Article I § 8 clause 2:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To borrow money on the credit of the United States;
Given that the Constitution authorizes Congress "To borrow money on the credit of the United States", it’s imperative to understand where this authorization comes from. Given that the Constitution must be interpreted through the metaconstitution in order to be rationally consistent with the natural rights polity that arises out of the Bible, and given that it’s imperative for this rational consistency to exist in order to avoid abusing natural rights, it’s critical to understand the moral foundation for this power to borrow money. The Constitution, being a human contract and not a Biblical Covenant, must operate on the basis of consent like all human contracts, and not on the basis of some presumptive pre-cognitive consent. Pre-cognitive consent, in the realm of human government and human law, exists in regard to the prohibition of bloodshed, and nowhere else. So the power to borrow money doesn’t arise rationally out of pre-cognitive consent, and can only exist in a human contract through cognitive consent. If there is unanimous consent among the parties to the compact that each party, and all the parties collectively, are willing to accept liability for payment of such a debt, then this certainly makes such human compact viable. Under such circumstances, this clause of Article I § 8 is perfectly lawful. But unanimous consent is so unusual that many people, perhaps most, can’t imagine how such unanimous consent could ever arise. For such people, it looks entirely utopian. But if one understands the difference between a secular social compact and a religious social compact, then this problem looks far less utopian and far easier to solve.
If one assumes that the Constitution is a secular social compact, meaning that it exists to enforce the human law prescribed by the global covenant, and to do nothing else, then it must by definition consist of a jural compact and an ecclesiastical compact (strictly defined), and of very little else. The only thing more is the secular social compact. The secular social compact exists to coordinate the functions of these two sub-compacts, and that’s the entire sum of the functionality of the secular social compact. Under such circumstances, such a secular social compact’s power to borrow money relates directly to Article I § 8 clause 1’s power to "lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts". If there are no debts, there’s no reason to pay them. Monetary debts can arise only by borrowing money. So the power to borrow money is intimately connected to the constraints on taxation indicated in the above commentary on Article I § 8 clause 1.
The disconnected relationship between taxing and spending is one of the reasons the monetary debt of the de facto united States is so huge that it’s virtually un-payable. 2 The power to borrow should never be disconnected from the power to pay. So if an unbreakable linkage were made between the power to borrow and the power to pay, then the constraints on the power to borrow would be almost identical to the constraints on the power to tax indicated in the above commentary about Article I § 8 clause 1. Given that this is true, from the perspective of the global covenant, we find nothing objectionable about this allocation of power to Congress. Congress might borrow money for either jural purposes or ecclesiastical purposes. As an agent of the entire social compact, Congress might need to borrow money for either of these disparate sets of purposes. Borrowing for either of these purposes appears legitimate, as long as the approach to taxation to pay for such debts meshes with the purpose of the debt. In other words, if the debt is ecclesiastical, then the method of taxation should be ecclesiastical, as indicated above. 3 And if the debt is jural, then the taxes to pay the debt can be applied to everyone who volunteered to be party to the jural compact, just like any other jural tax.
The potential for abuse is huge. This clause has, indeed, been hugely abused. 4 Since debts are merely a form of contract, everything that’s said here about the general government’s potential for abusing contracts applies to the general government’s potential for abusing debtor-creditor agreements, regardless of whether such government is in the role of debtor or creditor.