Basic Jurisdictional Principles
A Theological Inventory of American Jurisprudence
Article I § 8 clause 4
"The object is great which We have in View, and We must expect a great Expence
of Blood to obtain it. But We should always remember, that a free Constitution of
civil Government cannot be purchased at too dear a Rate, as there is nothing on this
Side of the new Jerusalem, of equal Importance to Mankind." 1
"[W]e call for your strenuous, unremitted exertions. Yet do not believe that you have
been, or can be saved, merely by your own strength. No! it is by the assistance of
Heaven, and this you must assiduously cultivate, by acts which Heaven approves.
Thus shall the power and the happiness of these sovereign, free, and independent
states, founded on the virtue of their citizens, increase, extend, and endure, until the
Almighty shall blot out all the empires of the earth" 2

Article I § 8 clause 4:

The Congress shall have Power . . .  To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

Alienage & Naturalization:

These days, anyone born in one of the fifty States automatically has the legal status of a citizen. This is according to the 14th Amendment § 1. An infant may be a citizen who lacks capacity, but it’s normally understood that when that human being reaches the age of majority, that natural person will be a full-blown citizen. When a foreigner moved to one of the thirteen States prior to the ratification of the Constitution of 1787, each State had its own rules for making this foreigner a citizen of the given State. Since it’s the primary concern of any secular government to protect the unalienable Rights of its citizens, it’s important for such government to make sure that people who migrate to the geographical jurisdiction of such government are not inimical to such rights. It’s therefore perfectly legitimate for Congress "To establish an uniform Rule" for doing so. So this "uniform Rule of Naturalization" is not a troublesome aspect of clause 4. We conclude that this Naturalization Clause, when viewed from the perspective of the framers’ original intent, is perfectly lawful. It is not inconsistent with the global covenant. But the constitutional distinction between citizens and non-citizens, according to supreme Court jurisprudence – i.e., according to the current implementation of the Constitution – is something altogether different, thanks largely to the supreme Court’s interpretation of the 14th Amendment.

Section 1 of the 14th Amendment addresses itself in part to the distinction between "persons" and "citizens". It says, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.". Since the 14th Amendment is one of the "Civil War Amendments", it’s obvious that "All persons born . . .  in the United States" pertains primarily to ex-slaves. This part of the Amendment makes ex-slaves citizens – clearly long overdue. But it also means that anyone born in the United States since then – even if the parents are illegal aliens and members of a Middle Eastern terrorist organization – is also automatically a citizen. This situation makes it obvious that we need to ponder more fully the facts surrounding citizenship.

When someone is born within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States, they lack capacity. Until they reach the age of majority, they are minors, and they are therefore disabled from exercising all the privileges of citizenship. But when they reach the age of majority, the disabilities that accrue to them as minors are eliminated, and they become citizens in fact, and not merely in potential.

We say "the privilege of citizenship", rather than the rights of citizenship, because in our study of the global covenant, we determined that since all people are created in the image of God, all people have rights, that are essentially property rights, that are inherently part of being alive, and being human. People have these essential rights regardless of whatever other abilities and disabilities they may have. Such rights are God-given. The only circumstances under which such rights can be denied by human beings, are in cases of bloodshed. 3 In other words, when one person violates the God-given property rights of another person, all human beings are mandated by the Noachian Covenant (Genesis 9:6) to execute justice – meaning retribution if the bloodshed is a gross delict, restitution or injunction if the bloodshed is a subtle delict, and whatever penalty the contract stipulates if the bloodshed is ex contractu – against the perpetrator. To distinguish these God-given gifts called rights – called unalienable Rights by the Declaration of Independence – from natural and conventional abilities and disabilities, especially from conventional disabilities deriving from gifts, licenses, implied contracts, etc., that are given by humans, we call the latter privileges. This distinction is essential to any studied view of the global covenant.

