the other, it's important to know what other heavens there are. If the third heaven is the heaven in which there is complete conformity to **eternal law**, then are the other heavens, whatever they may be, also characterized by complete obedience to **eternal law**? According to a rational reading of the New Testament, the answer must be "No!". There is only one heaven in which there is such complete obedience to **eternal law**, that being the third heaven. Even so, there is ample evidence that there are two other heavens.² These other two heavens are characterized by some element of delusion, meaning misapprehension of **natural law** and the missing of the **natural law**.

Ephesians 4:10 indicates that Christ "ascended far above all the heavens". This may appear to indicate that there are numerous heavens. On the other hand, it may only refer to the sky as "the heavens". Or it may be a poetic flourish that is not intended to have any bearing on epistemological or metaphysical issues. Regardless, the word translated to "heavens" in this verse is used over 260 times in the New Testament, and is used to refer both to Paul's third heaven and to the physical sky.³ ---- It's clear that the distinctions between these three heavens is based on biblical concepts, and not so much on the source language's more rudimentary linguistic cues.

This desire to abide in the third heaven clearly relates directly to what some theologians call "Christian hedonism". Such Christian hedonism is also crucial to a choice like Paul's, to return to war in the second heaven, and to bodily existence in the first.
 It's very difficult to find biblical evidence that there are more than three heavens in total. Regardless of whatever rabbinical and other claims may be made in regard to there being seven heavens or any number of other heavens besides three, if such alternative numbers are supported neither by the Bible nor by evident reason, then there's no good reason to believe such heavens are anything more than myth and delusion.

Ouranos, Strong's #3772. Examples of use to denote the third heaven: Matthew 7:21; 16:19; Luke 11:2; 2 Corinthians 12:2-4. Examples of use to denote the physical sky: Matthew 16:2-3; Luke 4:25; James 5:18.

Now that it's clear what some of the characteristic features of the third heaven are, and now that it's clear that one of the other two heavens is the physical sky, what is this other heaven? Evidence for the existence of this other heaven can be found in both evident reason and the Bible. Following the pattern that was established at the beginning, this theodicy will look at evident reason first.

Historically, it's been commonly accepted and acknowledged that humans have five organs of sense perception: taste, touch, sight, hearing, and smell. Each of these designates a field from which sense data arise. Together, they can be understood to be the physical field of perception.¹ It is through the physical field of perception that one of the three heavens, the sky, is perceived. Although sense data from the physical field of perception is integrated into percepts, then into concepts, such sense data is not generally integrated sufficiently for the human being to be sustained as a perpetual standing wave. The basis upon which to integrate such data is somehow missing. A coherent worldview that is conducive to the rational integration of all sense data, is missing, and so is the necessary integration of wave mechanics into such worldview. Parts of such a worldview may exist within any given human, but in all people, the cognitive system itself is defective. This leads one to wonder if there is also some field of sense perception that is missing from the ordinary person's repertoire, where this extra sense would facilitate the cognitive coherence that would facilitate the perpetual standing wave status. According to the worldview already posited above, there must either be some extra sense, or there must be some way to refine the existing five physical senses, or both, so that the basis for cognitive coherence exists, where such cognitive coherence is a prerequisite to perpetual organismic standing wave cohesion. The need for some basis for cognitive cohesion can be understood to be the basis upon which to presuppose the existence of a second, middle heaven, based on evident reason.

As indicated, there is no place in the third heaven for evil, and there is no room in the third heaven for choices that put the chooser at odds with <u>eternal law</u>. This means that there is no room for Satan, an angel fallen because of bad choices. So Satan's existence must be limited to the other two heavens. Because people generally cannot perceive Satan, as Satan, with their physical senses, it must be true

¹ This physical field of perception can be understood to be the combination of the exogenous physical field and the endogenous physical field. The endogenous physical field includes all endogenous, subjective perceptions, such as the perceptions of hunger, thirst, the need for a breath of air, *etc.* The exogenous physical field includes perception of objective, external phenomena through the five physical senses. In this brief exposition, only the exogenous physical field is pertinent, although the endogenous physical field is certainly pertinent to the cognitive processing of such exogenous phenomena.

that Satan exists in this other heaven, this heaven that is neither the third heaven nor the physical heaven.¹ This other heaven must be a spiritual field of perception and action, because it's certain that humans generally cannot perceive it with their physical senses. But calling it "spiritual" tends to conflate it with the third heaven, which is also spiritual in the sense that it transcends the physical. To avoid such conflation, this theodicy distinguishes the field of perception and action designated "third heaven", with the moniker, "Spiritual", while it calls the other spiritual field of perception and action the "psychic" field.²

There are two other words in the Greek New Testament, besides the most common ouranos, that are used to designate heaven. Given that the first heaven designates the physical field of perception and action, which certainly includes the earth as a celestial body embedded in the sky, and given that the third heaven designates the Spiritual field of perception and action, and given that the most common Greek word for heaven, ouranos, is used for both the first and third heavens, it's reasonable that it would also be used to designate the second heaven. In fact, ouranos is used this way, but there are two other words that also make it clear that this second heaven, this psychic field of perception and action, does in fact exist. Epouranios (Strong's #2032) is translated in Ephesians 6:12 to "high places", as in "spiritual wickedness in high places" (KJV). This certainly indicates a spiritual field of perception and action in which there is evil. In three verses in Revelation (8:13; 14:6; 19:17), the word mesouranema (Strong's #3321) is translated to "midheaven" (NASB) or "midst of heaven" (KJV). According to Thayer's lexicon,³ this word was used in classical Greek to refer to the fact that "the sun is said ... to be in midheaven, when it has reached the meridian". It means "mid-heaven, the highest point in the heavens, which the sun occupies at noon, where what is done can be seen and heard by all". By examining these three uses of mesouranema, it becomes clear that there was warfare between good and evil in the "midst of heaven", and that this usage carries meaning beyond the classical Greek usage. It is conceptual, and not rooted primarily in the source language's more rudimentary linguistic cues. --- Use of these three Greek words, ouranos, epouranios, and mesouranema, makes it clear that the Bible does, in fact, conceptually distinguish these three heavens and these three fields of perception and action: the physical, the psychic in which there is war

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¹ And Satan influences the perception of the physical field from this other heaven.

² This is based on the Greek *psuche*, Strong's #5590, which includes both mind and soul, but does not necessarily connote any kind of ethical content.

³ Thayer, Joseph Henry; **Thayer's Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament**, 4th edition, 1977, Baker Book House Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, p. 402.

between good and evil, and the Spiritual in which there is no war between good and evil (although the ability to make choices certainly exists).

c. <u>The Redemption Process:</u>

Now that these three fields of perception and action are distinguished, it's possible to return to focusing on the process that operates within these three fields. This is essentially the process of redemption itself. But making this claim demands clarification of what redemption is. When properly understood, it's clear that redemption encompasses dormancy and term activation, *i.e.*, the process of passionate implementation of the terms of the covenants, on one hand, and dormancy of terms, on the other. But the dormancy / activation process only exists in what Jonathan Edwards called "redemption with respect to the grand design in general".¹ As Vos rightly showed, there is a difference between objective-central redemption and subjective-individual redemption. Subjective-individual redemption pertains to "regeneration, justification, conversion, sanctification, glorification."2 Objective-central redemption pertains to the once-for-all-time purchase of all the elect's salvation by way of "the incarnation, the atonement, the resurrection of Christ".3 God's objective-central acts are the actual purchase of subjectiveindividual redemption for all the elect, while subjective-individual redemption is the application of that purchase to specific individuals, and each individual's subjective experience of it. As indicated above, this theodicy sometimes uses the expression, "objective-central redemption", to indicate all the things that God did to prepare the world for objective-central redemption in Vos' stricter sense of the expression. But Edwards uses the word "redemption" to mean something bigger than subjectiveindividual redemption, bigger than objective-central redemption in Vos' narrow sense, and bigger than objective-central redemption in this theodicy's larger sense. To Edwards,

The work of redemption is a work that God carries on from the fall of man to the end of the world.⁴

According to Edwards, "redemption ... is carried on from the fall of man to the end of the world in two respects." (i) The "*effect* wrought on the souls of the redeemed ... is common to all ages. ... [It] is carried on by repeating continually the same work over again ... in different persons, from age to age".⁵ So subjective-individual redemption

¹ Edwards, History, DOCTRINE, FIRST, II, 2. p. 535.

² Vos, p. 6.

³ Vos, p. 6.

⁴ Edwards, **History**, DOCTRINE, p. 534.

⁵ Edwards, **History**, DOCTRINE, FIRST, II, pp. 534-535.

is common to all ages and is repeated so that it applies once to every elect person. (ii)Redemption in the second sense pertains not only to repeated applications of subjective-individual redemption, but also to "the work of redemption with respect to the grand design in general". This latter kind of redemption

is carried on ... by many successive works and dispensations of God, all tending to one great effect ... and all together making up one great work. Like a temple that is building; first the workmen are sent forth, then the materials are gathered, the ground is fitted, and the foundation laid; then the superstructure is erected, one part after another, till at length the top-stone is laid, and all is finished. Now the work of redemption in this large sense, may be compared to such a building. ... All are parts of one great scheme, whereby one work is brought about by various steps, one step in one age, and another in another.¹

Edwards continues by indicating that it's important to understand the "grand design" to avoid "confusion" about how this temple is being built. In the same way that God said repeatedly of his creation that it is "good", he clearly claims that his grand design is good. The temple that he is building is for his own pleasure and his own glory. About all this, this theodicy concurs with Edwards. However, there are important differences between Edwards' **History** and this theodicy. Before emphasizing these differences, it's important to summarize regarding the types of redemption, and the relationship between redemption and term activation / dormancy.

(i)There appears to be complete agreement between Vos, Edwards, and this theodicy in regards to subjective-individual redemption. It is redemption as it applies to the regeneration, justification, conversion, sanctification, and glorification of any given elect human being. (ii)Objective-central redemption in the strict sense is the set of redeeming acts of God that are God's purchase of human redemption. They include the incarnation, atonement, and resurrection of Christ. They also include whatever Christ will do in his second advent. (iii)Objective-central redemption in the broad sense includes the acts of divine providence that are necessary precursors to objective-central redemption in the strict sense, where such acts of God include the cutting and promulgation of the local covenants, and where such acts are special revelation. Objective-central redemption in this broad sense started with the cutting of the Abrahamic Covenant; officially ended with the last acts of the apostles; and will begin again only with the second advent. (iv)Redemption in Edwards' "grand design" sense of the word subsumes each of the three kinds of redemption just mentioned, and it also includes the global covenants, God's acts of divine providence since the last acts of the apostles, and God's acts of divine

¹ Edwards, History, DOCTRINE, FIRST, II, p. 535.

providence during the intertestamental period, as indicated in Edwards' **History of the Work of Redemption**.

Edwards indicates that "God's design was ... to restore all the ruins of the fall".¹ As should be clear already, this theodicy claims that God's design is not only to restore the ruins of the fall, but much more. This is because the final destination of this grand design is not the rehabitation of the garden ecological niche, but eternal habitation in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. Using Edwards' analogy, the New-Jerusalem niche is equivalent to the temple that God is constructing in this grand design. Even though it's not clear from Edwards' **History of Redemption**, Edwards and this theodicy may be in agreement about this. Even if he did not make it clear, he probably believed that the final destination of the "grand design" is greater than the garden of Eden. So this is not a core point of disagreement between this theodicy and Edwards, even though it's an important truth to emphasize here. There is another difference between this theodicy and Edwards' **History** that is crucial to emphasize.

The whole emphasis in the grand design, according to Edwards, was the glorification of God, especially the glorification of Christ. Although this theodicy agrees that this is true, this theodicy also claims that the genuine glorification of the trinitarian God demands recognition of covenantal jurisdictions. Within a Christian religious social compact, this is absolutely valid, worthy, and a good emphasis. But within a secular social compact, such an emphasis is out of place. For centuries, nominally Christian countries have used Christianity to rationalize the existence and practices of their various slave farms. For Christians to continue to expound Christianity in the secular arena without a concurrent disclaimer, is on its face a continuation of the same-old, same-old slave-farming propaganda. In the secular arena in the 21st century, it is critical for Christians to operate with an express disclaimer that they will respect the **natural rights** of non-Christians, and that they will do so by firmly and consistently insisting on the adoption and implementation of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. So the emphasis in this grand design must be on the *jurisdictional* boundaries of the various covenants, at least in the secular arena. Within their religious social compacts, Christians would all do well to combine the knowledge about the jurisdictional boundaries with their glorification of Christ. But in the secular arena, Christians need to be sharing their knowledge about **natural rights** and **jurisdictions** with non-Christians, rather than emphasizing subjective-individual redemption there. For everything there is a season. So there is certainly a time and place for emphasizing subjective-individual redemption. But the American secular arena in the early 21st century is in desperate

¹ Edwards, History, DOCTRINE, SECONDLY, II, p. 535.

need of knowledge about the **jurisdictions** embedded in the grand design. In the final analysis, this is more glorifying to God than expounding subjective-individual redemption to people who show no interest in it.

The third heaven exists, and is certainly a place where everyone redeemed in Christ goes upon the death of his/her physical body. But the New Jerusalem is something more than this. --- It's clear that God's cultivation of miniature sovereigns requires the migration from the garden niche, through the out-of-the-garden niche, and into the New-Jerusalem niche. All of his **<u>natural law</u>**, both as depicted in the Bible and as made perceivable extra-biblically, acts as a goad prodding humanity toward maturity as miniature sovereigns. On the other hand, it's in the nature of the out-of-the-garden ecological niche for humans to mis-perceive natural law. Both the first heaven and the second heaven were created by way of human delusion. More accurately, the disabilities experienced in the physical field of perception and action are functions of delusion, and the delusion is seated primarily in the psychic field of perception and action.¹ Such disabilities are primarily the product of the mind's ability to choose, but they are also embedded deeply in the human condition, so much so that such disabilities can be passed genetically from generation to generation, and they are manifest abundantly in the physical field of perception and action. Even so, God broadcasts pure truth 24-7, through every possible medium. He does so from his headquarters in the third heaven. In contrast, HaSatan broadcasts lies and delusion 24-7 from his headquarters in the second heaven. The latter keeps humanity locked into its mutual disabilities and delusions. This war in the second heaven has been going on between God's truth and Satan's delusion since Satan and the people were booted out of the third heaven. This war will continue until the last lie is eliminated, and all miniature sovereigns in training become fully functional miniature sovereigns, and all such miniature sovereigns migrate into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, which is the same as Edwards' temple. As the war rages, the battle lines keep shifting.

On its face, it may appear that dormancy is merely a function of some deterministic measuring of how the battle lines are drawn at any given point in time. If Satan is winning on some given front, then to whatever extent he's winning, the truth of God is being made dormant on that front. On the other hand, if God is winning on some given front, then to whatever extent he's winning, the truth

¹ The disabilities referred to here are those that arise out of failure to operate as fully functional miniature sovereigns. Such disabilities are mutable, as distinguished from disabilities that are not mutable, like being disabled from being omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Immutable disabilities exist even for fully functional miniature sovereigns, because miniature sovereigns are never God.

of God must be coming out of dormancy on that front. Because the lies are a function of a covenant that humanity made with HaSatan in the garden, the lies are in constant competition with the truth of the covenants between God and humanity. However, this deterministic view of the battle lines in this war between good and evil is somewhat sterile. It is generally sterile because the perception of these battle lines is vulnerable to confusion about the "grand design". With understanding of the grand design comes understanding of one's role and calling in the construction of this temple. With confusion people are prone to having theories that misconstrue the grand design and lead people to act contrary to it. In the visible Church in America in the first quarter of the 21st-century, such confusion reigns, even among elders, pastors, and other church leaders. Regardless of whether Christ returns now or in the next millennium, there is a grand design that is evident when the Bible is properly interpreted. The visible Church in 21st-century America is confused largely because it has not interpreted the biblical covenants with an emphasis on jurisdictions. The result is that the visible Church is split into numerous factions where every faction has its own special theory about the grand design. The theories seem to range through the entire eschatological gamut, from a belief that the grand design and eschatology are irrelevant, to a belief that Christians are called to be gold bricks that Jesus is coming soon to collect, to numerous delusions in between. The fact that practically all these theories are wrong shows that the entire field of eschatology is in disarray, and it also explains why the visible Church is so impotent in doing what the grand design clearly calls it to do. There are plenty of good reasons to see a direct correlation between the visible Church's confusion about the grand design and the 20th century's mass democides (murders by government).

It's in the nature of the human conscience that people are responsible for what they know. So people are responsible as miniature sovereigns to put into action whatever knowledge they have acquired that impacts directly their status as miniature sovereigns in training. In other words, if God puts it in one's heart to do something, it's in one's best interest to do it. --- This removes dormancy from the realm of following the crowd, and calling something out of dormancy whenever the crowd appears to be doing the same. Whether something is dormant or not becomes an individual choice, commitment, and decision. It should always be based on one's personal relationship with God, and one's personal commitments. Whether the term of a covenant is dormant or not is not merely an act of following the crowd and group think. The bottom line is that dormancy is a matter of personal conscience. If one is party to a covenant, and one knows that something is a term of

that covenant, then whether one acts in accordance with that term or not depends upon how seriously one takes the covenant and one's love of those party to the covenant. In other words, it's a function of *covenant love*.

In a time when the terms of the covenants were relatively unknown, before ready access to the text of the covenants existed, it's reasonable that people would not generally understand the terms well.¹ They would become party based on assent, rather than based on fully informed consent. Parties of conscience are naturally inclined to work to remove terms from dormancy. Parties without conscience allow and magnify dormancy, and thereby jeopardize their status as parties. If one is genuinely party, then the covenant that one has with God will be more precious than physical life, because one will understand that participation in the covenant ensures eternal life, and neglect thereof jeopardizes that promise.² The decisionmaking process in this regard is much like the decision-making process of a given organismic standing wave. The organism is inclined to do whatever is most necessary at any given point in time to ensure the organism's status as a perpetual standing wave. Likewise, as a genuine party to the covenant, one is likely to do whatever is most necessary at any given point in time to ensure the covenant community's status as a perpetual standing wave. This translates into doing whatever is most necessary to maximize the manifestation of God's Kingdom on earth, to manifest principles broadcast from the third heaven so that they can be recognized in the first heaven, and to do whatever one is called to do in the construction of the temple, where the completion of this temple is the goal of the grand design. This translates into being genuinely called by God to do something, and to recognize, acknowledge, and comply with that calling.

Clearly, principles of **<u>natural law</u>** go into dormancy in human culture when people allow them to go into dormancy. They go into dormancy when guilt, remorse, and ignorance pile so high that these paralyze the parties. Then indifference and dormancy take over, and the given society lapses into decay. God allows for such dormancy, not as a permanent concession, but as part of a feedback loop that includes rest, learning, and recovery from misdeeds. God allowed the Genesis 9:6 duties to go dormant under the **<u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>** because he recognized the limitations of the parties to the covenant at that time. A similar claim applies under the **<u>Mosaic</u>** <u>**Covenant**</u>. God allowed the Genesis 9:6 mandate to go dormant in regard to

¹ As indicated above, before the Babylonian captivity, "there were but few copies of the law". --- Edwards, **History**, PERIOD I, PART VI, IX, p. 566.

² As is made clear below, salvation doesn't come through obedience to the covenants. But obedience to the covenants is a sign that salvation has come.

covenant outsiders because he recognized the limitations of the parties.¹ The same applies under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. God allowed the Genesis 9:6 mandate to remain dormant as long as his people were ignorant of their responsibilities under the *positive duty clause*. But this dormancy was an act of grace made available to the frail, not a term of the covenant negating Genesis 9:6. Although it's obvious that humans have critical roles to play in bringing terms out of dormancy, it should also be obvious that God is the prime mover in this process, and he moves according to the grand design that he set in place at the beginning.

When God sets terms into his covenants, and when those terms require affirming actions from human parties, the parties are able to perform only according to the grace God gives to the parties, the faith that arises within the parties as a result of that grace, and the *agape* love and passion that overflow out of that faith and grace.² Since the fall, people are not able to perform those obligations in genuine fashion except by such grace, through such faith, especially when such faith overflows with agape love for the covenant and the parties thereto. This lack of grace, lack of faith, and lack of *agape* love are the root cause of terms of covenants going dormant. On the other hand, the presence of grace, faith, and *agape* love are the root cause of terms coming out of dormancy.³ Even though these things are all true, there is still nevertheless a prophetic, grand design. The aspect of the grand design that pertains to this sibling rivalry is built into the terms of the Abrahamic Covenant, and reinforced to each of the patriarchs. It shows a basic pattern for the emergence of the Genesis 9:6 polity from dormancy. This pattern is based on the inherent conflict built into the dichotomy between syncretism and anti-syncretism. Syncretism is merely the process of blending and merging beliefs and practices from two or more societies. If the result of such syncretism is greater harmony with **natural law** than any one of the societies being blended, then syncretism is obviously a good thing. But if syncretism is an act of polluting a monotheistic society with idols, then

¹ If God interferes too much in the affairs of men, then he interferes with the miniature sovereign's need to take dominion over his/her own mind and body. God's act of recognizing the limitations of the parties is an act of tolerance necessary to the formation of the miniature sovereign's dominion. God takes a similar, hands-off approach to the construction of the ultimate temple, nevertheless providentially intervening in a visible way at key junctures, and in an invisible way constantly.

² If faith is understood to be equivalent to confidence, then when faith overflows into *covenant love*, it naturally becomes a passion that overflows into action consistent with the covenant.

³ An excessive focus on measuring endogenous, subjective phenomena, rather than on obtaining objective Kingdom goals, can be a major impediment to the attainment of such goals.

syncretism is obviously a bad thing. The issue is ultimately about the nature of truth. The existence and attributes of God and his covenants are a big TRUTH that should never be diminished for the sake of small truths. Even so, as long as the big TRUTH is not diminished, small truths should not be discarded, neglected, or disdained, but should rather be integrated into a holistic, God-centered system.

By way of the terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant**, the conflict between syncretism and anti-syncretism manifests in the covenant community as sibling rivalry. Understanding the conflict between syncretism and anti-syncretism, and how they relate to the sibling rivalry, and how the sibling rivalry relates to the grand design, should help people to understand when terms need to come out of dormancy, why, and how. Even though this sibling rivalry is first described under the patriarchs, and is even built into the terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant**, the sibling rivalry doesn't really become obvious until well after the transition from the theocratic confederacy into the monarchy. So it will probably be best to start the examination of the sibling-rivalry syndrome by looking first at each covenant that governs each of the two disparate kingdoms.

d. Two Covenants / Two Kingdoms

After Saul died, "the men of Judah came and ... anointed David king over the house of Judah." (2 Samuel 2:4) So David was the king of Judah before he was the king of Israel as a whole. After Saul died, Saul's son, Ish-bosheth, became the king over all of Israel excluding Judah, and he remained king over the rest of Israel for two years (2 Samuel 2:8-10). Before David became king over Israel as a whole, "there was a long war between the house of Saul and the house of David; and David grew steadily stronger, but the house of Saul grew weaker continually." (2 Samuel 3:1) Eventually, Ish-bosheth was murdered (2 Samuel 4:5-7), and all the tribes of Israel became united under David: "So all the elders of Israel came to the king at Hebron, and King David made a covenant with them before the LORD at Hebron; then they anointed David king over Israel." (2 Samuel 5:3) It was only after this "covenant" between "all the elders of Israel" was established that God made his covenant with David. After all the trials between Samuel's anointing of David as the king (1 Samuel 16), and the peace that followed the ratification of Israel's new constitution (2 Samuel 5:3), God made a covenant with David (2 Samuel 7:1-17). Although it's true that the word "covenant" (b'rit, Strong's #1285) is not mentioned in 2 Samuel 7:1-17, which may prompt some exegetes to make a plausible claim that this is not a covenantal passage, other passages clearly indicate that it is a covenant.¹

¹ Example, 2 Chronicles 21:7, Jeremiah 33:21. It's important to note that this is not a blood covenant. Also, its terms do not create any new prescription of generally applicable

There is an implicit covenantal obligation confirmed by David in his acceptance of the covenant (2 Samuel 7:18-29), to avoid building the temple, leaving that task to his heir. But this is the only immediate obligation that the covenant imposes on David. Even so, there are several obligations accepted by God in the form of promises made. --- It's clear that in this covenant, God is committing himself to proceed with preparations for objective-central redemption within the context of a slave-farming polity. In keeping with the four logical options for the *law-enforcement epoch*, indicated above, this covenant cements the use of a bad polity in which the human parties are to maximize the limited endorsement of <u>natural rights</u>, as indicated in the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>. The monarch is to execute his monarchial duties in a way that is consistent with Deuteronomy 17:14-20. In this covenant (2 Samuel 7:1-17), these are the promises that God made to David:

- Israel will have and live in its own land, undisturbed (vv. 10-11).
- God will make a house, meaning a dynasty, for David (vv. 11-12).
- David's offspring will build God's house, the temple (v. 13).
- God will establish David's kingdom and throne forever (vv. 13, 16).

Although God fulfilled the first three promises during the lives of David and Solomon,¹ the promise that the kingdom and dynasty of David is established forever cannot be fulfilled except in eternity. The Davidic dynasty is later (2 Kings 24-25) described as being terminated. So it's clear that this promise of the external existence of David's kingdom and throne went into dormancy. However, with the advent of Jesus Christ described in the New Testament, this promise came partially out of dormancy. The Davidic King appeared in the physical field of perception and action, but he was insufficiently acknowledged as King by his people to allow for a genuine and complete escape from dormancy. Even so, this term of the **Davidic Covenant** is a good example of how the escape from dormancy works.

At the time of the Babylonian Exile, the Davidic dynasty came to an end in regards to its physical existence. If one does not acknowledge the existence of the

human law. It consists almost entirely of promises made by God to David, and through David, to David's followers.

1 During the reigns of David and Solomon, (i)the Davidic dynasty was established; (ii) the temple was built; and (iii)much, if not all, of the land promised to the Israelites by God was in fact occupied by them in peace. If one believes that these prophecies fall into the category of being "already but not yet", then it's certainly true that they have already been fulfilled in some respects, but there will be a time in the future when these things will be fulfilled more completely. Of course the claim that these terms are "already but not yet" depends upon their re-emergence from dormancy, probably with much transformed specifications.

psychic field of perception and action, then the demise of the dynasty leads one naturally to conclude that God must be a liar. He promised David that David's kingdom, throne, and dynasty would last forever, but at the time of the Babylonian Exile, the dynasty went kaput. Even so, if one acknowledges the existence of the psychic field of perception and action, then acknowledging the possibility of dormancy is not so fanciful, and the demise of the physical dynasty becomes merely a redrawing of the battle lines so that the dynasty exists solely in the psychic field of perception and action.

Like this "forever" term of the Davidic Covenant, the Genesis 9:6 term of the Noachian Covenant went dormant. That doesn't mean it became nonexistent. It means that it temporarily became largely defunct in the physical field of perception and action, but it still exists in the psychic field, waiting to re-emerge into the physical field. Likewise, the polity that manifested in Israelite society as a result of putting the Genesis 9:6 mandate partially into effect, the polity under the judges, the jurisdictionally dysfunctional theocratic confederacy, went dormant when the monarchy was put into effect. But the fact that the Genesis 9:6 mandate can manifest completely only through such a confederacy means that the **<u>natural</u>rights**-honoring confederacy cannot go completely defunct unless the Bible itself is a pack of lies, and the God of the Bible is a liar. That God is a liar is precisely what the universe's master liar wants the human race to believe. Because God created the **natural law**, and because he created the biblical covenants to be in complete harmony with the **natural law**, he is incapable of lying. That means that the Genesis 9:6 mandate, the **natural-rights**-honoring confederacy, and the Davidic monarchy must all, at some point in the development of miniature sovereignty, re-emerge from laving dormant in the psychic field, into actual existence in the physical field. But of course this re-emergence doesn't preclude the possibility that those dormant terms could also be modified by covenantal appendments as part of the process of reemerging.

Given that these things are true, these truths beg some questions: If <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring polity and the monarchy polity are inherently at odds, as has been indicated above, then why should anyone believe they should both come out of dormancy? If monarchy is inherently a slave-farming polity, and is therefore inherently at odds with the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, then how could they coexist in the same society if they simultaneously came out of dormancy? --- The conflict between the monarchy polity and the <u>natural-rights</u> polity is based on the fact that all monarchs are fallen creatures who are inherently not qualified to have the kind of absolute power that monarchs by definition have. But if the monarch is sinless, meaning he never misses the <u>natural-law</u> mark, and he therefore has eternal life as a

perpetual organismic standing wave, then there is no inherent conflict between the **natural-rights** polity and such a monarchy. In fact, this is precisely the polity for which the Bible calls, a theocratic confederacy. Regardless of whether the Monarch chooses to manifest himself in the physical field of perception and action, or not, his followers have the covenantal duty to establish the **natural-rights** polity, and within their **religious social compacts**, to honor their King as God. It's clear that this is why the battle cry of the American War for Independence was, "No king but King Jesus!" By being biblically literate, they knew intuitively that this Monarch's polity is not an ordinary monarchy, but is rather a **natural-rights** polity.

The advent of Jesus Christ shows how sovereign acts of God redraw the battle lines in the second heaven. It shows how covenantal terms that are seemingly dormant arise from psychic slumber into the physical field of perception and action. The real Monarch in the **Davidic Covenant** was never David, Solomon, or any other fallen creature. These humans were merely surrogates for the real King, agents put in place to placate the carnal minds that dominated Israelite society. The term of the **Davidic Covenant** that promised David an eternal dynasty went dormant at the time of the Babylonian Exile. This term came partially out of dormancy with the advent of the true Davidic King, Jesus Christ. The fact that his people failed to give him the throne in the physical field of perception and action explains why he said, "'My kingdom is not of this world." (John 18:36) He did not say that his kingdom would never be of this world. Otherwise, the Lord's prayer (Matthew 6:10) would make no sense, unless "world" is defined as the world of slave farms, and is utterly distinct from "earth". The fact that his people failed to give him the throne shows that this term of the **Davidic Covenant** came partially out of dormancy, but not entirely. --- It should now be abundantly clear what dormancy is, how terms of the covenants come out of dormancy through covenant love, and that their reemergence from dormancy is always reliable if the terms have an eternal status.

As a result of Solomon's malfeasance, immediately after his death, the kingdom split in two.¹ This schism had been prophesied before it occurred.² The prophecy to Jeroboam, like the four prophetic terms of the **Davidic Covenant**, can be understood to be terms of a covenant. Like the covenant between God and David, the covenant between God and Jeroboam is not identified as a *b'rit* within the covenantal passage (1 Kings 11:29-39).³ Unlike the **Davidic Covenant**, there is little if any indication anywhere else in the Bible that this passage marks the initiation of a covenant

^{1 1} Kings 11:11-13; 11:43-12:19.

² To Solomon, 1 Kings 11:9-13. To Jeroboam, 11:29-39.

³ Like the **<u>Davidic Covenant</u>**, the <u>Jeroboamic Covenant</u> is not a blood covenant. Also, neither prescribes generally applicable <u>human law</u>.

between God and Jeroboam. Nevertheless, God makes promises to Jeroboam in this passage, and some of the promises are conditional. Jeroboam's assent is clearly demanded, and given. So these promises and prophecies take the form of a contract between God and Jeroboam, even if the Bible doesn't explicitly identify this passage as a *b'rit*. Here are the relevant terms:

- God will split the Israelite kingdom in two (vv. 31,35).
- God will give ten tribes to Jeroboam (v. 31).
- God will make Jeroboam king over the ten tribes (v. 37).
- IF Jeroboam walks in God's ways, as David did, then God will make Jeroboam's dynasty eternal, like David's (v. 38).

There was little risk that Jeroboam would walk in God's ways the way David did. So there was little risk that this new dynasty would last very long. Even so, the fact that this **Jeroboamic Covenant** marks the initiation of the divided kingdom has profound implications that can be traced back to the **Abrahamic Covenant**, and traced forward to the 21st century. These implications take the form of a sibling rivalry between Ephraim and Judah. Given that God is sovereign over the entire universe, nothing in the universe is accidental. The fact that David and Solomon represent Judah, while Jeroboam represents Ephraim, is no accident. It is the partial fulfillment of prophetic terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant**.¹

After Ahijah's prophecy to Jeroboam, Solomon died and was replaced by his son, Rehoboam. The events surrounding Rehoboam's rise to power mark the migration of the unified kingdom of Israel out of the physical field into the exclusively psychic field. Likewise, these events mark the migration of Ahijah's prophecy, and the kingdom split posited there, out of the strictly psychic field into the physical field of perception and action:

> Then Rehoboam went to Shechem, for all Israel had come to Shechem to make him king. ... Then ... Jeroboam and all the assembly of Israel came and spoke to Rehoboam, saying, "Your father made our yoke hard; now therefore lighten the hard service of your father and his heavy yoke which he put on us, and we will serve you." Then he said to them, "Depart for three days, then return to me." So the people departed.

¹ The fact that neither the **Davidic Covenant** nor the **Jeroboamic Covenant** is a blood covenant, along with the fact that neither prescribes generally applicable **human law**, appears to indicate that these covenants do not have the same status as the blood-covenants that are appendments, directly and indirectly, to the **Edenic Covenant**. In fact, these two covenants should be understood to be like statutory implementations of the blood covenants.

And King Rehoboam consulted with the elders who had served his father Solomon ... But he ... consulted with the young men who grew up with him and served him. ...

Then Jeroboam and all the people came to Rehoboam on the third day ... And the king answered the people harshly, ... saying, "My father made your yoke heavy, but I will add to your yoke; my father disciplined you with whips, but I will discipline you with scorpions." So the king did not listen to the people; for it was a turn *of events* from the LORD, that He might establish His word, which the LORD spoke through Ahijah the Shilonite to Jeroboam the son of Nebat.

When all Israel *saw* that the king did not listen to them, the people answered the king, saying, "What portion do we have in David? *We have* no inheritance in the son of Jesse; To your tents, O Israel! Now look after your own house, David!" So Israel departed to their tents. ... So Israel has been in rebellion against the house of David to this day. And it came about when all Israel heard that Jeroboam had returned, that they sent and called him to the assembly and made him king over all Israel. None but the tribe of Judah followed the house of David.

Now when Rehoboam had come to Jerusalem, he assembled all the house of Judah and the tribe of Benjamin, 180,000 chosen men who were warriors, to fight against the house of Israel to restore the kingdom to Rehoboam the son of Solomon. (1 Kings 12:1-21)

By way of the power put into Rehoboam's hands by the Israelite people, Rehoboam was essentially asking a portal question. The portal question coming from his seared conscience was essentially this: "If God has ceased hearing the cries of His people (1 Samuel 8:18), then why should I, their king, listen to them?" This is obviously a tyrant's invitation to destruction of both himself and his people. Given that this is essentially a rhetorical question for which the answer is already known, it's reasonable to seek what's really going on here, and to view this portal based on what's really going on. The portal question at this two-house portal is an extension of the portal question at the descent into the monarchy:

Given that God's people are descending further and further into social deterioration by opting for a slave-farming polity, how is this deterioration to be reversed?

The answer to this question existed in the <u>local covenants</u> from the beginning, and its existence has been amply confirmed in the Old Testament's prophetic and historical writings. But because this answer involves the conflict between syncretism and anti-syncretism, it is taking millennia for this deterioration to be

genuinely reversed. Even so, that the mechanism for such reversal exists is amply confirmed. So the focus in this examination of the two-house portal will be on establishing what the social mechanism for such reversal is. On its face, sibling rivalry may appear to be a mechanism for deterioration, rather than for reversing deterioration. By seeing the nature of the sibling rivalry, the social mechanism for reversing the social schisms and deterioration becomes obvious. Before flashing back to the patriarchs, it should be noted that the division of the kingdom under Rehoboam, into a Northern Kingdom and a Southern Kingdom, is accompanied by an important change in terminology. Until this split, "Israel" had been used almost exclusively to refer to (i)Jacob, (ii)the descendants of Jacob, and (iii)the single nation composed of the descendants of Jacob.¹ From this split forward, "Israel" can also refer to the Northern Kingdom, which is led by the tribe of Judah.

e. <u>Abrahamic Origins:</u>

In Genesis 15, God clearly entered into a blood covenant with Abraham. This is clearly the beginning of the **local covenants**. Even so, it's reasonable that all of what God promised Abraham in Genesis 12-25 should be taken as terms of this blood covenant, and not merely the terms in chapter 15. There are two such terms that are crucial to this two-house portal. The first is in Genesis 12:2, and the second is in Genesis 17:4-5. In Genesis 12:2, God promised Abraham, "I will make you a great nation." In Genesis 17:4-5, God promises Abraham, "I will make you the father of a multitude of nations." In verse 17:5, to confirm both promises, God changes his name from Abraham, from "exalted father" to "father of a multitude".

As an extension of the **Abrahamic Covenant**, God loosely reiterates these two terms to Isaac (Genesis 26:1-5), where he promises,

"Sojourn in this land and I will be with you and bless you, ... and I will establish the oath which I swore to your father Abraham. And I will multiply your descendants ... and by your descendants all the nations of the earth shall be blessed."

What is in effect a statutory implementation of these covenantal terms appears in Isaac's blessing of Jacob (28:3-4). Isaac tells Jacob,

"may God ... make you ... a company of peoples. May He also give you the blessings of Abraham".

The blessings of Abraham clearly indicate the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> and therefore include both the "great nation" promise (12:2) and the "multitude of nations"

¹ It says "almost exclusively" because "Israel" started to be used sometimes to exclude Judah before the split, for example, in 2 Samuel 2.

promise (17:4-5). It's reasonable to understand the "company of peoples" blessing to be a rephrased reiteration of the "multitude of nations" promise. In the same way Abraham bequeathed these nation / multitude of nations promises to Isaac, Isaac bequeathed the same to Jacob. This is confirmed to Jacob by God himself in Genesis 35:11, where God promises Jacob (Israel), "A nation and a company of nations shall come from you." Even though the Hebrew linguistic cues may vary some from one verse to the next throughout these citations, conceptually, the meaning is the same throughout.¹ God promised to each of the patriarchs that through the patriarch's descendants, the patriarch would become both a great nation and a company of nations.²

God reiterates the "great nation" promise to Jacob again in a vision in Genesis 46:1-4, where God promises that he will make Jacob a "great nation" in Egypt. --- Biblical history clearly indicates that God did in fact turn Jacob's descendants into a great nation while they were in Egypt. However, subsequent biblical history indicates that this is only a partial fulfillment. These "great nation" and "company

2 The Hebrew word translated to "multitude" in Genesis 17:4,5 is *hamon* (Strong's #1995). In Genesis 35:11, God reiterates the Genesis 17:4,5 promise to Jacob, but the Hebrew word translated to "company" in Genesis 35:11 is *qahal* (Strong's # 6951). It is commonly translated to "company", "assembly", or "congregation" (**Vine's**, O.T. section, p. 9). The shift from "you shall be the father of a multitude [*hamon*] of nations" to "a company [*qahal*] of nations shall come from you" indicates that this "multitude" is not merely a disconnected and disorganized aggregate of nations. Rather, there is some purpose to this assembly, some purpose or principle around which it is assembled. There is a slight shift in meaning from possible purposeless aggregate towards purposeful cohesion and coherence. It's reasonable to take this as evidence that the meaning of the original promise to Abram was that many nations would come to adhere to the **AbrahamicCovenant** without losing their uniqueness and identity as separate nations. If this

"multitude of nations" were to lose their cultural identities in the process of assimilation, then this would merely mean that they would become part of a "great nation" (Genesis 12:2). If this were the original meaning, then there would be little reason for the author of Genesis to indicate a distinct term, "multitude of nations" (Genesis 17:4,5), thereby distinguishing this "multitude" term from this "great nation" term.

¹ In these verses, the Hebrew word translated to "nation" is *goy* (Strong's #1471). Even though this word is often translated to "nation", it does not have exactly the same meaning as the English "nation". The word *goy* refers primarily to an ethnic group rather than to a political unit. Such an ethnic group usually has a political component, but *goy* refers primarily to a linguistic-cultural-religious people-group (**Vine's**, O.T. section, p.159). Because this word, *goy*, is used primarily to reference a people group, it is inherently suspect to insist that "fulness of the gentiles" in the New Testament refers exclusively to a full number of people who come from non-Israelite nations.

of nations" promises do not attain their final fulfillment until the New-Jerusalem ecological niche is about to be entered. So these promises are like other prophecies that are characterized as being fulfilled "already but not yet".

More about the mechanism by which these promises are to be fulfilled appears when Jacob delivers his last will and testament (Genesis 48:1-49:28).¹ Facially, his will may not have the same authority as covenantal promises, but it's reasonable to treat the will as a statutory implementation of the **<u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>**.² So long as it is consistent with the spirit and the letter of the covenant, it's reasonable to treat it as having comparable authority.

Before examining this will, to put it into proper context, it's important to note that there is a difference between a blessing and a birthright. This is clear from reading Genesis 25:29-34 and 27:36. These two things are different. In cultures that practice primogeniture, the firstborn son has a birthright that is generally different from the birthrights of whatever other heirs there may be. It's clear in this passage that both Esau and Isaac were inclined to practice primogeniture. So primogeniture was probably the common practice among the ancient Hebrews, but it's also clear that Abraham and Jacob both opted out of any strict adherence to it. Genesis 25:29-34 tells of how Esau sold his birthright to Jacob for a pot of stew. Since Esau later makes diligent effort to receive the first-born blessing from Isaac (Genesis 27:1-4; 27:30-37), it's clear that Esau had not given the blessing away, even if he had sold his birthright, his right to the estate. So the first-born blessing is indeed something different from the right to the estate. The word, "birthright" can be taken facially to mean both the right to the estate and the right to the first-born blessing, or one without the other. When Esau sold his birthright to Jacob for stew, he was selling his claim to the estate. Later, Jacob and Rebekah defrauded Esau of his first-born blessing as well (Genesis 27). "Be master of your brothers, And may your mother's sons bow down to you" (Genesis 27:29) shows that the first-born blessing gives the

¹ When Jacob said that God "said to me, 'Behold, ... I will make you a company of peoples' ", the words for "company of peoples" are *qahal* (Strong's #6951) of '*am* (#5971) (Genesis 48:4). "The [Hebrew] word '*am*, 'people, nation,' suggests subjective personal interrelationships based on common familial ancestry and/or a covenantal union, while *goy* suggests a political entity with a land of its own" (**Vine's**, O.T. section, p. 159). Jacob uses *qahal* of '*am* instead of *qahal* of *goyim* (as in Genesis 35:11) or *hamon* of *goyim* (as in Genesis 17:4,5).

² Given the fact that Jacob has a position in the **local covenants** that is similar to Abraham's, as a foundational figure in redemptive history, and given the fact that God sovereignly chose him to function in this role, it would appear to be a dangerous denial of divine providence to lightly dismiss Jacob's oracles to his sons, especially his last will and testament. He is speaking as mediator of the covenant.

beneficiary preeminence over the other sons. In other words, the benefactor gives the beneficiary the position of leadership over the benefactor's other offspring. --- So it's reasonable to conclude that the birthright pertains to a portion of the estate, while the blessing pertains to status in the clan. In spite of the fraud, Isaac bequeathed to Jacob both the firstborn's portion of the estate and preeminence.

By reading Jacob's last will and testament carefully, it's clear that the blessings and the birthright are again distinguished there. There are distinctions between a double portion of the estate (48:22) and preeminence (49:3-4, 8-12). Preeminence is what the father gives to the son he chooses to make the leader of the clan. Whereas Isaac gave both the firstborn portion and preeminence (27:29, 37) to Jacob, Jacob bequeaths the two separately, giving one son one and another son the other.

Jacob's will is divided into two parts. In the first part, Jacob first adopts two of his grandsons, Joseph's two sons who were born before Jacob arrived in Egypt. Jacob thereby elevated these two grandsons to a status equivalent to his sons. Jacob said to Joseph, "your two sons ... are mine; Ephraim and Manasseh shall be mine, as Reuben and Simeon are [mine]." (Genesis 48:5) Reuben and Simeon were Jacob's first- and second-born sons; so he was saying that Ephraim and Manasseh would have a status comparable to the statuses of Reuben and Simeon. Jacob is essentially giving Joseph a double portion of the estate (48:22). But Jacob is giving the double portion directly to his two newly adopted sons. In Genesis 48:8-22, not only does Jacob adopt Joseph's two oldest sons, Manasseh and Ephraim, but he also opts to give the first-born birthright to the younger of the two boys. Joseph is one of the richest men on earth. He has no need for Jacob's estate. So Jacob gives the firstborn double-portion blessing directly to Joseph's sons.¹ In doing so, Jacob switches the age ranking of the two sons, which is evident through the hand switch (48:17-20). He makes the younger son, Ephraim, the older in the distribution of the estate. No doubt Ephraim and Manasseh each get one portion of the estate,² but Ephraim

^{1 &}quot;The Hebrew word translated 'portion' (*shechem*) often means 'shoulder' or 'ridge' ... and is identical to the place-name 'Shechem' (33:19). Some see here a reference to the double portion in the Promised Land that Joseph received through Ephraim and Manasseh Others infer that Jacob bequeathed the area of Shechem, where Jacob purchased a tract of land (33:18:19) and which his sons later conquered (34:25-31), to Joseph's descendants (Josh. 24:32).". --- **New Geneva Study Bible**, p. 86, footnote 48:22. --- The way that biblical history unfolds leads one to conclude that this may be a multiple entendre. But the context also shows that the most prominent meaning in 48:22 is portion or share.

² Confirmation that this is what Jacob was doing appears in Ezekiel 47:13, where it says that "Joseph *shall have two* portions". It's interesting to note that the word translated to

is nevertheless treated formally as the older. In the process, Jacob allocates the "multitude of nations" promise of the **Abrahamic Covenant** to Ephraim (48:19).¹ This is an absolutely crucial aspect of this examination of the two-house portal, for reasons that will be clear shortly if they are not already.

After going through this process with Joseph and his two oldest sons, Jacob "summoned his sons and said, 'assemble yourselves that I may tell you what shall befall you in the days to come." (49:1). Even though this will is not officially covenantal, because it doesn't follow the normal form of a covenant, and even though it doesn't follow the normal form of a prophecy, it is clearly at least as authoritative as a statutory implementation of the Abrahamic Covenant. After giving Joseph the double portion of his estate, and making sure that that double portion would be distributed to Ephraim and Manasseh as though Ephraim was the older, Jacob calls all of his sons together. He is essentially assigning offices in Abraham's social compact. This is evident from the fact that he isn't talking much, if any, about his estate, unless the estate is understood to be the promised land. He's talking about the personalities of each son, and what kind of offices they, and their descendants, deserve to have in the social compact. The meaning may bleed over into implications for the allocation of land, but the blessings are primarily about social status, which implies informal offices in the **jurisdictionally dysfunctional** social compact. --- Joseph has already gotten the first-born son's double-portion of the estate. So the purpose of chapter 49 is not so much the disposal of Jacob's estate as the determination of who will receive the first-born son's blessing, *i.e.*, preeminence.²

There are two allocations of Jacob's estate that stand above the others, the allocation to Judah (49:8-12) and the allocation to Joseph (49:22-26). Although there is certainly a blessing in this passage, the actual meat of Jacob's will as it pertains

1 The Hebrew word translated to "multitude" here is *m'loh* (Strong's #4393). The Hebrew *m'loh* literally means "fulness, handful, mass, multitude, fulness, that which fills, entire contents, full length, full line". (**Strong's Hebrew Lexicon**, *Logos* Bible Software) This is the first time that the literal expression "fulness of the Gentiles" appears in the Bible. This apparently refers to an alliance of people-groups, where each has subjugated its cultural distinctives to the unifying principles of the whole, without completely abdicating or abandoning those distinctives. According to this last will and testament, Ephraim is the primary carrier of this blessing. So Ephraim has a calling to become a "fulness of Gentiles", a "fulness of nations".

[&]quot;*shall have two* portions" in the **NASB** is not *shechem*, but is *chebel* (Strong's #2256), which carries the meaning, "sorrows", like one's lot in life. (Ezekiel 48))

² Because it's assumed that each son besides Joseph will get a single portion.

to Joseph appears in chapter 48.¹ The double portion goes directly to Joseph's two oldest sons. Jacob's blessing of Judah is his allocation of preeminence. Preeminence, leadership of the Israelite clan, is clearly allocated to Judah. Jacob skips Reuben, the oldest, in the allocation of preeminence because Reuben defiled Jacob's bed (35:22). Jacob skips the second and third oldest, Simeon and Levi, because of their excessive punishment of Dinah's rapist (34:25-31). The most important aspect of this allocation appears in the statement that,

> The scepter shall not depart from Judah, Nor the ruler's staff from between his feet, Until Shiloh comes, And to him *shall be* the obedience of the peoples. $(v. 10)^2$

In this allocation of preeminence, Jacob is clearly allocating the primary responsibility for the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>'s "great nation" term to Judah.³ Because the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> is perpetual, it's clear that this allocation of the "great nation" promise to Judah is perpetual, at least "until Shiloh comes". Although the meaning of "Shiloh" may be ambiguous, exegetes often understand it to be a reference to the

¹ In ancient times, it was probably clearly understood (1)that Joseph was getting a double portion of Jacob's estate; (2)that that double portion would go directly to Joseph's sons Ephraim and Manasseh; and (3)that the city of Shechem (Strong's #7927) was included in Joseph's double portion. --- Jacob said, "'I am giving to you a [shechem (Strong's #7926)] ... more than to your brothers; I captured it from the Emori with my sword and bow." (v. 48:22, Complete Jewish Bible, translated by David Stern, 1998, Jewish New Testament Publications, Inc., Clarksville, Maryland.). The city of Shechem (Strong's #7927) was probably built on a "ridge". Jacob is making a double or triple (or more) entendre here. He is saying: (1)"I'm giving you a double portion, a shechem (Strong's #7926) more than your brothers." (2)"I'm giving you the land I captured from the Amorites with my sword and bow, when Shechem (Strong's #7927) raped my daughter." (3)"I'm giving you the land near the city of Shechem (Strong's #7927) that I purchased from the Amorites." (4)"I'm giving you the shechem (Strong's #7926), the shoulder or ridge of land that the city of Shechem (Strong's #7927) is built on." (5)"I'm giving you the city of Shechem (Strong's #7927)." All this is included as part of the double portion. Jacob was speaking densely with multiple meanings. He was not speaking with exclusive either-or logic. His ancient descendants probably understood it densely, as terse and poetic language that had serious legal gravity.

² Both "Jewish officialdom and the Christian church agree as the to fact that the patriarch [Jacob] is here [in Genesis 49:10] proclaiming the coming of the Messiah." (Unger, Merrill F.: **The New Unger's Bible Dictionary**, 1985, Moody Press, Chicago, Illinois, p.1182).

³ Jacob is giving leadership of the **social compact** to Judah. These are clear-cut statements very much like those spoken by Isaac to Jacob: "Be master of your brothers, and may your mother's sons bow down to you." (v. 27:29).

Messiah. The scepter and staff are clearly instruments of monarchial rule.¹ The way that the **NASB** translates this verse appears to indicate that when Shiloh comes, he will be a monarch, and "the peoples" (Strong's #5971) will give "obedience" to this special monarch. This appears to indicate that there will be a monarchial, slave-farming polity that will accompany this monarch, and that the slave-farming polity and this monarch will drive the people into "obedience". However, the word that's translated to "obedience" (Strong's #3349) can also be translated to "gathering", as in the **KJV**. Because Shiloh's polity is not a slave-farming polity, it's improper to imply that coercion will be the *modus operandi* of his polity. So the more appropriate translation is to "gathering".

The ambiguity involved in having a monarch without the normal monarchial polity exacerbates the possibility for sibling rivalry among Jacob's heirs. Such rivalry might especially exist between a people whose presumed destiny is to become a "multitude of nations" and a people whose presumed destiny is to become a "great nation" "until Shiloh comes". This rivalry is in fact referenced by Paul in Romans 11:25, where he indicates that non-Jewish Christians should be careful about their attitude towards Jews, *i.e.*, towards Judahites. Paul indicates that "a partial hardening has happened to Israel" (meaning to Jewish people) until a complete company of nations, a fulness of nations, a whole multitude of nations, "has come in". In other words, Jewish people, as heirs of the "great nation" promise, will generally be obstreperous towards the Christian message until the "multitude of nations" term of the **Abrahamic Covenant** is satisfied.² The complete multitude is accurately called a "fulness". The fulness clearly indicates the totality of the people groups, the clans, languages, religious social compacts, and nations that are destined to aggregate outside the New-Jerusalem niche in anticipation of going in.³ The "has come in" clearly indicates that these nations, languages, lands, clans, people groups, religious social compacts, etc., have come into some measure of compliance with the biblical covenants. The measure being marked by this theodicy is the agreement about the need for and definition of a unifying secular social compact.

By way of the "great nation" and "multitude of nations" promises, a typological structure was set up under Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, where this typological

1 These instruments may originate in tribalism, but the main difference between tribalism and slave farming is that slavery on a large scale is not generally economically viable in tribal cultures. Regardless, these instruments are generally understood in both tribal and monarchial cultures.

² For more about the "fulness of the Gentiles", see below. Also see Luke 21:24; Isaiah 66:18-23; Zechariah 8:20-23; and Revelation 7:9-10.

³ See Genesis 10 regarding clans, languages, lands, and nations that need to be gathered.

structure parallels or predicates the course of humanity's development: After the flood, humanity started out as a single family and nation with a single language, and on a single land. This was immediately prior to the fall of the Tower of Babel. According to the last chapters in Revelation, God's elect are destined to end up in a celestial city, the "new Jerusalem", where there will be a single language, family, land, and nation. Between these two chronological extremes, humanity has been broken up into a multitude of languages, families, lands, and nations. Under Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob there is some coalescing of this multitude of nations in the psychic field of perception and action, by way of God's promise. In the psychic field, Abraham became a great nation. But he was also to become the "father of a multitude of nations", meaning the father of a company of peoples / nations. He will become the father of a complete, full, band of nations. Then this band of nations will coalesce into the single nation in the celestial city.

God split the human race into a "multitude of nations" in response to humanity's attempt at building the Tower of Babel, and he intends to bring all his "elect" into the "new Jerusalem" (Revelations 21). So the process of redeeming humanity will go from a state in which there are a "multitude" of people groups, nations, **social compacts**, *etc.*, to a point where there is only one **social compact** for all of God's elect. So this is a progression in time from a "multitude of nations" to one "great nation". (i)This promise to Abraham that he would be the "father of a multitude of nations" (Genesis 17:4,5; 22:18) is repeated to Isaac (Genesis 26:4) and Jacob (Genesis 35:11).¹ The promised relationship between the **local covenants** and the "multitude of nations" is therefore critical to Biblical eschatology. (ii)This term regarding the "multitude of nations" is critical to American Christians because it relates directly to how the pluralistic peoples that constitute the American "melting pot" are to conform to a single standard of behavior.

There are two things that it's absolutely critical to notice about Jacob's last will and testament. One is that by giving Judah preeminence, Jacob was essentially putting him and his progeny in charge of the "great nation" term of the **Abrahamic Covenant**. Jacob was essentially saying that there would be a division of labor in the covenant community, and that Judah would carry primary human responsibility for the fulfillment of this term. Jacob was saying that Judah and his progeny would maintain preeminence until the Messiah came. The other thing that it's absolutely critical to notice is that according to Jacob's last will and testament, in this division of labor, Ephraim would carry primary human responsibility for the "multitude of nations" term of the **Abrahamic Covenant**. Given that the "fulness of the Gentiles"

¹ As already indicated, this relates directly to the "fulness of the Gentiles" (the fulness of the nations) cited in the New Testament (Romans 11:25; cf. Luke 21:24).

mentioned in Genesis 48 is the same concept as the "fulness of the Gentiles" mentioned in the New Testament (Romans 11:25; cf. Luke 21:24), Ephraim retains responsibility for the "multitude of nations" term up to the advent of the <u>Messianic</u> <u>Covenant</u>. Likewise, Judah retains responsibility for the "great nation" term of the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> up to the advent of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. These two covenantal terms are critical keys to understanding the unfolding of redemptive history, at least "redemption with respect to the grand design in general". They are critical to understanding what God's covenant people should be doing in the 21st century.

f. These Two Terms Under the Pre-Split Mosaic Agenda:

The "great nation" and "multitude of nations" promises obviously pertain to extremely different callings. Built into these two different callings are seeds for conflict between the two siblings who received these callings. In the final analysis, in order for Judah and Ephraim to achieve their allotted purposes, it will be necessary for them to work together, as in a feedback loop. But the appearances of these two terms of the Abrahamic Covenant, throughout Genesis, do not appear to impose any obligation on the respective parties to this covenant, which means that they don't appear to have any obligation to work at all in regard to these callings, much less to work together. In other words, these terms do not explicitly impose or prescribe human laws of either a special or general kind. They are merely statements about what God intends to do by way of the Abrahamic Covenant. In Jacob's words, they are meant to tell "what will befall you in the days to come" (v. 49:1). In Jacob's will, they are merely statements about how God intends to use Jacob's sons, and their progeny. As such, they are a distribution of gifts. Even so, if one recognizes oneself as an heir to one of these two callings, and if one genuinely loves the local covenants, one is naturally inclined to harmonize one's behavior with the calling. So even though neither God nor the patriarchs mandated human behavior in regard to these callings, it's obvious that human action is required to fulfill these callings. So these callings should be understood to be considerations that are of a non-jural nature, where these considerations are guidelines for the development of religious social compacts. Even so, the feedback loop will still be ultimately necessary for these two siblings to satisfy their respective callings, in the ultimate sense.

