Article IV § 1:

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

The Full Faith and Credit Clause establishes that the laws, records, etc., in one State will be honored in the other States. This is only a problem if one State has laws that inherently violate rights, or records that are inherently wrong, or laws that are inherently repugnant to the other State. For example, before the War Between the States, northern States were obligated to return runaway slaves to the "owners" in the South, based on this Full Faith and Credit Clause. These days the States have been largely homogenized into administrative provinces of the general government, and the kind of regional conflict that existed before 1860 is more difficult to find. Nevertheless, such conflict still exists.

This Full Faith and Credit Clause is more evidence that the framers were reaching for a confederate republic, without sufficient understanding of the principles necessary to its successful implementation. It’s obvious that in a confederate republic, secular social compacts – that are under an umbrella secular social compact – need to supply "Full Faith and Credit" with regard to bloodshed, meaning with regard to judgments, prosecutions, cases, suits, etc., regarding actions ex delicto and actions ex contractu. Murderers should not be allowed to escape prosecution simply by escaping to some State that doesn’t have an extradition treaty. The same is true for someone accused of a private delict, a tort, a subtle delict, or a violated contract. Since the subject matter jurisdiction of a secular social compact is limited to actions ex delicto and ex contractu, "Full Faith and Credit" between secular social compacts appears on its face to be relatively simple to understand. But the hermeneutical prologue stipulates that actions ex contractu are limited by use of what the hermeneutical prologue calls the property interest model of contracts. The property interest model of contracts stipulates that the title transfer model of contracts should be used in secular ecclesiastical courts, while the traditional promise-expectation model of contracts should be used in strictly defined religious ecclesiastical courts. So while it’s fairly simple to understand how "Full Faith and Credit" applies to gross delicts like murder, it’s not so easy to understand how it applies to subtle delicts, contracts, and other perhaps dubious laws. Because "Full Faith and Credit" regarding contract violations and supposed laws that are not obviously delictual is probably most difficult, we’ll look at three scenarios: first, applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to "same-sex marriage", which involves the application of "Full Faith and Credit" to contracts; second, applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to driver’s licenses, which involves "crimes" that violate laws against mala prohibita; and third, applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to drug laws, which involve the application of "Full Faith and Credit" to what some people may deem trespass-free mala in se.

Logically, law or one-or-more terms of a contract can be (a)both lawful and legal, (b)lawful but illegal, (c)legal but unlawful, or (d)neither lawful nor legal. In other words, logic demands that the follow must be true: (a)If a law or contractual term is both lawful and legal in the State of origin, then "Full Faith and Credit" is lawful and should also be legal in the target State. (b)If a law or contractual term is lawful but illegal in the State of origin, then whatever it is in the State of origin that makes the law or contractual term illegal should be ignored in the target State. So "Full Faith and Credit" would not apply under such conditions. (c)If a law or contractual term is legal but unlawful in the State of origin, then it should be both unlawful and illegal in the target State. So "Full Faith and Credit" would not apply under such conditions. (d)If a law or contractual term is neither lawful nor legal in the State of origin, then it should be neither lawful nor legal in the target State. So "Full Faith and Credit" would apply under such conditions. — For the sake of keeping truth and justice the standard in the law, "Full Faith and Credit" cannot be absolute, but must be judged on a case-by-case basis. "Full Faith and Credit" should be the standard to which all States aspire, but it’s naïve to pretend that "Full Faith and Credit" should exist when any given State goes rogue on some set of laws or issues.

(i)How does "Full Faith and Credit" apply between State Y, which doesn’t recognize "same-sex marriages", and State X, which does recognize "same-sex marriages"? — If States are clearly understood to be secular social compacts, then how can they rationalize issuing marriage licenses in the first place? This question has to be answered before any rational treatment of the "homosexual marriage" issue can be formulated. Since the mid-1990s, the united States have gone through a series of dubious acts and judicial decisions regarding marriage. To oppose the specter of "same-sex marriage", the general government enacted the "Defense of Marriage Act" in 1996, thereby defining marriage as existing only between one man and one woman. This act was later overridden by supreme Court decisions in 2013 and 2015. At this writing, "same-sex marriage" is legal in all fifty States of the united States, meaning that a marriage license issued by one State must be recognized in any of the other States, by way of "Full Faith and Credit". But given that the States are secular social compacts, is it right for State X to license marriages, regardless of whether the marriage is heterosexual or homosexual?

A license is by definition "The permission . . .  to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort. . . .  Privilege from state or sovereign." (Black’s 5th, p. 829) So the mere existence of marriage licenses implies that the marriage is illegal without such license. It means that every kind of marriage is illegal unless the State licenses it. When and how did the secular governments of the united States become the arbiters of whether a marriage is legal or not, and the licensers of those marriages it deems legal? This is a long and ugly story involving the failure to distinguish secular social compacts from religious social compacts, miscegenation, and eugenics. It’s outside the scope of this inventory to retell the story in detail. But we’ll provide a quick and dirty rendition of it, focusing on miscegenation. It’s all about governments being on the horns of a dilemma, the dilemma being whether such government is a secular social compact, a religious social compact, or something else entirely.

Because every State is lawfully a secular social compact and not a religious social compact, the States are not acting within their lawful jurisdictions when they issue marriage licenses and marriage certificates. There’s no way to formulate a rational, Bible-based approach to this issue if we refuse to address the underlying issue of whether States are acting within their lawful jurisdictions – as secular social compacts – when they issue such licenses and certificates.

As mentioned, a license is permission given by the State to do something that is otherwise illegal. Is marriage something that is inherently illegal? Absolutely not! Then how did States ever become the primary dispensers of marriage licenses? — Prior to the War Between the States, Anglo-American common law held that marriage between races was illegal. It was called miscegenation, and each State had its special penalties for it. Out of sympathy for couples who desired to intermarry, State legislatures started allowing the issuance of licenses by State officials to facilitate interracial marriages. In the decades after the War Between the States, such marriage licenses started becoming the norm among the urbane and sophisticated, and eventually became the norm for everyone who wanted to marry, except "gay" people. — Was it right for these State legislatures to issue such licenses? — As is obvious in retrospect, laws against miscegenation are unlawful. Issuing licenses to get around the unlawful laws may have been sympathetic in some respects, but doing so failed to deal with the root of the problem. The root of the problem was that interracial marriage was illegal in the first place, when it shouldn’t have been. At its historical origins, the illegality of intermarriage was not primarily racial. It was primarily cultural. It was based on the split between "Christian" Anglo-Americans and heathens of any color. It was another instance of the "established" church imposing itself on the people who preferred to operate outside the State church’s scope of powers. In other words, this whole problem with marriage licenses derives from the States being confused about whether they are secular social compacts or religious social compacts. — Under the lawful jurisdiction of a secular social compact, there’s no way intermarriage can be illegal. On the other hand, can intermarriage be illegal under a religious social compact? Sure! Whether it’s illegal or not depends entirely upon the nature of the religious social compact. But the fact is that since ratification of the Bill of Rights, if not since before then, the States have never been lawful religious social compacts. Therefore, the only police powers they lawfully possess are secular police powers.

At their core, the States have absolutely no business issuing marriage licenses. So it appears that this whole issue evaporates if States insist on being lawful, i.e., if they insist on being secular social compacts. Is this true? Does this issue just evaporate? — To answer this question, we should examine another document that is often issued through the State: the marriage certificate. A certificate merely certifies that something exists. These days, marriage license and marriage certificate are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably. So it’s reasonable to wonder: If marriage licenses cease to exist, will marriage certificates also cease to exist? — Maybe! It depends on how one looks at it.

Marriages have existed since before the State, or any government, was ever formed. Historically, weddings were essentially initiations of marriage contracts / covenants, and nothing more. They did not involve the State, but were usually festive events for a community because the couple being married wanted the community to help them to fulfill their marriage vows, i.e., the terms of their contract. Statist marriage licenses and certificates are nothing more than quick and dirty substitutes for a real marriage covenant. A secular social compact has no more business issuing marriage licenses and certificates than it does to sit as arbiter over any number of other kinds of non-delictual covenants or contracts. People will continue getting married even if the State collapses. If the State collapses, they will have their marriages solemnized by people other than State officials: by priests, preachers, ministers, rabbis, mullahs, roadmen, chiefs, etc., as was the norm for centuries before marriage licenses existed. These solemn religious officials might give the newly married couple a certificate that they can keep as evidence that they are married. Under such circumstances, the certificate would be a substitute for an actual contract that has its terms clearly spelled out. Under the current regime, when such contracts don’t exist, but such certificates do, the meddlesome statutes passed by the State legislature substitute for actual terms of a marriage covenant. If an official of a religious social compact marries two people, then such religious social compact’s ecclesiastical compact would have original jurisdiction over disputes within the marriage contract. But secular social compacts have no business defining marriage, so a secular ecclesiastical compact should never have original jurisdiction unless the court treats the instrument as a mere contract, and not a marriage contract. Marriage is inherently a type of contract, in the same way that bailment is a type of contract. But in both cases, the terms of the contract have priority over the rules used in interpreting the contract. Since marriage and religion have historically been intermingled, while bailment and religion have been much less so, it’s now imperative for secular social compacts to forgo defining marriage, even while it may be reasonable for the secular definition of bailment to stand, and for rules of interpretation regarding bailments to be applicable in secular trials. This means that a secular social compact cannot marry "gay" couples, because a secular social compact cannot lawfully marry anyone. It means that a secular social compact cannot adjudicate a marriage dispute, except by way of the title transfer model of contracts, the same set of rules of contractual interpretation that apply to secular bailment contracts and to every other kind of secular contract. Nevertheless, "gay" people should certainly retain the right to enter secular contracts, of any kind, like anyone else. But they, like "straight" people, might find the title transfer model of contracts an unsatisfactory interpretational protocol in the adjudication of marriage disputes, because it only deals with the transfer of title to property that can be recognized in a secular jurisdiction. So the most appropriate place to adjudicate marriage disputes is within religious social compacts. The hermeneutical prologue proposes that in the property interest model of contracts, the title transfer model of contracts should be used in strictly defined secular ecclesiastical courts, while the traditional promise-expectation model is more appropriate in strictly defined religious ecclesiastical courts.