Citizenship is essentially the same thing as being a party to a social compact. It is essentially contractual, which means that it requires consent. Whatever benefits accrue to such citizen from the ecclesiastical compact are privileges, while benefits that accrue from the jural compact consist of protected property rights. Since every social compact implicitly and/or explicitly encompasses two sub-compacts – the jural compact and the ecclesiastical compact – the privileges of citizenship vary according to the composition of these two sub-compacts. When a person consents to being party to the jural compact, they essentially consent to adhering to all the due process mechanisms, office filling mechanisms, etc., that pertain to fulfilling the obligations of the jural compact. When a person consents to being party to the ecclesiastical compact, they likewise consent to fulfilling whatever obligations they have to make the ecclesiastical compact functional. What, specifically, those obligations are, depends largely upon whether one is focusing on the broadly defined ecclesiastical compact or the narrowly defined ecclesiastical compact. By definition, secular social compacts only encompass the jural compact and the narrowly defined ecclesiastical compact within their original jurisdictions, while religious social compacts encompass the jural compact, the narrowly defined ecclesiastical compact, and the broadly defined ecclesiastical compact, within their original jurisdictions. Because the Constitution inherently defines a secular social compact, as is evident in this inventory’s examination of the religion clauses of the 1st Amendment, what’s at issue in section eight, clause four of the Constitution’s Article I, is the privileges and obligations of citizenship within a secular social compact. So the primary concern here is with the differences between the jural compact and the narrowly defined ecclesiastical compact. The differences between these two types of compacts is radical, as was manifestly clear in the hermeneutical prologue. 4 The jural society adjudicates bloodshed that arises ex delicto, while the narrowly defined ecclesiastical society adjudicates bloodshed that arises ex contractu. So the privileges of citizenship that are associated with these two sub-compacts also differ radically.

Within the context of the global covenant and the hermeneutical prologue’s basic jurisdictional principles, all this is common-sensical. But the general government has abandoned such fundamental legal principles. This is clear from the fact that the general government abandoned the compact theory of law during the War Between the States. They did this because the people who were expounding this theory (like Senator John C. Calhoun) were expounding an extremely defective version of the compact theory, a version that attempted to justify the existence of slavery. When the Confederacy was defeated, the theory was considered totally discredited. 5 This is another classic case of throwing the baby out with the bath water.

With these things understood, we need to look at what kind of mess the supreme Court and the general government as a whole has led us into. Before diving into a few supreme Court decisions, we should look at the rest of Amendment 14 § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." From the point of view of the global covenant, "privileges and immunities of citizens" pertains to the benefits that derive from being a party in a secular social compact. 6 This is because the "United States" is secular, meaning that it attempts to encompass all faiths within a single umbrella compact. It implicitly attempts to provide a secular social compact that encompasses numerous religious social compacts, 7 and numerous other social compacts, like those that form the States. Since the "United States" is a secular social compact, its lawful subject matter jurisdiction encompasses nothing more than the human law that arises out of the global covenant. The human law prescribed by the global covenant pertains to bloodshed, and only to bloodshed. Bloodshed can exist in only two kinds, out of a contract and not out of a contract. These are facts that pertain to all people. So the "privileges and immunities" that accrue to every party to the secular social compact that forms the "United States", pertain primarily to bloodshed.

From a Biblical perspective, all social compacts have both jural and ecclesiastical features. But if the social compact is secular, then common sense demands that the ecclesiastical features be strictly and narrowly defined. The primary ecclesiastical features that a secular social compact has are ecclesiastical courts, places where secular contract disputes can be resolved. If the social compact is religious, then common sense demands that the ecclesiastical features be both broadly and strictly defined. — The duties and benefits that accrue to voluntary citizens of the united States from the jural side of the social compact are things like (i)the duty to vote / the benefit of being well represented; (ii)the duty to serve on a jury in a criminal case / the benefit of trial by jury instead of by vigilance committee; (iii)the duty to protect one’s property / the benefit of being able to make property ownership part of the public record; (iv)the duty to pay lawful jural taxes / the benefit of being protected by the jural society; (v)the duty of testifying when under subpoena / the benefit of living in a society in which justice is revered; (vi)etc. It’s reasonable to surmise that benefits like these are what the 14th Amendment calls "privileges". The immunities that accrue to citizens of the "United States" from the jural side are things like immunity from illegal searches and seizures. The "privileges" that accrue to voluntary citizens of the "United States" from the ecclesiastical side are things like the privilege of having a contract dispute heard in a court of the general government. From the perspective of the hermeneutical prologue, these are all lawful "privileges" and "immunities" of a secular social compact.