By definition, a feedback loop cannot consist primarily of exclusive either-orlogic. A feedback loop must consist primarily of both-and logic, with a possibility for nesting either-or logic within the both-and feedback loop. Both the "great nation" and the "multitude of nations" agendas must be included in the feedback loop in order for the redemptive plan to unfold properly. But because of the radical differences in these callings, it sometimes appears that this sibling rivalry consists solely of exclusive either-or logic, and therefore of no real feedback loop at all. The first real sign that these two callings might be the source of serious sibling rivalry does not appear until the kingdom split under Rehoboam. But signs that they have opposite though complementary roles in the covenant community appear in places like Numbers 2, where the clan of Judah is placed on the east side of the tabernacle, and the clan of Ephraim is placed on the opposite, west side. But this is merely symbolic opposition and not a real sign of sibling rivalry.

From the time of Jacob's last will and testament until the time of the splitting of the Davidic kingdom, there was no major sign of conflict between Judah and Ephraim.¹ There are signs of conflict between Judah and Israel as a whole, for example, in Absalom's rebellion against David (2 Samuel 13:1-19:43).² But there is no significant sign of conflict between Judah and Ephraim until the split prompted by Rehoboam. Other than their applicability to the allocation of land, Jacob's prophetic bequests to these two tribes essentially go dormant until the split after Solomon's death. Then these terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant** essentially reawaken from dormancy. The conflict between Judah and Ephraim, because of the nature of their callings, is essentially a conflict between anti-syncretism and syncretism, respectively. Even though these terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant** largely went dormant between Jacob's last will and testament and Rehoboam's ascendancy, the conflict between syncretism was built mightily into the **Mosaic Covenant**.³ So in spite of the fact that these terms were dormant, the underlying issue, syncretism versus anti-syncretism, was absolutely not dormant during this period.

The penalties for idolatry under the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> were severe.⁴ All the seven nations and all the surrounding nations were deeply idolatrous. Because of this situation, syncretism in regard to these nations was absolutely forbidden by the covenant. The covenant people may have often violated these standards, but it's nevertheless clear that the <u>human laws</u> of their <u>religious social compact</u> forbade syncretism. Even so, it's clear that the entire <u>natural law</u> is God's, and it's important to understand this anti-syncretism within this larger context. --- One of the things

¹ In fact, representatives of Judah and Ephraim, Caleb and Joshua, respectively (Numbers 13:6, 8), were the only spies who did not return with a bad report, symbolizing that these two tribes would have leadership roles in the covenant community.

² There are also the rebellions of Bichri (2 Samuel 20:1-22) and Adonijah (1 Kings 1:5-49). Still the split after the death of Solomon is much more severe, and much more clearly a split between Ephraim and Judah.

³ More specifically, an absolute rejection of syncretism was built into the <u>Mosaic</u> <u>Covenant</u>.

⁴ Example: Deuteronomy 17:2-5.

that makes clans and nations unique relative to other clans and nations is that they discover **<u>natural laws</u>** that are relatively unknown to other clans and nations. For example, the ancient Greeks discovered mathematics and basic rules of logic that were largely unknown to other clans and nations, and these were incorporated into Greek culture in various ways. Generally, any clan / nation that is unique is unique because it has discovered something that distinguishes it from other clans / nations. The problem with syncretism is not that these foreign nations had discovered **<u>natural</u>** laws. Nations outside the local covenants often discover truths, natural laws, that are not known by parties to the local covenants. But idolatrous nations always have a perverted view of the truths, the **natural laws** that they discover. Given the fact that since the fall, every human being is inherently an idol factory, the propensity for every clan / nation to be idolatrous is huge. In fact, one of the main differences between the Mosaic community and other nations is not that the Israelites overcame this propensity, but that they had human laws built into their religious social compact that penalized explicit expressions of idolatry. All people, clans, and nations are prone to violating the moral-law leg of the **natural law** tripod. The big difference between the Mosaic community and other clans / nations was that explicit expressions of such violations were prohibited through human law. Of course such idolatry in the psychic realm was prohibited as well, but people generally are not capable of reading other people's minds, so such prohibitions in the psychic realm do not carry the force of human law.

The whole problem in regards to incorporating admirable knowledge about the **<u>natural law</u>**, truths incorporated by these foreign knowledge bases, is that such syncretism is prone to incorporating the foreign, skewed view in the process of incorporating truths of the <u>**natural law**</u>. One is thereby prone to follow the foreign propensity to violate the moral-law leg of the <u>**natural law**</u> tripod. This is precisely why it was crucial for the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u> to take a radical stand against syncretism. These truths that exist as other aspects of the <u>**natural law**</u> are not as easily integrated into the TRUTH of the moral-law leg of the <u>**natural law**</u> as one might wish. Humans are prone to compartmentalization instead of genuine integration, where compartment.¹ It was crucial to the covenant community's survival as God's people for the TRUTH never to be subverted by small truths, and for every compartmentalized idol to be thrown down, even if doing so entailed the

¹ Compartmentalization is a by-product of conflating either-or logic and both-and logic. When one does not clearly understand which one of these two kinds of logic defines a particular relationship, one is prone to compartmentalize and go *ad hoc*, thereby allowing the idol to stand instead of forcing it to submit to the proper kind of logic.

rejection of small truths. No room was allowed in the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> for the rational integration of small truths into the larger TRUTH of God's supremacy and sovereignty in all things.

In order for this people of the **Mosaic Covenant** to qualify as vehicles through which objective-central redemption could happen, the propensity to syncretism had to be stifled, so that the moral-law leg of the **natural law** would be sufficiently manifest in their society to allow the Messiah to grow up among them as a sinless man. The fact that monotheism was rare when the **Mosaic Covenant** was cut is evidence of how damaged the awareness of the moral-law leg had generally become by way of the fall. The **Mosaic Covenant** therefore clearly had, and still has, a bias against syncretism, and in favor of Judah's calling to be the leader in the formation of the "great nation" built around the supremacy of God. This is clearly a bias against Ephraim's calling to be a gatherer of nations, which was inherently a calling to be a syncretizer and harmonizer of diverse knowledge from various nations.

According to the blessing to Judah, the "obedience [(gathering)] of the peoples" would go to Shiloh, not to Ephraim and not to Judah. From this, and from biblical history, it's possible to draw the following conclusions: Shiloh would come primarily to Judah, not to Ephraim. He would come to the physical leader of Abraham's covenant community. Even though he came primarily to Judah, he would not come primarily *for* Judah. He would come primarily *for* Ephraim, to help Ephraim to be a fulness of nations, a gatherer of the peoples. If it's not clear already, it will become clear that this is precisely what happened in objective-central redemption, and the ramifications of this extend into the 21st century.

g. These Two Terms at the Kingdom Split:

At the split under Rehoboam, the more-or-less dormant sibling rivalry between Ephraim and Judah ceased being dormant, and manifested out of an undeniable birthing process. As the leader of Ephraim and the ten northern tribes, Jeroboam had legitimate grievances against the monarchy based in Judah. On the other hand, the **Davidic Covenant** marked the point in history at which Jacob's blessings to Ephraim and Judah show signs of being in gestation. While the agenda that's compatible with Judah's calling, meaning anti-syncretism, was always dominant under the **Mosaic Covenant**, Judah's preeminence didn't fully manifest until David became king and the staff and sceptre promises were confirmed in the **Davidic Covenant**. After the **Davidic Covenant** was established, God started manifesting the route that would be taken in fulfilling Jacob's blessing to Ephraim, that "his descendants shall become a multitude of nations" (Genesis 48:19). But the two courses to fulfillment, Judah's course toward becoming a "great nation", and

Ephraim's course toward becoming a "fulness of nations" (Genesis 17:4; 48:19), had other symbolic manifestations. For example, the ark of the covenant had been stored at Shiloh in Ephraim under the judges, but was moved to the territory of Judah by David, and later stored permanently in Solomon's temple. The fact that the ark of the covenant moved from Ephraim to Judah, and the fact that the centralized place of worship for all the tribes of Israel moved from Ephraim to Judah, are indicators that Judah's preeminence was being acknowledged. This is also more symbolic evidence that the "great nation" promise is essentially a promise for a **religious social compact**, a **social compact** for which the importance of the distinction between **global** and **local in personam jurisdictions** is minimal and largely irrelevant. This is in stark contrast to Ephraim's calling, which is implicitly a calling to manifest a **secular social compact** that would be the locus of numerous **social compacts** in confederation.

Essentially, by building the temple in Jerusalem, and by installing the ark of the covenant in the temple, and thereby fulfilling the prophecy in Deuteronomy 12:5,1 Solomon was consolidating the preeminence of Judah. During this time, there was little evidence that Jacob's prophecy to Ephraim (that his descendants would be a fulness of nations) was coming true. But Solomon's behavior, especially the methods that Solomon used in his public works projects, laid the foundations for the emergence of Ephraim as distinct, and if necessary separate, from Judah. --- Although Solomon affirmed Judah's preeminence, he also violated most of the standard set for Israelite kings in Deuteronomy 17:14-20. He multiplied horses and wives. He allowed his numerous wives to lead him into syncretistic religious practices and idolatry. He collected huge quantities of gold and silver for himself. Even though he may have made a copy of the Mosaic law for himself, and even though he may have read it every day, he did not sufficiently revere God to avoid turning aside to both the right and the left. In regards to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, like most Machiavellian rulers, he engaged in assassination plots (1 Kings 11:40), extraordinary rates of taxation, and forced labor. Each of these Machiavellian ploys figures into the eventual dismembering of unified Israel.

Although the terms of the **Davidic Covenant** were unconditional, God expressed to Solomon largely the same terms as purely conditional (1 Kings 9:1-9). In 2 Samuel 7:1-17 God made unconditional promises to David that the latter would have a kingdom, dynasty, and throne that would last forever (vv. 11-12, 13, 16), that the Israelite nation would live in its own land undisturbed (vv. 10-11), and that David's

^{1 &}quot;'But you shall seek *the Lord* at the place which the LORD your God shall choose from all your tribes, to establish His name there for His dwelling, and there you shall come.'" (Deuteronomy 12:5).

son would build the temple (v. 13). After Solomon finished building the temple, God spoke to him again in a dream indicating that he had indeed "consecrated this house[, this temple,] ... by putting My name there" (1 Kings 9:3). But God goes on to express unconditional terms of the **Davidic Covenant** as conditional terms to Solomon. God told Solomon,

"[I]f you will walk before Me ... in integrity of heart ... then I will establish the throne of your kingdom ...forever ... But if you ... turn away ... then I will cut off Israel from the land ..., and the house which I have consecrated for My name, I will cast out of My sight. ... And this house will become a heap of ruins". (1 Kings 9:4-8)

This shows the conditional side of the promise regarding the land, the promise regarding the temple, and the promise regarding the eternal kingdom and throne. If one does not have a holistic view of the unconditional promises to David, one might be prone to view the conversion of these terms into conditional promises as proof that the whole covenant is a ruse of a trickster god. But if one insists on a holistic view, then one knows that these unconditional promises have never been abrogated. In Solomon's dream, God is essentially showing Solomon that these terms of the **Davidic Covenant** are capable of going dormant. Like all terms of the biblical covenants that go dormant, when they go dormant, they go dormant due to human fallibility, not because God is a trickster.

(i)Solomon had just finished the construction of the temple, which was the migration of the temple out of the psychic field into the physical field. God had consecrated it. Then God was telling Solomon that if he turned away to serve other gods, then the temple would cease to exist in the physical field, and the covenantal term that produced it would return to being an unconditional term that's gone dormant. --- (ii)Under Solomon, Abraham's descendants occupied in peace most if not all of the land promised to Abraham. God had made an unconditional promise to Abraham that the land of his sojournings would be "an everlasting possession" (Genesis 17:8). This unconditional promise was reiterated to David (2 Samuel 7:8). Then God was telling Solomon that even though this was an unconditional term of an everlasting covenant, if Solomon or his sons "turn ... and serve other gods", then God "will cut off Israel from the land" (1 Kings 9:6-7). Under such circumstances, Solomon's people would be expelled from the land, and this term of the covenant would cease having a physical manifestation, and the term would go dormant. It does not cease being an unconditional promise, but it does cease having a physical manifestation. --- (iii)Solomon ascended the throne of his father, thereby affirming the validity of God's unconditional promise to David that David's kingdom, throne, and dynasty would last forever (2 Samuel 7:11-12, 13, 16). Then

in this dream, God was telling Solomon that if he turned away and served other gods, then "this house [(the throne, dynasty, kingdom)] will become a heap of ruins" (1 Kings 9:8). Again, this didn't convert the term from being unconditional into being conditional. It merely indicated that adverse human behavior was capable of causing the unconditional term to go dormant.

In fact, each of these unconditional terms eventually became completely dormant. Since going dormant, through a combination of God's providence and human endeavor, each has come out of dormancy to various extents and in various ways. Because these things are important features of the <u>local covenants</u>, it's important to track vacillations between dormancy and physical manifestation of these three things: (a)the throne, (b)the land, and (c)the temple. Given that the goal associated with each of these promises is conformity to <u>natural law</u>, it's foolish to think that the fulfillment of these promises must conform to human presuppositions and expectations, rather than to <u>natural law</u>. God never reneges on his promises, and he never violates <u>eternal law</u> for the sake of gratifying human expectations.

Solomon's decline started with his violation of practically all the standards set for Israelite kings in Deuteronomy 17:14-20. But the effects of Solomon's malfeasance didn't start impacting these three unconditional promises until after Solomon died and Rehoboam took over. As indicated, when "Jeroboam and all the assembly of Israel ... spoke to Rehoboam", the splitting issue was Solomon's tax burden on all the non-Judahite portion of Israel (1 Kings 12:4). The most egregious tax burden that Solomon placed on Israel was his system of forced labor, which was probably a combination of slavery and corvees. Jeroboam the Ephraimite was in charge of "all the forced labor of the house of Joseph" (1 Kings 11:28), so he was an authority on Solomon's forced labor. --- "King Solomon levied forced laborers from all Israel; and the forced laborers numbered 30,000 men" (1 Kings 5:13).¹ Solomon forced these 30,000 men to work because his public works demanded labor. According to the Mosaic Covenant, forcing Israelites into slavery or corvees was a violation of the law (Leviticus 25:39-43). It was certainly legal for an Israelite to sell himself into indentured servitude, but there were certain restrictions on this. People could sell themselves because of debt or poverty (Leviticus 25:35-55), but the servitude was limited to six years (Exodus 21:2), or until the year of jubilee (Leviticus 25:40). And it was not legal to force an Israelite into such servitude (Exodus 22:24). So when "King Solomon levied forced laborers from all Israel", he probably violated these standards just as he had violated Deuteronomy 17.

¹ Apparently, this 30,000 does not include the "70,000 transporters" and the "80,000 hewers of stone" (1 Kings 5:15).

Solomon's tax load almost inevitably drove some Israelites into debt. These debts almost inevitably included debts to the tax collectors. When such people became deeply indebted to tax collectors, their only visible recourse was almost inevitably either to escape to a foreign country or to sell themselves into indentured servitude. Since a corvee is "labor exacted in lieu of taxes by public authorities"¹, it's almost inevitable that some of what is being called "forced labor" was Israelite bondsmen.

It's obvious from 1 Kings 9:20 that most of Solomon's "forced labor" was composed of people "who were not of the sons of Israel". It's also obvious that "Solomon did not make slaves of the sons of Israel" (1 Kings 9:22). But did Israelites who owed him taxes volunteer to work for a time as indentured servants, in order to pay their taxes? If they volunteered, then it wouldn't be appropriate to call their labor "forced labor". But if an obstreperous tax collector tells person A that the only way person A will ever be able to pay his/her tax debt is through a corvee, then person A can only fend off the revenuer's rantings for so long before the only reasonable option looks like indentured servitude. So the difference between a tax-encumbered citizen voluntarily selling himself into indentured servitude to Solomon, and Solomon forcing the same into a corvee, becomes virtually nil. Even if it is appropriate to call such a corvee "forced labor", it is not appropriate to call it "slavery". That's because slavery is permanent. Like indentured servitude, a corvee has a limited duration: until the tax debt is paid. Since conscription is forced enlistment, it becomes clear that there is little difference between conscripting a tax debtor into a corvee and sending tax collectors against the man until he enlists. Since taxation is by definition a forced payment to the government, it becomes obvious that such indentured servitude is also involuntary, and conscription is a perfectly fine word to use to describe the means by which one enters such "forced labor". This doesn't mean that Israelites were forced into labor through the king's levy. In other words, the king probably didn't set a quota for a certain number of Israelites to be forced into labor. He certainly set quotas for laborers, and when the deputies over the conscription process depleted the pool of survivors from the seven nations, they almost certainly picked on the economic weaklings among their Israelite brethren.

The Hebrew language, by itself, without adequate effort at inducing the meaning from these scriptures, fails to make these distinctions clear. This is because the same word, *ebed* (Strong's #5650), is used to describe both a slave and an indentured servant. By putting the pieces of this puzzle together in a rational and reasonable fashion, it becomes clear that all the tribes other than Judah were suffering. The fact that Judah had elevated itself above this burden puts salt in the wound. If Solomon had confined his taxation to paying for strictly defined **jural functions**, and nothing

¹ Webster's 7th, p.188.

else, it's extremely unlikely that the tax burden would have become so great that conscription of Israelites into "forced labor" would have become a problem. The fact that Solomon was commissioned by God to build the temple is a sure indicator that people were not ready for strictly defined **jural functions** in Solomon's day.¹ The fact that they even demanded a king is proof enough of that. The monarchy was a slave farm. There's no doubt that Jeroboam's complaint against Rehoboam was perfectly legitimate (1 Kings 12:4).

After Solomon discovered that Ahijah had delivered the covenantal prophecy to Jeroboam, Solomon tried to have Jeroboam assassinated (1 Kings 11:31-40). Jeroboam escaped, and shortly thereafter Solomon died, having been reduced to a more-orless ordinary Machiavellian despot (1 Kings 11:41-43). Rehoboam, and "all Israel" assembled in Shechem, the historic town in Ephraim, for the new king's coronation (1 Kings 12). But some in the disgruntled faction called Jeroboam out of exile to confront the new king about Solomon's corvees. So after the initial confrontation, Rehoboam asked for a three day adjournment, so that he could decide what to do about these complaints about the corvees. He heard from two sets of advisers. One set, Solomon's elders, advised him to acquiesce to the demands made in Shechem. The other set of advisers recommended that Rehoboam tell the disgruntled faction that he should make their burden heavier than his father had made it. Being utterly devoid of his father's youthful wisdom, Rehoboam "spoke to them according to the advice of the young men, saying, 'My father made your yoke heavy, but I will add to your yoke; my father disciplined you with whips, but I will discipline you with scorpions." (1 Kings 12:14).

As far as the **global** biblical prescription of **human law** is concerned, the corvees and all of Solomon's other Machiavellian ventures were the core of what he did wrong. As far as the **ecclesiastical** functions of the Mosaic **religious social compact** are concerned, his biggest errors were his failed syncretism and the resulting idolatry. Successful syncretism is clearly a long-term goal of God's plan for redeeming humanity, but it's a dangerous process that should never be rushed. Solomon, as a man with a commitment to wisdom, naturally desired the harmony of all knowledge

¹ More evidence that they were not ready for strictly defined **jural functions** appears from the fact that people openly practiced slavery in Solomon's day. If all people are equal before the law, then how can one person own another person as property? They cannot. So slavery was in clear violation of the standard established by the **Noachian Covenant**. But it was a common practice when Moses delivered the **Mosaic Covenant**, so he had to make allowances for it, knowing that if he demanded too much of the people, they would not be able to make it. It was going to be hard enough for them as it was, without requiring more of them than they were capable of giving.

bases with the purity of the moral-law leg of the **<u>natural law</u>**, as posited in the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u>. But for him to think that he could achieve such an exalted goal against all the severe warnings of the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u> is a sure sign of presumption, and of having "his heart ... lifted up above his countrymen" (Deuteronomy 17:20). If he had been diligent in obeying the Mosaic commandments, he might have had much better grounds for integrating foreign knowledge without importing foreign values and distortions. But of course, this was not his calling; it's also not Judah's calling; and it's also prohibited by the <u>**Mosaic Covenant**</u>.

Solomon's opulence required a steady stream of goods and services from his subjects, both from Israelites and foreign tributaries. One has to conclude that all the dire warnings about monarchy that Samuel delivered in 1 Samuel 8:11-18, must have been fulfilled in Solomon's reign. But the Bible presents a very mixed view of Solomon's tenure. For example, the Bible indicates that "Judah and Israel ... were eating and drinking and rejoicing" (1 Kings 4:20), and "lived in safety, every man under his vine and his fig tree, from Dan even to Beersheba, all the days of Solomon." (1 Kings 4:25). Obviously "Judah and Israel" were living in abundance during these days. But if everything was perfect, then why would there be such complaining about Solomon's onerous burden immediately after his death (1 Kings 12:4)?

"Solomon had twelve deputies over all Israel, who provided for the king and his household; each man had to provide for a month in the year." (1 Kings 4:7). If Solomon's were a normal household, then providing for this household would not have been much of a burden. But since Solomon required huge quantities of gold (1 Kings 6; 7:48-51; 10:14-18), horses and chariots (1 Kings 4:26,28; 10:26), a large standing army to keep the foreign tributaries in line, huge quantities of food to feed all his entourage and livestock (1 Kings 4:28; 5:11; 10:4-5), and a huge labor force (1 Kings 4:6; 5:13-18; 9:15), it's not reasonable to assume that the provisions "for the king and his household" were triffing. Even so, "those deputies provided for King Solomon and all who came to King Solomon's table, each in his month; they left nothing lacking." (1 Kings 4:27).

So these "twelve deputies" had a big job to do, in collecting taxes for all these provisions. Besides the size of the tax load that Solomon placed on the people, he violated the **Mosaic Covenant** in the way that he distributed the tax burden. Examination of the twelve districts over which these "twelve deputies" presided (1 Kings 4:8-19) shows that, (i)the districts violate the **Mosaic Covenant**'s tribal boundaries, and (ii)Judah was exempted from taxation.¹ The fact that Judah was

¹ In the listing of the twelve tax districts in 1 Kings 4:7-19, Judah is not included. ---**New Geneva Study Bible**, "Solomon's Administrative Districts", p. 478.

exempted from the tax burden shows that not only was Solomon's "heart ... lifted up above his countrymen" (Deuteronomy 17:20), but also the collective heart of the tribe of Judah was lifted up above the rest of Israel. For Judah to have preeminence is one thing. For preeminence to turn into arrogance and domineering is another. But this kind of arrogance is normal in slave-farming polities. Rehoboam's response to "Jeroboam and all the assembly of Israel" (1 Kings 12:3) is evidence that not just the king, but the entire tribe of Judah was letting their preeminence go to their head. The fact that an Ephraimite was chosen to oppose Judah's excesses was no coincidence. It was the first sign that God is using a pincher strategy, playing Judah and Ephraim off against each other, in the pursuit of his grand design.¹

Unlike God's unconditional promises to David, his promises to Jeroboam were either quickly fulfilled or conditioned on Jeroboam's behavior. Shortly after the meeting with Rehoboam, God did make Jeroboam king over ten tribes, satisfying the unconditional terms of the **Jeroboamic Covenant** (1 Kings 11:31, 35, 37). But there was no risk that the conditions of the conditional promise would be met (1 Kings 11:38). The promise to Jeroboam of the preservation of his kingdom was totally conditioned upon his behavior (1 Kings 11:38). This distinction relates directly to Jacob's blessings. Jeroboam is an heir to Ephraim's blessing because he is an Ephraimite. But the blessing is that Ephraim would be a "fulness of nations", not that he would bear responsibility for the "great nation" promise. So God's promise to Jeroboam, of the perpetuity of his throne in the Northern Kingdom, was as flimsy as Jeroboam's ability to "walk before [God] ... in integrity was flimsy.

After escaping Shechem, Rehoboam considered war against the northern tribes, but "Shemaiah the man of God" told Rehoboam and

all the house of Judah and Benjamin ... "Thus says the LORD, 'You must not go up and fight against your relatives the sons of Israel; ... for this thing[, i.e., this secession,] has come from Me.'" (1 Kings 12:22,23,24)

After this the two kingdoms had two separate identities, and two separate existences. One, the Southern Kingdom, pursued the destiny allotted by Jacob to Judah, preeminence, and to be a "great nation". The other, the Northern Kingdom, pursued the destiny allotted by Jacob to Ephraim, to be a "multitude of nations".

¹ At least God is playing them off against each other until they learn to cooperate with each other in a genuine feedback loop. Because there is such deep corruption, rottenness, and bad theology in both of these camps in the early 21st century, the supposed cooperation between "Israel" and the "United States" at this time should absolutely not be counted as genuine cooperation.

Jeroboam initially established the capital of the Northern Kingdom in Shechem, in Ephraim (1 Kings 12:25). Among his first acts as the new king of the Northern Kingdom was to create a state religion (1 Kings 12:26-29). He feared that if the people in the northern tribes continued going to Jerusalem to observe the biblical feasts, then their attachment to Jerusalem would be a drain on his political power (1 Kings 12:27-33). Even if this was a legitimate concern, his solution was a disaster because it entailed breaking covenant with God (1 Kings 11:38). By creating a state religion, Jeroboam committed the Northern Kingdom to being a <u>religious social</u> compact, which is especially jurisdictionally dysfunctional given Ephraim's calling.

From the secession of the northern ten tribes and their formation of a second kingdom forward, and throughout the remainder of the Old Testament, and even into the New Testament, the Bible identifies the Northern Kingdom with several different names. "Israel" is one of these aliases. To the existing three different usages of "Israel" is added a fourth. From this point in the Bible forward, "Israel" can be used to indicate (i)the name God gave to Jacob at Peniel (Genesis 32:28); (ii) Jacob's descendants and covenant heirs; (iii) the nation formed by Jacob's descendants and those party to the Mosaic Covenant prior to the secession; and (iv)the nation formed by the northern ten tribes after the secession. Because Jeroboam established the capital of the Northern Kingdom in Ephraim, the Bible sometimes refers to the Northern Kingdom as "Ephraim". From this time forward, the capitals of the Northern Kingdom were always in the tribal territory of Ephraim. The capital was originally in Shechem (1 Kings 12:25), but was also at Tirzah (1 Kings 15:33), and eventually settled in the city of Samaria (1 Kings 16). Thereafter, the Northern Kingdom was also called "Samaria", after the name of its capital. So aliases for the Northern Kingdom include "Israel", "Ephraim", and "Samaria".

h. Prophecy of Ephraim's Doom:

Jeroboam's behavior as Ephraim's king, along with the similar behavior of all the subsequent kings of the Northern Kingdom, casts serious doubts on the possibility that Ephraim would ever become an *m'loh* (Strong's #4393, a "fulness, handful, mass, multitude, fulness, that which fills, entire contents, full length, full line" --- Genesis 48:19).¹ As a matter of fact, the same prophet who anointed Jeroboam king of the northern tribes later prophesied not only the end of Jeroboam's house, but the end of the Northern Kingdom of Israel, the eradication of Ephraim (1 Kings 14:7-11, 15-16). Ahijah prophesied to Jeroboam's wife,

¹ Strong's Hebrew Lexicon, Logos Bible Software.

"[T]he LORD will strike Israel, ... and He will uproot Israel from this good land which He gave to their fathers, and will scatter them beyond the *Euphrates* River, because they have made their Asherim, provoking the LORD to anger. And He will give up Israel on account of the sins of Jeroboam, which he committed and with which he made Israel to sin." (1 Kings 14:15-16)

This may be the first time in the Bible that a prophet prophesies Ephraim's physical doom, but it's not the last. Clearly, Jeroboam and Ephraim were even less prepared for the syncretism project than Solomon.

From the day of Israel's secession from Judah, all of Ephraim (meaning all ten tribes) were tempted by the knowledge and practices of foreign cultures, and they indulged their temptations. They may have paid lip service to keeping the moral-law leg of the **natural-law** tripod, as it was manifest in the **Mosaic Covenant**, but lip service is evidence of compartmentalization, which doesn't come close to genuine integration. Rather than procuring a genuine submission of foreign knowledge bases to the moral-law leg of the **natural law**, Ephraim practiced compartmentalization and duplicity. Rather than submitting all knowledge, whether foreign or not, to the overarching knowledge that there can be only one true God, they treated the one true God as simply one more in a pantheon of gods. They went for compartmentalization instead of integrity. The result was God's complete rejection of the physical manifestation of Ephraim, and all the other tribes that were with him. All the physical ten tribes were lost forever.¹

Before Ephraim's demise, there were ample prophecies of such demise. Most prominent among such prophecies are those of Hosea, who even named his three children to commemorate Ephraim's demise, even before it happened. The refrain in the books of Kings, speaking of the legacy of one Ephraimite king after another, is,

¹ In "modern Nablus", in what is now the "West Bank" of Israel, there is "a settlement of about two hundred [Samaritans], who have observed the law and kept the Passover on Mt. Gerizim 'with an exactness of minute ceremonial which the Jews have long since intermitted." (**Unger's**, p.1119). But given the history since the secession of the northern ten tribes, it is extremely unlikely that this small band of people carries God's promise to Abraham to be a "multitude of nations", or Jacob's promise to Ephraim to be a "fulness of nations". There is **NO** possibility that this sect carries Judah's preeminence. So even though this sect may have a knowledge base that is valuable in some respects, the degree to which its knowledge base is submitted to and harmonized with the moral-law leg of the **natural law** embodied in the biblical covenants must be doubted. This is especially true when considering the blemished history. Furthermore, it's clear that they have no more claim to being the lost ten tribes than any other group of Gentiles. This is because the biblical statements indicating total rejection are unequivocal.

he "did evil in the sight of the LORD, and walked in the way of Jeroboam and in his sin which he made Israel sin".¹ The kingdom of Ephraim existed for approximately two hundred years (930-722 B.C.).² As is obvious from Ahijah's prophecy against Jeroboam, and the king's syncretistic state religion, the earthly kingdom of Israel was not likely to last long.

Speaking to Ephraim under the alias, "Samaria", the prophet Amos said, "[T] hus says the Lord GOD, 'An enemy, even one surrounding the land, Will pull down your strength from you and your citadels will be looted." (Amos 3:11). He also prophesied by saying,

Hear this word, you cows of Bashan who are on the mountain of Samaria, Who oppress the poor, who crush the needy, Who say to your husbands, "Bring now, that we may drink!" The Lord GOD has sworn by His holiness, "Behold, the days are coming upon you When they will take you away with meat hooks, And the last of you with fish hooks." (Amos 4:1-2)

Amos was warning that "an enemy" would haul them mercilessly into exile. Amos delivered other prophecies to the Northern Kingdom, but the main thrust of them can be summarized when God speaks through Amos to say, "The end has come for My people Israel. I will spare them no longer." (Amos 8:2) Hosea expressed almost exactly the same sentiment when

the LORD said to him, " ... I will no longer have compassion on the house of Israel, that I should ever forgive them." (Hosea 1:6)

One might conclude from this that God is saying that he will never forgive the Northern Kingdom for their apostasy. All the evidence indicates that the physical humans who were carrying the Ephraimite blessing did, in fact, become totally irrelevant to the fulfillment of that blessing. Even so, God's plan, as expressed by Jacob in Genesis 48:19, would never be thwarted, even if the people were. Even in dormancy, the Ephraimite blessing would continue, because Ephraim and this blessing are pivotal to the **local covenants**, as much so as Judah.

Hosea also indicated that "Ephraim will become a desolation in the day of rebuke" (Hosea 5:9). At that time, "Ephraim is oppressed, crushed in judgment, Because he was determined to follow *man's* command." (Hosea 5:11) The command that Ephraim was "determined to follow" was Jeroboam's command that established a syncretistic state religion for the Northern Kingdom. Ephraim would be "oppressed,

^{1 1} Kings 15:26, 30, 34; 16:2, 19, 26, 31; 22:52; 2 Kings 3:3; 10:29-31; 13:2, 6, 11; 14:24; 15:9, 18, 24, 28.

² New Geneva Study Bible, p.473, chart.

crushed in judgment" by the "enemy" as a result of breaking the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>. Through Hosea, God said,

> "I *will be* like a lion to Ephraim. ... I, even I, will tear to pieces and go away, I will carry away, and there will be none to deliver." (Hosea 5:14)

God would be a destroyer of Ephraim, for the sake of rendering justice against him. The result would be that "Israel [Ephraim] is swallowed up; They are now among the nations Like a vessel in which no one delights." (Hosea 8:8)

Ahijah, Amos, and Hosea were primarily prophets to Ephraim, but they were not the only prophets who predicted the destruction of the Northern Kingdom. Some prophets to Judah who were alive before the end of the Northern Kingdom also predicted its destruction. For example, God used Micah to predict it:

I will make Samaria a heap of ruins in the open country, ... I will pour her stones down into the valley, And will lay bare her foundations. (Micah 1:6)

Isaiah also predicted Ephraim's doom. When Pekah, the king of the Northern Kingdom, waged war against Judah, as the kings of the Northern Kingdom often did,¹ Isaiah delivered a prophecy of Ephraim's ultimate destruction. On this occasion, Pekah had formed an alliance with Rezin, the king of Aram (a.k.a. "Syria", not to be confused with Assyria), for the sake of waging war against Jerusalem (2 Kings 15:37). Isaiah says,

thus says the Lord GOD, "... now within another 65 years Ephraim will be shattered, *so that it is* no longer a people" (Isaiah 7:7, 8).

God protected Judah against Ephraim's assault by using the king of Assyria.

i. <u>Doom of Ephraim:</u>

Clearly, the end of Ephraim was caused by syncretism, or more accurately, perverse syncretism. It was caused by a failed syncretism that was the state religion of the "kings of Israel". According to the author of 2 Kings,

[T]hey rejected His statutes and His covenant which He made with their fathers, and His warnings with which He warned them. And they followed vanity and became vain, and *went* after the nations which surrounded them, concerning which the LORD had commanded them not to do like them. And they forsook all the commandments of the LORD their God and made for themselves molten images, *even* two calves, and made

¹ Examples: 1 Kings 14:30; 15:6, 16, 32; 2 Kings 16:5.

an Asherah and worshiped all the host of heaven and served Baal. Then they made their sons and their daughters pass through the fire, and practiced divination and enchantments, and sold themselves to do evil in the sight of the LORD, provoking Him. So the LORD was very angry with Israel, and removed them from His sight; none was left except the tribe of Judah.

... And the LORD rejected all the descendants of Israel and afflicted them and gave them into the hand of plunderers, until He had cast them out of His sight. ... And the sons of Israel walked in all the sins of Jeroboam which he did; they did not depart from them, until the LORD removed Israel from His sight, as He spoke through all His servants the prophets. So Israel was carried away into exile from their own land to Assyria until this day.

And the king of Assyria brought *men* from Babylon and from Cuthah and from Avva and from Hamath and Sephar-vaim, and settled *them* in the cities of Samaria in place of the sons of Israel. So they possessed Samaria and lived in its cities. (2 Kings 17:15-24)

Taking Hosea 1:6 literally, God said that he would never have any "compassion on the house of Israel", meaning the Northern Kingdom, Ephraim, Samaria. So the physical manifestation of God's promise to Ephraim became completely dormant, even though the existence of this unconditional promise continued to exist in the psychic field of perception and action.¹

The Assyrian king's Mesopotamian transplants to Samaria may have learned something about the <u>local covenants</u>, but they never came close to catching the core of it. They were no better than the Ephraimites that they replaced, and they were probably worse. No descendants of Jacob who inhabited the Northern Kingdom received mercy or grace from God to continue being covenanted to him via the <u>local covenants</u>. Without doubt, there were people who left the Northern Kingdom, moving to Judah (1 Kings 12:17; 2 Chronicles 10:17; 11:16-17), and those people probably did not fall into this disfavor at this time. But for all the rest of the Northern Kingdom, both the exiles and the non-exiles, they received "no mercy". In other words, in God's eyes, the Northern Kingdom of Israel had ceased to be a

¹ Rabbinical Judaism and gentile Christianity generally agree that the ten tribes are utterly lost, and can be retrieved only through some extraordinary act of divine providence. --- For rabbinical view of the fate of the ten tribes, see Edersheim, Alfred; **The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah**, *8th edition revised*, 2 vol., 1896, Longmans, Green, London, England, vol.1, pp. 14-16.

people-group. They were no longer of any significance in God's plan for redeeming mankind.

In accordance with the prophecies, Ephraim's existence as a "people", a nation, a kingdom, ended during King Hoshea's reign (2 Kings 17:6). In the ninth year of Hoshea's reign, "the king of Assyria captured Samaria and carried Israel away into exile to Assyria, and settled them in Halah and Habor, *on* the river of Gozan, and in the cities of the Medes" (2 Kings 17:6).

[T]his came about, because the sons of Israel had sinned against the LORD their God, ... and they had feared other gods and walked in the customs of the nations whom the LORD had driven out before the sons of Israel, and *in the customs* of the kings of Israel which they had introduced. (2 Kings 17:7-8)

There is no Biblical evidence that these Israelite exiles retained anything significant of their covenant with the "Holy One of Israel". All the evidence indicates that if Ephraim continued to exist after the Assyrian exile, it could not have done so through the people who were exiled. In other words, Ephraim's heritage, as given through Jacob's blessing, did not pass to the exiles, because the exiled Ephraimites were assimilated into Gentile cultures. Likewise, Jacob's blessing did not pass to the Ephraimites who remained in the land, because they ceased to be covenanted into the **local covenants**. Perhaps more accurately, the fact that they were never covenant partners became manifest, and all pretense to the contrary was eliminated. So 2 Kings 17:20 says,

> [T]he LORD rejected all the descendants of Israel and afflicted them and gave them into the hand of plunderers, until He had cast them out of His sight.

It's necessary to conclude that the poor people who were left in the land were no more worthy to receive Ephraim's blessing than the ruling class people who were exiled. The people of the land of the northern ten tribes were not able to replace their ruling class with people of their own choosing. They would be ruled over, "possessed", by people from Mesopotamia. Ephraim went into exile from which he never returned, and these physical people who had once been the beneficiaries of Jacob's blessing utterly abdicated that blessing. The promise went utterly dormant. God rejected all the sons of Jacob that were left in Samaria, as though they were no different from other pagans. That all the Ephraimites were rejected, and not just some of them, is proven not only by 2 Kings 17:20, but also by the prophet Hosea. Lest there be any doubt, God used the prophet Hosea to convey the message of total rejection.

God first had Hosea marry a prostitute, as a sign that God himself was married to a metaphorical whore in being covenanted to Israel, the Northern Kingdom, Ephraim (Hosea 1:2-4).¹ God had Hosea name his first son "*Jezreel*" (Strong's #3157). The reason for this name is given in Hosea 1:4:

[T]he LORD said to him [Hosea], "Name him Jezreel; for yet a little while, and I will punish the house of Jehu for the bloodshed of Jezreel, and I will put an end to the kingdom of the house of Israel."

Ahab and Jezebel were the notoriously corrupt king and queen of the Northern Kingdom, and God used Jehu to wipe out all of their offspring after they themselves were dead (2 Kings 9-10). Jehu massacred seventy sons of Ahab in the Valley of Jezreel, in the Northern Kingdom. Jehu became king, and he wiped out the Baal worship that had been introduced by Ahab and Jezebel. But he refused to abandon the state religion that had been introduced by Jeroboam (2 Kings 10). According to Hosea 1:4, the prophet named his first child after the Valley of Jezreel for the sake of a reminder that Jehu's bloodshed in the Valley of Jezreel would need to be avenged, and the "end to the kingdom of the house of Israel" (v.4) was drawing near. Naming his son "Jezreel" would also signify that God would "break the bow of Israel in the Valley of Jezreel" (v.5). Breaking the bow is a token that all enforcement power would be taken away from Ephraim's government.

When Hosea's first daughter was born, God had Hosea name the girl *Lo-ruhamah* (Strong's #3819). God told Hosea to name her this because "I will no longer have compassion on the house of Israel, that I should ever forgive them." (Hosea 1:6) *Lo-ruhamah* literally means "no mercy". Taking this literally, one concludes that no descendants of Jacob who inhabited the Northern Kingdom received mercy or grace from God to continue being covenanted to him. This was confirmed again through Hosea when his next child was born. When Hosea's wife

had weaned Lo-ruhamah, she conceived and gave birth to a son. And the LORD said, "Name him Lo-ammi, for you are not My people and I am not your God." (Hosea 1:8-9)

Lo-ammi (Strong's #3818) literally means "not my people". In other words, in God's eyes, the Northern Kingdom of Israel had ceased to be his people. They were no longer of any significance in God's plan for redeeming mankind.

The names that Hosea gave to his second and third child have literal, Hebrew meanings that Hosea applied prophetically to the Northern Kingdom. But his first child appears, at least in the first few verses of chapter one, to have no such symbolic name. Hosea appeared merely to name his first child after a valley in the Northern Kingdom as a reminder of justice to be rendered to Jehu's dynasty. So at first, the

¹ This may have been a metaphorical prostitute. There is no way to know certainly whether Hosea really married a whore, or only metaphorically.

boy's name appears to be merely a cue to remember the evil done in the Valley of Jezreel, and therefore that the evil would be avenged. In contrast, the names of the other children are indications of what will happen to the whole house of Ephraim.

j. Prophecy of Restoration of Ephraim:

In Hosea 1:10-11, it appears that Hosea is using his first son's name in the same symbolic manner with which he used the names of his other two children. Hosea indicated that God said,

Yet the number of the sons of Israel Will be like the sand of the sea, Which cannot be measured or numbered; And it will come about that, in the place Where it is said to them, "You are not My people," It will be said to them, "You are the sons of the living God." And the sons of Judah and the sons of Israel will be gathered together, And they will appoint for themselves one leader, And they will go up from the land, For great will be the day of Jezreel. (Hosea 1:10-11)

After clearly indicating that the Northern Kingdom would cease being a people, God spoke of the "great ... day of Jezreel", as though that is somehow a hopeful day. If one doesn't look at the literal meaning of "Jezreel", then one might be inclined to believe that this is merely a day of judgment. The fact that this passage indicates that Ephraim and the other nine tribes will be too numerous to be counted is a hint that "Jezreel" should be taken much more literally. If one understands *Jezreel* to have a symbolic meaning, like the names of Hosea's other two children, then this passage makes much more sense. *Jezreel* literally means "God sows". This name is symbolic of God sowing the Ephraimite promise into the nations, so that the nations become incorporated into the **Abrahamic Covenant**. God allowed the promise to go utterly dormant with the expectation that it would be revived out of the "multitude of nations".

The name "Jezreel" does not have merely a double-meaning in Hosea 1. It has a quintuple-meaning: (1)It refers to the valley of judgment against Ahab's house. (2) It refers to the valley of judgment against Jehu's house. (3)It refers to the valley of judgment against the house of Ephraim and the Northern Kingdom. (4)It refers to the sowing of the Ephraimite blessing as seeds into the nations, whereby Ephraim utterly looses his identity as Ephraim. (5)And it refers to the valley of judgment against all mankind who oppose the biblical covenants, in the day when "the sons of Judah and the sons of Israel [the newly emergent ten tribes] will be gathered together" under "one leader", when they "will go up from the land".

Given that the names of Hosea's other two children are *Lo-ruhamah* (no mercy) and *Lo-ammi* (not my people), it seems clear that Hosea is saying that God is saying

that the Northern Kingdom is "not a people", and he will have "no mercy" on them, and "He will sow" them into the nations. Like all seeds, when they are sown into the earth and grow, they cease to exist as seeds. Ephraim ceased to exist as Ephraim. But this death, this sowing, was called "great" by God because of the harvest, the countless "sons of Israel", that it would produce. Because of the harvest, "the day of Jezreel", the day of sowing, is here presented as a day of celebration, in expectation of the time when God says to Ephraim, "*Ruhamah*", "I have mercy on you"; and "*Ammi*", "My people". Shortly thereafter, in God's timing, Judah and Ephraim will say to one-another, "*Ruhamah*", "I have mercy on you"; and "*Ammi*", "My people".

Hosea is not the only prophet who predicted that Ephraim would be restored. Over 100 years after Ephraim had been exiled, God spoke through Jeremiah to say,

> "I have surely heard Ephraim grieving, 'Thou hast chastised me, and I was chastised, Like an untrained calf; Bring me back that I may be restored, For Thou art the LORD my God. For after I turned back, I repented; And after I was instructed, I smote on *my* thigh; I was ashamed, and also humiliated, Because I bore the reproach of my youth.' Is Ephraim My dear son? Is he a delightful child? Indeed, as often as I have spoken against him, I certainly *still* remember him; Therefore My heart yearns for him; I will surely have mercy on him" (Jeremiah 31:18-20).

God does not make unconditional promises, then rescind them. If he uses Jacob to assign the "fulness of nations" term of the <u>Abraham Covenant</u> to Ephraim, unconditionally, as he did, then he will certainly deliver.

The promise to Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Ephraim, that they would become a "multitude of nations", certainly requires that knowledge in societies outside the local covenants conform to the moral-law leg of the natural law, at least to some significant extent, before such nations are considered inside the local covenants. This is inherently syncretistic, but it must be syncretism that honors the priorities of the biblical covenants. For this to happen, it's absolutely critical that the distinction between secular social compacts and religious social compacts be recognized and heeded by all. This means that the integration of the "multitude of nations" into the local covenants must be a two-step process. The long-standing presumption has been that people outside the **local covenants** would come into the **local covenants** through subjective-individual redemption, and that this one-step process would satisfy the needs of the "grand design", and would be all that God demanded of humanity in preparation for entering the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. But the structure of the biblical covenants requires that there be a two-step process. As long as humans exist in the out-of-the-garden niche, broadcasting the gospel and thereby facilitating subjective-individual redemption is crucial. But this, by itself,

does nothing to satisfy the need for a polity that's consistent with the **<u>natural law</u>** and consistent with the biblical covenants.

For a single individual person to become party to a **religious social compact** as a side effect or by product of subjective-individual redemption is one thing. For a nation, an existing **social compact**, to be integrated into the **Abrahamic Covenant**, is something else entirely. --- For a nation to remain a nation and at the same time be integrated into the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>, it's fitting that it would first satisfy the requirements of the **Noachian Covenant**. This is because the latter is **global**, and it already applies to all people. In contrast, the **<u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>** is **<u>local</u>**, and it only applies to people party to it. Subjective-individual redemption is certainly a process whereby people outside the Abrahamic Covenant are made subject to the jurisdiction of the Abrahamic Covenant through adoption (Galatians 3:29-4:5). But subjective-individual redemption does not apply to nations, clans, tribes, and other groups of people. It only applies to individuals. For nations to be brought into conformity with the biblical covenants, they first need to conform to the requirements of Genesis 9:6, thereby incorporating the distinction between legal actions *ex delicto* and *ex contractu*, between jural compacts and ecclesiastical compacts, and between secular social compacts and religious social compacts. This issue is crucial to the "grand design". It is the essence of what it means for Ephraim to be restored.

When "Shemaiah the man of God" told Rehoboam that the secession of the ten tribes came from God (1 Kings 12:22,23,24), he certainly didn't mean that God was actively setting up idolatry in the Northern Kingdom. Instead, the secession was the northern tribes' destiny, as part of the "grand design". Ephraim had a calling and destiny different from Judah's. Because the nine tribes followed Ephraim in becoming a "fulness of nations", rather than following Judah to become a "great nation", it's obvious that they did so because they perceived more freedom with Ephraim than with Judah. This is clear by considering Jeroboam's complaint against the burden imposed by Solomon (1 Kings 12:3-4). But Ephraim's freedom was not *lawful*. It violated **natural law**. So Ephraim's *de facto* freedom was that of the libertarian.¹ Genuine libertarianism demands the implementation of the **natural-rights** polity.

¹ By "genuine libertarian" is meant the *metaconstitution*. It should not be confused with metaphysical libertarianism. The latter rejects the precept that God has "from all eternity ... ordain[ed] whatsoever comes to pass" (Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter III, I), which this theodicy affirms.

Even though Ephraim ceased having a physical existence, and even though the "fulness of nations" promise went utterly dormant, the unconditional promise still existed in the psychic field of perception and action. As further proof, consider another prophecy from Jeremiah:

"[T]hus says the LORD of hosts, the God of Israel:... 'I shall bring Israel back to his pasture, and he will graze on Carmel and Bashan, and his desire will be satisfied in the hill country of Ephraim and Gilead. In those days and at that time,' declares the LORD, 'search will be made for the iniquity of Israel, but there will be none; and for the sins of Judah, but they will not be found; for I shall pardon those whom I leave as a remnant.'" (Jeremiah 50:18-20)

This indicates that according to God, there were still two houses, even after Ephraim was long gone, and even after Judah was well on its way into exile. Otherwise, how could God bring "Israel back to his pasture"? There are numerous other passages that prove that Ephraim and the northern tribes will be restored.¹

The Northern Kingdom was utterly assimilated into Gentile culture, in the physical field, but it was NOT assimilated into Gentile cultures in the psychic field. In the psychic field the Northern Kingdom was spread like psychic seeds into the Gentile world. As a result, in the same way that the Messiah is the only true King of the Southern Kingdom, the Messiah remained the only true King of the Northern Kingdom. Even though the **Davidic** and **Jeroboamic** covenants are both covenants that God made with human beings, only the **Davidic** has terms that are eternal and unconditional, and that therefore necessarily have an "already but not yet" status even into the 21st century. The Jeroboamic has terms that are either unconditional but fully satisfied, or conditional and fully satisfied. So the Jeroboamic Covenant has promises that are "already", but none that are "not yet". Even so, these two covenants and the houses they create show that God is using a pincher strategy in the redemption of human law. The pincher strategy does not explicitly prescribe human law, but it does set these two houses against each another so that they act as goads towards one another, encouraging one another to adopt human laws in their religious social compacts, so that their religious social compacts facilitate the "grand design", and so that they recognize and acknowledge the difference between actions ex delicto and ex contractu, between jural compacts and ecclesiastical compacts, and between secular social compacts and religious social compacts. These two covenants act as information given by God to help humans to understand

¹ Sample citations that prove Ephraim will be restored: Isaiah 9:1-5; 66:18-23; Jeremiah 3:12-17; 4:1-2; 16:19; 31:1-14; 31:15-21; 31:27-28; 31:31-34; 33:7-9; 33:14; 50:17-20; 50:33-34; 51:5-6; Ezekiel 37:15-25; 47:13-23; Hosea 3:4-5; 14:4-7; Zechariah 8:13; 9:9-13; 10:6-9.

what God is doing in the realm of **<u>human law</u>** and human government, as well as in regard to the "grand design" in general.

The Apostle Paul confirmed the establishment of this pincher strategy when he quoted Hosea 1:10 and Isaiah 10:22,23 in Romans 9:25-26. Although Paul's focus in Romans 9-11 may have been addressed mostly to soteriology, specifically, in depth arguments regarding subjective-individual redemption, it's clear that he was also addressing the "grand design". So every reasonable reading of this passage should recognize the two-house doctrine embedded there. --- The fact that the modern nation of Israel exists should not be understood to be merely the product of international law, United Nations resolutions, the commitments of zionistic socialism, and the machinations of international bankers; although it certainly is all those things. The modern nation of Israel is also the evidence of God's pincher plan. The extent to which this particular manifestation of the Southern Kingdom is *de jure* depends hugely upon the extent to which that nation adopts and implements *de jure* human law, meaning the natural-rights polity demanded of them from the beginning.

Even after three millennia, these ten tribes have not returned to Judah. Most people who have an opinion about this assume that they never will because they have been lost forever. That's probably a safe assumption, speaking strictly of their physical existence. But that doesn't mean that all the prophecies of their restoration are equally as defunct, and that their equivalent cannot be resurrected out of the psychic field. --- "God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham." (Matthew 3:9; Luke 3:8)

k. Near Demise of Judah:

The history of Judah's kings is not as devoid of signs of virtue as the history of Ephraim's. Ephraim's kings were obvious leaders away from God and into debauched syncretism.¹ The writers of Kings and Chronicles typically assessed the kings of each kingdom as adhering to the **Mosaic Covenant** or not. If a king adhered, then these writers typically classified the king as being good, with statements like so-and-so "did what was right in the sight of the LORD" (1 Kings 15:11). If they did not adhere to the **Mosaic Covenant**, then these writers typically stigmatized the king as being evil, with statements like so-and-so "did evil in the sight of the LORD" (1 Kings 15:26). Out of the twenty kings of Ephraim, each except two is classified as

¹ Hosea put it aptly: "Ephraim mixes himself with the nations; Ephraim has become a cake not turned." (Hosea 7:8). In other words, Ephraim has become half baked because his syncretism is half baked.

being evil, and the two not classified as evil are not classified at all.¹ --- Out of the twenty post-split kings of Judah, the writers of Kings and Chronicles classified nine kings as being good,² and eleven kings as being evil.³

The overwhelming reason Judah's evil kings were evil is that they "walked in the way of the kings of Israel, ... and ... did evil in the sight of the LORD. ..." (cf. 2 Kings 8:18-19). So the overwhelming reason for the evil of Judah's evil kings is debauched syncretism. The primary reason Judah's good kings were good is because they made genuine attempts at returning their kingdom and their people to the **Mosaic Covenant**, and away from syncretism (cf. 1 Kings 15:11-14). So syncretism is at the heart of the Bible's evaluation of these kings. Because syncretism was always assumed to be idolatrous under the **Mosaic Covenant**, idolatry is the yardstick by which the Bible evaluates all the kings of the **local covenant**'s monarchy period.

Judah's kingdom lasted from 930-586 B.C. This is 135 years longer than Ephraim's monarchy.⁴ Even though they each had twenty kings, Judah's monarchy lasted longer than Ephraim's because Judah's kings tended to live longer, because they were not violently deposed as often. During Judah's first 195 years, there were seven good kings and four bad ones. During Judah's last 150 years, there were two good kings and seven bad ones. Obviously Judah was in a process of decline almost from the first day that Solomon's kingdom was divided, and this decline was exponential, starting with Solomon's debauched syncretism and exacerbated by Ephraim's. Even so, the slave-farming polity must have played an important role in generating all these despots.

¹ Biblical assessments of Ephraim's kings: Jeroboam I (1Kings 13:33-34); Nadab (1Kings 15:25-26); Baasha (1Kings 15:33-34); Elah (1Kings 16:13); Zimri (1Kings 16:19); Omri (1Kings 16:25); Ahab (1Kings 16:30); Ahaziah (1Kings 22:51-52); Joram (2Kings 3:1); Jehu (2Kings 10:29-31); Jehoahaz (2Kings 13:1-2); Jehoash (2Kings 13:10); Jeroboam II (2Kings 14:23); Zechariah (2Kings 15:8); Menahem (2Kings 15:16-17); Pekahiah (2Kings 15:23-24); Pekah (2Kings 15:27-28); and Hoshea (2Kings 17:1-2). --- There are only two about whom there is any doubt, Tibni and Shallum.

² Kings of Judah classified as good: Abijah (2Chronicles 13); Asa (1Kings 15:11); Jehoshaphat (1Kings 22:43); Joash (2Kings 12:1-2); Amaziah (2Kings 14:1-3); Azariah (2Kings 15:1-3); Jotham (2Kings 15:32-34); Hezekiah (2Kings 18:1-3); Josiah (2Kings 22:1-2).

³ Kings of Judah classified as evil: Rehoboam (1Kings 14:21-22; 2Chronicles 12:1, 14); Jehoram (2Kings 8:16-18); Ahaziah (2Kings 8:26-27); Athaliah (2Kings 11; 2Chronicles 22:10-12); Ahaz (2Kings 16:1-2); Manasseh (2Kings 21:1-2, 16); Amon (2Kings 21:19-20); Jehoahaz (2Kings 23:31-32); Jehoiakim (2Kings 23:36-37); Jehoiachin (2Kings 24:8-9); Zedekiah (2Kings 24:18-19).

⁴ New Geneva Study Bible, p. 473, table.

Like the prophecies of Ephraim's demise, the prophecies of Judah's are prolific. They are especially numerous in Jeremiah, but they also appear elsewhere, for example in Isaiah 5:1-7. In Jeremiah 7:1-15 the prophet prophesied that God would make the temple in Jerusalem a ruin the same way he made the tabernacle at Shiloh a ruin. Jeremiah also prophesied the plundering, destruction, and exile of Jerusalem (Jeremiah 6:1-15; 20:4-5). Even so, Judah's near complete demise was assured even before Jeremiah, by the actions of King Manasseh. Manasseh restored all the worst practices of the Seven Nations, including sacrificing his own son and setting up idol worship in the temple.

Now the LORD spoke through His servants the prophets, saying, "Because Manasseh king of Judah has done these abominations, having done wickedly more than all the Amorites did who *were* before him, and has also made Judah sin with his idols; therefore thus says the LORD, the God of Israel, 'Behold, I am bringing *such* calamity on Jerusalem and Judah, that whoever hears of it, both his ears shall tingle. And I will stretch over Jerusalem the line of Samaria and the plummet of the house of Ahab, and I will wipe Jerusalem as one wipes a dish, wiping it and turning it upside down. And I will abandon the remnant of My inheritance and deliver them into the hand of their enemies, and they shall become as plunder and spoil to all their enemies; because they have done evil in My sight, and have been provoking Me to anger, since the day their fathers came from Egypt, even to this day."

Moreover, Manasseh shed very much innocent blood until he had filled Jerusalem from one end to another; besides his sin with which he made Judah sin, in doing evil in the sight of the LORD. (2 Kings 21:10-16)

Manasseh's syncretism consisted of violations of both Mosaic **jural laws** and Mosaic **ecclesiastical laws**. As far as **globally** prescribed **human law** is concerned, the *delicts* are by far the worst of these violations. But from the perspective of the Mosaic **religious social compact**, the idolatry was the worst. 2 Kings 21:9 clearly indicates that Manasseh did even worse than the Seven Nations. (2 Kings 24:3-4).