Conclusion: Secular marriages are unlawful, qua marriages, even though they may be lawful as secular contracts, because secular social compacts are operating ultra vires when they define marriage. Religious marriages are certainly lawful, but are difficult to enforce in genuinely secular courts because strictly defined secular ecclesiastical courts are limited to interpreting contracts through the title transfer model of contracts. If State X attempts to enforce marriage laws – qua marriage laws, regardless of whether the marriage is homosexual or heterosexual, and regardless of whether the marriage originated in State Y, which doesn’t recognize "same sex marriage", or State X – then the attempt to enforce is unlawful, even though it may be legal. Neither State X nor State Y should be obligated under "Full Faith and Credit" to enforce the other State’s unlawful positive laws regarding "same sex marriage", or regarding any other kind of marriage.

(ii)Applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to driver’s licenses: A malum prohibitum is, "A wrong prohibited; a thing which is wrong because prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law". 2 In other words, mala prohibita are acts that are wrong simply because so-and-so says they’re wrong. They are not mala in se, wrong or evil in themselves. They are therefore not delicts. So a legal action against a malum prohibitum is never ex delicto. Since all legal actions that are lawful must be either ex delicto or ex contractu, by a process of elimination, if a legal action against a malum prohibitum is not ex delicto, then it must be either a legal action ex contractu or a legal action that is an unlawful act perpetrated under color of law. If such action is not ex contractu, then the action is unlawful. So if an action ex malum prohibitum is not ex contractu, it is an action that is not lawful, even if it is legal. So given a "crime" that is criminal because it is malum prohibitum, the existence of a contractual nexus is crucial to the law being lawful.

In early 21st century America, all States make it criminal to drive without a driver’s license. If someone drives without a driver’s license, doing no harm to anyone, then this driving is certainly not a malum in se. It is not evil in itself, and therefore not a delict. If a police person jails a man for driving without a license, even though the man broke no other laws and damaged no property, the police action is against a "crime" malum prohibitum. But where’s the contractual nexus? Did the man enter into a contract in which he obligated himself to procure a driver’s license before driving? — In this country at this time, there is virtually never a contractual nexus with regard to the driver’s license. This is true for a number of reasons: (a)Jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts – i.e., the city, county, State, and "federal" governments – own the roads, and make the rules that pertain to them. But road creation, maintenance, and ownership are not lawful functions of secular social compacts. Creation and enforcement of laws that pertain to such roads is also not a lawful function of a secular social compact. (b)The driver’s license is never contractual because it is never consensual. Duress, coercion, threats, and the long and dangerous arm of big government are always there to encourage people to procure permission, i.e., a license, from the State before driving. (c)And plenty of other reasons, all being based on the premise that cities, counties, States, etc., are secular social compacts, where that premise is based on the fact that there is a dire lack of consent among the people inhabiting those territorial jurisdictions, regarding how those entities operate. — There is no contractual nexus because this whole arrangement is inherently unlawful. The driver’s license is imposed without consent. People who procure a driver’s license acquiesce under duress. — If someone is fined in State X for driving without a driver’s license, and this person moves to State Y to avoid paying the fine, "Full Faith and Credit" should not apply because the law in State X is inherently unlawful.

Since most people are so accustomed to doing business under the current regime, most people find it difficult to conceive of how order could be kept on American roads, streets, and highways other than through criminalization of such mala prohibita. The solution to this problem is essentially simple: By ensuring that there is a contractual nexus. Since secular social compacts have no business owning and operating roads, they need to be owned and operated by private entities, meaning by religious social compacts or by some set of lawful secular businesses or other private parties. The primary function of such entities would probably be operation and maintenance of roads and highways. Religious social compacts and secular businesses have lawful capacity to function in ways that secular social compacts do not have lawful capacity. Since it’s lawful for such entities to own roads, it’s lawful for them to make an offer to anyone who wants to hear it: "We own a highway. If you want to drive on it, we’re happy to enter this contract with you to allow you to do so. Here are the rules of the road, and the contract that you need to sign. When you give us the designated fees, and sign this contract, we’ll give you permission to drive." Here, there is definitely a contractual nexus. It may be an adhesion contract, but not necessarily so. Because the rightful owners of the roads within any of these jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts are the tax payers within those territorial jurisdictions, those tax payers should naturally own shares within such road companies, where they can consensually control the operation of such road companies through such shares. Here, driving without a license is not a malum prohibitum simply because some dictator says that doing so is prohibited. It is inherently a malum in se, because it is trespass on private property. It is a form of theft. — Switching control of the roads from jurisdictionally dysfunctional secular social compacts to road companies might not entail much difference in the way the roads operate, but that switch is huge, and necessary, for the sake of the principles that jurisdictional sanity demands.

If someone enters a contract with a road company, and later violates the rules of the contract, and flees to another State to avoid paying the contractual penalties, then it’s reasonable for the target State to honor the "Full Faith and Credit" clause. That’s because the penalty against the malum prohibitum is contractual and lawful. If someone never enters such a contract, and drives anyway, and is prosecuted for trespass, and flees to another State to avoid the penalty, the action is ex delicto, and the target State should honor the "Full Faith and Credit" clause.

Since most people are so accustomed to doing business under the current regime, most people may find it difficult to conceive of what advantage such privatization of the roads and highways could yield. Most may be able to see virtually no advantage to such privatization. This is the scourge of pragmatism, which dumps principles for convenience. — Besides keeping our laws rationally consistent – which facilitates freedom for everyone – such privatization eliminates the propensity of the mega-State to violate search and seizure laws, to abuse privacy through picture-id abuse, and to violate the natural person in many other respects.

Conclusion: Driver’s licenses as they currently exist are unlawful. Therefore, if they are legal in State X, they should not be enforced, or even recognized, in State Y under the pretense of "Full Faith and Credit".

(iii)Applicability of "Full Faith and Credit" to drug laws: Although the general government of the united States has exercised control over drugs and alcohol through excise taxation since the early days of the republic, it’s never been lawful. It hasn’t been lawful because the general government of the united States is inherently a secular social compact, and that kind of meddling in what people consume is inherently outside the subject matter jurisdiction of every lawful secular social compact. This meddling was exacerbated exponentially when the general government essentially made alcohol consumption illegal through the 18th Amendment. It was also exacerbated exponentially when the general government essentially made the consumption of various kinds of drugs illegal through the "Controlled Substances Act" of 1970. It’s important to note in passing that the promulgation of those laws was implementation of a United Nations treaty, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as domestic law. The mental gymnastics, and bad hermeneutics, necessary to reconcile such laws with a reliable understanding of the Bible can be seen by comparing it to what Jesus said in Mark 7:15: "‘There is nothing outside a person that by going into him can defile him, but the things that come out of a person are what defile him.’" (ESV) No doubt there are stewardship issues involved in any consideration of what any given person eats, drinks, breathes, etc. But for a secular government to assume the role of parent, teacher, and policeman over the consumption practices of an entire population of adults is beyond authoritarianism.

Secular drug laws are not laws against delicts and they are not laws against violating contracts. They are therefore outside the lawful subject matter jurisdiction of every lawful secular social compact. They are mala prohibita, although there are probably some people who have been convinced that such laws are against mala in se. If they are against mala in se, then they are necessarily against trespass-free mala in se, because there is no delict inherent in drug consumption. So all the drug laws currently in effect within the subject matter jurisdictions of the jurisdictionally dysfunctional States of the united States are unlawful. So it’s not reasonable for State Y, which doesn’t have drug laws, to enforce the drug laws of State X, which does have drug laws. So "Full Faith and Credit" cannot apply under such circumstances.

In summary, the "Full Faith and Credit" clause is crucial to the health and stability of any federal system. But without clear and reliable definitions of the various jurisdictions, the tendency for abuse is huge, and should be avoided.

Article IV § 2 clause 1:

The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

This clause is like a corollary of Article IV § 1. In other words, it stands to reason that if the States give Full Faith and Credit to one another, a citizen of State X would be treated as a citizen of the united States while such citizen visited State Y. In other words, the "Privileges and Immunities" that accrue to citizens of the united States apply also to the "Citizens of each State". This makes sense. From the point of view of the global covenant, this clause is not at odds with the global covenant. But like the problems in implementing Full Faith and Credit, the problems in implementing this clause are something else.

Citizen is not defined in the Constitution, except by saying in 14th Amendment § 1 that "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.". 3 Prior to the ratification of the Constitution, each State had its own custom definition of "citizen". Before the War Between the States, the supreme Court ruled in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) that a person of African descent could not be a citizen of the united States. After this War, the 14th Amendment repudiated the decision in Dred Scott, and replaced it with the principle of jus soli. 4 Jus soli literally means "right of land or ground". 5 Under jus soli, citizenship results from the place of one’s birth. In contrast, under jus sanguinis – literally "right of blood" – citizenship derives from one’s birth parents. Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott was essentially claiming that citizenship in the united States follows the rule of jus sanguinis. When the 14th Amendment stated that "All persons born . . .  in the United States, . . .  are citizens of the United States . . . .", the 14th Amendment essentially repudiated jus sanguinis as the basis for citizenship, and replaced it with the feudal principle of jus soli. Neither of these concepts is consistent with the global covenant because the global covenant contends that all people are created in the image of God, have unalienable Rights, and therefore, if they abide within the given territorial jurisdiction, they have the right to either consent to a citizenship status, or to dissent. But jus soli is more consistent with the idea that citizenship status should be offered by the secular social compacts of the united States to anyone living perennially within it’s geographical jurisdiction.