The expression, "life, liberty, or property", is a legal term of art that goes back at least as far as the "social contract" writings of John Locke. Locke was a 17th century English philosopher whose rendering of the compact theory of government was commonly studied and respected by the framers. 8 From the hermeneutical prologue’s perspective this phrase is essentially a reference to unalienable Rights, to the fact that every human being is created in the image of God, and therefore has essential rights, virtually all of which can be understood to be property rights. So when Amendment 14 § 1 says no "State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law", from the perspective of the global covenant, it’s essentially saying this: No State shall deprive any person, regardless of whether they are a citizen or not, of their unalienable Rights, unless it’s through lawful conviction for committing bloodshed ex delicto, or through a lawful judgment for committing bloodshed ex contractu (to fulfill a lawful contractual obligation). Given this understanding, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law", is perfectly lawful. This understanding acknowledges unalienable Rights, and posits that the States are obligated to recognize and honor them in all people, regardless of whether they were slaves or not, and regardless of whether they are citizens or not.

Given that the "United States" is a secular social compact, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment also makes perfect sense. It says no State shall "deny any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws". So if an ex-slave and an ex-slave owner are each being victimized by some perpetrator of bloodshed, the State, according to this clause, cannot give preferential treatment to one over the other. From the point of view of the global covenant, it makes perfect sense.

Seen from the perspective of the hermeneutical prologue’s basic jurisdictional principles, the first section of Amendment 14 is excellent law, and deserves our honor and respect especially because it was intended to be an at least partial correction to the institutionalized bloodshed of the South’s "peculiar institution". But in the hands of jurists and legislators who don’t recognize or acknowledge the fundamental distinction between rights and privileges, because they don’t acknowledge that people are created in the image of God, because they contend that God has no place in secular jurisprudence, Amendment 14 § 1 turns into something almost totally unrecognizable.

Shortly after the 14th Amendment was ratified, the supreme Court started applying it to alienage cases. The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) may not have been alienage cases, but in the majority opinion, Justice Samuel F. Miller, while indicating that the "Civil War Amendments" (13th, 14th, and 15th) existed to insure rights for newly freed slaves, also indicated that "these amendments did not necessarily apply to African-Americans alone". 9 Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) built on Miller’s opinion in Slaughterhouse. In Yick Wo, the Court held unanimously that the 14th Amendment applied to aliens. This is because the Equal Protection Clause in section one applies not only to citizens, but to all persons. This finding is not inconsistent with the 14th Amendment viewed through the global covenant.

In Yick Wo, a San Francisco law gave the city’s Board of Supervisors power to dispense laundry operating licenses. The ordinance applied only to laundries not operating in brick buildings. Most Chinese laundries were located in wood buildings. The maximum penalty for operating such a laundry without a license was a thousand-dollar fine and six months in jail. At that time, law of the general government barred Chinese from becoming citizens. — When the supreme Court heard this case in 1886, Yick Wo had immigrated from China to California in 1861, and had been in the laundry business for over twenty years. In 1885 the Board of Supervisors refused to license Yick Wo and two hundred other Chinese laundry operators. Most of these Chinese laundries continued operating without licenses. Yick Wo was arrested, tried in police court, found guilty, and fined ten dollars. He refused to pay, and was sent to jail for ten days. He petitioned the California supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, and was denied. So he appealed to the supreme Court of the general government, naming the sheriff, Hopkins, in the suit. — Yick Wo claimed that the city law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. San Francisco claimed that the general government could not use the 14th Amendment to take away the police powers reserved by the 10th Amendment to the states and cities. 10 — Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stanley Matthews directed San Francisco to release Yick Wo from jail. He said that the laundry licensing ordinance went beyond the boundaries of traditional police powers because it "constituted class legislation prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment". 11 This unanimous decision was a landmark in American jurisprudence, even though "the court did not build upon this precedent until the mid-twentieth century." 12