Two generations after Manasseh, Josiah attempted to make amends. But it was too late. God spared Josiah from having to witness Judah's demise, but he made it clear to him that the demise was inevitable. Josiah was the last good king that Judah had (2 Kings 22:1-23:29). After Josiah died, his son, Jehoahaz, replaced him. Jehoahaz was captured by Pharaoh, and he died in exile in Egypt (2 Kings 23:30-34). Pharaoh replaced Jehoahaz with Jehoahaz's brother Eliakim, whom he called "Jehoiakim". He was also one of Pharaoh's tributaries for several years. Later he became a tributary of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon. After paying tribute to Nebuchadnezzar for three years, he revolted (2 Kings 23:34-24:6). He died after being captured by Nebuchadnezzar (2 Chronicles 36:6), and he was replaced by his son, Jehoiachin (a.k.a. "Jeconiah", "Coniah"). Nebuchadnezzar also captured Jehoiachin (2 Kings 24:12-15). Jerusalem and the temple were destroyed, and all of the leading people in Judah were exiled to Babylon (2 Kings 24:6-25:21). Only the poor people were left in Judah (2 Kings 24:14).¹ After Jehoiachin was captured and exiled, Nebuchadnezzar made Zedekiah, Jehoiachin's uncle, the next king. Zedekiah was Judah's last king, at least until after the Babylonian exile. His death marks the end of the Davidic throne, dynasty, and kingdom in its physical manifestation. But before that, there were ample prophesies of the almost complete destruction of Judah.²

After spending some time in the stocks for speaking bluntly to public officials, Jeremiah delivered this prophecy to "Pashhur the priest":

For thus says the LORD, "Behold, I am going to make you a terror to yourself and to all your friends; and while your eyes look on, they will fall by the sword of their enemies. So I shall give over all Judah to the hand of the king of Babylon, and he will carry them away as exiles to Babylon and will slay them with the sword. I shall also give over all the wealth of this city [Jerusalem], all its produce, and all its costly things; even all the treasures of the kings of Judah I shall give over to the hand of their enemies, and they will plunder them, take them away, and bring them to Babylon." (Jeremiah 20:4-5).

The Babylonian Exile marked the end of the Davidic dynasty in its earthly form. It also marked the destruction of the temple and the elimination of the leaders of the Mosaic **religious social compact** from its designated **geographical jurisdiction** (2 Kings 24:1-25:30).

¹ The fact that they were poor doesn't mean that they were no longer party to the **Mosaic Covenant**, and no longer influential in the path of God's covenant people. But the fact that they were poor, given the circumstances of the times, does mean that they were less likely to be literate and less likely to be conscious of the terms of the **Mosaic Covenant**. Under such circumstances, it's difficult to see how they could be qualified to bear the banner of the covenants. This is precisely why the geographical arena of the biblical writings moves at this time out of the land of Judah to Babylon.

² Prophecies of destruction of Judah's monarchy, temple, capital, *etc.*: Is. 29:1-12; 39:5-7; 63:18-19; 64:10-12; 65:6-7,11-15; Jer. 4:5-5:2; 5:6-10; 6:1-2,6-8; 6:18-25; 7:15,19-20; 7:30-34; 9:11-16; 10:22; 12:14-15; 14:11-12; 15:1-2,6-9; 16:10-13; 19:1-13; 20:1-6.

Both Ephraim and Judah were destroyed as kingdoms, and carried into exile. The <u>local covenant</u>'s monarchy period ended with Babylon's defeat of Judah, Jerusalem's destruction, the temple's destruction, and virtually all of Judah being carried away into Babylonian Exile. All this was fulfillment of God's conditional promises to Solomon in 1 Kings 9. The same covenantal promises that were expressed unconditionally to David, regarding the land, the temple, and the Davidic monarchy, became utterly dormant, even though Judah itself did not go dormant the way Ephraim did.

l. <u>Conclusion to the Two-House Portal:</u>

It is amazing that the Jewish people were preserved through the Babylonian captivity, restored to the promised land, and made adequate vessels for receiving the first incarnation of Christ. The period from the destruction of Jerusalem and the temple, and the captivity of the Jewish people, up to the incarnation of Christ, is extremely interesting, amazing, and important, almost entirely because it was transforming to the Jewish people themselves. Even so, this theodicy is not a history of redemption. This theodicy is necessarily focused on law, covenants, and jurisdictions. It is focused on grace and redemption as facets of the covenants and law. Based on logic, this theodicy holds that grace and redemption only exist within the context of law and covenants. Grace outside the context of law is meaningless. Grace is an answer to law. Grace without law is an answer without a question. Grace is something that's dispensed by a righteous judge. A righteous judge cannot exist except as a function of enforcing law. So in order to properly understand grace and redemption, it's necessary to properly understand law, covenants, and jurisdictions. So the latter are the focus of this theodicy. If this theodicy were to be expanded into a history of redemption, then the resulting work would certainly focus in detail on the events between the Babylonian captivity and the incarnation of Christ. It was a period of a kind of redemption of the Jewish people, a period in which they necessarily ceased running their own slave farm, and acted largely as outside observers of Gentile slave farmers. Even so, the agenda of this theodicy requires that its treatment of this period be cursory. Almost nothing happens during this period that changes biblical law, covenants, and jurisdictions, or that opens another essential portal.

This *motive clause* part of this theodicy has focused primarily on portals. It's done this for the sake of showing the historical pattern in the gradual development of the **natural-rights**-honoring polity. Portals are a counterpart, an opposing part, to covenants. In the biblical covenants, agreements between God and humans are struck. The terms of those covenants are laws. The covenants always establish **jurisdictions**, where each of the subsidiary aspects of **jurisdiction** must exist before

genuine jurisdiction exists. Geographical jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and **subject-matter jurisdiction** must always exist for *lawful jurisdiction* to exist. This is as true in the realm of **natural law** as it is in the realm of **human law**. --- In contrast to an examination of covenants, laws, and jurisdictions, examination of portals is a process of examining violations of covenants, laws, and jurisdictions. A prerequisite for portal examination is the establishment of what the laws are, what the covenants are, and what the **jurisdictions** are, in order to manifest how the violation violates. Prior to the examination of the two-house portal, this motive-clause section spent little time exposing covenants, laws, and jurisdictions. This is because these should be fairly obvious to anyone who can read the Bible. But in the examination of the two-house portal, it has been necessary to examine the local covenants because the two-house doctrine and dormancy are not as obvious to the average Bible reader. In fact, as far as the knowledge of the author of this theodicy goes, the two-house doctrine and dormancy have never been adequately developed as features of the "grand design", in the entire history of Christianity. Even if stubborn people don't like having their boats rocked by the publication of unheard-of doctrines, if the veracity of the doctrines is confirmed by both biblical and extra-biblical evidence, then the stubborn should rejoice that the truth is prevailing. When God pares the earthly existence of his covenant people down to a puny remnant, as he did with the utter demise of Ephraim and the near demise of Judah, it must be time to start rebuilding. If he has clearly indicated that he intends to use the two-house doctrine as a core feature of his "grand design", there is no reason to think that that intent no longer exists simply because some of his promises have gone dormant. This portal shows further that God uses even despotic human behavior to make all things work together for good for those who love him, and who are called according to his purposes. How he does so unfolds further in the culmination of objective-central redemption.

Sub-Chapter 9: Preparations for the Incarnation

Before examining the portals associated with the culmination of objectivecentral redemption, it's fitting that this theodicy would first examine this period of redemption of the Jewish people, because it is a crucial preparation for Christ's incarnation and ministry. When this theodicy examines the two portals in the New Testament, it will again need to examine the "new covenant" in more than usual detail to establish its **jurisdiction**. This is not because Bible readers are generally unfamiliar with the New Testament. It's because they are generally not accustomed to seeing the two-house doctrine, as established by the patriarchs, in

the new covenant, and because the two portals in the New Testament are intimately related to the two-house doctrine. So before examining the two portals in the New Testament, it's reasonable to make a few terse comments about the history between the Babylonian captivity and the incarnation of Christ.

Even though the "grand design" clearly demands genuine syncretism, the God of the Bible has never encouraged a facile syncretism with regard to his **social compacts**. He has always demanded rigor and strict construction of his covenants. That demand is the explanation for much of what happened to his covenant people after their captivity under Nebuchadnezzar. The Ephraimite faction was long gone and utterly defunct by then. On the other hand, the Judahite faction was destined to stay in exile for seventy years. Even before Judah went into exile, there were prophecies of his return in seventy years:

[T]hus says the LORD ..., " ... this whole land shall be a desolation and a horror, and these nations shall serve the king of Babylon seventy years. Then it will be when seventy years are completed I will punish the king of Babylon and that nation" (Jeremiah 25:8-12)

God also made it clear to Judah through numerous other prophecies that Judah would return from exile.¹ After seventy years, God made good on his promise to restore the people to the land. But he did not restore the Davidic kingdom, and even to this day, he has not restored the Davidic kingdom on earth. God destroyed the Davidic dynasty through the Babylonian Exile. This relegated the "great nation" term of the **Abrahamic Covenant** to dormancy but not to error or oblivion. Even though Judah's existence didn't go dormant the way Ephraim's existence did, many of the covenantal promises did go dormant. The promise regarding the throne and the kingdom went dormant, along with the promise regarding the land and the promise regarding the temple.

Those who returned [from Babylon] were but a small number, compared with what had been carried captive; and for the most part they were dependent on the power of other states. They were subject to one while to the kings of Persia, then to the monarchy of the Grecians, and then to the Romans.²

While they were in exile, they lacked **geographical jurisdiction** over anything other than whatever meager real property the foreign slave farm allowed them

¹ Sample prophecies of Judah's return: Is. 49:22-23; 51:11; 60:1-17; 65:8-10; Jer. 16:14-

^{15; 23:2-3; 24:1-8; 27:21-22; 29:1-15; 30:1-11; 30:18-22; 31:1-14; 31:23-26; 31:27-28;}

^{32:36-44; 33:7-13; 33:14; 46:27-28; 50:17-20; 50:33-34; 51:5-6;} Ezek. 34:25-30; 37:15-25; 47:13-23; Joel 3:1-2; Amos 9:8-15; Micah 4:1-8; Zech 12:1-13:9.

² Edwards, History, Period I, Part V, XIV, p. 558.

to have. After this "small number" had returned to Canaan, they were generally dominated by foreign slave farms to such an extent that they could rarely exercise full **geographical jurisdiction** over the land.

The supreme power over Israel should be no more in the royal line of David ... [F]irst, the supreme power over Israel should be in the hands of the Persians; then ... of the Grecians; and then ... Romans, and be no more in the line of David \dots^1

These foreign interlopers, starting with Nebuchadnezzar, were used by God to enforce his original judgment against any slave-farming system operating in his name. God made his objections to monarchy clear from the beginning (1 Samuel 8:7). During this period between the Babylonian captivity and the incarnation, God generally used foreign tyrants and their slave farms to keep his remnant people from crowning one of their own.

> "Therefore, thus says the Lord GOD, 'Because you have made your iniquity to be remembered, in that your transgressions are uncovered, so that in all your deeds your sins appear-- because you have come to remembrance, you will be seized with the hand. And you, O slain, wicked one, the prince of Israel, whose day has come, in the time of the punishment of the end,' thus says the Lord GOD, 'Remove the turban, and take off the crown; this will *be* no more the same. Exalt that which is low, and abase that which is high. A ruin, a ruin, a ruin, I shall make it. This also will be no more, until He comes whose right it is; and I shall give it *to Him*."" (Ezekiel21:24-27)

Except for a short span of time during this several-century-long period, God denied "the crown" to the Judahites, through the secondary cause of foreign slave farms. There would never be another Davidic king, except the only Davidic King who ever deserved the crown. As indicated in the decree of Cyrus (Ezra 1:2-4), the purpose of Cyrus's release of the captives was not to allow them to restore their secular government. It was expressly for the purpose of rebuilding the temple in Jerusalem. So Cyrus was not encouraging Judah to reestablish their **jural society**. He was encouraging them to reestablish their **ecclesiastical society**, and that alone. In accordance with this, Judah had only a rudimentary, **jurisdictionally dysfunctional jural society** when they returned to *Eretz Yisrael*, and it stayed rudimentary until the Hasmonean dynasty. Even when they established the Hasmonean dynasty, they did not do so for the sake of reestablishing the Davidic monarchy. They did so for the sake of self-preservation, and for the sake of preserving the <u>local covenants</u>. But the Hasmonean dynasty became corrupt. Because Judah's **jural society** has had a

¹ Edwards, History, Period I, Part VI, p. 561.

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compulsion toward corruption that is almost as gripping as that of most Gentile **jural societies**, the Jewish **jural society** has been practically non-existent since the end of the Hasmonean dynasty,¹ until the reestablishment of the Jewish state in 1948.² And then it came into the physical field dysfunctionally, as an aspect of another glorified slave farm.

After the end of the seventy-year period of forced exile, this small Judahite remnant did reoccupy part of the promised land, and they did rebuild the temple. But "the temporal dominion of the house of David" was never re-established.

The Jews henceforward were always dependent on the governing power of other nations, until Christ came, for near six hundred years; except about ninety years, during which space they maintained a sort of independence by continual wars under the dominion of the Maccabees and their posterity.³

Although the temple was rebuilt, there were several important aspects of the temple worship that were never restored. The ark was never restored. The "two tables of the testimony delivered to Moses" were never restored. The "Urim and Thummim" were never restored. The Shechinah over the mercy seat was never restored (Leviticus 16:2). And the fire that "came down from heaven, and consumed the burnt-offering" was not restored (Leviticus 9:24; 2 Chronicles 7:1).⁴

During this six-century-long period, a number of important books were added to the *Tanakh*, and the canon of the Old Testament was closed. Perhaps almost as important as this is the fact that copies of the *Tanakh* were multiplied, so that copies were more readily available for ordinary people to read.

¹ Jonathan Edwards may claim that the Herodian dynasty was Jewish, but there are good reasons to dispute this: "The last concomitant I shall mention is the sceptre's departing Judah, in the death of Herod the Great." (**History**, PERIOD II, PART I, V, p. 574) Herod the Great may have been made "King of the Jews" by the Roman Senate, but his monarchy appears to lack the necessary qualifications for being a Judahite **jural society**, both because he was a vassal to the Romans and because his identity as a Jew is in dispute.

² The Judean entity arising out of the Bar Kokhba revolt (132-136 A.D.) was so shortlived and so thoroughly crushed by the Romans that it deserves no more notice here than a footnote.

³ Edwards, **History**, Period I, Part VI, I, 2, p. 563. --- Other sources indicate that the Maccabees and their heirs reigned from c. 140 B.C. to 37 B.C., the later date being when the Hasmonean dynasty gave way to the Herodian dynasty. During this 103-year period, they were apparently "autonomous" only from 110 B.C. to 63 B.C., after the Seleucid dynasty collapsed and before the Romans conquered.

⁴ Edwards, History, Period I, Part VI, I, 2, pp. 562-564.

The work of redemption was carried on and promoted in this period, by greatly multiplying the copies of the law, and appointing the constant public reading of them in all the cities of Israel in their synagogues. It is evident, that before the captivity, there were but few copies of the law.¹

There should be no doubt that increased literacy in the *Tanakh* helped the Judahite people to defend themselves against pagan beliefs and debaucherous syncretism. About the same time the canon was closed, the spirit of prophecy ceased.

Even though the monarchy period of the Israelite's history ended with the defeat of Judah, and Judah's exile into Babylonian captivity, Judah did not become extinct the way Ephraim did. Jacob's prophecy over Judah still clearly held enough weight to sustain Judah's physical existence, even in his defeat (Genesis 49:10). If God had not enforced this blessing over Judah, it's extremely unlikely that the Jews would have ever returned from Babylonian Exile, and it's extremely unlikely that they would have remained intact, and committed to the Mosaic Covenant. Their commitment to the Mosaic Covenant was absolutely critical to the incarnation of "Shiloh". If God would walk among men, and have face-to-face relationships with people, then those people would need to be purified. The Mosaic Covenant was like a purifying fire through which God put his people, to purify them for the first coming of "Shiloh".² Ephraim burned up, became utterly unrecognizable, and ceased having a physical existence. The only physical parties to the local covenants who were left were those who were willing to take a white-knuckled grip on "the ruler's staff". They would hold onto it because nothing else was left. They had their covenant, their God, and each other. But they had practically nothing else. This is the way God wanted them to be: completely dependent upon him, completely dependent upon their vertical relationship with him, which the "staff" symbolizes.

Soon after this, the spirit of prophecy ceased among that people till the time of the New Testament. Thus the Old-Testament light, the stars of the long night, began apace to hide their heads, the time of the Sun of righteousness now drawing nigh.³

At the same time the canon closed, not only did the spirit of prophecy cease, but the *Tanakh* also ceased being open to receiving the on-going history of God's people. Even so, reliable secular histories were written during this period. An important

¹ Edwards, History, Period I, Part VI, IX, p. 566.

² Apostle Paul says "[T]he Law has become our tutor *to lead us* to Christ, that we may be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a tutor." (Galatians 3:24-25). So the **Mosaic Covenant** was "our tutor" to prepare for "Shiloh".

³ Edwards, **History**, Period I, Part VI, XIII, p. 566.

ingredient in the resurrection of Ephraim was the translation of the *Tanakh* into Greek, the Septuagint. At the time of the Messiah's birth, Judah was again occupying a significant portion of the promised land, and the second temple was standing. The Jews were far more literate and understanding of their covenant with God than they had ever been before. And they were far less prone to indulge in syncretism. Ephraim had no physical existence. Judah still had almost no understanding of the only polity befitting their true King.

Sub-Chapter 10: New-Covenant Portals

Because Jesus is the mediator of the Messianic Covenant, it's necessary to look directly at his words to confirm with final authority what the jurisdiction of the **Messianic Covenant** is. Nevertheless, it helps to also look at the epistles to clarify the meaning of the covenant, per se. While the words of Jesus establish the terms of the covenant, didactic information in the epistles acts like statutory implementation of those terms, and thereby clarifies the terms of the "new covenant". --- Even though these claims are true on their face, the fact that this is a theodicy and not a history of redemption, or some other kind of protracted work, should explain why this theodicy will not attempt to expound the entire subject matter of the Messianic Covenant. It will focus on the jurisdiction of the Messianic Covenant in a general way, especially as it relates specifically to the two prominent portals that arose during this culmination of objective-central redemption. So it will focus on the three jurisdictional sub-types in a general way. Because there is a *de facto* change in **personal jurisdiction** in the transition from the **Mosaic** Covenant to the Messianic Covenant, and because this change is crucial to the portals, this theodicy will focus most specifically on the in personam jurisdiction of the Messianic Covenant before examining these two portals. The focus on subject-matter jurisdiction will be less specific, and attention to the geographical jurisdiction will be cursory. These should be sufficient to establish the general jurisdiction of the Messianic Covenant.

a. The Covenant in General:

Above, this theodicy has claimed that the biblical covenants interface with one another in a certain, specific way. No good reason is given in the New Testament, the rest of the Bible, or anywhere else, for abandoning this claim at the interface between the **Mosaic** and **Messianic** covenants. The **local covenants** build on one another in the same way the **global covenants** built on one another. Likewise, the **local covenants** build on the foundation of the **global covenants**. If a term of a given

covenant is not specifically countermanded by the term of a subsequent covenant, then there's no good reason to believe the term is countermanded. Terms that do not specifically replace, modify, or negate terms of prior covenants act as appendments to the pre-existing covenant. If a term goes dormant, that doesn't mean that the term ceases being an aspect of the covenant. It just means that it is not being implemented in the physical field of perception and action at the given time. Through this process of building covenants on top of the pre-existing covenantal foundation, (i)the morallaw leg of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod is clarified through progressive revelation; and (ii) the biblical prescription of **human law** is clarified and modified through largely the same process. Although **jurisdiction** is important in both the biblical description of **<u>natural law</u>** and the biblical prescription of <u>**human law**</u>, close observance of jurisdiction is far more critical in regard to human law. This is because human law offers humans a huge opportunity to perpetrate evil under the pretense that it's good. The Messianic Covenant introduces extremely important modifications to the local covenant's jurisdiction, and these modifications have huge implications for the biblical prescription of **human law**.

Like all the blood covenants in the Old Testament, the New Testament's blood covenant has a certain structure, and it has certain characteristics in common with the other blood covenants. But this doesn't mean that all the blood covenants in the Bible are suzerainty treaties.¹ Even if it's true that all the biblical blood covenants are structurally like suzerainty treaties, which this author doubts, analysis of each biblical blood covenant as though it is a contract divulges the underlying **jurisdiction** much more thoroughly. This latter kind of legal analysis is much more likely to get to the truth of what's being expounded in the biblical text than superimposing the suzerainty model on the text. It is also much more clarifying and edifying than neglecting to do any kind of legal analysis of the covenantal text. The claim being made by this author is that all contracts, including all covenants, *bailments*, and biblical blood covenants, follow a simple pattern. Even though any given contract or covenant may be extremely complex, at its root it is formed through a simple feedback loop, consisting of mutual offers, mutual acceptances, and mutual considerations, as described above.

¹ For more about suzerainty treaties as they appear in the Bible, see: Kline, Meredith G., **Treaty of the Great King, The Covenant Structure of Deuteronomy: Studies and Commentary**, 1963, William B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Also, Thompson, J.A., **The Ancient Near Eastern Treaties of the Old Testament**, 1964, The Tyndale Press, London.

Although the core of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> is certainly established by Jesus, as recorded in the four Gospels,¹ a good place to start seeing an explanation of this core is in Hebrews 8:6-13:

But now He ... is ... the mediator of a better covenant, which has been enacted on better promises. For if that first covenant had been faultless, there would have been no occasion sought for a second. For finding fault with them, he says, "Behold, days are coming, says the Lord, when I will effect a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah; not like the covenant which I made with their fathers on the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt; for they did not continue in My covenant, and I did not care for them, says the Lord. For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put My laws into their minds, and I will write them upon their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be My people. And they shall not teach everyone his fellow citizen, and everyone his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord,' for all shall know Me, from the least to the greatest of them. For I will be merciful to their iniquities, and I will remember their sins no more." When He said, "A new covenant," He has made the first obsolete. But whatever is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to disappear. (Hebrews 8:6-13)

It's generally conceded by all exegetes that the author of Hebrews is quoting Jeremiah 31:31-34 in this passage. Jeremiah is clearly speaking of a new covenant in that passage, but not all exegetes agree that Jeremiah's "new covenant" is the same as the **Messianic Covenant**. It's obvious that the author of Hebrews believes the two covenants are identical, and most people who are party to the **Messianic Covenant** agree. But most rabbinical Jews disagree. Those who disagree probably do so, at least in part, based upon the evidence they see that the law is NOT written on the hearts of those party to the **Messianic Covenant**.

When the New-Jerusalem ecological niche is finally entered by all of God's elect, the law will certainly be written on the heart of everyone going in. That will be the official end of the *law-enforcement epoch*. At that time, there will be no more need for <u>human laws</u> of any kind. Anyone who claims the *law-enforcement epoch* will end before then doesn't grasp the depths of human depravity. Such

¹ Especially Matthew 26:18-29; Mark 14:13-25; Luke 22:8-20; John 13-17; and the gospel narratives of the crucifixion. The crucifixion is to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> what Genesis 8:20 is to the <u>Noachian Covenant</u>; Genesis 15:9-10 is to the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>; and Exodus 12:5-14 is to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>.

people are utopian. All the evidence proves that following utopian visions leads to dystopic ends. So the question to Jeremiah is whether or not he is describing, (i) the covenant that marks the entry into the New Jerusalem; (ii)a covenant prior to the New Jerusalem that is not the Messianic Covenant; or (iii)the covenant prior to the New Jerusalem that is the **Messianic Covenant**. --- Given that it's intuitively obvious that the *law-enforcement epoch* doesn't end until the elect enter the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, and given that Jeremiah is not a utopian, it's clear that Jeremiah's "new covenant" must either be the covenant that terminates the lawenforcement epoch at the entry into the New Jerusalem, or a covenant that precedes entry into the New Jerusalem, and precedes the end of the law-enforcement epoch. If Jeremiah's "new covenant" precedes entry into the New Jerusalem, then Jeremiah's claim about the law being written on the heart and in the mind must be hyperbolic. The law on the heart and in the mind with regard to the New Jerusalem is not hyperbole, but the law on the heart and in the mind as a function of any covenant before New Jerusalem is necessarily hyperbole. --- Given that this "new covenant" is "with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah", the two-house doctrine must still pertain to the human parties to this "new covenant" at the time of the covenant's promulgation. This fact could be helpful in determining whether Jeremiah's "new covenant" pertains to the New Jerusalem or to one of the other two possible covenants.

Given that the two-house doctrine is based on two terms of the Abrahamic Covenant, as the terms existed after the promulgation of the Abrahamic Covenant and before Jacob's last will and testament, these two terms were not subject to a division of labor, and they were therefore only the two-house doctrine in gestation. In the division of labor, one term was allocated to one set of parties, and the other term was allocated to another set. So after Jacob's will, these terms were subject to a division of labor. Even so, the terms existed in a more-or-less dormant state until Israel split into two houses under Rehoboam and Jeroboam. This division of labor continued to exist at the time of Jeremiah's prophecy, even though Ephraim's existence at that time was purely psychic. As will be seen in this exposition of the New Testament, the Messianic Covenant revived Ephraim out of dormancy. The Messianic Covenant thereby revived the two-house doctrine in the physical field of perception and action. From this point of revival of the two-house doctrine, there should be a kind of reversal of this process going into the New Jerusalem. In other words, the course of the two-house doctrine has gone, and should go, something like this:

(i) two terms ("great nation" and "multitude of nations") existing purely in the psychic field as divine promises before Jacob's will; to

- the two terms allocated to a division of labor, but nevertheless still dormant after Jacob's will; to
- the activation of one term ("great nation") under the <u>Davidic Covenant</u>;
 to
- (iv) activation of the other term under the <u>Jeroboamic Covenant</u>, where such activation causes manifestation of the two-house split in the physical field of perception and action; to
- (v) recession of the "multitude" term into pure dormancy by way of the utter destruction of Ephraim; to
- (vi) revival of the "multitude" term by way of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>; to
- (vii) the "fulness" of the "multitude" term by way of the simultaneous preaching of the gospel to the ends of the earth (Matthew 28:18-20; Mark 16:14-18; Luke 24:45-47) and implementation of the only polity consistent with the biblical covenants (as argued above);¹ to
- (viii) the coalescing of the "multitude of nations" into a single nation, which will be the ultimate fulfillment of the "great nation" promise; to
- (ix) the final Judgment, which is the precursor to entry of the elect into the New Jerusalem.

According to this timetable, these two terms of the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> will be completely satisfied, and the usefulness of the division of labor will be depleted, during stage (viii), the coalescing of the "multitude of nations" into a single nation. This eighth stage is obviously prior to entry into the New Jerusalem.

This line of reasoning eliminates two possible interpretations of the meaning of "new covenant" in Jeremiah 31. (a)In speaking of the "new covenant", Jeremiah cannot be speaking of the covenant that marks the entry into the New Jerusalem, which can be rightly understood to be equivalent to the final Judgment. This is because the two-house doctrine will be completely fulfilled prior to the final Judgment. So it makes no sense for Jeremiah to be citing the two-house doctrine as an aspect of the

¹ This "fulness of nations" is the ultimate fulfillment of the "multitude of nations" promise. It consists of two parts, the preaching to the end of the earth and the implementation of the polity. This **natural-rights** polity requires the distinction between **secular social compacts** and **religious social compacts**, and for these two kinds of compacts to be **jurisdictionally** separate. When such a polity becomes the norm worldwide, and when the gospel has been preached worldwide, then the "fulness of the Gentiles" is genuinely come in. Even though the preaching and the polity develop separately, they also develop simultaneously from a multi-millennial perspective.

"new covenant" if he means "new covenant" to be equivalent to the final Judgment and entry into the New Jerusalem. The two-house doctrine and the perfect writing on the heart and mind are hereby seen to be mutually exclusive. (b)In speaking of the "new covenant", Jeremiah cannot be speaking of some covenant prior to the final judgment besides the **Messianic Covenant** because if he were, then where is it? Over twenty-five hundred years have passed since Jeremiah's prophecy, and the only covenant that's arisen that's even remotely like what's he's describing is the Messianic **Covenant**. Besides this fact, if Jeremiah is speaking of some covenant other than the Messianic Covenant, then the author of Hebrews must be mistaken or a liar when he equates Jeremiah's "new covenant" with the Messianic Covenant. It's difficult to conceive how one could be genuinely party to the Messianic Covenant and simultaneously believe that the author of Hebrews is wrong in identifying the "new covenant" as the Messianic Covenant. So it's necessary to conclude that when the LORD speaks through Jeremiah to say, "I will put My law within them, and on their hearts I will write it" (v. 31:33), Jeremiah is speaking hyperbolically. He is using hyperbole when he speaks of the law being written on the heart and in the mind. According to this line of reasoning, it's necessary to conclude that both Jeremiah and the author of Hebrews are saying that compared to the old covenant, parties to the new covenant will have the law written on their hearts and in their minds, but this doesn't mean that the law is written there well enough to end the *law-enforcement* epoch. It's necessary to conclude that both Jeremiah and Hebrews are identifying the Messianic Covenant as the "new covenant".

When the author of Hebrews says that the new covenant makes the old covenant "obsolete", according to this theodicy's description of covenantal interaction, this cannot mean that the Messianic Covenant makes the entire Mosaic Covenant If the entire Mosaic Covenant became obsolete, then this would obsolete. mean that the covenants upon which the Mosaic foundation is built also become obsolete. So there's a huge question regarding the extent of this obsolescence. It's not reasonable to jump to the conclusion that the entire Mosaic Covenant is thrown over and replaced. It's even less reasonable to assume that the covenantal foundations for the Mosaic Covenant are obsoleted. The rest of the New Testament is clear that the Abrahamic Covenant is not obsoleted, and neither are any of the prior **global covenants**. This makes this theodicy's claim regarding the manner of interface between the biblical covenants that much more credible. The biblical covenants build on one another, new terms sometimes voiding old terms, sometimes modifying terms, and sometimes acting as new appendments to the pre-existing covenant. It does not make sense for newer covenants to make blanket negations of older covenants, thereby replacing all the older terms. If this blanket-negation understanding of the interface between biblical covenants made sense, then ancient

heresies that attempted blanket rejection of the Old Testament would not be heresies, and there would be no more reason to study the Old Testament than there is reason to study the Apocrypha. It makes much more sense to understand this passage from Hebrews in a more nuanced and contextual way. The context of this passage clearly indicates that when the author speaks of the old covenant becoming obsolete, he is speaking of what has generally been called the "ceremonial law". All of these became obsolete when the **Messianic Covenant** replaced those terms with completely new forms and understandings, imperfect sacrifices and shadows of the perfect sacrifice being replaced by the ultimate and perfect sacrifice.

There are three other concerns manifest in this passage that are relevant to this motive clause section of this theodicy. --- (a)One is this "mediator of a better covenant", meaning Israel's only true King. When Shiloh came to take up the staff and scepter that were rightly his, Judah as a societal entity refused to give them up. This jurisdictionally dysfunctional social compact did not acknowledge its true King because it failed to adequately recognize its true God. It also failed to recognize that this King demands that his kingdom operate as a **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, not a slave farm. These issues define one of the two portals that will be examined below. --- (b)Another concern manifest in this passage pertains to the fact that the "new covenant" is with both the house of Israel and the house of Judah. People who don't acknowledge that dormancy and the psychic field are important interpretational doctrines do not acknowledge that Jeremiah is speaking of the two-house doctrine in verse 31. To them, Ephraim has been wiped off the planet; so Ephraim doesn't exist; so there is only one house. To these exegetes, Jeremiah is not really speaking of the two-house doctrine in verse 31. Instead, he's using "house of Israel" as a synonym for "house of Judah", and repeating the same concept for emphasis. This interpretation says that "house of Israel" and "house of Judah" should be understood to be two different names for the same thing. It says that Judah still existed in the physical field of perception and action; so he was the only remnant of Jacob's original house; so any reference to the house of Israel is also a reference more specifically to the house of Judah. If dormancy is a false doctrine, then this interpretation clearly makes sense. But if dormancy is a true doctrine, then taking these two houses as synonymous is clearly jumping to a false conclusion. Because this theodicy holds that dormancy is truly a possibility for terms of the biblical covenants, it also holds that both Jeremiah and Hebrews are referencing the then-dormant house of Israel (Ephraim) in this phrase. This issue relates to the *in personam jurisdiction* of the **Messianic Covenant**, which is examined in more detail below. --- (c) The third concern pertains to what precisely is "growing old", "becoming obsolete", and "ready to disappear". As indicated, the preliminary conclusion is that these pertain to the

"ceremonial law". But this needs to be addressed in more detail. So this issue will be examined in more detail below.

b. Law Types & Portals:

In order to get a reliable understanding of how the terms of this single local covenant changed at the transition from the Mosaic Covenant to the Messianic Covenant, it should help to consider what kinds of laws the Messiah obeyed during his lifetime on earth. Calvin classified laws according to their purposes.¹ Edwards classified laws according to the kinds of laws that the Messiah obeyed.² No doubt there are countless other ways to classify laws. Edwards' approach is largely compatible with, and congenial towards, the classification methodology already started in this theodicy, and it gets to some of the core issues essential to understanding the interface between the Mosaic and Messianic covenants. --- Edwards indicated that "the commands of God which Christ obeyed, were of three kinds": laws to which Christ was subject (i) as a man, (ii) as a Jew, and (iii) as Mediator of the Messianic Covenant. But Edwards also indicated that these three categories of law are subsumed under a single category, "what the apostle calls the law of works, Rom. iii. 27." The "law of works" is essentially the terms of the "covenant of works". As indicated above, the "covenant of works" is essentially the same thing as what this theodicy calls the Edenic Covenant.

> This law of works indeed includes all the laws of God that ever have been given to mankind; for it is a general rule of the law of works, and indeed of the law of nature, That God is to be obeyed, and that he must be submitted to in whatever positive precept he is pleased to give. ... [T]he law of works requires obedience to all the positive commands of God.³

The facts that the law of works is the terms of the "covenant of works"; that the "covenant of works" is the same thing as the **Edenic Covenant**; that the first violator of the "law of works" was Adam; that the first and thus far only human being to conform perfectly to the "covenant of works" was Jesus; and that Jesus is sometimes called the "second Adam", are collective incentive to focus on the distinctions between the first Adam and the second Adam. But first it's important to understand

¹ According to Calvin, the law has three purposes: 1)"to be a mirror reflecting to us both the perfect righteousness of God and our own sinfulness and shortcomings"; 2)"the 'civil use,' ... to restrain evil"; 3)"to guide the regenerate into the good works". --- "The Three Purposes of the Law", **New Geneva Study Bible**, p. 259.

² Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, pp. 575-6:

³ Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, p. 575:

the three kinds of laws that Christ obeyed as functions of the **jurisdiction** of the **Edenic Covenant**.

As a man, Christ

obeyed those commands which he was subject to merely as *man*. These were the commands of the moral law, which was the same with that which was given at mount Sinai, written in two tables of stone, which are obligatory on mankind of all ages and all nations of the world.¹

Here Edwards implicitly makes a distinction between the "moral law" as given in the Ten Commandments and the "law of nature". This is evident because the "law of works ... includes all the laws of God that ever have been given to mankind; for it is a general rule ... of the law of nature"; whereas he indicates that "moral law" is a subset of this "law of nature". So Edwards equated "law of nature" with the terms of the "covenant of works", and he indicated that the "covenant of works" encompasses the three kinds of laws that Christ obeyed. By indicating that "law of works" and "law of nature" are equivalent, and by indicating that these laws are the terms of the "covenant of works", he essentially equated these terms of the "covenant of works" with what this theodicy calls **natural law**. By indicating that the laws to which Christ was "subject ... merely as *man*" are equivalent to the "moral law", from this theodicy's perspective, Edwards seems to be muddling the jurisprudential landscape.

This theodicy recognizes that the **natural law** is composed of three distinct sub-functions: (i)that subset of eternal law that interfaces with human beings exogenously; (ii)that subset of eternal law that interfaces with human beings endogenously, and that thereby governs human cognition, digestion, metabolism, etc.; and (iii)that subset of eternal law that is inherently ethical, and that thereby governs human choice making, and is thereby instructions to every human in how to behave. These are the three legs of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod. This theodicy calls the third subset the "moral-law leg of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod". Edwards is hereby rightly indicating that the laws written on the two tablets of stone are manifestations of the "moral law", and are thereby clearly products of progressive revelation. But by implying that the moral law is the consummation of all the laws to which Christ was subject "merely as man", Edwards is confusing biblical law. He is thereby implying that "the moral law" is the only kind of law to which all people are subject. It's safe to assume that what Edwards calls "moral law" and what this theodicy calls the "moral-law leg of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod" are the same. But Edwards has neglected to include the other two legs of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod as applicable to all people.

¹ Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, p. 575:

All people are subject to all three legs of the <u>natural-law</u> tripod, not strictly to the moral-law leg. From a Judeo-Christian perspective, it's absolutely certain that the moral-law leg must take preeminence over the other two, because the moral-law leg embodies the fact that all truth is God's truth, and that this fact of God's existence and sovereignty over all things is the law above all other laws. Nevertheless, without perfect obedience also in the other two legs of the <u>natural law</u>, no human being is capable of perpetual survival.¹ To correct Edwards' error, a good place to start is to agree with him that Christ was utterly obedient to the "covenant of works" as the latter pertains to every human. But if Edwards is right in claiming that the *law of works* / <u>natural law</u> / "covenant of works" encompasses all the laws to which Christ was subject, which includes laws which Christ obeyed as a Jew, laws which Christ obeyed as Mediator, and laws which Christ obeyed "merely as *man*", then how are these three kinds of laws that are recognized by Edwards to be reconciled with the classification system being used by this theodicy?

The "covenant of works" includes not only all laws that apply to all human beings. Laws that apply to all human beings can be understood to be general terms of the "covenant of works" because they apply generally to all people. The "covenant of works" as it applies to any given individual also includes all laws that apply particularly, especially, and specifically to the given individual by way of contractual agreements entered by the individual. Because the "covenant of works" encompasses not only the **<u>natural law</u>** that applies to all people generally, but also special *ex* contractu laws that apply because the given individual has entered into contractual agreements, the expression "covenant of works" can be used either in a general sense, as it applies to all people, or in a special sense, as it applies to a specific person. So when Christ "obeyed those commands which he was subject to merely as man", he was satisfying the "covenant of works" in the general sense. When Christ satisfied laws pertinent to him as a Jew and as Mediator, he was satisfying the "covenant of works" in the specific sense by satisfying contractual obligations of contracts distinct from the general "covenant of works". This understanding of the distinction between "covenant of works" in the general sense and "covenant of works" in the specific sense is based on the fact that the moral-law leg of the **<u>natural law</u>** stipulates that all people are obligated to keep the promises they make. In this way, specific contracts are subsidiary to the overarching "covenant of works". So when Edwards speaks of laws to which Christ was subject "merely as man", it's implicit that he's speaking of terms of the "covenant of works" that apply globally, to all people. This doesn't

¹ In fact, in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche, no human being other than Christ has the capacity for perpetual survival within his/her self. In this niche, such survival exists only through extraordinary divine intervention in behalf of the fallen human.

include ordinary *ex contractu* obligations. It doesn't include ordinary *ex contractu* obligations because, even though the obligation to keep one's promises certainly applies to all people, actual promises made vary from person to person.

As a Jew, Christ

obeyed all those laws he was subject to as he was *a Jew*. Thus he was subject to the ceremonial law, and was conformed to it. He was conformed to it in his being circumcised the eighth day; and he strictly obeyed it in going up to Jerusalem to the temple three times a year; at least after he was come to the age of twelve years, which seems to have been the age when the males began to go up to the temple. And so Christ constantly attended the service of the temple, and of the synagogues.¹

Jesus was a consensual party to Judah's <u>religious social compact</u>. If he had complied fully with the "covenant of works" in the general sense without being fully obedient to this <u>religious social compact</u> to which he had obligated himself, then in the final analysis he would not have been fully obedient to the "covenant of works". But the evidence indicates that he was in fact fully obedient to his obligations as a Jew.

As Mediator of the Messianic Covenant,²

Christ was subject to *the mediatorial law*; or that which related purely to his mediatorial office. Such were the commands which the Father gave him to teach such doctrines, to preach the gospel, to work such miracles, to call such disciples, to appoint such ordinances, and finally to lay down his life: For he did all these things in obedience to the commands he had received of the Father, as he often tells us, (John x. 18. xiv. 31.) These commands he was not subject to merely as man; for they did not belong to other men: nor yet was he subject to them as a Jew; for they were no part of the Mosaic law: but they were commands he had received of the Father, that purely respected his mediatorial office.³

Jesus, the Second Person of the Godhead, was also a consensual party to the "covenant of redemption". As indicated above, this was a legal agreement between the three persons of the Godhead, in which they agreed that the Son would redeem a select portion of the human race. Christ is thereby the Mediator of the "covenant of grace" and the protagonist in the agenda foretold in Genesis 3:15, by first being party to the "covenant of redemption".

¹ Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, p. 575:

² And God of all the biblical covenants.

³ Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, p. 575:

Christ was in utter compliance with all three legs of the **<u>natural law</u>**, which in its specific application to him encompassed obligations arising out of the Jewish **<u>religious social compact</u>** and out of the "covenant of redemption". It was therefore impossible for death to reign over him. Of course this is not the case with any fallen human, and it was not the case for Adam and Eve even before the fall. The first Adam was created with a vulnerability to the law of sin and death. This is evident via the fact that he had a vulnerability that the second Adam did not have. The vulnerability can be seen tangentially in something that Edwards said while speaking of the law of works in general.

> This law of works indeed includes all the laws of God that ever have been given to mankind; for it is a general rule of the law of works, and indeed of the law of nature, That God is to be obeyed, and that he must be submitted to in whatever positive precept he is pleased to give. It is a rule of the law of works, That men should obey their *earthly* parents: and it is certainly as much a rule of the same law, That we should obey our *heavenly* Father ...¹

Parents are not perfect. God is. So it's obvious that the duties to obey "our *heavenly* Father" and to obey earthly parents cannot carry the same weight. Because parents are fallen creatures who make mistakes, it's not reasonable to interpret Exodus 20:12 to mean that the command to obey parents is as absolute as the command to obey God. In a tangential way, this shows the vulnerability that the first Adam had that the second Adam didn't. It was a vulnerability that revolved around conflicts in authority. Christ could be tempted, but he knew better than to give in. The first Adam had different inclinations, and different priorities.

If parents demand that their children violate the **natural law**, then they are demanding that they violate God's command. The parents are then presenting themselves to their children as though the parents are more authoritative than God. This easily turns into a hideously evil work against the children. On the other hand, in a fallen world, there are no perfect authorities other than God himself. This situation stimulates questions about why God included "Honor your father and your mother" in the Ten Commandments. It's certain that he knew that all parents are flawed. It's reasonable to suspect that Edwards was smart enough and wise enough to know that he was getting careless when he implied that "Honor your father and your mother" is "a rule of the law of works". Edwards must have known that "obey ... *earthly* parents" cannot carry equal authority with the "rule of the same law, That we should obey our *heavenly* Father".

¹ Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, p. 575:

The reason given in Exodus 20:12 for God writing with his finger on a tablet of stone that his people of the **local covenant** should honor their parents is, "that your days may be prolonged in the land which the LORD your God gives you." It appears from this that God's people should have selfish motives for complying with this mandate. They should do it for the sake of living longer in the promised land. In addition to the dubious motives indicated by a face-value reading, this verse seems to imply that people subject to this mandate were destined to live in the promised land in the not-too-distant future. According to this face-value reading, if one is not destined to live in the promised land, then the whole mandate might not apply to one at all. But both common sense and other Bible passages contradict this facile interpretation (*e.g.*, Ephesians 6:1-3, Colossians 3:20). It's obvious that there is some progressive revelation of the moral-law leg of the **natural law** manifest in this verse. The revelation pertains to something well beyond merely wanting a long life in the promised land. It pertains to another subsidiary contract.

All humans are born almost completely disabled as far as physical powers are concerned. Without parents, guardians, caregivers, etc., no human would survive past infancy. This is precisely why this theodicy claims that every child who has one or more such guardians is party to a *bailment* contract. A *bailment* contract is a contract in which the personal property of a *bailor* is given into the possession and control of a *bailee*, under the assumption that when certain conditions are met, possession and control will be returned to the bailor. This relates to "Honor your father and your mother" like this: Given that all people are created in the image of God, all people have fully formed *natural rights* at the instant of conception. However, at conception, no human has the ability to exercise those **natural rights** in any significant manner. At conception, every human is completely disabled. Human life from the point of conception forward is a process of developing the ability to exercise **<u>natural rights</u>**. But the normal state of existence at conception is as a growing zygote, and later embryo and fetus in the mother's womb. So the normal state into which every human is conceived is the state of having one's **<u>natural</u> rights** bailed into the possession and control of the mother, the bailee. The bailor's (child's) consent to this legal instrument is tacit. It is built into the *bailment* at a level that transcends the bailor's cognitive processes, and is beyond the newly conceived entity's ability to choose, agree, or disagree. This is obviously no ordinary contract because ordinary contracts NEVER have tacit consent that is this basic.¹ So this kind of *bailment* contract is based on the pre-cognitive consent of the *bailor* and the

¹ But it IS ordinary in the sense (i)that it is inherently subsidiary to the "covenant of works", (ii)that all people are conceived into such *bailment* contracts, and (iii)that the parties are generally imperfect.

combination of pre-cognitive and cognitive consent of the *bailee*. As long as the *bailee* (mother) operates in a way that clearly confirms that the **<u>natural rights</u>** of the *bailor* (child) are in her care and safe-keeping, the *bailment* contract is confirmed.¹

This *bailment* situation continues for as long as the parties agree to its perpetuation. In some **religious social compacts** the non-**jural** terms of the compact may *lawfully* stipulate that if a party to the compact who is pregnant chooses to abort, then she is a murderess under the terms of the compact. However, because the mother might interpret the presence of another human being in her body as trespass, it's not valid for any secular social compact to jump to the conclusion that the mother is a murderess if she intentionally aborts. This is based on the fact that one's ownership of one's body is a **natural right**, and no one should ever be allowed to override that natural right without the consent of the owner.² Anyone who perpetrates trespass without a license from the owner is perpetrating a *delict*. Even though these claims should be absolutely beyond dispute in the secular arena, in all genuinely Christian communities, it's recognized that all people who become Christian give their bodies to God as part of the act of becoming Christian. Christians cease being owners, and start being stewards, of God's property, when they become genuine Christians. Even so, the Christian standard, per se, doesn't have jurisdiction in the secular arena to whatever extent it conflicts with the jurisdiction of a lawful secular social compact.3

After the infant has emerged from the womb, it's certain that the *bailment*'s existence has been confirmed by its existence over the period of gestation. Under such circumstances, it's reasonable for both **religious** and **secular social compacts** to presume the existence of the *bailment* contract. Under such circumstances, if the *bailee* chooses to terminate the *bailment*, then it's necessary for her to exercise all due diligence in transferring the *bailment* contract to a cognitively consensual *bailee* other than herself. Regardless of whether she gives her child up for adoption or not, the *bailor*'s **natural rights** remain in a state of being *bailed* into the possession of one or more *bailees* until the *bailor* is able to survive on his/her own, without the help of

¹ **A Memorandum of Law & Fact Regarding Natural Personhood** expounds the characteristics of this parent-child / guardian-dependent *bailment* contract in more detail.

² As indicated above, perpetrators forfeit their **<u>natural rights</u>** in proportion to the gravity of their *delict*. Every perpetrator gives license to enforcers via the perpetrated *delict*.

³ It might be valid for a <u>secular social compact</u> to find that a hired abortionist who is not the presumed *bailee* might be guilty of perpetrating a serious *delict* against the infant if he/she kills the infant *in utero*. And of course, if it's *ex utero*, then there's no doubt that it's murder.

a *bailment* contract. Otherwise the *bailee* is responsible for violating a contract in a way that damages the other party.

This little examination of *bailment* contracts as they necessarily exist in parentchild relationships shows why it's in the child's best interest to honor his/her parents. The more trying a child is to his/her *bailee*, the more likely the *bailee* is to terminate the *bailment* by whatever means may be at the *bailee*'s disposal. A premature termination of the *bailment* contract could be devastating to the child. This little examination shows how Exodus 20:12 is progressive revelation of **natural law** that applies to all people.¹ As such, it is a kind of contract subsidiary to **natural law** to which all humans are subject at some time in their lives. So Christ necessarily obeyed the terms of such a *bailment* contract as an aspect of obeying all laws to which he was subject "merely as *man*". Even so, it's possible that the terms of such *bailment* contracts may vary from *bailment* to *bailment*.

Although this examination of the parent-child bailment confirms Exodus and Edwards in their claims that "men should obey their earthly parents", it doesn't adequately describe the downside of this arrangement. The downside can be described succinctly by citing the fact that God obeys his **<u>natural law</u>** perfectly, whereas no human parent in history has done the same. It's therefore easy to conceive of a situation in which parents abuse their children, whereas any claim that God abuses anyone is invalid on its face. Because God's authority is perfect, and all other authority is not, it's reasonable to prioritize law types based on the reliability of the authority. Based on what's been shown this far into this examination of law types obeyed by Christ, the **<u>natural law</u>** understood as terms of the "covenant of works" as applied to a specific individual includes both **<u>natural law</u>** as applied generally to all people, and *ex contractu* subsets of the moral-law leg of the **natural law**. **Natural** law as generally applied necessarily has priority over ex contractu subsets thereof whenever there is any chance that terms of such ex contractu subsets could violate natural law. Examining this rule as it applies to the two ex contractu sets of laws recognized by Edwards should elucidate the boundaries of the rule.

This rule that <u>**natural law**</u> in the general sense has priority over *ex contractu* subsets of <u>**natural law**</u> in the specific sense, applies because human error tends to adulterate the terms of contracts entered by humans. But because Christ was sinless, it does not apply to any contract that Christ entered. This is true at least in regard

¹ It's important to recognize that Exodus 20:12 is description of **natural law**, without being prescription of **human law**. This is because no penalties are prescribed. --- It's also important to recognize that anyone who insists that this description of the parent-child *bailment* is wrong, has a burden to prove that the motive behind their claim is not bias in favor of slave farming.

to his flawless interpretation of such contract's terms. As a party to the "covenant of redemption", Christ was party to a contract whose parties were all flawless. So even though the "covenant of redemption" was a contract, which means that it was an *ex* contractu subset of the natural law, it was also an exception to the rule because all parties were divine. Because Christ is both divine and human, one might be prone to presume that the rule does not apply to his divine nature, while it does apply to his human nature. Because **natural law** is defined as that aspect of **eternal law** that applies to humans, it's clear that the "covenant of redemption" is not subject to this rule in regards to Christ's divine nature. On the other hand, one might be prone to assume that the rule does apply to the "covenant of redemption" in regards to Christ's human nature. But because Christ in his human nature is sinless, there is no chance that any terms of the "covenant of redemption" could be in violation of **<u>natural law</u>**. So there is no chance that the "covenant of redemption" falls into this secondary tier of laws that are subject to this rule. So even though the laws that Christ obeyed as Mediator were a subset of a special contract, and the laws were therefore *ex contractu*, such laws exist in perfect harmony with the **<u>natural law</u>**. So the "covenant of redemption" does NOT fall into this secondary tier of error-prone laws, and it is not subject to this rule. So the status of terms of the "covenant of redemption" are unlike those of Judah's **religious social compact** because there are no flawed parties in the "covenant of redemption".

Like parties to any <u>religious social compact</u>, human parties to Judah's <u>religious social compact</u> may have claimed that God was party to their compact. But this cannot be a valid claim to whatever extent the terms of the <u>religious social</u> <u>compact</u> contradicted the terms of the more rudimentary general "covenant of works". Because *ex contractu* add-ons to the general "covenant of works", other than the rare exception like the "covenant of redemption", include fallen humans as parties, one might be prone to presume that all such contracts have a lower level of authority than the general "covenant of works". If this is true, then this means that compared to the general terms of the "covenant of works", all <u>social compacts</u> and all *bailment* contracts have a lower level of authority. Because the terms of these *ex contractu* add-ons are vulnerable to error, not so much in their performance as in their articulation, there is a huge potential for conflicts of authority between the general "covenant of works" and the terms of such subordinate contracts.¹ But this presumption cannot include the Bible's <u>global</u> and <u>local</u> covenants. Each of

¹ All human contracts are subject to performance problems. But performance problems are totally different from problems in the articulation of terms. When this theodicy speaks of error-prone contracts here, it is speaking only of articulation problems, not performance problems.

the Bible's **global** and **local** covenants is flawless, but each of the biblical covenants in the *law-enforcement epoch* inherently calls for human parties to form **social compacts**. All **social compacts** are fallible human contracts even if they happen to be based on flawless biblical covenants. So all **social compacts** are error-prone in this rule's term-articulation sense. What's more, if the "covenant of grace" is characterized as God's building allowances for human frailty into his dealings with humans, all the biblical covenants that are subsets of the "covenant of grace" are vulnerable to divine concessions to human frailty. Such concessions need to be explained here, so that this interface between the flawless and the flawed is clear.

In claiming that the Bible's local covenants are flawless, this theodicy appears to be contradicting a face-value reading of Hebrews 8:7, which clearly indicates that the **Mosaic Covenant** is NOT "faultless". So the **Mosaic Covenant**, according to this face-value reading of Hebrews, was flawed, and that's precisely why it had to be replaced. But a distinction needs to be made between any contract that's flawed because humans have introduced conflicts with **natural law** into the terms of the contract, and contracts that are flawed by way of God's flawless plan to lead humanity out of its fallen condition. To condescend to help humans, it's necessary for God to make certain concessions. But such concessions do not necessarily violate natural law. For example, Jesus Christ condescended to being born of woman like all other humans. By itself, this concession does not contradict natural law, even if it is extremely unusual and counter-intuitive. In the same way that Christ condescended to being born of woman, thereby making a concession to human frailty, he also condescended to enter into blood covenants with humans, as recorded in multiple Christophanies in the Old Testament. Measured by 21st-century, American aesthetics, these blood covenants may have all been extremely crude and primitive, since they involved the slaughter of animals, among other things. But from the divine perspective, they did not involve the violation of **natural law**. It was critical to God's plan for redeeming humanity that the terms of such covenants enter into the physical and psychic fields of human perception and action. Because God's plan of redemption involves his construction of the New Jerusalem, and his construction of the temple, and because the construction of these things via the secondary cause of human hands involves various phases of construction, it's clear that the construction process involves metamorphoses from crude to complex. At the transition from one level of crudeness to a greater level of sophistication, it's not erroneous for an advocate of the more sophisticated phase to refer to the cruder phase as "faulty". Under such circumstances, the old phase can be faulty without violating **<u>natural law</u>**. This must be the proper way to interpret the statement by the author of Hebrews, that "if that first covenant had been faultless, there would have been no occasion sought for a second" (v. 8:7). So in attributing fault to the biblical

blood covenants, it's crucial to distinguish between fault that violates **<u>natural law</u>** and fault that merely marks a superseded phase in progressive revelation. --- As will be evident in the coming examination of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>'s <u>subject matter</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> and <u>in personam jurisdiction</u>, this metamorphosis process has radical application to the temple, the Davidic monarchy, the land, the ceremonial laws, the syncretism-antisyncretism conflict, and the two-house doctrine.

Given that the Bible is inerrant and infallible, the biblical blood covenants carry the same attribute. These covenants thereby have a status comparable to the status of the "covenant of redemption". To the extent that they are divinely imposed, they transcend **<u>natural law</u>** by operating under the original **<u>jurisdiction</u>** of <u>eternal</u> law, like the "covenant of redemption". But to the extent that humans are party to such blood covenants, these covenants have a status that is subordinate to the "covenant of works" and **natural law** in the general sense, but not infected with human error. These covenants are thereby subordinate to the general "covenant of works" because their terms are ex contractu, but they are superior to contracts that are vulnerable to human articulation errors. These biblical blood covenants are therefore tier 1 infallible contracts like the "covenant of redemption". Because these blood covenants are all crucial to objective-central redemption, and the "grand design", it's crucial to understand them as flawless manifestations of **<u>natural law</u>**, in the sense that they never conflict with **<u>natural law</u>** via mis-articulation of terms. But they are nevertheless flawed in the sense that they can be superseded by subsequent special revelation. In contrast to these tier 1 blood covenants, to the extent that the biblical blood covenants are implemented as contracts / social compacts between humans, such **social compacts** have the inferior authority of mere human contracts. They are tier 2 compacts. So the biblical blood covenants are like a *metaconstitution* that exists to facilitate the proper construction and interpretation of religious and secular social compacts. When Edwards says that Christ "obeyed all those laws he was subject to as he was a Jew", it's clear that in Edwards' opinion, Christ's obedience to this error-prone human contract was filtered through such an interpretational grid. He was certainly not using a conception of Judaism that fitted neatly into the conceptual framework of rabbinical / pharisaical Judaism.