The jus soli interpretation of 14th Amendment § 1 was not immediately accepted by the supreme Court after the amendment’s ratification. For example, the Court ruled in Elk v. Wilkins (1884) that Native Americans born within the territorial boundaries of the united States were not automatically citizens because they were not entirely "subject to the jurisdiction" of the general government. That’s because they were members of tribes, and subject to the jurisdictions of their tribal governments. But Congress later countermanded this decision. 6 — By the end of the 19th century, the Court’s decisions were more consistently in agreement with jus soli. For example, in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Court ruled that since Wong Kim Ark was born within the territory of the united States, Wong Kim Ark was automatically extended citizenship status. But his parent’s were denied citizenship because laws of the general government made it impossible for them to be naturalized. 7

These days, there is a huge amount of ambiguity revolving around the differences between citizens and perennial inhabitants. That’s because there don’t appear to be very many, if any, advantages that citizens have over perennial inhabitants that are not citizens. This is mostly because of supreme Court interpretations of the "Privileges and Immunities" clause. 8 Under current interpretations of 14th Amendment § 1, "most of the Constitution’s key rights and liberties do not extend to citizens only. No less than the entire Bill of Rights applies to ‘the people’ – citizen and the noncitizen alike". 9 For example, in Graham v. Richardson (1971) the supreme Court maintained that a State could not "deny welfare benefits to noncitizens based simply on their alien status". 10 In light of the so-called "war on terror" instigated by the general government after the "terrorist attacks" on September 11, 2001, this kind of thinking by the supreme Court is not only asinine, but perilous. This goes to the whole question of what the privileges and immunities of citizenship are. Again, starting almost from the earliest days of the existence of the united States under the Constitution, this has been ambiguous, and in many respects at odds with the global covenant.

In Corfield v. Coryell (1823) a New Jersey statute prohibited any non-resident from gathering oysters in State waters. Justice Bushrod Washington claimed the statute was valid because it did not violate "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens". He claimed this because he believed that privileges and immunities are things that "are, in their nature, fundamental". He believed that they are things "which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments". For example, "the right to institute and maintain court actions" is such a fundamental "privilege". But oyster gathering is not such a universal "privilege", according to Washington, and New Jersey had a sovereign right to keep citizens of other States from gathering oysters in New Jersey waters. 11 — From the point of view of the global covenant, secular social compacts are limited to protecting such "fundamental" privileges and immunities as "the right to institute and maintain court actions". So Justice Washington was correct in this respect. But according to what has happened since the War Between the States, each State in the united States is as much a secular social compact as the general government is. So a State doesn’t have any business putting restrictions on oyster gathering, because such oyster gathering is the exclusive domain of religious social compacts and private individuals. That’s because of the restricted nature of the subject matter that pertains to a secular social compact’s geographical jurisdiction. 12

Like most of the other jurisprudential thinking of the framers’ generation, the supreme Court has thrown out Justice Washington’s "natural rights" concept of privileges and immunities. The slash and burn strategies of Lincoln’s Radical Republicans, and all subsequent generations of jurists, have practiced throwing the framers’ baby out with their national consolidation bath water. For example, in Toomer v. Witsell (1948) the supreme Court repudiated South Carolina’s license fees for out-of-state shrimpers as discriminatory. In the process, Justice Brennan wrote that, "A state’s unequal treatment of nonresidents [must] be reasoned and suitably tailored.". In other words, the State only needs to have a "substantial justification" in order to maintain discriminatory laws. In other words, the supreme Court has replaced law with pragmatism, i.e., with rule by fiat. Under the global covenant, neither the general government nor any State government has any business whatever issuing licenses for something like shrimping, because secular social compacts don’t have that kind of subject matter jurisdiction over its geographical territory. 13

Article IV § 2 clause 2:

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the crime.

This clause is another corollary of Article IV § 1. 14 It guarantees extradition from State to State. It contains nothing inherently at odds with the global covenant.

Article IV § 2 clause 3:

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

The type of "Person held to Service or Labour" here, could be either of two types: slave or indentured servant. An indentured servant owes "Service or Labour" due to the fact that he or she has contractually and consensually obligated his or her self. This type of "Service or Labour" is perfectly legitimate according to the global covenant. But it’s critical to remember that secular contracts, under the property-interest model of contracts, can only be adjudicated through the title-transfer model of contracts. Under that model, a naked promise to do future labor confers no title, and therefore a promise to be an indentured servant cannot transfer title to anything. So in the secular arena, an indentured servitude contract is essentially unenforceable, although it may be enforceable under any given religious social compact. On the other hand, if the "Person" is a slave, his or her existence as a slave is by nature and definition bloodshed, and no State can be obligated by the Constitution, or by anything else, to be an accomplice to bloodshed. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was an abomination. The Dred Scott decision enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act and declaring that African-Americans could not be citizens was not only an abomination, but also a clear sign to all of us that the supreme Court is perfectly capable of being an enabler, a stooge for legalized crime perpetrated by the general and State governments. So this entire paragraph was essentially repudiated by the 13th Amendment.

Article IV § 3 clause 1:

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

Article IV § 3 cl 1 pertains to the formation and inclusion of new States. There is nothing obvious about this clause that deviates from the global covenant.

Article IV § 3 clause 2:

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Article IV § 3 cl 2 pertains to "Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States". This is essentially the application of Congress’s "Power . . .  To exercise exclusive Legislation" found in Article I § 8 cl 17 to any new territories that the general government may acquire. 15 As long as this clause is strictly construed, there appears to be nothing obvious about it that deviates from the global covenant. Like Article I § 8 cl 17, Congress’s power by way of this clause is not only supreme, but exclusive. Since history has provided monumental evidence of abuse of such exclusivity, this clause, like Article I § 8 cl 17, demands special attention. Much of what is said at Article I § 8 cl 17 and the 5th Amendment pertains to this clause. 16

Article IV § 4:

The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

When this section says "The United States shall . . .  protect each [State] . . .  against domestic Violence", it’s not talking about family feuds and marital strife. This phrase could easily be taken by people like Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase – in Texas v. White – to be applicable to secession. It could easily be taken as a rationale for concluding that invasion of the South was justified on the grounds that the orderly rejection of membership in the united States by southern States was an insurrection perpetrated by a faction, rather than lawful secession executed by the sovereign within each of the southern States. Again, this argument is specious because King George made precisely the same argument against the seceding colonies. The situations were practically identical. 17 Such arguments depend hugely upon how the sovereign is defined. According to the global covenant, every human being is sovereign over his or her self. Those of us who are committed to the Bible’s local Covenants surrender our sovereignty to God, and thereby become bona fide parties to such local Covenants. Likewise, anyone who consents to being a citizen of one of the States exchanges certain features of such personal sovereignty for such citizenship. For example, in exchange for the benefits of citizenship, one might agree, implicitly, to abide by majority rule. In this case the sovereign of the State is the majority rule of the citizens. But the sovereign was the "People in Convention" 18 with regard to (1)secession of the colonies from Great Britain and (2)ratification of the Constitution. In other words, the citizens of each State used majority rule to elect representatives to a convention, and such conventions (1)voted to secede from Great Britain and (2)voted to ratify the Constitution. The same process was used by the southern States to secede. They were no more illegal in the War Between the States than they had been in the War for Independence. So the claim that illegal factions led the seceding slave States is the pot calling the kettle black. So the north’s claim to protection "against domestic Violence" is specious at best. This is even more obvious in view of the "Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive" phrase. This phrase means that the request and consent of the leading officials of the State are a prerequisite to the imposition of troops of the general government. 19

But this section also contains the Guarantee Clause in which the general government pledges to "guarantee to every State . . .  a Republican Form of Government". Now the question obviously becomes this: What is a "Republican Form of Government"? If the prevailing definition of republic is that it’s a government based on the consent of the governed, then that would certainly be a sound and rational reason to invade the southern States, because slavery is an obvious violation of such consent. But this has not been the prevailing definition of "Republican" at any time in American history. From the perspective of the global covenant, it should be. 20

The first major construction of the Guarantee Clause was delivered by the supreme Court in response to the Dorr Rebellion. In the 1840s Rhode Island had a constitutional crisis in which Thomas Dorr and his supporters disputed the legality of the State’s existing government. In Luther v. Borden (1849), the supreme Court claimed that it didn’t have "the power to assess either the legitimacy or the republican character of a state government". 21 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, the same man who wrote the Dred Scott decision, claimed that the power to make such decisions was strictly Congress’s. He claimed that such issues were political questions that were outside the scope of the judicial branch. — From the point of view of the global covenant, all governments revolve around consent, and all governments are necessarily composed of both jural and ecclesiastical features, and such features define the parameters of consent. So consent is crucial to any definition of "Republican . . .  Government". 22 Because every human being is responsible for enforcement against bloodshed, every human being is responsible for determining whether any given government is based on consent or not. If this is true of every human being, it’s true of Chief Justice Taney and the rest of the supreme Court. Therefore, Taney’s formation of the political question doctrine is essentially based on an evasion of responsibility, not only as a judge, but also as a human being. "Taney’s reluctance to assert judicial power in Luther affected the constitutional development of the Guarantee Clause for the next century." 23

"The political-question doctrine remains today one of the most influential monitors of federal jurisdiction". 24 This is because it is still used by the Court to avoid disputes that it reckons to be too hot to handle. For example, in Baker v. Carr (1962), the plaintiffs argued that the judicial branch had an obligation to fix what they claimed were racially malapportioned electoral districts. They made this claim based on the Guarantee Clause. But the Court refused to overhaul Taney’s political question doctrine, or to use the Guarantee Clause. Instead, it used the Equal Protection Clause to reapportion these legislative districts. Even though the Court didn’t overrule Taney’s political question doctrine, it did expand their view of the Court’s authority by implicitly enforcing the Guarantee Clause.