On its surface, there is absolutely nothing about this case that violates the standards set by the global covenant. Yick Wo and the other Chinese laundries certainly suffered an injustice, and it’s an absolute good that the supreme Court corrected it. But this case raises at least two issues that relate directly to this "uniform Rule of Naturalization": (1)What "privileges or immunities" should citizens have that aliens shouldn’t? (2)From the perspective of the global covenant, what agency, compact, facility, etc., should be the bearer of police powers? — By answering these questions, we’ll be in a much better position to appraise the alienage cases of the late 20th century.

It’s reasonable – especially since the attacks of September 11, 2001 – for citizens to wonder why our laws allow aliens to exist for protracted periods of time within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States, without their becoming citizens. It’s also reasonable for citizens to wonder why our laws allow people born within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States to automatically be citizens, 13 having all the privileges and benefits of citizenship even though they have never taken any kind of oath of allegiance or loyalty to the united States. — In Yick Wo, Chinese were disallowed from becoming citizens, but they were simultaneously allowed to immigrate. This is a colossal piece of insanity comparable to claiming that all people have unalienable Rights, and simultaneously claiming that slavery – an institution that exercises a denial of unalienable Rights – is good and deserves to continue. If a Chinese, or anyone else, immigrates to the geographical jurisdiction of the united States, it should be mandated that they (i)submit themselves to being educated about how the united States functions, legally; and (ii)pledge themselves to abide by these laws while they’re within this geographical jurisdiction. These two things should be minimal for anyone who migrates into this geographical jurisdiction, regardless of whether they intend to be citizens or not. If they intend to become citizens, then they should also (i)take an oath of allegiance and loyalty to the united States, and to the State where they reside; and (ii)commit to performing whatever obligations are inherent in being a citizen. If any immigrant refuses or is unable to go through this process, then they should be deported. For every person born within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States, when they reach the age of majority, they should be offered the opportunity to become a citizen. If they choose to be a citizen, then they should (i)submit themselves to the same education; (ii)pledge themselves to abide by the laws; (iii)take the same oath of allegiance; and (iv)commit to performing the same obligations. If they are unwilling or unable to do these four minimal things, then these people born within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States should be considered to have the legal status (i)of a denizen if they have perennial habitation within the United States, 14 and (ii)of an alien if they don’t have perennial habitation. A denizen, in keeping with the global covenant, would have fundamental property rights, including the right to own land, but would not be able to exercise certain privileges retained by citizens, like voting, being a juror, holding any governmental office (including being an officer of a court, a lawyer), etc. So all denizens would be natural born. No one would be allowed to immigrate, by law, for the sake of procuring a denizen status. Because taxation is necessarily voluntary under the global covenant, denizens would not be required to pay taxes that would probably be obligatory to citizens, because citizens volunteer to pay them. However, they would be able to register their property in the public records because property rights are fundamental. They would be people who refuse the privileges and obligations of full-blown citizenship (of being full-blown parties to the American social compact). 15 Every person born within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States, whose parents are either citizens or denizens, would be a natural born denizen, and the fact of perennial habitation would confirm this status. Citizenship status would be available only through consent. This is consistent with the fact that the united States is a social compact, and social compacts are established and maintained through consent. 16 To pretend that citizenship can come to anyone without consent is to pretend that this nation is some kind of monolithic entity that forces people to accept the obligations of citizenship without their consent. — Part of this arrangement entails that legal aliens would be allowed to stay in this country for very limited periods of time. While here, they would have all their unalienable Rights, including the right to own land. But when they left the country, they would lose the ability to own land within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States, which means that they would need to sell it before they left the country, or forfeit all rights to it. To do otherwise, is to give foreigners, people who may desire the ultimate destruction of the united States, power over our destiny.