The conflict inherent between the conceptual grid used by Jesus and the conceptual framework being used by the Pharisees points to something common and shared between each of the portals examined above. Each portal can be characterized as a perceived conflict in authority: (i)The tree-of-knowledge portal was a conflict in the authority of a warning issued by the Sovereign who promulgated the **natural law**, on one hand, and the presumed authority of the people's subjective inclination to know more, on the other. (ii)The anarchy portal was a conflict in authority of the

human conscience, which instructs every human by way of the **natural law** to avoid damaging other people, on one hand, and the inclination to do whatever one may feel like doing, including murder one's brother, on the other. (iii) The group-think portal identifies a syndrome that has characterized each of the subsequent portals. It was a conflict in authority of the group, meaning human agreements, on one hand, and the authority of the **<u>natural law</u>**, on the other. (iv)The slavery-and-statism portal was a conflict between the authority of the human customs of statism and slavery, on one hand, and the authority of the **<u>natural rights</u>** subset of the **<u>natural law</u>**, on the other. (v)The genocide portal was the slavery-and-statism portal on steroids. It was a conflict between the authority of God's plans for objective-central redemption, his "grand design", on one hand, and the authority of the **<u>natural rights</u>** of perverse people, on the other. (vi)The theocracy-monarchy portal was a conflict between the authority of the God-ordained natural-rights polity, on one hand, and a groupthink-based polity, on the other. (vii) The two-house portal was a conflict between the authority of the "great nation" promise and the authority of the "multitude of nations" promise.

When the **<u>human-law</u>** jurisdiction goes dysfunctional, it's critical that the parties, especially victims, find some way to redirect the human contract to make it functional. Each of the portals that has been examined above has been characterized by a perceived conflict in authority, and most of these portals are characterized by conflicts in authority as they pertain to **human law**. When parents are wrong, the choice between obeying God and obeying parents is a conflict in authority. When human government is wrong, the choice between obeying God and obeying government is a conflict in authority. When the authority of one's own inclinations are wrong, then the choice between obeying the one true, objective God and obeying subjective inclinations is a conflict in authority. So a similar conflict in authority was presented to Adam and Eve in the garden, with respect to the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The main differences between this original portal and all the subsequent portals were (i)that the decision makers in the original portal started off in the third heaven, rather than in the fallen condition; and (ii)that the authority that was putting itself into competition with God was far more subtle in its error. Even so, in every portal, it is the choice presented to every decision-maker. The question is always, "Can I violate the rule of the higher authority for the sake of obeying the rule of the lower authority, and do so without becoming an idolater?" The answer is always "No!".

Several passages in the New Testament clearly compare and contrast the "first Adam" and the "second Adam" (1 Corinthians 15:20-28, 42-49; Romans 5:12-21). Implicit in these passages is the recognition that all talk of the "second Adam" is

inevitably connected to the existence of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. There is also connected into such didactic passages an implicit reference to a covenant made by the first Adam. It might readily come to mind that immediately after the fall, God made a covenant with Adam and Eve, and this covenant is being called the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> by this theodicy. As indicated above, the <u>Adamic Covenant</u> is equivalent to what traditional Reformed theology has called the "covenant of grace". But Paul's comparisons of the first Adam and the second Adam is not focused on comparing and contrasting the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> and the "covenant of grace". In fact, the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> is the latest and most profound manifestation of the "covenant of grace". Instead, Paul's contrast of the first Adam and the second Adam implicitly compares and contrasts the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> and the covenant that Adam and Eve made with *HaSatan*.

[J]ust as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin ... so death spread to all men, because all sinned (Romans 5:12)

When these primordial humans entered into covenant with Satan, they built delusion into all subsequent human contracts, including most notably parent-child *bailment* contracts. Through this primordial sin, this primordial satanic contract, all humans ever since have been polluted, with the sole exception of the second Adam.

> [U]ntil the Law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over those who had not sinned in the likeness of the offense of Adam, who is a type of Him who was to come. (Romans 5:13-14)

Sin is certainly imputed by God to anyone who violates the **<u>natural law</u>**, regardless of when they live. But if <u>**human law**</u> doesn't prohibit sin, then those whose consciences are seared act in whatever way they want, and humans don't bother to enforce standards of <u>**human law**</u> that properly reflect the <u>**natural law**</u>. So "sin is not imputed [by humans] when there is no [<u>**human law**</u>]." The fact that God imputes sin even when there is no <u>**human law**</u> is proven by the fact that "death reigned from Adam until Moses", even over those who were not subject to any kind of reliable <u>**human law**</u>. None of these people between Adam and Eve, on one hand, and Moses, on the other, "sinned in the likeness of the offense of Adam", because none of them was capable of entering into a brand new covenant with Satan that would plunge the entire human race into sin and delusion. That had already been done. --- The "free gift" is the offer of partnership in the <u>**Messianic Covenant**</u>. This free gift is contrasted with partnership in Adam's covenant with Satan, which all humans inherit, whether they like it or not, through their prenatal *bailment*

contracts.¹ Becoming party to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> liberates one from "the law of sin and of death" (Romans 8:2) by putting the party into covenant with the sinless Man. This is essentially a negation of Adam's covenant with Satan. But it is not a perfect negation because the terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> are not written on the mind and in the heart sufficiently to end the *law-enforcement epoch*.

* * *

The tendency to convert morality into **human law** when it is inappropriate to do so has been a moral hazard throughout the *law-enforcement epoch*. This tendency has been the source of **jurisdictional dysfunction** for as long as humans have tried to govern themselves. This propensity is exacerbated by confusion over subject matter, and the confusion over subject matter is exacerbated by presupposing the existence of **personal jurisdiction** when **personal jurisdiction** does not in fact exist. To avoid these problems, this theodicy will look at the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>'s <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> before looking at its other two jurisdictional sub-types.

It's been emphasized above that the Genesis 9:6 term of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> was partially dormant under the <u>jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>. It was almost totally dormant under the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>, but it came partially out of dormancy under the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>. It came out of dormancy in relations between parties to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, but it remained completely dormant in the Israelite's relations with the foreigner, evidenced by the Israelites' genocidal treatment of foreigners. In the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, all legal barriers to the awakening of this term of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> have been removed, although the term will come completely out of dormancy only through the process by which people become edified about the <u>jurisdictions</u> of the covenants.

There are a couple of important questions that arise naturally out of these claims. --- (i)If it's true that the terms of the biblical blood covenants do not conflict with **natural law**, and if it's also true that genocide is an obvious violation of **natural rights**, where **natural rights** are a subset of **natural law**, then how is the genocide

¹ Under traditional American law, criminal proceedings start with the assumption that the accused is *innocent until proven guilty*. This standard in <u>human law</u> is confirmed by the <u>natural-rights</u> polity expounded above, and is based on the fact that human judges and juries are error prone. But in <u>natural law</u>, since the fall, the standard applied by God in his judgment of humans is exactly the opposite, *guilty until proven innocent*. Humans start missing the <u>natural-law</u> mark from the instant of conception. Their capacity for organismic standing wave permanence is that disabled. But according to Genesis 9:6, that disability does not negate the human's possession of <u>natural rights</u>.

mandated under the terms of the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> NOT a violation of <u>natural</u> <u>law</u>?¹ Perhaps this question was answered above, but it still needs to be answered from the perspective of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Given that the terms of the <u>Mosaic</u> <u>Covenant</u> called for the Israelites to utterly wipe out seven nations, those terms form a substantial legal barrier to the emergence of Genesis 9:6 from dormancy. This theodicy has made claims regarding the manner in which the biblical blood covenants interface with one another. The <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>'s legal barriers put these claims at stake, but what's also at stake here is the claim that God is omnibenevolent. If God mandated a term of the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> that is a term to violate <u>natural rights</u>, and if <u>natural rights</u> are indeed a subset of <u>natural law</u>, then God mandated the violation of his own law and the perpetration of evil in his name. The situation demands a more cogent interpretation, justification, reconciliation of these issues. ---- (ii)Given that this theodicy claims that the legal obstacles to the awakening of the Genesis 9:6 term have been removed under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, where is the evidence that this is true?

c. In Personam Jurisdiction:

The answers to these questions relate closely to the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Likewise, the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Messianic</u> <u>Covenant</u> relates intimately to the offer of partnership in the covenant. The offer of partnership in the covenant relates to the two-house doctrine. To get a clear picture of how these things interconnect, a good place to start is with John the Baptist's ministry, before the terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> start being manifest through Jesus' ministry.

John the Baptist's ministry was already well under way before Jesus' ministry started.

Now in those days John the Baptist came, preaching in the wilderness of Judea, saying, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." ... Then Jerusalem was going out to him, and all Judea, and all the district around the Jordan; and they were being baptized by him in the Jordan River, as they confessed their sins. But when he saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees coming for baptism, he said to them, "... [B]ring forth fruit in keeping with repentance; and do not suppose that you can say to yourselves, 'We have Abraham for our father'; for I say to

¹ Put another way: If sin is imputed by God to anyone who violates <u>natural law</u>, why should anyone believe the Mosaic genocide didn't cause God to impute sin to those he called to perpetrate the genocide, on the basis of that perpetration? Furthermore, if God called for such terms, why isn't he guilty of violating his own laws?

you, that God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham. ... As for me, I baptize you with water for repentance, but He who is coming after me is mightier than I, and I am not fit to remove His sandals; He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and fire. ..."

Then Jesus arrived from Galilee at the Jordan *coming* to John, to be baptized by him. But John tried to prevent Him, saying, "I have need to be baptized by You, and do You come to me?" But Jesus answering said to him, "Permit *it* at this time; for in this way it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness." Then he permitted Him. (Matthew 3:1-15)

John's baptism was a sign of repentance for sin, a sign that one recognized one's need to change because of one's missing of the **natural-law** mark. Jesus did not need this sign because he was sinless. So he must have desired this sign for some other reason. --- There are three crucial questions that arise out of this passage. Because John's baptism became a sign of participation in the **Messianic Covenant**, similar to the way circumcision was a sign of participation in the **Messianic Covenant**. John's baptism is a sign of the **personal jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant**. It's crucial to understand the differences between the **in personam jurisdictions** of these two covenants, along with their respective signs, in order to understand the two portals that appear in the New Testament. (i)So the first question is, how do these two-house doctrine manifest in passages like Matthew 3:1-15? (iii)Third, why would Jesus seek John's baptism when he had no apparent need for it, and why is it "fitting" for Jesus to be baptized "to fulfill all righteousness"? --- Each of these questions relates to the **in personam jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant**.

(i) In Personam Jurisdictions of Mosaic and Messianic Covenants: In the original Passover (Exodus 12:1-13, 21-23, 28-29), a clear option was given to the descendants of Abraham, either to mark their doors with blood and be passed over, or to suffer the plague that went through Egypt that night. If any of the descendants of Abraham in Egyptian slavery didn't want to be party to the covenant that God made with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and that he was reaffirming with Abraham's progeny through Moses, then it would have been appropriate for them to refuse to put the blood on the door. Given that the Mosaic Covenant is based on the consent of the parties, as has been proven above, the blood on the doorposts and lintels was a sign of that consent. But it's possible that someone was in one of those marked houses without actually consenting to be party to this newly emerging covenant. Even so, there would be ample opportunity after that night for any of Abraham's

descendants to reject participation. As long as people were going along with the covenantal agenda being presented to the people by Moses, each such person was affirming that he/she was a party to the covenant. So the **in personam jurisdiction** of the **Mosaic Covenant** was defined according to those who volunteered to be party to it. God originally offered this covenant to Moses (Exodus 3:1-4:17), then to Aaron (Exodus 4:28-30), and then generally to the descendants of Abraham who were in Egyptian bondage. In subsequent generations, it was offered by default to the offspring of adult parties. It was also offered to slaves and proselytes (Exodus 12:48).

Given that Genesis 9:6 has been a largely dormant term throughout postdiluvian human history, it should surprise no one that the normal understanding of the <u>in personam jurisdictions</u> of both the <u>Mosaic</u> and <u>Messianic</u> covenants does not agree with an understanding that emphasizes <u>natural rights</u>. For example, Christian arguments for paedobaptism sometimes claim that,

In the Old Testament, circumcision was the outward *sign* of entrance into the covenant community or the community of God's people. Circumcision was administered to all Israelite children (that is, male children) when they were eight days old.¹

It's obvious that at eight days old, no child has cognitive capacity to consent to such a contract. Any claim that the child has given pre-cognitive, tacit consent to being party to such a covenant has an insurmountable burden to prove the existence of such consent. In contrast to the parent-child *bailment* contract, in which evidence of the *bailment* exists in the pregnancy, there is no evidence at eight days old that the infant is voluntarily participating in the Mosaic contract.² Under such circumstances, circumcision cannot be a sign that the infant is party.³ So circumcision cannot be a sign that the child is entering into the covenant, so it cannot be a sign that the child is entering into the "covenant community". Following the same line of

¹ Grudem, p. 975. --- See Genesis 17:12-14; 21:4; Leviticus 12:2-3.

² Evidence that the prenatal human has given tacit consent to the *bailment* contract is obvious because it's obvious that his/her **<u>natural rights</u>** are either *bailed* into the possession of the *bailee*, or they don't exist. The claim that they don't exist violates the *motive clause*, and the claim that this prenatal entity is not human violates science.

³ Some passages in the Bible may be interpreted as implying that circumcision is a sign of covenant participation, even for infants. But to be technical, it's simply not possible for an infant to give consent to a contract that demands cognitive consent. Likewise, consent by a slave or anyone else who is under duress is not genuine consent. This technicality is based on the kind of **<u>natural-rights</u>** jurisprudence that has been posited above. There is no reason that a society suffering from Genesis 9:6 dormancy would recognize such a technicality.

reasoning, it's also true that infant baptism cannot be a sign that the infant is party to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. In regard to infants, both signs are signs that an offer has been made to the infant. In the cases of both infant circumcision and infant baptism, an offer is made to someone who lacks capacity to consent to the offer. These are therefore signs of a contractual offer, not signs of acceptance and consent. When the child reaches the age at which he/she has cognitive capacity to consent to the offer, then that person's consent would indeed move that person into the <u>in</u> <u>personam jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Mosaic</u> or <u>Messianic</u> covenant, as the case may be. The respective signs under those circumstances would be signs of assent or consent, not merely of an offer.

Even though paedobaptists and credobaptists may be at loggerheads over infant baptism, both camps agree that baptism is a sign of participation in the <u>Messianic</u> <u>Covenant</u>, as such participation pertains to adults who also show other signs of participation. Even so, another point over which they disagree is whether baptism in water should be by complete immersion or by something less. Related to this is an argument over the purpose of the baptism. When the main issue is <u>in personam</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> or not, the main issue is subverted by tedious focus on subsidiary issues. Jesus called this straining gnats and swallowing camels (Matthew 23:24). Nevertheless, by looking at this devil in the details, it should be possible to integrate such details into a rigorous definition of the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>.

In verse eleven of this passage, John declares, "I baptize you with water for repentance". Based on this statement, it's reasonable to assume that John's baptism pertains to repentance, which is an attitude and act of renouncing one's prior sins. From this, combined with ample evidence from the New Testament's epistles that shows clearly that John's baptism was adopted as a crucial sign of participation in the **Messianic Covenant**, it's reasonable to assume that anyone who repents and is baptized is party to the **Messianic Covenant**.¹ But the New Testament also indicates that baptism symbolizes much more than a mere act and attitude of repentance. According to Wayne Grudem, "Sometimes it is objected that the essential thing symbolized in baptism is not death and resurrection with Christ, but purification and cleansing" are more in the realm of human works, while "death and resurrection" are more in the realm of divine works. A good example of the "purification and cleansing" position has been presented by David Stern in his

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¹ Anyone capable of genuine repentance should also be capable of genuine consent to being under the **in personam jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant**.

² Grudem, p. 969.

commentary on the New Testament. Even though Stern himself might not espouse this position, his commentary on Matthew 3:1 gives a good description of it:

According to the *Torah* one had to be ritually pure before entering the Tabernacle or Temple. Ritual purity could be lost in many ways; the preeminent means of restoring it was through washing. A quick review of Leviticus shows how frequently the matter is mentioned, and one of the six major divisions of the Talmud (*Taharot*, "Cleansings") is devoted to it. ...

A person who immerses himself participates in an obvious yet living metaphor of purification, with the water, as it were, washing away the impurity. Here Yochanan the Immerser [(John the Baptist)] proclaims for the old practice of immersion a new context, cleansing from a life pattern of sin \dots .¹

According to Matthew 3, John's reason for calling for the people to repent was, "for the kingdom of heaven is at hand" (v. 2). Given that it's obvious from both Matthew 3 and from other passages in the New Testament that John was a prophet sent to introduce the Messiah's ministry, it's probable that "kingdom of heaven is at hand" refers to the presence of the Messiah on earth. This relates to this excerpt from Stern's commentary by way of the fact that Christ referred to himself as the temple.

Exodus 30:18-21 certainly established that people who ministered in the temple / tabernacle needed to be ritually clean. But given that this was cleanliness by way of a bronze laver, and not by way of immersion in a *mikveh*, it might be difficult to see how John's baptism by immersion relates to the ritual purity that did not require immersion. Even though this may be unclear from examination of the *Torah*, *i.e.*, from examination of the **Mosaic Covenant**,² virtually everyone in John's audience knew that rabbinical teachings required immersion in a *mikveh* of anyone who wanted to convert to Judaism.

[A] form of baptism (complete self-immersion in a *mikveh* [(a ritual bath)] is required at the point when a non-Jew converts to Judaism.³

So when John said, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."; and "I baptize you with water for repentance"; he was saying at least three things: (i)He was saying,

1 Stern, David H.; **Jewish New Testament Commentary: A Companion Volume to the Jewish New Testament**, 1992, Jewish New Testament Publications, Clarksville, Maryland, p. 15 (Matthew 3:1 note).

² Where, in accordance with *sola scriptura*, the **Mosaic Covenant** is part of the *Torah*, and the *Torah* is part of the canon of special revelation, but the Talmud is not special revelation.

³ Stern, p. 15.

"The only true king of the Israelite nation is in your midst, and you need to repent and cleanse yourself to be properly prepared to be in His presence." (ii)He was saying, "You people are not in proper covenant with the Messiah, and you need to submit yourselves to complete immersion in a ritual bath as a precursor to being in proper covenant with Him." (iii)And he was saying, "The true temple, the temple made by God without human hands, is manifesting itself in your midst, and you need to purify yourselves for that event."

The claim that Jesus referred to himself as the temple is confirmed in John 2:19-21.¹ So it's reasonable to assume that John was demanding that the people of Judea ritually purify themselves because they were on the verge of being in the presence of the true temple, the true king, and the Mediator of the metamorphosed **local covenant**. Given that the temple made with human hands was on the verge of being eclipsed by the temple made by God unmediated by human hands, it's reasonable to assume that the Mosaic standard of ritual purity applied to every Judean who might come in contact with this new temple, their Messiah. Under the circumstances, it's also reasonable that the sign of ritual cleansing would graduate from laver-washing to immersion.

In another passage in Matthew, Jesus sheds more light on the nature of John's baptism (vv. 21:23-27). When Jesus answered a question from "the chief priests and the elders of the people", by asking another question, the chief priest and elders answered by saying, "We do not know" (v. 27). Christ's question to them was, "The baptism of John was from what source, from heaven or from men?" (v. 21:25). The chief priests and elders got into playing politics instead of answering truly. They indulged in Machiavellian group think. In fact, there is no clear passage in the Torah that says that people need to go through cleansing by immersion before entering the temple or tabernacle. Exodus 30:18-21 certainly established that people who ministered in the temple / tabernacle needed to be ritually clean. But it did not say, and does not say, that people who minister in the temple need to undergo immersion. So the spirit of John's baptism was certainly in the Mosaic Covenant, but the letter of it was not. John was doing something new and appropriate under these new circumstances. But people more interested in obeying group think than in obeying God couldn't see it. It's therefore fitting that Jesus answered his own question not only with parables, but by telling them plainly, "John came to you in the way of righteousness and you did not believe him" (v. 32). So Jesus clearly answered his

¹ This understanding of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>'s metamorphosed temple is also confirmed in Revelation 21:22, which indicates that there is no temple in the New Jerusalem because the Triune God is the temple. Also see Matthew 26:59-61 and Mark 14:58.

own question by indicating that John's baptism was from heaven. Given that John's baptism was from heaven, it's appropriate that John's baptism might symbolize not only "purification and cleansing from sins", but also "death and resurrection with Christ", as is clearly indicated in other passages in the New Testament. It is also a sign of participation in the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>.

Adult baptism and adult confirmation of infant baptism can both be rightly understood to be signs that indicate that the given person is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the Messianic Covenant. Such adult baptism and adult confirmation are each therefore like a signature on a contract that obligates the signer to the terms of the contract. Because it's necessary to distinguish between participation in a human contract whose terms are subject to human fallibility, and participation in the Bible's local covenant, which does not have the same fallibility, it's important to discern the extent to which the signatory is signing onto a human contract, and the extent to which the signatory is signing onto a biblical covenant. This is largely a distinction between membership in a visible church, a religious social compact, and membership in the "invisible Church". Of course membership in the invisible Church is not information readily available to humans. One can have some assurance about oneself, but the less one knows someone else, the less one can have assurance about them. So even though it may be true that the signatory is genuinely entering a tier 1 biblical covenant, it's also true that the signatory is signing onto a tier 2 human contract, a **religious social compact** either simultaneous with the baptism or closely connected thereto. Visible church membership and invisible Church membership are usually divided into separate issues, and it's assumed that physical baptism is a sign of membership in the invisible Church, while membership in a **religious social compact** is by way of a separate oath. Even so, it's reasonable to assume that there is some connection between the two.

Given that one of the central objectives of this theodicy is to find the biblical prescription of **human law** within the larger context of biblical jurisprudence, it's necessary to understand that the visible and invisible are being hereby distinguished, but not separated. It's necessary to separate the two only when there is a conflict in authority between the two. Under normal circumstances, signatories are primarily signing onto a tier 1 covenant, and secondarily a tier 2 human contract that they agree to interpret through their own best understanding of the tier 1 **local covenant**. In other words, each is agreeing to participate in a Christian **religious social compact** through his/her best understanding of the **local covenant**. So every Christian **religious social compact** is a **human-law** implementation of the Bible's **Messianic Covenant**, and as such it is an implementation of the biblical model, where the

model established by the <u>local covenant</u> in no way conflicts with <u>natural law</u>. The <u>religious social compact</u> is thereby a marriage of <u>natural law</u> and <u>human law</u>.

The things just said about the **Messianic Covenant** and its visible implementation, specifically regarding the necessity of genuine consent and the distinction between the local covenant and the human-law implementation thereof, are equally true of the **Mosaic Covenant**. But there are also big differences in their **in personam** jurisdictions, and these differences in personal jurisdiction are part of the metamorphosis of terms. The metamorphosis of terms is the shift from "only a shadow of the good things to come and not the very form of things" (Hebrews 10:1), to "the very form of things". --- In the Messianic Covenant, the Mosaic Covenant's levitical priesthood is replaced by the only true priest after the order of Melchizedek (Hebrews 5:5-10; 6:19-7:3, 9-17). The levitical sacrifices are replaced by the one true, perfect, and unrepeatable sacrifice (Hebrews 7:26-28). The Davidic king is replaced by the true king, the only king who ever deserved the throne formed by the local covenants (Psalm 45:6-7; Hebrews 1:8-9). The temple made with human hands is replaced with the perfect temple made without human hands (Hebrews 8:1-2). Even though the promised land remained the promised land, the nature of it is replaced, the physical, earthly land being replaced by a heavenly manifestation (Hebrews 11:13-16). The city that God is preparing is the New Jerusalem, and is not merely this physical place that has been trodden down over the millennia. The metamorphosis of these terms is emblematic of the general decentralization of the local covenant at the transition from the Mosaic to the Messianic covenant. This decentralization goes some distance in explaining the shift in the local covenant's personal jurisdiction.

(i)In the transition from the levitical priesthood to the priesthood after the order of Melchizedek, imperfect physical priests are replaced by a single individual who was born of woman, had a physical body, lived a perfect life, died, rose from the dead, and ascended in his resurrected, physical body to abide in the third heaven. From there he ministers perpetually before God the Father in behalf of his elect. Because Christ is thereby readily available to all of his people, rather than fixed locally in a physical body, the priesthood of the **Messianic Covenant** is thereby decentralized. ---- (ii)In the transition from the levitical sacrifices to the true, once-and-for-always sacrifice, repetitious sacrifices of physical goats, bulls, lambs, doves, *etc.*, were replaced by the single sacrifice by the high priest of his blemishless Self. Because this sacrifice does not need to be repeated, but only remembered and fully appreciated, this transition is also a decentralization of the **local covenant**. --- (iii)Although monarchy was originally eschewed by the **Mosaic Covenant**, the covenant did nevertheless make allowances for monarchy (Deuteronomy 17:14-20). That allowance culminated in the **Davidic Covenant**, in which God promised a perpetual monarchy. But the monarchy failed due to human fallibility, and it went into dormancy. In the **Messianic Covenant**, the Davidic monarchy comes out of dormancy and continues forever under the reign of the only perfect Davidic King. This Davidic King reigns in the second heaven orchestrating the construction of his kingdom in the physical and psychic fields of perception and action. --- (iv)In the transition from the temple made with human hands to the temple made by God without human hands, the temple is decentralized in the same way that the priesthood, the sacrifices, and the monarchy are decentralized. A physical building made with physical stuff is replaced by a spiritual building made with salvaged human souls (1 Peter 2:5).

In each case, there is a transition from a physical manifestation to a psychic manifestation, and this transition identifies a decentralization of the given term of the local covenant. This is decentralization in the sense that the so-called process of "spiritualization" makes the metamorphosed entity more accessible to a larger number of people. Each of these four covenantal metamorphoses shows how the transition from the **Mosaic Covenant** to the **Messianic Covenant** was a transition from a conception of the term as being primarily physical and centralized in the given physical manifestation, to being primarily psychic, but secondarily physical. This is not strictly an act of these terms going dormant, because there is a real transformation in the conception of them. In some respects they may go dormant, and in some respects they don't. But there is no doubt that they are conceptually transformed, and that an important effect of the transformation is decentralization. The transition from the centralization of the local covenant in the physical city of Jerusalem to a prophesied New Jerusalem, shows that Edwards' use of the templebuilding metaphor is absolutely appropriate. The "grand design" calls for just such a decentralization, because such decentralization is necessary to the expansion of the offer of partnership in the local covenant to almost anyone who can hear the call. This is not a transition into the final destination of the grand design, but it is a major, major advance in the construction process. This decentralization is an absolutely critical aspect of the restoration from dormancy of the "multitude of nations" term of the Abrahamic Covenant. In other words, this decentralization goes hand-inhand with the revival of Ephraim from oblivion, and the restoration of the twohouse doctrine. But it does not negate the "great nation" term, but merely revives, from dormancy, this feedback loop between the two terms, and keeps them alive.

This is merely a sample of how the terms of the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, that are symbolic and ceremonial, foreshadowed their metamorphosis into terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Each of these, land, temple, throne, sacrifice, priesthood, points to the New-Jerusalem ecological niche that God is preparing through the

local covenants. But each points more immediately to a state of this psychic standing wave that is closer to the New Jerusalem than the standing wave formed via the **Mosaic Covenant**, but still a long distance from the end goal. Something that's critical to understand about this construction project is that the **Mosaic Covenant**'s revelation of the moral-law leg of the **natural law** is not overridden by the **Messianic Covenant**'s revelation of the same, even if all these facets of the "ceremonial law" are.¹ As will be explained in the subject-matter section below, the revelation of the moral-law leg of the **natural law** is enhanced in the **Messianic Covenant** relative to the **Mosaic Covenant**, in a construction process that is more-or-less linear. An absolutely critical aspect of this enhanced revelation of the **natural law** is the expansion of the offer. Unlike the **Mosaic Covenant**'s stingy offer of partnership in the covenant to offspring and a meager selection of proselytes and slaves, the **Messianic Covenant**'s offer of partnership is to the entire human race. But merely saying this still does not quite get to the bottom of what's going on in regard to this decentralization of the offer.

In his letter to the Romans, the Apostle Paul shows that baptism is much more than merely a sign of "purification and cleansing". He says

> [D]o you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus have been baptized into His death? Therefore we have been buried with Him through baptism into death, in order that as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life. (Romans 6:3-4)

Paul reiterates this description of baptism in his letter to the Colossians:²

[I]n Him you were also circumcised with a circumcision made without hands, in the removal of the body of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ; having been buried with Him in baptism, in which you were also raised up with Him through faith in the working of God, who raised Him from the dead. (Colossians 2:11-12)

¹ But this statement should always be understood as accompanied by the caveat that strict construction of the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> demands simultaneous recognition of that covenant's limited <u>personal jurisdiction</u>.

² As Grudem indicates, "Here it is said that Paul makes an explicit connection between circumcision and baptism." (Grudem, p. 976) It's reasonable to assume that there is just such a metamorphosis with respect to these terms. As indicated above, this "explicit connection" fails to suffice as an argument for recognizing as parties, people who lack capacity.

This circumcision of the heart (Romans 2:29) clearly goes hand-in-hand with entry into the new covenant. Likewise, baptism by immersion clearly coincides with being "buried with Him" better than laver-washing. But of course the act is merely the outward manifestation of something that has happened or is happening to the party being immersed. The immersion symbolizes tier 1 covenantal events. As indicated by Grudem,

> [T]he waters of baptism have an even richer symbolism than simply the symbolism of the grave. The waters also remind us of the waters of God's judgment that came upon unbelievers at the time of the flood (Gen. 7:6-24), or the drowning of the Egyptians in the Exodus (Ex 14:26-29). Similarly, when Jonah was thrown into the deep (Jonah 1:7-16), he was thrown down to the place of death because of God's judgment on his disobedience -- even though he was miraculously rescued and thus became a sign of the resurrection. Therefore those who go down into the waters of baptism really are going down into the waters of judgment and death, death that they deserve from God for their sins. When they come back up out of the waters of baptism it shows that they have come safely through God's judgment only because of the merits of Jesus Christ, with whom they are united in his death and resurrection.¹

The drowning in the deluge, the drowning of the Egyptians, and the near drowning of Jonah each depict well the gravity of what's going on in the psychic field in this transition from NOT being a party to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> to being a party. The case of Jonah depicts not only the death, but also the resurrection. The case of the flood may not overtly depict the resurrection, but it does depict a close linkage between death and entry into covenant with God. The same could be said of the drowning of the Egyptians. But the Apostle Peter makes it clear that he believes the flood depicts the gravity of the situation best.

For Christ also died for sins once for all, ... in order that He might bring us to God, having been ... made alive in the spirit; in which also He went and made proclamation to the spirits *now* in prison, ... when the patience of God kept waiting in the days of Noah, during the construction of the ark, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were brought safely through *the* water. And corresponding to that, baptism now saves you ... through the resurrection of Jesus Christ, ... after angels and authorities and powers had been subjected to Him. (1 Peter 3:18-22)

¹ Grudem, pp. 968-969, footnote 7.

He says that "corresponding to" salvation through the ark, immersion and emersion "now saves you", the same way it saved "Noah and his family from the waters of judgment in the flood."¹ Peter clearly cites the deluge as being the typological origin of John's baptism. So it's fitting that people recognize that their depravity is so great that they deserve death, as a precursor to entry into the **Messianic Covenant**.

The fact that Peter characterizes Christian baptism as having Noachian gravity has huge implications in regard to the general decentralization of the <u>local covenant</u> via Christ's ministry. The fact is that the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> applies to the entire human race, and that it therefore has a <u>global in personam jurisdiction</u>, even if some of its terms are dormant. Of course the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> does not have a <u>global in personam jurisdiction</u>, but it does attempt to make a <u>global</u> offer. This offer parallels the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> by saying, in effect, to every offeree,

"If you recognize

- that you violate the **<u>natural law</u>** almost incessantly, just like the antediluvian humans;
- that you therefore do not deserve perpetual organismic standing wave status any more than they did;
- that you therefore deserve a fate like those who drowned in the flood under God's judgment on the vast majority of humanity;
- that the only human who never violated the **<u>natural law</u>**, who is therefore a perpetual organismic standing wave, who is alive even now, is offering you redemption from the fate you deserve by offering you partnership in his covenant, where the covenant constitutes a psychic standing wave that will eventually metamorphose into the New Jerusalem;

then he will treat you like Noah and Noah's family, rather than like the people who died in their sins, and he will bring you into covenant with him."

One of the reasons it's critical to recognize that these are the full implications of entering the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> is that reason itself demands that the <u>Noachian</u> <u>Covenant</u> come out of dormancy simply because the offer of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> is <u>global</u>; so what is <u>global</u> and dormant is necessarily called out of dormancy by the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Baptism in the New Testament is a sign of regeneration and the beginning of the sanctification process, but it is also a sign that the legal barriers to emergence from dormancy of the Genesis 9:6 mandate are officially removed.

Regarding regeneration: God implemented a vehicle at the time of the fall, through which individual humans could be saved from the normal fate of organismic

¹ Grudem, p. 969, footnote 7.

standing wave disintegration. This mechanism allows people to be saved through a sovereign act of God, and only through a sovereign act of God. Early recipients of such sovereign grace included Abel, Enoch, and Noah.¹ This shows that no matter what human law may be, God is sovereign over the life of every human. God can sovereignly give someone permanent standing wave status, through grace, or sovereignly give someone permanent wave disintegration, through justice, as God sovereignly chooses. This is an inherent aspect of the **natural law**, that God is the ultimate adjudicator and enforcer of it. Because the perpetuity of the organismic standing wave is dependent upon the perpetuity of the communal psychic standing wave, whether one receives justice / disintegration or grace / cohesion depends upon whether God sovereignly includes one in the psychic standing wave, or not. Because this psychic standing wave is one-and-the-same as Christ's kingdom, and because Christ is utterly sovereign over who becomes a citizen of his kingdom, and who doesn't, he is utterly sovereign in determining who participates in this psychic standing wave and who doesn't. This is precisely why solus Christus stands firm in the face of the current deluge of extra-biblical information. No other human being has ever made such an offer to anyone. It's fitting that outward, physical acceptance of this offer is the sign of membership in the **Messianic Covenant**, and that baptism is the expression of that acceptance. Under the circumstances, it's also fitting that even some people who were born and died long before Christ's incarnation are in essence included as full partners in the Messianic Covenant. Because the basis of the **in personam jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant** is regeneration, such participation is not limited by time, and it's not limited by earthly participation in a religious social compact either.

Election is apparently a process whereby specific humans are chosen by God to be his people. Regeneration is a process whereby he draws these elect people through pre-cognitive processes into entry into covenant with him. However, only through cognitive choice, agreement, and consent can other people recognize that any given elect person is indeed elect. Election happens according to the New Testament as an act of God performed at the beginning of time. However, this transition from precognitive influence to cognitive acknowledgement, choice, consent to participation in a covenant, happens in the given party's lifetime. People who claim to be party to one of the **local covenants** but who have not in fact gone through this process of regeneration are people who are prone to group-think. Because regeneration is a largely psychic phenomenon that happens between a person and his/her God, it's nearly impossible for any human third party to know whether regeneration really exists in a given other person. One can only judge by external evidence, especially

¹ Hebrews 11:4-7.

whether the behavior of Person X conforms to the terms of the covenant or not. --- Historically, people have been prone to go into an us-and-them group think instead of relying upon external evidence. People have relied on leaders to define who's in and who's out, and what behavior comports with the alleged covenant and what doesn't. In this way, the perception and understanding of the covenant itself becomes warped. This was precisely the situation in Jesus' day, which is why he railed against the group think of the Pharisees. This is precisely the circumstance in Paul's day, which is why he railed against the Judaizers. This is precisely what tends to happen with all groups and institutions. They are inherently prone to being taken over by group-think people who are all about being part of the group, and steering the group, but who have little or no grasp of what being party to the covenant really means. This issue of group think vs. one-to-one relationship with God IS the issue of whether one's actions are man-centered (group think) or God-centered, whether one is focused primarily on being a man-pleaser or a God-pleaser.

Although it's clear that fully informed consent was required for genuine entry into the Mosaic Covenant, and that the sign of the covenant, circumcision, was really just a sign that the circumcised had received an offer, there is no evidence in the **Mosaic Covenant** that regeneration was a prerequisite to entry into the covenant. Regeneration has always been a prerequisite to being in perpetual covenant with God, but the "grand design" clearly takes advantage of the discrepancy between tier 1 covenants and tier 2 covenants. That's why regeneration was never seen as a prerequisite for participation in the Mosaic Covenant in its tier 2 manifestation. God's purpose in promulgating the Mosaic Covenant, meaning that phase of objective-central redemption, was primarily to construct the foundations for the psychic standing wave. Under the circumstances, this required propagating knowledge of the **<u>natural law</u>**, especially of the moral-law leg thereof. It also required establishment and enforcement of human law consistent with such moral law, and it required the ceremonial breed of **human law** as a critical part of the construction process. So the focus during this Mosaic phase was on building the psychic standing wave, and this was necessarily a focus more on law than regeneration. Regeneration was an almost negligible issue in that phase of construction. This orientation of the Mosaic Covenant is obviously vulnerable to group think. --- By making regeneration a prerequisite to genuine participation in the Messianic Covenant,¹

^{1 &}quot;But how does one become a member of the church? The means of entrance into the church is *voluntary*, *spiritual*, *and internal*. One becomes a member of the true church by being *born again* and by having *saving faith*, not by physical birth. It comes about not by an external act, but by internal faith in one's heart. It is certainly true that baptism is the sign of entrance into the church, but this means that it should only be given to those who

the *prima facie* orientation of the **local covenant** shifted from a focus on the societal, psychic standing wave to focus on the organismic standing wave.¹ But this face-value understanding of the **Messianic Covenant** is too facile. Even though there is rightly an emphasis on regeneration, the tent spread by the **Messianic Covenant** is broad enough to include both an emphasis on regeneration of the organismic standing wave, on one hand, and an emphasis on the psychic standing wave and **jurisdictionally** reliable law, on the other.

(ii) Two-House Doctrine in the Messianic Covenant: The tent of the Messianic Covenant was not only broad enough to encompass both the emphasis on law necessary to the psychic standing wave, and the emphasis on grace necessary to the regeneration of the organismic standing wave. It was and is also broad enough to expand the offer to all humanity. Even if it was not explicitly stated in the New Testament, this broadening of the offer was equivalent to the awakening of Ephraim from dormancy. --- Any claim that the two-house doctrine is defunct throughout the New Testament period has a burden to prove that the defunct argument is superior to the dormancy argument. The two-house doctrine has its roots in the **local covenant** under the patriarchs. The Bible simply does not support any claim that the two-house-doctrine went defunct simply because the Northern Kingdom vanished. Given that the burden in regard to proving that the two-house doctrine is defunct is practically insurmountable, there's no reason to believe that Jesus Christ did not believe in the two-house doctrine, even if he never spoke of it in exactly those words. The reawakening of Ephraim is an important part of the explanation for how and why the offer was broadened to practically the entire human race. But out of obedience to the Mosaic Covenant, Jesus did not start his ministry with this broad offer. But he knew Jeremiah 31 well enough to know in advance that the "new covenant" that he would mediate would restore Ephraim: "I have surely heard Ephraim grieving ...; Therefore My heart yearns for him; I will surely have mercy on him" (Jeremiah 31:18-20). --- That covenant would be with both houses (v. 31; Hebrews 8:8). But the emphasis would be on Ephraim / Israel (v. 33; Hebrews 8:10). Consistent with that claim of Jeremiah's, John the Baptist said, "God is able from these stones to raise up children to Abraham". The Baptist's statement makes it clear

give evidence of membership in the church, only to those who profess faith in Christ." --- Grudem, p. 977.

¹ "In ... the old covenant those who were physical seed or descendants of Abraham were members of the people of Israel, but in the New Testament those who are the spiritual 'seed' or descendants of Abraham by faith are members of the church (Gal. 3:29; cf. Rom. 4:11-12)." --- Grudem, p. 977.

that the fact that Ephraim went into dormancy does not mean that the <u>in personam</u> <u>jurisdiction</u> of the <u>local covenant</u> is limited to Judahites and a meager selection of slaves and proselytes.

The claim that the offer of the <u>local covenant</u> expanded under the <u>Messianic</u> <u>Covenant</u> is confirmed by passages such as this one in Matthew 10.

These twelve Jesus sent out after instructing them, saying, "Do not go in *the* way of *the* Gentiles, and do not enter *any* city of the Samaritans; but rather go to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. And as you go, preach, saying, 'The kingdom of heaven is at hand.'" (Matthew 10:5-7)

This clearly indicates that at this stage of Jesus' ministry, he was not interested in extending the offer to the Gentiles, or even to the Samaritans. So at this stage, the offer was being made strictly to Jews. But the fact that Jesus referred to these Jews as the "house of Israel" is not a sign that he believed that the "house of Israel" was composed strictly of hereditary and converted Jews. The house of Judah had absorbed some refugees from the northern ten tribes when the Northern Kingdom went into exile. These refugees became assimilated into Judah, and the pharisaic argument claims that blessings pertinent to the house of Ephraim became pertinent to the house of Judah. But this pharisaic argument is not for the dormancy of Ephraim, but for the death of it, and for the complete assimilation of everything pertinent to it. So this pharisaical attitude violates the dormancy doctrine. This is why it's more appropriate to view Jesus' use of "house of Israel" as a code phrase calling Ephraim out of dormancy.

Another possible explanation for Jesus using "house of Israel" instead of "house of Judah" is because the places he was sending them were in the historical territories of the northern ten tribes. Under this interpretation, he was sending them to Jews in these territories, so his use of this expression has no more significance than this. But this interpretation is also belied by passages like his encounter with the woman of Sychar (John 4:5-26), his instruction to the disciples at the ascension (Acts 1:4-8), the great commission (Matthew 28:16-20), and numerous other passages that show the expanded offer. During his ministry, prior to the resurrection, he was focused on being obedient to the **Mosaic Covenant**, thereby making the offer to people who were genuinely party to the Judean **religious social compact**, but who were also people who saw themselves as "lost sheep" relative to the agenda of the Pharisees and Sadducees. These Jewish "lost sheep" would replace the lost ten tribes, and the apostles would be the new heads of these tribes.¹

¹ Christ's appointment of twelve apostles is part of the rescue of Ephraim's promise from dormancy. The ten tribes had to be replaced in order for Ephraim's promise to

Christ's focus on making the covenantal offer to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel", and exclusively to them, remained constant for the sake of obedience to the **Mosaic Covenant**, until after the **Messianic Covenant** had been cut and he had been resurrected. But there was a minor softening of the exclusivity of this offer during his ministry, as can be seen in Jesus' treatment of the Canaanite woman.

And behold, a Canaanite woman came out from that region, and *began* to cry out, saying, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, Son of David; my daughter is cruelly demon-possessed." But He did not answer her a word. And His disciples came to *Him* and kept asking Him, saying, "Send her away, for she is shouting out after us." But He answered and said, "I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." But she came and *began* to bow down before Him, saying, "Lord, help me!" And He answered and said, "It is not good to take the children's bread and throw it to the dogs." But she said, "Yes, Lord; but even the dogs feed on the crumbs which fall from their masters' table." Then Jesus answered and said to her, "O woman, your faith is great; be it done for you as you wish." And her daughter was healed at once. (Matthew 15:22-28)

This shows that even though his ministry was primarily to the people of the <u>local</u> <u>covenant</u>, the offer was being broadened as part of this decentralization process. Even though Jesus clearly indicated that his ministry was to the "lost sheep of the house of Israel", there's no doubt that after the resurrection, the offer would be extended to a calling to the Gentiles, as was foretold by Moses (Deuteronomy 32:21; Romans 10:19), and by Isaiah (Isaiah 65:1-2; Romans 10:20). But at the beginning of Christ's ministry, this was not the focus. The focus was on being obedient to the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u>, including to its severe, anti-syncretistic exclusivity.

(iii) Why Jesus Would Seek John's Baptism: Although the claim that John's baptism derives from the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> is plausible, as indicated above, John's baptism being found in the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> in spirit even if not in letter, this does not explain why Jesus, a sinless man, would submit himself to it. If "the kingdom of heaven is at hand", meaning the King is at hand, and if baptism is being encouraged for the sake of preparing the population of sinners for the appearance

return to having a status in the physical field. --- Jesus "called ... twelve ... apostles, who were the grand ministers of his kingdom, and as it were the twelve foundations of his church. (See Rev. xxi. 14.) These were the main instruments of setting up his kingdom in the world, and therefore shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." (Edwards, **History**, Period II, Part II, Sect. III, p. 577)

of their sinless King, then why would anyone think the King himself needed the baptism? This is essentially the question that John asked Jesus (Matthew 3:14). Under the circumstances, Jesus' response to John's question shows a gravity that goes well beyond the **Mosaic Covenant**'s ritual purity: "[I]t is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness." But this answer to John begs an answer to "Why?". Why does it fulfill all righteousness, and how?

The reason Jesus submitted himself to John's baptism relates directly to the combined facts that he is the only rightful King of the <u>local covenant</u>, and the only polity appropriate for his kingdom is the <u>natural-rights</u> polity. This combination of facts has huge explanatory power in regard to the genocide. But this becomes obvious only when John's baptism is understood within the context of the flood motif.

Peter marks baptism as a symbolic reenactment of the flood (1 Peter 3:18-22), an admission by the principal that he/she deserves to die like Noah's generation, because of corruption. The admission that one deserves to die in the flood is implicitly an admission that if one survives the flood, then one will be so grateful that one will do whatever one is covenantally obligated to do as a survivor. So in essence, anyone who is baptized by immersion is admitting that they need to observe the Genesis 9:6 duties with all due care and diligence. --- In the case of the Messiah, given that Peter has precisely nailed the nature of baptism, the Messiah's baptism is also an acknowledgement of the **natural-rights** polity that arises naturally and rationally out of the **Noachian Covenant**. So even though this King's reign will be consummated in the New Jerusalem, after the end of the *law-enforcement epoch*. It even exists now in the psychic field. One of the prerequisites to its coming out of dormancy is for his people to implement the polity his kingdom demands.

In order to understand the genocide properly, it's necessary to understand it within the context of this kingdom, this King, and this polity. In order properly to understand why Jesus sought John's baptism, it's necessary to understand it within the same context. --- Even though Jesus Christ was sinless, and remains forever sinless, he took the sins of all his fallen elect upon himself as the price he had to pay for their redemption. After that price was paid, he stands as a shield before each of his regenerate elect, deflecting the judgment those elect deserve because of their missing the **natural-law** mark. The deflection comes by way of the fact that these people are woven by the Messiah into the psychic standing wave that he is constructing. Because this psychic standing wave will be the New Jerusalem when its construction is complete, this psychic standing wave is the key to properly understanding both Christ's baptism and the genocide that he commanded.

It's crucial to understand that **natural rights** derive from the fact that God created humans in his image. God has no problem recognizing that every human is imbued with the *imago Dei*, but he also has no problem recognizing that every fallen creature has defiled the imago Dei with which he/she is imbued. On the other hand, fallen humans have huge problems in recognizing that every human is imbued with the imago Dei, because every human has defiled the imago Dei in his/her self. God has no obligation to abide by the **natural rights** of his creatures because he is sovereign over the **<u>natural law</u>**. However, because some people are elect by the Messiah and have been regenerated, God looks on those people and does not see the defilement, but only the Messiah's imputed righteousness. God sees that the Messiah has locked those people into the psychic standing wave. All the people who are not elect are destined for the same fate as the people who drowned in the flood. Likewise, they are destined for the same fate as the people killed in the genocide. The big difference between these two is that the parties to the tier 2 Mosaic Covenant were used as secondary causes in the genocide, while no humans were used as secondary causes in the flood.

Without the psychic standing wave, no one gets saved. It's construction is therefore absolutely crucial to every good thing that God is doing by way of the "grand design". So regardless of whether they are sovereignly elect or not, people who are willing obstacles to the construction of this psychic standing wave are opposing God's "grand design". They are putting themselves in huge danger. This is precisely the situation of the people who drowned in the flood. It's also precisely the situation of the victims of the genocide. The difference is that the perpetrators of the genocide were violating their victims' **<u>natural rights</u>**. But by way of terms of the tier 1 **<u>Mosaic</u> Covenant**, they were given a license to violate those victims' **<u>natural rights</u>**. For the sake of reviving Genesis 9:6 at least partially from dormancy, among other things, God gave his people not only a unique license, but a unique mandate, to annihilate the natives of the promised land, who were all obstacles to the formation of the psychic standing wave. The genocide terms of the Mosaic Covenant are absolutely and totally defunct under the Messianic Covenant. No such license continues to exist under the Messianic Covenant.¹ --- When all the evidence is duly considered, it's obvious that the enforcement of **natural rights** exists for the sake of serving the construction of the psychic standing wave, not the other way around. The fact that natural rights exist in the service of the psychic standing wave, and not the other way around, explains why it was no sin for God to mandate the genocide, and it was

¹ Even though it's true that this license to genocide no longer exists, the license given by *delict*-perpetrators to enforcers under the **Noachian Covenant** certainly continues.

not sin for the people to perpetrate it. In human history, it was therefore an utterly unique genocide.

Now that it's clear that the enforcement of **<u>natural rights</u>** exists for the sake of the psychic standing wave, and not to the detriment of it, it's possible to return to explaining why Jesus sought John's baptism.¹ As already indicated, part of the reason he sought John's baptism was because he would be taking the sins of all his elect onto himself, so it would be fitting for him to symbolically act out the death and resurrection embodied in the flood because of that burden of sin. Another major part of the reason for his baptism revolved around the fact that he would be the King over this **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. This means that he would be necessarily submitting himself to the agenda established by the **Noachian Covenant**, which is the agenda of the *law-enforcement epoch*. Everyone in this epoch is a descendant of the flood. So for the sake of identifying with his people, it's fitting that this King would submit himself to the flood. So the Messiah's submitting himself to John's baptism was necessary "for us to fulfill all righteousness". Christ is hereby admitting that he is also party to the **Noachian Covenant**, and therefore also subject to its **in** personam jurisdiction. He is admitting that he shares this participation with all of his people, who are also subject to the *in personam jurisdictions* of both the Noachian Covenant and the Messianic Covenant.

d. Subject Matter Jurisdiction:

In the same way that the <u>in personam jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> comes out of dormancy under the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, the <u>local covenant</u>'s <u>subject matter jurisdiction</u> goes through a similar metamorphosis. The <u>Messianic Covenant</u> removed the legal obstacles to the awakening of the <u>Noachian Covenant</u> from dormancy. So the Genesis 9:6 mandate comes out of dormancy, in principle, if not in actual fact. In order for it to come out of dormancy in fact, people willing and able to enforce it need to exist. So it makes sense that the visible Church of Jesus Christ has for so long emphasized evangelism and conversions, not law, polity, and <u>natural rights</u>.

An examination of Matthew 5 should suffice to show generally how the <u>subject</u>-<u>matter jurisdiction</u> of the <u>local covenant</u> changed in the transition from the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. This is the part of the Sermon on the Mount that is by some called the "antitheses", and by others, the "culminations".

¹ This statement should not be misunderstood as equivalent to saying individual rights exist for the sake of the group. This would be an absolute distortion consistent with the typical conflation of **<u>natural law</u>** and **<u>human law</u>**. This is another distortion resulting from assuming either-or logic when both-and logic is necessary.

People who call this passage the "antitheses" generally indicate that Christ is quoting the Old Testament, then negating it by positing the "new covenant" approach to the given subject matter. People who call this passage the "culminations" generally indicate that Christ is not negating the Old Testament, but pointing beyond it to its fulfillment. This theodicy contends that Christ meant these more as "culminations" than "antitheses". --- The change in **subject-matter jurisdiction** at the transition from the **Mosaic** to the **Messianic** covenant is closely connected to the change in **personal jurisdiction**. This change in subject matter is seen most profoundly in verses 17-48:

"Do not think that I came to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I did not come to abolish, but to fulfill. For truly I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not the smallest letter or stroke shall pass away from the Law, until all is accomplished. Whoever then annuls one of the least of these commandments, and so teaches others, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but whoever keeps and teaches *them*, he shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I say to you, that unless your righteousness surpasses *that* of the scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.

"You have heard that the ancients were told, 'You shall not commit murder' and 'Whoever commits murder shall be liable to the court.' But I say to you that everyone who is angry with his brother shall be guilty before the court; and whoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca,' shall be guilty before the supreme court; and whoever shall say, 'You fool,' shall be guilty *enough to go* into the fiery hell. ...

"You have heard that it was said, 'You shall not commit adultery'; but I say to you, that everyone who looks on a woman to lust for her has committed adultery with her already in his heart. And if your right eye makes you stumble, tear it out, and throw it from you; for it is better for you that one of the parts of your body perish, than for your whole body to be thrown into hell. And if your right hand makes you stumble, cut it off, and throw it from you; for it is better for you that one of the parts of your body perish, than for your whole body to go into hell. ...

"Again, you have heard that the ancients were told, 'You shall not make false vows, but shall fulfill your vows to the Lord.' But I say to you, make no oath at all, either by heaven, for it is the throne of God, or by the earth, for it is the footstool of His feet, or by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the great King. Nor shall you make an oath by your head, for you cannot make one hair white or black. But let your statement be, 'Yes, yes' *or* 'No, no'; and anything beyond these is of evil.

"You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist him who is evil; but whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if anyone wants to sue you, and take your shirt, let him have your coat also. And whoever shall force you to go one mile, go with him two. ...

"You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor, and hate your enemy." But I say to you, love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you in order that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for He causes His sun to rise on *the* evil and *the* good, and sends rain on *the* righteous and *the* unrighteous. For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Do not even the tax-gatherers do the same? And if you greet your brothers only, what do you do more *than others*? Do not even the Gentiles do the same? Therefore you are to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." (Matthew 5:17-48)

To interpret this passage properly, it's necessary to understand it as part of the expansion and decentralization of the overall jurisdiction of the local covenant. When Jesus says that he has not come to abolish the law, but to fulfill it, that statement leaves his audience with a big question, specifically: What does it mean to fulfill the law? Given that the Messiah was an expert in the Tanakh, he was very familiar with what God claimed through Jeremiah about the "new covenant" (Jeremiah 31:31-34). Given that Jeremiah's description of the "new covenant" is true, Christ's fulfillment of the law is the same as what Jeremiah describes by saying, "I will put My law within them, and on their heart I will write it" (v. 33). Given that this is true, that what Christ calls the fulfillment of the law is the same as what Jeremiah indicates is the fulfillment of the law in the "new covenant", it's also true that like Jeremiah, Christ's claim about fulfilling the law is somewhat hyperbolic. So in order to understand what Christ means when he claims that he came to fulfill the law, it's necessary to understand the parameters of his hyperbole. It's certainly true that the "ceremonial law" went through the kinds of metamorphoses indicated above. But as indicated by the subject matter of this passage from Matthew, Christ is not speaking of "ceremonial law" in this passage. He is speaking of murder, adultery, vows, the lex talionis, and the scope of one's love for people. These are similar to the issues covered by the horizontal mandates of the ten commandments: murder, adultery, theft, false witness, and envy.

Even though it's clear that there must be an element of hyperbole in this passage, it should also be clear that there was no hyperbole in Christ's statement that, "you

are to be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (v. 48). This perfection is the perfect obedience of the **natural law** that has been required of the human race since humanity's creation. This standard has never been relaxed, and it never will be. By showing that these horizontal mandates are not fulfilled merely by avoiding the violation of their **human-law** prohibitions, Christ is showing that obedience to human law does not, and cannot, pass as a substitute for obedience to natural law. Christ is showing that the standard is so high that fallen creatures are not capable of keeping the standard. He uses hyperbole to express the gravity of these laws, and to show how impossible it is for humans to keep them through their own efforts. It's clear from this passage that the standard is perfect, and people are not capable of keeping it. --- What's not expressed in this passage, but what is clear elsewhere in the New Testament, is that even though Christ's elect are incapable during the *law*enforcement epoch of keeping the standard perfectly, they are seen by the Father as keeping it perfectly through Christ's imputed righteousness. Christ imputes his righteousness to his own, and stands as their advocate before the Father. They are thereby sustained through the righteousness of Christ, by an alien righteousness that is not their own. Even so, if they presume to rely on this alien righteousness without making any effort at acting in accordance with the moral-law leg of the **natural law**, then their lack of effort signals a lack of respect for Christ, which means that they probably do not have his grace, and are probably not thus justified before the Father. Under such circumstances, the imputation is not a fact, but an illusion. But his genuinely elect are salvaged through his imputed righteousness, a righteousness that is not their own. It is an imputation that fallen creatures need because they are all incapable of keeping the **<u>natural law</u>** perfectly through their own efforts.

The hyperbole in this passage shows up in verses (i)22, (ii)29-30, (iii)34, and (iv)39-41. --- (i)Matthew 5:22 indicates that not just people who murder are "liable to the court". Christ is escalating the recognition of guilt beyond the domain of **human law** into the psychic realm. "[E]veryone who is angry with his brother shall be guilty before the court". What court? Certainly not a **human-law** court that is incapable of reading anyone's mind or heart. It must be a court that is capable of judging such evidence. That can only be the "supreme court", the court of final authority and ultimate appeals. Christ is using equivocation to show the difference between a **human-law** court and a **natural-law** court. Murder should certainly go into a **human-law** court as long as there is recognizable evidence that the murder exists. But the thoughts of one entertaining anger cannot suffice as evidence in **human law**. Neither does calling someone else names. Neither the thought nor the

names can be recognized in a human court as damage.¹ By intentionally conflating the **human-law** court and the **natural-law** court, Christ is showing just how serious violations of **natural law** are. He is showing that even if someone never breaks the **human law** against murder, harboring anger and ill will against another human is enough to ensure one's final destination in hell. This is hyperbolic only because of Christ's intentional equivocation in regards to "court". He is nevertheless saying something extremely important about the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant**, specifically, that it includes phenomena in the psychic field of perception and action much more prominently than did the **Mosaic Covenant**.