Article V:

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

Article V indicates the method by which the Constitution can be amended. Given that the Constitution is "the supreme Law of the Land", 25 it’s critical for us to understand that if the Constitution is circumvented by any means other than through amendment, it can only be through a consensual, contractual means that perpetrates bloodshed against no one. The right to contract is unalienable, and is therefore a higher law than this "supreme Law of the Land". But if the Constitution is circumvented through deception, intimidation, fraud, nonfeasance, malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-deliberate misconstruction, then the circumvention is illegitimate, and demands to be corrected and/or discarded. Lacking proof to the contrary, we are convinced that this is the case with most of the activities of the Federal Reserve banking system, the Internal Revenue Service, the Social Security Administration, all entitlement programs sponsored by the general government, most regulation of the economy by the general government, all businesses and enterprises run by or through the general government, and monetary and legal tender laws that violate the clear meanings of Article I § 8 cl 5, Article I § 8 cl 6, and Article I § 10 cl 1 – and most State counterparts to all of the above. 26 This list of illegal and unlawful amendment to the Constitution is certainly not exhaustive.

Article VI clause 1:

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

The fact that the debts that existed under the Articles of Confederation were not repudiated when the Constitution was adopted is an extremely important indication that the framers were using the Articles of Confederation as a foundation. Therefore, every similarity in language between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution should be taken as a key to understanding the Constitution. This claim is confirmed by the fact that the Articles of Confederation are included in the Statutes-at-Large. 27 — We see nothing inherently wrong with this clause. 28

Article VI clause 2:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

"Laws of the United States":

This is usually called the "Supremacy Clause", for obvious reasons. The most far-reaching interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause was delivered by the supreme Court in 1819, in McCulloch v. Maryland. 29 "The specific issues involved [in this case] were the Congress’s power to incorporate the . . .  Bank of the United States and the right of a state to tax an instrument of the federal government [(namely its central bank)]." 30 — In 1791 there was heated debate in Congress over whether the Constitution allowed the general government to create a national bank. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton had proposed the chartering of this national banking corporation. James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were the most vocal opponents. They "opposed the measure as unauthorized by the Constitution". 31 Congress and President Washington were persuaded by Hamilton’s "loose construction of the Constitution". They chartered the bank for twenty years, at which time it would dissolve unless rechartered. When the twenty years were up, followers of Jefferson dominated Congress, and they declined to restore the bank based on their strict construction of the Constitution. After the second Bank of the United States expired in 1811, 32 there were five years of inflation and relative monetary disarray. Part of this disarray was probably caused by the War of 1812. But if one had asked how much of this inflation was caused by fractional reserve bankers creating money out of thin air, the correct answer would probably be, "Almost all of it!". 33 But that question was apparently not asked at that time. The Jeffersonians who controlled Congress tired of the economic problems and changed their minds about the bank. They chartered the third Bank of the United States in 1816. The strict construction of the Constitution was so popular among the general populations of all the States that some of the State governments started taxing the local branches of the third Bank. 34 Maryland adopted such a tax in 1818. James McCulloch, the head of the Baltimore branch of the third Bank refused to pay the tax. The original jurisdiction of the case was in Baltimore County, but it was eventually appealed to the supreme Court. The Court proclaimed the Maryland tax law unconstitutional. 35

Before we look at the supreme Court’s opinion, we should ask how this decision stands up against the global covenant. — Without consent that is totally devoid of duress, no person can lawfully be subjected to confiscatory taxation for the sake of anything. So running banks, post offices, and interstate highways is outside the legitimate scope and purview of a lawful secular social compact. This doesn’t mean that we are bound to a strict construction of the Constitution. It means that we are bound to a strict construction of Scripture. If we were committed to a strict construction of the Constitution, we would allow slavery to exist, given that the "Civil War amendments" had not been adopted. Under a strict construction of the global covenant, we would not allow slavery. We also would not allow anyone to have property that they acquired through their own blood, sweat, and tears to be stolen, even by government. When a government that is lawfully restricted to the jurisdiction of a secular social compact enters into an otherwise free market with coercion on its sleeve, it becomes unlawful and exercises monopolistic powers. These monopolistic powers influence competitors in such a manner as to inflict regulatory takings on such competitors. In other words, the government drives competitors out of business because the government-sponsored corporation is backed by confiscatory taxation that private businesses don’t possess. So from this point of view, the second Bank was wrong, and the third Bank was also wrong. — But the people were having difficult economic problems before the establishment of the second Bank in 1791, and they were having difficult economic problems during the five years between the expiration of the second Bank and the chartering of the third Bank. Doesn’t this clearly teach us that we needed this bank, even as we need such a central bank at the beginning of the 21st century? — No one can reasonably claim that an organized banking system isn’t a good thing. Likewise, no one can reasonably claim that a good postal system and good roads and highways are not good things. Everybody benefits from these things. But for the sake of the law, we need to ask if these things can only come into existence through the warping of secular social compacts. Is that the only way they can come into existence?

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the monarchy of England patented numerous enterprises that the queen may have conceived as being impossible without her intervention. But people eventually learned to hate the monopolies that she created, and found that the economic system worked far better without royal patents. The same pattern has existed in the general government of the united States, under the influence of people like Alexander Hamilton. The general government has essentially patented certain economic activities, like these banks, post offices, post roads, etc. The assumption behind such patents is that without the government’s intervention, these things would not get done. Hitler thought the same thing about the Autobahn. In fact, if incentive to pursue such projects exists in the private sector, there is no reason such things cannot be done in the private sector. In the private sector, they can be done without bloodshed, i.e., without violating people’s property rights. In the public sector, they cannot be done without bloodshed, because of the inevitable nexus between confiscatory taxation and regulatory (and other) takings, on one hand, and government spending, on the other. 36 — If Alexander Hamilton had a vision for a banking system that was privately owned and operated and didn’t sponge off the government, a banking system that had branches in every State, he could have pursued that vision, and organized financiers to build such a system. Instead, he had a vision of the Constitution being used to build a consolidated national government in which Congress had plenary powers, so that the general government would be a monolithic source of royal patents.

In order to create an opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland that was consistent with the Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall first addressed the issue, "has Congress the power to incorporate a bank?" (p. 401). To answer this question, he recounted the manner in which the Constitution had been ratified. It had been ratified by "specially elected conventions". 37 So he concluded that, "the government proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’ in the name of the people" (p. 403). If the consent of everyone who paid taxes, and everyone who had to live under the laws of the united States, was thoroughly considered and accounted for in the election of these special ratifying conventions, then Marshall’s argument would be valid. But as we’ve seen elsewhere, 38 the consent of all human adults within the geographical jurisdiction of the united States was definitely NOT considered in this ratifying process. So in effect, Marshall’s claim that the Constitution was ratified directly by the people – by the people in convention assembled – is fallacious. It was ratified by some of the people, to the exclusion of others. In other words, it was imposed on some people without their consent. The effect of this was that what was really being established through the Hamiltonian / Marshallian construction of the Constitution was a dictatorship of the proletariat. Their view of the Constitution as a national consolidation was another Tower of Babel, a construction that was built on bloodshed. John Marshall followed Alexander Hamilton in his "loose interpretation" of the Constitution. Like Hamilton, he admitted that the powers created by the Constitution were enumerated. And like Hamilton, he also used the things like the Necessary and Proper Clause to rationalize the national consolidation. 39

In contrast to Marshall, the Jeffersonians believed that the Constitution was a compact between the States. Each State had a single, special convention that ratified the Constitution. So Madison and Jefferson rationalized that the Constitution was a compact between States, rather than a national consolidation. They in effect claimed that each State was a religious social compact that lent a small portion of its sovereignty to the formation of the general government. Given that the States were already well on their way to being lawfully nothing more than secular social compacts, their position was weak. Given the fact that their position was used to excuse slavery, their position was not just weak, but sick. — According to Marshall’s view, if "the people" want to create a bank, they have the sovereign right to do so. He said, "the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action" (p. 405). He based this claim on the Supremacy Clause. He claimed that "although the power to charter a corporation is not a specifically enumerated power, there is nothing in the Constitution that excludes it.". 40 From such ideas, Marshall excused the existence of the bank. He then went on to claim that in light of the Supremacy Clause, neither Maryland nor any other State had the power to tax an entity created by the general government.

Embedded in this opinion is Marshall’s conviction that "a loose and expansive interpretation" of the Constitution is indispensable. 41 Even though President Madison signed the bill creating the third Bank, both Madison and Jefferson opposed Marshall’s decision because of its megalomaniacal construction of the Constitution. The "decision seemed to sanction a federal program of internal improvements. Such a program would have involved not only the building of roads, canals, and bridges, but also an assortment of educational, scientific, and literary institutions throughout the country. . . .  In the twentieth century McCulloch v. Maryland quickly became the virtually undisputed constitutional cornerstone for the federal government’s broad involvement in the economy, for the New Deal and the Welfare State, and for various other social, scientific, and educational programs.". 42 — As long as the general government is restricted to its lawful status as a secular social compact, there’s nothing wrong with the Supremacy Clause. Under any other conditions, this Clause is an invitation to totalitarianism at its worst, and Fabian socialism at its best. We have the latter, under the guise of central-bank "capitalism" and fiat money, and we appear to be well on our way to the former.

"Treaties":

With the above as an introduction to the Supremacy Clause, we’re in a better position to see the national consolidation that’s happened by way of treaties. We start by asking whether it’s lawful for the general government to impose any treaty on citizens of a State. Since treaties form a crucial subset of the law of nations, and since Congress is given authority via Article I § 8 cl 10 to "define and punish . . .  Offenses against the Law of Nations", 43 it’s clear that Congress has power under the original intent of the framers to create statutes that enforce treaties entered by the President via Article II § 2 cl 2. 44 It’s not obvious that such statutes manifest a congressional "Power . . .  To exercise exclusive Legislation", the same way Congress has power of "exclusive Legislation" over "the Seat of Government [(District of Columbia)] . . .  and . . .  all Places purchased . . .  for . . .  Forts, Magazines, Arsenals . . . ". 45 But since Article VI cl 2 clearly makes treaties the "supreme Law of the Land" – and explicitly binds State judges to conform their rulings to such treaties – it’s obvious that the framers, at the very least, intended for State governments to conform themselves to the demands of such treaties. Taking the Supremacy Clause literally entails accepting that even if Congress doesn’t pass a statute to enforce a treaty, and even if State governments don’t conform themselves to a treaty, the general government has power and authority under the original intent of Article VI cl 2 to enforce treaties within State borders, regardless of the extent to which State officials may object. — Is this really what the framers meant, and is there anything inherently wrong with this arrangement?