Before we address this question about police powers – namely, where they should reside – we should look at another case. "While the states have police powers to regulate health, safety, welfare, and morals, Yick Wo held that these powers were subject to the federal equal protection clause.". 17 Implementing this view, the supreme Court held in Truax v. Raich (1915) that a State law that used its police powers to force businesses to limit the number of aliens they hired to no more than 20%, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The State law violated the right to contract by forcing businesses to have limits on their employment contracts. It thereby violated the right to property by being a regulatory taking. The State law could have easily been struck down on those basic grounds. But the supreme Court chose to use the Equal Protection Clause instead, thereby limiting State police powers.

In Graham v. Richardson (1971), the supreme Court ruled that a State could not deny "welfare" benefits to aliens, based on the Equal Protection Clause. There are huge problems with this. First, given that each State, like the general government, is a secular social compact, it’s obvious that the State collecting taxes for the sake of distributing them to "welfare" recipients is not lawful, from the perspective of the global covenant. This is because the consent of the tax giver is essential, and it’s extremely unlikely that such consent is common. Second, why should aliens be given "welfare"? If a private citizen, a private denizen, or a private religious social compact wants to provide money, housing, food, clothes, etc., to an alien, or to a class of aliens, or to anyone else, then this is not the concern of a secular social compact unless the benefit entails bloodshed. — In Graham the supreme Court is limiting the State’s police powers by mandating that the Equal Protection Clause is applicable to "welfare", and aliens. But this situation demands that we wonder not only about whether the Equal Protection Clause should be applied to "welfare" / aliens, and not only about whether the States should be providing "welfare" at all, but also, this situation demands that we wonder about whether the States should have full-blown police powers at all. Police powers traditionally entail the regulation of "health, safety, welfare, and morals". If the States are secular social compacts, then it appears that most of the broadly defined ecclesiastical concerns embedded in police powers need to be "reserved . . .  to the people", 18 more specifically, to religious social compacts and individuals.

In Plyler v. Doe (1982), the supreme Court held that children who were not born in the united States, and who were the offspring of illegal aliens, were deserving of a free public education. The State of Texas allowed school districts to forbid children of illegal aliens to attend public school. Texas attorneys claimed that illegal aliens are not "persons" covered by the 14th Amendment. The Court disagreed. Texas was forced to allow children of illegal aliens to attend their public schools. — This case generates the same basic issues as Graham. Since each State at present is a jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compact, while traditionally police powers were "reserved" to the States, are we correct to wonder seriously about whether the States are the correct repository for police powers that are broadly ecclesiastical? In the case of Plyler, are the States lawfully collecting taxes to pay for public schools? From the perspective of the global covenant, the answer is an emphatic "No!". They may be collecting taxes to pay for public schools, but they are not doing so lawfully. So the Equal Protection Clause may indeed apply to illegal aliens, and to their children. But the States have no business using the involuntary servitude of their tax payers to run secular, State-funded schools, regardless of whether the students are children of illegal aliens, children of legal aliens, children of ordinary citizens, or children of the president. 19


The bankruptcy of a citizen living within one of the States – and having no financial interests or obligations outside that State – is an inherently commercial proceeding. But on its face, it falls outside the legal constraints of Article I § 8 cl 3. 20 It falls outside the parameters of the Commerce Clause not because it is not damaging to someone’s property, but because it falls exclusively within the sovereignty of the State, and does not cross State borders. For such exclusively intra-state bankruptcies, it appears that each State has the power and authority to maintain its own approach to addressing the bankruptcy. But for cases of bankruptcy in which the affected financial interests cross State borders, it’s reasonable, according to Article I § 8 clause 3, for Congress to get involved. If we fail to strictly construe, and fail to recognize that this bankruptcy clause is limited to bankruptcies across State borders, then this clause becomes troublesome because it is again allowing Congress to build a monolithic government that is inherently callous to individual rights. 21 But this bankruptcy clause could be troublesome for us for other reasons also.