(ii)When Christ says that "everyone who looks on a woman to lust for her has committed adultery with her ... in his heart", he is merely stating a fact. The fact is that psychic sin is as real as physical sin, even though it's not recognizable in a human-law court. To convey the gravity of this fact, he uses hyperbole. "[I] f your right eye makes you stumble, tear it out", and, "[I]f your right hand makes you stumble, cut it off", are clearly hyperbolic. In fact, people are conceived in sin, and if they followed this regime, they would be eyeless, limbless, and tongueless by the time they reached adulthood. But this hyperbole shows well the emphasis of the **Messianic Covenant**'s **subject-matter jurisdiction**. It is on obedience to the moral-law leg of the **<u>natural law</u>**, not on the <u>**human law**</u> that has been prescribed as a subset of **<u>natural law</u>**. It is on psychic obedience with the understanding that psychic obedience is a precursor to physical obedience. Even so, this subject matter does not eliminate the Mosaic prescription of human law. Instead, it emphasizes psychic obedience. This is a process of broadening the subject matter in a way that's similar to the **Messianic Covenant**'s broadening of the **local covenant**'s **in** personam jurisdiction.

(iii)When Christ quotes the ancients, saying, "You shall not make false vows, but you shall fulfill your vows to the Lord" (v. 33), it's implicit that all genuine vows are "to the Lord" before they're to anyone or anything else. That's why he says the correct equivalent of an oath is "Yes, yes" or "No, no". Thus, Christ says, "make no oath at all". If "Yes, yes" / "No, no" are understood to be a kind of oath, then it's reasonable to understand "make no oath" as hyperbole. It's clear that Christ is calling all his people to live their lives *Coram Deo*, before the face of God, where everything that they say is true, and therefore making vows is not necessary. This doesn't negate the proscription against false vows. It just shows what a low standard

¹ This is true unless the name-calling shifts into ruining someone else's reputation with lies. Then that can be recognized as damage in a *lawful* human court. Also, other acts such as name calling could be made illegal within a **religious social compact**, even when there is no damage that could be recognized under a **secular social compact**.

that prohibition sets. Because it's clear that the entire chapter emphasizes the higher **subject-matter jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant**, it's reasonable to assume that the proscription against all oaths is also hyperbolic. But it's also reasonable to understand that making vows on people, places, and things is not a good idea, because it paints the truth of God as based on something other than what it's genuinely based on. In the life lived *Coram Deo*, there is no need for oaths because all statements are submitted to sovereign inspection by default.

(iv)In verses 38-42, Christ essentially casts doubts on the entire *lex talionis*. "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" is the prototypical expression of the *lex talionis*. It appears almost verbatim in the *Torah* (Leviticus 24:19-20; Deuteronomy 19:18-21), and can be understood to be an expression of the partial reawakening of Genesis 9:6 under the **Mosaic Covenant**. Genesis 9:6 says, "Whoever sheds man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed". This is also generally understood to be an expression of the *lex talionis*: blood for blood, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, *etc.* This again shows that Christ is setting a standard that is much higher than **human law** can set. However, if one does not see what he says about the *lex talionis* as hyperbole, then it should be understood that Christ is hereby declaring the end of the *lawenforcement epoch*. Christ is calling for the end of the *law-enforcement epoch* as it is to claim something similar about Jeremiah 31.

[D]o not resist him who is evil; but whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn him the other also. And if anyone wants to sue you, and take your shirt, let him have your coat also. And whoever shall force you to go one mile, go with him two. (Matthew 5:39-40)

Christ is hereby pointing to perfection, meaning the perfection of the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, where there is no need for **human law**, where the *lawenforcement epoch* has ended. He is pointing to an attitude that all his people should cultivate and abide in, an attitude of *agape* love towards all of God's creation, with the knowledge that by abiding there, no ultimate harm can ever be done to the victim, even during the *law-enforcement epoch*. But to jump to the conclusion that **human laws** should be modeled on this standard is equivalent to saying that there should not be any **human laws**. As should be obvious by now, the Bible doesn't posit that position, and neither does Jesus Christ. These statements are therefore again hyperbolic. Christ is hereby emphasizing an attitude that his people are to cultivate, even judges, lawyers, executioners, policemen, and soldiers. His people are hereby called to have perfect equanimity when they are victimized. They are also called to perfect equanimity in their prosecution of **human law**, even until the end of the *law-enforcement epoch*. It's a standard that's beyond the fallen human's

capacity to reach. But all of Christ's people are called to strive for it because that is the standard set by the covenant they have entered.

When Christ speaks specifically about the scope of one's *agape* love in verses 43-48, he does not use hyperbole of any kind. He tells his people to love even their enemies. This is indeed a radical departure from the **Mosaic Covenant**. It confirms that the **Messianic Covenant** broadens the offer of the **local covenant** to include the entire human race. It also shows the attitude that one should have as an agent of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. It is not an attitude that allows murderers to get away with murder, thieves to get away with theft, or batterers to get away with battery. It is an attitude of care and objectivity, and even *agape* love, in the execution of justice.¹ This is one of the reasons the *lex talionis* should be understood as a proportionality, rather than as a one-to-one correspondence. This is more evidence of the emergence of Genesis 9:6 from dormancy. But it is an emergence that emphasizes the proper attitude and eschews revenge and vengefulness.

These interpretations of Christ's sayings in Matthew 5 are confirmed again in Matthew 7.

"Do not judge lest you be judged. For in the way you judge, you will be judged; and by your standard of measure, it will be measured to you. And why do you look at the speck that is in your brother's eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye? Or how can you say to your brother, 'Let me take the speck out of your eye,' and behold, the log is in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the speck out of your brother's eye." (Matthew7:1-5)

If this passage is taken literally, then one comes to the conclusion that Christ's people are obligated to go through their lives as non-judgmental zombies. Judgment is an unavoidable feature of the cognitive process of choice-making. But the context makes it clear that cognition is not what Christ is talking about. He is speaking of **human law** as it was enforced under the **Mosaic Covenant**, and as it is prone to being enforced in all slave farms. As God said through Jeremiah, about the "new covenant", "they shall not teach again, each man his neighbor and each man his brother, saying, "Know the LORD," for they shall all know Me, from the least of them to the greatest of them,' declares the LORD, 'for I will forgive their iniquity, and their sin I will remember no more.'" (Jeremiah 31:34). Jeremiah is pointing to the failure of the **human law** of the **Mosaic Covenant** to properly implement the

¹ It also involves a kind of calculation. See <u>Section</u> g, "<u>Portal --- Ephraim's Confusion</u> <u>about Polity</u>", below.

spirit of the **<u>natural law</u>**. Confirming Jeremiah, Christ is hereby pointing to the same failure, and to the same remedy.

Because the Messiah is so adamant in establishing this perfect standard, it's easy to assume that he must be a pacifist, and he must be establishing a standard of pacifism for his people. If this were the case, then that would have been the establishment of a standard that ended the *law-enforcement epoch* two thousand years ago. In fact, he established a standard that will eventually end the *law-enforcement epoch*, but not without his people going through the program established by the <u>Abrahamic</u> <u>Covenant</u> and the two-house doctrine. Christ can return at any time and declare that program fulfilled. But as long as he tarries, his people are bound by the covenant that they voluntarily entered to work on the program that he established, and to build his kingdom on earth, to the best of their ability. --- During his ministry on earth, if Christ had intended for the *law-enforcement epoch* to end immediately after his ascension, then why did he say, "Do not think that I came to bring peace on earth; I did not come to bring peace, but a sword" (Matthew 10:34). Furthermore, when his earthly ministry was coming to an end, why would he say this:

"When I sent you out without purse and bag and sandals, you did not lack anything, did you?" And they said, "*No*, nothing." And He said to them, "But now, let him who has a purse take it along, likewise also a bag, and let him who has no sword sell his robe and buy one." (Luke 22:34-36)

The reason he says, "Get a sword", is because he knew that it is his people's job to establish the **natural-rights** polity. And it's the King's job to establish the tone of that polity by establishing the basic demeanor and motivation of the people working to establish and maintain that polity. The standard of his kingdom is perfect obedience to the **<u>natural law</u>**. Through these "culminations" in Matthew 5, Christ makes this perfection absolutely clear and undeniable. But he also makes it clear that such perfection is not attainable through human law alone. Human law plays a part, but it's a much more secondary part than was indicated in the Mosaic Covenant, especially in the pharisaical interpretation thereof. So the King has hereby established the **subject-matter jurisdiction** of his covenant and his kingdom. It pertains primarily to **natural law**, and only very secondarily to **human law**. ---The context of these verses from Luke is that Jesus has just told Peter that he will deny Christ three times before the rooster crows. Then Jesus tells them that the time of going barefoot with no money is ended, and it's time to buy a sword. Then he says to his people that it's his destiny to be the victim of the existing slave farm (v. 37). Then the apostles say, "Lord, look, here are two swords" (v. 38). Christ responds by saying, paraphrasing, "Yeah! That's enough." When the mob came with clubs and swords to arrest Jesus, Peter drew his sword and struck the slave of the high priest.

Jesus told him, "Put your sword back into its place; for all those who take up the sword shall perish by the sword" (Matthew 26:52). This must again be taken as hyperbole. History clearly shows that not everyone who arms himself dies by such arms. Nevertheless, he clearly makes the point: Christ's kingdom is a kingdom of peace, not bloodshed. His people are not to be perpetrators of *delicts*, but the defenders of life. He established that standard by allowing himself to be murdered by the slave farm, then rising from the dead. Because he rose from the dead, he is the *lawful* King of this **natural-rights** polity. In leaving his people on earth to build his kingdom, the sword is a necessary tool for bringing this **natural-rights** polity into existence. But his point is clear. Each of his people must have a heart for true justice before they are qualified to be genuine agents of the **natural-rights** polity.

Although what's been said here is sufficient to give a general description of how the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of the <u>local covenant</u> changed in the transition from the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> as it pertains to the new offer to Gentiles should be addressed before this general description is called complete. Before doing that, here's one brief comment on Paul's attitude about Mosaic law.

Paul has been the great teacher of the philosophy of law in the economy of redemption. Most of the Pauline formulas bear a negative character. The law chiefly operated towards bringing about and revealing the failure of certain methods and endeavors. It served as a pedagogue unto Christ, shut up the people under sin, was not given unto life, was weak through the flesh, worked condemnation, brings under a curse, is a powerless minister of the letter.¹

Paul's negative characterization of the Mosaic law exists primarily because of the Judahite propensity to overemphasize **human law**. This overemphasis shows that the Mosaic law itself is capable of being converted into an idol. This is precisely why these negative characterizations showed up. On the other hand, the **Mosaic Covenant** was skewed from the beginning to emphasize the construction of the psychic standing wave, even to the point of treating foreigners as practically sub-human. From the perspective of the **natural-rights** polity, **jurisdictional dysfunction** was built into that covenant, as is evident in its failure to apply the **natural-rights** standard instead of the genocide standard. From the perspective of the construction of the psychic standing wave, the **natural-rights** polity is secondary, and therefore **jurisdictional dysfunction** was NOT built into the **Mosaic Covenant**. When the **Messianic Covenant** expanded the offer to include the entire human race, and when

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¹ Vos, p. 126.

it expanded the **subject-matter jurisdiction** to emphasize obedience in the psychic field of perception and action, it kept the construction of the psychic standing wave as the priority, but it removed the **jurisdictional dysfunction** that existed in the covenant from the perspective of the **natural-rights** polity. All of Paul's negative characterizations of the Mosaic law should be understood within this context.

In the 15th chapter of Acts, the subject matter of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> as it is offered to Gentiles is addressed specifically. Because Pharisees who had been converted to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> insisted that Gentile converts must be circumcised in accordance with Mosaic law, and because they insisted that other aspects of the Mosaic law applied to Gentile converts, while Paul, Barnabas, Peter, and others did not agree, the early church held a council in Jerusalem to resolve these disagreements. The leader of the church in Jerusalem, Christ's half brother James, resolved the dispute in Paul's favor by saying,

"[I]t is my judgment that we do not trouble those who are turning to God from among the Gentiles, but that we write to them that they abstain from things contaminated by idols and from fornication and from what is strangled and from blood. For Moses from ancient generations has in every city those who preach him, since he is read in the synagogues every Sabbath." (Acts 15:19-21)

The council then circulated a letter written by them to their non-Jewish brethren, saying,

"[I]t seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us to lay upon you no greater burden than these essentials: that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and from things strangled and from fornication; if you keep yourselves free from such things, you will do well. Farewell." (Acts 15:28-29)

So these minimal prohibitions were extended from the <u>Mosaic Covenant</u> to non-Jewish converts to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Such converts were instructed to abstain from things contaminated by idols, to abstain from fornication, to abstain from things strangled, and to abstain from blood. Given that these four prohibitions are adequately defined, they are the minimal negative <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> as such <u>jurisdiction</u> is designated for enforcement through a Messianic <u>religious social compact</u>'s <u>human law</u>. In other words, they are the minimal negative laws that a Messianic <u>religious social compact</u> needs to enforce within its <u>jurisdiction</u>. But it's important to see that James is indicating that they are a bare minimum. This is evident by the fact that he says, "For Moses ... is read in the synagogues every Sabbath" (v. 21). So he's indicating that anyone who wants to know more can go to the synagogues that are "in every city", to learn

more. So new Gentile converts shouldn't be expected to understand the whole law of Moses, and they shouldn't be expected to abide by any other laws than these four.

This situation naturally stimulates one to wonder, Why these four? Also, should the understanding of these four be taken from the pharisaical interpretation of the Torah, or from Paul's interpretation? This latter question is important because Paul was called to a ministry to the Gentiles, while James was called to lead the Messianic Jewish church in Jerusalem. There may have been a discrepancy in their interpretations of the Torah that relate directly to the two-house doctrine. --- The leaders of the early church clearly wanted to avoid the same mistake as the Pharisees, which Jesus characterized as traveling "around on sea and land to make one proselyte; and when he becomes one, you make him twice as much a son of hell as yourselves" (Matthew 23:15). This proselytizing was the act of subjecting non-Jews to Jewish human laws. It's clear that there was little grace in this process. People who volunteered for this process were prone to converting Mosaic law as interpreted by the Pharisees, into an idol, in violation of the spirit of the local covenant if not the letter of it. The elders of the early church clearly wanted to avoid this problem. They probably consulted the Noachide Laws, which were understood by rabbinical Jews as applying inherently to all people. The Noachide Laws consisted of six negative laws and one positive law.¹ The six negative laws were prohibitions of idolatry, murder, theft, sexual immorality, blasphemy, and eating flesh from a live animal. The one positive law was the mandate to establish law courts. It's clear that the Jerusalem Council reiterated the prohibitions of idolatry and fornication, neither of which is explicitly addressed in the global covenants. Blasphemy can be understood to be a manifestation of idolatry, so the Council probably saw no reason to reiterate it. How the Council got "blood" and "what is strangled" from the Noachide Laws may be a mystery. But it's likely that both relate to Genesis 9:4-6. "Blood" can refer to the eating of animal blood, or the shedding of human blood, or both. "[W] hat is strangled" is probably from a rabbinical interpretation of Genesis 9:4. If the presumption of this relationship between Genesis 9, the Noachide Laws, and these prohibitions from the Jerusalem Council is true, then "blood" encompasses the prohibitions of murder, theft, and eating "flesh with its life, that is, its blood" (Genesis 9:4). So avoiding what is strangled also falls within the ambit of Genesis 9:4. The Council probably avoided going into more detail in their explanations in order to avoid constructing barriers to non-Jews receiving the Messianic offer.

The fact that the Jerusalem Council did not specifically mention murder and theft is evidence that they were only focused on laws that would be administered by a broadly defined <u>ecclesiastical society</u>, and not laws that were within the <u>subject</u>-

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See above.

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matter jurisdiction of a **jural society**. So the distinction between a **secular social compact** and a **religious social compact** was probably intuitively obvious to them. Being under the Roman Empire, people were already subject to the laws of a **jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compact**, and they did not need to be reminded of that in their introduction to the **Messianic Covenant**. So the Council did not explicitly address the avoidance of murder and theft. --- Also pertinent to this expansion of the **local covenant** to attempt a **global** offer to the Gentiles: Although idolatry is as rigorously prohibited by the **Messianic Covenant** as by the **Mosaic**, syncretism is not.

e. Geographical Jurisdiction:

The **geographical jurisdiction** of the **Messianic Covenant** exists wherever two or more parties thereto agree to form a **religious social compact** that by its nature has a *lawful* **geographical jurisdiction**. If there is no such agreement covering a given territory, then the **geographical jurisdiction** with regard to that territory is dormant. In order to establish such **jurisdiction**, and to do so *lawfully*, it's necessary to do so without perpetrating any related *delicts* and without violating any related contracts. The laws of such a **religious social compact** are whatever the parties agree to. Obviously, this theodicy contends that the distinction between a subordinate **jural compact** and a subordinate **ecclesiastical compact** is crucial. It also contends that if people are genuinely interested in forming a **religious social compact** that honors Christ, the terms of their compacts should follow the biblical model, to the best of their understanding.

f. Portal --- Judah's Rejection of Shiloh:

In accordance with the terms of the **Mosaic Covenant**, the priests in attendance at the tabernacle and temple were responsible for the slaughter of sacrificial animals. From that perspective, it makes perfect sense that the high priest would call for Jesus to be sacrificed for "the whole nation" (John 11: 48-53). But the high priest was conveniently overlooking the fact that Jesus was a human being, and not an animal, and that such a sacrifice would be murder. To compound this murder, the murder victim would be the Messiah, the one who had orchestrated the construction of everything Mosaic and everything Jewish from even before Judah was born. To compound the murder still more, the murder would be done in the name of the Judean nation, and by way of this nation's *de facto* leaders. To compound the error still more, when the chief priests told Pilate, "We have no king but Caesar" (John 19:15), they were violating Mosaic law. Mosaic law stipulates that "you may not put a foreigner over yourselves who is not your countryman" (Deuteronomy 17:15).

These things together were the beginning of a national tragedy for the Jewish people that is still going on even in the 21st century.

When Judah's possession of staff and scepter were dormant during the Babylonian captivity, that term of the Abrahamic Covenant, assigned to Judah by Jacob, did not go defunct. It was not obsoleted. However, when the Messianic Covenant was officially cut, meaning at the crucifixion and resurrection, the Messiah clearly proved to everyone paying attention and not deluded, that he was officially taking the staff and scepter into his own possession. Those Jews who followed him gave those instruments to him gladly. By doing so, they proved that they were true Jews, and true heirs to Jacob's bequest. Thus the scepter and staff departed from Judah when Shiloh came. By his resurrection and ascension, he was officially coronated permanent King of the Davidic monarchy, even in the physical field of perception and action. He took these instruments with him into the second heaven, as he reigns in the third heaven. It's a duty of his earthly people, meaning those who are genuinely party to the local covenant, to enforce his Kingship on earth. Because the polity that goes with his kingdom is absolutely not a slave-farming polity, his people have a duty to enforce the only kind of polity that is genuinely compatible with his kingdom, namely, a polity that's based on recognizing the **natural rights** of all people.1

At the cutting of the **Messianic Covenant**, many of the Jewish people recognized *Yeshua* as their *Meshiah*. These people formed the foundation of the visible Church of Jesus Christ, as is evident by the number of Jews who wrote the New Testament. On the other hand, the Judeans who failed to recognize *Yeshua* as their King essentially refused to acknowledge that staff and scepter had *lawfully* departed from Judah. The Jewish people who recognized and followed their Messiah followed the path of the "lost sheep of the house of Israel" who had been found by their Shepherd. As a people, these "lost sheep" were eventually assimilated into the resurrected Ephraim, into the "multitude of nations" thereafter following the Messiah. The Judeans who did not recognize *Yeshua* as their King, for whatever reason, defaulted into group think because they did not acknowledge the truth of God above and before the opinions of mere humans. The price they paid for opting for the group-think idol

¹ Actually, to the extent that this polity is recognized as being grounded in Christian **religious social compacts**, it is recognized as being destined to metamorphose into the New Jerusalem ecological niche, which is a psychic standing wave. To the extent that this polity operates as one or more **secular social compacts**, it has a **global in personam jurisdiction**; it has the extremely narrow **subject-matter jurisdiction** of all *lawful* **secular social compacts**; and it says nothing about being destined for anything other than the enforcement of its limited subject matter.

was that as a people-group, they assumed all the curses of Deuteronomy 28:15-68. Nevertheless, their continued existence as a distinct people, even two thousand years later, is evidence that the two-house doctrine is alive and well, and is by no means dormant.

As in all prior portals, at this portal, people faced an apparent conflict in authority. The Jewish people were generally expecting their Messiah to appear as the king of a slave farm. When their Messiah appeared with great signs and wonders, accompanied by an absolute refusal to take any office in any slave farm, many became bewildered, confused, and even bitter. As the Apostle John said, "He came to His own, and those who were His own did not receive Him" (John 1:11). Because of his refusal to put his mighty powers at the disposal of a slave-farming agenda, "He was hated and reproached by his own visible people."1 One by-product of that shared delusion, was that this strain of Judaism that rejected its Messiah was trounced in the Jewish-Roman Wars (66-136 A.D.). Among other things, (i)the temple and Jerusalem were destroyed in 70 A.D.; (ii)there was a Roman genocide against the Jewish people resulting in the diaspora that still exists; (iii)there was a schism between Messianic Judaism / Christianity, on one hand, and this form of Judaism that refused to acknowledge Shiloh, on the other; and (iv)all Jewish sects other than Messianic Judaism were consolidated into rabbinical Judaism. Speaking of God, the apostle Paul said, "He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires" (Romans 9:18). They were hardened for the sake of the restoration of the two-house doctrine from dormancy. If Judah had been mentally nimble enough at the time of the Messiah's appearance, then they would have been able to both acknowledge Yeshua as King and maintain their unique identity as Judah. Both biblical and extra-biblical facts clearly show that they were not that mentally nimble. Instead of seeing this as a both-and situation, they saw it as an either-or situation. Either way, Ephraim was being called out of dormancy into existence in the physical field of perception and action, and his calling was being restored as an essential aspect of the local covenants. Those who are in Ephraim's camp, and have benefited thereby, should be grateful to the hardened camp, because even hardened Judah are elders in the covenants. But that absolutely does not mean that Ephraim should follow hardened Judah.

Hardened Judah, as opposed to that portion of Judah that acted as midwife in the restoration of Ephraim, recognized neither their *lawful* King nor the kingdom's *lawful* polity. They did not recognize Ephraim's calling. They did not accept the existence of the two-house doctrine. Hardened Judah largely put itself into a category with numerous other **religious social compacts** that have beliefs and

¹ Edwards, History, Period II, Part II, Sect. IV, p. 579.

practices that are inherently at odds with reliable Bible interpretation, including reliable interpretation of the Tanakh. They suffered a presumption that they cannot be Christians and Jews at the same time. But there is nothing in Christianity that precludes them from having their own separate, unique religious social compact, for the sake of remaining true to their calling as Judah, and to recognize Jesus Christ as their Messiah, King, and God, all at the same time. Two thousand years ago, eitheror logic reigned, and the Truth went one way and their religious social compact went the other. The staff and scepter departed from Judah forever. But that doesn't mean that they don't still have a calling from God to work towards the fulfillment of the two-house doctrine, "for the gifts and the calling of God are irrevocable" (Romans 11:29). Because Shiloh has come, Judah is no longer preeminent in regard to these regal instruments. But Judah does nevertheless still have preeminence as a sign of life from the dead (Romans 11:12, 25). So Judah does still have a calling that is blessed by God. But to receive that blessing, they must do what's necessary to eliminate the curse that arose from their failure to acknowledge the culmination of objective-central redemption. They must acknowledge both their King and the polity the King demands for his kingdom.

The question asked at this portal is essentially this: What happens if we reject the culmination of objective-central redemption? Or, Why shouldn't I murder my brother; am I my brother's keeper? Or, We're mostly interested in making a name for ourselves, so why shouldn't we crucify this babbler who refuses to go along with our agenda? Or, Slave farms are the norm in this world, so if this babbler refuses to be king of our slave farm, why shouldn't we kill him? Or, We have no king but Caesar, so why shouldn't we assassinate this guy who pretends to be our true king? ---Even though it's true that no 21st-century Jew carries any personal guilt for Christ's murder, as long as Judah's existing jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compact does not correct its two-thousand-year-old error, the compact will continue to suffer the related curse. To change their social compact, the people of Judah must recognize the changes to their covenant wrought by the Messiah's first appearance. This is an obvious prerequisite to their being a proper vessel for all the blessings God has for them. Among other things, Judah no longer has the staff and scepter, because those were given up at the first coming. As long as Judah refuses to acknowledge this, Judah will be operating in violation of its own covenants, and will suffer whatever penalty the covenant requires for such violation. Operating an unlawful polity is always a disaster, especially for people who should know better. The Messiah can return whenever he chooses, regardless of how ill prepared they may be.

Jesus was not what the Jews were expecting two thousand years ago. The life of Jesus Christ was the culmination of the first phase of objective-central redemption. The Jews were certainly expecting the Messiah then, but they were expecting the Messiah to come ministering to the House of Judah, not to the House of Ephraim. They were expecting the Messiah to come to reinstate the Davidic monarchy. Given that the Davidic monarchy consisted of a slave-farming polity presided over by glorified despots, they were grossly underestimating the Messiah. When the Messiah came into the societal milieu that had been formed by the preceding centuries of the objective-central redemptive process, presenting himself as the ultimate sacrificial lamb, the Jews generally spurned him. Begrudgingly, after centuries, they had finally fulfilled their role as Judah under the patriarchal promise, and Shiloh had come. But Shiloh had come primarily to restore the multitude-of-nations blessing to Ephraim. Collectively, the Jews were like the donkey that Jesus road into Jerusalem, thinking that the crowds were cheering for him rather than for who was riding on his back. The Jews made essentially the same mistake they had made when they rejected the theocratic confederacy, and had opted for a despotic polity instead. They wanted another human king to protect them against Rome and all the other foreign influences. --- The New Testament clearly indicates that the Messiah will come again, but not as a sacrificial lamb. It's tempting to assume that he will return as a Conquering King. However, it's crucial to understand that the Messiah will never return to reinforce a slave-farming polity.

In regard to this portal, Jonathan Edwards has things to say that are immediately on point:

1. ... Christ denounced ... a woe upon them ... Matt. xiii. 14, 15.---This curse was also denounced on them by the apostle Paul, Acts xxviii. 25, 26, 27, and under this curse, this judicial blindness and hardness, they remain to this very day ...

2. They were rejected from being any longer God's visible people. They were broken off from the stock of Abraham, and since that have no more been reputed his seed, than the Ishmaelites or Edomites, who are as much his natural seed as they. ... Deut. xxxii. 21. ... Isaiah lxv. 1. ... Acts xiii. 46, 47. ... Acts xviii. 6. and xxviii. 28.¹

This characterization may seem harsh to some 21st-century Messianic Jews, but from a reliable reading of the New Testament, there should be no doubt that Edwards is on target in saying these things. Indeed, people who are even now operating under the banner of rabbinical Judaism are still suffering this "judicial blindness

¹ Edwards, History, Period II, Part I, p. 590.

and hardness". Because they rejected the changes to the <u>local covenant</u> wrought by the Messiah, their <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional religious social compact</u> is no longer preeminent. But this doesn't mean that they are utterly "replaced", because the Bible makes it abundantly clear that God still has plans for this remnant of Judah, as he does also for "Ishmaelites".

g. Portal --- Ephraim's Confusion about Polity:

Throughout the New Testament, the authors establish certain emphases in regard to the jural and ecclesiastical terms of the Messianic Covenant. The emphases clearly establish that the ecclesiastical terms generally have priority over the jural terms. This is obvious because the New Testament doesn't explicitly state that jural terms even exist as part of the Messianic Covenant. So if these terms are included in the **Messianic Covenant**, then they must have a lower priority in some respects than the terms that are explicitly mentioned. On the other hand, the fact that jural terms are not explicitly mentioned should not be taken as final proof that they are not included at all. A rational reading of the entire Bible makes it unavoidably obvious that *jural* terms must be included among the terms of the **Messianic Covenant**. But this rational reading must also recognize that the jural terms originate in the Noachian Covenant, and that they have been largely dormant throughout human history since the Tower of Babel. It's already been established that the Mosaic Covenant's legal obstacles to emergence of these terms from dormancy were removed under the Messianic Covenant. But during the days of the apostles, this emergence from dormancy was not central to what they were doing. So in the eyes of the apostles, these jural terms probably still existed primarily in the psychic realm, and they were not seriously relevant in the physical realm. So the apostles accepted the existence of slavery, and the existence of the slave-farming megastate, and they made no effort to eliminate these things. So the priority was for the **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** terms to be implemented within the existing slavefarming system. There is virtually no verbal evidence that the authors of the New Testament even acknowledged the existence of **jural** terms, even though the rational reading of the entire Bible nevertheless demands that those "inspired" authors must have known about the existence of the **jural** terms.

It's probable that this apparent neglect of the **jural** terms of the **Messianic** <u>**Covenant**</u> by the authors of the New Testament was intentional. It's crucial that the **jural** terms be motivated by way of the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms, in keeping with the *motive clause*, and for the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms to thereby have priority over the **jural** terms through this motivation. But this intentional neglect offered the opportunity for the opening of a major portal. In fact, this is the last portal that this theodicy will address. --- The New Testament neglect of the **jural** terms offers an opportunity for confusion about governance and polity. So this portal's basic question was, What kind of governmental polity is consistent with the terms of the <u>Messianic</u> <u>Covenant</u>? In history, this portal was opened and the question has been asked and answered through trial and error. History shows that this question has not generally been answered through rational, methodical, Bible-based inquiry. Historically, this trial-and-error approach has allowed the emergence of Antichrist, as explained in the examination of post-ascension eschatology below. So it's important to understand that this portal is the door through which Antichrist has become prominent in the world. The upcoming examination of post-ascension eschatology looks at that subject in more detail. But here and now, in this examination of the <u>Messianic</u> <u>Covenant</u>'s liberation of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, the "multitude of nations" term, and Ephraim, from dormancy, it's important to examine biblical evidence that this relationship between jural and <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, and these priorities, are real. The evidence exists most prominently in Romans 13:1-7:

> ¹ Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God.

> ² Therefore he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God; and they who have opposed will receive condemnation upon themselves.

³ For rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil. Do you want to have no fear of authority? Do what is good, and you will have praise from the same;

⁴ for it is a minister of God to you for good. But if you do what is evil, be afraid; for it does not bear the sword for nothing; for it is a minister of God, an avenger who brings wrath upon the one who practices evil.

⁵Wherefore it is necessary to be in subjection, not only because of wrath, but also for conscience' sake.

⁶ For because of this you also pay taxes, for *rulers* are servants of God, devoting themselves to this very thing.

⁷ Render to all what is due them: tax to whom tax *is due;* custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor. (Romans 13:1-7)

On its face, Romans 13 is instructing Christians to kowtow to slave farmers. But Paul is not dumb, he's not ignorant, and he's not giving simplistic instructions.

To comprehend this passage, it's important to understand that it contains a mixture of implicit references to God's <u>decretive will</u> and God's <u>preceptive will</u>. These are relatively simple theological concepts that deserve some explanation for

the sake of understanding this passage. They are also sometimes called God's "will of decree" and God's "will of precept". A failure to properly distinguish these two leads to misinterpretation. These two concepts appear throughout the Bible, and they therefore have been developed in systematic Bible interpretation, *i.e.*, in systematic theology.¹ Their existence in the Bible can be exemplified by examining Deuteronomy 29:29:

The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our sons forever, that we may observe all the words of this law.

This verse clearly posits a distinction between things revealed by God and things not revealed by God, between "secret things" that are hidden and "revealed" things that have ceased being hidden. As indicated above, the concept of progressive revelation can be induced from this verse. By way of special revelation, God progressively reveals both the **natural law** and the **divine law**, and he has also orchestrated the recordation of such revelation in the Bible. So limitations on progressive revelation at any given point in time exist at the boundary between what is revealed and what is not. If God reveals new things tomorrow, then day after tomorrow, the boundary between what is revealed and what is not will be different from what it is today, and the limitations on progressive revelation will thereby shift as new things are revealed. This is a more-or-less maleable limitation on progressive revelation because this limitation changes with time. But there is another limitation on progressive revelation that is not maleable because it is a fixed limitation on human understanding. This latter limitation on progressive revelation can be understood to exist by way of the fact that humans are inherently finite. Humans are localized in space and time, and are therefore finite, even though humans may live with an infinite forward duration. This finite attribute of humanity means inherently that humans are not capable of knowing everything. So there are some things that God will never reveal, and these will remain "secret things" forever. Neither omniscience nor omnipotence is an option for any human. So there are clearly things that humans are incapable of knowing. So progressive revelation will never reveal such permanently hidden knowledge.

Even though there is this obvious distinction between secret things and revealed things, God's will is in operation in regard to both sets of things. In both sets of things, and regardless of fixed or maleable limitations on progressive revelation, God decrees whatsoever comes to pass. Because God is sovereign over the universe and over every creature within it, God's decrees, His will of decree, His <u>decretive will</u>, define the decrees of an unchallengeable sovereign. This is precisely why this theodicy

¹ Grudem, pp. 213-216.

has posited the distinction between God's law as it's perceived by God, the <u>eternal</u> <u>law</u>, and God's law as it's perveiveable by mankind, the <u>natural law</u>. Although God created the entire universe and everything in it, and did so by way of laws, covenants, and <u>jurisdictions</u>, and thereby did this creation by way of <u>eternal laws</u> that are terms of <u>eternal covenants</u>, that doesn't mean that humans are capable of knowing all such <u>eternal laws</u>. Because of human finitude, it's silly for any human to believe that he/she is capable of knowing all of the <u>eternal law</u>. It's as silly as the delusion that he/she is God. That's precisely why this theodicy has posited the distinction between <u>eternal laws</u> that are capable of being known by humans and <u>eternal laws</u> that are NOT capable of being known by humans. This theodicy designates as <u>natural law</u> all <u>eternal law</u> that is capable of being known by humans. So God's <u>decretive will</u> is intimately connected to the <u>eternal law</u>, and the same way <u>natural law</u> is that subset of <u>God's <u>decretive will</u> that God intends for humans to use as rules or principles for guiding their actions and conduct.</u>

God's decretive will, also known as God's will of decree, is generally understood to reference the decrees through which God ordained "whatsoever comes to pass".1 From this perspective, God decreed not only humanity's existence, but also the fall, the original sin, the existence of HaSatan, human misery, and the existence of human government. But as the Westminster Confession of Faith indicates, "yet ... neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." So as this theodicy has been showing from its beginning, even though God is utterly sovereign, and even though everything in the universe has been ordained and decreed by God from the beginning, it's a gross misunderstanding of the human condition to blame God for sin, Satan, suffering, and the existence of the state. The existence of these things is certainly linked ultimately to God's decretive will. But to gain the proper understanding of these things and their existence, it's necessary to filter the perception of God's decretive will through the matrix of God's preceptive will. While God's decretive will established the eternal law, God's preceptive will defined that subset of the eternal law that is herein called the natural law. God's preceptive will established the precepts humans need to be miniature sovereigns, and to avoid blaming God for sin, evil, suffering, etc.

It should help to recall that the **<u>natural law</u>** encompasses three things simultaneously: (i)the laws that govern all exogenous natural phenomena recognizable by human beings; (ii)the laws that govern all endogenous natural

¹ Quoting the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter III, "Of God's Eternal Decree", I. --- URL: http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/.

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phenomena recognizable by human beings, which necessarily includes the process of cognition, meaning the endogenous perception and cognition of exogenous natural phenomena so that exogenous phenomena are accurately understood by way of endogenous cognitive processes; and (iii)the laws that govern choice making, which includes most prominently the moral law that instructs humans on how to behave so that they remain perpetual standing waves.¹ Because historic Christian theology has been focused primarily on the moral law in its definition of natural law, it has usually neglected to include all three legs of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod in its definition of God's preceptive will. So historic Christian theology has sometimes defined God's preceptive will as God's ordination of the moral law, and thus God's ordination of the precepts necessary for humans to discern the moral law. But just as limitations on progressive revelation can be understood to be both maleable and fixed, God's preceptive will can be understood to have the same fixed limitations as progressive revelation, and to be subject to the maleable limits of progressive revelation. When understood to have such maleable limits, God's preceptive will can also be understood to be subject to human dormancy. --- Because humans are localized in space and time, and because this localization necessarily exists as long as humans exist as standing waves, and because this localization inherently requires a coexisting correspondence theory of human perception, it's necessary to understand God's **preceptive will** as reflecting the **natural law**'s existence in this three-fold state. God's preceptive will essentially refers to the moral law leg of the **<u>natural-law</u>** tripod, but with ramifications regarding laws governing exogenous natural phenomena and laws governing endogenous natural phenomena, especially cognition. With God's **decretive will** and God's **preceptive will** established within this context, it's possible to see how Romans 13 manifests these two aspects of God's will

In this passage Paul is speaking as God's spokesperson, and is essentially laying out the parameters of God's **preceptive will** as it pertains to the Christian's attitudes about secular human government. In other words, Paul is expounding the morallaw leg of the **natural-law** tripod as it pertains to secular human government. This moral law, meaning God's **preceptive will**, includes both the Bible's description of **natural law** and its prescription of **human law**. But God's **preceptive will** is not confined to **special revelation**. As Paul indicates in Romans 1:18-32, God's **preceptive will**, His moral law, is broadcast into the heart, mind, and conscience of every human being, but humans generally suppress it, don't want to know about it, and refuse to abide by it. As is evident in Genesis 9:6, God's **preceptive will**

¹ See **PART I: SCIENCE & BIBLE**, RETELLING THE BIBLICAL STORY IN THE LINGO OF WAVE PHYSICS, *The Devil and the Natural Law*.

throughout the *law-enforcement epoch* has been for humans to govern themselves in a way that stays within rational jurisdictional boundaries. But as long as humans have refused to operate within God's <u>preceptive will</u> in this regard, they've suffered under the obvious alternative, jurisdictionally dysfunctional human governments, i.e., the state. The refusal to operate within God's <u>preceptive will</u> in regard to human governance leaves human societies victims to statism, by default. Because this refusal has been the default since the Tower of Babel, statism has been the default. These facts bear directly on the proper approach to interpreting and understanding this passage.

It's clear from reading this passage that Paul is positing that secular human government exists as part of the <u>decretive will</u> of God. It's also obvious that he is positing some moral posture that his audience should have towards secular human government. But the big question remains: What moral posture is Paul positing as definition of the parameters and limitations on secular human government? --- In the view of the biblically sub-literate, Paul's not positing any limitations on government. All the limitations are placed on those subject to secular human government, not on those exercising the power of secular human government. This is the obvious reading to the biblically sub-literate because they generally don't know where in the Bible to look for God's <u>preceptive will</u> in regards to limitations on secular human government.

Because Paul's audience has been nowhere near as astute in Bible interpretation as he was, from the day he wrote Romans up to the present, it's been normal for his audience to succumb to a face-value understanding of this passage. They therefore understand "governing authorities" to be whatever officials happen to be in control of the governmental power centers in their area, whether it be Roman soldiers / American cops, Roman tribunes / American federal judges, or Roman emperor / American president. This face-value reading leads to the belief that because "there is no authority except from God", God has established all these authorities. As far as the decretive will of God is concerned, there is no doubt that this is true. The naive, face-value reading of this passage stops there, because people don't know where else to look for God's preceptive will, regarding this subject. If God said nothing in His preceptive will about the proper boundaries for human government, then this naive, face-value interpretation would necessarily default into being the correct interpretation. But the fact is that God's preceptive will does address this issue, of ascertaining the proper limits on secular human government. To deliberately ignore this fact is a violation of long-honored Bible-interpretation policies.

The presupposition that one can properly understand this passage simply by assuming vernacular definitions of the terms in this passage, meaning, without

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properly consulting the rest of the Bible for definition of terms, violates the longstanding interpretational policy that holds that the Bible interprets itself:

The primary rule of hermeneutics was called "the analogy of faith." The analogy of faith is the rule that Scripture is to interpret Scripture: *Sacra Scriptura sui interpres* (Sacred Scripture is its own interpreter.). This means, quite simply, that no part of Scripture can be interpreted in such a way as to render it in conflict with what is clearly taught elsewhere in Scripture.¹

This "primary rule of hermeneutics" clearly indicates that if there are other passages that have a bearing on the interpretation of this passage from Romans, then refusing to bring that passage to bear is a violation of this primary rule of hermeneutics. The naive, face-value interpretation is therefore inherently hazardous. It leads people to kowtow to slave farmers, which is clearly an impediment to humans trying to understand God's **decretive will** in a way that doesn't violate God's moral law.

This interpretational policy clearly implies that **special revelation** forms a conceptual matrix within which all **general revelation** is subsumed. Up to the invention of "presuppositional apologetics" in the first half of the 20th century, all serious Bible scholars followed this primary rule of hermeneutics, and they all generally admitted that there is much knowledge in **general revelation** that is not explicitly contained in **special revelation**. So implied in the "analogy of faith" is the belief that to whatever extent the Bible may leave itself ambiguous, recourse to **general revelation** may be permissible. It's permissible especially when all of Scripture has been consulted for the sake of establishing the conceptual matrix necessary for the proper interpretation of **general revelation**. --- With only rare exceptions, this primary rule of hermeneutics, as it pertains to this passage from Romans, has not been followed by the visible Church, throughout Christian history. On the contrary, the face-value interpretation of this passage has ruled, and has even been used by characters like Adolph Hitler to rationalize statist excesses.

During the early centuries of the visible Church, there was little need for Paul's audience to recognize the **jural** terms of the **Messianic Covenant**. That's because there was no hope then for reining the Roman Empire into proper **jurisdictional** confines. Besides, the emphasis then was properly on soteriology in general, not on that small segment of soteriology known as sanctification. In fact, God's **preceptive will** with regard to secular human government is a small segment of the sanctification process. God's priorities regarding human governance of other humans was well-

¹ R.C. Sproul, **Knowing Scripture**, Chapter 3, "Hermeneutics: The Science of Interpretation", p. 46, 1977, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, Downers Grove, Illinois 60515.

portrayed by the object lesson that shows up in the *anarchy epoch*. God deliberately showed reluctance to allow or encourage humans to govern other humans. Now that the state, even with all of its abuses and dysfunction, is a fixture in human society, the solution to its dysfunction is to return to and stick with those original priorities, as much as is possible within the *law-enforcement epoch*. God prefers to have relationships with people that are not mediated by human mediators like secular human government. In other words, God prefers humans to be governed by **<u>natural law</u>** without the existence of <u>**human law**</u>. <u>**Human law**</u>, and secular human government, are concessions to human fallibility. In order for humans to implement secular human government properly over the long haul, it's necessary for them to first have their priorities straight with regard to God's preceptive will. Having good motives, meaning proper recognition of the *imago Dei*, is a prerequisite to proper implementation of secular human government over the long haul. If one doesn't properly understand soteriology, then it's extremely unlikely that one will appreciate the existence of the *imago Dei* in other people. If one doesn't recognize the *imago Dei* in other people, then it's extremely unlikely that one will be able to implement this extremely small sliver of the sanctification process that is God's preceptive will regarding the implementation and limitation of secular human government. Sanctification is merely a subset of soteriology, of the overall process of salvation. Establishing these priorities was far more important to Paul than any focus on God's preceptive will regarding secular human government. Paul was smart enough, being inspired by the Holy Spirit, to phrase this passage so that it clearly presents the priorities of the **Messianic Covenant** without negating the **jural** terms, meaning without negating God's **preceptive will** as the latter clearly appears in Genesis 9.

The proper interpretation of Romans 13:1-7 requires that practically every word be defined within the context that the Bible has already established. By assuming that each word is clearly defined merely by relying upon vernacular definitions, the Bible reader is making a mistake that is common among laymen when they read legal documents. The layman doesn't understand that a word that appears to be an ordinary word has a specific and specialized definition within the legal document. Such assumptions can lead the layman into extremely serious legal problems. ----Certainly Paul's audience in the early centuries of the Christian Church did not suspect that he might be using ordinary words in technical ways. But the existence of **jural** terms within the **Messianic Covenant**, and the awakening of the **naturalrights** polity from dormancy, both demand that the reader acknowledge the possibility that Paul is deliberately using terms of art within this passage. To refuse to entertain this possibility is to insist on vernacular-based *eisegesis*, instead of genuinely allowing the passage to speak through exegesis, and through "the analogy of faith".

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When Paul says, "Let every person" (v. 1), it's reasonable to ask what he means by "person". The Greek word translated "person" is *psuche* (Strong's #5590). The **King James** translates this Greek word to soul, life, mind, heart, *etc.*, in its various passages. So it's reasonable to assume that Paul's talking about every human being, so the **NASB**'s "person" is close enough to Paul's apparent meaning. So the meaning of "every person" is not limited to Christians, or to parties to the <u>local covenant</u>. It's clear that "every" (Greek *pas*, Strong's #3956) is **global** and includes the entire human race. --- This phrase, "Let every person", is important because it sets the <u>in</u> **personam jurisdiction** of Paul's declarations in Romans 13:1-7. Given the gravity of the subject matter in this passage, it's not a good idea to be careless about such things.

When Paul says, "be in subjection" in "Let every person be in subjection" (v. 1), the Greek verb used is *hupotasso* (Strong's #5293). This is "primarily a military term".¹ As a military term, little or no room is allowed for disobedience. **Strong's Lexicon** indicates that "In non-military use, it was 'a voluntary attitude of giving in, cooperating, assuming responsibility, and carrying a burden".² Regardless of whether Paul meant this word to be understood in its military connotations or non-military connotations, it's clear that he means for "subjection" in this verse to be imperative. But it's also implicit that God is the supreme governing authority, and Paul would not demand anyone to disobey the supreme authority for the sake of obeying a lower-level magistrate. So as long as his audience sees no conflict between the supreme authority and the lower-level authority, "Let every person be in subjection" is demanding that the **global in personam jurisdiction** be universally obedient.

So Paul is mandating such universal obedience to "the governing authorities" (NASB), also known as "the higher powers" (KJV) (v. 1). Neither of these translations is controversial, largely because the nature of these entities is explained in verses three and four. By "governing authorities", Paul means "rulers" (v. 3) who "bear the sword" (v. 4). A face-value reading of this has a clear meaning: "Obey the government and be submitted to it." If one assumes that the Bible is inherently statist, which is an assumption broadcast by the propaganda arm of all nominally Christian slave farms, then the state has an inherent right to exist, and the "rulers" within the state must be obeyed. They must be obeyed because Paul says so, and Paul says so because "there is no authority except from God, and those which exist are established by God." This second sentence in verse one deserves special attention, but first it's important to determine whether the Bible is statist or not.

¹ Vine's, N.T. section, p. 606.

² Logos Bible Software.

There is a myth common in Christendom that the state, meaning secular human government, is ordained by God. As already indicated, this is certainly true in regards to God's **decretive will**. But whether it's true regarding God's **preceptive** will may be a question that still remains. The above investigation of the biblical covenants does not support this myth in regards to God's preceptive will. Neither does a thorough examination of the entire Bible. What the Bible clearly ordains, as an aspect of God's **preceptive will**, in regard to **global human law** and secular human government, is a **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. It does not ordain human government willynilly. When Paul wrote this letter to the Romans, he must have known that neither the Romans, nor anyone else, was ready for the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. Being inspired by the Holy Spirit, it must have been intuitively obvious to him that it might take centuries for the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity to develop within Christian societies. So he needed to use language that could have a dual meaning, one to encourage his naive readers to keep peace with slave farmers, and the other to encourage his more biblically literate readers to implement the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. But the latter implementation would necessarily be subject to the priorities that Christ, Paul, and the other apostles, clearly establish throughout the New Testament. The priority behind this more contextual reading, is that ecclesiastical terms generally come first, because the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity requires that the **<u>jural</u>** terms arise naturally out of the *ecclesiastical* terms, because they arise out of the *motive clause*.

This dual meaning, and this split between the naive readers and the biblically knowledgeable readers, is evident in the compound sentence in the second half of verse one. According to the first half of this compound sentence, the reason Paul is mandating **global** "subjection to the governing authorities" is because "there is no authority except from God". The **King James** says, "there is no power" except from God. Either way, it's clear that Paul is talking about human beings having power and authority over other human beings. Given that all fallen human beings come into the world via *bailment* contracts, it's clearly part of the human condition that some people have authority over others. But to say this without specifying limits to that authority implies that there might not be any limits. So if Nero, Mussolini, Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, Mao, or any one of numerous other governmental mass murderers is set up by God as the authority for the day, then the naive reading says, "God put them in authority. We must obey."

A long-standing problem in Christian theology has been the determination of where to draw the limits of such authority. Slave-farm propagandists may often claim that this boundary is clear, but in Bible-based systematic theology, it's never been clear. From this passage it's certain that Paul was not interested in entering into a discussion of such **jurisdictional** limitations. Regarding **ecclesiastical** terms,

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Romans is an extremely sophisticated and elegant epistle. But regarding **jural** terms, it may be true, but it's also extremely naive on its face. Paul made it this way deliberately, for reasons that are anything but naive. --- He says that the authorities "which exist are established by God." No one who believes in the sovereignty of God can argue with this, because God made everything. But God cannot be counted the author of sin, because sin is a perceptual and actual problem for which humans must take responsibility. Even so, God certainly uses sin, pain, and suffering as goads to move his "grand design" forward. He allows Satan to put psychopaths in authority in human governments when the people are so morally jaded that THEY allow it. This morally jaded state is the rule in human history, and that's why slave farming is also the rule in human history. So when Paul implicitly indicates that God uses psychopaths as secondary causes and goads to move the entire human race away from slave farming and towards the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, on its face such a claim may be naive, but beneath the surface, this claim is both complex and elegant.

In the second verse, Paul says, "he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God". It's clear that Paul is setting up a very serious proscription here. There is little or no controversy regarding the source language, and this NASB translation is close enough. Because Paul is mandating a proscription here, it's crucial to understand the underlying meaning of "authority" and "ordinance of God". It's clear that whatever "authority" there may be acquires its authority from "the ordinance of God". What is this ordinance? --- It's reasonable to take this verse as one of the primary sources of Christendom's myth that God has ordained the state. It's already clear that God ordained the state in the **decretive** sense. The state, in the traditional, slave-farming definition of that word, certainly exists, and God has certainly ordained "whatsoever comes to pass",1 so God has certainly ordained the state in the **decretive** sense of that word. So there can certainly be no doubt that in the **decretive** sense, God has, in fact, ordained the state. So God has certainly ordained the slave-farming classes to reign over the slave classes, in the same way He ordains hurricanes, volcanos, earthquakes, and other "natural" disasters. A facial reading of this verse leads to the conclusion that God's ordination of the state falls into this same category with natural disasters. On the other hand, a rigorous reading of the entire Bible leads to the conclusion that God's preceptive will has a crucial role in the proper interpretation of this verse. God's preceptive will does not encourage any human or group of humans to engage in slave farming over a subjugated human population. Because the state has always been a slavefarming operation, practically by definition, it has NEVER been ordained in this

¹ Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter III, "Of God's Eternal Decree", I. --- URL: http://www.reformed.org/documents/wcf_with_proofs/.

preceptive sense. The only **global**, biblical portrayal of God's **preceptive will** regarding human governance of other humans appears in the **Noachian Covenant**. But the **Noachian Covenant** does not ordain the state. It ordains the **naturalrights** polity. It emphatically does not ordain slave farming, because slavery clearly violates the *motive clause*. The **Noachian Covenant** ordains the enforcement of **natural rights**. The truth is that there is a progressive process that exists between these two extremes of God's **decretive** ordination of the state and God's **preceptive** ordination of the **natural-rights** polity. It is clearly God's **decretive will** to use the state as a goad to steer humanity towards the **natural-rights** polity. It's clear that Romans 13:1-7 mandates that people acknowledge the process and work towards the **natural-rights** polity. It's crucial that people choose to put themselves on the right side, and deliberately avoid siding with psychopaths.

Following this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the "ordinance of God" that is the source of this "authority" is recorded in Genesis 9:6. It's the only place in the Bible where any kind of **<u>global</u>** human governance is ordained through God's **preceptive will**. The "authority" that derives from that verse pertains to the enforcement of **natural rights** against damage. Any presumed "authority" beyond that is inherently ultra vires. Likewise, anyone who "resists [such] authority", when such "authority" is properly within its designated limits, is, indeed, opposing "the ordinance of God", because such a person is resisting the positive and negative clauses that surround and protect the imago Dei, in direct violation of the clear ordinance. Because Genesis 9:6 mandates global human law as a subset of natural law, anyone who is opposed to such global human law "will receive condemnation upon themselves" as surely as if they had violated any other **natural law**. But this "condemnation" pertains only to people who oppose the jurisdictionally valid and lawful execution of such human law. The claim that such "condemnation" falls upon people who resist and are opposed to unlawful and ultra vires pseudoimplementations of such **globally** ordained **human law**, is a *non sequitur*. So with the understanding that the "ordinance of God" that Paul is talking about in verse two is found in Genesis 9:6, and that he is not referring willy-nilly to slave farms, verses one and two are absolutely true and biblically authoritative. The "authority" that he's speaking of is that of people who are genuinely enforcing Genesis 9:6, not the authority claimed by psychopaths who happen to have inordinate state power, and not the authority of people in rebellion against the state without having the natural-rights polity as the motivating goal of such rebellion.

The face-value understanding of verse three encourages "every person" to have complete trust in "rulers", as though such rulers are beyond reproach. The Greek word translated to "rulers" is *archon* (Strong's #758). The same word is translated

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to such terms as "prince", "chief", "magistrate", etc. These are all words from the slave-farming lexicon. Because slave farming is all Paul's Roman audience knows in regard to such subjects, he is extremely limited in how he is to express this thought. Even so, for him to make a general claim that "rulers are not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil", could be breath-takingly confusing to any naive reader being brutalized by a totalitarian regime. For the reader who understands that Paul is speaking a kind of coded message, and that this passage should be interpreted within the context of all the biblical covenants, a "ruler" is not just some guy with a lot of political, military, and police power. According to Genesis 9:6, a "ruler" is an enforcer of the rule, and the rule is, "Whoever sheds man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed". This "shall" indicates that all people are called by God to enforce this rule. Therefore, all people are called to be rulers. So the non-naive interpretation of this verse is that anyone who is enforcing this rule is "not a cause of fear for good behavior, but for evil". Likewise, when it says, "Do you want to have no fear of authority?", the "authority" is anyone authorized by "the ordinance of God". The ordinance of God in Genesis 9:6 clearly authorizes the entire human race to enforce this rule. So when people "Do what is good", there is certainly no reason to fear genuine enforcers of this genuine rule. And because the people enforcing this rule are on the side of good, they will certainly praise people who are doing good.

When verse four says that this "authority" is "a minister of God to you for good", there is no doubt that this is true of enforcers of the rule in Genesis 9:6. But it is absolutely not necessarily true of psychopaths who happen to be in control of a slave farm. So when psychopaths get into control of the machinery of government, the naive reader is prone to getting very confused about what's good and what's bad, and about what's right and what's wrong, and about who's genuinely carrying the torch for the visible Church, and who's not. --- Given that Paul knew that it might take centuries for the visible Church to become strong enough and edified enough to dump slave farming, he knew that the visible Church would need to grow up within the social superstructures established by slave farming, and that growing up outside these superstructures was not an option. So the Messianic Covenant clearly establishes that ecclesiastical laws rule the visible Church, not jural laws. This means that the prohibition of idolatry and the other non-jural mandates within the Ten Commandments are core issues of the visible Church, and the **jural** mandates are secondary, and are left to enforcement by forces outside the ecclesiastical realm of the visible Church. This is the basis of the so-called "separation of church and state". By allowing the existence of the slave farm to go unquestioned, Paul was allowing the jural terms to devolve to enforcement by slave farmers, with the shrouded proviso that the slave farm would some day be permanently overthrown, and replaced with genuine jural societies. But in those days, when Paul's audience had precious little

exposure to the biblical covenants, it was obvious to him that he would need to treat the existing slave farmers as though they were a legitimate "minister of God" to do good, and a worthy "avenger who brings wrath upon the one who practices evil". So to his naive audience, he was saying this "minister of God" does not "bear the sword for nothing". It "bears the sword", and has a virtual monopoly on the use of force, and is as uncontrollable as any "act of God", with regard to naive Christians who should fear and respect such forces similar to the way they fear and respect God and nature. That's why "it is necessary to be in subjection, not only because of wrath, but also for conscience' sake" (v. 5).

The fact that Nero was probably emperor when Paul wrote Romans, by itself, does not mitigate Paul's statement that "it is necessary to be in subjection". Nero was a psychopathic slave farmer if there ever was one. This necessity to be in subjection is a function of the capacity of the knowledgeable to implement an alternative to the slave farm, to implement the **natural-rights** polity. This necessity to be in subjection is not a function of how dastardly the chief slave farmer is. It was obvious to Paul, and it should be obvious to all biblically knowledgeable people, that the priorities of the **Messianic Covenant** mandate that parties to this covenant do whatever builds Christ's kingdom on earth. If kowtowing to psychopaths does that better than taking up arms to enforce Genesis 9:6 against them, then kowtow it is. But if it is obvious that slave-farming psychopaths are threatening the visible Church with utter destruction, through perversion of the ecclesiastical terms (among numerous mechanisms), and if the existing social superstructure is based on core principles of the **natural-rights** polity, as is the case in 21st-century America, then the health of Christ's kingdom on earth demands Genesis 9:6 enforcement against the psychopaths, not kowtowing. The "subjection", in both cases, must first be to God, and to his priorities. The priority is the building of Christ's kingdom on earth, and the coherence of the psychic standing wave that will metamorphose into the New Jerusalem. Because the **jural** terms are motivated by the *motive clause*, the priorities also specify that the **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** terms generally have priority over the **<u>jural</u>** terms. But when the visible Church is being perverted in its doctrines, on a massive scale, and when there is a genuine capacity of the knowledgeable to implement the alternative to the slave farm, then the necessity "to be in subjection, ... for conscience' sake", demands the non-naive interpretation of this passage. The circumstances demand that the slave-farming psychopaths be treated like the criminals that they truly are, not like the "minister of God". This is inherently a rejection of slave farming and replacement of it with the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. This rejection of slave farming in preference to **<u>natural rights</u>** bears directly on the interpretation of verses six and seven.