As long as the general government doesn’t pretend that a treaty somehow provides it with an excuse to violate the rights of State citizens, making such a treaty "the supreme Law of the Land" is necessary and appropriate. As long as treaties are not taken by the general government as licenses to damage primary and secondary property, making treaties part of "the supreme Law of the Land" is probably necessary to establish and maintain the general government as a functional entity in international law. — All people have an inborn duty under Genesis 9:6 to execute justice against perpetrators of delicts. So whether the execution comes against an in-State perpetrator (i)from a private citizen, (ii)from a State official, or (iii)from an official of the general government under the color of a treaty, is not as important as that the execution comes from some human source. — If the original intent of the Supremacy Clause included such limitations, there’s no doubt that the original intent was lawful. But there is virtually no evidence that the Supremacy Clause acknowledged such limitations. There is ample evidence in the way that treaties have been implemented to prove that the open-ended-ness of the Supremacy Clause has been a huge source of abuse of this treaty power. This treaty power, along with numerous other powers that are inadequately limited, has offered the general government a vast ocean of unlawful authority.

When the general government fails or neglects to enforce treaties whose subject matter is clearly within the scope of the global covenant, the results can certainly be damaging. But when the general government actively enforces treaties whose subject matter is clearly outside the scope of the global covenant, the general government puts the nation on the road to a worldwide collectivist government, a "new world order". — An example of failure to enforce when the global covenant demands enforcement shows up early in supreme Court jurisprudence. Early in the 19th century, Georgia attempted "to assert jurisdiction over Cherokee lands within the state that were protected by treaty". 46 Among other things, the State of Georgia had been "seizing tribal lands, executing Indian citizens who were precluded from testifying in court, and requiring the minister Samuel Worcester to have a Georgia permit to live in Cherokee Country". 47 In Worcester v. Georgia, the "Court held the Georgia laws void because they violated treaties . . .  and the sovereign authority of the Cherokee nation". 48 In contradistinction to its repudiation of treaty rights in Johnson v. McIntosh and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the supreme Court in Worcester was fulfilling its responsibilities under both the global covenant and the Supremacy Clause. But Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the Court’s findings, leading the general government in the repudiation of the global covenant, the repudiation of treaty rights, and repudiation of the Supremacy Clause. This eventually led to the "trail of tears". That’s what happens when people refuse to do their duty under the global covenant: The disenfranchised suffer damages and receive no remedy or justification in human law.

While the Cherokee Cases are good examples of what happens when the general government fails or neglects to enforce treaties whose subject matter clearly falls inside the scope of the global covenant, good examples of abuse on the other side don’t start showing up until the early 20th century. When the general government actively enforces treaties whose subject matter clearly falls outside the scope of the global covenant, we’re on the road to turning our back on the global covenant. With it understood that the Supremacy Clause with respect to treaties is lawful when the subject matter of the treaty is confined to the subject matter of a lawful secular social compact, we’re ready to look at how such Supremacy Clause has been implemented. Law Professor William C. Banks gives a quick overview of such implementation:

No part of any treaty has been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court . . .  [T]he Court has nurtured the understanding that the political branches should shape the nation’s foreign policy largely free from judicial supervision . . .  On a few important occasions, the Court has determined the place of treaties in the hierarchy of federal and state law . . .  While it is clear that there must be joint participation in treaty making, the framers did not otherwise prescribe limits on treaties or offer a rule for deciding a conflict between treaties and the Constitution or the laws.

Before World War I, . . .  states often contended that treaties could not deal with matters reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment. Although the Court early held that treaties override state law, not until 1920 did the Supreme Court definitively establish the scope of the treaty power relative to the states. 49

So the supreme Court did not define the scope of the general government’s treaty power inside State geographical jurisdictions until a case in 1920.

According to what we’ve already seen, the geographical jurisdiction of the general government is confined to (i)Washington, D.C., 50 (ii)the general government’s enclaves within the States, 51 and (iii)"the territories and insular possessions" of the general government. 52 Over such geographical jurisdictions, the general government has exclusively supreme power, as long as it observes its limited subject matter jurisdictions. There are numerous cases that verify the general government’s "exclusive" power over such geographical jurisdictions. In other words, over these geographical jurisdictions, the general government’s exercise of power is not hampered by having to share such power with some other governmental entity, like a State. But that doesn’t mean that over these geographical jurisdictions, the general government has municipal power, i.e., plenary police powers, i.e., police powers that are lawfully reserved to religious social compacts, and denied to secular social compacts. The general government cannot have that kind of power, even when it has original jurisdiction, because it is limited to being a secular social compact. In its relationships with the States of the union – according to both the original Constitution and numerous supreme Court cases – the general government’s police powers are extremely limited. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, the general government is "limited in its powers . . .  [but] . . .  supreme within its sphere of action". According to Chief Justice Fuller in Wilkerson v. Rahrer (1891), "The power . . .  to impose . . .  burdens upon persons and property in conservation and promotion of the public health, good order, and prosperity [(i.e., via police power)] is a power originally and always belonging to the states, not surrendered to them by the general government, nor directly restrained by the constitution of the United States, and essentially exclusive.". We conclude that it’s unavoidably obvious that according to the global covenant, according to the original intent of the framers, and according to many judicial decisions through the end of the 19th century, "Congress has no general power to enact police regulations operative within the territorial limits of a state". 53

Even though it’s undeniable that the original intent of the framers was that the union be a confederate republic and not a consolidated national government (with States as administrative provinces), "every day, the people of this country experience actions of the feds outside the jurisdiction of the United States and inside the jurisdiction of the States". 54 In other words, every day, officers of the general government violate the jurisdictional boundaries delineated by the confederate republic, and operate as though the States were mere administrative provinces of a consolidated national government. 55 What follows here is a short survey of the role that treaties have played (and are playing) in this process of national consolidation.

In about 1914 a man named Shauver was arrested in Arkansas for shooting migratory birds. Hunting migratory birds was a common activity and still is, which begs the question: Why was he arrested? Federal law enforcement officers arrested him to enforce the Migratory Bird Act of March, 1913. "Shauver moved to dismiss the indictment filed against him on the grounds that the act contravened the 10th Amendment by invading the jurisdiction of the States upon a matter historically reserved for legislation by the States. In deciding that this act was unconstitutional, Judge Trieber noted that the common law provided that the States essentially owned the birds within their borders and State legislation was the sole source by which control of hunting could be accomplished." 56 In his opinion in this case – United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D.Ark. 1914) – Judge Trieber also said this:

If Congress has not the power, the duty of the court is to declare the act void. The court is unable to find any provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game in a state, and is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional. 57

This case presents us with an important question: Who owns the "migratory wild game in a state"? If we were mere lawyers, then we might look no further than the common law, and agree with Judge Trieber that the State is the owner. But we are not mere lawyers, and we are trying to apply biblical principles to human law.

The global covenant gives dominion over the entire planet to the human race. 58 In other words, as a potential power, every human being has a claim to the entire planet. This claim exists in the realm of natural law, and it interfaces with human law at the point at which it is capable of being meaningful as human law. That claim is most meaningful at each human being’s claim to own his or her own body, i.e., at primary property. Claims to own secondary property are meaningful as human law when a given human has lawful title. Grandiose claims to own the moon, the stars, and the seven seas are whimsical, meaningless, and irrelevant with respect to lawful title. To establish lawful and meaningful title, there must be some degree of possession, some degree of use, and some degree of intent to defend against encroachment by other humans. Humans have unalienable rights to enter contracts that establish community property, where each party to the contract has a claim to such community property. It follows that each such claim is limited by the terms of the contract. Such contractual claims to secondary property are inherently religious because they fall outside the limited subject matter of secular social compacts.

To answer the question, Who owns the "migratory wild game in a state"?, we can recapitulate and state what we’ve just said in slightly different terms: Under natural law, ownership of wild things belongs by default to all people. But that ownership is meaningless as human law until specific human laws are promulgated to make such ownership claims enforceable. Under legal positivism, such ownership claims can be enforced by whoever is able to muster the most raw power, regardless of any overarching morality. Under the social compact theory of government, such ownership claims are to be enforced through consent, i.e., through lawful social compacts. By claiming that "the common law provided that the States essentially owned the birds within their borders", Judge Trieber was claiming, unknowingly, that he and the common law agreed that the States were religious social compacts. If they were, indeed, such religious social compacts, then each citizen of the given State had a lawful claim to the State’s community property, and the limitations on such claims were framed by the terms of the State religious social compact. In other words, wildlife within the geographical jurisdiction of the State was owned by each citizen of the State, and each citizen’s ownership rights were defined by the terms of the State social compact, i.e., by the laws of the State – assuming that the States were lawful religious social compacts. But since States are inter-religious, they are inherently secular social compacts that are operating under color of being religious social compacts. So Judge Trieber’s claim that the State owns the birds is colorable.

So who owns the birds? From a lawful perspective, the answer is everyone, which, as far as human law is concerned, means no one – everyone and no one then, and everyone and no one now. But there are de facto entities that are now exercising colorable claims to the birds. For example, a State fish and wildlife department might exercise such claims. If the States were converted into lawful secular social compacts, such departments would need to be privatized or abolished. The people living within the geographical jurisdiction of such State secular social compacts have a claim, under the natural law, to be the default owners of all such State wildlife. They therefore have the best claim to the fish and wildlife department as a privatized religious social compact.