Bankruptcy is something that happens between debtors and creditors. "Bankruptcy", at its etymological roots, means "rotten bench". 22 The debtor and creditor are both party to a contract that becomes rotten, because the debtor is unable to pay or discharge the debt in a timely manner. So bankruptcy is inherently a function of strictly defined ecclesiastical societies, because it is entirely a by-product of a contract. This part of Article I § 8 clause 4 is dedicated to standardizing the manner in which interstate and international bankruptcies are adjudicated. So this general social compact will have subject matter jurisdiction over some ecclesiastical / contractual issues, namely, contracts that entail interstate and international debt. But this by no means gives the general social compact subject matter jurisdiction over all ecclesiastical issues, because that subject matter would constitute a police state unless everyone consented to it. — We acknowledge that the original intent of the framers, with regard to this Bankruptcy Clause, was probably to prevent people from escaping from indebtedness in one State to a debt-free status in another State. Since different States had different approaches to bankruptcy, this was probably necessary. But the original intent can hardly be recognized in current bankruptcy laws. These days,

[T]he bankruptcy laws compel the discharge of a debtor’s voluntarily contracted debts, and thereby invade the property rights of the creditors. The debtor who refuses to pay his debt has stolen the property of the creditor. . . .  Bankruptcy laws, which discharge the debt in defiance of the property rights of the creditor, virtually confer a license to steal upon the debtor. In the premodern era, the defaulting debtor was generally treated as a thief and forced to pay as he acquired income. 23

We believe that this quote from Murray Rothbard’s book, The Ethics of Liberty, is consistent with the global covenant. Since this is only a brief, cursory examination of the Constitution, and because it’s more important to understand the overall context within which current bankruptcy laws exist, we’ll say no more about the Bankruptcy Clause at this time, except to say that if a debtor discharges debts owed to a swindler, the swindler is probably getting what he/she deserves.


1John Adams wrote this in a letter dated July 1, 1776, to Archibald Bulloch. See Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 4 May 16, 1776 – August 15, 1776, URL:​cgi-bin/​query/​r?ammem/​hlaw:@field(​DOCID​+@lit(dg004270)).

2These are among the closing remarks of An address of the Congress to the inhabitants of the United States of America, URL:​item/​90898049/, "By order of Congress, HENRY LAURENS, President. IN CONGRESS, May 9, 1778. RESOLVED, that it be recommended to Ministers of the Gospel, of all denominations, to read, or cause to be read, immediately after divine service, the above address to the inhabitants of the United States of America, in their respective churches and chapels, and other places of religious worship. Published by order of Congress, CHARLES THOMSON, Secretary.".

3There are also special relations between care-givers and dependents, but these are contractual arrangements, and not bloodshed.

4See Maxims of the Global Covenant #3 / #4 / #5 / #20 / #21.

5Proof for this can be found in places like the majority opinion in Texas v. White.

6A secular social compact is not "secular" in the sense that it is "not spiritual; not ecclesiastical", etc. It is "secular" in the sense that it is intended to encompass all religions, as long as they conform to the human law prescribed by the global covenant.

7A religious social compact is most easily defined in contradistinction to a secular social compact. A secular social compact is intended to encompass multiple religions. The umbrella law that encompasses all these religions is the global covenant’s prescription of human law. In contrast to the secular social compact, the religious social compact is intended to encompass only a single religion. "Religion" is here defined as any belief system, including any of the normally recognized religions, or any philosophy, including secular humanism and atheism. We distinguish this definition of "religion" with special typography: religion.

8def.: social contract — "The original covenant by which, according to certain philosophers of modern times–Hooker, Hobbes, Althusius, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, etc.–individuals have united and formed the state. . . .  This theory goes back to ancient philosophy and was upheld by medieval thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas . . . . The theory of the Social Contract had a remarkable influence upon the political philosophy of the American colonies." — Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 310, "Social Contract", by Walter Eckstein.

9The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 24, "Alienage and Naturalization", Patrick J. Bruer.

10def.: police power — "The power of the State to place restraints on personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to limitations of the federal and State constitutions, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government." — Black’s 5th, p. 1041. — 10th Amendment, URL: ./0_7_Am_X.htm​#TenthAmendment.

11The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 948, "Yick Wo v. Hopkins", by John R. Wunder.

12The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 948, "Yick Wo v. Hopkins", by John R. Wunder.