PART II, CHAPTER I, MOTIVE CLAUSE: TOWER OF BABEL, STATISM, . . .

The normal, naive, slave-farming-compatible interpretation of verses six and seven is obvious, and everybody knows it. "[E]very person" is obligated to "pay taxes". To whom? The naive interpretation answers, to whatever psychopath happens to be in office on any given day. This naive interpretation does not specify what those taxes are collected for, or what they are to be spent on. Such decisions are left to whoever happens to be in charge. --- On the other hand, the edified understanding holds that "rulers" are people who enforce the Genesis 9:6 rule, not people who enforce fiat rules willy-nilly. As clearly indicated above, these "servants of God" need to be funded for very specific purposes, and these purposes inherently set definite limits on amounts taken. No one is obligated to "pay taxes" for ultra *vires* activities. If any "government official" collects taxes for the sake of spending on anything *ultra vires*, then such taxing and spending is evidence that these "officials" are not devoted to bearing the sword for good, but for evil. So when Paul says, "Render to all what is due them", it is absolutely true from both the naive and the biblically knowledgeable perspective. On the naive side, for the sake of building Christ's kingdom on earth during periods when slave farming is inevitable, render whatever kowtowing to slave farmers is necessary to build Christ's kingdom. On the biblically knowledgeable side, render to slave-farming psychopaths the justice that's due them. In 21st-century America, that means prosecution, jail, and capital punishment, as due process demands. In 21st-century America, it also means render to genuine Genesis 9:6 rulers "tax ...; custom ...; fear ...; honor", because that is what's due them.

h. <u>Conclusion of New-Testament Portals:</u>

The apparent dichotomy between prophecies of Christ's appearance as Davidic king and Christ's appearance as Suffering Servant is not as clear-cut as some claim. This is true even though prophecies of the appearance of the Messiah as Davidic king, for the sake of fulfilling the **Davidic Covenant**, Jacob's blessing to Judah, and the "great nation" promise to Abraham, are abundant. But prophecies of the Davidic King are combined with Suffering Servant prophecies, indicating the possibility of a single appearance of the Messiah, both as Davidic king and as Suffering Servant.¹ One of the most interesting of these is Zechariah:

Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion! Shout *in triumph*, O daughter of Jerusalem! Behold, your king is coming to you; He is just and endowed with salvation, Humble, and mounted on a donkey, Even on a colt, the foal of a donkey. And I will cut off the chariot from Ephraim, And the horse from Jerusalem; And

¹ Is. 7:14-16; Is. 25:1-9; Is. 28:16-29; Is. 42:1-9; Zech 9:9-10.

the bow of war will be cut off. And He will speak peace to the nations; And His dominion will be from sea to sea, And from the River to the ends of the earth. (Zechariah 9:9-10)

If one accepts Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, then this is a largely fulfilled prophecy of his appearance as both Suffering Servant, and King of a psychic, as yet unmanifest kingdom.

Sub-Chapter 11: Conclusion of Motive Clause & Biblical Law

With the closure of the canon, the deposition of biblical law is complete, even if the understanding of it is still dubious to most of the visible Church. With it understood that the *positive* and *negative* duties of the Genesis 9:6 bloodshed mandate are necessarily tempered by the *motive clause*, and that the *motive clause* is tempered by the **Messianic Covenant**'s emphasis on grace, and with it understood that all law is subject to **jurisdictions**, it's clear that it may take some time after the completion of the canon for the visible Church to grasp biblical law, and to implement it holistically. Even so, at the closure of the canon, the era of utter subjugation of the *motive clause* to the slave farm is over.

Part II, Chapter I, Motive Clause: Tower of Babel, Statism, . . .

PART III:

THE GENESIS 3:15 PROPHECY --- CONCLUSIONS

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Given that the Messiah was the Mediator of the Messianic Covenant, and that the terms of the covenant were established while he was physically manifest on earth, it might appear reasonable to assume that the terms of the covenant were fully established by the time of the ascension. Although the premise is true, the conclusion is not entirely true because the authors of the New Testament produced prophetic, historical, and didactic works that are like statutory implementations and case-law interpretations of the terms established by the Messiah. There are also appearances of Christ to Paul (Acts 8), John (Revelation 1-3, 22), and others after the ascension. These all bear on the proper interpretation of the covenant, meaning the understanding of the law contained within the **local covenant**. So the proper understanding of the covenant depends not only on the words of the Messiah, but also on the proper interpretation of the *Tanakh* and the proper interpretation of the rest of the New Testament. The point of saying these things is to emphasize that at the completion of objective-central redemption, and the closure of the canon of the New Testament, the scope and jurisdiction of biblical law was established, and that interpretational guidelines were also built into the canon. As long as the canon is closed, and objective-central redemption has not resumed, the jurisdiction of biblical law does not change. However, the understanding of this jurisdiction certainly changes, as surely as God's people are commanded to love him with all their minds, as well as with their other faculties.

Chapter A: Post-Ascension Eschatology

Because the Bible is primarily a covenant, and is about a system of covenants, it is primarily a law book. It is a law book whose law does not change as long as the Messiah chooses to tarry. Likewise, this law book harmonizes with **natural law**, which never changes. So biblical law is the same in the first quarter of the 21st century as it was in the second century. But the understanding and implementation of biblical law are absolutely not so fixed. Similar to the way special revelation was progressive throughout biblical history, the understanding of the words that are recorded in the closed canon is also progressive throughout the period since the end of biblical history. This explains how the New Testament's only purely prophetic and visionary book has value, "to show ... the things which must ... take place" (v. 1:1), even after the canon is closed. The Book of Revelation has value to people in the 21st century because it explains what will happen in the future. Even so, the thought that biblical eschatology can be somehow divorced from biblical jurisprudence is colossally foolish.

Part II of this theodicy relied primarily upon the basic legal structure of the Bible for its organization. It found secondary support for this legal structure in the Bible's historical material, and it found tertiary support for this legal structure in the Bible's prophetic material. This approach leads to a worldview applicable and relevant in the 21st century without warping Scripture. By allowing the Bible to speak for itself, with the understanding that the Bible clearly expounds covenants, laws, and jurisdictions, there is a natural distinction between biblical jurisprudence that is naturally authoritative, and more symbolic and metaphorical Bible passages whose interpretation requires far more speculation. When the Bible reader gets to the Book of Revelation, there is no more historical narrative. At this point, the Bible's entire legal structure is contained in and expounded by prior books. From this point forward, it's necessary for this theodicy to rely upon sources of authority that are more speculative. On one hand, this means reliance upon biblical prophecy. On the other, purely extra-biblical hand, this means reliance upon authorities like secular histories, logic, mathematics, and science. Because much of the visible Church of Jesus Christ in the 21st century is captured by eschatology divorced from biblical jurisprudence (*i.e.*, is deluded), it's crucial to include in this theodicy a treatment of eschatology that is still married to jurisprudence.¹

¹ Like much of what appears above, this treatment is not intended to be exhaustive in regard to details. But it is nevertheless intended to be conceptually comprehensive. This

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Three times in the last chapter of Revelation, the Messiah says, "I am coming quickly". Clearly, he wants his people to believe his return is imminent. Because this desire is also expressed in other passages in the New Testament, it's clear that this desire of the Messiah is part of the terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Over two thousand years later, this is still part of the <u>subject-matter jurisdiction</u> of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. Because this term is clearly emphatic, this theodicy holds that this is the overriding precept in the study and exposition of all post-ascension eschatology. So above all other eschatological claims, this theodicy claims that Jesus will return whenever the Father tells him to, which in his view is "quickly". Post-ascension eschatology is largely based on symbolic and visionary passages whose interpretation demands extreme speculation. So it's not reasonable to claim that any conclusions based on such speculation take pre-eminence over this fundamental legal principle: God is sovereign. He can return whenever he wants. No amount or variety of human speculation has any contradictory bearing on such sovereignty or such return.

With it clearly established that God can return in the flesh whenever he wants, and that he demands that his people live in constant expectation of his return, it's also necessary to admit that the eschatology between the ascension and the New Jerusalem, as depicted in Revelation, is labyrinthine, highly symbolic, and ambiguous. Added to this apparent labyrinth, and to the fact that God is sovereign over all human speculation about the meaning of the labyrinth, are several facts that bear directly or indirectly on the interpretation. One fact is that the psychic field of perception and action is real, and is also distinct from the physical field, as well as from the Spiritual field. Revelation 1 clearly indicates that Revelation is the transcription of a vision, which John calls a "prophecy" (v. 3). As a biblical vision, Revelation is real and true in the psychic field. It's reasonable to believe that these events in the psychic field have some bearing on events in the physical field. They can describe in metaphorical terms (i)events that have already happened in the physical field, (ii)events that are already happening in the physical field, (iii)events that will certainly happen in the physical field, (iv)events that may or may not happen in the physical field, and (v) events that will never happen in the physical field. The effort at discerning the exact relationship between the psychic imagery and the physical field in regard to each passage in Revelation, is almost entirely speculative, and the relationship will probably not be established with certainty until the Messiah actually returns in the flesh. However, based on what's already been established as biblical law, there are some things that can be claimed with certainty.

theodicy will rely on the basic strategy used by Edwards' **History**, but with a diligent attempt at avoiding his errors.

CHAPTER A, POST-ASCENSION ESCHATOLOGY

It's certain that some biblical prophecies have already been fulfilled, and will not be fulfilled again. For example, the **Jeroboamic Covenant** is largely prophetic. Every term of that covenant has been fulfilled completely, and there is nothing about its **jurisdiction** that is in any way still pending. It's reasonable to assume that some prophetic imagery in Revelation is also likewise completely fulfilled, and some of it may have been fulfilled even before John transcribed his vision. --- Other biblical prophecies have been partially fulfilled, and are still partially pending. For example, God's dual promises to Abraham that his offspring would become a "great nation", and that he would be the father of a "multitude of nations", have both been partially fulfilled, but not completely fulfilled. So this kind of prophecy is "already but not yet". It's reasonable to assume that some prophetic imagery in Revelation is also "already but not yet".

As has already been shown, when Ephraim was restored from dormancy by the Messiah's ministry, the "multitude of nations" term was also restored. Through this restoration of that term, it follows that that term will be completely fulfilled when the gospel has been preached to the ends of the earth, and when this plurality of nations are united into a <u>natural-rights</u>-honoring confederation of <u>secular</u> and <u>religious social compacts</u>. From this worldwide confederation that is crucial to the fulfillment of this "multitude of nations" promise, it follows that this confederation of <u>social compacts</u> will eventually coalesce into a single <u>religious social compact</u> that will be the ultimate "great nation", which will be the precursor to the New Jerusalem ecological niche. --- One crucial thing to notice about this extension of the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u> into the future is that it may take a long time. This may appear to conflict with Christ's statement, "I am coming quickly".

Regarding time-frames in prophetic passages: If it's reasonable to accept hyperbole from the Messiah with the understanding that he is pointing to something deeper and more profound than what a face-value reading of the passage would convey, then it must necessarily be at least as reasonable to treat time-frames, days, years, *etc.*, in a similar manner, when they appear in Revelation. They indicate a time-frame reference, but insisting that such a reference must be exact and precise is risking a failure to see the underlying point. For example, when Revelation 8:1 says, "there was silence in heaven for about half an hour", is it reasonable for humans to impose a conception of the physical passage of time on this psychic event?¹ So time-frame references in prophetic, visionary, and highly symbolic passages like those throughout most of Revelation, should not be forced like round pegs into square holes. It needs

¹ Anyone who pays any attention to his/her dreams knows that the passage of time can be extremely subjective. But that subjectivity, by itself, cannot invalidate the meaning of a dream.

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to be admitted up front that "quickly" to God may be extremely different from "quickly" to any given human. So it's necessary to take a two-pronged approach to these passages whose interpretation is highly speculative: (i)God can return whenever he wants, which means that he can restart objective-central redemption whenever he wants, which means that he can declare all unfulfilled prophecies fulfilled. This means that whatever conception of the so-called "end times" any given person may have are subject to being either marked as delusion or heralded as true, based on the resumption of objective-central redemption. People are not capable of knowing the future with the same certainty that they know physical facts, biblical facts, and biblical law. (ii)On the other hand, there are clear patterns in God's plan for redeeming his elect. Anyone who fancies himself among the elect is covenantally obligated to do his/her best to walk in whatever light he/she may have, and to operate in life according to his/her best understanding of the covenant. This means that subject to the understanding that God can return whenever he wants, parties to the **Messianic Covenant** need to do their best to understand how God's plan extends into the future, and they need to act accordingly.¹

As has already been indicated, this theodicy is claiming that the two "nation" terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant**, which metamorphosed in time into the two-house doctrine, have been largely neglected in Christian Bible interpretation, including in post-ascension eschatology. But the two-house doctrine is not the core issue in this theodicy's exposition of biblical eschatology. The main thing that distinguishes this theodicy's eschatology from others is its insistence that implicit in Genesis 9:6 is the mandate to establish a worldwide **natural-rights** polity as an alternative to whatever other form of government may be proposed by anyone.

In his History of the Work of Redemption, Jonathan Edwards said,

So far as the *kingdom of Christ is set up* in the world, *so far* is the world brought to its end ... So far as Christ's kingdom is established in the world, *so far* are things wound up and settled in their everlasting state $...^2$

If "world" is understood to be equivalent to "Satan's visible kingdom on earth", it's difficult to find any error in Edwards' claim. So there is an inverse proportionality between the establishment of "the *kingdom* of Christ" and the disestablishment of "Satan's visible kingdom on earth". The existence of this inverse proportionality shows that for as long as Satan's kingdom has existed on earth, Christ's kingdom has also existed on earth. But Satan's kingdom has dominated the planet throughout

^{1 &}quot;Several passages indicate that we do not, and cannot, know the time when Christ will return. ... (Matt. 24:44) ... (Matt. 25:13) ... (Mark 13:32-33)." --- Grudem, p. 1093.

² Edwards, History, Period III, Sect. I, III. --- Hendrickson, p. 584.

human history, so much so that it's often difficult to perceive Christ's kingdom at all. But Shiloh's taking the staff and scepter in the physical field at the time of his resurrection was certainly a major manifestation of his kingdom, as were many of the events of the early, visible Church. Because Christ's kingdom has always existed on earth to some extent, it's reasonable to be sympathetic to Edwards' claim that in post-ascension eschatology, there are four "comings of Christ", three "spiritual" and the last "literal".¹ If Christ's kingdom has always existed on earth, even if the size of a mustard seed, then it's reasonable to understand any advance of his kingdom as being one of his comings. Even so, it's also reasonable to mark high-profile, historical advances of his kingdom as having a special significance for the visible Church that more private and personal advances do not have. As long as Edwards is clearly indicating that Christ's final "coming", at "the last judgment", is actual, physical manifestation of the Messiah, it's reasonable to allow these four comings to stand as at least plausible, and to examine them as extensions of the jurisprudence that has been posited above. The four comings seen by Edwards are delineated in the following:

> The setting up of the kingdom of Christ is chiefly accomplished by four successive great events, each of which is in Scripture called *Christ's coming in his kingdom*. The *first* is Christ's appearing in those ... dispensations ... in the apostles' days, ... which ended in the destruction of Jerusalem. ... Matt. xvi. 28. ... The *second* is that which was accomplished in Constantine's time, in the destruction of the heathen Roman empire. ... (Rev. vi. at the latter end.) The *third* is that which is to be accomplished at the destruction of Antichrist. ... 7th chapter of Daniel, and in other places. The *fourth* and last is his coming to the last judgment which is the event principally signified ... by *Christ's coming in his kingdom*.²

So the first "coming" was the period from the ascension up to and including the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., "in the apostles' days". The second "coming" was "in Constantine's time", when the Roman Empire was nominally Christianized, and the visible Church was delivered from systematic persecution. The third "coming" will be "at the destruction of Antichrist", which is still in the future. ---- These first three instances of "*Christ's coming in his kingdom*" are what Edwards describes as "spiritual". It's reasonable to understand each of these three as being a "coming" that occurs in the psychic field of perception and action. Christ is alive and reigning in the third heaven. He is broadcasting instructions into the second

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Sect. I, IV. --- Hendrickson, pp. 584-585.

² Edwards, History, Period III, Sect. I, IV, 1. --- Hendrickson, p. 584.

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heaven pertaining to the construction of his kingdom, which is the global psychic standing wave. At these three "spiritual" advances of his kingdom, his instructions in the psychic field reach earthbound humans sufficiently for these humans to put those instructions into action in the physical field. History shows that this was the situation in both the first "coming" and the second "coming", and it's reasonable to assume that the same situation will exist in the third "coming". Edwards indicates that this third "coming" would mark the end of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, and would happen "upon the fall of Antichrist and the calling of the Jews".

The fourth "coming" is more than merely psychic and "spiritual" because it involves a physical appearance of the King. It also involves the bodily resurrection of the dead. This is the consummate "*deliverance* for his church". Each of these four deliverances is immediately preceded by "a time of great opposition to the church". The first opposition was "by the Jews", the second "by the heathen", the third "by Antichrist", and the fourth "by Gog and Magog". Each "coming" results in "a terrible destruction" of the opposition. Edwards calls each of the first three deliverances a "*spiritual* resurrection". The fourth deliverance is an actual, physical resurrection of the dead, which accompanies the "last judgment" and the entry into the New Jerusalem ecological niche.

There has been so much turmoil impacting the visible Church since Edwards wrote his **History** that one might wonder if his **History** is still relevant in the 21st century. The reader should notice that there has been no great deliverance of the visible Church since Edwards' day. So these four instances of "*Christ's coming in his kingdom*" may still be the most significant instances of his "coming". But even if they are, there have been major advances in some aspects of biblical law since the 18th century, and these should have a profound influence on the proper interpretation of eschatological passages. But the visible Church generally has not acknowledged and incorporated these advances in the implementation of biblical law. This is probably in part because these advances exist primarily in the secular arena, outside the recognized ambit of the visible Church. These advances since Edwards' day have huge implications for the understanding of who or what Antichrist is. They also have huge implications for the understanding of the "coming" that occurred during Constantine's time.

These advances in biblical law in the secular arena manifested in the 18th century by way of the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Although these were certainly not perfect, they were nevertheless major manifestations of the escape of Genesis 9:6 from dormancy. This major advance out of dormancy that happened in the 18th century was a sign that a significant portion of the visible Church was aware of this escape from legal dormancy that happened by way of the Messianic Covenant. The terms of the Messianic Covenant had removed the local **covenant**'s legal obstacles to the escape from dormancy. Then in the 18th century, it must have been intuitively obvious to a significant portion of the visible Church that these legal obstacles to the escape from dormancy had been eliminated. So this significant portion of the visible Church became committed to implementing this escape from dormancy in the physical field. And this escape from dormancy in the physical field manifested most prominently in the adoption of the organic documents of this new constitutional republic. But this major advance out of dormancy that happened in the 18th century was preceded by numerous centuries of very gradual awakenings that show up in the jurisprudence of nominally Christian nations. In order to keep this major advance in the 18th century within the proper context, it should help to see this gradual awakening of Genesis 9:6 within the context of the four instances of "Christ's coming in his kingdom". By making a cautious effort at following Edwards in his demarcation of the four comings, it should be possible to comprehend the awakening of Genesis 9:6 and the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity since the ascension within the proper context.

Sub-Chapter 1: The 1st "Coming"

As has been indicated above, the apostle Paul, with statements like those that appear in Romans 13:1-7, clearly indicated to the visible Church that it should be focused on the salvation and sanctification of lost souls, and not on "foolish controversies and genealogies and strife and disputes about the Law" (Titus 3:8). With passages like these, Paul makes it clear that terms of the Messianic **Covenant** that are inherently **ecclesiastical** generally have priority over terms that are inherently **jural**. But this doesn't mean that Paul didn't know that **jural** terms were inherently part of the **Messianic Covenant**. It also doesn't mean that he was so ignorant of **<u>natural law</u>** that he didn't recognize the distinction between **<u>jural</u>** and **<u>ecclesiastical</u>**. Furthermore, it's absolutely foolish to believe that he wanted to permanently offscour the jural terms.¹ On the contrary, it's necessarily true that Paul knew that both kinds of law, both *jural* and *ecclesiastical*, were and are terms of the **Messianic Covenant**. But he also knew that the question of how to make jural and ecclesiastical laws work together under the Messianic Covenant could be perplexing, because these two kinds of law have different jurisdictions. Jural laws have a **global** in personam jurisdiction by way of their origin in the Noachian Covenant. Ecclesiastical laws have a local in personam jurisdiction. Jural laws

¹ This is because there is absolutely no biblical basis for such an offscouring.

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have a relatively significant hindrance to their implementation. As long as people do not acknowledge that all people have the *imago Dei*, they are not capable of implementing **jural** laws properly and consistently.¹ So the **ecclesiastical** terms must necessarily take priority. **Ecclesiastical** terms educate people about the *imago Dei*. So Paul's teachings naturally follow these priorities of emphasizing **ecclesiastical** terms while de-emphasizing **jural** terms.

With it clear that these are the Messianic Covenant's priorities, and these are the reasons for these priorities, it's evident how the Christian church was designed to emphasize grace without a general elimination of law. It's also clear that in the postascension era, the struggle to set up "the kingdom of Christ ... in the world" is still a struggle to implement biblical law on earth. It is still a struggle between Christ's kingdom and "Satan's visible kingdom on earth". This struggle encompasses both the **<u>jural</u>** and the **<u>ecclesiastical</u>**, but with the **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** generally taking priority. Nevertheless, in regard to both jural and ecclesiastical terms, this is still a struggle between the **natural-rights** polity and slave farming. Even though Christ can return at any time, as long as he tarries, this struggle between these two kingdoms goes on, even after "Satan's visible kingdom on earth" is defeated, as a kingdom. By following these priorities, Paul essentially guarded the religious social compacts that he was so carefully nurturing, by proscribing legal wrangling that was sure to be more divisive than constructive. Even so, this struggle between these two kingdoms will go on as long as Messiah tarries. The fight on the **natural-rights** side of the struggle is deeply dependent upon the renewal of the Christian's mind, and the entire sanctification process. This sanctification process reached a zenith during and after the 1st Great Awakening. This sanctification process under the 1st Great Awakening laid the ideological foundation for the Declaration and Constitution. But when Paul was writing his epistles between the ascension and the destruction of Jerusalem, sanctification and Christian mind renewal were operating at a far more rudimentary level, evidenced by the fact that Paul's immediate audience was far less biblically literate than 18th-century Americans.

¹ Actually, some people might be totally ignorant about the *imago Dei*, and might not even believe in God, but might still believe, through the mechanism of conscience, that all people have <u>natural rights</u>. Hypothetically, if this kind of belief arises outside the visibly manifest <u>local covenant</u> on a broad enough scale, then such a belief would be sufficient to make <u>jural</u> law functional. But a more or less widespread belief in <u>natural rights</u> has existed historically almost exclusively in cultures where there has been a close association between the belief in God and the belief in the *imago Dei*. Evidence of such a widespread belief outside the influence of the <u>local covenant</u> is practically non-existent.

Because the Jewish rejection of their Messiah has already been treated above, there will not be more treatment of it here, except to say that what Edwards said about the destruction of Jerusalem is true:

[T]he generality of them, refusing to receive conviction, God soon destroyed ...; agreeable to what Christ foretold, Matt. xxiv. 21. ...

This destruction of Jerusalem was in all respects agreeable to what Christ had foretold of it, Matt. xxiv. as appears by the account which Josephus gives of it ... [B]y his account, it was accompanied with many fearful sights in the heavens, and with a separation of the righteous from the wicked.¹

So Edwards shows that in this first "coming", God sovereignly destroyed those inimical to the visible Church, the rabbinical Jews, by using Roman legions as the secondary cause of this destruction. This was thus a major and sovereign deliverance of God's covenant-keeping people through the destruction of their enemies. But just as he had done at the Babylonian Exile, God retained a remnant of rabbinical Judaism for his sovereign purposes.

Sub-Chapter 2: The 2nd "Coming"

The second "coming", the second major advance of the visible Church, happened at the time of Constantine. Edwards marks this as a major advance of Christendom, but it's important to avoid following Edwards too closely. In fact, the Roman Empire was a slave farm before Constantine, and it was a slave farm afterwards. Edwards marks the ascension of Constantine as a major advance, the second "coming", primarily because it marks the end of the systematic persecution of Christians by the Roman Empire.² There's no doubt that this was a major advance, but as Edwards indicates, this "coming" was short lived. It's reasonable to treat this advance more as a transition in the kind of persecution than as the end of persecution. As Montesquieu said,

[O]ne does not succeed in detaching the soul from religion by filling it with this great object, by bringing it closer to the moment when it should find religion of greater importance. A more certain way to attack religion is by favor, by the comforts of life, by the hope of wealth; not by what reminds one of it, but by

¹ Edwards, **History**, Period III, Part I, III. --- Hendrickson, p. 590.

² With the relatively minor exception in the likes of "Julian the apostate". --- Edwards, **History**, Period III, Part III, I, 2. --- Hendrickson, p. 594.

what makes one forget it; not by what makes one indignant, but by what makes men lukewarm, when other passions act on our souls, and those which religion inspires are silent. In the matter of changing religion, State favors are stronger than penalties.¹

Montesquieu's claim here is certainly true. Even so, there was one great advantage in having the visible Church protected by the slave farm, rather than persecuted by it. The peaceful coexistence of church and state would facilitate the emergence of Genesis 9:6 from dormancy. This partial awakening happened in the Roman legal system, as recorded in the Code of Justinian. As indicated above, the distinction between legal actions ex delicto and legal actions ex contractu eventually became an important feature of Roman law. It's doubtful that this would have happened if the Roman Empire had remained "heathen". This adoption of these legal principles into Roman law was a major emergence of the Genesis 9:6 mandate from dormancy. The same emergence from dormancy appears in the English common law, starting in Britain during the so-called "dark ages". These principles that show up in both Roman civil law and English common law can be summarized by two simple statements that are sometimes marked as the foundational principles of the so-called "natural law". The statements are, (i)Do not trespass against (or encroach upon) anyone or their property; and, (ii) Do what you agreed to do. --- These are clearly the core principles of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. Their manifestation in Roman civil law and English common law shows that the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity was emerging from dormancy even under the duress of despotic, slave-farming regimes of early Christendom.

Sub-Chapter 3: The 3rd "Coming"

Following a tradition starting during the Reformation, Edwards claimed that the pope was the Antichrist. Even if some popes have been seriously evil, this identification of the pope as the Antichrist does not properly represent biblical truth. Understanding the difference between slave farming and the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity reveals the truth about the Antichrist. Different kinds of laws arise out of these two different kinds of polity. The laws that arise out of slave farming are arbitrary, fiat, capricious, often irrational, often inconsistent, and usually designed to promote the interests of power-holders at the expense of power-lackers. Slave-farming laws

¹ Montesquieu, Baron de; **The Spirit of the Laws**, 1748, translated by Thomas Nugent, 1752, Batoche Books, Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, Book XXV, "On the laws in their relation with the establishment of the religion of each country, and of its external police", Chapter 12, "Of Penal Laws". --- URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/ montesquieu/spiritoflaws.pdf.

therefore inherently conflict with <u>natural-rights</u> laws. <u>Natural-rights</u> laws are laws of Christ's visible kingdom, while slave-farming laws are laws of Satan's visible kingdom, and the laws of Satan's main man, Antichrist. --- This conflict between laws that arise out of <u>natural rights</u>, versus laws that arise out of slave farming, relates directly to the significance of both the second and third "coming", and it relates indirectly to the definition of Antichrist.

Edwards implicitly acknowledged the efficacy of the approach to undermining Christianity marked by Montesquieu. He acknowledged this by acknowledging the short duration of this second "coming":

After the destruction of the heathen Roman empire, Satan infested the church with *heresies*. ... [T]herefore the peace and prosperity which the church enjoyed in Constantine's time, was but very short. ... [T]he church soon began to be greatly infested with heresies ...¹

Although these heresies were in many respects defeated by orthodox (meaning right) Christianity, they also tended to weaken the social fabric enough to make this nominally Christian Roman Empire vulnerable to invasion:

Another way that Satan attempted to restore paganism in the Roman empire, was by *the invasions and conquest of heathen nations*. For in this space of time, the Goths and Vandals, and other barbarous nations from the north, invaded the empire, and obtained great conquests. They ... took possession of the western half of the empire, and divided it amongst them. It was divided into ten kingdoms, with which began the ten horns of the beast ... 8th chapter of Revelation ... Now by their means heathenism was again for a while restored ...²

Edwards marks the demise of the nominally Christian Roman Empire as the beginning of "two great works of the devil". He claims these two "works of the devil" are the "Antichristian and Mahometan kingdoms". He claims these

both together comprehend the ancient Roman empire; the kingdom of Antichrist the Western, and the Mahometan kingdom the Eastern, empire. As the Scriptures in the book of Revelation represent it, it is in the destruction of these that the glorious victory of Christ, at the introduction of the glorious times of the church, will mainly consist. And here let us briefly observe how Satan erects and maintains these two great kingdoms of his in opposition to the kingdom of Christ.

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part III, I, 1. --- Hendrickson, p. 594.

² Edwards, History, Period III, Part III, I, 1. --- Hendrickson, p. 594.

1. With respect to the kingdom of *Antichrist*. This seems to be the masterpiece of all the contrivances of the devil against the kingdom of Christ, and is evidently so spoken of in Scripture. Antichrist is *that* man of sin, (2 Thess. ii. 3) emphatically, as though he were so eminently. ... [T]he apostle John observes, that in his days there were *many* Antichrists. But yet this is called *the Antichrist*, as though there were none but he, because he was so eminently, and above all others. So this contrivance of the devil, is called *the mystery of iniquity*, 2 Thess. ii. 7. We find no enemy of Christ one half so much spoken of in the prophecies of Revelation as this, and the destruction of no enemy is spoken of as so glorious, and so happy for the church. ...

2. The Mahometan kingdom is another of mighty power and vast extent, set up by Satan against the kingdom of Christ. He set this up in the Eastern empire, as he did that of Antichrist in the Western.¹

So according to Edwards' interpretation, Christ's success in setting up his kingdom will come by way of the destruction of these two earthly kingdoms, "the kingdom of Antichrist" and the kingdom of Islam. In acknowledging that Edwards' interpretation, as it appears in this quote, might be at least partially true, it's crucial that two disclaimers closely accompany the acknowledgment: (i)Edwards' definition of Antichrist does not properly represent the Christian Bible. (ii)All wars of aggression and genocide are forbidden by the terms of the Messianic Covenant. So if there is physical warfare between Christians and Muslims, or between real Christians and Antichristians, Christians are obligated to follow "just war" standards and to respect **natural rights** of all people. --- According to their own "holy" book, Islam has adopted the mantle of Ishmael. Muslims thereby claim, in effect, to be God's chosen people, via Ishmael. But chosen people are as chosen people do. If they don't produce the works of the chosen people, then it's difficult to see how they're chosen for very much that's good. Through Ishmael, Muslims have put themselves into a category of people who have a tangential relationship to the biblical covenants (Genesis 17:18-21).² Islam is therefore like rabbinical Judaism, a people who have been offscoured by God, but who nevertheless have been divinely preserved, presumably because they have a special relationship to God's covenants and are monotheistic. Both rabbinical Judaism and Islam may thereby receive some quasihonorable mention in end-times prophecy, but God's chosen people are manifestly

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part IV, I. --- Hendrickson, pp. 595-596.

² Nominally Christian Americans who have violated "just war" and <u>natural rights</u> in their prosecution of so-called "terrorism" since September 11, 2001, and who simultaneously claim to be "chosen", are also in such a tangential relationship, at best.

chosen people only if they are manifestly committed to building God's kingdom on earth, with the <u>natural-rights</u> polity that is the only polity suitable for the King. Even though neither of these two people groups is inclined to the development of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, neither is so diametrically opposed to its development as Antichrist and his sycophants.

It's clear that in Edwards' eschatology, the Antichristian kingdom is Roman Catholicism. This theodicy emphatically does NOT hold that Roman Catholicism is the kingdom of Antichrist. But it's important to follow that claim with a description of what the Antichristian kingdom is. --- Satan's visible kingdom on earth is composed primarily of every slave farm on earth, but it also includes all tribal communities that do not operate consistently with the **natural-rights** polity. Every nation on earth in the 21st century is a slave farm, without exception. The same was true of every nation and tribe between the fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the Reformation. But some of these nations during that period were nominally Christian, and were therefore spawning grounds for the development of laws and jurisprudence that honor **<u>natural rights</u>**. Following Edwards' lead, but not too closely, this theodicy proposes that the Antichristian kingdom is the system of slave farms that sat atop clans and nations that were nominally Christian. So these were nominally Christian slave farms. Rather than calling Roman Catholicism "Antichristian", this theodicy is classifying all nominally Christian slave farms as Antichristian, regardless of whether they are historically Protestant, Roman Catholic, Eastern / Greek Orthodox, or of any other nominally Christian sect. So all slave farms outside the ambit of historical Christendom are merely slave farms that are part of Satan's visible kingdom on earth. But slave farms that are within the ambit of historical Christendom are Antichristian slave farms. This distinction is necessary because these slave farms within this ambit are prone to develop ideologies that are diametrically opposed to the **natural-rights** polity. They do this for the sake of preserving the powers of slave farmers against their uppity underlings.

The rationale for calling nominally Christian slave farms "Antichristian" pertains to the clash between <u>natural rights</u> and slave farming. This is a clash between the true King and his true kingdom, on one hand, and existing governmental leaders and governmental structures, on the other. Christ refused to be the king of a slave farm. He would wait for the proper polity to develop before accepting an earthly kingdom.¹ --- As already indicated, laws dedicated to the protection of <u>natural</u> <u>rights</u> developed gradually within nominally Christian nations. Laws based on <u>natural rights</u> and laws arising out of slave farms are inherently antagonistic. So

¹ As opposed to a worldly kingdom, which is equivalent to "Satan's visible kingdom on earth", which Christ eschews forever.

PART III, CHAPTER A, POST-ASCENSION ESCHATOLOGY

this clash was built into nominally Christian slave farms practically from the instant the Roman Empire became nominally Christian under Constantine. The slave farm continued to exist even while the **natural-rights** polity gradually developed within it. Within all nominally Christian slave farms, the pure **natural-rights** polity has been gestating within a monstrous mother. For this to happen, there are two phenomena that necessarily accompany this gestation: (i)The slave farmer's inherent antagonism towards his slaves going free must be somehow appeased (*greasing the slave-farming wheel*). (ii)There are almost inevitable instances in which the slave farmer will be irate towards the development of the **natural-rights** polity on his slave farm, at which time the slave farmer will act like what he is in fact, Antichrist (*Antichrist goes irate*).

(i) Greasing the wheel: Every slave farm has incentive to use religion as a propaganda tool for maintaining and advancing the interests of the slave farm. The fact that Christianity at its core is the truth does not eliminate this incentive. Because every religion is vulnerable to being used as a propaganda tool, there is some truth in Marx's quip that "religion is the opiate of the masses". History shows that Christianity has this vulnerability as much as other religions. But being the truth, there is also a side to Christianity that is far more than a mere opiate, or propaganda tool. --- Every nominally Christian slave farm needed to fit Christianity into a slave-farming niche, as a propaganda tool. For the **<u>natural-rights</u>** agenda and the slave-farming agenda to coexist, slave farmers had to believe that they were in control, and that they were able to use Christianity as a propaganda arm of the slave farm. Slave farmers apparently thought that the minimal concessions they made to the **<u>natural rights</u>** of ordinary people were merely their way of greasing the slave-farming wheel. Generally, slave farmers within nominally Christian societies cared no more about the **<u>natural rights</u>** of their people, than slave farmers within "heathen" societies cared about the **<u>natural rights</u>** of their people. To slave farmers, religion, regardless of kind, was merely a propaganda tool for strengthening their slave farm, and convincing their slaves to stay on the plantation. Slave farmers who have been sympathetic to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity have always been the exception, not the rule. By allowing Christianity to be used as a propaganda arm of the slave farm, Christians have historically appeased the slave farmer's inherent antagonism towards allowing slaves to go free. This appeasement has facilitated the gestation of the **natural-rights** polity, on one hand, and worked in diametrical opposition to the development of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, on the other.

(ii) *The Antichrist goes irate*: Because of this need to appease the slave farmer, nominally Christian leaders have had a long-standing propensity to be sycophants

towards their slave farmers.¹ This is in contrast to real Christians who actually understand how little sympathy the Bible has towards slave farmers and slave These sycophantic Christian leaders generally have more in common farms. with religious propagandists in non-Christian slave farms than they do with real Christians. These sycophantic, nominal Christians are generally willing to sacrifice principle and people for mammon, power, and peace with the slave farmer. So these nominal Christians have tended to reject the **natural-rights**-based laws, and opt for the laws of slave farmers instead. They have generally relied heavily upon the priorities described above, specifically, the priorities expressed by Paul by which the **natural-rights** agenda is kept on a back burner, and **jural** laws are secondary to <u>ecclesiastical</u> laws. The more the <u>natural-rights</u> polity develops in earnest, the more disgusting the slave-farming polity appears to those who see the difference, which especially includes those genuinely party to the **Messianic Covenant**. Slave farming within Christendom is therefore rightly called "Antichristian". On the other hand, in a slave-farming polity that is not spawning the development of the natural-rights polity, as in slave farms that have not been historically Christian, this clash exists to a much lesser extent, *i.e.*, to a largely negligible extent. So these non-"Christian" slave farms are pure slave farms. Within genuine Christian religious social compacts, the natural-rights polity naturally puts King Jesus at its head. So according to these compacts, any other human who assumes the exalted headship of a nominally Christian nation, is a usurper, and has instead acquired the office of Antichrist for the day, hour, year, etc. So even though, as "the apostle John observes, ... there are many Antichrists", the eminent Antichrist is whatever "man of sin" happens to have the lead usurper's position at any given point in time and space. So "this contrivance of the devil", this "mystery of iniquity", is not the Roman Catholic Church and the papacy, specifically. It is the whole system of slave farming that encompassed Christendom, and that continues to encompass Christendom. The costumes and tactics of slave farmers change over the centuries. But there is deep and inherent antagonism between slave farming and the legal priorities of the Messianic Covenant, which no amount of camouflage can cover up. No matter how much Christians may try to keep peace with their slave farmers, the two systems are inherently at odds. When Christians behave as real Christians, they are inherently at odds with slave farmers. In other words, they are inherently at odds with Antichrist in all his various permutations. When confronted with

¹ Some nominally Christian leaders have even assumed the mantle of Christ on earth as part of this sycophancy, as did many if not most of the popes. But the papacy as a societal construct merely marks a variety of slave farm that has an extremely powerful propaganda arm. It was, and is, not an escape from slave farming.

this opposition from genuine Christianity, Antichrist becomes irate, and acts like the slave farmer that he is at heart. And this is precisely what Antichrist has done repetitively in the history of Christendom since Constantine.

There can be no doubt that under these numerous Antichristian regimes over the centuries, the nominal church of Jesus Christ has been used as a propaganda arm. On these nominally Christian slave farms, this propagandizing class has coordinated its efforts with the brutalizing class, to keep the slaves docile and on the plantation. What Edwards says about the papacy and Roman Catholicism is more appropriately aimed at the whole propensity of nominally Christian slave farmers to convert the church of Jesus Christ into a propagandizing mechanism of their slave state:

> This is a contrivance to turn the ministry of the christian church into a ministry of the devil, and the angels of the churches into fallen angels. In the tyranny, superstition, idolatry, and persecution, which he sets up, he contrives to make an image of ancient paganism, and more than to restore what was lost by the overthrow of paganism in the time of Constantine. By these means, the head of the beast, which was wounded unto death in Constantine, has his deadly wound healed in Antichrist, Rev. xiii. 3. And the dragon, that formerly reigned in the heathen Roman empire, being cast out thence, after the beast with seven heads and ten horns rises up out of the sea, gives him his power, and seat, and great authority; and all the world wonders after the beast.¹

In his **History**, Edwards goes on to speak more specifically of the roles of "the church of Rome" and the "Mahometan kingdom" in John's vision and prophecy. What he says about these things is largely compatible with this theodicy, as long as one understands "church of Rome" to be a misnomer and a surrogate for "nominally Christian slave farms". Even though this is true, it needs to be emphasized that since the Reformation, nominally Protestant nations have also been prone to using the nominal church of Jesus Christ as a propaganda arm of their particular slave farms. Given the boundless despotism of the last two centuries, Edwards does not adequately explain the role played in these nations by nominally Protestant churches. He does acknowledge that some denominations and sects are influenced by "*corrupt opinions*". But Antichristianity is something much more perverse and pernicious than Roman Catholicism, and Edwards doesn't seem to recognize this fact. If one were to tweak the definitions of Antichrist, Antichristianity, and "Satan's visible kingdom on earth", as herein proposed, most of what he says about these things

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part IV, I. --- Hendrickson, p. 595.

would be a fairly accurate representation of biblical truth. But his interpretation would still be missing the necessary mention of **<u>natural rights</u>** and the emergence of **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. Even so, the truth of his interpretation can be seen in claims like this:

[I]t was prophesied, that this Antichrist should reign over peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues, Rev. xvii. 15. ... Rev. xiii. 3. ... (2 Thess. ii. 4.) ... Rev. xiii. 5. ... Dan. vii. 8, 20. ... Dan. vii. 21. ... Rev. xiii. 7. ... Rev. xvii. 6. ... It was foretold, that he should forbid any to buy or sell, but those that had his mark: Rev. xiii. 17.¹

These Bible citations are all true of Antichrist as herein defined. But the prophecy of the proscription of buying and selling without the mark of the beast is far more real in 21st-century America than it ever was anywhere before or during Edwards' day. Any American who doesn't believe this should try living in America for a few years without any use of a Social Security number or employment identification number.² Slave farmers in the "United States" have publicly stated plans to make buying and selling without their mark far more difficult still. People who ignore this warning from John's prophecy do so at their own peril. These facts show that the "United States" is now far more Antichristian than any nation within the ambit of Roman Catholicism ever dreamed of being. This is one among a number of good reasons to dump Edwards' identification of the pope as Antichrist and Roman Catholicism as Antichristianity.

After painting secular history from the Reformation to his own day, from the perspective of biblical prophecy,³ Edwards enters into describing "how the success of Christ's redemption will be carried on" from his day "till Antichrist is fallen, and Satan's visible kingdom on earth is destroyed".⁴ Regarding sources of authority, Edwards indicates, at the beginning of this new part of his **History**, that,

Through most of the time from the fall of man to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, we had scripture history to guide us; and from thence to the present time we had prophecy, together with the accomplishment of it in providence, as related

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VI, I. --- Hendrickson, p. 604.

² The SSN, EIN, *etc.*, may not have all the features of the "mark of the beast" that are required by a face-value reading of the passage, especially regarding "right hand" and "forehead". But the fact that they fulfill the "buy or sell" clause means that at minimum, these IRS identifiers are very close precursors to said "mark".

³ Edwards, History, Period III, Part V. --- Hendrickson, pp. 597-601.

⁴ Edwards, **History**, Period III, Part VII, "The Success of the Redemption from the Present Time to the Fall of Antichrist". --- Hendrickson, p. 604.

in human histories. But henceforward we have *prophecy alone* to guide us. And here I ... shall insist only on those things which are more evident.¹

A huge amount of history has happened in the 254 years since Edwards' death in 1758. This history between his death and now can be used to update his **History**, as this theodicy has been doing already. But regarding the early 21st century forward, this theodicy faces the same limitation in authoritative sources that Edwards faced. So this theodicy must also rely on "*prophecy alone* to guide us". One advantage that this theodicy has over Edwards' eschatology is its recognition of the pertinence of biblical law. In spite of this and other major differences, one important point of agreement is that as long as the Messiah tarries, the "grand design" in the Bible indicates that Antichrist will fall, and Satan's visible kingdom on earth will be destroyed. It follows that as long as the Messiah tarries, those party to the **Messianic Covenant** are obligated by the covenant to put their thoughts, prayers, *etc.*, in the psychic field, and their speech and actions, in the physical field, into harmony with this "grand design".

Regarding the 254-year interim, Edwards did not foresee the creation of the "United States", along with all of its appending principles and events. This is expected because he did not recognize the **natural-rights** polity or the two-house doctrine as applicable. So it's understandable that he would not foresee these principles and events as important in biblical eschatology. Theologians since his day have generally had the same blind spot, probably because the visible Church has been under almost constant siege from "*corrupt opinions*" since his day. This blind spot manifests in a lack of understanding about how to put the Declaration, the Constitution, and **natural rights**, into a reliable biblical perspective.

Even though much-reviled deists may have been instrumental in crafting the organic documents of the "United States", these documents nevertheless represent a major advance in the implementation of biblical law in the physical field of perception and action. As indicated in the above description of the *metaconstitution*, the federal Constitution failed to escape slave farming. Nevertheless, when the Declaration and Constitution are regarded as a rationally integrated unit, the resulting *metaconstitution* is closer to a genuine **natural-rights** polity, to the complete exclusion of slave farming, than any set of governmental documents ever implemented in human history. They thereby pointed, and still point, to the complete elimination of slave farming from the face of the earth.

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VII. --- Hendrickson, p. 605.

Because slave farming is a defining characteristic of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, the fall of Satan's visible kingdom is equivalent to the elimination of slave farming as the dominant system on the planet. In keeping with the inverse proportionality indicated above, its fall is the rise of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity. Although Satan's visible kingdom on earth includes all slave farms, the fall of the Antichristian sector of Satan's visible kingdom is apparently the key to the overthrow of Satan's entire visible kingdom. --- Edwards makes a point of showing that this third "coming", with its "destruction of Antichrist ... Rev. vi. 10", could be both swift and "gradual".¹ It's reasonable to take this to mean that this "coming", "this great work of God", would be wrought "swiftly", but with recognizable gradations. He indicates that this great work will be

accomplished by *means*, by ... use of the ordinary means of grace. ... The Scriptures hold forth, that there should be several successive great and glorious events by which this glorious work should be accomplished.²

The alleged swiftness of these events is subject to the same caution regarding time frames indicated above. But the gradations can be verified in both Revelation and historical events since Edwards' death. Edwards proceeds to show the gradations in the "destruction of Antichrist" and the conquest of Satan's visible kingdom on earth.

Edwards indicates three things that will happen as precursors to the victory of Christ's kingdom on earth:

1. The Spirit of God shall be ... poured out for the ... *revival and propagation* of religion [(Christianity)]. ...

... [T]he gospel shall be preached to every tongue, and kindred, and nation, and people, before the fall of Antichrist ...

2. ... [W]hen the destruction of Antichrist is ready at hand, and Satan's kingdom begins to totter, the powers of the kingdom of darkness will rise up, and mightily exert themselves. ...

When the Spirit begins to be so gloriously poured forth, when the devil sees such multitudes flocking to Christ in one nation and another, when the foundations and pillars of his kingdom are ready to come to swift and sudden destruction, all hell will be greatly alarmed. ...

It seems, in this last great opposition, all the forces of Antichrist, and Mahometanism, and heathenism, will be united;

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VII, I. 2. --- Hendrickson, p. 605.

² Edwards, History, Period III, Part VII, I. 2. --- Hendrickson, p. 605.

all the forces of Satan's visible kingdom through the whole world of mankind. ...

We know not particularly in what manner this opposition shall be made. It is represented as a battle; it is called *the battle of the great day of God Almighty*. There will be some way or other a mighty struggle between Satan's kingdom and the church ...

3. Christ and his church shall in this battle obtain a complete and *entire victory* over their enemies. ... Rev. xix. 11, &c. ... *Armageddon* ... Satan ... now sees his antichristian, Mahometan, and heathenish kingdoms through the world, all tumbling down.¹

These three events, in at least their partial fulfillment, are undeniable precursors to the establishment of Christ's kingdom on earth. If Christ were to manifest in the physical field tomorrow, these things would probably be completely fulfilled in some way or another, and they would all be declared completely fulfilled. But the purpose of exploring Edwards' post-ascension eschatology is to show what the Bible indicates Christ's people should be doing while he tarries. So the assumption is that while he tarries, "all will not be accomplished at once, as by some great miracle". As long as he tarries, this eschatological Plan B indicates that "this work will be accomplished by *means*, by ... the use of the ordinary means of grace". So this theodicy needs to show how these three things will be accomplished, to whatever extent they will be accomplished, by ordinary means of grace, with an emphasis on the two-house doctrine and the **natural-rights** polity.

1. *Revival and propagation*: Christians who are deeply involved in missions are keenly aware that every tongue, kindred, nation, and people have not been reached. Edwards clearly indicates that this must be done before Satan's visible kingdom on earth is threatened. However, there is no emphatic indication in the Bible that the gospel must be preached to the ends of the earth before events two and three can happen. So it's not necessarily true that the great commission must be fulfilled before (ii)"*the battle*" and before (iii)"*victory*". --- Because the **Abrahamic Covenant** is biblical law, while these three events are presumed through interpretations of visions and prophecies, it's reasonable to claim that these visions and prophecies need to be interpreted within the context of the "great nation" and the "multitude of nations" terms of the **Abrahamic Covenant**. Before the "great nation" migrates into the New Jerusalem, the "multitude of nations" that are committed to the biblical covenants must coalesce into a single nation. Before such a "multitude of nations" can coalesce into a single nation, there must be some point of agreement

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VII, II. --- Hendrickson, pp. 605-606.

or set of terms that enables and facilitates that coalescing. The model for such terms is contained within the **Messianic Covenant**. The terms exist in two types that are distinguished by their subject matter. The two types of terms are jural and ecclesiastical. Even though all people who are committed to the biblical covenants may agree that Christ is King, they do not agree about how to implement the terms of the biblical covenants. This is evidenced by the fact that they exist as distinct nations, denominations, sects, etc. So for this transformation from a multitude of nations into a single nation to happen, it's necessary for this multitude of nations to go through a process of hashing out the terms of their relationships, and working from whatever historical backgrounds they may have, towards some set of agreements that transforms them into a single nation. This transformation of this "multitude" relates directly to two things that arise out of these two different kinds of laws. The two things are (i)the preaching of the gospel to the ends of the earth,¹ and (ii)implementation of the **natural-rights** polity. The preaching to the ends of the earth arises directly out of <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. The implementation of the **natural-rights** polity arises directly out of the **jural** terms of the **Messianic Covenant**. History shows that the implementation of these terms proceeds in largely parallel paths that are only marginally connected.

As indicated, the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms generally have priority over the jural terms. However, the jural terms have an intrinsically <u>global</u> in <u>personam</u> jurisdiction that is not inherent to the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms. Because jural terms are inherently <u>global</u>, it's reasonable to expect widespread agreement about the jural terms that is much more difficult to achieve for the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms. In fact, when one understands the <u>natural-rights</u> polity that grows naturally out of the <u>global Noachian Covenant</u>, it's clear that anyone who opposes the jural terms is inherently a slave farmer, or on the side of slave farming. It's also true that because people would generally rather be free than slaves, the human population of the earth could come to agreement about the jural terms without ever hearing the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms. --- This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the kingdom of Antichrist and Satan's visible kingdom on earth could be deeply threatened by the spread of the gospel long before every nation, tribe, and tongue hears the message. Although it's certain that preaching the gospel to the ends of the earth is crucial, it's not certain that it is a prerequisite to the destruction of Satan's visible kingdom on earth.

2. *The battle*: One extremely important reason to understand that the gospel being preached to the ends of the earth cannot be a prerequisite to "all the forces of Satan's visible kingdom" being "greatly alarmed", is this: Through the existence of myriad subtle technologies and political, economic, and military instruments,

¹ Matthew 28:18-20; Mark 16:14-18; Luke 24:45-47.

it's obvious that the forces of Satan's visible kingdom on earth are already "greatly alarmed". They are so alarmed that they are already implementing strategies that are capable of leading to the extinction of the human race.¹ Extinction of the human race is not God's plan, but it is certainly Satan's. Through international finance, "global governance", treaties conceived in hell, and Frankensteinian technologies, the entire human race is already well down this road to oblivion. This fact, emphatically, FACT, not "conspiracy theory", is concrete evidence that Satan's visible kingdom has already risen up in "mighty opposition" to the establishment of Christ's visible kingdom on earth. Edwards indicates that in the Bible, "this opposition ... is represented as a battle", and "it is called the battle of the great day of God Almighty". But he admits that he doesn't understand what shape this battle is to take. But anyone who is simultaneously committed to the terms of the Messianic Covenant, and to an objective and unbiased understanding of current events, knows that the battle is already going on. Through subtle technologies, health is being destroyed, reproductive capacities are being eliminated, brain power is being stifled, and people are being brainwashed, all on a massive scale. The mind-control technologies described above are an extremely minute (and in some respects out-dated) example of the kinds of technologies that are already being used against people worldwide. Through the *de facto* governments and the corporations that are their evil companions, i.e., through the military-industrial-agricultural-medical-educational-religiousbanking complex, apparently purposeless and fruitless wars continue for decades, and totalitarianism is spreading worldwide like an international cancer. Nominal Christians who sit in their pews claiming that Jesus will come save them from this disaster are violating their covenant with him by refusing to act in accordance with the terms of that covenant. --- This battle is already going on. But right now, it is not a battle. It's a massacre. Only when God's people wake up, and start fighting the forces of darkness that are presently winning, can this rightly be called a "battle".

3. *Entire victory*: God's people cannot win this victory if they do not go out to fight. If they do not study the terms of their covenant, understand the strategies, stratagems, and tactics of their enemy, and make meaningful attempts at cooperating with their covenant partners, then they will continue defaulting into cooperation with the slave-farming psychopaths who are killing them for fun and fortune. The visible Church in America is now under such control of slave-farm propagandists that almost the entire Church is standing down, and allowing Christ's Bride to be raped by satanic minions. --- Edwards rightly indicates that "Christ and his church

¹ Any capable adult who does not recognize this already is probably spending too much time exposing his/her self to slave-farming propaganda, and too little time genuinely seeking the truth.

shall ... obtain a complete and entire victory". But Edwards does not sufficiently identify the nature of the social superstructure that replaces the slave farm. In fact, the human race, Christians included, is generally so accustomed to slave farming that they are by default utterly ignorant about the alternative. They have no idea how to operate *lawfully* within a rigorously defined **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. They know even less about how to construct such a *natural-rights*-based social superstructure. So at their present state of ignorance, if they went into battle and won, Christians would generally default into replacing the old slave farm with a new slave farm. This is positively not what their King demands. This is probably the most serious indictment against Edwards' eschatology. It defaults into painting a post-victory social superstructure that looks too much like a whitewashed slave farm, and too little like a social superstructure the Davidic King would willingly rule. In other words, it looks too much like mere dominance and too little like a polity in which the Ruler would avoid breaking a "bruised reed" (Isaiah 42:3). The idea that such dominance is good enough has set itself like an opposite-complement in Hegelian dialectics against the passivity of the majority of the visible Church. It's as if there's some false dichotomy between premillennialism and dominion / reconstructionist theology. In fact, they're both wrong, but for different reasons. When it comes to this "victory", Edwards' eschatology falls naturally into this false dichotomy on the reconstructionist side.

The war that is even now being waged against the visible Church is first "spiritual", meaning that it's a psychic war. It is secondarily an information war, and the sorting and deciphering of monumental amounts of information is dependent largely upon the capacity to categorize. This means that meaningful categories and deciphering systems must exist as a prerequisite to properly processing the information. The distinction between a **natural-rights**-based social superstructure and a slave-farming social superstructure is absolutely crucial to this categorization process, and is therefore crucial to this information war. This war against the visible Church is tertiarily physical, but it is physical mostly by way of technology, techniques, and legal subtleties that are generally too subtle for ignorant, self-indulgent people to decipher. So as long as this sleeping giant stays asleep, Satan's slave farm will rage on towards its goal of dominating the planet. And the "Christian" giant will continue dying by increments, until it is utterly incapacitated. Or so the satanic plan goes.

The alternative to the satanic plan is for the visible Church to wake up, and seek truth as though its life depends upon it. Because it does. As long as the Messiah tarries, the Church will survive only by seeking the truth. This is because truth seeking is part of Christ's prime directive to his Church. He said, "you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (John 29:32). Does this mean that God's people can sit like vegetables in front of TV sets, or in front of slave-farmpropagandizing preachers, and absorb the truth? If that's what he meant, then why did he say that "the great commandment of the Law" is, "You shall love the Lord your God ... with all your mind" (Matthew 22:36-37)? Such love necessarily compels action that is not compatible with the slave-farming propagandist's zombification technologies. --- To explore this alternative to Satan's plan, it should help to look in more detail at Edwards' description of this victory over Satan's visible kingdom on earth.

III. Consequent on this victory, Satan's visible kingdom on earth shall be *destroyed*. ... Rev. xvi. 19, 20. ...

Concerning this overthrow of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, I would show wherein it will chiefly consist, with its extent and universality.

1. I would show wherein this overthrow of Satan's kingdom will chiefly consist ... without pretending to determine in what order they shall come to pass ...

(1.) *Heresies, infidelity,* and *superstition,* among those who have been brought up under the light of the gospel, will then be abolished ... Jer. xxxii. 39. ...