Now that we know who really owns the birds, we can return to the history: To circumvent the unconstitutionality of the Migratory Bird Act of March, 1913 – as it pertained to any given State’s geographical jurisdiction – the general government entered a treaty in 1916 – the Convention for Protection of Migratory Birds (39 Stat. 1702) – with Canada (Great Britain). To enforce the new treaty, Congress passed a new Migratory Bird Act (40 Stat. 755) in 1918. 59 In 1919 federal law enforcement officers arrested another hunter in Arkansas for violating the second Migratory Bird Act. This second case went before the same federal judge, Judge Trieber, in United States v. Thompson, 258 F.257 (E.D.Ark. 1919). Mr. Thompson used the same 10th Amendment defense that had resulted in Shauver’s acquittal. 60 "But this time around, things were different and the federales were acting upon the authority of a treaty and this one change within the law dictated an entirely different result. . . .  Judge Trieber concluded that this treaty . . .  provided Congress with a power of municipal legislation and that treaty and its implementing act plainly operated within the State of Arkansas." 61 In his opinion in Thompson, Judge Trieber stated that "Even in matters of a purely local nature, Congress, if the Constitution grants it plenary powers over the subject, may exercise what is akin to the police power, a power ordinarily reserved to the states". 62 Since Judge Trieber’s decision in Thompson established a precedent in treaty jurisprudence that has been virtually unquestioned up to the present day, we should devote special time and energy to placing this decision into the context of the global covenant.

We saw that Trieber’s decision in Shauver was based on the erroneous assumption that the birds are owned by the State. But since Shauver blocked the process of national consolidation, we can treat Trieber’s error in that case as a distinction without a difference. But since Trieber’s decision in Thompson laid the foundation for the massive abuse of treaty power that is leading us like livestock into a global totalitarian "new world order", we need to give it due consideration. — If the general government does not have jurisdiction over a given subject matter, then it cannot give such jurisdiction to someone else. So if the general government lacks jurisdiction over the birds in Arkansas, there is no reasoning behind the claim that entering a migratory bird treaty with a foreign country somehow magically changes such jurisdiction. If the birds in Arkansas are owned by the State, then when the general government enters a migratory bird treaty, they continue to be owned by the State, and there is no lawful rationale that could shift such ownership from the State to the arena of international law, based merely on such treaty. So no branch of the general government can give such jurisdiction to federal law enforcement officers. But virtually no one in the judicial branch of the general government has ever seen the treaty power in this light, largely because Article VI cl 2 seems to so clearly grant such a shift in ownership. But there is a much stronger argument against Judge Trieber’s decision in Thompson.

The general government is lawfully confined to being a secular social compact. It is therefore lawfully constrained from entering into treaties that impose religious police powers on people outside its geographical jurisdiction, specifically, outside (i)D.C., (ii)federal enclaves within States, and (iii)territories. As far as State geographical jurisdiction is concerned, treaties are limited to being about the execution of justice against bloodshed, which can arise either ex delicto or ex contractu, but by no other means. Even when the general government enters a treaty that is exclusively about delicts, and the Supremacy Clause lawfully applies within the State geographical jurisdiction, and the general government certainly has supreme jurisdiction within the State, the general government does not have exclusive jurisdiction there because the State government still exists. The general government may have supreme jurisdiction, but the State still has original jurisdiction. Even while this is true, it’s also true that religious subject matter is not lawful for treaties, even where the general government has original jurisdiction. In other words, even in (i)D.C., (ii)federal enclaves, and (iii)federal territories, places where the general government has original jurisdiction, the general government cannot exercise religious police powers, even if such religious police powers arise out of treaties. So treaties that generate religious police powers may not lawfully apply within a State’s geographical jurisdiction, and they may not lawfully apply within the general government’s original jurisdiction. Therefore treaties have extremely limited lawful impact on State citizens. Judge Trieber was therefore wrong in this case, and he set a precedent that has been disastrous to both State citizens and the entire federal structure.

In 1919, the same year as the Thompson case, federal officials arrested another hunter in Missouri with virtually the same charges that were imposed on Thompson in Arkansas. After a federal court followed Judge Trieber in finding the hunter guilty, the State government in Missouri "challenged the treaty as an invasion of powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.". 63 This case went to the supreme Court in Missouri v. Holland (1920). In Justice Holmes’s majority opinion, he said, "There may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could" (p. 433). So Holmes and the Court justified the treaty’s usurpation of State power by leaning on expediency, essentially using "pragmatism" as a euphemism for collectivism. Holmes also said, "Valid treaties . . .  ‘are as binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United States.’ . . .  No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power." (Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, at 434.). — From the perspective of the global covenant, the proper way to interpret Justice Holmes’s statement is to notice that the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 is not valid as imposed within State geographical jurisdictions, and this opinion is therefore unlawful.

Even though the general government’s use of the treaty power as a tool to expedite the process of national consolidation grew exponentially throughout the 20th century, it has had a few minor legal obstacles. It "was held . . .  in Foster v. Neilson (1829) that a treaty must ‘be regarded in courts . . .  as equivalent to an act of the legislature’ (p. 254) and thus that a treaty is not valid if it contravenes the Constitution.". 64 Furthermore, "In Reid v. Covert (1957), the Court held . . .  that no treaty or executive agreement ‘can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution’ (p. 16).". 65 Obviously, how the Constitution is interpreted is absolutely crucial if treaty-based totalitarianism is going to be stopped. "[A] treaty ‘operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision [unless] the terms of the stipulation import a contract [in which case] the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court’ (p. 254)." 66

The out-of-control State Department has been able to foist treaties on the out-of-control general government that have the potential to impact practically every aspect of the everyday lives of ordinary Americans in the fifty States. (i)The general government’s control of aviation within State airspace is based on treaties. (ii)Food and drug regulations are enforced in States based on treaties. (iii)The Controlled Substance Act and federal laws against recreational drugs are enforced in States by way of treaties. (iv)The general government exercises control of communications media within States via treaties. (v)The relative freedom of the internet is under constant threat by way of obscenity treaties. (vi)Even while he claims that the UNITED STATES is at war, the president refuses to adequately protect the nation’s international borders, thanks to treaties like NAFTA. (vii)The United Nations charter is a treaty which gives the general government unwarranted jurisdiction within State borders. (viii)The number of treaties in which the UNITED STATES is entangled is so huge that even surveying the potential threats of the federal government against people living within State borders is a monumental undertaking. 67

Conclusion:

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution must be understood within the context of the global covenant. Otherwise, the grandiose interpretation of it that now dominates the day will certainly entail this country’s demise, and with it, civilization as a whole, and perhaps the human race as a whole.

Article VI clause 3:

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

This is interesting because it indicates that in spite of the fact that Article VII says that the Constitution was "Done in Convention . . .  the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven", this Constitution is essentially secular, i.e., "no religious Test shall ever be required". — Is this a problem for people who adhere to the hermeneutical prologue’s basic jurisdictional principles?

The fact that this constitutional system is secular is not a problem for adherents to basic jurisdictional principles. This is because the global covenant is secular in the sense that it applies to all people, regardless of their religion, sect, or nation/tribe of origin. The global covenant applies to all people, regardless of what culture or religion they may claim to be a part of. The standards of the local Covenants do not apply – in the physical field of perception – to all people. They only apply to those of us who consent and commit to live by them. But this doesn’t mean that secular – in the sense of being confined to the jurisdiction of the global covenant – is the same as "moral relativism". It is absolutely not moral relativism. But it definitely is a form of secularism. It is a form of secularism that puts rigorous limits on what behaviors are tolerable, and which are not. Specifically, it makes all forms of bloodshed anathema. With the exceptions noted above (and below), this Constitution conforms to the global covenant. By pressing towards elimination of the legal deformities, we accept an equivalence between the secular and the global covenant, with a healthy understanding that this is the pattern that our God set up from the beginning, and with the understanding that secular and secular have drastically different meanings. 68

We should note in passing that Article VI cl 3 is sometimes used to justify the North’s invasion and conquest of the South. The claim is made that the State officials in the South had taken an oath of allegiance to the federal Constitution, and that by following secessionists, these officials were in violation of their oaths. The claim is made that since these officials were in violation of their oaths, the North was justified in its invasion of the South to stop the secession process. This claim hinges on the assumption that the Constitution disallowed secession. We’ve already shown elsewhere that it does not. The North was justified in its invasion of the South to terminate the South’s institutionalized bloodshed. The invasion was NOT justified by presumed violations of Article VI cl 3.

Article VII:

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names.

Nothing in Article VII inherently conflicts with the global covenant. Even so, since Article VII clause 1 indicates the method by which the Constitution is to be ratified, it in essence thereby indicates who has sovereignty to make such decisions. When we examined Article IV § 4 – and touched briefly on what constitutes a "Republican Form of Government" according to the global covenant – we glimpsed this sovereign. 69 In any government built on consent, the sovereign is the collective consent or voluntary acquiescence of all people who have capacity and who reside within the geographical jurisdiction of that government. For those of us who believe in the God of the Bible, the Sovereign is always God, above all others. Even so, we recognize that God creates every human being in His image, and thereby gives a limited type of sovereignty to each human. To the degree that humans operate within His grace, they submit and subordinate their sovereignty to the legal structures that He ordains. In forming a social compact, the parties consent to infusing their personal sovereignty into the compact, thereby allowing the collective will, the collective consent and voluntary acquiescence, to be the sovereign, under God, over that social compact. — If in the process of becoming a citizen, the citizen agrees to abide by majority rule, and if the majority elects to convene a convention to vote on ratification of the Constitution, then that convention is acting as the sovereign with respect to that decision about ratification. 70

This Article and the Preamble are the bookends of this Constitution, and they should be read together. 71 The Preamble explains why the Constitution was established. Article VII explains how it is to be ratified: by specially elected ratifying conventions of nine States. "Because state legislatures would lose power through the adoption of the new federal constitution, it was thought state conventions would give more impartial consideration to the plan framed in Philadelphia." 72 Again, if the power to ratify the Constitution rests with a specially elected convention within each State, the power to secede or nullify an edict of the general government also rests there. This is a legal fact with regard to this corporate level of consent. It indicates that sovereignty with regard to this public corporation, this general secular social compact, rests with specially elected conventions of people within each State. At a personal level, every human being has to make their own decision, according to their own conscience, whether they will cooperate with this program or not.