13URL: #CitizenTerrorist.

14By denizen we mean a "natural born citizen" who is not necessarily a consensual citizen, i.e., not necessarily a citizen in fact. Because the normal legal definition of denizen is inadequate (even though there is no other word in the American legal lexicon that comes closer to our meaning), we use special typography to specify a more rigorous definition. — Since 14th Amendment § 1 indicates that "All persons born . . .  in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens . . . ", constitutional interpretation, from the hermeneutical prologue’s perspective, demands that denizens be understood to be outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the "United States" for all subject matters other than those that constitute bloodshed.

15A perfectly understandable reason for such refusal might be as a protest against the federal government’s abuse of power. For the government to recognize that such people exist, and deserve to have their rights honored, is a step towards acknowledgement that consent is the only lawful basis upon which any government exists. It is comparable in microcosm to acceptance of nullification and secession.

16Some people claim that there is an implied contract between the government and everyone born within the government’s territorial jurisdiction. The claim is that whenever such human being is born, such person automatically acquires benefits offered by the government, and such person is therefore automatically obligated to fulfill certain duties inherent in this implied contract, for example, to pay taxes. There is a huge problem inherent in this idea. The problem is that this assumption usurps the pre-cognitive consent that the Bible clearly indicates must exist in every human being’s relationship to the global covenant. All human beings are in effect automatic parties to an implied covenant with God. Through the global covenant’s prescription of human law, every human being is morally obligated to prosecute Genesis 9:6 bloodshed. But such a moral obligation does not automatically translate into a human-law obligation because no human-law penalty is stipulated in the covenant. Because this prescription of human law is the preceptive foundation for secular human government, there is no implied contract between a newborn and any human government, even though there is certainly an implied contract between every newborn and his/her God. The assumption of an implied contract between government and human is the logical source of jurisdictional dysfunction that characterizes most governments. For example, the differences between jural societies and strictly defined ecclesiastical societies arise out of this same reading of Genesis 9:6. In the latter, all parties consent – or at least acquiesce – and only parties participate. In contrast to this, a jural society is inherently obligated to execute justice against anyone, whether they are party or not, who commits a delict. This means that suspects are forced to participate even if they are aliens and not parties. So jural societies and strictly defined ecclesiastical societies have radically different jurisdictions. It’s true that consent is necessary to the formation of a jural society that employs stable due process mechanisms. But it’s also true that a single person can exercise the impetus behind the jural society’s existence, acting alone, without approval, agreement, or consent from anyone else. In a jural society, consent is secondary to the primary impetus behind the jural society, the fulfillment of the Genesis 9:6 mandate. In contrast to this, in an ecclesiastical society, consent defines its very existence because ecclesiastical societies only prosecute bloodshed ex contractu. — We conclude that people who believe there is an implied contract between the government and every citizen fail to understand these distinctions, or deliberately ignore them.

17The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 25, "Alienage and Naturalization", by Patrick J. Bruer.

18See the 10th Amendment, URL: ./0_7_Am_X.htm​#TenthAmendment.

19For more about such police powers, see the 10th Amendment, URL: ./0_7_Am_X.htm​#TenthAmendment. For more on citizenship generally, see Article IV § 2 cl 1, URL: ./0_5_Art_IV-VII.htm​#Citizen.

20Article I § 8 cl 3, URL: ./0_2_1_2_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_3.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl3.

21It’s probable that the Bankruptcies phrase and the Naturalization phrase appear in the same clause because the framers were concerned that people who went bankrupt in one State might run to another State to avoid obligations, and thus crossing interstate and international borders, respectively, was probably the underlying issue.

22Funk and Wagnalls Dictionary, p. 112. See Article I § 8 cl 3, URL: ./0_2_1_2_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_3.htm​#RottenBank, to see how the banking and monetary system in the United States turned into a "rotten bench".

23The Ethics of Liberty, Chapter 19, "Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts". Online at the Anarcho-Capitalist, URL:​wp-content/​pdfs/​Rothbard%20%28Murray%29%20-%20The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty.pdf.