(2.) The kingdom of *Antichrist* shall be utterly overthrown. ... (Rev. xviii.) ... Rev. xvii. 16.

(3.) Satan's *Mahometan* kingdom shall be utterly overthrown. ...

(4.) Jewish infidelity shall then be overthrown. ...

(5.) Then shall also Satan's *heathenish* kingdom be overthrown.

2. Having thus shown wherein the overthrow of Satan's kingdom will consist, I come now to observe its *universal extent*. The visible kingdom of Satan shall be overthrown ... Haggai ii. 7. ... Isa. xi. 9. ... Isa. xlv. 22. ... Dan. vii. 27. ...

... [I]t is represented that he [(Satan)] shall be cast out of the earth ... and shut up in hell, Rev. xx. 1, 2, 3. ...

"... Now the time of travail of the woman clothed with the sun is at an end; now she hath brought forth her son: for this glorious setting up of the kingdom of Christ through the world, is what the church had been in travail for, with such terrible pangs, for so many ages: Isa. xxvi. 17. ... (See Isa. lx. 20. and lxi. 10, 11.) ... (as Isa. xlii. 10-12) ... Rev. xviii. 20. ... Isa. xliv. 23. ...

This dispensation ... puts an end to the former state of the world, and introduces the everlasting kingdom of Christ. Now Satan's visible kingdom shall be overthrown. ...¹

As indicated in the previous blockquote, Edwards believes that before this conquest of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, while the battle is still going on, all these satanic forces that he recognizes, meaning those of Antichrist, Islam, and "heathenism", will be "united". If this claim about the battle is true, then this truth should have some bearing on the outcome of the battle. --- Now into the 21st century, this battle has been going on for decades. One extremely significant difference between the battle as it has been unfolding over these decades, and the battle described by Edwards, is that what he believes to be Antichrist, the papacy, and what he considers to be the kingdom of Antichrist, Roman Catholicism, show very few signs of taking the leadership role on the satanic side of the battle. But if one believes Antichrist is those men of sin who control the slave-farming systems that sit atop Christendom, then it's obvious to those who study these systems that Antichrist is a cabal of international bankers, who have ceased having any significant allegiances to any traditional religions.² Generally, they worship power, and they have become experts at manipulating traditional religions into serving the purposes of the bankercontrolled slave farms. So they are experts at manipulating nominal Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and "heathenism" to serve their purposes. On the surface of things, these religions don't appear to be "united" or cooperating now any more than they did in Edwards' day. But the fact that the leadership of these religions are so easily manipulated by bankers, tax collectors, treaty enforcers, agents of the United Nations, etc., is evidence that there is a united cabal that is using these religions as puppets, similar to the way they use politicians as puppets. They are experts at using incentive systems to manipulate, and this is precisely how these slave farmers keep the slavery cloaked and the slave farm misidentified.

Edwards' list of things "wherein this overthrow of Satan's kingdom will chiefly consist" is certainly still relevant under present circumstances. So none of these items needs to be eliminated from the list. But each demands some commentary to show its status at this stage of *the battle*. Each really demands books to do the job properly. But here, a few short comments about each will need to suffice. But before starting such commentary, another disclaimer is needed: The imagery in the Bible in regard to these abolitions, overthrowings, and conquests is generally brutal. It is generally images of war. But this warfare is primarily psychic, not physical. It is primarily "spiritual warfare", and it's possible that such spiritual warfare might

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VII, III. --- Hendrickson, pp. 607-609.

² Unless one considers Satanism a traditional religion.

manifest in the physical field as warfare almost not at all. These facts make it necessary to define "overthrown" more carefully, so that martial imagery doesn't dominate the understanding.

Given that Edwards has neglected both the <u>natural-rights</u> polity and the twohouse doctrine, it's necessary to redefine "overthrown" so that it does not suffer from this neglect. --- For each of these sets of <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u> <u>social compacts</u>, the "kingdom of Antichrist", Islam, Judaism, and the "heathenish kingdoms", it must be admitted that it's possible for these groups of people to be converted with regard to the <u>natural-rights</u> polity, without being simultaneously converted to belief in the Messiah. It's possible for these groups to be converted in regard to <u>jural</u> terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> without being simultaneously converted with regard to <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms.

Because the overthrow of the Antichristian sector of Satan's present visible kingdom on earth is the key to overthrowing his entire earthly kingdom, it's reasonable to focus primarily on how Antichrist and Antichristianity are "overthrown", rather than on the other four items. So out of the five items "wherein this overthrow of Satan's kingdom will chiefly consist", the fact that the "kingdom of Antichrist shall be utterly overthrown" is pre-eminent. --- Implicit in Edwards' apparent definition of "overthrown" is the assumption that these enemy kingdoms will be "utterly overthrown". If Edwards explicitly included both **jural** and **ecclesiastical** terms in his conception of the Messianic Covenant, then it would be reasonable to conclude that Antichrist's legal system would be overthrown to whatever extent it opposes the **Messianic Covenant**'s **jural** and **ecclesiastical** laws. But there is no sign in his History that Edwards made this distinction between jural and ecclesiastical terms. So when he says "utterly overthrown", it's reasonable to assume that he means utterly wiped out, annihilated, totally crushed, etc. If this wipeout exists purely in the psychic field, then it appears that this wipeout would entail a mass conversion of people in Antichrist's kingdom into Christ's kingdom, so that they ceased serving Antichrist and switched allegiance to Christ. But Edwards doesn't limit the wipeout to the psychic field, and he thereby allows for the possibility for massive physical warfare between the servants of Antichrist and the servants of Christ. Physical warfare between these human beings means Genesis 9:6 bloodshed, and not merely warfare between angels and demons. Such shed blood demands definition of whether Christ's people are perpetrating *delicts* against the servants of Antichrist, or executing justice against the servants of Antichrist in response to the latters' perpetrations of damage against the innocent. Edwards does not enter into such distinctions, even though such distinctions are absolutely crucial. Genocide is not an option for parties to the Messianic Covenant. The shedding of blood as a product of following due process

of law, where law is defined strictly as the protection of **<u>natural rights</u>**, is certainly allowable to parties to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. But the perpetration of *delicts* is not, even if the victims of such *delicts* are servants of Antichrist. As indicated above, included within the definition of enforcement against *delicts* is necessarily a rational definition of "just war".

It should be obvious to the entire visible Church that if Christians want to speak openly about overthrowing anyone, it's necessary to clarify what that means, and it's necessary to accompany that clarification with a disclaimer indicating that Christianity forbids the perpetration of *delicts*, unlike Antichristianity, which is systematically perpetrating *delicts* against the people of historical Christendom. With such clarification, such disclaimers, and a genuine commitment to enforcing the jural terms of the Messianic Covenant, the visible Church of Jesus Christ might convert the vast majority of people presently serving Antichrist into belief in the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, even if they cannot convert them into serving Christ in everything. As long as Christ tarries, this is an important strategy in the overthrow of Antichrist's kingdom. Overthrowing Antichrist's kingdom via this strategy is an important approach to overthrowing the rest of Satan's visible kingdom on earth. Under present circumstances, and as Christ tarries, this strategy is the only viable road to establishing his kingdom on earth. This is an incremental and "gradual" approach to this "overthrow". This is an approach that explicitly repudiates the genocide option, and the eugenics option, the way these should have been systematically repudiated long before now. This strategy does not mean that the priorities of the Messianic Covenant have changed. The priorities established by Paul (Romans 13:1-7; Titus 3:8; etc.) are still the priorities of the Messianic **Covenant**. The difference is that it's no longer possible to ignore the fact that the Messianic Covenant includes jural terms. It's no longer possible to ignore the fact that the Messianic Covenant posits the natural-rights polity as an important, though secondary, aspect of the covenant. Insisting on excluding the jural terms both violates the covenant and threatens the health of the visible Church. It also defaults into collaboration with the Antichristian program that is aimed at the extermination of both the Church and the human race.

Out of these five items "wherein the overthrow of Satan's [visible] kingdom will chiefly consist", one especially needs closer examination, because it is a subset of the "kingdom of *Antichrist*" item. This is the item indicating that the victory over Satan's visible kingdom on earth will consist in part in the abolition of "*Heresies, infidelities,* and *superstition,* among those who have been brought up under the light of the gospel". Given the definitions of Antichrist and Antichrist's kingdom that are being posited by this theodicy, people prior to the defeat of Antichrist who are "brought up under

the light of the gospel" are also brought up within Antichrist's kingdom, because they are brought up on slave farms. They therefore have exposure to much of the same pollution that all people in Antichrist's kingdom suffer. Even if the **natural-rights** polity were nominally adopted tomorrow, it's extremely unlikely that all of these people suffering such pollution would cease manifesting its symptoms overnight. Even if perfectly *lawful* and reliable secular social compacts were established across the globe, and even if the jurisdictional boundaries defined by the natural-rights polity were honored perfectly, it might take centuries for all heresies, infidelity, and superstition to be eliminated. --- The fact that Edwards included the abolition of such things as part of his conception of the overthrow of Satan's kingdom, is a function of his neglect of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity and the two-house doctrine. The whole subject matter of the abolition of heresies, infidelity, and superstition is the subject matter jurisdiction of religious social compacts. It's not the subjectmatter jurisdiction of secular social compacts. The elimination of the kingdom of Antichrist, qua kingdom, depends almost entirely upon the lawful segregation of jural societies and ecclesiastical societies, along with the *lawful* segregation of <u>secular social compacts</u> and <u>religious social compacts</u>. The random mixing of these things, as appears inherently and by default in this passage from Edwards' History, is a sure sign of jurisdictional dysfunction. Jurisdictional dysfunction is a sure sign of vulnerability to slave farming, *i.e.*, systematic, government-sponsored perpetration of *delicts*.

CALL TO ACTION: The way to remedy this jurisdictional dysfunction that exists in every existing variety of Christian theology is for existing Christian religious social compacts to implement the natural-rights polity, starting in local congregations. Because *lawful* jural societies have no present existence in the physical field of perception and action, local congregations need desperately to form jural societies to augment their existing ecclesiastical societies. These Christian jural societies should be set up as auxiliaries to the existing ecclesiastical societies, not as competition to them or detraction from them. As jural societies, their primary function would be the prosecution of *delicts*. But because every *lawful* religious social compact necessarily has definite geographical, personal, and subject-matter jurisdictions, the local Christian jural society would be limited largely to the protection of the local church of Jesus Christ, especially against the myriad attacks from Antichrist. As things are presently proceeding, these attacks will increase in number and severity. Antichrist's aim is to destroy the visible Church, and then to destroy most of the rest of humanity.¹ Nominal Christians who knowingly collaborate

¹ In contrast, Satan's aim is to utterly destroy both, including Antichrist, after the latter's usefulness is spent.

with this aim are thereby declaring themselves infiltrators and collaborators. At present, most of the visible Church in America is swollen with collaborators, and the churches themselves are deeply polluted with such collaboration with Antichrist. But at present, much of this collaboration happens out of ignorance and a sense of impotence. At present, these hordes of "Christian" collaborators are not deliberately malevolent. They are merely following the example set for them by their nominally Christian leaders, who are almost universally slave-farm propagandists, by default. When this slave-farm propaganda coming out of the pulpits is understood to be combined with, and compounded by, slave-farm propaganda that is pervasive in the secular arena, the reason for the average Christian's ignorance and impotence is obvious. But the way out of this predicament is not so obvious. The way out is for the visible Church to implement the **natural-rights** polity within every local congregation, regardless of denomination or other sectarian allegiances. It's clear that in this world, as long as Christ tarries, ignorance, apathy, and impotence will not deliver Christians from physical harm any more than it delivers non-Christians. The subtle and sneaky *delicts* ("soft kills") perpetrated by Antichrist and his minions against the unwary and impotent within the visible Church will continue for as long as those within the visible Church refuse or neglect to lift a finger to stop them. This is precisely why Christian jural societies are now absolutely essential, and why the natural-rights polity must be implemented within local congregations.

When a local Christian congregation makes a unanimous commitment to follow the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity in addition to a renewed commitment to all its *lawful*, traditionally recognized <u>ecclesiastical</u> functions, the congregation makes a major step towards eliminating jurisdictional dysfunction from within the congregation. These are absolutely critical steps that every 21st-century Christian congregation must take. This is a major step towards being a genuinely healthy Christian **religious social compact**. --- One of the primary functions of this newly formed **jural society** is the identification of all the various ways the congregation is being damaged by outside forces. After such identification, the jural society needs to follow whatever due process mechanisms are appropriate to terminate the damage. Because the damage to every local congregation is huge and multifaceted at this time, this process of identification and termination is also huge and multifaceted. Because American churches usually have contracts with the slave farm that are inherently damaging, and inherently unlawful, such as with the IRS and other State and federal agencies, this identification process will often indict elders who have collaborated with the slave farm as primary suspects. Abundant grace should be a crucial aspect of the educational process, and witch hunts and reigns of terror should always be avoided. Even so, collaboration with slave farmers must end, and lawful social compacts must replace the *de facto* business as usual. Christian leaders

who discourage the recognition and protection of **<u>natural rights</u>** are inherently part of the slave farm's propaganda machinery. Because slave farmers hate vigilantes, because they are seen as uppity slaves, such intransigent "Christian" leaders will also vehemently oppose the formation of **<u>jural societies</u>**.

With it understood that this call to action is primarily a call for the establishment of Christian <u>religious social compacts</u> that are not <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional</u>, it should also be understood that this is secondarily a call to form and transform <u>secular social compacts</u>. All the *de facto* governments in the *united States* are <u>jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts</u>. They all need a radical overhaul to make them *de jure*. They must either be transformed or abolished. Which it is, should be determined locally on a case-by-case basis, with the goal of eliminating all slave farming and replacing it with the <u>natural-rights</u> polity. To make such determinations, it may be necessary to form a *de jure* <u>secular social compact</u> for each *de facto* <u>secular social compact</u>, so that the *de jure* operates in parallel with the *de facto*, and competes explicitly or implicitly with the slave-farming system. This process of driving the <u>jurisdictional dysfunction</u> out of existing <u>secular social compacts</u> is far more challenging than doing the same with an existing <u>religious</u> <u>social compact</u>. For a small taste of such difficulty, this theodicy will now return to the test case of Minnesota's 600 licenses.

The State of Minnesota proudly proclaims on one of its websites that another of its websites provides "licensing information on nearly 600 licenses, administered by over 45 state agencies in Minnesota".¹ For all intents and purposes, all these 45+ State agencies are **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**. This is because they all violate the strict distinction between **jural** and **ecclesiastical** functions. They do this by way of the fact that not just Minnesota, but all the States, are built on false premises. The false premises are, (i)the State is pluralistic, meaning that it is designed to govern any and all religions, and is therefore **secular**; (ii)the State operates on the principle that *lawful* government is by the consent of the governed, which implies that all *lawful* government is based on the existence of the government's **social compact**. These are not false premises because there is anything inherently wrong with these principles. They are false premises because the State claims to operate by these principles on one hand, and absolutely does not operate by them on the other.² All the States are thereby schizophrenic. The fact that Minnesota doesn't operate by

¹ The list of "State Agencies, Boards, Commissions" is on the internet at, URL: http://mn.gov/portal/government/state/agencies-boards-commissions/. --- The licenses by Minnesota State agencies are listed on the internet at, URL: http://mn.gov/elicense/.

² In all States, the principles are generally claimed via organic documents, and are generally repudiated in statutes and case law.

these principles is why, generally, all of these 600 licenses, and the agencies that issue them, are *unlawful*.

Each of these 45+ State agencies has goals that would be admirable if such goals were pursued *lawfully*. All enforcement of **human law** needs to be either *ex contractu* or ex delicto. If it's not one or the other, it's a sure bet that the human law being enforced is a tyrant's malum prohibitum, or a do-gooder's bad legislation, or both. --- A license is permission from the State to do something that is illegal without such license. None of the things licensed by these 600 licenses is a *delict*. They are things like driver's licenses, gambling licenses, landscaping licenses, dairy-plant licenses, and catering permits. If the State were not claiming to be a secular social compact that governs all kinds of people, on one hand, and inherently violating government by consent, on the other, then these might be worthy goals to pursue, given also that the goals were pursued through genuinely free-market processes, and not via the State. But the State pursues these things by first making something illegal. Given that all the people within the **geographical jurisdiction** of the State of Minnesota have not given, and do not give, their consent to making these 600 things illegal, these 600 mala prohibita that make these 600 things illegal are inherently violating government by consent. So if someone does one of these 600 things without the prescribed license, and the State treats this malum-prohibitum violator as a criminal, then the State is perpetrating a *delict* against this person. That makes the State the perpetrator, not this person. This situation applies across the board to every single one of these 600 licenses, and it applies to every State in the united States, because all States operate with the same conflation of secular and religious social **compacts**. In fact, to be *lawful*, and to follow the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, every State must strictly observe the distinction between *delicts* and contracts, between actions ex delicto and ex contractu, between jural compacts and ecclesiastical compacts, and between secular social compacts and religious social compacts. At present, every State is ignoring these distinctions, and is therefore a slave farm. Because Minnesota, and every State, is inherently pluralistic, there is no hope at present for the State to operate *lawfully* as a *religious social compact*.

Given unanimous consent within a **religious social compact**, these 600 *mala prohibita* that are the foundation for licensure could be perfectly *lawful* within the **jurisdiction** of such **religious social compact**. But given that every State is inherently pluralistic, none of these 600 prohibitions is *lawful*, and their existence in the Minnesota statutes is evidence that Minnesota is a slave farm. The sad fact is that modern statutes and administrative rules are clogged with crimes that are not against Genesis 9:6 damage even in the most imaginative bureaucratic mind. In biblically prescribed **global human law**, damages need to be proximate, and

they must be real, because if they are not proximate and real, the **human law** will probably be misapplied, in which case whoever misapplies it will be guilty of a *delict*. There needs to be a causal connection between the damage and the cause of the damage that is generally "beyond a reasonable doubt". In fact, these "crimes" are not criminal because they are *delicts*, and they do not arise *ex contractu*. So these "laws" are more like rules imposed by organized crime than they are real crimes. The *de facto* government is the *de facto* criminal. This is the state of things in 21st-century America. America is now at a crossroads. One road goes deeper into bondage to this organized crime syndicate. The other road is a road to freedom from it. And this is precisely where Christian **religious social compacts** can take a leading role on the road to freedom, and away from slave farming.

Probably none of these 600 *mala prohibita* is an inherently Christian issue. But if the visible Church is to take a leadership role in defeating Antichrist, as it should, then it is critical that in the process of becoming a *lawful* religious social compact, every local congregation act as an organizational focal point for this radical revamping of the State. This means that not only should every *lawful* religious social compact consider how to replace the State's *unlawful negative laws*, such as these 600 *mala prohibita*. Each *lawful* religious social compact should also consider how to replace the State's *unlawful negative laws*, such as these 600 *mala prohibita*. Each *lawful positive laws*. For example, the *de facto* States are each involved in public education, food assistance programs, health care, and numerous welfare programs, each of which is *ultra vires*. These are almost universally programs that usurp functions that were in local Christian communities during the early years of the *united States*, where statist do-gooders actively worked for many decades to migrate these functions away from the local church, converting them into State-controlled programs. To defeat Antichrist, this migration must be reversed.

Any <u>social compact</u> that claims to guarantee free exercise of religion to everyone within its <u>geographical jurisdiction</u> is inherently claiming to be a <u>secular social</u> <u>compact</u>. That's the case with both the *united States* Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. The sad thing about both of these *de facto* governments is that they are both essentially claiming to be <u>secular social compacts</u> out of one side of their mouths, and to be <u>religious social compacts</u> out of the other side of their mouths. They have both become confused and despotic.

Lawful government is built on consent. Most of the things that governments do these days are not consensual. Most of the things the governments do these days are built on misrepresentation. They misrepresent the nature of a policy, program, or law, and once they get people into their system, they treat people like they consented to everything. Whenever the government demands that people conform

to something to which they have not consented, the government is making demands of a *strawman*. The slave farm expects people to stand as surety for the *strawman*. People can opt out. Of course there's a price for opting out. Each person needs to do cost-benefit analysis, and to act according to his/her own conscience. People need to keep in mind that if the slave farm is perpetrating **bloodshed** by way of its demands, standing as surety for the *strawman* might make one an accomplice.

Historically, when a society has lacked consensual, contractual mechanisms for getting things done, the government has stepped in to fill this vacuum with force. At this particular point in time, not only Americans, and not only the visible Church, but also the entire human race is at a crossroads. If people continue allowing *de facto* government to fill the vacuum, it will lead to dark ages like this world has never seen before. This is because this is a global, scientific dictatorship like nothing that ever existed. The alternative is for ordinary people to understand what it takes to build *de jure* government, and to do it, starting with *lawful* **religious social compacts**.

Governments that are formed in a *lawful* manner are formed through <u>social</u> <u>compacts</u> and consent. <u>Social compacts</u> that are formed in a *lawful* manner are composed of a clearly defined <u>jural compact</u> and a clearly defined <u>ecclesiastical</u> <u>compact</u>. In a <u>social compact</u> that is formed in a *lawful* manner, and that continues to operate in a *lawful* manner, there will not be a confusion of the <u>jural</u> and the <u>ecclesiastical jurisdictions</u>. The massive confusion of these two <u>jurisdictions</u>, in the current social superstructure, is evidenced by all the laws against non-consensual *mala prohibita*, against things that the government says are criminal simply because the government says they're criminal, not because there is a *delict* or a broken contract, and they're evidenced also by the collection of non-consensual taxes as described above. Tyrannies in general don't bother to distinguish between these two jurisdictions, and to confine themselves to these two jurisdictions. Slave farming thrives almost entirely on the mass confusion about, and neglect of, these two jurisdictions.

In a nutshell, these changes to *de facto* religious and secular social compacts to make them *de jure*, is this theodicy's call to action. As long as the Messiah tarries, this call to action is crucial to establishing his kingdom on earth, and to disestablishing *HaSatan*'s visible slave-farming system. More immediately, it is crucial to defeating the kingdom of Antichrist. Such a mass action by the visible Church could destroy Antichrist's kingdom on earth. Even so, there's no doubt that this is no small undertaking. But many hands make light work. The alternative to such an action cannot be acceptable to any of God's covenant-keeping people. But even if the visible Church of Jesus Christ enters into such a mass action, and is successful, this doesn't mean that "*[h]eresies, infidelity*, and *superstition*" would be

immediately eliminated from "among those who have been brought up under the light of the gospel". Such personal changes to massive numbers of God's people might take centuries after Antichrist's kingdom is destroyed. But that doesn't mean that the other three items on Edwards' list of things "wherein this overthrow of Satan's kingdom will chiefly consist" will also take centuries. The "overthrow" of "(3.) Satan's *Mahometan* kingdom", "(4.) *Jewish infidelity*", and "(5.) ... Satan's *heathenish* kingdom", *qua* kingdoms, or at least as slave-farming superstructures, could follow very closely after the overthrow of the kingdom of Antichrist.

"(3.)": Regarding Islam, there's no doubt that some Muslims are bitter and angry against so-called "Western" nations and people, probably with some justification. According to Edwards, "Satan's Mahometan kingdom" is utterly committed to making war against the visible Church. Although Antichrist, meaning the cabal of slave farmers who act as puppet masters over historical Christendom, certainly want their gullible "Christian" serfs to believe that Muslims are just so inimical, the facts may be far more complex and far less threatening. There's no doubt that there are threatening passages in the Quran. On the other hand, for centuries Antichrist has played the geopolitical game of, "Let's you and him fight". By encouraging warfare, Antichrist makes money in the arms trade, destabilizes countries so that they can be exploited, and depopulates the earth. By remaining cloaked behind fractionalreserve banking and fiat money, *i.e.*, behind fraud, Antichrist has prospered through several centuries of imperialism, through two world wars, and through massive global democide. In recent decades Antichrist has pitted historic Islam and historic Christendom against one another. There's no doubt that these two religions are historical enemies. But historically, the "Christian" side of this conflict has been dominated by people who are ignorant about the Christian Bible and Christian theology, and who are too naive to avoid collaboration with slave farmers. Regarding natural-rights polity and the two-house doctrine, this includes Jonathan Edwards. By correcting these two defects in Edwards' theology, the "overthrow" of the "Mahometan kingdom" might look very different from the default vision of scorchedearth warfare.

There's no doubt that the *Quran* calls for *jihad* against "people of the Book", meaning Jews and Christians. But it's also clear that *jihad* can be understood to be psychic warfare as well as physical warfare. Because Islam is a belief system that is monotheistic, extremely **jurisdictionally dysfunctional**, and inherently prone to slave farming, it is a belief system with an array of assets and liabilities that lend themselves naturally to a very specific kind of Christian ministry. The kind of Christian ministry that this kind of belief system needs is a Christian ministry that includes the **natural-rights** polity. When the **natural-rights** polity is widely

accepted within the *united States*, and Antichrist is defeated throughout historic Christendom, Islamic countries and Islamic people will go out of their way to seek what Christendom will then have to offer. This ministry of **jural** terms of the **Messianic Covenant** will then open up opportunities for ministry of **ecclesiastical** terms. Under such circumstances, this "overthrow" of the "*Mahometan* kingdom" would look very different in the physical field from the default psychic scorched earth. In fact, this "overthrow" could be almost entirely educational, rather than martial.

"(4.)": Regarding "Jewish infidelity", Edwards has this much more to say:

Nothing is more certainly foretold than this national conversion of the Jews, in Rom. xi. ... The prophecies of Hosea especially seem to hold this forth, that in the future glorious times of the church, both Judah and Ephraim, or Judah and the ten tribes, shall be brought in together, and shall be united as one people, as they formerly were under David and Solomon; (Hos. i. 11, &c.)--Though we do not know the time in which this conversion of Israel will come to pass; yet thus much we may determine by Scripture, that it will be before the glory of the Gentile part of the church shall be fully accomplished; because it is said, that their coming in shall be life from the dead to the Gentiles, (Rom. xi. 12, 15.)¹

Like Islam, rabbinical Judaism is monotheistic, extremely jurisdictionally dysfunctional, and inherently prone to slave farming. These things may be true for completely different reasons and in completely different ways, but they are nevertheless true for both Islam and rabbinical Judaism. Because of this, a Christian ministry that includes the <u>natural-rights</u> polity is far more likely to work than a ministry that includes exclusively <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms. When Antichrist is defeated throughout historical Christendom, Israel and the Jewish people in general will go out of their way to seek what Christendom will then have to offer. This ministry of jural terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> will then open up opportunities for the ministry of <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms. But it's far more likely that there will be a genuine rebirth of Trinitarian Messianic Judaism with very little need for missions from historic Christendom.² Through this mass recognition of the importance of the <u>natural-rights</u> polity in the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, the two-house doctrine will thereby make a major advance towards its ultimate fulfillment.

¹ Edwards, **History**, Period III, Part VII, III. --- Hendrickson, p. 607.

² This is because of the widespread rebirth of Messianic Judaism that started largely in the 1960s.

"(5.)": Regarding "Satan's heathenish kingdom", it's clear that by "heathenish", Edwards is referring to all the remaining clans and nations in all the remaining lands of the earth. Under the Mosaic Covenant, syncretism with such cultures was absolutely banned. Under the Messianic Covenant, the ban on idolatry is as strong as ever, but the ban on syncretism is not. This is because it's implicit that all idolatry is the perversion of **natural law**, while healthy syncretism is a process of eliminating the perversion of **<u>natural law</u>**. This kind of ministry, the ministry of correcting the perverse perception and use of the **natural law**, is essentially an ecclesiastical function of the visible Church. This kind of ministry has been going on since even before Constantine. However, throughout all these centuries, forces of Antichrist have deliberately kept such perversions in operation. Antichrist has done this because such perversion is essential to the slave-farming propaganda. The pervasiveness of the perversion has manifested historically in nominally Christian missions that combine the pure heart of the gospel with demonic and imperialistic exploitation. Most of the world has now been negatively impacted by these polluted missions. Given that Antichrist exploits and perverts practically everything he touches, and that he has exploited and perverted practically every Christian mission field on earth to a huge extent, most people in these "heathenish" parts of the earth will probably be very glad to be rid of the slave farms that now oppress them, and the forces of Antichrist that have polluted their countries, and these polluted missions. On the other hand, the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity is not a top-down system. It's a bottom-up system. So a top-down insurgency against tyrannical regimes in the "developing" world is not a legitimate function of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity. The natural-rights polity relies on individual initiative throughout, and any attempt at a top-down implementation of it would simply be more perversion. Even so, Christian missions definitely need to include the teaching of the jural terms of the Messianic **Covenant** in their ministries, along with the teaching of the normal **<u>ecclesiastical</u>** terms. They also need to conscientiously eliminate collaboration with slave farming. The teaching of the **jural** terms is equivalent to teaching the entire **natural-rights** polity. Through such teaching, Satan's visible kingdom on earth can be defeated even in former Marxist nations, fascist nations, and among the most exploited and destitute aboriginal tribes. The "overthrow" of Antichrist will exponentially speed this "overthrow" process in the so-called "heathenish kingdom".

It should be clear that if the destruction of Satan's visible kingdom on earth happens by way of physical warfare, it will happen primarily in the conflict between the forces of Antichrist and those forces within Christendom that side with the **natural-rights** polity. This physical warfare will not happen primarily in conflicts with Islam, Judaism, or other systems. It will happen because the adoption of the **natural-rights** polity by the visible Church will be cognized by Antichrist as the

beginning of an open slave revolt. Even so, as long as Christ postpones his physical appearance, and as long as Christ's people are actively building his kingdom, he will certainly come in the form of the Holy Spirit, and he will certainly lead his people to victory in both psychic and physical warfare against Antichrist.

Sub-Chapter 4: The "Church ... in a State of Peace and Prosperity"

According to Edwards' interpretation, after Antichrist is defeated and Satan's visible kingdom on earth has been destroyed, and the 3rd "coming" has been thereby completed, the visible Church and the earth in general will enter into a time of great peace and prosperity. Although Edwards cites numerous Bible passages to establish his belief in this millennial state of peace and prosperity, the focus is primarily on Revelation 20:1-10. According to this passage, at the end of the 3rd coming, when Satan's visible kingdom on earth is destroyed, Satan is "bound for a thousand years" (v. 2) and thrown "into the abyss ... so that he should not deceive the nations any longer, until the thousand years were completed" (v. 3). It's important to notice that Satan is bound for a very specific purpose, "so that he should not deceive the nations any longer". It does not say, "so that he should not deceive individual people any longer". It's silly to think that all sin on earth is eliminated during this thousand-year period, because all sin cannot be eliminated until entry into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. To properly interpret this passage, it's also important to understand that what Edwards says is "a State of Peace and Prosperity" is probably not as peaceful, prosperous, and perfect as he suggests. This is because immediately after the defeat of Satan's visible kingdom, the world in general has still not been convinced of the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. At that particular time, the world in general will have adopted the **jural** terms, but the adoption of the ecclesiastical terms may take some time longer. So even though Satan is no longer generally able to deceive nations, qua nations (i.e., as **<u>natural-rights</u>** confederations), into practicing slave farming, individual humans have certainly not escaped Satan's influence entirely. This theodicy and Edwards agree that in this "millennium", the Genesis 3 curse on humanity is partially lifted, but that it will not be entirely lifted until after the final judgment. Even given this agreement, Edwards' understanding of the "millennium" is somewhat different, mostly in emphasis:

IN order to describe this part, I would speak, *first*, of the prosperous state of the church through the greatest part of this period; and, *secondarily*, of the great apostacy there shall be towards the close of it.

I. I would speak of the *prosperous state* of the church through the greater part of this period. And in the general I would observe two things,

1. That this is most properly the time of the kingdom of *heaven upon earth*. ...

2. Now is the principal fulfillment of all the prophecies of the Old Testament which speak of the glorious times of the gospel in the latter days. Though there has been a glorious fulfillment of those prophecies already, in the times of the apostles, and of Constantine; yet the expressions are too high to suit any other time entirely, but that which is to succeed the fall of Antichrist. This is most properly the glorious day of the gospel. Other times are only forerunners and preparatory to this: those were the seed-time, but this is the harvest. ...

(1.) It will be a time of great light and *knowledge*.... Zech. xiv.6, 7. ... Isa. xx iv. 23. ...

... Isa. xxv. 7. ... Isa. xxxii. 3, 4. ... Jer. xxxi. 34. ...

... So great shall be the increase of knowledge in this time, that heaven shall be as it were opened to the church of God on earth.

(2.) It shall be a time of great *holiness*. Now vital religion shall every where prevail and reign. Religion shall not be an empty profession, as it now mostly is ... [N]ow holiness shall become general: Isa. lx. 21. ... Isa. lxv. 20. ... Zech. xii. 8. ... Isa. xxiii. 18. ... Zech. xiv. 20, 21. ...

(3.) ... It shall be a time wherein *religion* shall in every respect be *uppermost* in the world. It shall be had in great esteem and honour. The saints have hitherto for the most part been kept under, and wicked men have governed. But now they will be uppermost. ... Dan vii. 27. ... Rev. v. 10. ... Rev. xx. 4. ... Isa. xlix. 23. ... Isa. lx. 16. ... Psal. xlv. 12. ...

(4.) Those will be times of *great peace and love*. ... Isa. ii. 4. ... Psal. xlvi. 9. ... Zech. ix. 10. ... Isa. xxxii. 18. ... Zech. viii. 10, 11.)

... Isa. xi. 6-10. ... Mal. iv. 6. ...

Then shall all the world be united in one amiable society. ... Isa. lx. 5-9 ... Isa. xxxii. 5. ...

(5.) It will be a time of *excellent order* in the church of Christ. ... Psal. cxxii. 3. ...

(6.) The church of God shall then be *beautiful and glorious* on these accounts ... Isa. lx. 1. ... Isa. lxi. 10. ...

Sub-Chapter 4, The "Church . . . in a State of Peace and Prosperity"

(7.) That will be a time of the greatest *temporal prosperity*. ...
Zech. viii. 4. ... Zech. viii. 5. ... Isa. lxv. 21. ... Mic. iv. 4. ...
Zech. vii. 12. ... Jer. xxxi. 12, 13. and Amos ix. 13. ... Jer. xxxii.
9. ...

(8.) It will also be a time of great rejoicing: Isa. xxxv. 10. ... Chap. lv. 12. ... Chap lxvi. 11. ... Chap xii. 3. ... Rev. xix. 7. ... Ver. 9. ...

The Scriptures every where represent this prosperity to be of long continuance. ... Rev. xx. 4. ... Isa. lx. 15. ... This may suffice as to the prosperous state of the church through the greater part of the period from the destruction of Satan's visible kingdom in the world to Christ's appearing in the clouds of heaven to judgment.¹

Throughout the history of Christianity, the visible Church has emphasized the ecclesiastical terms of the Messianic Covenant to the almost complete exclusion of the jural terms. The jural terms have been implemented in a largely parallel and disconnected sphere, *i.e.*, in the courts of slave farms, while the **ecclesiastical** terms have been implemented within the visible Church. So the slave farm has largely obscured the jural terms. When Antichrist and slave farming are defeated, it will be because the jural terms come out of obscurity, and are implemented globally. But in the process of being broadly implemented, the jural terms might have the appearance of eclipsing the ecclesiastical terms, especially among non-Christians. This fact may make this "millennium" appear slightly less bright than Edwards paints it. Although everything Edwards says in this blockquote is on target and reliable, the fact that Satan's visible kingdom on earth is destroyed before the human race in general consents to being party to the Messianic Covenant means that alongside this bright description, there will be the normal strain of pain, suffering, depravity, and darkness. This dark side supplies a partial explanation for why this period ends with "the great apostacy". Because the only polity befitting Christ's kingdom is a **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, in opposition to the historically pervasive slavefarming polity, and because this "millennium" is the period in which the natural**rights** polity is the generally accepted polity, it's appropriate to claim that "this is most properly the time of the kingdom of heaven upon earth". Compared to all previous Christian history, this "millennium" will certainly be "the glorious day of the gospel". Compared to all previous human history, this "millennium" will be "a time of great light and knowledge", "a time of great holiness", "a time wherein religion shall ... be uppermost", a time "of great peace and love", "a time of excellent order in the church", a time when the "church of God shall ... be beautiful and glorious",

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VIII, I. --- Hendrickson, pp. 609-611.

"a time of the greatest temporal *prosperity*", and "a time of great rejoicing". So it's certainly appropriate to see this as the time of the "fulfillment of all the prophecies of the Old Testament". But compared to the New Jerusalem ecological niche, this "millennium" is not as beatific, and even utopian, as Edwards portrays. If it were, then why would it be followed by the "*great apostacy*"? Although Edwards describes the apostasy well, the reasons he gives for it are short on explanatory power:

II. I now come to speak of the *great apostacy* ... And this I shall do under three particulars.

1. A little before the end of the world, a *great part of the world* shall fall away from Christ and his church. It is said, Rev. xx. 3. that Satan should be cast into the bottomless pit, and shut up, and have a seal set upon him, that he should deceive the nations no more *till the thousand years should be fulfilled*; and that afterward he must be loosed out of his prison for a little season. Accordingly we are told, (ver. 7, 8.) that when the thousand years are expired, Satan shall be loosed out of his prison, and go forth to deceive the nations, ... Gog and Magog. This intimates, that the apostacy would be very general. ... Rev. xx. 8 ... the number of them is as the sand of the sea ...

Thus after a happy and glorious season, ... Satan shall begin to set up his dominion again in the world ... And the church of Christ, instead of extending to the utmost bounds of the world, as it did before, shall be reduced to narrow limits. ... Luke xvii. 26, &c.

2. Those apostates shall make *great opposition* to the church of God. ... However, there is nothing in the prophecy which seems to hold forth, that the church had actually fallen into their hands, as it had fallen into the hands of Antichrist ... God will never suffer this to take place after the fall of Antichrist ...

3. Now the state of things will seem most remarkably to call for Christ's immediate appearance to *judgment*. ...

Again, the circumstances of the church at that day will also eminently call for the immediate appearing of Christ ... Christ shall appear ... in the glory of his Father with all his holy angels. And then will come the time when all the elect shall be gathered in. That work of conversion has been carried on from the beginning of the church after the fall through all those ages, shall be carried on no more. There never shall another soul be converted. ... And the mystical body of Christ ... will be complete as to the number of parts, having every one of its members. In this respect, the work of redemption will now be finished. $\ldots^{\scriptscriptstyle 1}$

Although there is nothing inherently wrong in this portrayal of the "great apostacy", the emphasis is a bit skewed. --- It's obvious that people can be converted to belief in the **natural-rights** polity without belief in the **ecclesiastical** terms of the **Messianic Covenant**. Because the **natural-rights** polity is based on the *motive clause*, that all people are created in the image of God, it's possible for people to claim allegiance to the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity where such allegiance is based on mere lip service. In other words, they don't really believe in God, in the sense of vowing allegiance to him, so they don't really believe in the *imago Dei* in other people. So they believe in the **natural-rights** polity out of some limited pragmatism, some quasi-commitment. If it serves their self-glorifying purposes, then they like the **natural-rights** polity. Otherwise, they don't. Under such circumstances, even though Edwards' description of the "millennium" is true, it's also true that there is an undercurrent of defiance against God that exists during this millennium. After a period of peace, prosperity, and holiness for the visible Church, the undercurrent eventually becomes strong enough and defiant enough for Satan to rise out of the abyss to challenge Christ's kingdom a final time. From the perspective of the **<u>natural-rights</u>** polity, this is the basis of the "great apostacy".

After the "overthrow" of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, the subsequent "millennium", assuming Christ tarries, will be a time in which the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> become more and more accepted. Among non-Jews, this means that more and more of the human race will commit themselves to the triune God, and to the terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. This means that the population of Ephraim will expand throughout this period. This means that the "fullness of the Gentiles" will be increasing throughout this period, thereby solidifying the fulfillment of the "multitude of nations" term of the <u>Abrahamic Covenant</u>. So throughout this "millennium", the increase in the number of individual people joining Ephraim will incrementally satisfy this term. Something similar will happen in regards to Judah.

After the defeat of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, which will include the defeat of slave farming among rabbinical Jews, such Jewish people will be increasingly attracted to the truth of the <u>ecclesiastical</u> terms of the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>. So they will increasingly repudiate the errors of rabbinical Judaism, and accept the truth of Trinitarian Messianic Judaism. This will lead throughout this period to an increasing reunification of Ephraim and Judah, as described by Ezekiel:

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part VIII, II. --- Hendrickson, p. 611.

The word of the LORD came again to me saying, "And you, son of man, take for yourself one stick and write on it, 'For Judah and for the sons of Israel, his companions'; then take another stick and write on it, 'For Joseph, the stick of Ephraim and all the house of Israel, his companions.' Then join them for yourself one to another into one stick, that they may become one in your hand. And when the sons of your people speak to you saying, 'Will you not declare to us what you mean by these?' say to them, 'Thus says the Lord GOD, "Behold, I will take the stick of Joseph, which is in the hand of Ephraim, and the tribes of Israel, his companions; and I will put them with it, with the stick of Judah, and make them one stick, and they will be one in My hand."' And the sticks on which you write will be in your hand before their eyes. And say to them, 'Thus says the Lord GOD, "Behold, I will take the sons of Israel from among the nations where they have gone, and I will gather them from every side and bring them into their own land; and I will make them one nation in the land, on the mountains of Israel; and one king will be king for all of them; and they will no longer be two nations, and they will no longer be divided into two kingdoms.""" (Ezekiel 37:15-22)

There are numerous other passages in the *Tanakh* that remove any doubt that reunification of Ephraim and Judah is a crucial part of God's plan for redeeming humanity.¹ This reunification is the fulfillment of the two-house doctrine. This is a crucial part of the "fulfillment of all the prophecies of the Old Testament". With this final fulfillment of the two-house doctrine, the two houses will in fact be united into a single "great nation". But this final unification will not happen until after the "great apostacy", assuming Messiah tarries still.

During this "millennium", there will be a gradual coalescence of all the numerous **religious social compacts** by way of the **secular social compacts** to which they all agree. This coalescence will be the coalescence of a "multitude of nations" towards a single nation. It will be the coalescence of a multitude of **religious social compacts** under the umbrellas of unifying **secular social compacts**, and it will be the coalescence of numerous **secular social compacts**, and it will be the coalescence of numerous **secular social compacts**. After "the *great apostacy*", the confederacy will metamorphose into a single "great nation", a single **religious social compact**. But this single **religious social compact** will not be Judah. During the

¹ See also Jeremiah 3:18-19; 31:6-21, 27-28, 35-37; Ezekiel 47:13-23; Hosea 1:11; Zechariah 4:1-3,11-14; 9:11-16; 10:6-10; 11:7,9-14; Isaiah 2:1-4; 11:12-13; 14:1-7; 27:6; 60:18-22; 61:1-7; 62:1-9; 65:16-25.

"millennium", Judah will be simply one **religious social compact** among numerous religious social compacts, where all adhere to the natural-rights polity and to their individualized understanding of the ecclesiastical terms of the Messianic **Covenant**. The final opposition to Christ's plan of redemption will arise out of some kind of impasse in the negotiation of terms for the single, global religious social compact. Assuming Christ tarries until then, he will return then to resolve the impasse, and to do the other things that the Bible clearly indicates he will do. Christ will return in his incarnate state to resolve the dispute, to execute judgment against the apostates, to mediate the resurrection of the dead, to mediate the final judgment, and to do whatever else prophecy indicates he will do. These claims are based more on biblical visions than on biblical law. So the nature of this "apostacy", and of these other events, is highly speculative. There is such a dearth of authoritative sources that it's difficult to say, based on biblical law and biblical prophecy, much more about the nature of this "great apostacy" and these future events, than has already been extrapolated. However, changes in the scientific enterprise after the defeat of Satan's visible kingdom on earth, could help to explain it further.

During this "*battle*" that Antichrist is now waging against the visible Church in the early 21st century, the slave farm dominates the scientific enterprise. The research agenda is biased through funding. So the biases of Antichristian slave farmers who are in control of the central banking system skew research and technology development. So research and development projects generally cater to the interests of slave farmers. A paucity of current research is geared to the interests of the visible Church. When Antichrist is defeated, this will necessarily change. But will it change so that there is no research, and the scientific enterprise is dead? Or will it change so that research is aimed at satisfying the interests of the visible Church? Or will research be geared to something else entirely? After the kingdom of Antichrist is defeated, and after Satan's visible kingdom on earth is eradicated, what will be the status of the scientific enterprise? If it still exists, then will the visible Church have any say in steering it? If so, what say will it have, and what interests will it have?

The scientific enterprise falls naturally in the Christian domain under the rubric of stewardship. In Genesis 1, God told the newly created humans to "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it" (v. 28). Then God put the people into the garden of Eden with instructions to cultivate and keep it. This ordination of human stewardship is reiterated in the **Noachian Covenant** (vv. 9:1-2,7). The scientific enterprise is thereby understood to be a basic outgrowth of the biblical covenants. The visible Church therefore has an inherent interest in science. Any claim to the contrary is therefore inherently anti-biblical. But these claims by themselves do little to retrieve that enterprise from its present status as a tool of slave farmers.

After suffering several centuries of lies foisted on humanity by slave-farm propagandists, in the name of "science", it's reasonable for the visible Church to evaluate what, from this enterprise, is genuine, and what is flimflam. The best way to do this is for the visible Church to have its own agenda on this front, and to have this agenda grow out of its ordination to good stewardship. Improvements in transportation, communication, data processing, housing, nutrition, medicine, *etc.*, all fall within this rubric of stewardship, as long as they don't violate **natural rights**. But improvements in eugenics, "transhumanism", and first-strike warfare do not fall within this rubric, because they are inherent violations of **natural rights**. In fact, every dollar taken by force from a tax payer, for any reason, is theft and violates **natural rights**. This is especially true of dollars taken for the sake of funding any kind of research that is not clearly **jural**. The same is true of every dollar created through fractional-reserve banking and fiat-money creation, especially if it funds Antichrist's research agenda. As long as slave farmers control science, they will use it to destroy the visible Church and to exterminate humanity.

Given that this war between Antichrist and the visible Church is already going on, and given that, in keeping with this biblical eschatology, the visible Church is destined to destroy Antichrist, the Antichristian scientific agenda will also be destroyed. Then, within Christendom, science will be returned to its role as an enterprise that pursues truth and good stewardship. But there is nothing inherently controversial about building better cars, washing machines, computers, and other such devices. So such mundane technologies don't really have any direct bearing on the existence of this "great apostacy". But the science that is the basis for this theodicy's claims about standing waves absolutely does bear on this "great apostacy".

As indicated above, God SPOKE the universe into existence (John 1:1-3). Speaking and words exist in essentially two different but related states. The spoken word is sound, and sound is transmitted by waves of vibrating air. Words that are thought probably have an electromagnetic and chemical counterpart in the brain, and thought waves, including thought words, have a radiative quality, which means that they exist as waves of electromagnetic radiation. If the name of an entity resonates with the named entity's standing-wave frequency, then whoever knows the name potentially has power to manipulate the named entity through a resonance effect. This is because every physical entity is a standing wave, as posited above. These facts relate intimately to this transformation of the scientific agenda, and to the "*great apostacy*", through the transformation of human language.

Because God spoke things into existence, there was necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between what God named and the actual things, objects, entities that his naming created. God's naming had generative power because of consistency

between the name and the form generated by his speaking the name. When Adam named creatures (Genesis 2:19), his naming did not have the same generative power. Nevertheless, because Adam was created in God's image and was not at that time fallen, it's reasonable to assume that there was much more harmony between name and form in Adam's language than there was in human languages after God confused them (Genesis 11:7,9). If humanity is indeed advancing towards the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, meaning towards a perpetual psychic standing wave that is formed by way of the agreement of fully formed miniature sovereigns, then it's necessary that they have a language befitting this psychic standing wave.

It should be clear that this "millennium" has the potential to be the Tower of Babel redux. To go into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, it's necessary for those people who are genuinely going there to have a language that is conducive to the perpetual existence of this psychic standing wave. This can be thought of largely as a reversal of the process that the people on the plain of Shinar went through. But a reversal of that process would not be adequate, even if it led to the same language that Adam and Eve spoke. This is because the garden ecological niche is not the same as the New-Jerusalem ecological niche. The language of the New-Jerusalem ecological niche must be one in which there is a huge degree of harmony between name and form, even if it is not the same one-to-one correspondence that God has, evidenced in creation. It must be a language that is conducive to a fully coherent, perpetual psychic standing wave. Like the people on the plain of Shinar, the people of the "millennium" will in effect be trying to form a fully coherent psychic standing wave. Probably, the "apostates" who foment this "great apostacy" will make the same mistake that the Tower of Babel people made. They will neglect a crucial component in their aggregate standing wave, specifically, God. They will be suckers for group think. This is largely a failure in priorities, where the winning priorities put God and **<u>natural law</u>** ahead of group think. It is only by the sovereign grace of God that this perpetual psychic standing wave will be formed. It's certain that pursuit of this standing wave, and pursuit of the language necessary to it, are essential aspects of good stewardship. Even so, fallen humanity has a deeply entrenched problem with idolatry that can pollute even the worthiest goals. The Tower of Babel episode still stands as a warning against humanity attempting to develop social programs, organizations, language, or scientific investigations, that glorify humans to the exclusion of God. Group think doesn't work. But humanity is so prone to it that it will probably raise its ugly head at the end of the "millennium", being the motive force behind the last apostasy.

Given the dearth of authoritative sources, this theodicy will say little or nothing more about "the *great apostacy*", other than that as long as Messiah tarries, Christians

should count it as something that will happen. Given that Messiah tarries until then, this apostasy will trigger his 4th "coming", and the final judgment.

Sub-Chapter 5: The 4th "Coming"

The Bible is clear that before God's people enter the New Jerusalem, and after the "great apostacy", there are certain things which must take place. Before citing these things, a momentary review is in order, to keep things in perspective. It should be remembered that since the fall, human beings are disabled from keeping the **natural** law with the perfection that is necessary for eternal standing-wave coherence. This is largely a cognitive problem, being built into human cognition by way of prenatal bailment contracts. Because of this disability, all humans deserve eternal standingwave disintegration. But through the covenant of redemption, God has made a way for at least a subset of the human race to be redeemed. This redemption exists in two important kinds: (i) the kind by which those who die in Christ (1 Thessalonians 4:16) are delivered from the default separation from God at their death, and (ii)the kind by which both those who died in Christ and those alive in Christ are delivered into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche after the final judgment. The first kind is the primary concern of the field of soteriology, which is addressed below, in the section on soteriology, annihilationism, and hell. The second kind will be addressed in this section on the 4th "coming".

Before citing those events that biblical prophecy claims will take place at Christ's second coming, which is the same as what Edwards calls Christ's 4th "coming", it's crucial to keep the events in the context of wave physics. To understand these events between "the *great apostacy*" and entry into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, it should help to extrapolate from wave physics some concept or theory about how the New Jerusalem could operate as a perpetual standing wave. Such a theory necessarily focuses on how the glorified people in the New Jerusalem operate on a moment-to-moment basis. A reasonable starting place for such a theory is with the only perpetual organismic standing wave yet known to exist on planet earth, the Messiah himself.

To develop this theory, there are several basic assumptions that are necessary. The most basic assumption is that God exists. Second is that God has orchestrated the development of this perpetual standing wave that the New-Jerusalem ecological niche will be. Third is that only those elect by God to be there will be there. This means that no one who is prone to missing the **natural-law** mark is allowed in. This means that the people who are allowed in are prone to being perpetual organismic

standing waves, and are NOT prone to damping, incoherence, or other causes of wave disintegration. This also means that in their communications, there is no propensity to miss the mark, or any hint at violation of **<u>natural law</u>**, or any temptation to it. This means that the language used in the New Jerusalem has a consistency between name and form that is conducive to harmonious relationships and communications. This means that built into the language is the agreements necessary to form and perpetuate the New-Jerusalem societal standing wave.

Because the New Jerusalem is so alien to fallen creatures, it's important to consider the acts of the only known perpetual organismic standing wave as a starting place for understanding the New Jerusalem. When Christ was physically alive on earth during the first incarnation, he performed numerous acts that were perfectly normal for him, but that were perceived as "miracles" by the fallen creatures by whom he was surrounded. In addition to healing countless kinds of diseases, deformities, and defects, Christ also turned water into wine,¹ filled fishermen's nets with fish,² raised the dead,³ reattached the ear of a man whose ear was cut off,⁴ stilled tempests,⁵ fed multitudes of people with food created by inexplicable means,⁶ walked on water,⁷ had his friend collect tax money from a fish's mouth,⁸ was visibly glorified in the transfiguration,⁹ and was resurrected from the dead.¹⁰ It's certain that each of these events, including the healings, would not have occurred if Christ had not lived in complete harmony with **natural law**. Because one of the defining characteristics of the New-Jerusalem ecological niche is that each inhabitant will live in complete harmony with **<u>natural law</u>**, it's reasonable to assume that each inhabitant will have the same capacity to perform the same kind of unusual phenomena. But that doesn't mean that they actually will perform such phenomena. They might not, simply because they don't have the same kind of ministry to fallen creatures. In fact, once they enter the New Jerusalem, they might never see another fallen creature again. So even though they will have the same capacity to perform similar feats, they

- 7 Matthew 14:22-33; Mark 6:45-52; John 6:16-21.
- 8 Matthew 17:24-27.
- 9 Matthew 17:2-9; Mark 9:2-10; Luke 9:29-36.
- 10 Matthew 28:1-20; Mark 16:1-8; Luke 24:1-53; John 20:1-21:25.

¹ John 2:1-11.

² Like 5:1-11; John 21:6.

³ Luke 7:11-16; Matthew 9:18,19,23-26; Mark 5:22-24,35-43; Luke 8:41,42,49-56; John 11:1-46.

⁴ Luke 22:49-51.

⁵ Matthew 8:23-27; 14:32; Mark 4:35-41; Luke 8:22-25.

⁶ Matthew 14:15-21; 15:32-39; Mark 8:1-9; Luke 9:12-17; John 6:5-14.

might never do so, but they might perform other feats so extraordinary that they are unimaginable to fallen creatures. The fact that Christ lived in perfect harmony with the **<u>natural law</u>** is certainly something that they will have in common with him, and this commonality offers a glimpse into how the New Jerusalem might function.

Assuming that from the organism's endogenous perspective, the core problem in humanity's fallen condition is cognitive, the way to shift from a propensity to miss the **<u>natural-law</u>** mark to a propensity to never miss the <u>**natural-law**</u> mark is to go through some kind of major change in cognitive processes. In the fallen condition, the human's capacity for processing input is somehow dysfunctional. In the fallen condition, humans are unable to activate their innate potential to process inputs in a way that makes the human remain perpetually obedient to <u>**natural**</u> <u>**law**</u>. In addition to stirring this innate capacity out of dormancy, it's also necessary for the fallen human to shift from using a language that has a major discrepancy between name and form built into it, to using a language with a much diminished discrepancy between name and form, a language that Christ probably knew and used in speaking to the Father and in causing such extraordinary phenomena.

Like the humans in the garden ecological niche, the humans in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche must necessarily sustain their status as permanent standing waves by making choices that don't encourage the onset of endogenous damping and incohesiveness. So their actions, and the choices that give rise to those actions, cannot miss the **natural-law** mark, or at least cannot be so far off the mark that they cannot be easily mitigated. So they must process information in such a way as to facilitate the making of good decisions and good choices. So to sustain themselves as perpetual standing waves, they must know what they need to know when they need to know it; so that they choose what they need to choose when they need to choose it; so that they do what they need to do when they need to do it; where need is defined in terms of sustaining themselves as perpetual standing waves. No human, whether fallen or not, is omniscient because only God is omniscient. So to sustain themselves as standing waves, they must know what they need to know when they need to know it. They must be able to perceive objective, exogenous reality clearly and accurately. It's certain that Christ was perceiving reality in just such a manner when he performed these unusual feats. These people also need to be able to perceive subjective, endogenous reality clearly and accurately, meaning that they need to have a degree of self-understanding, meaning that they need to have a degree of understanding about how to match internal desires to external objects. The degree of this understanding must be high enough to eliminate the dangers of endogenous damping and incohesiveness. According to a correspondence theory of

perception, for every object existing externally, there must be some kind of internal, endogenous representation of that external object for the sake of elimination / mitigation of damping and incohesiveness that could arise out of misperceiving the external object.

The people who God allows into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche have in common with all people, in that niche or not, that they have a finite set of options. In every ecological niche, every organism within the given niche has some limited range of choices, and is preoccupied with acting out those choices. This is true for every living organism, regardless of ecological niche, because every living creature is localized in space and time, and therefore occupies some ecological niche. The difference between humans and other organisms is that humans have a capacity for standing wave permanence that other organisms don't have. The difference is not that some organisms make choices and other don't. All organisms make choices. But the range of choices varies from species to species and from ecological niche to ecological niche. The difference between humans and other organisms is also not that humans are rational while other organisms are not. Fallen humans are marked by irrationality via their fallenness. They're not completely irrational but they're not completely rational either. Fallen humans share this part-rational characteristic with non-human organisms. But non-fallen humans completely bypass the irrationality. Non-fallen humans probably also have a more refined definition of rationality than any fallen human's definition.

When Adam and Eve ate from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they acquired a range of choices that was different from the range they had before eating. Likewise, after the final judgment, when people enter the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, these newly glorified people will have a different set of choices from the set of choices available to non-glorified people in the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. Even though these newly glorified people operate in complete harmony with the natural law, they might not have the option of working the kinds of "miracles" that Jesus worked. That's not because such people would not be capable of it. It's because those feats were choices available to the only perfect human being who then inhabited the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. The people in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche will no longer be in the out-of-the-garden niche. The range of choices is different in each of humanity's three ecological niches, and a given choice in one might not be available in another. For example, the option of missing the natural-law mark will not be available in the New-Jerusalem niche because the only people allowed into that niche are people who cannot see any pleasure or point in missing the mark. One of the characteristics the garden niche and the out-ofthe-garden niche have in common is that in each, people mis-perceive pleasure in

missing the mark. The inhabitants of the New-Jerusalem niche will see absolutely no pleasure in it, and will therefore not entertain violation of the **<u>natural law</u>** as an option.