When any one of the States ratified the Constitution, the framers understood that the same State could secede by the same process. The framers who entertained ideas like Hamilton’s plan for national consolidation didn’t want it to be that way. "For example, on July 23, 1787, Gouverneur Morris proposed that the United States Constitution should be adopted by one Convention of the People made up of delegates from all the States. This mode of adoption would have created one nation indivisible, it would have consigned nullification and secession to the oblivion of forgotten ideas. So far was such a notion from the thinking of the Framers that the motion of Mr. Morris went without a second and died." 73 Morris’s proposal received the same cold reaction from the Philadelphia Convention that Hamilton’s plan for a consolidated national government received. It was treated like something that the cat dragged in. But thirty-two years later Chief Justice Marshall was able to import the same idea into American jurisprudence via McCulloch v. Maryland. Marshall essentially claimed that the Constitution had been ratified by a single "Convention of the People", when he claimed that the people are the sovereign, as though the States don’t exist. Morris, Hamilton, and Marshall tended to depreciate the compact theory of government, and to appreciate national consolidation. They were more interested in empire building than they were in human rights. This pathetic minority among the framers is now the chrome-plated megaphone of destiny that reaches our ears today, while the whisper of the majority that believed in the compact theory is practically inaudible.

Marshall’s comments on who, or what, constitutes the sovereign with regard to this public corporation that is the united States, are interesting. He was a delegate to the specially elected convention in Virginia whose duty was to either ratify or refuse to ratify the Constitution of the general government. At this convention in 1788, speaking of the power of the general government, he said the following:

We are threatened with the loss of our liberties by possible abuse of power, notwithstanding the maxim that those who give power may take it away. It is the people who give power, and can take it back. Who shall restrain them? They are the masters who give it, and of whom their servants hold it. 74

To today’s ears, this may sound like a wonderful statement, like "All power to the people!". But when we look at Marshall’s supreme Court opinions, we see what he meant. In Cohens v. Virginia (1821), he said,

The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by their will, . . . . But this supreme and irresistible power to make and unmake resides only in the whole body of the people, not in any subdivision of them. The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their power of repelling it. 75

His claim that the sovereign "power to make and unmake resides only in the whole body of the people" indicates a gross misunderstanding – or intentional misrepresentation – of how the Constitution was ratified. Marshall is in essence claiming that it was ratified in the manner proposed by Gouverneur Morris. That method of ratification would indeed eliminate the possibility of lawful secession, except through a national convention. But given the manner in which it was actually ratified, secession by a single State is not "usurpation", but is rather the exercise of a right of a State, as a social compact. Here, Hamilton, Morris, and Marshall were laying the foundations for the mismanagement of the secession of the slave States, and for all the national consolidation that has occurred since, including the creation of the Welfare State; the micromanaged, centrally-planned general economy; the mass-indoctrination of multiple generations of American youth into secular humanism; etc. 76

As John Remington Graham puts it,

Things might otherwise have been designed, but, as the issue was joined in Philadelphia, the American Union was either formed by one act of the American People, or by separate acts of the People of each of the several States. If the American Union was divided into administrative provinces called States, then neither one State nor any combination of States had constitutional means to resist any illicit but unified demand of all three branches of the National Government. But if the American Union was made up of several States, each animated by its People in Convention, then either one State or any combination of States, each acting by its Sovereign Power, had constitutional means to resist any such unwarranted demand of the Federal Government. If the intentions of the Framers are consulted, this question is not hard to answer. The undeniable facts of history show that the American Union was meant to be an association of free, sovereign, and independent States United in a Confederacy. 77

No amount of misconstruction by the supreme Court, and no amount of denial by officials of the general and State governments, and no amount of denial and ignorance in the majority populations of the several States, can change the facts. People who refuse to stand on law, will not have law to stand on.

As to the regular powers of government for superintendance of affairs from day to day and from year to year, they mixed national and federal elements. But, as to sovereign powers, they left things a pure league of confederacy. It is from this distribution of sovereign powers that the rights of nullification and secession are deduced, and were intended to exist as a safety valve to protect cultural diversity and precious freedoms which generous minds should wish to preserve. 78

Judicial Review:

Given all the important issues that we’ve addressed from the Preamble through Article VII – regarding the nature of sovereignty within a confederate republic that’s based on consent, the powers of the general government, and the nature of the supremacy claimed in the Supremacy Clause – we’ll end the examination of the original Constitution by comparing the supremacy claimed by the supreme Court with the supremacy that inherently exists in this nation’s sovereign. 79 This nation’s sovereign is the consent of its people. The people-in-convention-assembled has been the mechanism by which this sovereignty has been historically (and imperfectly) exercised. Juxtaposed to this is now the supreme Court’s claim of judicial review, in essence setting itself up as the ultimate voice for all governmental decisions.

"Through judicial review the Court . . .  asserts its authority to determine what the Constitution means. The power of the Court to review the law extends in two directions. The first involves decisions by other branches of the federal government. . . .  Judicial review also expresses the authority of the federal courts over state laws and judicial decisions . . .  ." 80 — "Scholars trace the origins of judicial review to Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610). Sir Edward Coke, of England’s Court of Common Pleas, stated that ‘when an act of parliament is against common right and reason or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void’ (p. 118a)." 81 This indicates that at its origin, judicial review was used to protect rights against abuse by government. But judicial review has turned, in our history, into something altogether different. It has turned into a mechanism by which secular government protects itself against rights.

In a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams in 1804, Jefferson stated, "The efforts of Federalism to exalt the Judiciary over the Executive and Legislative and to give that favorite department a political character and influence . . .  will probably terminate in the degradation and disgrace of the judiciary.". 82 It has taken two hundred years for this "degradation" to reach its nadir, but as we continue by examining the amendments to the Constitution, you’ll see that we are very close to Jefferson’s nadir. — "Jefferson believed each branch of the government had the right to decide for itself the constitutionality of matters before it and objected to a claim that the Court’s judgment was superior to that of the other branches. . . .  [He] supported the doctrine of ‘coordinate construction,’ whereby each branch of the federal government interprets the Constitution for itself." 83 — Largely because of the War Between the States, Jefferson’s conception has practically disappeared from consideration. "Justice Thurgood Marshall, in commenting on the constitutional bicentennial celebration of 1987, said that the Constitution did not survive the Civil War, but was remade following that conflict." 84 — Who can doubt that the confederate republic was abolished, and has been replaced by the national consolidation? — "The two substantive doctrinal contributions that characterize the growth period for the modern Court are acceptance of economic regulation and the nationalization of civil liberties." 85 When the "Court" accepted economic regulation, it usurped the liberty of contract – thereby violating the unalienable Right to contract – and violated property rights in a manner to which we have sadly become accustomed. That the "Court" accepted "nationalization of civil liberties" might be good, and it might not. We’ll find out as we look at the "bill of rights" and other amendments. — Many "observers have concluded that the Constitution is ‘what the justices say it is.’". 86 In other words, many of us are convinced that because the supreme Court has the power of judicial review, it is the head of a monster that is ruling by fiat, rather than by law. 87

If the supreme Court, and secular government in general, were committed to observing consent, then allowing it to keep its claim to judicial review might be fine. — For any genuine Bible-believing, flesh-and-blood human being, one’s allegiance is first to the God of the Bible. Such one is therefore obligated covenantally to exercise one’s sovereignty over oneself. This inevitably entails some sharing of sovereignty with whatever social compact one happens to participate. For each person, this personal sovereignty necessarily has priority over all claims to sovereignty made by the social compact. This is because our primary objective as Bible-believing people is to keep our consciences clear before our Creator, for the sake of honoring and glorifying Him. Keeping conscience clear before the supreme Court, or before any other agent of secular government, is purely secondary. Our first obligation is to obey the law as we find it in the Biblical covenant. Again, our obligation to obey the law formulated by the supreme Court is purely secondary. — Even if we don’t have the power to decide the constitutionality of an issue, we have not only the power, but more emphatically the duty, to decide whether we will consent to claims of power made by secular governments. Will we go along with them, or will we refuse? At what point do we decide that they are too perverse for us to acquiesce to them any longer?

Footnotes

1The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 1, "The End for Which God Created the World". — Excerpt 1: Chapter I Section I p. 97. Excerpt 2: Chapter I Section III p. 101. Excerpt 3: Chapter I Section IV p. 102. Excerpt 4: Chapter II Section VII p. 119. — This dissertation is online at Christian Classics Ethereal Library, URL: http://www.ccel.org/​ccel/​edwards/​works1.iv.html. — Also see related commentary in God’s Passion for His Glory.

2Black’s 5th, p. 865.

3See Article I § 8 clause 4, URL: ./0_2_1_3_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_4.htm​#AlienageAndNaturalization, for more about citizenship.

4def.: jus soli — "The law of the place of one’s birth as contrasted with jus sanguinis, the law of the place of one’s descent or parentage. The principle that a person’s citizenship is determined by place of birth rather than by the citizenship of one’s parents. It is of feudal origin." (Black’s 5th, p. 775)

def.: jus sanguinis — "The right of blood. The principle that a person’s citizenship is determined by the citizenship of the parents." (Black’s 5th, p. 775)

5The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 146, "Citizenship", by Patrick J. Bruer.