Carrying the symbolism of the garden ecological niche forward into describing the New Jerusalem niche, as the book of Revelation clearly does, both the tree of knowledge of good and evil and the tree of life will probably be available in the New Jerusalem niche. Revelation clearly indicates that the tree of life will be there (Revelation 22:2,14), but the status of the tree of knowledge of good and evil is not as obvious. The fact that God, in Genesis 3:22, indicates that the garden people had "become like one of Us, knowing good and evil", implies that from then forward, humanity would be like God to the extent that they would also know good and evil. From the fall until entry into the New Jerusalem, they would NOT be like God in God's always choosing the good. If they always chose the good, then they would have retained access to the tree of life, because the good is defined as obedience to the **<u>natural law</u>**, which is life-sustaining, while disobedience to the <u>natural law</u> is the source of death. So even if the New Jerusalem people don't have access to the tree of knowledge of good and evil, they will certainly have access to its fruit, "knowing good and evil". So there are few if any reasons to believe that the people will not have access to the tree of knowledge of good and evil in the New Jerusalem. That access symbolizes that their range of choices in the New Jerusalem is the entire range of the **natural law**.

In the analogy described in Part I, the people in the New-Jerusalem ecological niche will have both hardware and software that are conducive to permanentstanding-wave status. Unlike people in the two previous niches, they will also have fully developed software. Such software will operate so that no matter what kind of input may come to the people, their endogenous processing of such input will yield choices that never miss the mark.¹ --- Unlike all other creatures, humans were created in God's image, and were therefore created to be fully functional miniature sovereigns. As fully functional miniature sovereigns, they are localized in space and time, and they are therefore not omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent. But they know what they need to know when they need to know it; choose what they need to do it; where need is defined as the necessity of being undamped, cohesive (and in this case, largely coherent) organismic standing waves forever. Miniature sovereigns are therefore utterly benevolent within their local space and time.

¹ It's reasonable to assume that the development of such software will be the primary focus of scientific research during the "millennium".

The New Jerusalem being a city, its population of miniature sovereigns, who each never violates **<u>natural law</u>**, create a collective, societal standing wave through their interactions. This societal standing wave is exogenous to any given individual miniature sovereign. It's reasonable to assume that this societal standing wave and this city are synonymous. Given that God SPOKE creation into existence, and given that language is a defining characteristic of human nature, it's reasonable to assume that this perpetual societal standing wave is composed of the superposed thought waves of the city's inhabitants, where these thought waves are aided in their coherence by use of a language that is conducive to such coherence. Each inhabitant will be by definition a friend of God. Each inhabitant will also be by definition a friend to every other inhabitant. The language used will facilitate the satisfaction of individual, community, and city-wide desires. --- Pain will still exist because pain is a necessary feature of the choice-making process. When "evil" is defined as one end of a continuum of choices, where the other end is "good", pain is the feeling associated with the "evil" end. So pain is necessary to the choice-making process, and both pain and this special kind of "evil" will necessarily exist in the New Jerusalem, as surely as "knowledge of good and evil" will exist there. Pain is important and useful, both now and in the New Jerusalem, because pain communicates important information into the endogenous information-processing center. So pain is crucial to the whole process of choosing, and so is "evil" when it's defined as one end of a continuum between good and evil. But this is not true of "evil" that's associated with suffering.

Suffering is pain that continues even after pain's message has been properly delivered to the endogenous processing center. It continues to exist because the organism doesn't respond in a manner that holistically alleviates the pain. Such unalleviated pain is suffering, and such suffering exists when knowledge about the cause of pain, and capacity to alleviate the pain, do not cooperate to alleviate the pain. Such suffering will not exist in the New Jerusalem. Such suffering is "evil" in this alternative sense of that word. This kind of evil is not merely the opposite of good. It is also a defining characteristic of the out-of-the-garden ecological niche. This kind of evil is pervasive in the out-of-the-garden niche. Both suffering and this particular kind of evil will not exist in the New Jerusalem. Because all who enter the New Jerusalem are friends, all these friends will recognize both their own pains and their friends' pains. These friends will use the language of high harmony between name and form to satisfy the desires of friends, themselves, and God. This will yield holiness, glory, and societal coherence. In this way, the whole city's "beatific vision" of God is perpetuated forever.

Because of their interdependence, it makes sense that only people who are mature miniature sovereigns would be allowed into the New Jerusalem. By definition of miniature sovereignty, these people would have a range of choices that encompasses the entire purview of the **natural law**. But in this ecological niche, they would be utterly obedient to all three legs of the **natural law**, even while their range of choices covered the full range of good and evil. As fully-functioning miniature sovereigns, these people gladly take full responsibility for their actions, and never blame God for anything, and never presume to sit in judgment of God, ever.

In the early 21st century, the evidence is overwhelming that thoughts exist as mental signal waves that are carried by physical electromagnetic carrier waves. So subjective experiences of the mind are carried as signal waves on extremely weak electromagnetic carrier waves. So all the rules that subtend the superposition principle apply as much to mental phenomena as they do to physical waves. There is no good reason to believe these facts have no pertinence in the New Jerusalem. Given that these claims are true, it follows that there is shared ground between the superposition principle and human agreements.

Given that a thought is a wave, an agreement between two people is composed of the superposed thought waves of those two people. Likewise, given that a thought is a wave, an agreement shared by an entire city of people is composed of the superposed thought waves of every person in the city. So every miniature sovereign in the New Jerusalem will be in electromagnetically-interfering standing waves with every other miniature sovereign in the New Jerusalem, with regard to the subject matter of every thought of every miniature sovereign. This thought matrix is essentially the same thing as the New-Jerusalem ecological niche, and God is the enforcer of the **natural** law that governs this city, and there is no need for human law. --- In the case of a single organismic standing wave, coherence between all three legs of the **<u>natural law</u>** is an absolute prerequisite to this organismic standing wave's perpetual existence. But God did not create humans to be solitary standing waves. The same absolute prerequisite for standing-wave permanence that exists for the organism also exists for the New Jerusalem's societal standing wave. For the New Jerusalem's mental standing wave to be genuinely perpetual, every miniature sovereign's standing wave must also be genuinely perpetual, where all are in complete obedience regarding the full range of choices available under the natural law. --- When two people agree about something, and when their agreement is affirmed by **<u>natural law</u>**, their agreement about the given subject matter superposes into a coherent standing wave, thereby contributing to the overall coherence of each organismic standing wave. When a whole city of miniature sovereigns agrees about something, and when their agreement is affirmed by **<u>natural law</u>**, their agreement about the given subject

matter superposes into a coherent standing wave, thereby contributing to the overall coherence of each organismic standing wave.

With this post-"great apostacy" period properly couched within the wavephysics storyline, it's possible to proceed with a description of the eschatological events between the "great apostacy" and entry into the New Jerusalem. --- Assuming that Christ tarries until then, after the "great apostacy" he will return in his second incarnation. This time, he will not be born of a virgin, but "will appear in the glory of his Father, with all his holy angels, coming in the clouds of heaven".¹ Many people understand this second incarnation as Christ's coming as "conquering king". There is some biblical evidence to support this understanding, and this understanding may even be appropriate in this theodicy, as long as it's clearly understood that Christ has no intention of ever being the king of a slave farm. Given that modern exegetes have no frame of reference for understanding a king as anything other than the ruler of a slave farm, their understanding of his appearance as "conquering king" is inherently skewed. Nevertheless, as long as this disclaimer is established in advance, Jonathan Edwards can be taken at his word, as giving a reliable description of Christ's second physical appearance:

> And now all the inhabitants that ever shall have been upon the face of the earth, shall all appear upon earth at once. ... Now also all the enemies of the church in all the ages shall appear again. ...

> And at the same time that the dead are raised, the living shall be changed. The bodies of the wicked who shall then be living, shall be so changed as to fit them for eternal torment; and the bodies of all the living saints shall be changed to be like unto Christ's glorious body, 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, 53. ...

> ... [A]ll the elect shall now be actually redeemed both in soul and body. Before this, the work of redemption, as to its actual success, was but incomplete; for only the *souls* of the redeemed were actually saved and glorified, excepting in some few instances: but now all the *bodies* of the saints shall be saved and glorified together; all the elect shall be glorified in the whole man, the soul, and body in union. ...

III. Now shall the saints be caught up in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, and all wicked men and devils shall be arraigned before the judgment-seat. ... 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17. ...

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part IX. --- Hendrickson, p. 612.

IV. ... Those saints ... shall now appear clothed with the glorious robe of Christ's righteousness. ... Now God will bring forth their righteousness as the light ...

V. The sentence shall be pronounced on the righteous and the wicked. $^{\scriptscriptstyle 1}$

It's important to notice that all dead humans will appear for the final judgment. This includes both those who are doomed to perdition and those who are destined for the New Jerusalem. The mechanisms by which this resurrection happens will be covered in the next section, on soteriology, annihilationism, and hell. Here it's assumed that as long as the Messiah has tarried until what Edwards calls the 4th "coming", all the dead will be resurrected, both the blessed and those fit for "eternal torment". The damned will be outfitted for their eternal destination in hell, as described in the next section. On the other hand, every saint, both those who died in Christ and those alive on earth at Christ's return, will be glorified, and will receive their resurrection bodies in preparation for entry into the New Jerusalem. It's reasonable to assume that all these saints will also receive their resurrection language at this time. --- As Edwards indicates, until this moment of glorification, God's elect have had their souls redeemed, but not their bodies.

Now shall be the most perfect fulfillment of Gen. iii. 15. "It shall bruise thy head."

VIII. At the same time, all the church shall enter with Christ, their glorious Lord, into the highest heavens, and there shall enter on the state of their highest and eternal blessedness and glory. ... [T]he whole church shall enter, with their glorious Head, and all the holy angels attending, in joyful manner, into the eternal paradise of God ... Here Christ will bring them, and present them in glory to his Father, saying, "... I have brought them all together into one glorious society ..." And then the Father will accept them ...

Now shall be the marriage of the Lamb in the most perfect sense. The commencement of the glorious times of the church on earth, after the fall of Antichrist, is represented as the marriage of the Lamb; but after this we read of another marriage of the Lamb, at the close of the day of judgment.--And the beloved disciple had given an account of the day of judgment, (Rev. xx. xxi.) he gives an account, that he saw the holy city, the new Jerusalem, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. ...

... [T]hey shall then begin an everlasting wedding day. ... 21st and 22nd chapters of Revelation.

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part IX. --- Hendrickson, pp. 612-614.

And now the whole work of redemption is finished. Now the top-stone of the building is laid. In the progress of our discourse, we have followed the church of God in all her great changes, all her tossings to and fro, all her storms and tempests through the many ages of the world. We have seen her enter the harbour, and landed in the highest heavens, in complete and eternal glory. We have gone through the several ages of time, as the providence and word of God have led us. We have seen all the church's enemies fixed in endless misery, and have seen the church presented in her perfect redemption before her Father in heaven, there to enjoy this most unspeakable and inconceivable glory and blessedness; and there we leave her to enjoy this glory throughout the never-ending ages of eternity.

... Now shall all the promises made to Christ by God the Father before the foundation of the world, the promises of the covenant of redemption, be fully accomplished. ...

... 1 Cor. xv. 24. ... Luke 1. 33. ... Dan. vii. 14. ...¹

And so this theodicy, and its wave-physics storyline, agree with Edwards about this "inconceivable glory and blessedness", about this termination of the work of redemption, and about this fulfillment of the Genesis 3:15 prophecy and "all the promises made to Christ by God".

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part IX. --- Hendrickson, pp. 614-615.

Chapter B: Soteriology, Annihilationism, & Hell

As Edwards rightly indicates, the salvation offered by God prior to the ultimate redemption in the New Jerusalem is salvation of the soul, but not of the body.¹ Body, mind, soul, and spirit are all saved at entry into the New Jerusalem, with glorification as fully formed miniature sovereigns. Given that all humans who ever lived are to be resurrected for the final judgment, there is a huge question pertaining to how this preservation from death to resurrection is effected. How are these souls preserved during this so-called "intermediate state"? How does the preservation of both the blessed and the damned from the time of their respective deaths until the final judgment happen? How are these people preserved from their respective deaths until their respective resurrections for final disposition? This problem of preserving the soul from death until final disposition is generally understood to be a soteriological problem. Another problem is, what do their final dispositions look like? It should be clear enough by now what the final disposition for those destined for the New Jerusalem will look like. But what about those destined for destruction? Will their final disposition be mere annihilation, just like any other sub-human organismic standing wave? Or will their disposition be "eternal torment", as Edwards claims? This is generally understood to be the problem of annihilationism. --- This second and final chapter of this third and final part of this theodicy has two sub-chapters. The first sub-chapter will address these questions generally within the context of the field of soteriology. The second sub-chapter will focus specifically on "eternal torment", annihilationism, and hell.

Sub-Chapter 1: Soteriology

The fact that God bestowed common grace on the human race at the time of the fall has made common grace something that has reigned over the human race ever since.² It's a safe assumption that this resurrection of all the dead before the final judgment is God's final act of common grace. It's also a safe assumption that each of these souls is preserved from the time of physical death until the final judgment under the auspices of God's common grace. But common grace is not saving grace, even though it may preserve all the dead from the time of their death to the time of their resurrection for final judgment.

¹ Edwards, History, Period III, Part IX, II. --- Hendrickson, p. 613.

² Regarding common grace, see Grudem, pp. 657-658.

PART III, CHAPTER B, SOTERIOLOGY, ANNIHILATIONISM, & HELL

Because Reformed Bible-exposition as it pertains to soteriology conforms closely to the Bible, this theodicy generally adheres to the *ordo salutis* (order of salvation) expounded by Reformed theologians. Reformed Christianity posits the following as the biblical order of salvation:

"The Order of Salvation"

- 1. Election (God's choice of people to be saved)
- 2. The gospel call (proclaiming the message of the gospel)
- 3. Regeneration (being born again)
- 4. Conversion (faith and repentance)
- 5. Justification (right legal standing)
- 6. Adoption (membership in God's family)
- 7. Sanctification (right conduct of life)
- 8. Perseverance (remaining a Christian)
- 9. Death (going to be with the Lord)
- 10. Glorification (receiving a resurrected body)¹

(1) God's first act in the salvation of any human being establishes that God is sovereign over the given human's life. "Election is an act of God before creation in which he chooses some people to be saved, not on account of any foreseen merit in them, but only because of his sovereign good pleasure."2 To understand that election and predestination are crucial features of biblical soteriology, it's important to actually read and understand the biblical passages relevant to these doctrines. But because this theodicy is not a soteriology, it will not enter into attempting to prove the Reformed position on these biblical doctrines. The following citations should suffice to prove that God ordains (predestines) to eternal life in the New Jerusalem only a select subset of the human race, and not all humans: Acts 13:48; Romans 8:28-30; 9:11-13; 11:7; Ephesians 1:4-6,12; 1 Thessalonians 1:4-5; 2 Thessalonians 2:13; 1 Peter 1:1; 2:9. --- If some number less than the whole number of human beings is elect for eternal life in the New Jerusalem, then the rest of this whole number are NOT elect. Some people may call this "double predestination", but this is generally not an appropriate characterization of the doctrine of election, as will be seen shortly. --- Election is God's sovereign choice, and because it is purely God's choice, it is unconditional. This is why participation in the Messianic Covenant is by precognitive consent that manifests as cognitive consent. In other words, election to genuine participation in the Messianic Covenant is via pre-cognitive consent that yields a voluntary, volitional, and utterly non-coerced choice to participate. In

¹ Grudem, p. 670.

² Grudem, p. 670.

contrast, participation in the **global covenant** is by pre-cognitive consent that might yield cognitive consent and might not. But participation in the **global covenant** is a function of common grace, while participation in the **Messianic Covenant** is a function of saving grace. Although this theodicy will say little if anything more about the doctrine of election, because it's necessary to show that the wave-physics storyline supports the Reformed *ordo salutis*, it's necessary to say more about reprobation.

In Wayne Grudem's words, "*Reprobation is the sovereign decision of God before creation to pass over some persons, in sorrow deciding not to save them, and to punish them for their sins, and thereby to manifest his justice.*"¹ Here are a few citations that prove that the Bible teaches reprobation: Jude 4; Romans 9:17-22; 11:7; 1 Peter 2:8. The reason "double predestination" is an inappropriate moniker for the doctrines of election, predestination, and reprobation appears in this quote:

[R]eprobation is viewed as something that brings God sorrow, not delight (see Ezek. 33:11), and the blame for the condemnation of sinners is always put on the people or angels who rebel, never on God himself (see John 3:18-19; 5:40). So in the presentation of Scripture the cause of election lies in God, and the cause of reprobation lies in the sinner. Another important difference is that the ground of election is God's grace, whereas the ground of reprobation is God's justice. Therefore "double predestination" is not a helpful or accurate phrase, because it neglects these differences between election and reprobation.²

It may be true that some people are predestined to eternal blessings, while other people are predestined to eternal reprobation. Nevertheless, Grudem makes a good point by insisting that the respective grounds for these things are different, and that this difference in grounds should not be neglected. A similar point needs to be made about this theodicy's claim that the souls of both the elect and the reprobate are preserved between physical death and final judgment under the auspices of common grace. It's true that the entire human race was preserved through the covenant of grace, and that common grace thereby blankets the entire human race, from the time of the fall until the end of the final judgment. So it's true that both the elect and the reprobate are preserved between death and final judgment under the auspices of common grace, but such a claim is not very discriminating. In fact, the covenant of grace was a postponement of justice, and the final justice appears in the final judgment. But at the final judgment, the elect are found not guilty, while the reprobate are found guilty. Furthermore, after death, the elect are preserved by

¹ Grudem, p. 685.

² Grudem, p. 686.

way of a special extension of God's grace into saving grace, while the reprobate are preserved through the ordinary mechanisms of common grace. --- Human sorrow over the existence of reprobate friends and family is a huge problem for any theodicy. The same is true about God's sorrow about the reprobate. Both human and divine sorrow over this issue will be addressed as this exposition of conclusions about the Genesis 3:15 prophecy proceeds.

(2) The next event in the *ordo salutis* is the gospel call. In Romans 8, Paul says, And we know that God causes all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose. For whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren; and whom He predestined, these He also called; and whom He called, these He also justified; and whom He justified, these He also glorified. (Romans 8:28-30)

Major events in the *ordo salutis* are mentioned here: election ("predestined"), gospel call ("called"), justification ("justified"), and glorification ("glorified"). Although all ten events are not mentioned in this passage, the passage clearly establishes that there is an order to salvation, and it makes sense that after election, the next event in the process would be "calling".¹ This call is essentially God's call to his elect to participate in the Messianic blood covenant. As such, it is a call to which the living elect always eventually respond in the affirmative. But this affirmative response is also a function of both how clear, cogent, and manifest the gospel call is, on one hand, and how receptive the hearer is, on the other. The gospel call has always been going forth, ever since the covenant of grace was promulgated. This is evident in what Paul says in Romans 1:18-21.² Even before any of the local covenants was cut, there were people sensitive enough and receptive enough to hear the call and to respond affirmatively to it. Evidence that this is true appears in Hebrews 11, where Abel, Enoch, and Noah are each listed among the elect. On the other hand, now, after the **Messianic Covenant** has been cut and the gospel has been proclaimed far and wide with substantial power and clarity, there are numerous people too dull

¹ The fact that death is mentioned in the *ordo salutis*, while physical birth is not, may be troublesome to some people. It's probably excluded only because it's so obvious that it's not very edifying to include birth. Nevertheless, birth should be assumed to exist as an important event between election and calling.

² Paul may be speaking in this passage of general revelation, but the fact that Abel, Enoch, and Noah responded as they did indicates that there must have been some element of special revelation that they perceived as an external call, and that instigated an internal call within them.

and unresponsive to heed the calling. There are clearly two kinds of gospel calls, one internal and one external. When the elect are confronted with the external call, at some point in their life it ignites an internal call, which is too compelling for them to ignore. On the other hand, the reprobate hear the external call from birth until death, and it never ignites a genuine internal call in them. Even so, the more manifest and cogent the external call, the more likely the internal call will be ignited.¹

(3) The third major event in the *ordo salutis* is regeneration. "*Regeneration is a secret act of God in which he imports new spiritual life to us.* This is sometimes called 'being born again' (using the language of John 3:3-8)."² For this event in the *ordo salutis* to be properly explained here, the wave-physics storyline must manifest again. --- As argued above, all the mental activity of the human race -- especially the contracts, laws, beliefs, commitments, *etc.*, that are strongly held -- tends to form a single standing wave out of this superposition of thought waves. The situation with regard to this superposition of thought waves is similar to the situation with regard to the single organismic standing wave. For both the organismic and the societal standing waves, it's reasonable to ask what it takes for the standing wave to become perpetual.

In the case of the humanity-wide thought wave in the 21st century, the superposition principle is so much failing to hold, and destructive interference is so much the rule of the day, that this wave's permanence appears to be far more dubious than the presumed permanence of any given organismic standing wave. This is true even though the rule for the organismic standing wave is death. For both the organismic standing wave and the humanity-wide psychic standing wave, for these standing waves to become perpetual, damping / incohesiveness must be utterly eliminated and/or mitigated before it's reasonable to call the standing wave perpetual. For the human race's psychic standing wave to be genuinely permanent, every organismic standing wave within it's thought matrix must also be genuinely permanent. There is a feedback loop between these two, between the organismic and societal standing waves. This is because human beings are social creatures. If one fails, the other tends to fail. Human beings are incapable of becoming genuinely stand-alone, perpetual organismic standing waves because they are social creatures. They are dependent upon the existence of a societal psychic standing wave for the organismic standing wave to be perpetual. So for the organismic standing wave to be perpetual, the societal standing wave must also be perpetual. The resolution to

¹ This must be why Paul emphasizes the gospel call in Romans 10:14. --- For more about the gospel call, see Grudem, Chapter 33, pp. 692-698.

² Grudem, p. 699.

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this quandary is for there to be a single sinless human being to be the seed crystal around which the societal standing wave coalesces. This is precisely who Jesus Christ is, a sinless, and therefore divine, human being whose organismic standing wave is the "seed" (Genesis 3:15) around which the human race's psychic standing wave coalesces. This coalescence is precisely what has been going on since the covenant of grace was promulgated. A societal standing wave has been coalescing around Christ the seed crystal, where this societal standing wave is an alternative to the dysfunctional, humanity-wide psychic standing wave. The culmination of this coalescence around the Messiah is precisely the New Jerusalem ecological niche. The final judgment is the final elimination of damping / incohesiveness from the human race's psychic standing wave, thereby turning this standing wave into a purely Spiritual phenomenon, a perpetual, Spiritual, societal standing wave. The Bible, the visible Church, all the biblical covenants, and all the events that have gone to create these things over many millennia, all work together to establish this perpetual, Spiritual, societal standing wave. The basis for all of it is the permanent organismic standing wave of the Messiah, in accordance with Genesis 3:15. But in this discussion of regeneration, the big question is, How does all this relate to the regeneration of a single human being?

Being the seed crystal for the formation of the end product of this "grand design", the Messiah's mind and vision form the template for the psychic standing wave, and people who are genuinely regenerated are plugged into this psychic standing wave emanating from the Messiah's mind. Christ chooses specific people, broadcasts the truth to them, called the "gospel calling", and when the hearer responds affirmatively to the gospel call, that person is plugged into the psychic standing wave that is being constructed upon the Messiah's foundation. This is the mechanism by which the organismic standing wave of the newly regenerated is preserved even after death. It is preserved in the societal standing wave that is being constructed by the Messiah. It's reasonable to assume that the soul of such a regenerate human goes into the third heaven at death, and that this person has no physical body during the intermediate state between death and resurrection. It's also reasonable to assume that such a soul is this person's organismic standing wave with all inclination towards damping / incohesiveness and sin excluded, and with its physical manifestation thereby curtailed. --- In contrast to the preservation of the regenerate soul in the third heaven, the mechanism by which the unregenerate dead are preserved from their death until the resurrection of all the dead is far more ambiguous. Because the entire human race is connected and networked by way of familial and other relationships, it's plausible to assume that the unregenerate dead are preserved for the final judgment in the second heaven, by way of these attachments. In other words, it's plausible to assume that they are preserved by way of their relational connections to people who are plugged

into the Messiah's alternative societal standing wave, *i.e.*, by way of the regenerate. But this apparently plausible assumption is not confirmed by biblical exegesis, for reasons that are made clear below, in the examination of the death event. But the point that needs to be asserted in this examination of the regeneration event is that at regeneration, the elect are plugged into the societal standing wave that is being constructed by the Messiah.

(4) Because "it is impossible for a person to be regenerated and not become truly converted",1 the regeneration event leads to the next event in the ordo salutis, conversion. This fourth event in the order of salvation is divisible into two fundamental parts, faith and repentance. According to Grudem, "Conversion is our willing response to the gospel call, in which we sincerely repent of sins and place our trust in Christ for salvation."2 --- "Conversion" literally means "turning". In this context, it means turning away from sin, where such turning is repentance, and turning towards Christ, where such turning is faith. Conversion clearly includes both repentance and faith, but even though these two things are distinguishable, they are not separable. It is not genuinely possible to have one without the other, because there is a direct proportionality between the two. It's also not possible to claim one always precedes the other chronologically. --- While election, gospel call, and regeneration are all things that God exclusively does towards his elect, conversion is something that the human does. Conversion is the act by which a person changes from NOT being party to the Messianic Covenant to being party. As indicated above, participation in this covenant requires "saving faith". "Saving faith is trust in Jesus Christ as a living person for forgiveness of sins and for eternal life with God."3 The act of conversion also requires repentance. "Repentance is a heartfelt sorrow for sin, a renouncing of it, and a sincere commitment to forsake it and walk in obedience to Christ."4

(5) After the newly converted human has repented of missing the <u>natural-law</u> mark, and has put faith in the Messiah for forgiveness for missing the mark, it's reasonable to expect the next event in the *ordo salutis* would be something that God does in response to the conversion. In fact, the fifth event in the order of salvation is justification, something that God does. --- As emphasized throughout this theodicy, the penalty for violating the <u>natural law</u> is death, disintegration of the organismic standing wave. Because humans generally miss the mark, it follows that humans generally die. Because Christians generally die, it doesn't appear on its face to be

¹ Grudem, p. 705.

² Grudem, p. 709.

³ Grudem, p. 710.

⁴ Grudem, p. 713.

a convincing claim that such conversion actually delivers one from this penalty for violating the **natural law**. But by adhering to sound biblical exegesis, it becomes clear that in the order of salvation, the elect are in fact delivered immediately from this penalty in regard to their souls at the time of death. But deliverance from this penalty in regard to their physical bodies is mediated by the interim between death and resurrection for final judgment. Because the **natural law** can never really be broken, and because entities that enter into violating it are really just committing suicide in the process, the legal mechanism by which such suicide is avoided is absolutely crucial to the *ordo salutis*, to the whole process of redemption initiated in Genesis 3:15, and to the entire covenant of grace. That mechanism is justification.

Using Grudem's Bible-based definition,

Justification is an instantaneous legal act of God in which he (1) thinks of our sins as forgiven and Christ's righteousness as belonging to us, and (2) declares us to be righteous in his sight. ... [T]he emphasis of the New Testament in the use of the word justification and related terms is on the second half of the definition, the legal declaration by God. But there are also passages that show that this declaration is based on the fact that God first thinks of righteousness as belonging to us.¹

It's clear in both Greek and Hebrew that speakers of the biblical source languages recognized a distinction between a legal declaration that something is just, and the thing actually being just. For example, a human court could declare someone indicted for murder to be not guilty. This would be a declaration that the accused is righteous and just regarding the murder. But such a declaration doesn't actually make the accused justified and innocent. It merely means that there was insufficient evidence to support the accusation. This distinction between justification as a declaration of righteousness, and justification as an actual fact of righteousness, is important in **human law** because **human law** is inherently error prone, and human courts are only capable of justification in the declaratory sense. But because God never errs, there appears to be a big question on the face of this supposed event in the ordo salutis, specifically: Why would God ever declare anyone righteous, just, and justified when the person is not in fact so? This question, and this issue of justification, goes to the very core of the Protestant Reformation. It is also a major dividing line between the variety of sects in Christendom, and "is the dividing line between the biblical gospel of salvation by faith alone and all false gospels of salvation based on good works."2

¹ Grudem, p. 723.

² Grudem, p. 722.

Paul's letter to the Romans provides the most thorough biblical treatment of the doctrine of justification. The Greek verb translated to "justify" is *dikaioo* (Strong's #1344). According to Strong's lexicon, the word can mean not only an act that genuinely makes righteous, and not only an act of declaring righteous, but it can also be an act that manifests or exhibits righteousness. Although James 2 deals primarily with justification as a process of manifesting righteousness, Romans uses this verb with a focus more on the declaratory sense of the word and the actuation sense of the word. Because justification was a central theme of the Reformation, the argumentation over this subject is voluminous. So the focus in this theodicy will be on what light wave physics can shine on the subject, rather than on repeating the same old arguments.

Being the seed crystal for the formation of the elect's perpetual, societal standing wave, the Messiah's mind and vision have formed the template for this societal standing wave since the promulgation of the covenant of grace. The way justification works so that it conforms to both the wave-physics storyline and the Bible, pertains to how someone who is elect, who has heard the gospel call, who God has sovereignly regenerated, and who has been converted, can be justified, and thereby counted perfectly righteous, even though they have seriously missed the mark. Given that this fifth event in the order of salvation is prior to death, it's necessary to show how God can treat this sinner as righteous even though sinners are by definition not righteous. --- Given that justification is by faith alone, when the convert "trust/s] in Jesus Christ ... for forgiveness of sins", the Messiah acknowledges that he has allocated a position in his societal standing wave for that particular human. From that time forward, God the Father, the righteous and holy eternal enforcer of the **natural law**, sees the Messiah's imputation of his righteousness to this person, rather than the person's propensity to miss the mark. In forensic terms, the Messiah stands at the judgment seat of the Father and claims that this person's sins have been forgiven, and the Messiah does in fact forgive the sinner's sins, so that the sinner can go on to live from day to day with confidence that he/she has been justified. So such justification is not based on any lies. It is based on contractual, covenantal promises. Under the contract, justification is Christ's act of imputing his righteousness to the elect human so that God the Father acknowledges this covenant and allows this party into his presence for the sake of his Son and for the sake of the covenant of redemption. So justification is a one-time event that has perpetual consequences. So justification is both the process by which that person is declared righteous based on the duly entered covenant, and the process by which the imputed righteousness of Christ actually replaces that person's guilt through the covenant. So justification is not based on a lie, or on a mere declaration that is not based on fact. Justification is based on a contractual promise made by the Second Person of the Godhead, where

this promise will be made good, *i.e.*, translated into actual and undeniable fact, in the process of the *ordo salutis*.

(6) The next event in the *ordo salutis* is adoption. "Adoption is an act of God whereby he makes us members of his family."¹ Passages like Romans 8:14-17 make it clear that when God recognizes that someone is justified by the Son's covenantal promise, he adopts that person into his family. It's important to recognize that this family exists by way of the promises of the **Messianic Covenant**, and not by way of any parent-child *bailment* contract. "[T]he New Testament connects adoption with saving faith, and says that in response to our trusting Christ, God has adopted us into his family. ... [A]doption follows conversion and is God's response to our faith."² Through adoption, the adopted party becomes a member of the family formed by way of the societal standing wave, and the privileges of family membership become the possession and property of this new party.

(7) While election happens even before creation, the five subsequent events, gospel call, regeneration, conversion, justification, and adoption happen at the beginning of one's participation in the **Messianic Covenant**. After these five events that initiate participation in the covenant, one enters into the sanctification process. "Sanctification is a progressive work of God and man that makes us more and more free from sin and like Christ in our actual lives."3 Sanctification happens by way of increased conformity to **natural law** during life on earth. Increased conformity to **natural** law happens both by avoiding what one knows to be prohibited, and by performing what one knows to be prescribed. Understanding the "grand design" is crucial to going wholly into performing what one knows to be prescribed. Unlike justification, which is purely a sovereign act of God, sanctification is a cooperative process, a process in which one cooperates with God's design, plan, and ways. The process of sanctification is continuous throughout life from entry into the covenant until death. The emphasis in sanctification, and the motivation behind this emphasis, are certainly not on legal considerations. The motivational emphasis is on satisfying the priorities of the **Messianic Covenant**, which means the **ecclesiastical** concerns of the parties, starting with God, but including human parties. The motivational emphasis is not on legal considerations, or on jural issues. Nevertheless, ecclesiastical concerns have their legal attributes, and jural concerns are almost entirely legal, and both forms of legality are necessarily included in the sanctification process. Even so, the motivations behind the sanctification process can be understood to be varied.⁴ But

¹ Grudem, p. 736.

² Grudem, p. 738.

³ Grudem, p. 746.

⁴ Grudem, pp. 758-759.

in terms of priorities, the motivation towards sanctification are of God's kingdom, and they are the reverse of the motivations behind Satan's kingdom.

(8) The eighth event in the *ordo salutis* is perseverance.

The perseverance of the saints means that all those who are truly born again will be kept by God's power and will persevere as Christians until the end of their lives, and that only those who persevere until the end have been truly born again.¹

The first part of this definition of perseverance merely indicates that anyone who has genuinely become party to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u> can rely unequivocally on God to perform his part of the contract. Once saved, always saved. But such assurance is never an invitation to take the covenant for granted, and to thereby allow one's life to deteriorate so that the values of Satan's kingdom dominate the values of Christ's kingdom. "Once saved, always saved", assumes that conversion is a genuine response to a genuine internal gospel call, as distinguished from some merely presumptuous assent to some external call. --- The second part of the definition merely indicates that presumptive parties who allow the values of Satan's kingdom to dominate their lives on earth are thereby giving evidence that their participation is mere presumption, and they were never really parties at all.

Even though this doctrine is built by common sense into the covenantal structure of the Bible, so-called "evangelical Christians" have argued over its validity for centuries. Within some evangelical traditions, people claim "that it is possible for someone who is truly born again to lose his or her salvation".² Both common sense and sound biblical exegesis make it obvious that this "is not possible for someone who *is truly* born again."³ --- It's reasonable to understand the theological argumentation that's gone on over the centuries over this issue, and over most of the *ordo salutis*, to be disputation between factions of slave-farm propagandists. The root issue in the argumentation is slave farming, and the obstreperous translate finger-pointing and accusations over slave farming into an alternative set of issues, usually soteriological, because neither side knows how to address the slave-farming issue straight on. A frontal assault on slave farming would, after all, arouse the ire of Antichrist, and result in big trouble for these factions of slave-farm propagandists. In fact, most of the theological argumentation in Christendom since the Reformation has the same

¹ Grudem, p. 788.

² Grudem, p. 788.

³ Grudem, p. 788.

character to it. It is argumentation motivated by slave farming under the pretense that it's not about slave farming.¹

(9) The ninth event in the ordo salutis is death. Because all people die, this might seem on its face to be no more significant than birth, which theologians have generally neglected to include in the order of salvation, presumably because it's so obvious, and there's virtually no controversy in it. But the disposition at death for the elect is different from the disposition of the reprobate. So the death event goes to the core of how people are sustained from death to resurrection. That subject is fecund grounds for speculation, and is therefore rife with controversy. --- What happens at the death of someone who has been plugged by Christ into his societal standing wave? The short answer to this question is that they go directly into God's presence. As Christ told the thief on the cross, "today, you shall be with Me in Paradise" (Luke 23:43). The biblical evidence indicates that God's elect spend this "intermediate state" between death and resurrection in praise and worship before the throne of God. --- Of course, the question remains, how do the reprobate spend this "intermediate state"? Before going directly into answering this question, it's important to understand the different attitudes the regenerate and the reprobate should have towards their respective deaths.

Death for the regenerate is a deliverance from the propensity to sin, and it's deliverance into an interim state between having a physical body that's prone to miss the **natural-law** mark and having a physical body that doesn't have this propensity. On the other hand, death for the reprobate has more in common with death of any non-human organismic standing wave. But because humans have the capacity for perpetual standing-wave status, the death of the reprobate is not annihilation. It's reasonable to expect the souls of animals and plants to be annihilated at death, and there's scant biblical evidence to counter this expectation. But because humans have been created in God's image and have the capacity for eternal life, annihilation is not a reasonable expectation in the deaths of reprobate humans. The next chapter, "Annihilationism & Hell", will examine this controversy in more detail.

As made clear in Part I, for an organismic standing wave to violate **natural law** is for the organismic standing wave to invite and entertain damping, incohesiveness, and disintegration, *i.e.*, annihilation. For plants and animals, such annihilation is not so controversial, because they have been designed for such annihilation. Such annihilation is controversial for humans because the evidence is clear that humans have not been designed for such annihilation. In view of this fact, it's reasonable

¹ This includes most long-standing friction between Roman Catholics and Protestants, as well as most sectarian arguments about "TULIP".

to wonder what attitude humans should have towards death. It's also reasonable to wonder whether the attitude of the regenerate should be different from the attitude of the reprobate.

The attitude towards death held generally by the reprobate is much like the attitude in the animal kingdom. The will to survive is paramount throughout the animal kingdom. But because all animals die, every animal eventually acquiesces to its death. If one ignores the fact that humans have the capacity for eternal life, then it appears that humans generally have precisely the same attitude. The will to organismic survival is paramount, and the organism eventually acquiesces to its death. But the biblical evidence is clear that people who are genuinely party to the **Messianic Covenant** are called to a completely different attitude.

Animals never sin because they were not designed to never miss the <u>natural-</u> <u>law</u> mark. They were designed to live within a certain ecological niche, and to play their allotted role within that niche, until the propensity towards standingwave disintegration overtakes them. They were designed to have specific limitations under the <u>eternal law</u>, where those limitations disallowed immortality. But humans were designed for immortality, and they were thereby designed to operate in an ecological niche in which their choices covered the entire range of the <u>natural law</u>, and they were designed to make those choices in such a way as to sustain their immortality and their status as perpetual organismic standing waves. The regenerate are characteristically called to recognize this distinction and to behave accordingly. But the regenerate are called to more than this.

For the people genuinely party to the <u>Messianic Covenant</u>, death is a huge blessing. Death of the regenerate is the discarding of the physical body that has been so prone to miss the <u>natural-law</u> mark, and it is simultaneously entry into the presence of the holy creator of the universe, and into the praise and worship that surrounds the throne of God. The claim that "the wages of sin is death" (Romans 6:23), is equally true for both regenerate and reprobate. But "all things work together for good to those who love God and are called according to his purpose" (Romans 8:28), which is not true for the reprobate, because they don't love God, and because they are not called according to his purpose. For the reprobate, all things work together for bad. For the regenerate, every hardship in life, including death, is the loving Father's discipline of his beloved child. For the reprobate, every hardship is the exercise of God's justice against someone who doesn't deserve his saving grace. Every hardship of the reprobate is retribution for violation of the <u>natural law</u>, and this set of hardships includes the reprobate's death. For the regenerate, every hardship in life is God's goading the regenerate to a closer walk with his/her creator.

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Even though death for the regenerate is a huge blessing for the regenerate, the regenerate should not actively seek it. This is because God has put his elect on earth with physical bodies for the sake of doing kingdom-building activities. So for the regenerate to actively seek his/her own death is to usurp God's authority over the regenerate's life. So for the regenerate, suicide is self-murder, and is clearly proscribed by the moral-law leg of the **natural law**. The regenerate's **religious social compact** might also proscribe suicide through its **human law**. But it's not valid for **secular social compacts** to proscribe suicide in their **human law**, for reasons that are clearly delineated above. So if the reprobate want to commit suicide, and the reprobate is pursuing this goal on a **territorial jurisdiction** that is not that of a **religious social compact** that proscribes suicide, then it is not *lawful* under **human law** for the regenerate to directly interfere, even though it may be *lawful* under **natural law** for the regenerate to interfere.¹

Because death for the regenerate is a blessing, the regenerate whose mind is fully renewed should approach his/her death fearlessly. Even so, for both the regenerate and the reprobate, "death is not natural; ... and in a world created by God it is something that ought not to be. It is an enemy, something that Christ will finally destroy (1 Cor. 15:26)."² --- Even though these distinctions between the regenerate and the reprobate are undeniable from a biblical perspective, it needs to be emphasized, in passing, that even though these distinctions are dramatic and real, it is not possible for fallen human earthlings to know who is elect and who is not. In the final analysis, God is sovereign over election, and he is sovereign over regeneration, and God's timing in the regeneration of his elect is an issue between him and his elect, and is not the business of bystanders. So for any given person to judge whether another person is regenerate or not is an inherently errorprone judgment. Nevertheless, in building Christian communities, i.e., Christian religious social compacts, this is a risk that is an unavoidable part of the process, because it's necessary for such community builders to assume that people who come to help are regenerate.

This warning about the error-prone nature of judging other people's election and regeneration should be extended into all speculation about the "intermediate state". In fact, the intermediate state of mankind

is a subject upon which the light of Scripture is not abundant.

... That a most powerful contrast is declared between the state

of the righteous and that of the wicked, not only after the final

¹ And if the regenerate thereby risks the repercussions of such interference, then it's reasonable that the regenerate would acquiesce to such repercussions without complaint.

² Grudem, p. 812.

judgment but also during the interval between that event and the death of the body, should also be regarded as beyond question. ... [S]peculation has been rife and has frequently illustrated the peril of attempting to be "wise above that which is written.¹

But with this disclaimer duly made, as with much post-ascension eschatology, it's also necessary to use whatever authoritative material is at hand to get as clear a picture of reality as presently possible. Based on such authority, it's also necessary to distinguish what appears to be undeniable biblical truth from speculation run amuck.

Speculation about the afterlife and the "intermediate state" abounds, both inside the visible Church and outside it. One theory that has existed in eastern religion and in western philosophy since ancient times is the concept of reincarnation. In the 21st century, there are also people who claim to be Christians who also claim to believe in reincarnation. But the Bible is clear that "it is appointed for men to die once and after this comes the judgment" (Hebrews 9:27). So the Bible certainly does not support reincarnation. It should also be obvious by now that the wavephysics storyline cannot support reincarnation except by way of an extraordinary and ridiculous stretching of the facts. Even though reincarnation cannot be supported by either Bible or wave physics,

From what is revealed in the Scriptures it may reasonably be concluded ... that the intermediate state is not for the wicked that of their final misery, nor for the righteous that of their completed and final blessedness.²

But the nature of such "misery" and "blessedness" in the intermediate state, along with the same in the "final" state, is still subject to massive and largely unproductive speculation.

Another conception of the afterlife includes the existence of purgatory. But, "the fact that the souls of believers go immediately into God's presence means that *there is no such thing as purgatory*."³ In the words of E. McChesney, "the theory of a purgatory ... has no foundation in Scripture".⁴

Another theory that is entertained within the visible Church from time to time is the theory of "soul sleep". Teachers of this doctrine claim that the souls of the regenerate go into a state of unconsciousness upon the death of the physical body, "and the next thing that they are conscious of will be when Christ returns and raises

¹ E. McChesney, "Intermediate State", Unger's, p. 625.

² E. McChesney, "Intermediate State", Unger's, p. 625.

³ Grudem, p. 817.

⁴ E. McChesney, "Intermediate State", Unger's, p. 625.

them to eternal life."¹ Like purgatory, this doctrine is opposed by the preponderance of biblical evidence that indicates that the souls of the regenerate go immediately and consciously into God's presence.²

Another theory expounded within the 21st-century visible Church is the doctrine that the intermediate state doesn't really exist, because the regenerate dead go into their final disposition upon their death. But, "This theory also ignores the final judgment as represented in the Scriptures."³ It also ignores the whole program established at the beginning of the Bible, which ends with the final judgment and the migration into the New Jerusalem. The whole program started at the fall is a program designed to establish a society in which all people are in agreement about what constitutes <u>natural law</u>. The metaphorical statement in Genesis 3:15 indicates, among other things, that humanity would have divine assistance in this progression.

For those who have willfully rejected the offer of salvation through Christ there is no ground of hope based upon Scripture that after death that offer will be renewed. It is proper to emphasize this statement in view of the spirit of presumption fostered by conjectural dealing with this most awful of all themes.⁴

(10) The last event in the order of salvation is glorification. This is the equivalent of the resurrection of the body. Given the confluence of the wave physics storyline and biblical redemption, it's probably more accurate to understand this as being reemergence of the physical body from the psychic field of perception and action, than as re-emergence of the physical body from the earth. Either way, reception of the glorified body is an immediate precursor to entry into the New Jerusalem. Again, using Grudem's words,

Glorification is the final step in the application of redemption. It will happen when Christ returns and raises from the dead the bodies of all believers for all time who have died, and reunites them with their souls, and changes the bodies of all believers who remain alive, thereby giving all believers at the same time perfect resurrection bodies like his own.⁵

To understand the relative destinies of both the regenerate and the reprobate, it's important to accompany these claims about the regenerate with comparable claims

¹ Grudem, p. 819.

^{2 2} Corinthians 5:8; Philippians 1:23; Luke 23:43; John 14:1-3; Hebrews 12:23.

³ E. McChesney, "Intermediate State", Unger's, p. 625.

⁴ E. McChesney, "Intermediate State", Unger's, p. 625.

⁵ Grudem, p. 828.

about the reprobate. The doctrine of the resurrection of the reprobate is based on passages like the one found in John 5:

"[A]n hour is coming, in which all who are in the tombs shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; those who did the good deeds to a resurrection of life, those who committed the evil deeds to a resurrection of judgment." (John 5:28b-29)

As indicated above, in regard to "double predestination", the grounds for these two destinies are different. The final judgment of "those who did the good deeds" is grounded on grace and life. The final judgment of "those who committed the evil deeds" is grounded on justice and death. But this resurrection of the reprobate will be for a judgment that leads to "the second death" (Revelation 21:8). The second death is certainly the reprobate's "final misery". But there are several questions appertaining to this "second death". (i)One pertains to what this second death looks like, which will be covered in the upcoming sub-chapter on annihilationism and hell. (ii)Another question pertains to when the resurrection of the reprobate happens, relative to the resurrection of the regenerate.

(iii)Regarding when the reprobate are resurrected, this footnote from Grudem's theology pertains:

Some evangelical Christians hold that believers and unbelievers will be resurrected at the same time (this is the position taken by amillennialists). Others (especially premillennialists) hold that the resurrection of believers occurs before the millennium and the resurrection of the unbelievers for judgment occurs 1,000 years later, after the millennium.¹

The idea that there are two different times for the respective resurrections of believers and unbelievers is apparently based on the speculation-prone passage in Revelation 20:

> And I saw the souls of those who had been beheaded ... because of the word of God, ... and they came to life and reigned with Christ for a thousand years. The rest of the dead did not come to life until the thousand years were completed. This is the first resurrection. (Revelation 20:4b-5)

Because amillennialists do not acknowledge the existence of the millennium, it's difficult for them to see the resurrections of the regenerate and the reprobate as happening at different times. Because of the expanded uncertainty of apocalyptic, prophetic literature, it's probably best to avoid schisms over such things.

¹ Grudem, p. 829, footnote #2.

PART III, CHAPTER B, SOTERIOLOGY, ANNIHILATIONISM, & HELL

Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence, including the interpretation found in Edwards' **History**, indicates that a middle path between these premillennialist and amillennialist extremes is most compatible with the facts, assuming Christ continues to tarry.

It's clear that the 3rd "coming", in Edwards' interpretation, is "spiritual", meaning that it is marked by a reign by the Holy Spirit, but not by a physical manifestation of the Messiah. This 3rd "coming" is at the defeat of Antichrist. That "coming" is therefore not the final resurrection of Jesus Christ. It makes sense that any resurrection of saints at that time would also not necessarily be a physical manifestation, but would be a major psychic following of deceased saints, a partial resurrection that is not quite physical, but that nevertheless is significant enough to mark the beginning of "the prosperous state of the church" during the millennium. So there will be a psychic resurrection of saints at the defeat of Antichrist, but the preponderance of evidence indicates that the physical resurrection of the saints will be at the end of the millennium, immediately before the final judgment and immediately after the conquest of the "great apostacy", *i.e.*, at the same time as the resurrection of the reprobate.

(ii)As indicated above, the regenerate are preserved from death to physical resurrection by a sovereign act of God, by God plugging the regenerate into the societal standing wave being constructed by the Messiah. It makes sense, given both the history as it has unfolded since the fall, and the compatibility of the wavephysics storyline, that something similar to this societal standing wave would exist on the satanic side. While the Messianic societal standing wave is built around the truth of the **<u>natural law</u>**, including all the attributes necessary to making the society happy and harmonious, including love, grace, patience, peace, kindness, selfcontrol, and all the "fruits of the spirit", the satanic societal standing wave is built around the misperception of **natural law**, and distortions in the understanding of it. In opposition to the fruits of the spirit are all the fruits of the demonic. Because this opposing societal standing wave is built around misperception and deception, one of the primary attributes that distinguishes the dead reprobate from the dead regenerate is their ignorance about what's at the center of their societal standing wave. It's necessary for every dead regenerate to love the Messiah utterly. In contrast, it's only necessary for the dead reprobate to be deceived about the nature of their societal commitments, *i.e.*, their contracts. It's possible, and even probable, that they don't even believe in Satan. If they know that the angel of appearances and deception is at the core of their social network, and they worship him, then they are the most evil. But the vast majority of people plugged into this network are merely deceived, and they don't even know that, or even care to think that, Satan exists, and

is master of the vortex of death that dominates their existence. Because the psychic field of perception and action is real, and because humans are easily deceived, the angel of appearances, misperception, and deception must necessarily reign in some **jurisdictions** of the second heaven.

At the final judgment, saints and angels, on one hand, and the reprobate, demons, and devils, on the other, are arraigned before the divine judgment seat. The saints are called to assist the Triune God in rendering justice against the reprobate and their entire network, including demons, devils, and Satan himself. It makes sense that it's by way of this psychic network that the reprobate are preserved from their initial state of misery after death until their "final misery" after the final judgment. At the core of this network is the covenant that primordial humanity made with the angel of appearances in the garden. This covenant, and the network that grows therefrom, has been passed from generation to generation ever since, by way of prenatal *bailment* contracts.¹ But such *bailment* contracts are not the core of this network. The covenant that humanity made with *HaSatan* is close to the core. But God's curse on this covenant is probably at the core of this network.

When Adam sinned God cursed the ground because of him (Gen. 3:17-19) ... Paul says that "the creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Rom. 8:21). ... [H]e says that the creation is somehow longing for that day: "For the creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the sons of God ..." (Rom. 8:19, 22-23).²

This curse is finalized when all the reprobate, Satan, and all the demons and devils are sent to eternal perdition. At that time, the curse on the ground is removed, and "the creation itself [is] set free".

Sub-Chapter 2: Annihilationism & Hell

The fact that human beings are created in the image of God confirms the conventional translation of Ecclesiastes 3:11. A worthy representation of the conventional translation appears in the English Standard Version, which indicates that God "has put eternity into man's heart". Although some people may dispute

¹ Even so, this arrangement should not be understood to be an indictment against parents. It should rather be understood to be a sign of the superiority of God's alternative set of covenants and contracts.

² Grudem, pp. 835-836.

this translation to "eternity" from the ancient Hebrew, there can be no doubt that being created in the image of God, and for an eternal existence, is not debatable based on biblical source texts. --- The remainder of verse 3:11 indicates that God has also created human beings "so that man will not find out the work which God has done from the beginning even to the end". In other words, even though God has created humans for an eternal existence, he has also created them so that they are localized in space and time, cannot be omniscient or omnipotent, and cannot consciously know much that is beyond a given moment's capacity to know.

As indicated above, this eternal existence pertains to both regenerate and reprobate. But the claim that animal souls are annihilated, while reprobate human souls are not, and rather have some kind of eternal existence, demands some explanation for how the eternal existence of the reprobate can be compatible with the wave-physics storyline.

It's the contention of this theodicy that the proper understanding of this eternal existence can be acquired only through the recognition that eternity is a largely subjective phenomenon. It is the subjective attempt at perceiving and understanding something that is inherently an objective phenomenon. The objective phenomenon is mathematical infinity. Like mathematical lines, points, and chance, infinity is a psychically objective phenomenon. It is not physically objective like a tree, a car, a rock, or another person. But it is psychically objective, like all mathematical objects. It is similar to chance. Chance is a conceptual tool that humans use to deal with complexity in the physical universe. But chance doesn't exist in the physical universe. It is conceptual, *i.e.*, psychically objective. As a conceptual phenomenon, chance may have an endogenous counterpart in the thinker's nervous system, and existence that takes the form of endogenous electromagnetic, chemical, and cellular events. But chance only has meaning and usefulness as a psychically objective phenomenon. Something similar to this is true in regard to infinity. Infinity has meaning and usefulness as a psychically objective phenomenon, even though mathematical infinity may have some endogenous counterpart in the thinker's nervous system.

In some respects, the word "eternity" may be synonymous with mathematical infinity. But because of the nature of the biblical source languages, "eternity" should be understood by Bible interpreters to be an extremely dirty approximation of mathematical infinity. The history of Christian Bible interpretation shows that this dirty approximation is not generally recognized as such. For example, the word translated to "eternity" in Ecclesiastes 3:11 is *olam* (Strong's #5769), which has numerous meanings that are not equivalent to mathematical infinity. Besides "eternity", *olam* has also been translated to mean "remote time"; "at the very beginning"; "from pre-creation, till now"; "from (in) olden times"; "long ago"; "formerly [...] in

ancient times"; "ancient"; "into the indefinite future"; "as long as one lives"; "day by day"; "continually"; "most distant future"; and "without beginning, without end, and ever-continuing".¹ Study of both Old Testament and New Testament occurrences of "eternity" and its source-language cues makes it obvious that there may be huge differences between the eternities in "eternal life" and "eternal torment", which are not generally expounded. These differences leave the discrepancy between annihilationism and "eternal torment" wide open for exploration.

In order to make rational speculation about how "eternal torment" can exist for the reprobate, based on the wave-physics storyline, it's necessary to recognize the distinction between mathematical infinity and the mathematical infinitesimal. They are two very different things, even though both involve some form of infinity. As a prelude to exploring the differences between these mathematical entities, it's important to acknowledge that "eternity" is usually assumed to be equivalent to an infinite timeline. Mathematical laymen generally assume that "eternity" refers to an infinite timeline into the future. But given that the vernacular definition of eternity is absolutely not rigorous, it doesn't really follow that "eternity" must always be defined as an infinite timeline. The assumption that it's an infinite timeline is also common in Christian theology, but there's no more reason to believe the definition is rigorous in theology than there is reason to believe it's rigorous in the vernacular. In fact, "eternity" in theology might refer to infinite time, infinite space, infinitesimal time, or infinitesimal space. Which it is can only be determined by the theological context.

A typical definition of mathematical infinitesimal is that it is "A function or variable continuously approaching zero as a limit."² --- When it says the function or variable is approaching "continuously", it means that this function or variable is approaching infinitely. It continues to approach zero forever, without ever getting there. In calculus, the mathematician takes the limit, which means that he/she assumes that because the function is continuously approaching zero, it must be zero. But this is really a kind of cheating, for practical purposes, because the function never really gets to zero. It becomes infinitely small. It's the contention of this theodicy that this is precisely the nature of "eternal torment". The consciousness of the reprobate becomes infinitely small, but it never really reaches zero. When an animal dies, because it has not been created for perpetual life, its consciousness is annihilated along with the organismic standing wave that constitutes its physical body. So its consciousness really does go to zero. But when a reprobate human

¹ Vine's, O.T. section, p. 72.

² **The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language**, Fourth Edition, 2000, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Massachusetts.

dies, even though his/her consciousness may continuously approach zero, it never really gets there. It approaches zero forever, and this process of infinite deterioration is precisely what happens in "eternal torment". But this "eternal torment" doesn't really get started until the final judgment is passed.

As indicated above, the reprobate are preserved after death by way of their allegiance to *HaSatan*'s societal standing wave. But after the final judgment, when Satan's psychic network is offscoured to its final dissipation,¹ the dead reprobate's consciousness then enters into its deterioration into the infinitesimal. This is hell.² It happens because people are more committed to lies than to the truth.

In contrast to the reprobate, the consciousness of the dead regenerate does not approach zero. The consciousness of the regenerate approaches the infinite, but it never really gets there because miniature sovereigns are by definition localized in space and time. After the final judgment, the regenerate enter into the New-Jerusalem ecological niche and live in perpetual harmony with the truth of the <u>eternal law</u>.

¹ The people in the garden were created with a huge propensity to misperception. Anything outside the garden ecological niche was vulnerable to misperception, as was the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which was inside the garden ecological niche. Misperception, by definition, is a disjunction between appearances and reality. If angels are set as guardians over every aspect of creation, then it's only reasonable to assume that there would be an angel, along with a contingent of followers, that would be set as guardians over such appearances. But this is a reasonable assumption only if there is a discrepancy, or a propensity for discrepancy, between appearances and reality. If there is little or no chance of appearances conflicting with actualities, then there is no need to distinguish the angel of appearances to be redeemed. That angel served its purpose, and no longer has any use. It's therefore only reasonable that Satan and his minions would remain condemned forever.

² Grudem defines hell as "*a place of eternal conscious punishment for the wicked*". ---Grudem, p. 1148. --- It appears that this definition of hell as perpetual dissipation of consciousness into the infinitesimal does not conflict.

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