6The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 146, "Citizenship", by Patrick J. Bruer.

7The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 146, "Citizenship", by Patrick J. Bruer.

8There is a "Privileges and Immunities" clause in Article IV § 2 clause 1, URL: #Article4Section2Cl1, and there is a "privileges or immunities" clause in Amendment XIV § 1, URL: ./0_C_Am_XI-XXVII.htm​#FourteenthAM. Since they’re each speaking of the same thing, privileges and immunities of citizens, we’ll treat them here as being largely the same.

9The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 146, "Citizenship", by Patrick J. Bruer.

10The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 146, "Citizenship", by Patrick J. Bruer.

11The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 680, "Privileges and Immunities", by C. Herman Pritchett.

12In examining the Supremacy Clause, URL: #SupremacyCl, under "Treaties", we examine this issue in more depth by exploring Who Owns the Wildlife in a State, URL: #WhoOwnsWildlife.

13For more about citizenship, see Article I § 8 Clause 4, URL: ./0_2_1_3_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_4.htm.

14URL: #Article4Section1.

15URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl17.

16Article I § 8 cl 17, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl17; 5th Amendment, URL: ./0_A_0_Am_V_(Intro).htm.

17Except for the obvious fact that when the southern States seceded, they did so to protect an economic system that was based inherently on bloodshed. But when the thirteen colonies seceded, they did so to protect unalienable Rights that the King was abrogating. Even so, the definitions of sovereignty were the same, and the powers of the sovereign were the same.

18See Article VII, URL: #Article7.

19In the War Between the States, the seceding States never made such requests. — The incentives for States to remain in the Union was originally intended to be "the enormous advantages of commerce, order, protection, care, and freedom which the Union would bring when its machinery worked properly", not the fear of being clubbed to death by federal thugs who have no respect for consent or conscience. "The Framers . . .  did not want the Union to become a military superstate." — Quotes are from Principles of Confederacy, p. 43.

20It’s important to note in passing that "Republican . . .  Government" was normally understood by the framers to mean that property could not be taken without just compensation. This is verified by Principles of Confederacy, pp. 560-561. — See the 5th Amendment, URL: ./0_A_0_Am_V_(Intro).htm.

21The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 355, "Guarantee Clause", by William M. Wiecek and Timothy S. Huebner.

22See republic for our definition.

23The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 355, "Guarantee Clause", by William M. Wiecek and Timothy S. Huebner.

24The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 378-379, "History of the Court: Establishment of the Union", by William M. Wiecek.

25Article VI cl 2, URL: #Article6Cl2.

26Article I § 8 cl 5, URL: ./0_2_1_4_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_5.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl5; Article I § 8 cl 6, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl6; and Article I § 10 cl 1, URL: ./0_2_3_Art_I_Sec_10.htm​#Article1Sec10Cl1. — Also, to get a clear conception of why the monetary and banking practices should be abolished, see The Creature from Jekyll Island.

27Statutes at Large, URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​llsl&​fileName=​001/​llsl001.db&​recNum=127.

28To see a practical proposal to eliminate the immense debt-load of the "federal" government without repudiation, see The Creature from Jekyll Island, pp. 565-588, Chapter 26, "A Realistic Scenario".

29The Necessary and Proper Clause is in Article I § 8 cl 18, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl18.

30The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 536, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

31The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 536, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

32The bank proposed by Hamilton in 1791 was the second national bank. The first central bank is often overlooked. The "United States had its first central bank even before the Constitution was drafted. It was chartered by the Continental Congress in the Spring of 1781". — The Creature from Jekyll Island, p. 325.

33Actually, there should be no doubt that "Practically all of it!" is correct. For evidence that the economic depression in the first quarter of the 19th century was caused by fractional reserve banking, consider the following: After the charter for the second Bank of the United States expired in 1811, there were five years in which "the conservative policies established by the Bank of the United States" were increasingly ignored. "As the pressure for money continued to build . . .  the temptation to loosen credit and to print more notes than one had hard currency or United States dollars on hand to support soon proved overwhelming." In 1816 Congress chartered the third Bank of the United States (usually called the Second Bank). Then "[E]very private bank that had a charter considered it a license to print money . . .  The notes that were turned out had a dollar value printed on them, but it was rare that the bank held even 10 percent of that amount in redeemable United States currency or coin. One western bank did possess $27,000 in gold and silver – and issued bank notes against it, amounting to $395,000. . . .  As John Quincy Adams had written to Rush a few years before: ‘The banking infatuation pervades all America. Our whole system of banks is a violation of every honest principle of banks . . .  a bank that issues paper at interest, is a pick-pocket or a robber. But the delusion will have its course. You may as well reason with a hurricane.’" — Quotes are from From Sea to Shining Sea, pp.204-209.

34Not only slave States like Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, and Kentucky, but also non-slave States like Pennsylvania and Ohio adopted taxes on the federal bank. — The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 537, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

35The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 536-537, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

36Not to mention the "hidden tax" created by government-sponsored banks that created money out of nothing. See The Creature from Jekyll Island for an excellent explanation of how this robbery takes place.

37The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 537, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

38See Article I § 8 Clause 3, URL: ./0_2_1_2_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_3.htm.

39Necessary and Proper Clause, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl18.

40The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 537, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

41The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 537, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

42The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 538, "McCulloch v. Maryland", by Richard E. Ellis.

43Article I § 8 cl 10, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl10.

44Article II § 2 cl 2, URL: ./0_3_Art_II.htm​#Article2Sec2.

45Article I § 8 cl 17, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl17.

46The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 139, "Cherokee Cases", by John R. Wunder.

47The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 580, "Native Americans", by Rennard J. Strickland.

48The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 139, "Cherokee Cases", by John R. Wunder.

49The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 878, "Treaties and Treaty Power", by William C. Banks.

50By way of Article I § 8 cl 17, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl17.

51By way of Article I § 8 cl 17, URL: ./0_2_1_5_Art_I_Sec_8_Cl_6-18.htm​#Article1Sec8Cl17.

52By way of Article IV § 3 cl 2, URL: #Article4Section3.

53Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

54Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

55"By statute, all federal agencies must confine their activities to the jurisdiction delegated to them; see 5 U.S.C. §558. . . .  [But] most federal agencies fail to publish any statements, either in the Code of Federal Regulations or some other source, which define their respective jurisdictions." — Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

56Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

57Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

58See Maxims of the Global Covenant, #1(3).

59Regarding Migratory Bird Act, see URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​~becraft/​40Stat755.pdf.

6010th Amendment, URL: ./0_7_Am_X.htm​#TenthAmendment.

61Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

62United States v. Thompson, 258 F.257, at 263 (E.D.Ark. 1919). Quoted from Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html.

63The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 878, "Treaties and Treaty Power", by William C. Banks.

64The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 878, "Treaties and Treaty Power", by William C. Banks.

65The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 878, "Treaties and Treaty Power", by William C. Banks.

66The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 878, "Treaties and Treaty Power", by William C. Banks.

67Most of these claims can be verified by way of Becraft’s "Treaties: A Source for Federal Municipal Power", URL: http://home.hiwaay.net/​%7Ebecraft/​TREATIES.html. Also see Research Guide for United States Treaties at University of Delaware, URL: http://www2.lib.udel.edu/​subj/​godc/​resguide/​ustreat.htm.

68See the 1st Amendment, URL: ./0_8_1_Am_I_(De_Facto_Prot_Est).htm​#DeFactoProtest, regarding the de facto establishment of the local Covenants.

69Article IV § 4, URL: #Article4Section4.

70"The legal attribute of preeminence was not vested in regular governments: these were only public corporations which could sue and be sued. Sovereign attributes, including immunity from civil suit, belonged solely to the People in each of the States. Strictly speaking, therefore, if a suit was brought for money against a republican government in the United States, fundamental law denied sovereign immunity as a plea in bar." — Principles of Confederacy, p. 270.

71Preamble, URL: ./0_1_Preamble.htm​#Preamble.

72Principles of Confederacy, p. 53.

73Principles of Confederacy, p. 54.

743 Elliot’s Debates 233 (Virginia Convention, June 10, 1788), URL: http://memory.loc.gov/​cgi-bin/​ampage?​collId=​lled&​fileName=​003/​lled003.db&​recNum=​244&​itemLink=​r%3Fammem%2Fhlaw%3A@field%28​DOCID​%2B@lit%28ed0031%29%29%230030001&​linkText=1. — Quote appears at Principles of Confederacy, p. 54-55.

75Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U.S. 1821) — Quote appears at Principles of Confederacy, p. 486-55.

76In fact, even though Hamilton is the father of loose construction, and therefore the father of national consolidation, he did concede that States have the right to secede. In "Federalist No. 78", he made the following statement: "Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur with its enemies [(Vide Protest of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, Martin’s speech, etc.)] in questioning that fundamental principle of republican government which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this shape than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body.". In other words, secession is a right, but it should not be approached "for light and transient causes", as the Declaration puts it. — The Federalist Papers, pp. 469-470. — See "Federalist No. 78" at The Constitution Society, URL: http://www.constitution.org/​fed/​federa78.htm; Yale’s Avalon Project, URL: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/​18th_century/​fed78.asp; or Library of Congress, URL: http://thomas.loc.gov/​home/​histdox/​fed_78.html.

77Principles of Confederacy, p. 487.

78Principles of Confederacy, p. 56.

79Preamble, URL: ./0_1_Preamble.htm​#Preamble; Article VII, URL: #Article7; Supremacy Clause, URL: #SupremacyCl.

80The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 464, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

81The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 464, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

82The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 465, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

83The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 467, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

84The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 467, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

85The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 468, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

86The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States, p. 469, "Judicial Review", by John Brigham.

87Clearly, once the nation accepted fiat money as legal tender (by way of opinions like those in the Gold Clause Cases), the judiciary’s decisions accompanied such money into the same fiat morass. Both the paper money and the judicial decisions have the same intrinsic, fiat value.